fuhrer directives

_ 1146y~VES ______

f-7~I'

FUEH.RER

AND OTHER

TOP- LEVEL DIRECTIVES.

OF. THE

GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

1942 -1945

1 v )jQ^'C -

P"Ir

Foreword

This is the second of two volumes of top-level directives issuedby Hitler and by the German Armed Forces High Command from 1939 through195 and translated by this office. In a few cases it was possible toinclude top-leveli-' aval directives showing the Navy's reaction. Thefirst volume covers 1939 through 1941, the present one 1942 through1945.

The statements made in the foreword of the first volume apply tothe second one, as well. The directives of the later years of the warclearly reflect the change in the character of German warfare from large-scale planned offensives to piecemeal defensive operations.

Except when otherwise indicated the references given in the tableof contents denote the microfilm reels and sections thereof on whichthe documents may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records andLibrary. Where WD numbers appear, the originals can be found in theGerman Military Document Section of the Department of the Army.

Washington, D.C.1948

8-68

UNCLASSIHEP

TABLE OF C ONTENTS.Document Signature Date

1i421.

2.

3.

4,

5,

6.

7,

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

'17.

18.

Armament for 194 2

Armament for 1942

Deception of the Enemy

Operations in the Black Sea

Operations in the North

Directive 40 - Command Organ-ization on the Coasts

Command Organization on theCoasts

Directive 41 - Eastern Front

Special Order No. 1 i Connec-tion with Directive 41

Coastal Defense

Operations in the Mediterranean

Directive 42 - Operationsagainst Unoccupied France andthe Iberian Peninsula

Appointment of Commissioner ofMaritime Shipping

Regulations for Handling SecretDocuments

Manpower Needed for Shipyards

Strengthening of DefenseMeasures in the West

Directive 43 - Operations inthe Crimea

Reinforcement of the AfricanPanzer Army

Hitler

Raeder

Keitel

Raeder

Hitler

Hitler

Raeder

Hitler

Keitel

Raeder

Keitel

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Jan.

Jan.

Feb.

Feb.

Mar.

Mar.

Mar.Apr.

Apr.

Apr.

May

May

May

June

Jul.

Jul.

Jul.

Jul.,

Reference

T 413 BPG 32020

T 7APG 32117

T 222 CPG 31755

T 27 BPG 32219

T 3 BPG 32160

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222-CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 21 BPG 32201

T 222 CPG 31755

W.D.80234

T 22 BPG 32205

T7APG 32117

.T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

GermanNaval StaffWar Diary,Part A,194 2.

8-68

Documents

19. Directive 144 - Warfare inNorthern Finland

20. Directive 45 - Operation"Braunschweig "

21. Directive 46 - Fight AgainstBanditry in the East

22, Reinforcement of Crete andNorth Africa

23. Unified Command in theMediterranean

24. Destruction of Sabotage Troops

25. Motivation for Above Order

26,. Defense of the French Mediter-ranean Coast

27. Coastal Defense

28. Directive 47 - SoutheasternEurope

Annex to Directive 47

1. Supplement to Directive 47

2. German-Italian Command inTunisia

3. Defense Measures for theBalkans

4. Equipment for the ComingMonths

5. Supply of 6th Army

6. Treatment of Saboteurs

7. Operations of Naval SurfaceForces

8. Operations Order No. 5

Signature Date

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

NavalStaff

ArmedForces HighCommand

v' Hitler

Keitel

Hitler

Jodl

Hitler

Hitler

NavalStaff

Doenitz

Hitler

21 Jul.

23 Jul.

18 Aug.

14 Sep.

13 Oct.

18 Oct.

18 Oct.

4 Dec.

5 Dec.

28 Dec.

Reference

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

W.D.80291

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CPG 31755

3.Jan. T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 C5 Jan. PG 31755

T 222 C11 Jan. PG 31755

T 44 B14 Jan. PG 32602

15 Jan. T 44 BPG 32602

T 222-C11 Feb. PG 31755

T 373 B19 Feb. PG 317147

13 Mar. T 222 CPG 31755

39-

41

44

47

49

50

51

53

55

56

60

61

62

614

67

69

69

71

74

8-68

tN1ASSIFLlP- iE

Document

1943

9, Warfare in the East

10. Expansion of Naval Bases

11, Defense of Corsica

12. Defenses in the Mediterranean

13. Reinforcement of Defenses inthe Mediterranean

14, Changes in Directive 47

15. Warfare in Sicily

16. Directive 48 - Command Organ-ization and Defense in theSoutheast Area

17. Operations in Italy

18. Operations in Italy

19. Supplement, to Directive 48

20. Operations in Southern Russia

21. Italian Capitulation

22. Operations in Southeast Europe

23. Directive 50 - Transfer of the20th Mountain Army

24. Note on Directive 4f9

25. Application of Directive 4O toItaly

26. Operations by CommandingGeaeral, Armed Forces, Southand Army Group B

27. Application of Directive 40.to the Crimea

Signature Date

Keitel

Mleisel

War imont

Keitel

Keitel

Ke itel

Hitler

Keitel

Keitel

Hitler

Hitler

Jodl

Keitel

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Hitler

Reference

L7 Mar, T 222 CPG 31755

?4 Apr. T 119 DPG 46114

.2 May T 222 CPG 31755

.2 May WD H22/147

WD H.3 May 22/147

1 Jun. T 222 CPG 31755

.3 Jul. T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 C!6 Jul. PG 31755

1 Aug. WD H22/147

1 Aug. WD H22/147

!4 Aug. T 572PG 33658

6 Sep. T 222 CPG 31755

8 Sep. WD H22/147

9 Sep. WD H22/147.

T 222 C!8 Sep. PG 31755

7 Oct. T 222 CPG 31755

T 119 D3 Oct. PG 46114

T 222 C

4f Oct. PG 31755

T 27 B'3 Oct. PG 32219

iii

Page

76

78

79

759

80

82

83

84

87

88

89

89

91

92

93

94

95

95

98

-68

IiASSI1E LDocument

124228. Operations in Southern Russia

29. Directive 51 -Defenses in theWest

30. Command Organization in Italy

31. Rommelts Army Group for SpecialEmployment

32. Naval Report in Connection withDirective 51

33. Warfare against England

31k. Preparations for Imminent Large-Scale Battles in the West

35. Reinforcement of ThreatenedSectors

36. Order Forbidding Withdrawalsof Personnel and Equipmentfrbm the West

12L4

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Concerning Army Group B

Combat Zones in the West

Fortresses in the West

Command Authority in theSouthwest

Supplies and Transports inthe Aegean Sea

Battle for Rome

Order to Destroy U.S. 5thArmy

Operations by Naval Forces inCase of an Enemy Landing

Channel Island Fortresses

Fuebrer Order No. 11 -Strongpoints

Signature Date Reference

Hitler 29 Oct. T 222 C(28 Oct.)PG 31755

T 222 CHitler 3 Nov. PG 31755

Keitel 6 Nov. T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CHitler 6 Nov. PG 31755

T 222 CDoenitz 13 Nov. PG 31755

Hitler 1 Dec. T 222 CPG 31755

T 222 CKeitel 12 Dec. PG 31755



EXeitel

Hitler

Jodi

Jodl

Jodi

Hitler

Jodl

Doenitz

Keitel

Hitler

1 Jan. T 222 CPG 31755

17 Jan. T 222 CPG 31755

19 Jan. T 222 CPG 31755

T 27 B19 Jan. PG 32218

T,27 B20 Jan. PG 32218

28 Jan. T 27 BPG 32218

T 27 B14 Feb. PG 32218

T 191 C19 Feb. PG 48613

3 Mar. T 1222 CP( 31755

a 1222 C8 Mcar. PGI 31756

Pam

98

99

103

105

106

110

110

115

117

118

118

119

120

120

121

122 -

123

126

127

B-68

Signature Date

11. D'estruction of Hsrbors andbor Installations DuringEvacuation

Har-

12. Operational Order No, 7 -Operations on the EasternFront

13. Organization of Army Group G

14. Bombardment of England

15. Directive for Operations ofthe Task Force

16, Task of the Party in Case ofan Invasion

17. Order for the Navy to Take Overthe Direction of Shipping

18. Maritime Shipping

19. Cooperation Between the Partyand the Armed Forces

20. Command Authority in an Opera-tions Area Within the Reich

21. Emergency Situations

22. Reorganization of CommandAuthority in Corps Area I

23. Preparations for the Defenseof the Reich

Annex to Preceding Document -Participation of CivilianAuthorities in RepellingEnemy Attacks

24. Reorganization of CommandAuthority in the Area of theNorthern Army Group

25. Positions in the Foothills ofthe Alps

26. Supplement to Above Order

27. Supplement to Fuebrer OrderNo. 11

T 222 CKeitel 23 Mar. PG 31756

Hitler

Jodi

T 31 B2 Apr. PG 32904

26 Apr. T 222 CPG 31756

Keitel 16 May T 222 CPG 31756

T 191 CDoenitz 27 May PG 48613

T 222 CBormann 31 May PG 31756

T 222 CHitler 12 Jul. PG 31756

Keitel 12 Jul. T 222 CPG 31756



Keitel .15 Jul. T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 15 Jul. PG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 19 Jul. PG 31756

Keitel2 Sep. T'222 C1942 PG 31756



Jodl 29 -Jul. T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 CGuderian 1 Aug. PG 31756

129

130

132

137

140

141

143

147

148

151

153

154

155

157

B-68

Document Reference PBage

~~~k~SSIyrA

OHCLAIS IF lDDocur

124428.

29.

30,

31.

32.

33.

35.

Signature Date Referenceaent

Construction of Rear Defensesin Northern Italy

Preparations for Gas Warfare

Reinforcement of the GermanWestern Position

Preparations for War BetweenRumania and Germany

Fortification of the GermanBight

-Supplement to Above Order

Westwall Defenses

Commahder of Fortress Crete

Annex-to Above Order

Further Warfare in the West

Preparations for Gas Warfare

Defenses in the West

Command Authority in the West

Command Authority in the West

Evacuation in the Allied,Friendly, and OccupiedCountries

Fortifications in the South-east

Fighting in the West

Fortification of the GermanDefense Zone in Slovakia

Cooperation Between the Partyand Armed Forces Within theReich

T 222 CKeitel 3 Aug. PG 31756

Guderian 23 Aug, T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 CHitler 24 Aug. PG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 26 Aug. PG 31756

T 222 CHitler 29 Aug. PG 31756

Jodl 31 Aug. T 222 CPG 31756

Hitler 1 Sep. T 222 CPG 31756

Keitel 2 Sep. T ?22 CPG 31756

Keitel 6 Jun. T 222 CPG 31756


Machens 4 Sep. T 222 CPG 31756

Warlimont 4 Sep. T 222 CPG 31756



T 222 CJodl 10 Sep. PG 31756

T 222 CHitler 12 Sep. PG 31756

Jodi 16 Sep. T 222CPG 317536

T 222 CKeitel 18 Sep. PG 31756

T 222 CHitler 19 Sep. PG 31756

36.

37.

38.

39.

k0.

41.

42.

k3.

44

if5.

Page

157

160

161

163

164

165

166

168

171

172

174

175

176

177

178

179

181

182

183

8-68

* ~

Document

1944

46.. Command Authority in an Opera-tions Area Within the Reich

47,' Fortification of the Ems-RhineLine

48. Defense in the West

49, Command Areas and Organizationin the West

50. Expansion of Western Defenses

51. Command Area of the CommandingGeneral, Armed Forces, West

52. Defense of Cities and Villagesin the XVII and XVIII CorpsAreas

53. Change in the Borders of theVI, IX, X, and XI CorpsAreas

54. Additional Positions inSlovakia

55. Cooperation Between the ArmedForces and the German Voiks-sturm

56.' Construction of Defenses

57. Bratislava to be Made a Fort-res s

194 5;1. Responsibility of the Commanders

to Report to the Fuebrer

2. Commitment of the Volkssturm

3. Construction of Defenses

4. V-l and V-2 Operations

5. Command Organization in theNetherlands

6. Coordination of Organizationaland Tactical Measures


T 222 CHitler 20 Sep. PG. 31756

JodlT 222 C

30 Sep. PG 31756

Keitel 30 Sep. T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 30 Sep. PG 31756

Keitel 8 Oct. T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 19 Oct. PG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 22 Oct. PG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 13 Nov. PG 31756

JodlT 222 C

23 Nov. PG 31756

28 Nov. T 222 CHimmler (23 Nov.)PG 31756

Jodi

Jodl

1 Dec. T 222CPG 31756

T 222 C5 Dec. PG 31756

T 222 CHitler 21 Jan. PG 31756

Hitler 28 Jan. T 222 CPG 31756

Keitel 31 Jan. T 222 CPG 31756

Jodi

Keitel

Keitel

31 Jan. T 222 CPG 31756

T 222 C3 Feb. PG 31756

T 222 C4 Feb. PG 31756

vii

Page

185

186

188

189

190

191

192

193

19ff

195

196

196

198

199

199

200

200

201

8-68

SPLASSFIEi)


7. Evacuee Transports from theEast to Denmark

8. Evacuation of Personnel in theWest

9. Withdrawals from ThreatenedAreas Within the Reich

10. Measures Against Desertion

11. Soldiers Must Fight to theLast

12. Extension of the Command Areaof the Commanding General,Armed Forces, West

13. Withdrawals From ThreatenedAreas Within the Reich

14. Evacuation of Personnel Westof the Rhine

15. Principles for EvacuatingPersonnel in the West

16. Commitment of Forces of theReplacement Army and OtherTraining and ReplacementOrganizations

17. Measures for DestructionWithin the Reich


19. Prevention of an Enemy Landingat Pola


21. Command Authority of the Com-manding General, Armed Forces,West


23. Destruction in the Reich Area

5 Feb. T 222 CHitler (4 Feb.) PG 31756

KeitelT 222 C

21 Feb. PG 31756

T 222 CKeitel 26 Feb. PG 31756

8 Mar. T 222 C(5 Mar.) PG 317568 Mar. T 222 C

(5 Mar.) PG 31756






20 Mar. T 222 CHitler (19 Mar.)PG 31756

Keitel

Jod.l

T 222 C22 Mar. PG 31756

T 34024 Mar. PG 31746


Keitel

Keitel

Keitel

T 222 C1 Apr. PG 31756

T 222 C1 Apr. PG 31756

4 Apr. T 222 CPG 31756

201

202

204

205

205

206

207

208

208

209

210

211

212

213

214

215

216

viii

Document

B-68

fn IV, "m

Document Signature Date

24. Reorganization off CommandAuthority in. the West'

25, Order off the. Day to the ArmedForces on the Eastern Front

26, Command Authority in CaseGermany is Divided

27. Order Appointing Doenitz Com-mander of the Northern Area

28. Evacuation from NorthernNorway

29. Command of Eastern Theater.Taken Over by Armed ForcesHigh Command

30. Evacuation in the NorthernArea

31. Capitulation Rumors Denied

32._ Necessity to Obey Commands

33. Doenitz Appointed Successor ofHitler

34. Hamburg Not to be Defended

35. Kesseiring Authorized to Con-clude Truce

36. Fighting Against Montgomery toCease

37. Doenitz Ready to Stop Fightingin the West

38. Fighting to Stop in West,Continue in East

39. Order Prohibiting "Werwolf"Activity

40. Truce With Montgomery

Hitler

Reference Pame

T 222 C7 Apr. PG 31756

T 222 CHitler, 15 Apr. PG 31756

German15 Apr.Naval Staff

War DiaryPart A

German20 Apr.Naval Staff

War .DiaryPart A

JodiT 222C

26 Apr. PG 31756

217

219

220

221

222

T 431Keitel 28 Apr. PG 31801 H 223

T 431Keitel 29 Apr. PG 31801 J 223

Chief,Naval Staff

Jodl

Admiralon

SpecialDuty

Jodl

29 Apr. T 431PG 31801 J 224

29 Apr. T 431PG 31801 J 224

30 Apr. BritishAdmiraltyFuehrerConferences1945 p.121 225

2 May T 431PG 31801

T 431Doenitz 4 May PG 31801

Keitel

Keitel

Keitel

Keitel

T 4314 May PG 31801

T 4315 May PG 31801

T.4315 May PG 31801

T 4315 May PG 31801

5 May T431PG 31801

L 225

L 226

L 227

M 227

M 228

M 229

M 229

8-68

Document Suture Date Reference Page

1945

41. Naval Command West Jodi 5 May T 431PG 31801 J 229

12. Destruction Forbidden Doenitz 6 May T 431PG 31801 M 230

43. Command Authority Keitel 6 May T 431PG 31801 M 230

44. Western Fortresses and Channel T 431Islands Keitel 6 May PG 31801 M 231

45. Capitulation Document for Hol-land, Northwestern Germany, Naval 6 May T 431and Denmark Staff PG 31801 14 231

46. Unconditional Surrender Naval 7 May T 431Staff PG 31801 M 232

47. Evacuation of Refugees Keitel 7 May T 431PG 31801 14 233

48. Capitulation to Eisenhower Keitel. 7 May T 431PG 31801 M4 233

49. Negotiations With the Anglo- T 131Americans Keitel 7 May PG 31801 1 234

50. Terms or Capitulation Doenitz 7 May T 431PG 31801 M 234

'51. Corrections to Above Order Jodl 7 May T 431PG 31801 M 235

52. Capitulation in Norway Keitel 7 May T 431PG 31801 M 235

53. Destruction of Equipment ..... 8 May T 431Forbidden PG 31801 1 236.

54. Unconditional Surrender Doenitz 8 May T 431PG 31801 1 236

X B-68

The Fuebrer and Supreme Co mnder Fuebrer Headquarters, 10 Jan. 1942of the Armed Forces

Nr. 1/42 g,K OKW/WFSt/Org.Wi No. 4 of 20 copiesRue Amt,

Subjects urent for 1942

Top Secret

I,

In accordance with the changed war situation, the following guidingprinciples will apply to armament in 1942:

1. The general objective will remain unchanged. It will consist of im-proving the Air Force and t Navy or te purpose of fighting theAnglo-American powers. All armament plans and, preparatory measures willhave to take this into consideration.

.The strategic demands of 1942, however, make it impossible, for the timebeng, toattain this obJectve through a further decrease in the amount

of Army ordnance. Instead, the Army, is to be reinforced and resuppliedfor the strategic tasks of 1942.

2. Armament material is to be used, therefore, for the time beingminly to fill the increased needs of the Army.The basis for allocations will be the entire amount of raw materialsavailable to the Armed Forces.

I therefore order the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command to dis-tribute raw materials accordingly during the first half of 1942, wE iecuttin te alocations of the Nay and the Air Force if this is un-avo a e.e

The Commissioner of the Four Years' Plan will issue the necessary ordersfor the acquisition of additional raw materials, particularly of coaland oil, since they form the foundation of all armament production.

3. The necessary further equalization between the strategic demandsand the actual supplies which can be furnished on the basis of the rawmaterial situation must be achieved in the following ways:

a. A more definite concentration, within the armament programof each branch of the Armed Forces, on productc s which are essentialfor strategic purposes,

b. Adjustment of production programs in order to overcome bottle-necks, by means of substitute materaal s, moadiied designs, and lowere

Lt~ards.

In this connection, everyone must realize that raw materials beyondwhat have already been allotted or are earmarked for allotment will notbe available.

a. Adjustment and standardization of euipmnt with regard tobottlenecks in producing individual parts an su lSute parts.

d. Reallocation and the greatest possible limitation of stocks

B-68

on the basis of experience during the ware

e, Increased use of b (oo e (equipment, ammunition, and weapons)especially for coastal defense everywhere.

All equipment, weapons, 'ammmunition, and useless booty no longer fit foruse or capable of being repaired are to be scrapped. Applications forclearance for weapons and ammunition (also captures weapons and ammuni-tion) will have to be made to the Armed Forces, High Command,'War Econ-omy and Armament Division, on the basis of inventory lists.

., Within the limits of the means put at their disposal and on thebasis of my requests, the Commanders in Chief of the various branches ofthe Armed Forces direct their own armament on their own responsibility

II.

The following principles will apply to armament for the individualbranches of the Armed Forces and the special programs which are directlyconnected with it:

5. Army:

a. Readiness of the Army, as planned by the Army High Commandand approved by myself, must be assured by supplies sufficient for about4 months.

b. The equipment of the forces will have to be adapted, as con-cerns mobility, striking power, anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense, andthe organization of supply, to the characteristics of the theaters ofwar in which they are to serve and to the various tasks assigned to them.

in addition to a number of motorized units suited for use at variousfronts, those portions of the Army committed in the East will also haveto be mobile, and will have to have sufficient service troops(Versorgungstruppen) at their disposal.

However, mobility is not required for the formations assigned tocoastal defense in the West (including Norway).

c. Besides the first full allotment of ammunition, a backlogamounting to six times the average monthly consumption of the campaignin the East (based on Aug. 1941 and corrected for the number of weaponswhich will be in use by the field army onl May 1942) is to be built.up, sufficient for the main weapons, at least.

d. The reorganization of the Army with the shift of emphasis tomotorized troos is to be continued as far as possible beyond 1 May

e. T h e A rm e d (W a fen - SS ) .

The tables of organization and equipment of the Army apply tothe various units of the Armed 3S also, and the SS units are to be sup-plied to the same extent as the Army is supplied.

I am still reserving my decision concerning the future table of organ-ization in wartime of the motorized SS divisions.

The setting up of new units which would need additional German equip-ment is out of the question. The new table of organization for wartimealso applies to the SS Body Guard Regiment "Adolf Hitler" (Leibstandarte"Adolf Hitler").

-2- B-68

t~~~~ !d r t f

6. Nav:Within the limits of' available raw materials the main empasis is

to be given to building up and maintaining the submarine arm.

Moreover, the maintenance of the escort service and the security ofNorway as well as of the coastal zone will continue to be important.The inevitable restrictions resulting from the allocation of raw materialsmust be counteracted by improvisation, so far as the harbor constructionprogram and other projects are concerned. The supplies of ammunitionon hand permit a curtailment in favor off Army production,

7. Air Force:

The airplane construction program and the anti-aircraft artilleryprogram are to be carried out to the extent permitted by the allocationof raw material, Any restriction of the anti-aircraft artillery pro-gram will hae to be approved by me.

A temporary curtailment off the production of ammunition and bombs inall classifications whore a sufficient, supply exists must be expected as'long as production 'is impaired owing to conversion to substitutes forscarce non-ferrous metals,

8. a, All measures necessary for carrying out the petroleum programare to be moved forward with the greatest urgency.

b, Thear nt programs in the fields of railroad and communica-tions services as well as the chemical production fauoh) plan are toe carried out just as heretofore; the program ffor motor vehicles is to

be expanded.

In view of the great amount of ferrous and non-ferrous metals requiredfor the execution of these programs, production goals must be reachedthrough the most economical use of metals possible in wartime..

9. The improvement of the coastal defense along the entire WesternFront, incling orway, an on Crete is o be continued, to the limitof our ability and of the means available.

10. The armament pro gas of the various branches of the Armed Forcesare to bed out in conformity with the preceding directives. Anyimportant changes are to be submitted to me for approval. Any necessaryfurther coordination will be worked out by the Chief of Staff, ArmedForces High Command,

III.

As far as replacement of personnel is concerned, the Chief of Staff,Armed Forces Hgh Command will balance military, and civilian require-ments in agreement with the Re Minister of Armament and Ammunitiona he other ministerial agencies concerned.

Proposed organizational changes and the replacement program of thebranches of the Armed Forces are to be adbusted to production.

IV.

My instructions concerning armament, issued on 14 July 191l1, will re-main in force in so far as they refer to general principles of aneconomic or technical nature.

3 B- 68

IN CLASSIF[ -HTheir importance is herewith increased, and they are not affected bythis directive.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Commander in Chief, Navy Copy

B. Ni. Ski. Qu.A. 350/12 Gkdos, Berlin, 20 January 1942

To Naval Staff Operations Division

Re: Armament 1942

Reference: The Fuehrer and Supreme CommanderN'. 1/12 Gkdos. OKW/WSt/OrhWliRue Amt, 10 Jan. 192.

I. The new Fuebrer directive referred to above results in additionaltemporary cuts in raw material allotments; however, in the long runthe aim remains to combat the Anglo-American forces by means of theNavy and the Air Force. This aim must be kept in mind in making thesecuts and in utilizing the available raw materials; in other words itmust be assured that production or the items curtailed or discontinuedat the present time will be resumed later.

II. Further cuts in production are to be expected as the result of thedrafting or workers from the protected armament industries, in otherwords also from the shipyards and their subcontractors.

III. In order to utilize the remaining personnel and materiel resourcescorrectly, I order the following basic directive for the time being:

a. No further cuts should be made in:

Submarine repairSubmarine constructionRepair of torpedo recovery vesselsConstruction of torpedo recovery vesselsRepair of light naval forces, including destroyers

b. As few cuts as possible should be made in construction of thefollowing (in the order named):

PT boatsMotor mine sweepersDestroyersTorpedo boatsMine sweepersMine detonating vessels

B-68

Escort vesselsPatrol vessels and subehasers

As regards armament:

Antiaircraft gunsCoastal guns and equipment for Norway

c. Cuts are possible in the folloving:

Ship repairConstruction or conversion of auxiliary shipsArmament for other coastal sectorsReplacement armament for: ships, etc.Ammunition, including torpedoes and mines

d. The following may be discontinued temporarily:

Construction of cruisers, aircraft carriers, scout cruisers,supply ships, and tankers

The new construction program (though not explicitly) generally followsthese principles, The ordnance divisions must adjust production to pos-sible changes in ship construction.

IV. An attempt must be made to absorb other cuts in raw materials inprojects other than ship construction, i.e., in bufldings, ammunitionproduction, preliminary factory work, etc.

1, The technical offices off Naval Ordnance will discuss possiblefurther reductions in ammunition and will submit suggestions.

2. The Naval Construction Division will report as soon as possiblewhether cuts in production will result from drafting of workers and howproduction dates are affedted. The following is to be kept in mind:

Repairs have precedence over new construction.

Submarine construction should not be curtailed any further.

Any necessary shifts in manpower are to be handled in such away that construction of surface forces in the above-mentioned order isassured.

3. Furthermore, the Naval Construction and Ordnance Divisions areto report what other curtailments are feasible in building constructionand preliminary factory work, and are to report the consequences thatwould result from such cuts.

signed: Raeder

-5-

~ I I~ __ _~~ ~ _

B-68

4 . t.5 Ls r 4- H R

Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer Headquarters

N'. 55328/42 Gkdos. Chefs, WFSt/Op. 12 February l912

No. 6 of 14 copies

Guiding Princi lea for Deco tion of the Enemy

The following guiding principles are to be followed in deceiving theenemy with regard to our future plans in the East:

"Thge German High Command intends to launch a renewed attack against Mos-cow after the winter and muddy season have ended, concentrating strongforces for the purpose, bringing up newly organized units, and exchang-ing fresh divisions from the West for exhausted ones in the East. Fol-lowing this, the High Command intends to push ahead to the central Volgaand to capture the industrial area there.

The forces for this purpose are to be brought up in a surprise operation.For this the capacity of the necessary railroad lines will be increased,and not until this has been done will the forces ready at home and inthe west area be brought up. In the meantime strong forces, particularlyof our allies, will have started a large-scale dummy operation againstRostov for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.

As far as Leningrad is concerned, the German High Command is of the opin-ion that this city will collapse of itself as soon as the ice on LakeLadoga melts. It is. not considered necessary to make further attackshere."

Reports of this sort are to be fed to the enemy intelligence service bythe Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command, starting verysoon.

German troops are to be deceived for the time being only to the extentthat the home units and those in-the West which are intended for theEast will be given corresponding geographic data and maps, etc., for theMoscow area; no deceptive measures are to be undertaken for the Armyin the East until after the defensive battle is ended.

The Army and the Air Force are requested to make further suggestions ondeception during this time to the Armed Forces High Command, OperationsStaff as soon as possible.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

- 6 - BB-68

The Commander in Chief, N vi- Berlin, 23 February 1942and Chief, Naval Staff

1/Ski I m 275/42 Gkdos, Chefs. Top secretCopy No. 3

To: Naval Group South

Subject: Operations in the Black Sea

Re: 1. Group South op kf /k2 Gkdos. Chefs, of 5 Feb.2. Group South op 698 Gkdos. of 6 Feb.

The Russians, with 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders, 15 de-stroyers, and 41 submarines, as well as 3 torpedo boats, 4 mine layers,minesweepers, patrol vessels, special duty and auxiliary vessels, pos-sess naval supremacy in the Black Seam This affords the Russians greatfreedom of action, and means a constant threat to the southern flank ofthe Army and to the necessary supply by sea, which is a prerequisite forexecution of the planned Army operations and which must start up againas soon as the ice situation permits. It must not '5teorgotten thatany transport of supplies by sea, even though only a small part of therequirements of the Army, relieves the difficult land transport situa-tion to a noticeable degree, and that the Army considers any increase insea transports, even if it is only small, as essential,

The Russians will continue with their well-known tenacity and ruthless-nesa to try to hold and improve their positions on the Crimea and toprevent the Axis troops from pushing farther to the East. They willrely in this to a greater extent on their naval forces. The strengthof these forces, together with the lack of any sort of defense on ourpart, permits the enemy to go around our Army units stationed near thesea and to launch attacks with strong forces behind our lines. Thismust be prevented by all possible means,

A main objective of our Army is to conquer the Crimea entirely as soonas possible. It is prerequisite to the further offensive of the Armyto the east or southeast that the Crimea be held with as few Army forcesas possible. To permit this it is necessary to block the Kerch Straitagainst any penetration of Russian forces into the Sea of Azov.

Thus there emerge clearly the following main tasks for the Navy in thefuture:

a. As soon as the ice situation permits it is necessary to startup supply traffic by sea to the South Ukrainian ports and the ports onthe western Crimean coast, and also in the Sea of Azov from Genicheskto the east. Depending on the advance of the Army operations supplytransports must be carried out to ports on the eastern coast of theBlack Sea,

b. Measures must be taken to secure this supply traffic.

c. The Army must be supported in taking Sevastopol and the Kerch.Peninsula and in occupying the Crimea.

d. Russian landings behind the Army front must be prevented.

The Naval Staff agrees with Group South that the main tasks of the Navyin the Black Sea are to execute and protect supply operations.. In orderto fulfill in the bestpossible manner the expected transport require-

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~~~L1$Z~ EDments it is necessary to find out on the spot all possibilities forexpediting the transports in the Russian harbors which are already oc-cupied or which are still to be occupied. Any difficulties which appearmust be eliminated at once (e.g., confiscating all suitable vessels,using every kind of improvisation, putting newly occupied harbors incondition to receive supplies, etc.). The Shipping and Transport Branchof the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is sending additional informa-tion with regard to creating the post of Shipping and Transport Officer,Black Sea and setting up a mobile advance post with extensive powers.Mines will be of particular importance in securing the transport routesto the Dnieper and the harbors in the northwestern part of the Crimea,including Eupatoria, later also those on the southern coast of theCrimea and on the Kerch Strait,

In order to carry out the tasks listed from b. to d we must preventRussian naval forces from operating undisturbed on the supply routesand along the occupied coasts, or at least we must make it very diffi-cult for them to do so. The most effective way to do this would be todestroy the Russian means of combat, Up to now practically only theAir Force has been able to combat the Russian naval forces, which formthe backbone of their operations. The air forces on the Crimea havebeen reinforced, to be sure, and the Commander in Chief, Air has ex-pressly recognized the necessity of using them to combat Russian navalforces and transports; nevertheless it is probable that when the Armyoffensive begins they will be used mainly to support the Army, and willbe available for attacking the Black Sea Fleet only occasionally,

Except for submarine operations on the west coast, it has hitherto. notbeen observed that the Russian naval forces have tried to undertake op-erations beyond their direct escort and defense tasks in order to ex-ercise naval supremacy in the whole Black Sea area.

Furthermore, to judge from our experience in the Baltic Sea, the RussianNavy is immediately discouraged from its operations if it notices anysort of countermeasures aimed to disturb its activities at sea,.or if ithas been unsuccessful in some way. Considering the fact that the Rus-sians, for instance, did not repeat their bombardment of Constanta orother Rumanian coastal localities after the MOSKVA was sunk, we wouldseem to be justified in applying these experiences made in the BalticSea to the Black Sea Fleet. The evidently entirely inadequate prepara-tions for the Russian landing in Eupatoria on 5 Jan. 1942, about whichthe Group Command will receive more detailed information, point in thesame direction.

It is known that Group South has very inadequate means for carrying outthis sort of defense measure. The Naval Staff believes, however, thatthere are still possibilities for preventing the enemy from keeping theinitiative everywhere entirely undisturbed, if the few means availableare.utilized to the very fullest and numerous improvisations are resortedto. Certain losses must be reckoned with. If our countermeasures suc-ceed in paralyzing the activity of the Russian naval forces against theoccupied coasts, harbors, and supply routes, then these losses are ab-solutely justified in the face of the advantage won.

One possibility of this kind is the planned mining of Russian harborsas suggested by Group South in communication op 698 Gkdos. Group Southcalls these operations defensive and not very important, but they cancertainly be considered effective with a view to securing the main oper-ations later.

8-68

Independent of these statements, Group South is requested to have theadvance posts investigate fur'ther possibilities, and to report its in-tentions,

signed in draft forma Raeder

countersigned: (signature illegible)

C OPY,

Ob.d.M. B.Nr. 6O5/42 Gkdos. Chefs. 1k Mar. 1942

1. Most of the reports about the British and American intentions agreethat the enemy considers it most important to maintain Russia's power,of resistance by means of the largest possible amount of supplies of warmateriel and food, and in addition to set up a second front in Europein order to force us to withdraw forces from Russia. The regular,heavy convoy traffic from Scotland to Murmansk or Archangel can serveboth purposes. Thus one can expect enemy landing operations on theArctic coast; the enemy objective most dangerous for us and thereforethe most probable one is the nickel mines in northern Finland which arevital for Germany.

2.1 For this reason it is necessary to cut the sea communications be-tween the Anglo-Americans and Russia in the Arctic Ocean, which up tothe present time have been practically undisturbed, and to eliminate thenaval supremacy of the enemy, which reaches into our own coastal waters.All available means must be employed in the battle in this sea area,which at this time is more important than the area off the west Africancoast.

3. I order in. detail as follows:

a. The Navy is to increase submarine operations in the ArcticOcean to such an extent that we can count on successes against the enemyconvoys in spite of difficulties brought on by the weather conditionsin the Arctic Ocean.

b. The Air Force is to increase the planes in the arctic area,particularly by using more long-range reconnaissance and bomber units.The bulk of the torpedo plane squadrons is to be transferred far enoughto the north that they can be employed off the particularly endangeredarctic coast. The most important tasks of the Air Force are as follows:To attack persistantly the enemy unloading ports on the Murman coast.To increase reconnoitering of the area between Bear Island and theMurman coast. To attack the convoys and enemy naval forces which arereported, particularly enemy aircraft carriers.

c. Close cooperation between the Navy and the Air Force on theNorwegian-Finnish coast must be assured by combining the command staffs,

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or at least by exchanging liaison officers. Any technical difficultiesin communications are to be eliminated.

d. In order to reinforce the forces in the Arctic Ocean we willhave to reduce operations in other areas. In particular sea reconnais-sance in the Atlantic, the range of which is no longer adequate for sub-marine operations there in any case, must be greatly reduced. Howeverblockade runners must be brought to and from the French west coast asbefore.

*e. The Army High Command, Lapland must constantly have sufficienttroops at its disposal on the arctic coast, in order to be prepared fora large-scale enemy attack against the coast, particularly since trooptransfers via the Oulu-Petsamo highway take too much time and wouldprobably arrive too late.

3. The Commander in Chief, Navy; the Commander in Chief, Air; theCommanding General, Armed Forces, Norway; and the Army High Command,Lapland are to report to me proposed measures via the Armed Forces HighCommand.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander, Armed Forces


OKW WFST Op. (V) Nr. 55493/42 Gkdos. Chefs.

(Marginal note in handwriting: The above directive was instigated pri-marily by the report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer.)

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Heacquarters, 23 Mar. 1942of the Armed Forces

OKW/WSt/Op. Nr. 001031/42 g.Kdos No. of 25 copies

Secret

Directive No. 40

Subject: Command organization along the coasts.

I. Main principles:

In the near future the European coasts will be exposed very seri-ously to the danger of enemy anings.

The time and place of the enemy's landing attempts will not be dependentexclusively upon strategic considerations. Failures in other theatersof war, obligations toward allies, and political considerations maywell prompt him to make decisions which would be regarded as improbablefrom a purely military standpoint.

Even limited-objective landing attempts, if the enemy should succeed in

S10 -8-68

gaining a foc. hold on the coast, would interfere materially with our ownplans in any case. They would interrupt our shipping traffic along thecoast and would tie down strong forces of the Army and Air Force, thuspreventing us from employing them at decisive points. It would be es-pecially dangerous for us if, the enemy should succeed in gaining ourair iields for his use or in establishing air bases for himself in ter-ritory he has captured.

In addition, installations of military importance or of importance to*the war economy which are located on or near the coast in considerablenumbers and which, in part, include especially valuable equipment arean invitation to local surprise attacks.

Special attention should be given to British preparations for landingson the open coast, for which they have at their isposal numerousarmored landing craft suitable for carrying tanks and heavy weapons.Parachute and airborne landing atte mts on a large scale must be reckonedwitha so.

II. General tactical instructions for coastal defense:

1. The defense of the coast is a task of the Armed Forces whichdemands particularly close and un nterrupt-ed coopera on y ranchesof the Armed Forces.

2. The Intelligence Service, as well as the reconnaissance ser-vices of the Navy and the Air Force, must make every effort to recognizein time the enemy's re,. aerations for a landing attempt, his state ofreadiness, his approach.

In such a case all suitable forces on the sea and in the air are to beconcentrated against the enemy's embarkation operations and against hisfleets of transports, for the purpose of destroying him as far from thecoast as possible.

However, since the enemy may be able to achieve complete surprise bymeans of clever concealment and by taking advantage of a period of poorvisibility, all troo s which might be exposed to such surprise actionsmust be on a fu a ert status at all times.

One of the most important command duties will be to prevent any slacken-ing in the alertness of the troops, since experience has shown that thetendency to relax increases with the passing of time.

3. Recent battle experiences have taught us that in the fightingfor the coast (this includes the coastal waters within the range ofmedium coatal artillery) one man must ave e sole, unrestrictedresponsibility for preparing and executing the defense.

The responsible commander must make use of all available materiel andpersonnel of the various branches of the Armed Forces, plus any avail-able formations and units outside of the Armed Forces, as well as thepersonnel of German civilian offices present in the area; his purposeis to destroy the enemy's means of transportation and bis landingtroops and to bring about the collapse of the attack - ' f the coast,if possible but after the coast has been reachd at the very latest.

Enemy forces that have succeeded in landing must be destroyed or throwninto the sea by immediate counterattacks. All men capable of bearingarms, regardless of the branch of the Armed Forces or of the formationoutside of the Armed Forces to which they may belong are to be usedjointly for this purpose. At the same time, the supply installations

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on land must be kept working, while the Air Force ground organizationand the anti-aircraft artillery at airfields must maintain a state ofcombat readiness, unless they should become' involved in ground fightinganyway.

No command post or unit is permitted to initiate a withdrawal under suchconditions. Where German men are employed on or near the coast, theymust be armed and trained for combat,

The enemy must be kept from establishing himself on any islands which,if he had possession of them, would represent a danger to the mainlandand to coastal shipping.

1. The organization of forces and the imrovement of fortifications

are to be carried out in such a manner that the best-deffended coastalsectors will be those which the enemy might use for landing places(fortified areas).

Wherever any of the remaining coastal sectors are in danger or suddenattack, even by small formations, a strongpoint type of defense is tobe set up, depending as much as possible upon the coastal batteries rorsupport. All installations important from a military or an economicpoint of' view are to be included in this strongpoint defense.

The same principles hold good for the islands of the coast.

Less endangered coastal sectors will be patrolled.

5, The branches of the Armed Forces must come to a general agree-ment concerning the distribution of coastal sectors. If necessary, thefinal decision will be made by the commaner in charge as per sectionIII, 1.

6. The fortified areas and strongpoints must be in a position todefend themselves for a long tie, even against superior enemy forces.This is to be made possible through proportionate allocation of forces,through improvements (all-round fortification) and adequate supplies.

Fortified areas and strongpoints are to be defended to the utmost. Theymust never be forced to surrender because of a lack of ammunition, sup-plies, or water.

7. The commander in charge as per section III, 1 will issue in-structions f'or patrolling the coast, and will guarantee that reconnais-sance findings of all branches of the Armed Forces will be quickly eval-uated and summarized, then transmitted to the proper command authoritiesand civilian offices.

As soon as there are indications of a pending enemy operation, he isauthorized to lay down the necessary general directions for unifiedand mutually complementary sea and air reconnaissance.

8. Peacetime privileges will not be granted to the staffs andunits of the Armed Forces or to formations and units outside of theArmed Forces stationed in the vicinity of' the coast. The nature oftheir shelters, security measures and equipment, as well as; their stateof alert and the employement of the terrain are to be determined solelyby the necessity of opposing every enemy attack as quickly and asstrongly as possible. Where the military situation requires it, thecivilian population is to be evacuated at once.

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III. Comand authority:

1. The following authorities ill be resonsible for preparingand carrying out coastal defense wi i a m-controlled area:

a. In the zone of operations in the East (Finland excluded)the Army commanders designated by the Army High Command.

b. In the coastal area of the Army High Command, Lapland,the Commanding General, Army High Command, Lapland.

c. In Norway, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway.

d. In Denmark, the Commander of German Troops in Denmark.

e. In the occupied area in the West (including the Nether-lands), the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

In matters of coastal defense the responsible commanders as per para-graphs d. and e. will be directly subordinate to the Armed Forces HighCommand.

f. In the Balkans (including the occupied islands), the Com-manding General, Armed Forces, Balkans.

g. In the Baltic countries and the Ukraine, the CommandingGeneral, Armed Forces, Baltic States and White Ruthenia, and the Command-ing General, Armed Forces, Ukraine.

h. In the home theater, the commanding admirals.

2. The commanders designated in paragraph III, 1 will haveauthorit as far as this task is concerned, over the staffs commandingvarious units of the branches of the Armed Forces, and over Germancivilian offices and any formations and units not belonging to the ArmedForces which are located in their areas.

In exercising this authority, they are to issue the necessary ordersconcerning tactics, organization, and supply, and they are to make surethat their orders are carried out. They will influence training as faras is necessary for ground combat. The niecessary data is to be put attheir disposal.

3. Among the instructions to be given and the measures to betaken, the following should be given first place:

a. Location of all installations important for military oreconomic reasons, especially those of the Navy (submarine bases) and ofthe Air Force, in fortified areas or strongpoints.

b. Unified direction of the coastal patrol.

c. Infantry defense of fortified areas and strongpoints.

d. Infantry defense of all individual posts outside thefortified areas and strongpoints, e.g., coastal patrol stations and air-craft warning posts.

e. Artillery defense against ground targets (in installingnew coastal batteries or converting those already present, the require-ments of naval warfare will have first priority).

- 13 - B-68

if. Preparedness 'off installations for defenste, if pro ve te tsto them, and stocking them with supplies;. preparedness and adequacy offsupplies in individual posts outside .;the installation s. (This Includesequipping with weapons 'ne66asaryfoi 'd'~s sc smns hand:,g'e'-~nades, flame throwers, obstacle-building material, etc.)

g. Communications,

h. Testing alertness, 'and infantzy and artillery trainingwith regard to specified defens ive duties. '

1f. The same powers are given to the commanders of local head-qarters, inso ar as they are made responsil a or the def'ense oV

c asa sectors,

The commanders designated in paragraph III, 1 are to 'designate,. in gen-eral, the commanders of the ArM& -dvisins conmiitted -to costal defence;in Crete the "Fortress Cmaer ee"will be designated in likemanner. .

In individual sectors or subdivisions off sectors, and especially inthose which are definitely air ,or naval strongpoints, the local commandersof the Air Force or the Navy are to'be put, in charge -of the entire de-fense, so far as their other duties peiit.

5. The naval forces and air ces eM- -edintregc warfarewill be un ertwih 6iiand offt ciry e AirForce 'respctv ;However, during attacks on the coast they ill be obligated to complywith the demands of' the commanders responsible for defense, as far asthey are tactically abler.' H e ce theyr m tist be i ichtded in the communi-c.ations set-up .in preparation ifor their employment later on. Closecontact must be kept with their lTnesaduarters ',

IV. Special duties of the bandhs of 'the AI'med 'FoZ'ce" 'in the field Toffcoastsi 7defenser t .-- 4,.

1. Navy'

a.: Organization and protection '~ coatal shipping. '.

b. Training arnd einjloytnent of 'the eiiirecoastal -aie lleryagainst sea targets.

c. Employment of naval forces. ''-

2. Air Force:;

a. AntiL-aircraft defense in the coastal- areas.

The bringing up, on orders from the local commanders responsible for de-fense, of available' ant-i-aircraft antill1ery' suited ifor defense 'againstenemy landings will, not be affected b~y this.

b. Improvement off the Air Force ground organization and itsprotection' against 'attach' t'ror the air and &gain't4 surprise attacks onthe ground; -the latter' applies 'to such airifelds " as' at'e'' not: included in'the coastal defense and therefore are not sufficiently defended on th&ground.

c. Use of operational'air forcb~&.eOccasional 'duplication of command must be expected to result from these

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special duties.

V. All previous orders and instructions not in agreement with this di-rective are cancelled starting 1 April 19k2.

All new combat directives based upon my directive which are issued bythe responsible commanders are to be submitted to me through the ArmedForces High Command.


Commander in Chief, Navy Berlin, 27 March 1942Skl.au.A. II 771/42 Gkdos. No. 31 of 48 copies

Secret

Re: Command Organization on the CoastsFuehrer Directive No. 40.

Fuehrer directive No. 40 is herewith brought to the attention of thevarious commands.

I wish to add the following remarks in this connection:

The constant enemy threat to the coasts of the occupied countries hascaused the Fuehrer to issue this directive. It is aimed at designatingone responsible commander for each area and each coastal sector, charg-Tin him with preparing and carrying out the defense of the coast. Con-trary to previous regulations, the respective commander will have thecommand authority assigned him for this purpose at all times, and notonly at the time of an enemy invasion. This wild et.na e a change incommand shortly prior to or during combat.

The enemy will launch landing operations at points along the coast whichare inadequately or not at all protected by coastal artillery. Duringsuch operations he may also attempt to land paratroops in the rear ofour coastal artillery. We must reckon with the fact that the enemy mayin spots succeed in gaining a temporary foothold on the coast.

The Fuehrer directive takes care of this situation by concentrating themain effort of our coastal defenses on land fighting and thus puts com-mand in the hands of the Army (divisional commanders).

Even if the fight for the coast extends to the coastal areas withinreach of the medium coastal artillery (range of the Army coastal artil-lery), command over the bombardment of targets at sea remains in thehands of the naval shore commanders, who have command over coastal ar-tillery (inclusive of Army coastal artillery) in the sector for thispurpose. The naval shore commanders are under the operational commandof the respective divisional commander only in the fight for the coast;

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aside from such defense activity their coastal artillery is under therespective naval commander (for protection or convoys, support of navalforces, etc.).

The naval forces and other means of naval warfare (for example mines)are under the sole and rsponsible command of the Navy also as regardsthe defense of Tie coas. cordng to the directive, the Armed Forcescommanders or their subordinate sectional commanders have the-right toissue "directives for uniform and complete reconnaissance at aea and

,to request naval forces for specified tasks in the fight for the coast,The decision as to their commitment, however, remains exclusively inthe hands of the naval commanders,

The following questions bear further investigation:

a, Integration of the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service(Coastal) CVGAD(K)) into the coastal patrol service.

b. The sectional division of the coast.

It should be examined especially how the present areas and tasks undernaval authority in the Netherlands and in Denmark can be made to conformto the Fuehrer directive,

Tasks designated under III, 4 (last paragraph) should not be taken overwithout my approval in each particular: case, since the naval commandersand stations involved are also engaged in the tasks remaining under mycommand in the coastal sectors.

signed: Raeder

countersigned: Stangenberg

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander Fuehrer Headquartersof the Armed Forces 5 April 1942

OKW/WFSt Nr. 55616/f 2 g.K.Chefs. Top secretNo. 3 of 14 copies

Directive No. 41

The winter campaign in Russia is nearing its close. The outstandingbravery and the self-sacrificing effort of our troops at the EasternFront have achieved a great defensive success.

The enemy suffered very severe losses in men and material. In an at-tempt to take advantage of what seemed to be initial successes, Russi-during the course of: the winter also expended the bulk of her reservesintended for future operations.

8-68- 16 -

-b~ :;

The mopping up still necessary in the central and northern parts of theEastern Front cannot be finally decided upon until ater the presentfighting and the muddy season are at an end. The necessary forces, how-ever, must be provided as soon as the situation permits by thinning outthe front lines.

C. The Main Operation on the Eastern Front

The objective is, as already stated, to take the Caucasusfront, destroying the Russian forces from Voronezh to the south and westand north of the Don,* Because of the manner in which the availableforces must be brought up, this operation can be carried out only in aseries of successive attacks, which, however, are in connection witheach other or supplement each other. Therefore they are-to be synchro-nized from north to south in such a manner that in every single one ofthese attacks the greatest possible concentration of Army and especiallyair forces can be assured at the decisive spots.

Considering that, as often enough demonstrated, the Russians are notvery vulnerable to large encirclements, we should strive particularlyto carry out the individual breakthroughs as separate pincer operations,similar to the battle of Vyazma-Bryansk.

We must avoid closing the pincers too late, thus ' giving the enemy thepossbiity of eadaping destruction.

It must not hap pen that by advancing too swiftly and too far the tanksan oorized forces lose connection with the infantry following them,

or that they lose the. possibility of assisting the infantry forces ofthe Army pressing ahead, by direct attacks on the rear of the encircledRussian Armies.

Therefore, aside from the over-all operational objective, in each sepa-rate case we must be absolutely sure to destroy the enemy by the method.of the attack and the direction of our forces.

The whole operation will begin with a comprehensive attack or break-through from the area south of Orel toward Voronezh.** Of the two tankand motorized forces forming the pincers, the northern one will bestronger than the southern one. The aim of thibreakthrough is tocapture Voronezh. While part of-the infantry divisions will have thetask of building up at once "a strong defensive front between Orel, thestarting point of the attack, and Voronezh, the tank and motorized for-ces are to continue the attack with their left flank from Voronezhtoward the south along the Don in support of a second breakthrough,which is to be launched from the general area of Kharkov toward the east.Here also the primary objective is not to break the Russian front assuch, but-rather, in cooperation with the motorized forces advancingdown the Don, to destroy the Russian forces.

* Handwritten marginal note: Voronezh - Rostov - 500- 1i.

** Handwritten marginal note: Front - Voronezh - 200 km.

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The third attack in the course of these operations is to be so conductedthat the units proceeding down the Don join the forces which advance outof the Taganrog-Artemovsk area between the lower Don and Voroshilovgradacross the Donets to the east. These in turn should finally make con-nection with the panzer army adve ncing against Stalingrad.

If in the course of these operations there should arise opportunitiesto form bridgeheads east or south of the Don, especially through captureof undamaged bridges, these opportunities should be utilized. In anycase we must try to reach Stalingrad or at least to subject this cityto bombardment of our heavy weapons to such an extent that it is elimin-ated as an armament and traffic center in the future.

It would be particularly desirable if we were able to capture either un-damaged bridges perhaps in Rostov itself, or other bridgeheads south ofthe Don for later operations.

In order to prevent important parts of the Russian forces north of theDon from escaping across the river toward the south, Xt is essentialthat the right wing of the group advancing from the Taganrog area to theeast be reinforced by tanks and mobile forces, which if necessary shouldbe provided by improvised units.

Corresponding to the progress of these attacks we must not only providestrong protection of the northeast flank of the attack operation, butalso we must begin at once with reinforcement of the positions along theDon. In this matter particular attention is to be laid on very strongtank defenses. The positions are to be selected from the very startfrom the standpoint of possibly having to use them in winter, and prep-arations for such use should be made in every way possible.

In the main, units of our allies will be used to occupy the Don front,which in the course of this operation will become longer and longer.German troops will be added as strong support between Orel and the Donand in the Stalingrad sector; also several German divisions will re-main available as reserves behind the Don front.

The troops of our allies are mainly to be disposed so that the Hungariansare farthest north, then the Italians, and the Rumanians are farthestsouth.

D. In consideration of the season, we must be sure to provide forfast progress of the movements across the Don toward the south for at-taining the operational objective.

III. Air Force

It is the task of the Air Force, besides directly supporting the Army,to protect the assembly of troops in the area of the Southern Army Groupby intensifying air defenses. This applies especially to the railroadbridges across the Dnieper.

If assembly movements of the enemy are recognized, his main traffic"roues and the railroads leading to the battle area are. constantly tobe disrupted far into the rear area; for this purpose particularly therailroad bridges across the Don are to be attacked.

In preparation for the operation the enem air force and its ground or-ganization in the attack area are to a attacked and destroyed with con-centrated forces.

The possibility of a quick shift of planes to the central and northernzones of operation mus be provided for, and the ground organization

B- 68- 19 -

necessary for this must be retained as far as possible..

IV. Navy

In the' Black Sea it is the main task of the Navy - insofar as our combatand esc Er rces and our. tonnage permit - to assist in supplying theArmy and the Air Force,

Considering that the power of the Russian Black Sea fleet is still un-broken, it is particularly important to get the light naval forces tobe transferred to the Black Sea ready for operations there as soon aspossible.

The Baltic Sea is to be secured by cutting off the Russian naval forcesin the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.

V. My basic orders for preserving secrecy are to be issued once moreto all offices taking parts inthe preparations. The procedure to be fol-lowed with our allies will be laid down in special regulations in con-nection with this directive.

VI. The branches of the Armed Forces are to report to me via the ArmedForces High Command the preparations they intend to make, includingtimetables.


The Chief of Staff of the Fuehrer Headquarters, 5 April 19k2Armed Forces High Command

Ni. 55628A2 g.K. Chefs WFSt/Op. Top secretNo. 5 of twenty five copies

Special Order No. 1 in connection with Directive No. 4L

I. Security of information:

1. The Fuehrer's "Basic Order" or 11 Jan. 1940 (copy with detaileddirections in the Armed Forces Countermeasures, Annual Order of 1940) isto be the guiding principle for security of information.

All officers and Armed Forces officials charged with working on prepara-tory measures for operation "Siegfried" will be reacquainted with theseorders.

2. The number of persons working on the plans is to be kept to aminimum. Before adding workers to this circle, the commanding officerresponsible is to give his written consent in each individual case. Alsothose officers who are not directly involved are to consider it theirduty to observe strict discretion when possible operations are beingmentioned or discussed.

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3. In addition che.Fuehrer orders the following general directionsin connection with operation "Siegfried":

"Telephone calls to discuss preparations for and execution of this opera-tion will nok e conducted beyond the headquarters of Army Groups, AirForces, and the VIlith Air Corps."

Orders and reports are to be put in writing and sent by courier. Anypoints not understood will be cleared up in personal conferences or byway of telegrams. The vital points (e.g.,objective and time of attack)in these telegrams, which must be kept from the personnel who handlethe messages, must be put in code.

4. Offices which, although not dii'ectly concerned with the opera-tion as such, are entrusted with preparations which are connected withthe operation but which can be carried out without mention of place andtime (e.g., economic measures), are to refrain from all reference tooperational plans in their preparatory measures.

5. In informing and conferring with our allies, no one is to re-veal any more than is necessary - in any case not more than the assemblyarea, if this is unavoidable.

6. The Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command is makingpreparations to stop long-distance communications with foreign countries.temporarily.

II. Propaganda:

i. In cooperation with the high Reich authorities concerned, theArmed Forces High Command, Propaganda Branch is to lay down the generalprinciples for propaganda and is to areare to carry them out. In thisconnection, the propaganda aimed at t Ciicasian population (which isto have full autonomy) is to be placed in the foreground. A specialorder will be issued to fix~ the date when this propaganda is to begin.

2. Liaison officers will be assigned to the propaganda offices ofour allies. Besides ascertaining that the propaganda of the variouscountries is coordinated, they are to see to it that no reports areprinted concerning operational plans of the German command at present,and, when such reports do appear later on, that they are written alongthe lines determined by the Armed Forces High Command.

signed: Keitel

Naval High Command Berlin, 11 Apr. 1912B. 111. l.Skl. I Op. 8329/42 Gkdos.

Secret

Re: Coastal defenses

No previous correspondence

I. The experiences of St. Nazaire and Cape d'Antifer showed that the

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British are determined and able to attack our extensive coastline morefrequently and on a larger scale than heretofore.

The fact that the bulk of our Army and Air Force has been occupied inthe East for almost a year has enab1led the British to make considerablepreparations for an offensive against our coast, after fortifying theBritish Isles, and since the threat of an invasion has been removed.Moreover our air forces in-the coastal areas hhave been weakened consider-ably and therefore the coastal defense is not as strong as heretofore.First the British tried small raids at weak points in the Norwegian area.Since then they have grown strong enough to make landings also at therelatively strong French coast, These landings were thoroughly and care-fully prepared and were boldly carried out. The variety of the means and;methods used indicates that we must be prepared for any possible surprisein the future,

It is difficult to say whether the enemy is at present ready not only forsimilar limited landing operations but also for large-scale operationsaimed at establishing new land fronts, In the west area such large-scale operations seem unlikely at the present time; in Norway they arepossible probably only in the arctic and the Lofoten-Narvik area, At,any rate, however, we must expect that sooner or later the enemy willhave available the forces necessary for such large-scale operations. Wemust also keep in mind that developments in the East and the politicalpressure exerted by Russia will force the British to undertake more orless large-scale operations,

Fuebrer Directive f0 was issued as a result of this changed situation.In addition, the experiences at Cape d'Antifer and-at St. Nazaire makeit necessary for us to-examine once more carefully the possibilities ofour Anglo-American enemies and our defense measures, in order. to makesure that all possible means have been utilized to strengthen, perfect,and improve our coastal defenses in every respect. We must revent theenem from achieving even small successes in his attaks us caiius considerable setbacks,

II. Posssibilities of~_ enemy landings.

I. West area

a. French Atlantic coast

The most important and most valuable objectives for lim-ited operations are the submarine bases Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Brest.In addition, Brest is of special importance because of its shipyard fa-cilities and as a base for surface forces.

Besides these harbors, La Pallice-La Roehelle, Royen-Le Verdon, andBayonne-Saint Jean de Luz, as bases for our defense forces, and also theGironde as a base for Italian submarines and point of departure for ourauxiliary cruisers and for our traffic with Spain and overseas, are goodtargets-for nuisance raids.

The spots suitable for establishing bridgeheads for large-scale opera-tions are primarily the harbors in the Loire estuary and in the Gironde,which provide the necessary facilities for landing large numbers oftroops and equipment and are at the same time suitable starting pointsfor operations on land (swift advance to unoccupied France). By a pincermovement in Brittany simultaneously from the north (St. Malo area) andfrom the south (Lo rient-Loire area), Brest could be out off completely.For such an eventuality defenses against an attack from land must begiven special attention when building up the fortifications.

b. French Channel coast, Belgian-Dutch coast

Here Boulogne, Ostend, and Ijmuiden may be considered

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especially endangered, as, bases of our PT boats. However, all otherharbors are likewise valuable targets for enemy attacks in view of theirsignificance for minesweeping, convo, and escort service in the Channel,especially Flushing, Dunkirk, Calais, Cherbourg, and Le Havre. An attackon the Scheldt as far as Terneuzen,or perhaps even as far as Antwerp, aswell as a temporary occupation of Hook off Holland and a simultaneous ad-vance toward Rotterdam, could strike a serious blow at our sea communica,-tions,

In addition in this entire area along the coast, particularly however inthe Strait of Dover, there are numerous objectives of military impor-tance, such as coastal-batteries, radar installations, airfields, etc.,which the enemy might raid. In northeastern France, Belgium and Hollandthere are also numerous installations close to the coast which are ofimportance to the war effort, and which the enemy might consider worth-while occupying temporarily and destroying.

Large-scale enemy operations might be expected in the Seine-Somme areaand in the Dutch area, particularly at Scheveningen and Hook of Holland.,

2. Norway

Nuisance raids aimed merely at destroying coastal batteriesand other installations of importance, as well as at disrupting andhampering coastal. shipping, are possible almost anywhere along the. Nor-wegian west and north coasts and in the polar area.

Large-scale operations with limited objectives may be expected especiallyagainst the bases of our surface forces and submarines. In Trondheimand Bergen the shipyard and base installations, as well as the heavy andlight forces are particularly good targets. However, also the other har-bors being used for convoy and escort forces and as ports of call andtransshipment for supply traffic are endangered; in these places the en--emy would be, able to strike a serious blow at supplies for -Norway by de-stroying merchant ships and escort forces as well as transshipment facil-ities. This applies especially to the terminal points of our supply traf-fic, Kirkenes, Petsamo, and Kristiansand-South, important in-between sta-tions such as Tromsoe, and harbors, e.g., Stavanger, which have shipyardand repair facilities.

Large-scale enemy landings can be expected in the vicinity of Kirkenesand Petsamo and in the Lofoten area. In the former area the objectivewould be to establish a junction with the Russians in northern Finlandand to capture the Petsamo nickel mines. On the Lofoten islands, Harstadwould be the base from which an attack could be launched against Narvik,as was done as early as 19f0.

3. Skagerrak, Kattegat, Jutland, German Bight

Also in these areas there are profitable and possible targetsfor enemy operations, such as airfields, harbors, the coastal batteries'of the coast of Jutland, especially the Hanstholm battery, Heligoland,or the Frisian islands.

An operation with strong forces into the Skagerrak and the Kattegat, com-bined perhaps with a temporary occupation of Laesoe and Anholt and an ad-vance toward Helsingoer and Copenhagen as well as into the Oslo Fjord,could paralyze supply shipments to Norway temporarily and perhaps con-siderably reduce the number of our merchant ships and escort forces.

III. Reinforcement of coastal defenses by the Navy

Fuehrer Directive 4O defines operations by naval forces and training and

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use of the entire coastal a til.e ry against sea targets as the tasks ofthe Navy in coastal defense

Operations of naval, forces means use of all naval weapons. Consequentlyeven through Directive 4o does not mention this 'explicitly, the use ofmine., boom and net barrages., of radar against sea targets and submarines,installation and " use of torpedo batteries and land-based depth chargethrowers as well as all other means of coastal defense, insofar as theyare used against the enemy prior to his landing, fall under the juris-diction of the Navy. As regards coastal artillery, in addition totraining and use against sea targets, the Navy shares the responsibilityfor installing new batteries and changing the positions of old ones,since the requirements of naval warfare are of prime concern.

1. Operation of naval forcesAs regards coastal defnse, the naval forces serve the purpose

of reconnaissance (to supplement air reconnaissance) and, insofar asforces are available, of repelling enemy landing attempts.

In order to carry out these tasks, a continuous patrol service is neces-sary, at least in the vicinity of all especially endangered points, andthese patrol boats should be backed up by stronger forces lying inreadiness (destroyers and torpedo boats),

With the forces available at present, such patrol service can be main-tained only to a limited extent, since almost all patrol boats, mine-sweepers, and defense forces are being used for minesiweeping and escortservice, and are fully occupied with these tasks. Combat vessels toback up the patrol boats are also lacking almost everywhere.

Thus it becomes evident that every possibility to increase the availableforces must be utilized. Therefore a careful investigation should bemade as to whether all vessels suitable for defense tasks are beingused for this, purpose and not for less important tasks, and which vesselscould be put to better use by improving their armament and equipment.A report on this should be made by 1 Ma . Pertinent suggestions andrequests should be made at the same me or later.

2. Minelayin and use of othermaval weapons at the coast

a. The statements made concerning naval forces apply alsoto mines. If the mine supplies were inexhaustible and ships enoughwere aailable to transport and lay mines, coastal defenses could bereinforced and perfected by extensive use of mines much more than here-tofore, Since this is by no means the case, however, it is necessary tomake the best possible use of the available means.

Therefore the Group Commands and the Commanding Admirals are requestedto examine thoroughly all mine plans. Perhaps entirely new possibilitieswill become apparent (e.g., in areas where there is. a great differencein high and low tide, ground mines could be buried or perhaps washedunder in the approaches to important harbors which are shallow or evendry at low tide, but passable by enemy vessels at high tide.

b. Local conditions will determine the use of net and boombarrages as well as of other means of preventing enemy raids, and alsothe use of additional,, radar installations against sea targets and sub-marines, and the emplacement of new torpedo batteries and depth chargetblowers, The Commanding Admirals are requested, insofar as this isnot already being done, to see that experiences are exchanged and eval-.uated in' their areas and that the subordinate commanders make a complete

B-68

evaluation of all possibilities with the available means. Requests forallocation of weapons, equipment, and materiel are to be made as soonas possible in the order of urgency. All possible makeshifts are to beutilized. Equipment available in the various sectors is to be utilizedfully, and possibly to be exchanged and supplemented from other sectors,so as to make the greatest possible use of everything available in thegiven command areas.

3. Installation of new coastal batteries and shifting of old ones.Requests and suggestions for reinforcement of coastal artillery

in the various areas will be fulfilled insofar as possible.

In addition, on the basis of the recent experiences it is necessary toinvestigate whether the available batteries are well distributed andemplaced. For example, while the areas of Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk,and the coast of Flanders are amply supplied with coastal batteries,there are considerable gaps in other areas. Since the deadline foroperation 1''Seeloewe" has been put off, it might be justifiable tempor-arily to withdraw some 'of the batteries,

The Commanding Admirals are requested thoroughly to examine the distri-bution and emplacement of the coastal batteries in their areas, at thelatest by 15 Ma , Wherever it seems necessary or advisable to s flT

batterisan is could be done in a short time and without too mucheffort, pertinent proposals should be submitted at once in the case ofnaval coastal batteries, and in the ease of Army coastal batteries thenecessary or advisable measures should be carried out in agreement withthe Armed Forces' or Army commands involved.

In investigating the distribution and emplacement of coastal batteries,all commands should keep in mind that the German home territory at thepresent time is almost completely devoid of coastal batteries, andthat it would be especially desirable to release batteries for theGerman coast. An effort should be made to reinforce the defenses ofthe German coast by 1 Sep. 1942.

4+. Special exueriences

a, Every new enemy operation may bring new surprises. Thenecessary exchange of experiences should not result in the fact thatdefense measures in all areas are determined by the experiences gainedduring the last enemy peration in one particular area. The means andmethods whiccf2an be used by the enemy are generally determined by thelocal conditions. All coastal defense measures should therefore takeinto consideration first of all the possibilities offered the enemy onthe spot and the fact that the enemy. is fully aware of them.

b. The lack of patrol boats, minesweepers, and escort forceshas resulted in the fact that paPoo service has been neglected ascompared to minesweeping and cot service Insofar as the few forcesavailable permit, patrol service in the future must be given greaterconsideration in view of its importance, as long as the convoy serviceis not overly curtailed. Weather conditions and other circumstanceswhich may necessitate special measures must be taken into account ineach individual case,

c. During temporary absences of a commanding officer, forexample because of sickness or leave, the actin commander must be able.to take full responsibility, ie must be fillyfFamiliar with the con-ditions in the area, with all tasks and all instructions and ordersissued. If the officer who is to take over is not suitable or trainedfor the task, the higher command must provide a proper substitute.

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d. The full readiness of the coastal defenses should be as-sured also during attacks from the air. All watch and look-out postsmust remain manned, and vigilance toward the sea must not be diminishedbut increased. The crews of the naval batteries as well as the navalunits assigned to infantry defense will remain at their stations in ac-cordance with readiness regulations. The command staffs are to evaluateall incoming reports and ,observations. with special attention.

e. The possibility that there are large quantities of ex-losives aboard enemy ships abandoned by their crews should always bekpt in mind. Prisoners should be use rutessly n searching suchships and for the purpose of disposing of explosives discovered (forexample, prisoners should be detained aboard ship until they are readyto talk or to cooperate voluntarily).

f. The lack of patrol boats, minesweepers, and defense forcesis equally evident in all areas. At the beginning of the year the NavalStaff distributed all available forces in the various areas in accord-ance with the tasks to be performed. Until a fundamental change occursin the situation, there is no reason to change this distribution. Thismeans that each area must manage with the forces at its disposal; allcommands must endeavor to utilize all makeshifts in their area, in ac-cordance with paragraph III 1, in order to be able to carry out thenecessary tasks in spite of the lack of forces.

IV. Naval, Army and Air Force coastal defenses can be reinforced, sup-plemented, and improved only to a very small extent by allocation ofadditional forces, weapons, and equipment; for our resources arestrained to the utmost on all fronts, and our means are limited. Ratherit is necessary to distribute and use all available means in the bestpossible manner, to utilize all reserves, and to exploit all possibili-ties and makeshifts. This is particularly the task of the local com-maners. Thus they have a special responsibility. I expect that allnaval stations are aware of this responsibility, and will not pass upany opportunity to make the coastal defenses under the jurisdiction ofthe Navy as efficient as possible with the limited means available.

signed: Raeder

countersigned: WagnerCaptain

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_ _II __

Armed Forces High Command Fuehrer HeadquartersNr. 5579/42 g.K. Chefs. WFSt/Op. 4 May 192

No. 5 of 20 copies

Top secret

Re: Planned operations in the Mediterranean area

During the conference between the Fuehrer and the Duce, the time scheduleand extent of the German part of the planned combined operations in theMediterranean area was determined.

Accordingly, the offensive in North Africa will be carried out at theend of May, the beginning of June at the latest. This operation will becalled "Theseus" (secret) for the purpose of communication among Germancommands. The first day of the attack will be known as R day.

Operation "Herkules" will be postponed until the middle of July, themiddle of August at the latest, in order to; keep the two operations frominterfering with one another. The first day of the attack will be knownas L day.

Expanding previous plans, the Fuehrer has decided to use considerablystronger forces for operation "Herkules", and has issued the followingorders:

I. Participation of German forces:

A. "Theseus":

The Panzer Army, Africa is to receive the following reinforce-

ments in the course of Ma:

1. Army:

a. 1 battery of 210 mm. howitzers (21 cm. Moerser 18)without motor vehicle for 4/Artillery Regiment 115.

b. Eight 15 cm. howitzers 414 (f) for rearming ArmyCoastal Artillery Battalion 523. Also the transfer of four 10 cm. can-nons 35 Ct) for the same purpose is to be speeded up.

c. The smoke screen detachment requested by the PanzerArmy.

d. 6 anti-tank guns 7.62 Cr) Sf1.; later 6 more.

2. Air Force:

The 2 parachute battalions requested by the Panzer Army,Africa cannot be supplied in view of their limited value for operation"Theseus", and since all specialized troops available will have to beassembled for operation "Herkules".

B. "Herkules":

The following are to be made available in southern Italy at a

time to be specified by the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South:

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1. Air Force:

All parts of the 7th Airborne Division ready for opera-tions. The Commander in Chief, Air will report the forces available assoon as the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South has set the date.

2. Army:

a. Approximately one battalion of engineers.

b. 12 tanks IV with long tank guns (suitable for thetropics), 5 VK 1801 and 5 vK 1601, and all available captured heavyRussian tanks, (at least 10, among them as many 43 and 52 ton tanksas possible), with crews.

II. Command organization:

"Herkules":

The Army units participating in this operation will be subordinatedto the 7th Airborne Division upon arrival in the assembly area. The 7thAirborne Division is under the Commander, Armed Forces, South, who in,turn will handle cooperation with the Italians.

III. Air Force:

A. The 2nd Air Force must be sufficiently strong in the Mediter-ranean to assure air superiority during the operation together with theItalian Air Force.

B. The necessary transport planes for operation "Herkules" willbe ordered by the Fuehrerdepending on the number of parachute unitsavailable and in accordance with the requests to be submitted by the

Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South. Transport planes already inthe Mediterranean area are to be prepared for parachute jumping insofar.as possible., I

fuhrer directives

Documents

bpg 32205t7apg

operations order

defensive operations

unified command

character of german

leveli aval directives

command organization

thegerman armed forces