fuelling the violence

7/31/2019 Fuelling The Violence

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FUELLING HEVIOLENCEOil Companies and Armed

Militancy in Nigeria


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FUELLING THE VIOLENCE: OIL COMPANIES AND ARMED MILITANCY IN NIGERIA

Oil companies such as Shell and Chevron have unded armedmilitant groups in the volatile Niger Delta region o Nigeria since at

least 2003 and paid protection money to other hostile groups ordecades, according to US embassy cables and other sources. Armed

militants cut Nigerias oil production by more than a quarter in2006.1 Oil companies and the Nigerian government have used

payments and contracts to paciy the militants. Yet these practiceshave uelled the confict in the Delta, which claimed an estimated1,000 lives a year.2 Despite repeated promises over the past decade,

oil companies have continued making these harmul payments.

Ex-militant leaders have recently been awarded lucrativegovernment and oil company contracts worth millions o dollars.

In 2012 the government plans to spend over $405 million on

its amnesty programme or militants, more than it spends onchildrens basic education.3 Yet the underlying problems o poverty,unemployment, environmental devastation and political grievances

that stirred militancy in the Deltas creeks remain unresolved.

Summary


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In the dense mangrove swamps

o Delta State, a group o perhaps

300 militant and well-armed Ijaw

youths last month was able to shut

down over 40 percent o Nigerias oil

production, costing over [one billion

US dollars] to date.4

So begins a US embassy cablesent in the name o Ambassador

Harold F. Jeter on 17 April 2003.

According to the cable, these militants,based in the village o Okerenkoko in

Warri southwest, were armed with new

assault ries and rocket-propelled gre-nade (RPG) launchers and [were] aided

by a eet o ast speedboats. They

were believed to possess sophisticat-ed weapons including armor-piercing

artillery in their arsenal.5

Ambassador Jeters cable was sent dur-

ing national elections widely marred byrigging and political violence. The local

oil city o Warri had been at the epicen-

tre o a recurrent political and ethnicconict between the Ijaw, Urhobo and

Itsekiri ethnic groups. The main source

o unding or the conict was oil bun-kering, the tapping o crude oil rom

pipelines and other inrastructure or

sale on the black market.6 Ethnic mili-tia ought each other and government

orces to control the highly proftable

trade in stolen oil.

Oil companies played a signifcant role

in the resulting conict which displacedthousands and killed an estimated 500

people.7 US embassy cables suggest

that Shell and Chevron, the main opera-tors in the area, provided regular pay-

ments, contracts and one-o fnancialsettlements to local Ijaw militants. Ac-

cording to a cable sent in Ambassador

Jeters name:

many o these [Ijaw] youths have

been used to receiving direct

payments rom the oil companies

to rerain rom vandalizing oilinstallations or threatening oil

companies personnel. Disbursed

under the guise o a community

guard or watch program, these

payments average the equivalent

o $300 per month.8

Te Warri crisis

Nigerian military stop and search residents inWarri, 2003. Photo by George Osodi.


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At the time, $300 would have sustained

each militant with quality weapons

and supplies or several weeks.9 Thecable does not speciy how many pay-

ments were awarded, nor does it say

how many militants were paid or when.Yet a cable sent under Ambassador

Jeters successor, John Campbell,

suggests that these fnancial relation-ships were already well entrenched:

the oil companies have poured

money into select villages/clans

to buy protection or placate local

populations. Over three decades

that money has piled up guns in the

hands o Delta villagers.10

Whilst Shell and Chevron were not the

only source o income or Warri militants,

company payments exacerbated theconict and risked involving the compa-

nies in gross human rights abuses. TheWarri crisis also impacted heavily on oil

operations. According to a UK govern-

ment memo released to Platorm underthe Freedom o Inormation Act, Shell

reported:

125 community related disruptions,

1200 production days and 3.9 millionbarrels lost in 200311

In March that year, the humanitarian

impact o the Warri crisis reached the

companies gates. Thousands o dis-placed locals, primarily rom the Itsekiri

ethnic group, converged on Chevrons

Escravos terminal to escape rom aseries o ethnic raids. Chevron airlited

2,000 people, mainly Itsekiris, to saety.

Shell also evacuated dozens o peoplerom its Escravos owstation by helicop-

ter, and reportedly came under fre romarmed militia.12

In subsequent years Shell has remainedcentral to the dynamics o conict in

the Delta. Independent investigations

between 2003 and 2011 by Shell secu-rity consultants WAC Global,13 Amnesty

International,14 the Financial Times,15 and

Platorm16 have all highlighted that Shell

has awarded contracts to groups re-sponsible or, or linked to, human rights

abuses in the Niger Delta. Platormsreport ound that rom 2005 to 2010,

Shells routine contracts and payments

to armed militants uelled a range oconicts. In Rumuekpe town, a major

artery o Shells eastern operations, Shell

awarded contracts worth over $57,000to armed gangs who ought over control

o the area.17

The resulting conict ledto the complete destruction o the town,

where it is estimated that at least 60

people were killed.


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The exact amount o Shells overall pay-

ments to militant groups in the Delta is

uncertain, but the scale and extent othese payments is substantial. Shell se-

curity spending data leaked to Platorm

reveals that globally, the company spent$127 million on so-called Other security

costs in 2008, accounting or over 40%

o Shells security spending. In Nigeria,Shell spent an estimated $65 million

on government security orces and $75

million on Other security costs in 2009.Note that this does not include an esti-

mated $200 million in annual commu-

nity development unds that have otenbeen distributed to groups that threaten

Shell operations.18 Shell appears to haveturned a blind eye to vast amounts o

unexplained security spending in Nige-

ria, during a period o intense violentconict in the Delta.

Capital expenditure 10%

$32,500,000

Other 37%

$127,000,000

Staff costs 14%

$48,500,000

Third Parties 29%

$99,000,000

Contractors 10%

$35,000,000

Severence 0.3%

1,000,000

Figure 1. Shell Global Security Spending by Category 2008

Source: Shell Total Security Spend $343mm
http://platformlondon.org/2012/08/19/data-leak-reveals-shell%E2%80%99s-deep-financial-links-to-human-rights-abusers-in-nigeria/http://platformlondon.org/2012/08/19/data-leak-reveals-shell%E2%80%99s-deep-financial-links-to-human-rights-abusers-in-nigeria/


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Shell has repeatedly pledged toend its cash payments to local

communities and militant groups.

In a letter to Human Rights Watch inAugust 2003 Shell claimed to be clamp-

ing down on these practices:

SPDC [Shell] Managing Director

Ron van den Berg circulated an in-

ternal memo to all sta stating that,

eective immediately, There shall be

NO Cash Payments to communities

other than those specifed or legiti-

mate business reasons.19

Three months later, a US embassy cable

reported that Shells practice o oering

fnancial benefts to settle communitygrievances was still routine:

In order to molliy local unhappiness

over the deployment o military

troops at the various reopened Shell

sites, Shell community liaison ofcers

have been oering new contracts to

various communities, according to

local NGOs.20

In December 2003, a leaked internalreport by security analysts WAC Global

ound that Shells distribution o cash

and contracts in the Delta was a promi-nent trigger or conict.21 Shell largely

dismissed the report, but claimed that

they would change their operating,security and community development

strategies.22 However, as violenceerupted in 2004 between rival militant

actions led by Ateke Tom and Asari

Dokubo in the western Delta, Shell keptup regular payments to paciy these

militant groups.23

A letter released to Platorm under the

Freedom o Inormation Act suggeststhat Shell continued with business as

usual. Between 19 and 21 July 2004, the

UK High Commissioner to Nigeria, Rich-ard Gozney, took helicopter tours over

Shells acilities. Shells Mutiu Sunmonu,

who was then General Manager o Pro-duction in the eastern region, brieed

Gozney on local community issues. Shell

promised: Big rules or the uture nocash payments, new rules or contrac-

tors (not to issue pay-os), no ghost

workers.24 However, the Foreign Ofce

noted that:

the new Head o Community

Development spoke in terms [o]

achieving these in the uture SPDC

[Shell] have stated in the past that

this policy was already in place25

Broken promises


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Almost a year ater Shell committed itsel

to a policy o NO Cash Payments,

Shell repeated the same empty promiseword or word.

Speaking at an event in London in Feb-ruary 2012, Sunmonu, now Managing

Director o Shell Nigeria, confrmed the

companys lack o progress:

you do not know who is a militant

and who is a genuine contractor.

So there could be cases in the past

where you have thought you were

employing, you know, a genuine,

bona fde contractor, and yet he is

probably a militant or a warlord.26

Sunmonus statement illustrates a stun-

ning ailure o due diligence. Under the

UN Framework or Business and HumanRights, Shell has a duty to avoid hu-

man rights violations regardless o howchallenging the external environment.

In conict-zones like the Delta, this duty

requires heightened due diligence andenhanced preventative measures to

ensure that company conduct does not

worsen conict and abuses.27 Shells

decade o broken promises and lack o

compliance with international standardsexposes the company to legal, reputa-

tional and fnancial risks.

Nigerian Joint Task Force soldier guardingChevron acilities in the Niger Delta. Photoby Sophie Evans.


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In order or Chevron to operate itsgas plant in Escravos during intense

fghting between insurgents and the

Nigerian military, the oil company didbusiness with one o the main command-

ers o the Movement or the Emancipa-

tion o the Niger Delta (MEND), knownas Government Tompolo. From late

2006, MEND had launched devastating

attacks on oil company inrastructureand personnel.28 Despite this, Chevron

developed a close working relationshipwith Tompolo and his army o MEND

militants. Tompolos base was located at

Camp Five, along the river supply routeto Chevrons gas plant. A cable sent on

8 February 2008 describes how Chevron

had contact on security matters with themilitants via phone and text messages.29

Chevron admitted it maintains

regular contact with members o

Tom Polos militant organization,

going so ar as to occasionally call

militants beore river-borne supply

convoys pass by militant camps to

make sure the situation is stable

enough or the convoy to arrive

at Escravos intact.30

The relationship between Chevron andTompolo went beyond coordinating river

supply convoys. In Escravos, Chevrons

construction workers were housed alongthe river in dozens o houseboats. On a

tour o the area, US ofcials noticed that:

clearly visible on one o the

house boats was the name,

Tom Polo Limited.31

When asked about the origin o theboat, Chevron claimed:

they didnt have much choice;

in addition to his militant activities

Tom Polo was a local businessman

and his houseboat went through the

same vetting process as those rom

other companies.32

That Tom Polo Limited sailed through

Chevrons vetting process highlightsserious ailings in Chevrons basic proce-

dures. The company had been renting

houseboats rom a prominent MENDcommander, whose militants had slashed

Nigerias oil production and kidnapped

oil workers in attacks on the industry.33

Regular contact

Ibori ties:Tompolo was not the only controversial

gure benetting rom oil company

contracts. James Ibori, the notoriously

corrupt ex-governor o Delta State,

owned a company that leased Chevron

several o the houseboats in Escravos.

At the time, Ibori aced over 100 counts

o corruption in Nigeria.34 In April 2012,

Ibori was sentenced to 13 years in pris-

on ater pleading guilty at Southwark

Crown Court in London to 50 million

worth o raud.35


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The business links between Chevron

and Tompolo demonstrate the wider

privatisation o militancy in Nigeria.Lack o governance and harmul corpo-

rate practices have encouraged the rise

o powerul militant leaders and armedgroups, and have rewarded violence. Mil-

itant leaders have been enriched by gov-

ernment and company payouts. In March2012, the Nigerian government gave

Tompolo ofcial backing by awarding his

company, Global West Vessel SpecialistAgency, a contract worth $103 million to

secure the waterways o the Delta. Other

ex-militant leaders have beneftted romsimilar contracts. 36

Masked MEND militants in the Delta.

Photo by George Osodi.


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As armed militancy spread across theDelta, oil companies became increas-

ingly involved with militant groups in

order to regain access to acilities closedor damaged by the conict. In 2003, the

Nigerian National Petroleum Corpora-

tion (NNPC) reportedly paid $55,000 tomilitants in Escravos or permission to

repair a pipeline which runs to the north-

ern refnery in Kaduna.38 According to

US cables, Chevron planned to negoti-

ate with armed Ijaw militants who killedscores o people when they attacked and

razed over 40 Itsekiri villages and several

oil installations.39 The US governmentwas quick to point out the dangers o

such moves:

any compromise with the Ijaw

militants will only enhance their

power and status and will whet

their appetite or more money and

control o the local area.40

Chevron used local security contracts

to keep opponents and youth groupsunder control. As a US embassy cable

confrmed:

Chevron-Texaco, like other

companies, oten pays idle youth to

serve as home guards protecting

the companys acilities in the area.

This is little more than payo to

youths who threaten oil company

installations with sabotage.41

The eectiveness o this strategy is ques-tionable. In May 2003, Chevrons home

guards turned against them, occupied

an oshore platorm and held sta hos-tage near the coast o Bayelsa State until

the Nigerian Navy intervened.42

Shell temporarily abandoned its opera-

tions in the western Delta in February2006, ollowing a series o attacks,

including multiple hostage takings.43

Later in July, the US government metwith Shells Vice President or Arica, Ann

Pickard, who described how Shell was

coming under pressure. The shut-downo Shells Forcados export terminal had

removed 500,000 barrels o oil per day

rom the world market, some 25% o Ni-gerias production. Shell had conducted

unmanned overights o the region,

but had been unable to ully re-enter itsacilities. US cables report that:

Shell was now compelled to

re-negotiate re-entry with MEND

characters. [Pickard] described

these interlocutors as a small group

o ideologues joined in a marriage

o convenience with militant and

criminal elements operating in

the creeks.44

The details o these negotiations are

scarce, but they illustrate how oil com-panies engaged in complicated relation-

ships with armed militant groups and

their networks in order to extract oil rom

the Delta during a time o conict.

Privatised militancy37


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Shells relationship with militants in the

eastern Delta also caused complications.

In an interview with Platorm in 2011,a Shell manager described the compa-

nys approach:

Most o the militants, the ex-

militants, we got close to them, even

when they were militants. Relating

well with them, talking well with

them. Being kind and nice, not to

be aggressive. And with that they

have that confdence that we will not

betray them45

In practice, Shell has tried to incorporate

militants into its security arrangementsvia surveillance contracts. The Shell

manager told Platorm:

Some o them came asking orspecial surveillance services, what

they could be doing or Shell and we

said okay, its better i we entrust

some o our acilities into your hands

[so] you look ater them

We brought them close to

ourselves and using them at least

to discourage other people rom

vandalising, doing bunkering46

While proessional training and sustain-

able employment are sorely needed in

the Niger Delta, Shells security contractshave provided neither. These contracts

have uelled violent rivalry between

armed youth groups, de-stabilised com-munities and sparked communal con-

icts.47 Shell and other companies have

incentivised violence by awarding con-tracts to groups with the most coercive

power.48 A recent study by the Wilson

Centre stated that these contracts otenend up in the hands o the very groups

responsible or attacks on oil acilities.49In one example, a Shell contractor based

in the village o Ikarama in Bayelsa State

alleged that Shell awarded contracts topaciy an armed gang that was responsi-

ble or sabotaging the companys Okor-

dia maniold in February 2008.50

It is likely that Shell will fnd it hard

to extricate itsel rom these arrange-ments.51 Between 2 and 15 August

2011, the Okordia Rumuekpe trunk

line in Ikarama was attacked by local

youths urious over the companys sud-den withdrawal o their surveillance

contracts.52 In cases like this, Shells sur-

veillance contracts are simply a fg lea

or illegitimate protection payments.

A boy stands between pipelines in Okrika,Rivers State. Photo by George Osodi.


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The routine payments to armedmilitants made by Shell, Chevron,

NNPC and other companies have

uelled violence in the Niger Delta overthe past decade. It is estimated that

the distribution o cash and contracts

by oil companies has contributed tothe killing and displacement o thou-

sands o local people in communal

and ethnic conicts.53 Company secu-

rity contracts have rewarded violence

by channelling unds towards the mostpowerul armed groups.

Every payment made by oil companiesin Nigeria should be linked to a clearly

and accurately recorded transaction. I

there is a signifcant risk that cash pay-

ments and contracts could go to armedgroups or worsen conict, the transac-

tions should stop. Hiding such payments

is not a sustainable option and will notenable companies to avoid contributing

to human rights abuses.

Shell, Chevron and the Nigerian govern-

ment must prioritise the saety and se-curity o local communities over access

to inrastructure and oil extraction rates.

The limited gains o the governmentsamnesty or militants could easily beundermined unless security is based on

respect or human rights, the protection

o the environment and the peaceulresolution o social and political griev-

ances in the Niger Delta region.54

For further recommendations to arange of stakeholders visit:

http://platormlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pd

Conclusion

Shell oil barrel. Photo by Friends o the Earth.
http://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdfhttp://platformlondon.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/12.08.02-Dirty-Work-Recommendations.pdf


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Joe Brock, Reuters, Ex-militants pose latent1.

threat to Nigerian oil, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/06/nigeria-militants-

idUSLDE73317V20110406, 6 April 2011.

International Crisis Group, (2006): The Swamps2.

o Insurgency, p 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/

media/Files/arica/west-arica/nigeria/The%20

Swamps%20o%20Insurgency%20Nigerias%20

Delta%20Unrest.pd; also see Report o Techni-

cal Committee on the Niger Delta, vol. 1 (2008):

p 9, http://www.mosop.org/Nigeria_Niger_Del-

ta_Technical_Committee_Report_2008.pd.

The Economist, The Niger Delta: Still an oily3.

dangerous mess, http://www.economist.com/

node/21560299?src=scn/tw_ec/still_an_oily_

dangerous_mess, 11 August 2012. Others

estimate the 2012 budget or the amnesty to

be around $450m, The Wall Street Journal, Ni-

gerias Former Oil Bandits Now Collect Govern-

ment Cash, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100

01424052702304019404577420160886588518.

html?mod=WSJ_hps_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNew

sTop#articleTabs%3Darticle, 21 August 2012.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/4.

03ABUJA718.html, 17 April 2003.


03ABUJA1061.html, 13 June 2003.

Human Rights Watch, (2003): The Warri Crisis:6.

Fueling Violence, http://www.hrw.org/sites/

deault/fles/reports/nigeria1103.pd, p 17 to 20.

Amnesty International, (2005): Nigeria:7.

Ten years on: injustice and violence haunt

the oil Delta, p14, http://www.amnesty.

org/en/library/asset/AFR44/022/2005/

en/63b716d6-d49d-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/

ar440222005en.pd.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/04/8.03ABUJA718.html, 17 April 2003.

According to an internal Shell report at the9.

time, WAC Global, Peace and Security in the

Niger Delta, p43, http://shellnews.net/2007/

shell_wac_report_2004.pd.


04ABUJA1486.html, 30 August 2004.

Platorm FOI request to the FCO, re 0470 avail-11.

able here: http://platormlondon.org/wp-con-

tent/uploads/2012/08/0470-Digest-or-request-

or-inormation-redacted-KS-rcd-23-Sept.pd.

Human Rights Watch, (2003): p 7 - 8.12.

WAC Global (2003): p5.13.

Amnesty International, (2005): Nigeria:14.

Ten years on, p19-22.

Dino Mahtani and Daniel Balint-Kurti,15.

Financial Times, Shell gives Nigerian work to

militants companies, http://www.t.com/cms/

s/0/0237da00-d58a-11da-93bc-0000779e2340.

html, April 2006.

Platorm, (2011): Counting the Cost:16.

corporations and human rights in the Niger

Delta, p 33-36, http://blog.platormlondon.

org/2011/10/03/counting-the-cost-corporations-

and-human-rights-abuses-in-the-niger-delta/See note 16.17.

What was not included in the fgure was18.

mentioned in a Platorm interview with ex-Shell

manager, 7 October 2011. On community

development unds, see Michael Watts, (2008):

Curse o the Black Gold: 50 years o oil in the

Niger Delta, p46. Also Adam Groves, (2009):

(Un)civil society and corporate security strate-

gies in the Niger Delta, p22 to 23, http://www.e-

ir.ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.

Human Rights Watch, (2003): p12.19.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/20.03ABUJA1908.html, 3 November 2003.

WAC Global (2003): p 5 and 14.21.

Kenneth Omeje, (2006): High stakes and Stake-22.

holders, p 78, http://books.google.co.uk/books

?id=IH0bSRZP8bEC&printsec=rontcover&sour

ce=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q

&=alse.

See Watts, (2008): Blood Oil: The Anatomy o23.

a Petro-Insurgency In the Niger Delta, Nigeria,

p 5, http://oldweb.geog.berkeley.edu/Proj-

ectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/

WP/22-BloodOil_Watts.pd.

Plaorm FOI request to the FCO, reerence24.

0470-11, available here: http://platormlondon.

org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/0470-Digest-

or-request-or-inormation-redacted-KS-rcd-23-

Sept.pd.

See note 24.25.

Shell admits unding Niger Delta warlords,26.

Greenpeace UK blog, Ben Amunwa, http://

www.greenpeace.org.uk/blog/climate/shell-

admits-unding-niger-delta-warlords-20120502,

2 May 2012.

ENDNOES


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UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human27.

Rights: Implementing the United NationsProtect, Respect and Remedy Framework,

Point 23, p 21, http://www.business-human-

rights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-

guiding-principles-21-mar-2011.pd. Also

Andrea Shemberg, New Global Standards or

Business and Human Rights, presentation at

Herbert Smith LLP, 7 July 2011.


07LAGOS64.html, 2 February 2007; also see

BBC, Profle: Nigerias militant kingpin, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/arica/8068862.stm,

27 May 2009.


08LAGOS41.html#, 8 February 2008.

See note 29.30.

See note 29.31.

See note 29.32.

Joe Brock, Reuters, Ex-militants pose latent33.

threat to Nigerian oil, http://www.reuters.

com/article/2011/04/06/nigeria-militants-

idUSLDE73317V20110406, 6 April 2011.

See note 29.34.

BBC, Former Nigeria governor James Ibori35.

jailed or 13 years, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

world-arica-17739388, 17 April 2012.

The Guardian, AP Exclusive: Nigeria ex-militant36.

linked to bid, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/

eedarticle/10170051, 29 March 2012. The Wall

Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB100 0142405270230401940457742016088658

8518.html?mod=WSJ_hps_MIDDLENexttoWhats

NewsTop#articleTabs%3Darticle, 21 August 2012.


08LAGOS449.html, 14 November 2008.


03ABUJA1138.html#, 1 July 2003.

See note 38.39.

See note 38.40.


03ABUJA807.html, 1 May 2003.

See note 41.42.

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06LAGOS27.43.

html, 12 January 2006; http://wikileaks.org/

cable/2006/01/06LAGOS48.html,

17 January 2006.


06LAGOS1030.html#, 26 July 2006.

Platorm interview with Shell manager,45.

15 August 2011.

See note 45.46.

Examples include Dere, Nembe, Odioma,47.

Ozoro and the inter-ethnic Warri crisis between

Ijaw, Urhobo and Itsekeri communities. See

Watts, (2008): p 46; and Ikelegbe, (2005): The

Economy o Conict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta

Region o Nigeria, Nordic Journal o Arican

Studies 14(2): p 220, http://www.njas.helsinki.f/

pd-fles/vol14num2/ikelegbe.pd.Anna Zalik in Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds),48.

(2011): Oil and Insurgency, p 188.

The Wilson Centre, (2011): Securing Develop-49.

ment and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and

Conict Analysis or Change, http://www.wil-

soncenter.org/sites/deault/fles/AFR_110929_

Niger%20Delta_0113.pd, p62 63.

Platorm interview with Shell contractor in50.

Ikarama, 29 September 2010.

See Groves, (2009): p 30,51. http://www.e-ir.

ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.

Reuters, Shell shuts Nigerian oil ow station52.

ater spills, http://a.reuters.com/article/invest-

ingNews/idAFJOE7720HL20110803,

3 August 2011.

Omeje, (2004): The State, Conict and Evolving53.

politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, Review o

Arican Political Economy, No. 101 p 436.

As quoted in Groves, (2008): p 27, http://

www.e-ir.ino/?p=1488&article2pd=1.

For a uller discussion o community defnitions54.

o shared security, see IKV Pax Christi, SDN,

CSCR/ACCR, (2008): Local Perspectives on

Security and Human Rights in the Niger Delta,

p 4, http://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/

uploads/SDN%20Publications/0804_Local_Per-

spectives_on_Security_and_Human_Rights_in_

the_Niger_Delta%5B1%5D.pd.

fuelling the violence

Documents