5 June 2013 | Vol. 4, № 19.

From the Editor’s Desk

Dear FDI supporters, Welcome to the Strategic Weekly

Analysis. This week’s issue begins with a

look at the latest developments in the

Naxalite Rebellion in India’s “Red

Corridor”. We then consider Afghan

President Hamid Karzai’s recent visit to

New Delhi, including the implications of

that visit for Pakistan.

Still in Pakistan, we examine the future for

US-Pakistan relations in light of the drone

strike that killed a leading member of the

Pakistani Taliban last week.

We then head back to India and examine

that country’s growing relationship with

Japan.

Next, we turn our attention to Africa,

investigating the growing regional

tensions caused by Ethiopia’s plans to

divert the Nile River for its ambitious

Grand Renaissance Dam.

This week’s edition concludes by looking

at another ambitious plan, this time

further south in Mozambique. Funding

has been announced for Phase III of the

Nacala Development Corridor, linking

Mozambique with Malawi and Zambia.

I trust that you will enjoy this edition of

the Strategic Weekly Analysis.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

*****

Page 2 of 13

Drone Strike May Weaken Pakistani Taliban, but Islamabad

and Washington Face Dilemma

While a recent drone strike against the Pakistan Taliban’s second-in-command may

weaken the group, it may also hinder the ongoing peace process in Pakistan. Meanwhile,

Islamabad and Washington must now decide the future limits and use of the controversial

drone campaign.

Background

Less than a week after President Obama outlined a new direction for his covert drone

campaign, Pakistani officials have said that a CIA missile strike has killed a top member of

the Pakistani Taliban. The strike on 29 May was the first since Pakistan’s general election on

11 May, which saw several candidates, including the incoming Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif,

campaign against the US drone strikes. The strike may offer a short-term tactical victory

against the Taliban, but Islamabad and Washington must now decide the future use and

limits of the controversial programme.

Comment

The drone strike on 29 March in Pakistan’s northwest, killed the deputy commander of the

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Waliur Rehman. The 40-year old Rehman was widely

believed to the brains behind the TTP; he had reportedly orchestrated dozens of suicide

attacks on Pakistani civilians and conducted cross-border attacks against NATO troops

fighting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

In the short-term, therefore, Rehman’s death should come as a major blow to the TTP. The

group will now be deprived of a key strategist, whose experience in raising funds and

carrying out major attacks posed a significant threat. A mature leader in an organisation of

young fighters, Rehman was also seen as a galvanising figure who helped ease tensions

among different factions. As Rutam Shah Mohmand, the former Pakistani ambassador to

Afghanistan told Central Asia Online, ‘it’s a serious blow to the already shaky Taliban

command and control, which is seriously faced with leadership crises’.

This may be true, but observers have also expressed concern that Rehman’s death may

hinder the ongoing peace process. The incoming government has shown a willingness to

negotiate with the TTP, even if the army has not; many saw Rehman as an important figure

in any upcoming negotiations. Renowned for his cool head and intelligence, Rehman, as a

former member of the Islamist political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), may well have

been invaluable in bringing the two sides together. For now, however, negotiations have

been put on ice. The TTP promptly abandoned talks and vowed to exact revenge for the

strike. With many of the TTP’s remaining leaders believed to be hardliners, the strike may

actually push the two sides further apart.

Yet it also served to highlight the recent divisions about Pakistan’s security policy. So far,

Prime Minister Sharif has advocated a soft line; he has repeatedly said he would rather talk

with TTP than launch a major military offensive in North Waziristan. The area remains a

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haven for jihadists from around the world and, aside from American drones, is effectively

lawless. Meanwhile, the head of Pakistan’s powerful military, General Kayani, appears to

favour a tougher approach, convinced that urgent action is required to defeat the TTP. Last

year he declared that the whole country should join in a ‘war against extremism and

terrorism’; however, he is set to retire at the end of the year.

Sharif has a complicated relationship with the military, which ousted him in a coup d’état in

1999. But he now appears determined to handle the defence and security portfolios, two

areas usually controlled by the military. Pakistan, therefore, will continue to try to negotiate,

though its patience is wearing thin; the escalation in violence and lack of progress in

negotiations, may force it to adopt a harder line in the future.

But it remains to be seen what Pakistan intends to do on the drone issue. Sharif has

previously called them a ‘challenge’ to Pakistan’s sovereignty, but was notably quiet after

the recent strike; most likely because Rehman was a powerful anti-state actor. Defence

analyst, Ayesha Siddiqua, told The Australian that the strike may have been a symbolic one,

aimed at highlighting the value of the strikes. He said, ‘this drone attack is a signal to

Pakistan and its new government by America that “look, it’s not all bad. We’re also killing

people who attack you and the Pakistani state.”’ To make progress, Islamabad and

Washington must now find an appropriate middle ground.

Finally, the strike may signal a new chapter in Obama’s much-maligned drone campaign. In a

recent security address, Obama said he planned to reign in the “global war on terror” and

impose stricter protocols for drone strikes. According to the President, lethal force would

now only be used against those who pose a ‘continuous, imminent threat to the American

people’. Significantly, Rehman became a ‘specially-designated global terrorist’ in 2010.

Strikes against high value targets, such as Rehman, will continue of course. But the drone

strikes have been reduced and are likely to be reduced even further in the future. Given the

backlash against them in Pakistan, and around the world, that can only be a good thing.

Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme amanners@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Page 4 of 13

Naxalite Attack Sows Discord

Naxalite-Maoist insurgents have ambushed an Indian National Congress party convoy,

killing some senior party leaders and leaving others injured. The aftermath has been

marked by politicisation of the attack, as parties and government authorities seek to

apportion blame.

Background

Around half of the 28 states of India have some Naxalite (formally the Communist Party of

India (Maoist)) presence, but they are most active in the states of Karnataka, Andhra

Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal; together, these states are

known as the “Red Corridor”. The

insurgency has been ongoing since

the late 1960s, highlighting the

inability (or lack of will) of

successive Indian governments to

resolve it.

Comment

On 25 May 2013, around 250

Naxalite insurgents ambushed a

Congress party convoy in the

Darbha Valley, in the Chhattisgarh

state of Eastern India. The convoy

carried around 200 Congress

personnel in 25 vehicles. Senior

state Congress party leaders were

present, as they were conducting a

local Parivartan Yatra (change

rally). The convoy was travelling

along National Highway 221, which

connects Chhattisgarh to the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh. The attack was swift

and well executed, beginning around 4pm local time and ending less than two hours later. It

took place along a densely forested section of the highway, 50km from the village of

Keshloor, to which the convoy was travelling, after leaving the town of Sukma. A felled tree

blocked the road, slowing the convoy, after which a landmine was detonated near the fourth

vehicle, destroying it. The Naxalites then opened fire from nearby hills, drawing out the

convoy’s personal security officers, who exchanged fire until they ran out of ammunition.

Many escaped on foot, while the Naxalites executed their high-level targets after demanding

their surrender.

The attack claimed at least 24 lives and injured over 30. The senior state leadership of the

Congress party has been devastated by the attack: amongst the dead are party Chief Nand

Kumar Patel and his son Dinesh, as well as senior leader Mahendra Karma. Senior leader

Vidya Charan Shukla is among the injured and remains in critical condition. Many had “Z” or

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“Z+” category (top) security status, as they were known targets of the insurgents. Numerous

attempts had already been made on the life of Karma, in particular. The last was in

November 2012 under similar circumstances, as he campaigned directly against the

Naxalites. Despite this, both he and the other senior leaders were travelling with less

security than was appropriate for their status, perhaps contributing to their own deaths. The

insurgents were able to strike in strength, which is not surprising considering Chhattisgarh

has a security force of only 25,000 to cover an area of two million square kilometres. In

comparison, Delhi has over 70,000 personnel. Many reports have indicated that the convoy

had no state-provided security, despite being properly scheduled with high-security

passengers.

In response, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister, Raman Singh, held an emergency meeting of senior

administration officials and ordered a judicial enquiry into the attack. Federal Home

Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, has liaised with Singh and set up an investigation by the

National Investigation Agency. Chhattisgarh is currently ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party,

engendering allegations of conspiracy against the leadership of the Congress party.

Fomenting this, it was revealed that a Central Reserve Police Force camp in the Darbha area

was shifted a week before the attack, despite indications from the Indian Intelligence Bureau

that a major Naxalite offensive was possible. State police deny receiving any actionable

intelligence and have since deployed over a thousand security personnel to the area.

Consequently, the Chhattisgarh Government and Police have been widely criticised for

failing to provide adequate security, while the Congress party and the BJP are locked in a

politicised blame-game. This has fuelled a toxic atmosphere around the attack, as political

manoeuvring overshadows the larger problem of possible corruption and incompetence and

stymies trans-state cooperation against the insurgency.

The timing of the attack fits broader patterns of Naxalite campaigns: May offers better

visibility in the rough terrain where the insurgents prefer to operate. The trees and bushes

shed their leaves and this allows them to attack from greater distances and heights. May

also falls in the middle of the Naxalite’s annual five-month (March to July) “tactical counter

offensive campaign”, a time when they are believed to be at full strength. It also offers

numerous logistical advantages over the monsoon season. While considered terrorists by

the political and security establishment, the ongoing strength of the insurgency testifies to

its grass roots support, estimated to be in the millions. Unless the state and federal

governments form a unified strategy, the insurgency is likely to continue unabated,

emboldened by victory.

Daniel Barnes Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Page 6 of 13

India and China Pushed Together Over Afghanistan

Growing two-way investment between China and India and co-operation on economic and

security issues in Afghanistan, are helping to bring the two Asian giants closer together. It

is, however, leaving Pakistan increasingly sidelined, potentially jeopardising incoming

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s plans for enhanced ties with India.

Background

In late May, Hamid Karzai visited India, where he met with the country’s leaders. Karzai

praised Indian and Chinese investment in his country and encouraged its growth, while

blaming the American investment contract system for corruption. As 2014 and the

withdrawal of coalition troops approaches, Afghanistan’s neighbours are assessing the

economic and security circumstances inside the country.

Comment

Karzai’s comments in India confirmed his model for Afghanistan’s development, a prominent

feature of which is regional competition for investment. The development of infrastructure

by Afghanistan’s neighbours is a model that has also been touted by the US. India and China

already have important investments in Afghanistan. The stability required for economic

interests means that traditional alliances are being reconsidered. Pakistan’s failure to keep

up, means that its role is increasingly minimised.

In India, Karzai met with the country’s leaders and accepted an honorary degree. During the

visit, Karzai ruled out running for another term in 2014, and said that the withdrawal of

foreign troops that year would improve stability and emphasised the destructive influence of

the foreign peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan.

While in New Delhi, Karzai praised India’s commitment to Afghanistan. He referred to

existing Indian investments, including the November 2012 signing of several mining and

development deals and India’s commitment to US$2 billion of infrastructure aid. A prime

example of Indian investment is the Hajigak iron ore project, which is likely to be valued at

up to US$10 billion.

China has also invested substantially in Afghanistan, notably in the huge copper mine at Mes

Aynak, 40 kilometres southeast of Kabul. This project has suffered controversy and delays,

however, as it is also the site of an ancient Buddhist city. What will potentially be China’s

most important investment in Afghanistan, however, involves the plans to develop oil and

gas infrastructure in the north. While some investment has already gone ahead, the

indications are that China is waiting to assess the security situation following the withdrawal

of foreign troops, before injecting more funds.

Earlier this year, China and India engaged in a in a trilateral forum with Russia, to discuss

Afghanistan’s future. This represented a significant development in cooperation, given the

divisions between India and China over Afghanistan – which centres particularly around each

nation’s relationship with Pakistan. The talks were concerned with investment and security

and included a discussion on the prevention of a Taliban surge after 2014. For China,

Page 7 of 13

economic and strategic interests are increasingly trumping other factors, although Beijing

has also made sure that traditional ties with Pakistan have been reaffirmed in a similar

forum.

The embracing of Indian and Chinese investment by Afghanistan, will continue to

marginalise Pakistan’s position on the conflict. During his time in Delhi, Karzai said that the

war on terror was being fought in the wrong place, arguing that the foreign presence in

Afghan villages only bred resentment. He implicitly suggested that Taliban sanctuaries in

Pakistan are the real source of trouble. Pakistan will see the growing Indian influence in

Afghanistan unfavourably, particularly by the military. In turn, this will hamper the plans of

Pakistan’s newly elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, to improve his nation’s relationship

with India.

Sharif has come into office with promises of dialogue with the Taliban and an improved

relationship with India. Although he has made moves towards peace talks with the Taliban,

the presence of the militants in Pakistan will continue to obstruct the closer regional

relationships that Islamabad desires. In addition, Pakistan seems to be the only nation that

sees a role for the Taliban in a post-2014 Afghanistan. This position has also contributed to

China’s motivation to engage India over the future of Afghanistan.

Kabul hopes that the investors will arrive after 2014. This, however, will be contingent on

the security situation – something that may be just out of reach.

James Davies Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Southern Africa to Benefit from Mozambique Transport

Corridor Phase III

When completed, the Nacala Development Corridor will have a potentially transformative

effect on the economic development of the northern region of Southern Africa.

Background

In a move intended to have significant benefits for the Mozambican economy, foreign

investors and its neighbours Malawi and Zambia, the African Development Bank announced

funding of US$50 million for the third phase of the Nacala Development Corridor project.

When completed, the project’s improved transport networks will boost regional economies,

by facilitating the transport of goods to the deep-water port at Nacala in the north of

Mozambique.

Page 8 of 13

Comment

Phase III of the Nacala Development Corridor (NDC) took a significant step forward on

28 May, with the announcement by the African Development Bank of funding of US$50

million. It will be used to seal the highway between the towns of Cuamba and Lichinga in

northern Mozambique. Works are scheduled to start in 2014.

The latest phase is just one

part of the larger US$1.2

billion NDC project, which

will also rehabilitate the

long-damaged rail link from

Nacala port to Malawi.

When completed, the road

and rail corridor will give

landlocked Malawi and

Zambia their most direct

access to the Indian Ocean.

The NDC project is

important for the economic

development of the north of

Mozambique. It has lagged

behind the south, where the

Maputo Development Corridor links Gauteng Province – the industrial and commercial

heartland of South Africa, centred on Johannesburg – by road and rail with the deep-water

port at Maputo, the Mozambican capital.

The NDC will be intended to replicate that development in the north. It will transport such

products as Malawian tobacco and agricultural produce, Zambian copper and cobalt and

Mozambican foodstuffs, to the port of Nacala. Both the Zambian and Malawian

governments have expressed their interest in using the NDC.

The NDC also has the potential to link Mozambique’s coal-producing province, Tete –

separated from the rest of the country by Malawi – with Nacala port via Malawi. It will

provide a more direct route to port than the current southerly route to the port of Beira in

central Mozambique.

For potential foreign investors, the Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia provinces, all of which lie

on or very near the NDC, have been assessed as having high development potential for

agriculture, by the Japanese International Co-operation Agency; an assessment based on the

extensive availability of good soils and amenable climates. The Japanese Government has

contributed extensively to the NDC project, further boosting its presence in the Indian Ocean

Region. The Japanese International Co-operation Agency provided technical assistance and

studies of sustainable development options for the three provinces listed above. Tokyo will

also contribute funds to Phase III of the NDC.

Page 9 of 13

In addition to the improved port facilities, road and rail links, the international airport at

Nacala is also being upgraded to handle larger aircraft; a move that will complement the

NDC project. When completed in 2017, the improved and integrated transport links offered

by the NDC, along with the sustainable development initiatives, will have the potential to

improve economic outputs and the lives of residents in the undeveloped north of

Mozambique and in neighbouring countries.

Leighton G. Luke Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme lluke@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Indo-Japanese Ties Move Forward

The visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Tokyo has engendered much empathy with

the Abe government and, simultaneously, drawn attention in Beijing. Whether India can

make full use of the generated bonhomie, though, is another issue.

Background

Prime Minister Singh recently concluded an official visit to Tokyo, where he was accorded

full state honours. This included lunch with the Emperor and Empress, a protocol usually

reserved for heads of state. Arguably more importantly, he found Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

amenable to enhancing trade and security ties with India.

Comment

Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo a week after Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to New

Delhi, itself made in the wake of the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in the

Himalayas, generated much goodwill between Singh and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Apart

from purchasing two Japanese aircraft – an important milestone since Japan does not

usually sell technology with military potential – the two leaders sought to enhance trade and

security ties. India and Japan are to “regularise” joint naval exercises. Japan is to invest in

India’s infrastructure, including developing its fast rail network.

Arguably most importantly, the two countries are to fast-track discussions on the transfer of

nuclear technology. Given Japan’s justifiably strong feelings on the military use of nuclear

technology and India’s equally justifiable refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the two sides had hit a major hurdle in their previous discussions. The meeting

between the two leaders, though, is an attempt to overcome this stumbling block. The

transfer of Japanese civilian nuclear technology to India would be a milestone, both in Indo-

Japanese relations and in India’s infrastructure development.

Page 10 of 13

Additionally, an Indian media report refers to Japanese companies moving their

manufacturing facilities from China to India. While on the one hand this is logical, given

India’s low costs and China’s rising cost structure, it is not easy to transfer whole factories.

The strategy is also impeded by India’s lack of infrastructure to cater to such a

manufacturing base, which may be why a two-stage process is envisaged: first, create the

infrastructure required to facilitate manufacture, then establish the factories.

If Japan establishes a manufacturing base in India, it will be at China’s expense. In the

context of the currently poor Sino-Japanese relations, it makes sense for Japanese

organisations to opt for a country that will not use current events to hold them to ransom.

This, naturally, has angered Beijing. The People’s Daily newspaper hailed Li’s visit to New

Delhi and berated Japan for Abe’s visits to China’s neighbours, as part of a move to isolate

China. It implicitly called him a “petty burglar”. From Beijing’s perspective, this is part of an

orchestrated move by the USA and Japan to constrain it.

The US promotes the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – essentially the economic basis for its

pivot to Asia – which was signed in 2005 by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. The

other participating countries are: Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United

States and Vietnam. Abe now wants to join in. The partnership aims at establishing free

trade agreements between signatories – with some caveats. Firstly, signatories must

acknowledge and protect the intellectual property rights of each partner. Secondly,

signatories will enact legislation to provide investor-friendly environments. Thirdly, all

players in each market will be forced to compete fairly, even state-owned organisations.

Each of these provisions strikes at the core of Beijing’s current investment regime. If enough

states sign up to the Partnership, China will be forced to contend with these issues, just as it

was forced to do by the requirements for joining the WTO. But this time around, there will

be one big difference: it will have little leeway to manipulate the terms to its benefit. Also,

China prefers to deal with issues in isolation, just as it deals with states individually. Any

grouping in the region of which it is not a part, or over which it has no control, is anathema

to it.

This, then, makes India all-important in China’s eyes, which might explain Premier Li’s

heralded first official trip to that country, and its need to sway India from close ties with

Japan. It might also explain Prime Minister Abe’s desire for closer ties with India.

Thus India finds itself in an enviable position, being courted, as it were, by the two largest

economies in Asia. But things are not as rosy as they may appear. To ensure Japanese

organisations do actually set up shop in India, Prime Minister Singh must prepare the ground

for them. Investment processes must be made easier. The difficulty of obtaining the

necessary licences to do business in India must be minimised and brought in line with

international standards. Power must be made available, no small feat in a country plagued

by power shortages. Also, policies must be drafted to minimise the possibility of corruption

in bringing this to fruition.

Page 11 of 13

These are hardly minor issues to contend with, but for India to stand any chance of

translating the goodwill generated by Mr Singh’s visit to Tokyo into beneficial action, they

will have to be dealt with.

Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme lhughes@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Ethiopia Causes Regional Tensions to Surface as it Diverts the

Nile

Project construction to divert water along the Blue Nile River in preparation for Ethiopia’s

Renaissance Dam, began last week amid rising water security concerns in Egypt and

Sudan.

Background

Early last week, Ethiopia began the process of diverting the course of the Blue Nile, to

continue construction of the country’s Grand Renaissance Dam. The decision was made

ahead of the release of an international panel assessment of the impacts of the dam for

Ethiopia and its downstream neighbours; Sudan and Egypt. The decision has raised tensions

in the region, as Egypt has reacted negatively, warning against any flow reductions.

Comment

One of two main Nile tributaries, 84 per cent of the waters in the Blue Nile is sourced from

Ethiopia. The population of the basin is predicted to double in the next 25 years, further

straining over-allocated resources. More than 80 per cent of available discharge is allocated

downstream, through the 1959 colonial-era agreement between Sudan and Egypt. Of the

Nile’s annual flow of approximately 85 billion cubic metres, Egypt uses its entire 55 billion

cubic metre allocation and forecasts indicate it will require an additional 21 billion cubic

metres by 2050. Egypt, which is reliant on the Nile as the only source of water, claims the

dam will require the diversion of 18 billion cubic metres of water, leaving it severely short of

water in the future.

The colonial era agreement that allocates Nile flows, was made prior to the independence of

the upstream states that contain the sources of the river; consequently, the agreement

disregarded the water rights of these states. In 2010, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and

Tanzania, followed by Burundi in 2011, signed a new agreement to redistribute water

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allocations along the Nile. Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the new agreement. Tensions

persist over water allocation rights and access between the riparian states.

The $4.7 billion Grand Renaissance hydroelectric project, is part of a larger $12 billion

investment project to enhance power production within the region. Ethiopian officials have

stated that the dam will be used for electricity generation purposes only and no water will

be diverted away from the river. The dam is currently around 20 per cent constructed and

due for completion in 2017. The project, which will be the largest on the continent, is likely

to be funded entirely by the Ethiopian government, as foreign donors remain eager to avoid

a conflict with Egypt.

Egypt has, in the past, threatened war to preserve its water share. The country is currently

facing increased pressure on its water supply and has grave concerns about its future water

security. President Morsi warned on Sunday, that he will not allow the project to reduce his

country’s share of the Nile. In comments on Egyptian television he stated that Egypt cannot

let ‘one drop’ of water be affected; he vowed to take steps to ensure water security.

Addis Ababa has responded by claiming that Egypt has no need to worry, as neither the

re-routing of the river, or the dam itself, will have any effect on the Nile’s flow. This

assertion has been backed up by the international panel formed to study the impacts of the

dam, which released the findings of its year-long study to the governments of Ethiopia,

Sudan and Egypt on Friday. The panel, made up of teams from each of the three countries,

as well as international experts, concluded that the dam’s construction meets international

standards and will not significantly affect Sudan or Egypt. Further environmental and social

assessments have been recommended, however, because concerns remain about whether

the flow of the river will be affected by the filling of the dam’s reservoir.

Diplomats from both Ethiopia and Egypt have played down the potential for conflict over the

past week; but, in political meetings broadcast on Egyptian television on Monday, politicians

proposed hostile acts against Ethiopia. Their suggestions included backing rebels and

carrying out sabotage to halt construction of the dam. President Morsi did not directly

respond to these suggestions, rather he has called for a national dialogue meeting to discuss

and study the report. It is unlikely that serious conflict will result over the dam, but Egypt’s

strong national interest in maintaining its share of the flow, means that regional relations

could suffer long-term damage should Egypt perceive that the hydroelectric development

will negatively impact its water security.

Sinéad Lehane Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme

*****

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au

What’s Next?

South African President Jacob Zuma today completes his round of meetings with

Japanese officials and business leaders.

Mozambican President Armando Guebuza’s visit to South Korea continues until

6 June. Bilateral economic ties are at the top of the agenda.

US President Barack Obama will host Chinese President Xi Jinping for their first

meeting, to take place in southern California on 7-8 June.

The Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia

is hosting a lecture by Dr Emile Nakhleh titled “The Arab Spring at Two and a Half:

Lessons, Challenges, and Opportunities” on 10 June from 2.30-4.00pm. The venue

is G.06, Law, E-Moot Court, Hackett Entrance № 1, Hackett Drive, Crawley. For

more information, contact (08) 6488 4554 or cmss-sscs@uwa.edu.au.

The Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani Air Forces will be holding joint exercises called

Peace Hawks 1 at King Fahd Air Base, Saudi Arabia until 24 June.