from the editor’s desk - future directions...
TRANSCRIPT
13 March 2013 | Vol. 4, № 7.
From the Editor’s Desk
Dear FDI supporters,
Welcome to the Strategic Weekly
Analysis. This week, we begin in Kenya.
We consider the implications of last
week’s presidential election, before
looking at the potentially revolutionary
usage of mobile phone technology for
real-time data collection in the Kenyan
livestock industry.
Next, we examine the increasingly
precarious food security situation in
Egypt, as the country’s grain reserves fall
to record lows amid ongoing political and
economic instability.
Moving to the Middle East, we report on
French initiatives to secure the sale of
high-tech military equipment, such as the
Dassault Rafale fighter jet, to regional
governments, including Qatar, Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates.
In India, we examine the decision to
reinforce the disputed border with China
in Arunachal Pradesh. New Delhi seems to
be demonstrating a new-found
confidence in its dealings with China on
this contentious issue.
Moving closer to home, we conclude by
analysing Australia’s relationship with
near-neighbour Indonesia, in light of a call
from Foreign Minister Bob Carr to expand
it further.
Our next Strategic Analysis Paper is an
analysis by FDI Visiting Fellow Saloni Salil
of the emerging concept of the Indo-
Pacific strategic theatre and India’s place
within it. Ms Salil’s paper is scheduled for
release later this week.
I trust that you will enjoy this edition of
the Strategic Weekly Analysis.
Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International
*****
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Challenges Ahead For Kenya Election Victor
After a close election, Kenya faces continuing uncertainty with a planned legal challenge
to the election result and its incoming leaders under investigation by the International
Criminal Court.
Background
Even as the dust settles on the Kenyan elections, President-elect Uhuru Kenyatta is
confronted by a number of challenges. The new leader faces a legal challenge from his main
opponent, Raila Odinga, who refuses to concede defeat, claiming that the election was
tainted by vote-rigging. Equally important will be the task of uniting Kenyans after the
divisiveness of the poll period and the uncertainty engendered by Odinga’s court challenge.
The new president and his deputy also face investigation by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) for Crimes against Humanity, relating to the violence that followed the 2007 election.
Comment
Having secured 50.03 per cent of the vote in the 4 March presidential election – thus
achieving the requirement of 50 per cent plus one vote – Uhuru Kenyatta has avoided a
second round run-off against the incumbent Prime Minister Raila Odinga by the narrowest
of margins.
But matters are by no means settled. Odinga is yet to concede defeat and has said that he
will challenge Kenyatta’s victory in the Kenyan Supreme Court. At the centre of Odinga’s
case are allegations of vote-rigging associated with the high number of informal or “spoiled”
votes, estimated at over 300,000. Over 70 per cent of eligible voters took part in six
simultaneous presidential, senatorial, regional and local government polls. Unfortunately,
the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission had not been able to carry out an
ideal test programme on the new technologies used for the polls.
The uncertainty surrounding a lengthy legal challenge will be unsettling for both Kenyans
and foreign investors in East Africa’s leading economy, but both Kenyatta and Odinga have
called for calm. So far, their calls have been heeded: goods are moving through the port at
Mombasa and the violence that followed the 2007 presidential election and claimed the
lives of over 1,100 people has been avoided. Complicating matters once again is the tribal
factionalism that Kenyatta and Deputy President-elect William Ruto – also indicted by the
ICC – stand accused of inciting five years ago. This year, Kenyans again voted largely along
tribal lines. Voters from Kenya’s two largest tribes, the Luo and Kikuyu, tended to support
Odinga and Kenyatta, respectively.
Both Kenyatta and Ruto have stated that they will co-operate with the ICC proceedings, but
the mere fact of having leaders indicted by the ICC puts Kenya and its chief Western allies in
a potentially awkward situation. A close ally of the United States and a key participant in the
African Union-led campaign against Islamist militant group al-Shabaab in Somalia, Kenya
may find its leaders facing travel bans and finance restrictions. That situation would be
awkward, but, more importantly, a possible reduction of diplomatic links would certainly not
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be conducive to Kenya’s efforts in Somalia or its role as a leading regional actor.
Neighbouring countries are therefore unlikely to impose sanctions on Nairobi.
Although it is difficult at this stage to imagine Kenyatta and Ruto as Kenyan equivalents of
the pariah Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the situation has the potential to isolate
Kenya. If that happens, China may be willing to forge a closer relationship in the face of a
reduced Western presence. Certainly, a Kenya constrained by international sanctions and
isolation would be welcomed by al-Shabaab and mourned in Mogadishu.
Leighton G. Luke Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
New Technology Set to Transform Kenyan Livestock Sector
Mobile phone technology is currently being tested by Kenya’s livestock industry, in the
hope of revolutionising real-time data collection and food security worldwide.
Background
The increased use of mobile phones across Africa has given rise to technology designed to
accurately report key livestock information, with real-time data availability. A number of
these technologies, supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), are currently being tested by Kenyan veterinarians to report animal disease
outbreaks and track vaccinations and veterinary treatment locations.
Comment
Early warning of disease outbreaks amongst Kenyan livestock will, in the near future, take a
matter of seconds rather than days or weeks. The FAO, partnering with Kenya’s Royal
Veterinary College and Vetaid, a local NGO, is supporting tests of EpiCollect, a mobile phone
application designed to track animal vaccinations and treatment campaigns throughout the
country.
EpiCollect was developed by researchers at the Imperial College of London’s School of Public
Health. It allows users to store and relay data to an online database, where officials and field
vets can monitor and track up to date and geographically accurate data on livestock.
The technology is currently in the testing phase. The expectation is that it will be made
available to community animal workers and village elders as internet-enabled phones
become more accessible. Estimates indicate that one-third of Kenyans have access to the
internet at present, with 99 per cent of this access from mobile devices.
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With increased internet accessibility via mobile devices in Kenya and other regional
countries, a rise in the use of mobile applications by a multitude of industries is inevitable.
The FAO is currently investigating the success of EMPRES-i, a Global Animal Disease
Information System that reduces delays in updates on animal disease outbreaks and also, in
partnership with Oxfam, the use of Nokia Data Gathering (NDG) to monitor water points, as
a way of identifying drought conditions as early as possible. Similar uses of NDG in the
livestock industry in Uganda are already returning positive preliminary results.
Constant technology development and increased access to it will enable faster reporting and
response times and a wider distribution of important information. This will result in greater
food security through, for example, limiting the impact of animal disease outbreaks, the
early identification of drought conditions, and greater trade possibilities. In Kenya, where a
drought in 2011 left two million people in need of food aid, it may permit farmers to be
better prepared for droughts or heavy rains and help them to preserve their livelihoods.
Sinéad Lehane Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
*****
Egypt Faces Food Insecurity and Social Unrest as Strategic
Grain Stocks Fall
Egypt faces heightened food insecurity as the depletion of foreign reserves undermines the
government’s ability to maintain supplies of subsidised food. Subsequent increases in food
prices could spur public protests that would challenge the government’s hold on power.
Background
Egypt is the world’s largest grain importer. Domestic production levels fall well short of
demand and half of the 18.8 million tonnes of grain that Egypt consumes annually is
imported. Egypt’s General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) buys strategically on
global markets to ensure that wheat stocks are equal to at least six months’ consumption.
This is the level necessary to maintain the programme of heavily subsidised flat loaves that
are supplied to 40 per cent of Egypt’s population. Egypt has a history of civil unrest when
food prices rise and, after bread riots in 2008 and 2011, protecting the food supply is
considered crucial to maintaining social peace.
Comment
Egypt’s wheat imports have declined sharply this year, leading to a large depletion of wheat
stocks. Late last month, the Cabinet announced that strategic stocks had dropped to 2.3
million tonnes, sufficient to last only until 29 May. The government has claimed that it is
allocating top financing priority to wheat purchases and that the arrival of tendered
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purchases for March and April will extend supplies to four months. Private importers and
financiers, however, have expressed scepticism, pointing to fewer grain ship arrivals as
evidence that GASC is having problems maintaining imports. Importers are also having
difficulty accessing foreign currency and have reported that some parties are rejecting
letters of credit used to finance purchases.
Egypt is currently experiencing severe economic problems. The Egyptian pound has dropped
eight per cent in value since the start of January and foreign reserves have fallen to US$13.6
billion, from US$36 billion prior to the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak. A safe level,
required to maintain a three-month grain supply, is considered to be US$15 billion. The fall
in the value of the pound is placing significant strain on the government budget, as it pushes
up the cost of state subsidies on food and energy that are predominantly US dollar-
denominated. Continued political turmoil has caused foreign investment and tourism to dry
up and measures to tighten capital controls are unsustainable in the long-term.
The budget deficit is forecast to hit ten per cent by the end of the financial year, a level the
government cannot afford and that would necessitate rises in the price of some goods and
services. To avoid that, Egypt will rely on the successful completion of negotiations for a
long-delayed US$4.8 billion loan from the IMF.
In the meantime, the government is supporting efforts to increase the domestic wheat
supply, by providing incentives and raising the price paid to domestic producers. An increase
in domestic output of 500,000 tonnes is expected, but this will still not meet overall needs.
The higher level of output is unlikely to be sustainable, given existing pressures on Egypt’s
agricultural sector. GASC is considering abandoning its public tender system, which has long
been a centre point of global grain markets. Australia is one of the four main suppliers of
Egyptian wheat imports. The abandonment of the public tender system will have
implications for Australian wheat producers, as it will remove a long-held source of market
transparency.
If the government fails to provide adequate food at acceptable prices, it is likely to lead to
serious civil unrest. The Egyptian Central Bank is not well placed to support grain supplies in
the case of escalating tensions. Given the fall in strategic supplies and foreign reserves, it is
unlikely that subsidised food provision could be maintained in the event of another
protracted period of unrest. This would heighten food insecurity for large sectors of the
population. It would also challenge the Muslim Brotherhood government’s hold on power
and could have destabilising effects across north-east Africa, particularly within the context
of potential turmoil resulting from coming parliamentary elections.
Lauren Power Research Analyst Global Food and Water Security Research Programme
*****
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A Liaison Française for Qatar?
Qatar and France have recently wrapped up the Gulf Falcon 2013 military exercise, which
ran from 16 February to 7 March. The exercise provided a lucrative opportunity for France
to showcase the high-tech weaponry that Qatar and other Gulf states are considering
purchasing.
Background
The French air force, L’Armee de l’Air, recently participated in a comprehensive military
exercise operating out of Doha, which is part of France’s strategy for selling its defence
capabilities to the Middle East. France has been seeking to sell its Dassault Rafale fighter
overseas, having faced stiff competition from Britain’s BAE Eurofighter Typhoon, Sweden’s
entry-level Saab JAS-39 Gripen and the United States’ “gold-plated” F-35 Lightning II. Gulf
Falcon 2013 has provided an opportunity for France to showcase its most sophisticated
fighter yet.
Comment
Gulf Falcon is a quadrennial exercise between the French and Qatari armed forces. It is
aimed at increasing interoperability and expanding the capabilities of the armed forces of
both countries. It also serves as a selling platform for French defence technology and
equipment. It is this aspect of the exercise that is most important, as it has deep implications
for the future of both the Qatari Air Force and the French defence industry.
The Dassault Rafale has had something of an unfortunate history in the export market,
competing with fourth-generation jet fighters from several other countries and at a time
when the world was experiencing its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.
Consequently, the Rafale has only been picked up by a few customers; notably India, which
purchased 126 aircraft, and, potentially, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, which are in
the process of procurement evaluations.
French President François Hollande visited Kuwait and the UAE in January 2013, in an
attempt to persuade the respective Emirs to purchase the Rafale. Hollande did not visit
Qatar on that trip but, on 10 February, the French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, met
with Qatari Crown Prince Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani. Discussions involved defence matters
and addressed Doha’s concerns about French military involvement in Mali. The French
Ministry of Defence has referred to Qatar as a ‘privileged guest’, quoting figures from
defence sales that, since 2007, have amounted to over €450 million. The full cost of
procuring the Rafale has not been made public yet, but estimates indicate that it will be
substantially lower than the US$8 billion price offered by former president Sarkozy to Brazil
in 2009.
President Hollande’s interest in selling the Rafale to Qatar stems from a long-standing Qatari
tradition of purchasing French military aircraft. The Qatari Air Force currently operates 14
French Aérospatiale Gazelle attack helicopters and 12 Dassault Mirage 2000-2005 models, in
addition to various other French aircraft and missiles. With an evaluation programme to
choose Qatar’s next generation of fighter aircraft currently underway, France
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understandably has great interest in the outcome. A decision was expected from Doha at
the end of 2012, but is still yet to be announced. The purchase is expected to involve
between 24 and 36 aircraft.
As well as Qatar, France has been courting the governments of Kuwait and the UAE.
President Hollande is hoping that the UAE will purchase 60 Rafales, giving encouragement to
both Kuwait and Qatar to also purchase the jet fighter. The UAE purchase, if it goes through,
would be worth an estimated US$10 billion.
The Middle East is a profitable market for Western defence industries. As threats mount in
the region, with instability in Syria and Iraq and a hostile Iran, many of the regional states in
have increased their defence spending. This is especially the case in the Gulf States, which
live in the shadow of larger or more sophisticated militaries, such as Israel and Turkey, and
which have particular concerns about the Iranian navy.
The potential purchase of the Rafale by Qatar will be indicative of how Doha perceives its
strategic environment. With a relatively low price tag of US$82 million per aircraft, the
Rafale represents a sound investment and provides sufficient capabilities to address the
contingencies that Qatar would be most likely to face. The Eurofighter Typhoon, however, is
a natural competitor with a similar range of capabilities and a price comparable to that of
the Rafale, but it has performed in fewer operations and thus is less proven. A purchase of
the F-35 Lightning II is also possible, but would be more a political decision than militarily
sound. The F-35 is a “gold-plated” aircraft, with abilities beyond the tactical requirements of
the region and it carries a price-tag to match, with an estimated cost of US$238 million per
unit.1
Gulf Falcon 2013 will have served as a major exhibition for the Rafale and, with its proven
success in Operation Harmattan in Libya in 2011 and Operation Serval in Mali in 2012, it
meets the region’s strategic needs. France’s visibility in Gulf Falcon and visits such as those
by President Hollande may lift the profile of the Rafale further and encourage other
countries to also purchase it.
Gustavo Mendiolaza Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
1 Caverley, J., and Kapstein, E., 2012, ‘Arms Away: How Washington Squandered Its Monopoly on
Weapons Sales’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, №. 5, pp. 1-3.
Page 8 of 12
India Reinforces its Eastern Border with China
For practically the first time since it lost the 1962 war with China, India is reinforcing its
Arunachal Pradesh border with that country, demonstrating a self-assurance it previously
lacked.
Background
India’s Minister of Defence, A. K. Antony, recently informed the Upper House of Parliament
that the Indian Army would raise thirty infantry battalions (approximately thirty thousand
troops) to ‘enhance combat capacity’. These troops will complement a 90,000-strong Strike
Force, which is to be deployed along India’s eastern border with China.
Comment
India has been in the news of late for its high-tech military purchases and R&D. Its
acquisition of fighter aircraft from France, development of fifth-generation fighters with
Russia and purchases of submarines from Germany, have all been widely reported. Not quite
as prominent, however, have been its efforts to enhance the capability of its infantry.
The 2012-13 budget for capital acquisitions to modernise the Indian Army is approximately
US$2.75 billion. This forms part of an estimated cost of US$16 billion to raise the Strike
Force, which will be spread over the twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17). These new forces will
be in addition to the two mountain divisions raised since 2009 and stationed at Tezpur and
Dimapur. The soldiers will eventually be provided with modern assault rifles to replace the
inefficient, indigenously-built INSAS 5.56mm rifle. The new rifles will be sourced from one of
five vendors, including Colt, Sig Sauer and Israel’s IWI. Additionally, troops will be equipped
with light machine guns, sniper rifles and “bunker-busting” anti-materiél rifles.
These troop and weapons enhancements complement other purchases of tanks and troop
carriers. More important, however, is the development of roads through mountainous
terrain leading to the border. India is playing catch-up with China, which can move thirty
army divisions, each comprising fifteen thousand soldiers, to the Line of Actual Control in a
relatively short time.
While India has only now started to develop the road infrastructure on its side of the border
in Arunachal Pradesh, China has built over 58,000 kilometres of roads, five operational air
bases and a vast rail network on its side of the border, close to the area it calls South Tibet,
which it claims as Chinese territory. In contrast, the Indian Army’s Border Roads
Organisation (BRO) has constructed only about 2,700 km of roads in Arunachal Pradesh; with
only twelve of a planned seventy-three roads constructed so far, India lags far behind
Chinese efforts.
This, though, is not due to inefficiency or ineptitude. The mountains through which these
roads are to be built take their toll on human lives and machinery. Earthmoving equipment,
snow ploughs and other machinery are reduced to just over thirty per cent of their life span
in these conditions. That the Changla and Khardungla roads to the border are kept open
even in winter’s sub-zero temperatures and snowstorms, gives an indication of the efforts
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and expertise of the BRO engineers. The toll in human lives is high, higher even than that of
the troops fighting in Kashmir.
Despite this, seventy-five roads, totalling approximately 6,000 km, are under construction,
with another 7,000 km planned. These roads will ferry Indian troop reinforcements and
supplies to positions at the border. The truth of the dictum that politicians and armchair
strategists discuss tactics but professionals study logistics, is pronounced here.
More positively, this new infrastructure and troop enhancement demonstrates a new-found
confidence in India’s strategic thinking. In 1962, as Indian troops retreated before advancing
Chinese soldiers, they burned bridges and destroyed roads and other infrastructure so that
the Chinese could not use them to progress further into India. After these events, no
infrastructure development took place in Arunachal Pradesh for decades as a tactic to slow
any Chinese invasion. Now, New Delhi believes, it can stand up to an aggressive China.
A major task of the Strike Force is to take the fight to Chinese troops in Tibet. The Indian
army has proposed a tactical airlift capacity, with the Air Force deploying its C-130J aircraft
to position paratroopers deep in enemy territory. India has also deployed thirty-six Sukhoi
Su-30MKI fighter aircraft In Tezpur. The purchase of 126 Dassault Rafale fighters means that
India could also re-position the Su-30MKI aircraft it has on the Pakistani border, east to the
Chinese border. This would provide even more capacity should it be required.
It appears India has indeed turned a corner in its strategic thinking and self-belief – as
becomes a regional power and aspirant to great power status.
Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
Australia Seeking to Deepen Relations with Indonesia
At the recent Indonesia-Australia dialogue, Foreign Minister Bob Carr stressed the
importance of deepening relations with Indonesia and building stronger cultural and
people-to-people ties.
Background
At the Indonesia-Australia dialogue, Foreign Minister Bob Carr said relations
between Australia and Indonesia are at a ‘near historic high’ but stressed more needed to be
done to deepen the relationship. The annual conference, which was held over 3-4 March,
was aimed at promoting non-governmental relations and a greater understanding between
the two countries. As Asia continues its rise, deeper relations with countries such as
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Indonesia that go beyond trade, diplomacy and security, will be critical in determining
whether Australia fully capitalises on the so-called “Asian Century”.
Comment
Speaking to a range of business people and former diplomats on 4 March, Carr praised the
current relationship but said more needed to be further relations. ‘It is time to build on our
existing partnership to elevate bilateral relations to a higher level’, he declared. He went on
to say that ‘this effort should not be the exclusive domain of politicians, diplomats and
officials, but should include a range of people, including students, business people,
academics, scientists, athletes and artists.
Carr’s comments come at a crucial time for Australia-Indonesia relations. Trade and security
dealings between the two states have scarcely been better; bilateral trade has grown by
over 60 per cent in the last ten years alone. But beyond these areas the relationship has
largely failed to achieve its full potential. At a time when Australia should be moving closer
to Indonesia, its Indonesia “literacy” and cultural ties have been declining.
Indeed, polling by the Lowy Institute and Newspoll indicates that ordinary citizens know little
about each other’s countries. Less than half of the Australians polled knew that Indonesia
was a democracy and one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Similarly, only 14
per cent of Indonesians knew that Australia was Indonesia’s largest aid partner. This lack of
understanding should not be understated; without broader awareness and engagement, the
relationship is unlikely to move beyond the traditional realms of trade, security and
diplomacy.
In fact, a recent government-commissioned report went even further, warning of the
possible consequences should Australia continue on its current path. The Murdoch
University paper said that unless Australia significantly improved its understanding of
Indonesian culture and language, it risked getting left behind and ‘losing *its+ competitive
advantage’. As Carr rightly acknowledges, ‘the lack of knowledge between our two societies
remains a key challenge’. Building closer cultural and person-to-person ties is easier said
than done, however.
Though more than a million Australians visit Indonesia each year, few venture beyond
the island of Bali. Australia’s love affair with the tourist island may be great for its locals,
many of whom have taken to calling the island kampong bule, or “whitey town”, but it does
little to boost cultural ties and understanding beyond those confines.
Public diplomacy that addresses long-standing attitudes and opinions must be improved on
both sides. For its part, Jakarta should put greater emphasis on promoting tourist
destinations other than Bali, which would better showcase the diversity of cultures and
lifestyles across the archipelago. But Canberra, especially, must work on shifting the
attitudes of its citizens. Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world and the
largest Muslim country; it comprises almost 18,000 islands, not just Bali.
In the recent Asian Century White Paper, the Federal Government outlined a number of
ways in which it aimed to boost non-governmental ties. These included: promoting
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Indonesian language studies; building greater student networks; extending cultural grants;
furthering private trade relations and even improving media coverage of Asia and Indonesia.
This certainly sounds good in theory. In practice, however, a more concerted effort and
greater funding will be required to achieve these goals and reverse the current trend.
Should Australia deepen relations with the archipelago state, the potential rewards may be
huge. One of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Indonesia’s recent pace has
outstripped even the likes of China and India; it is predicted to be the seventh largest
economy in the world by 2030. It is also going to be home to one of the largest middle
classes in the world. Although Australia’s current bilateral trade with Indonesia, our
thirteenth-largest trading partner, is currently modest, there are promising signs for the
future. No longer considered a “screen door” blocking Australia from the rest of Asia,
Indonesia’s proximity and projected rise makes it one of Canberra’s most important allies in
the region.
But that is no sure thing. Australia must do all that it can to build stronger cultural ties with
Indonesia. That would then position it to truly capitalise on Indonesia’s projected ascent. As
David T. Hill concluded in his Murdoch University report, ‘Australia’s bilateral relationship
with Indonesia is arguably our most important …. Now, more than ever, there is a need for
collaboration and partnership across all aspects of the … relationship’.
Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]
*****
What’s Next?
• Burmese president Thein Sein is to visit Australia from 17-19 March. He will meet with Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Governor-General Quentin Bryce and business leaders. He is the first Burmese head of state to visit Australia since 1974.
• The Flinders University Centre for United States and Asia Policy Studies (CUSAPS) is
hosting a free half-day seminar titled “Building Confidence in Times of Structural Change” that will investigate security challenges and opportunities in the emerging Indo-Pacific region and how states might seek to best manage them. The venue is the Adelaide Convention Centre, North Terrace, from 2.30pm-6.00pm on 19 March. To register, contact Ali Lehman on [email protected] or (08) 8201 2186.
• The New Zealand Government and the European Union are hosting the Pacific
Energy Summit in Auckland from 24-26 March, preceded by two days in Tonga to see the Tonga Energy Roadmap in action (21-22 March). The focus of the Summit is on investment in both renewable energy and energy efficiency.
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