15 August 2012 | Vol. 3, № 31.

From the Editor’s Desk

Dear FDI supporters,

Welcome to this week’s edition of the

Strategic Weekly Analysis.

We begin this week, with a critique from

FDI Associate, Commander S.S. Parmar on

the geopolitical importance of Yongxing

Island, and the strategic depth it gives

China in the South China Sea.

Next, the Food and Water Crisis Programme, in the context of Australia’s national food plan, considers Canada’s recent proposals. We then move to South Asia. Firstly, the Indian Ocean Research Programme examines the implications of recent ethnic violence for political reforms. On a similar topic in Nepal, the programme focuses on the ramifications of Nepal’s continued transition to federalism. In the same region, the Energy Security Programme analyses the likelihood of power shortages and possible solutions to the problem. This is an ongoing issue,

highlighted by August’s blackout in India. In addition, we consider the impending food crisis that India may face, as it suffers poor monsoonal rains. To conclude, we concentrate on developments in Africa; examining the visit of US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in August and then discussing food insecurity in Kenya. I trust that you will enjoy this edition of the Strategic Weekly Analysis. Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

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Yongxing Island: China’s Diego Garcia in the South China Sea?

Background

China’s decision to set up a military garrison at Sansha on Yongxing Island (also known as

Woody Island) in the Paracel chain, along with the creation of a city administration, could be

seen as a step in expanding its military reach, strengthening its claims in the South China

Sea, and, finally, countering the United States’ decision to pivot towards the region.

Comment

Militarily, an established base could provide “depth” to both China’s defence and offence,

while increasing its surveillance range. The distance of around 350 kilometres from Hainan

Island, in the north-west of the South China Sea, provides Yongxing with a strategic location.

It could effectively extend Chinese “Lines of Operation” well south of Hainan and mainland

China. This would enable China to exploit the dictums of “sustainability” and “reach”, in both

air and maritime operations in the disputed area. Therefore, this island could well become

China’s Diego Garcia in the South China Sea; there are some similarities between Yongxing

Island and Diego Garcia that merit attention.

The runway on Yongxing is around 8,200 feet (2,500 metres) long and is capable of

handling the operations of Chinese fighters, such as the Sukhoi SU-30MKK. The map

below indicates the area that can be covered by the combat radius of JH-7 and SU-

30 aircraft operating from the island. Extension of the combat radius arcs shown in

the map into a full circle indicates that China would be able to cover the full area of

the South China Sea. Even though the runway juts out into the sea, there is the

possibility that it could be extended by reclamation. This would depend on the

topography and the depth of the water. The runway at Diego Garcia is around

12,000 feet (3,658 metres) long and has supported US operations in and around the

Indian Ocean, as well as in other theatres.

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The naval base at Yongxing has, over the years, been upgraded, with the

construction of a jetty of around 1,640 feet (500 metres) and an anti-wave dyke to

protect ships berthed there. There are also, apparently, no depth limitations for

anchorage of large vessels like destroyers and frigates. The depth available could be

increased by dredging to allow the anchoring or berthing of larger ships. Diego

Garcia supports both ships and submarines and both its anchorage and jetty are

protected, as they are situated in the lagoon.

The islands around Yongxing, which are under Chinese control, could be used as a

station for monitoring maritime activities and also for intelligence gathering.

Satellite pictures taken in 2008 revealed the presence of antennae, indicating that

the Chinese had set up a listening and monitoring station. Radar installations would

add to the network and make these islands a valuable communication node, similar

to Diego Garcia.

The island could be used as a forward operating base, with facilities such as bunkering,

ammunition depots, logistic and medical support, repair and maintenance, and

accommodation. Although the number of assets would be limited due to space constraints,

it would nevertheless be a valuable outpost. This much can be inferred from the statement

of Zhang Zhexin, a US studies expert with the Shanghai Institute for International Studies,

who said that ‘China will certainly continue reinforcing its political and military control over

Sansha as it has drawn lessons from maritime disputes in the past.’

Although the Chinese forward presence is considered ‘militarily untenable’, it is highly

unlikely that any one regional country has the capability to physically stop China’s

augmentation of infrastructure without engaging in a skirmish or military stand-off. They

are, at best, likely to engage in rhetoric and lodging strong diplomatic protests. Any attempt

to counter China’s actions by pausing engagement or dialogue would only paralyse the

progress made so far, no matter how miniscule. Efforts to increase aid and military

assistance to regional countries could also result in China hardening its stance.

Under Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which

covers island regimes, an island has to sustain human habitation or economic life to have an

exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. While the limited land mass of Yongxing may

not be able to sustain any such activity, the proximity of rich fishing grounds and potential

oil fields would prompt China to stake a claim for the island’s maritime zones, under Article

121. These maritime zones also include a territorial sea and contiguous zone. The

mathematics is interesting; in the case of Yongxing, the land mass of around 13 square

kilometres would accord jurisdiction over two million square kilometres of water. This would

push the 200 nautical mile (370 km) limit of China’s EEZ (stipulated as per UNCLOS – see map

below) outwards.

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The inability of the ASEAN ministerial meeting to agree on a joint communiqué at the recent

meeting of foreign ministers, is indicative of the inability of the nations of the region to join

hands and take a multilateral stance. This helps China in its quest for bilateralism, an aspect

covered by Liu Weimin of China’s foreign ministry during a press conference on 10 July 2012,

prior to the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The statement commented:

‘The South China Sea issue is not an issue between China and ASEAN, but one between

China and some ASEAN countries …. China is ready to peacefully resolve the South China Sea

disputes through dialogue and negotiation with the countries directly involved.’

Therefore, it is possible that China, taking advantage of the situation, is looking at an “island

hopping” strategy to strengthen its claims and presence in the region. Should China decide

to set up similar cities and jurisdictions on other islands that it controls, it could cover its

entire South China Sea claim, as well as strengthen its presence in the area. This would

complicate the US rebalancing strategy.

Commander S. S. Parmar FDI Associate

About the Author: Cmdr Parmar is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, Kharakwasla

and the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He was commissioned into the Indian

Navy in 1987. A helicopter pilot, he has commanded two ships and a frontline Indian Naval Air

Squadron. He has served as Joint Director Naval Plans at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and

has also been on the Directing Staff at DSSC Wellington. He was a member of the XI Indian

Antarctic Summer Expedition in 1991 and has attended the South Asia Regional Governance and

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Management Defence Course, conducted by the British Government at Colombo in 2005. He

represented the Indian Navy in the first international HOSTAC (helicopter operations from ships

other than aircraft carriers) conference held at Norfolk, USA in 2008. Cmdr Parmar holds an MSc

in Defence Studies and is currently working on Piracy and Regional Maritime Security issues.

This article was originally published by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

(www.idsa.in) at:

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/YongxingIslandChinasDiegoGarciaintheSouthChinaSea_sspar

mar_070812

*****

National Food Plan: Canada’s Civil Movement Alternative

Background

Many countries have created, or are in the process of forming, national food policies in an

effort to ensure food security for their growing populations. Australia is among them, with

the Australian Government’s recent release of Australia’s National Food Plan green paper in

July 2012. The green paper has received mixed reviews, however, since its release. An

interesting alternative approach to government-driven development of national food policy

is the Canadian proposal, Resetting the Table: A People’s Food Policy for Canada. This has

been developed by a non-governmental organisation, which conducted a two-year public

consultation process involving more than 3,500 Canadians.

Comment

Canada and Australia face some similar challenges regarding the future of their food

security. In Canada, amid government plans to establish food security policies in response to

these challenges, a civil food movement has worked to develop its own national food plan.

This effort has been driven by Food Secure Canada, a non-profit organisation of local and

national groups, businesses and individuals committed to eradicating hunger, creating a

sustainable food system and ensuring access to healthy and safe food.

Central to the policies proposed by Food Secure Canada is the notion of food sovereignty, a

concept first coined by Via Campesina (an international movement of peasants, small-scale

farmers and marginalised peoples) during the World Food Summit in 1996. Food sovereignty

means that the decision-making powers concerning food production should be held by the

people. A main requirement is that fair relationships should be built between producers,

consumers and the environment, to ensure sustainable and just practices along the entire

food-supply chain (Via Campesina: Food Sovereignty, January 2003).

Food Secure Canada’s proposed national food policy, Resetting the Table: A People’s Food

Policy for Canada, is unique as it is the first national food policy to be developed by a civil

movement. This was facilitated through 350 ‘Kitchen Table Talks’ (publicly accessible

discussions), multiple tele-conferences, online discussion forums, hundreds of policy

submissions and three cross-Canada conferences. Through this nation-wide network of

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planning and negotiations, ten policy discussion papers were produced and the national

food policy was based on these. The discussion papers each include recommendations on

policies and guidelines to implement the proposed changes in the national food industry and

address a wide range of issues. Among them are the issues of indigenous food sovereignty;

access to food in rural, remote and urban areas; sustainable agriculture and fisheries;

science and technology; and international food policy. Food Secure Canada lists the

following as key aspects of the proposed plan:

Ensuring that food is eaten as close as possible to where it is produced

Supporting food providers in a widespread shift to ecological production in both

urban and rural settings…including policies for the entry of new farmers into

agriculture.

Enacting a strong federal poverty elimination and prevention program, with

measurable targets and timelines, to ensure Canadians can better afford healthy

food.

Creating a nationally-funded Children and Food strategy…to ensure that all children

at all times have access to the food required for healthy lives.

Ensuring that the public, especially the most marginalised, are actively involved in

decisions that affect the food system.

The Canadian example thus presents an alternative approach to a government-initiated

development of national food policies. It is organised by an independent and publicly

accessible organisation, which bases policies on extensive participation from the Canadian

public and promotes food sovereignty as a means to address food security. A similar

organisation exists in Australia - the Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance. See: Australia’s

National Food Plan – A Plan for the People or a Plan for Big Business?.

The Australian National Food Plan is now available for comment. For the public consultation

to be successful it should canvas as many views as possible, as occurred in Canada.

Facilitating wide-scale consultations cannot be an easy task. Nevertheless, Food Secure

Canada’s proposed food policy demonstrates that a high level of public participation in

policy development is possible, so long as members of the public are willing to participate.

The process must ensure that avenues are available for public consultation and discussion,

without restrictions on attendance numbers or discussion topics. If the Australian

Government is genuine in seeking feedback to improve the National Food Plan, it is vital that

all concerned parties are given the opportunity make their views know.

For further information, please see Food Security Canada’s Resetting the Table: A People’s

Food Policy for Canada; the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and

Forestry Consultation opportunities on the National Food Plan green paper; and The

Australian Food Sovereignty Alliance.

Sarah Metcalfe Research Assistant FDI Global Food and Water Security Programme

Page 7 of 16

*****

Ethnic Violence and Burma Reforms

Background

With Burma taking its first steps towards economic openness and political change after

decades of isolation and suppression, the continuing ethnic violence, directed towards the

Muslim Rohingya minority, represents a source of concern. The country’s return to a “state

of emergency” in the affected area in June 2012, calls into question Burma’s ability to

continue its process of reform without falling into violence or a return to suppression. The

unity required to move forward, involves finding a solution to Burma’s many long-standing

internal tensions.

Comment

The Burmese Government is yet to recognise its 800,000 Muslims (known as Rohingya) as

citizens. Since violence broke out in late-May 2012, in the western province of Rakhine, it

has resulted in many Rohingya fleeing to an unwelcoming Bangladesh.1 With resources

already overstretched, Bangladesh has rejected the Rohingya as refugees; accepting them is

not regarded as being in Bangladesh’s national interest. This lack of acceptance highlights

how imperative it is for Burma to be able to appropriately address the situation internally.

The United Nations has called for an independent investigation into the sectarian violence

after allegations were made of torture, murder and mass arrests, committed by security

forces trying to restore peace.2

With Burma’s recent developments being watched globally, movement away from how the

military regime of the past treated the Rohingya and other minorities may become a pre-

requisite if international investment from Western countries is to continue.

Since President U Thein Sein initiated reforms and internationally-imposed sanctions were

lifted, foreign investors have shown increasing interest in Burma. The World Bank is also

considering US$85 million in aid to assist in development: the first Burma has received from

that body in twenty-five years.3 Burma’s chances of competing at the same level as the

major ASEAN members are many years away and would require massive investment.

Improvements to the situation in Rakhine, which could also be applied nationally, include

the offer of citizenship to the Rohingya by the Burmese government and the institution of a

strategy to address issues of displacement. This still fails, however, to address the feelings of

resentment between the Muslim minority and the Buddhist majority. Both groups have

1Australia Network News, 8 August 2012, ‘US urges Bangladesh to provide aid to Rohingyas’.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-08/an-us-urges-bangladesh-to-maintain-rohingya-aid/4185500 2 Australia Network News, 5 August 2012, ‘UN calls for urgent investigation into Burma clashes’.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-05/an-un-calls-for-investigation-into-burma-violence/4178032. 3BBC World News, 1 August 2012, ‘World Bank preparing $85m aid to boost reforms ’.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19077440.

Page 8 of 16

committed acts of violence against the other since the time of British colonisation, when

there was large Muslim immigration from British India, often as officials or businesspeople.

To avoid the risk of the current conflict spreading further as the government moves away

from its authoritarian past, reconciliation programmes incorporating development projects

would be highly beneficial to the region as a whole.

Locally, the violence has continued, with calm yet to return. The state of emergency and the

military response, bring into question Burma’s ability to hold individuals and groups to

account for their actions in a way that meets international standards, without resorting to

the harsh measures of the past.

The alleged abuses by the Burmese military in Rakhine raise issues that must be dealt with

once peace is achieved. Not only issues of accountability among the ethnic groups for the

crimes committed against each other, but also the conduct of state personnel in the region

How local people will view government forces once peace returns remains to be seen.

While the Government’s openness about the violence in Rakhine is a change from the past

secrecy, if Burma is to continue back into the international community, the ongoing violence

must be addressed.

Zamaris Saxon FDI Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Federalism in Nepal: A Step Towards Divergence?

Background

Federalism has been a hot topic in Nepalese politics for some time now. Despite having been

re-named the “Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal” in 2008, the country has yet to

acquire a truly federal design, as the architects of Nepalese federalism are unable to come to

a consensus. Deadlock has occurred over the model of federalism: should it be based on

ethnicity or geography? Maoist and ethnically-based parties are demanding the former,

while other parties, including the Nepali Congress (the main opposition) prefer a

geographically-based model. One danger of choosing the ethnic model is that Nepal may

lose its longstanding sense of national unity.

Comment

The end of the civil war in 2006 and the election of the Constituent Assembly (CA) in 2008,

which was authorised to write a new federal constitution, offered a glimpse of hope to many

Nepalese. Various parties from both left and right united to seek a lasting peaceful

resolution, but the CA’s deadline expired on 28 May 2012 and it was dissolved without an

agreement. A caretaker government under Dr Baburam Bhattarai, has proposed elections

for November 2012, but his government enjoys relatively less support especially after the CA

dissolution.

Page 9 of 16

The State Restructuring Committee proposed a “Ten State” model, while the CA Committee

proposed a fourteen-state version. Despite other differences, both models contain two

states in the southern part of Nepal (the Terai or Madhes region). The coalition of the

Unified Communist Party (Maoist) and other parties from southern Nepal, including the

United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), has argued for a constitution with identity-based

federalism, effectively creating states on the basis of ethnicity.

If federalism is based on ethnicity, then Nepal may well face inter-ethnic conflict in the

future, which is already looming on the Nepalese horizon. Ethnic division and identity

politics have been increasingly used during the post-2006 peace process. In Terai, the United

Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) has redefined residents’ identities as either being a

native of Terai or an outsider. As a result, some incidents of ethnic violence have already

been recorded. One of the leaders from the Madhes region, Raj Kishor Yadav, who is also

Minister for Information, recently declared that: ‘Our entire battle is for federalism. If they

betray us, I will go back to the Terai; we will declare our own pradesh (province) and have

nothing to do with Kathmandu.’ It is increasingly likely that the central authority of

Kathmandu will be challenged.

The plains of southern Nepal are known as the country’s grain basket and are also the

gateway to the landlocked Himalayan state. The region, which is controlled by the Madhesi

people also controls most of the imports coming into Nepal. Ethnically-based federalism

would devolve greater power to the Madhes region. As a source of much of Nepal’s food

products, it could come to control the supply of food to other states in inner and north

Nepal. It would also be likely to yield greater power than the other states because it controls

the country’s major import and export transit points connecting with India. Eventually, it is

likely to become a major economic hub and a powerful player within the federation. Thus, in

time, leaders from this region would be able to directly influence the central government’s

economic and foreign trade policies if their demands are not met.

Leaders from the Madhes region may also use their political and economic power as

leverage to bargain for further autonomy and concessions from the central government. The

Madhesi parties have already used their political power to secure key ministerial posts in

various governments during the post 2006 peace process. Their power and influence in Terai

are often displayed by bringing businesses and public activities to a standstill (famously

known in Nepal as BANDH – meaning closure) and strikes. Such standstills result in food and

fuel shortages and huge revenue losses for private and public enterprises in inner Nepal. The

former Foreign Minister Upendra Yadav, of the United Democratic Madhesi Front, brought

Terai to a standstill for several days in May 2012, demanding a separate autonomous

Madhes province.

Despite the politically motivated 1996-2006 Civil War, Nepal has not so far suffered an

ethnic conflict. That may change, however, if an ethnically-based federalism model is

adopted.

Paras Lohani FDI Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

Page 10 of 16

*****

India’s Power Cut Tip of South Asia’s Energy Crisis

Background

Chaos from power cuts is not limited to India; across South Asia, energy security is a policy

challenge. Growing demand, with limited supply expansion, is likely to compound the

problem. Although no easy task, regional integration and co-operation will be fundamental

to resolving the issue, which could simultaneously provide the catalyst for closer economic

relations.

Comment

The power cut that hit India in July highlights the significant energy challenges that the rising

power must face. India is not alone, however; an energy crisis exists right across South Asia.

Chronic underinvestment, lack of strategic planning and entrenched graft has led to similar

situations across the region, albeit not so well documented.

For instance, despite the newly-appointed Pakistani Prime Minister suggesting energy was a

policy priority of his government, blackouts have reached a peak of up to 16 hours a day in

Islamabad. In rural areas, shortages are even more severe, with reports suggesting that as a

result of power failures, residents could only expect about two hours of power daily.

Additionally, the rate of access to electricity in South Asia is among the lowest in the world.

Predictably, India and Pakistan have the highest access rates, at around 66 per cent.

Bangladesh and Nepal, however, are closer to 40 per cent.

Paradoxically, South Asia is energy wealthy. Fossil fuels are plentiful, including coal in

Pakistan and India, and gas in Bangladesh and Burma. Renewable potential, such as

hydropower, could be exploited to a greater extent across the region. Similarly, analysts

suggest Pakistan holds substantial wind power potential.

The catalysts for energy shortages are unique for each state, although commonality exists in

projections about the future. Undoubtedly, demand across the region will rise, with national

governments suggesting demand growth of four per cent on average. Yet, across South Asia,

there is collective anxiety as to how this demand will be met.

The implications are significant. Power cuts and shortages in energy supplies are proving an

inhibitor to economic growth, with Pakistan’s Planning Commission arguing that the power

crisis shaved three to four per cent off its GDP in 2010-11. In India, industry has vocalised its

concerns, which may result in decreased foreign investment, further contracting the

country’s already slowing economy. Energy shortages and resulting economic factors may

create socio-political issues, with protests already taking place in Pakistan and India.

As with security issues and continuing economic development, regionalism is the key to

greater energy security. A regional, interconnected grid could allow South Asia to diversify

its energy mix, reducing the growing gap between supply and demand. Some early trends

Page 11 of 16

suggest scope for such co-operation exists, with Bhutan supplying hydro-electricity to India.

Correspondingly, India is working on a project to supply 55 megawatts of power to

Bangladesh and a cross-border power transmission line to Nepal.

Undeniably, as with all aspects of multi-lateral relations, particularly in South Asia, obstacles

remain. For all states, however, a secure energy supply is vital and would remove the

current ceiling of economic growth that constrains the region. Allied to this issue, greater

energy co-operation may also promote opportunities to not only improve relations, but also

expand regional economic links. The lack of these connections is another key factor limiting

South Asia’s economic potential.

Liam McHugh

Research Manager

Northern Australia & Energy Security Research Programmes

lmchugh@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Poor Indian Monsoon Stokes Fears of Drought, Food

Insecurity

Background

The monsoon season in India, June through September, has delivered significantly lower

than average rainfall so far this year. As a result, many areas are facing water shortages and

the prospect of crop failures. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

(FAO) is primarily blaming a 7.8 million tonne decrease in global rice production on lower

than normal Indian yields. With predictions of a looming spike in global food prices, the

effect of any crop shortages could be exacerbated by the need to import food from an

abnormally expensive global market.

Comment

In the context of a possible spike in global food prices, the current poor monsoonal rains

across many parts of India could not have come at a worse time. For a country in which

agriculture employs around 60 per cent of the workforce and provides 16 to 20 per cent of

gross domestic product, a drought that significantly affects crop harvests is a serious matter

at the best of times. In this case, however, with the current drought in the USA and dry

weather in other key crop exporting regions around the world, raising the spectre of a

significant increase in global food prices, India’s overall food security may be about to come

under threat.

Much of India’s food sources rely on reliable rainfall, with 48 per cent of food crops being

rain fed, making India particularly vulnerable to drought. This is compounded when many

areas across India are already depleting groundwater resources to provide for their crops.

Aquifers in these areas have little capacity to compensate for decreased rainfall.

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The populous Indian states of Rajasthan, Punjab and Haryana, endured a loss of 109km³ of

groundwater over the period 2002 to 2008, according to a study by Matthew Rodell and his

colleagues, published in the journal Nature. This equates to more than double the capacity

of India’s largest surface water reservoir, the Upper Wainganga Dam. In times of low rainfall

such as those currently being experienced, farmers often turn to groundwater to supply

their crops. This will only accelerate the depletion of India’s groundwater supplies and, when

these run dry, the effect on India’s food security will be devastating.

With the total of stored water in India at 61 per cent of 2011 levels, the effects of the decline

in rainfall this year is clearly severe. Indian Food Minister, K.V. Thomas, has indicated that

while food grain production will remain more or less the same, pulses used to make the

Indian staple food Dal will decline, along with oilseed crops. Drought hit states like

Karnataka, Gujarat and Maharashtra are also facing severe fodder shortages, raising fears

that the dairy industry will be hit hard. The fodder shortage is also likely to affect Punjab,

Haryana and Rajasthan.

Farmers have also been favouring water-intensive rice crops, even in dry areas, due to the

government offering prices generally higher than market prices. This has exacerbated the

current water shortage and must be remedied by the government cutting these subsidies as

soon as possible. With India being the world’s largest rice exporter, however, the necessary

reduction in subsidies may contribute to higher global food prices. As it is, global rice

production is already expected to be down by 7.8 million tonnes, to 724.5 million tonnes,

primarily due to the lower than normal Indian monsoonal rains.

Expectations from Copenhagen-based Danske Bank are that difficult crop growing conditions

around the world are likely to increase the price of at least some foods by up to 25 per cent.

With exports of India’s major grain crops likely to be slashed due to the lower rainfall, the

prospect of India needing to import food to meet its grain requirements has increased

markedly. The Indian food ministry is already preparing a proposal to import lentils and

distribute them at a subsidised rate. The situation in India must be monitored closely, as a

continuation of the current poor monsoonal rains will have significant implications for both

global food prices and food security in India. If this trend continues, India may need to move

away from water intensive agriculture, such as rice, to effectively conserve its water

resources.

Ryan Wilson

Research Assistant

FDI Global Food and Water Security Research Programme

*****

Page 13 of 16

US-China Rivalry Surfaces during Clinton’s Africa Visit

Background

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton began a ten-day tour of Africa on 31 July

2012. It included visits to Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia and Malawi.

Regional security and economic issues took priority, although Clinton’s attempts to promote

stability and increased US investment in the region, were overshadowed by perceptions of

US-China competition for trade relations and political influence in Africa.

Comment

Secretary Clinton’s trip marks her second visit to Africa as US Secretary of State and followed

the unveiling of the four-pillar “US Strategy for Africa” in June 2012. The trip has been

promoted as an opportunity for the United States to address the relative neglect of the

region in US foreign policy since 2001. It also provided a platform for the United States to

attempt to woo African investors and businesses and to devise strategies for increasing US

foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa.

US investors have been reluctant to expand their commitments in Africa, yet interest has

heightened in recent years in the wake of China’s expanding investment in, and increased

credit to, the continent. Currently only one per cent of US FDI is held in Africa,4 and events

such as the second meeting of the South Africa-USA Strategic Dialogue and the US-South

African Business Partnership Summit aim to address the situation. The latter was attended

by Secretary Clinton and a delegation of representatives from ten US companies in

Johannesburg. It provided a particularly important opportunity for the United States to court

business and investment partnerships. The United States signed an agreement pledging

US$2 billion to fund renewable energy projects in South Africa that involve US companies.5

The energy agreement is clearly a strategic move, although, in itself, it will not shift China

from its position as South Africa’s top trading partner and the largest investor in the African

continent. In addition, Secretary Clinton’s address to Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar,

Senegal, sparked controversy with its emphasis on ‘partnerships, not patronage’ and

democracy in contrast to exploitation, a theme she reiterated throughout the trip. China’s

official news agency, Xinhua, interpreted this as a veiled criticism of Chinese engagement in

the continent, ‘designed to drive a wedge between China and Africa for the US’... gain.’6

The US reaffirmed its commitment to regional stability and consolidated ties with regional

partners when Secretary Clinton visited Uganda, where US forces are currently helping to

train the country’s contingent in the AMISOM force that is fighting al-Shabaab militants in

Somalia. She also met with Somali President Sheikh Sharif in Nairobi, to underscore US

4Kimenyi, M., Magolo, E. and Diagne, A., ‘Priority Issues During Secretary Clinton’s Trip to Africa’,

Brookings Institute: Washington DC, 1 August 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/08/clinton-africa-kimenyi. 5 Gambrell, J., ‘US to offer $2B in clean energy loans to South Africa’, Associated Press, 6 August 2012.

<http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AF_SOUTH_AFRICA_US_BUSINESS?SITE=NCSHE&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT> 6 ABC News/Associated Press, 3 August 2012, ‘China Media Takes Swipe at Clinton Over Africa’.

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-media-swipe-clinton-africa-16919738>

Page 14 of 16

support for the “Road to End the Transition” Agreement. Secretary Clinton also travelled to

the Southern Sudanese capital, Juba, where she praised initiatives to bring about an oil-

sharing agreement between Sudan and South Sudan. The agreement will pave the way for

the reopening of the South’s oilfields, which have been closed since January 2012 at great

financial loss to both countries. The potential oil agreement represents significant progress

on one of the “burning issues” in regional stability. Although it is not yet signed and is still

sketchy on details, it may lead to the resolution of border security conflicts and other issues

left unresolved in the wake of South Sudan’s secession in July 2011.

Fay Clarke FDI Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Growing Food Insecurity in Kenya’s Cities

Background

Kenya is experiencing the highest rate of urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The high

population density of unplanned urban settlements, combined with rising food prices, is

generating concerns for food security in its cities. Kenya’s urban poor have limited

possibilities for alternative strategies for dealing with food inflation, creating the need for

government intervention to ensure access to food for all people.

Comment

Over the last decade, Kenya’s urban population has increased by 5 per cent, more than

double the average urbanisation rate for Sub-Saharan Africa. This rapid growth has

expanded Kenya’s food insecurity, traditionally seen as a rural issue, to become problematic

for the country’s urban peripheries. According to a recent assessment, conducted by the

Famine Early Warning Systems Network, the World Food Programme, the Food and

Agricultural Organization, and the government of Kenya, 70 per cent of urban dwellers live

in slums and are increasingly vulnerable to poverty-related food insecurity. The inhabitants

of informal settlements have exceptionally low income levels, with limited access to basic

services such as clean water, sanitation, stable housing, education or healthcare.

Kenya is a low-income food-deficit country, with a per capita GDP of around US$775. Its

reliance on food imports makes it vulnerable to global price fluctuations. For the country’s

urban poor, expenditure on food accounts for 60–65 per cent of their total income.

Relatively high food inflation is largely responsible for Kenya’s growing urban insecurity. The

assessment reveals that 13 per cent of high-density urban households have unacceptably

low levels of food consumption. The average daily energy intake for this group is just 1,800

calories, well below the required minimum of 2,100 calories. More than one-quarter of

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urban children are stunted as a result of chronic malnutrition, with many families consuming

fewer or smaller meals as a way of coping with higher food prices.

Poor dietary diversity has been identified as the key driver of urban food insecurity. Between

97 and 100 per cent of food consumed by Kenya’s urban population is purchased. The

prevalence of urban agriculture is reasonably low; just 29 per cent of city households grow

their own food, and this only supplements, rather than satisfies, their food requirements.

The dependence on purchased commodities plays a significant role in establishing poverty-

related food insecurity in an urban setting. With this in mind, the government of Kenya is

promoting urban and peri-urban agriculture as a means of improving food access among the

country’s poor.

A possible solution to rising food prices is to increase rural food production. Agriculture in

Kenya currently does not meet its productive potential, therefore it may be possible to

reduce the prices of domestically-grown crops by increasing agronomic capacity. There are

calls for Kenya’s government to support this measure by subsidising agricultural inputs, such

as seeds, fertiliser and training. Despite this potential, Kenya’s reliance on food imports

remains problematic. There is, however, scope to improve the country’s terms of trade. The

World Bank claims Kenya maintains barriers to trade in its key staple crop imports of maize,

wheat and sugar. The removal of these barriers, according to the Bank, will assist in reducing

prices and alleviating the country’s growing urban food insecurity.

Jay Vella Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme jvella@futuredirections.org.au

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. Desborough House, Suite 2, 1161 Hay Street, West Perth WA 6005 Australia. Tel: +61 8 9486 1046 Fax: +61 8 9486 4000 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au

What’s Next?

On 15 August, India celebrates Independence Day, to coincide Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, is expected to announce plans to distribute six million cell phones to poor Indian families.

Hosted in Saudi Arabia, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Summit will conclude on 15 August.

Free Trade Negotiations between India and Israel will continue this week through till 16 August.

From 15 – 17 August, French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, will visit Jordon, Turkey and Lebanon to discuss the on-going crisis in Syria.

In Tanzania, later this week, three ships from Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force will visit in a training operation.

In Maputo, Mozambique, the annual Southern African Development Community Heads of State Summit will meet at the weekend.