further examination of the hoplite debate

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE HOPLITE DEBATE

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Further Examination of the Hoplite Debate

Mike Lally

History of Ancient Greece

Professor Denise Kawasaki

SUNY Empire State College

June 26, 2014


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John Hale attacks the hoplite orthodoxy in Chapter 9: Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not

Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare, of Donald Kagan’s

and Gregory Viggiano’s Men of Bronze (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 176). Hale attempts to

introduce an “alternative context for the origin of hoplite warfare, and tracks early hoplites into a

realm where private enterprise, not public service, was the guiding star.” (Kagan and Viggiano

2013, 176)

I will share the hoplite orthodoxy as defined by Kagan and Viggiano in Men of Bronze

(Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 1). I will compare Hale’s thesis against both Kagan’s definition and

the reigning champions of the current factions of the hoplite debate, Victor Davis Hanson for the

orthodox and Hans Van Wees for the revisionists. I will show that Hale bases his thesis on a

partial acceptance of the orthodoxy. I will share my alternative approach to the orthodoxy and

explain how Hale does not prove his thesis. Lastly, I will describe how Hale’s findings can easily

be incorporated into my own thesis that hoplites emerged in an iterative manner.

I do not find that Hale proves hoplites emerged mainly from private Greek enterprise. He

does not present enough compelling evidence to declare a definitive end to the debate by

providing a final answer to the questions regarding the emergence and evolution of the Greek

hoplite in both warfare and politics. Hale does produce a convincing argument for the inclusion

of entrepreneurs/mercenaries as a third group providing hoplites alongside Hanson’s farmers and

Van Wees’ aristocrats.

I continue to accept the definition of the hoplite orthodoxy detailed by Donald Kagan and

Gregory F. Viggiano in their introductory chapter of Men of Bronze. The orthodoxy defines the

early Greek polis as the result of a sudden change or “revolution” in military equipment and

tactics which drove social and political “revolutions” in Greece. The authors’ state:


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“A central part of the thesis is that the change in fighting style was directly

related to recent innovations in arms and armor. Second, the phalanx depended

on the weight and the cohesion of heavily armed men who employed “shock”

tactics in brief but decisive battles. Third, it has been critical to identify the

greatest number of hoplites with a middling group within the polis, which had

the wealth to provide its own arms. Fourth, this middling group transformed

Greek values.” (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 1)

Both Victor Davis Hanson and Hans van Wees find common ground in the hoplite debate

in that hoplites emerged in support of the polis. Hanson feels that all social, political, economic

and military issues in Ancient Greece were always concerning land pressure. Hanson’s theories

provide the backbone of the orthodox position. In The Western Way of War, Hanson states that

hoplites were middling farmers who fought for and over farmland. He feels the adoption of the

full hoplite panoply, including the double-grip shield were used tactically in the phalanx

formation. In his book, The Other Greeks, Hanson takes the position that the hoplites came from

an expanding class of middling farmers and became a force the affected socio-political change

that culminated in the rise of the polis.

Hans van Wees leads the charge of the anti-orthodoxy revisionists in two of his papers:

The Homeric Way of War: The ‘Iliad’ and the Hoplite Phalanx (I and II). In a footnote to Part II,

van Wees concludes: “I do not believe that the introduction of the double-grip shield greatly

accelerated the growth of the phalanx formation.” (van Wees, The Homeric Way of War: The

'Iliad' and the Hoplite Phalanx (II) 1994, 155). He feels that the infantry fighting men came from

an aristocratic leisure-class who fought for their respective poleis rather than for individual gains

in political power. Van Wees does not feel hoplites played a revolutionary force in politics.

Hale relies heavily on Nino Luraghi’s article Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-

History of Greek Mercenary Soliders in the Eastern Mediterranean (Luraghi 2006) to make his


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case. Luraghi provides ample evidence of mercenaries operating in the Near East. He highlights

written document from Egypt and Assyria; the poetry of Archilochus, Alcaeus and Antimenidas

(Alcaeus’ brother) and archaeological artifacts such as a horse frontlet found on Samos and a

blinker found in Eretria both made of North Assyrian bronze and both bearing similar

inscriptions.

Figure 1 The Amathus Bowl


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Perhaps the most striking piece of evidence is the Amathus Bowl pictured in Figure 1

(Luraghi 2006, 29). Luraghi says:

“Quite surprisingly, if we look at the group of warriors that approaches from

the city from the right, behind the man with a pointed helmet of Assyrian or

Syrian type on his head leaning a ladder against the wall, we see four Greek

hoplites in close formation, with the full equipment of Greek heavy infantry;

crested helmets (possibly with cheek pieces), spears, round shields with

delicately incised blazons, and greaves. In fact, this is the earliest depiction of a

hoplite phalanx.” (Luraghi 2006, 37)

There is no doubt that Luraghi builds a strong case that mercenaries were operating as

early as 732 BC in Assyria. He concludes:

The history of Greek mercenaries begins considerably earlier than is usually

thought. Its roots would lie in the activities of pirates-traders from Euboea, the

Cycladic islands and Asia Minor, who seem to have started their business in the

Levant in the third quarter of the 8th century. They were the ancestors of the

Greek mercenaries who fought for almost every single Near Eastern kingdom

from the mid-seventh century to the age of Alexander the Great. (Luraghi 2006,

41-42)

I feel that Hale, through Luraghi, has succeeded in proving that hoplites were employed

in mercenary service abroad. Hale shifts to proving that hoplite arms and tactics evolved outside

the realm of the polis to support his full thesis that hoplites solely emerged from the private

Greek enterprise of mercenary service. We can now begin to examine Hale’s findings through

the lens of Kagan’s definition of the hoplite orthodoxy.

Hale does not focus on the first two points of the orthodoxy. He prefers to concentrate on

points 3 and 4 concerning where hoplites came from and the impact they had on shaping the

Greek social, political and economic landscape.


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Hale presents contradictory sources on the arms and armor of the ancient Greeks. He

cites a passage from Herodotus detailing the inventions of the Carians (near western Anatolia):

… the Carians became by far the most famous of all peoples at that time. The

Hellenes, in fact, adopted three of their inventions for their own use. The Carians

taught them how to tie plumes to helmets, to decorate shields with devices, and

to attach handles to shields. Indeed, they were the first to use shield handles;

until then anyone who bore a shield manipulated it not by handles, but rather by

a leather strap worn around the neck and left shoulder. (Herodotus 2007,

1.171.3-4)

Immediately following this citation Hale points out that Anthony Snodgrass has argued against

the Carians’ claims. (Snodgrass 1964). However, in reading Snodgrass’ paper, I find that he

concludes that there is no definite answer. We can only infer from conflicting sources.

The second point of the orthodoxy pertains to the tactics of the phalanx. Hale suggests

that phalanx emerged from shield wall tactics employed by raiders in beach landings. He cites a

lengthy passage from an Athenian commander named Iphicrates who orders his troops to land in

formation prior to commencing a raid near Phoenicia. Hale also cites from Douglas Gerber’s

translation of a fragment from Mimnermus. (Gerber actually cites from the wrong Gerber

translation. He cites from Greek Iambic Poetry but the fragment is actually found in Greek

Elegiac Poetry.) The fragment of only two lines, clearly describes a phalanx:

So the king’s men charged, when he gave the word of command, making a fence

with their hollow shields. (D. L. Gerber 1999, 13a)

The third point of the hoplite orthodox pertains to the emergence of a middling class to

form the majority of hoplites. This growing class of citizen had the wealth necessary to purchase

the arms and armor necessary to fight in the phalanx. Hale’s entire paper is an argument against

this point. Hale argues that hoplites were mercenaries returning home from foreign engagements.


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Hale begins to prove his thesis by suggesting that hoplites were born and trained in

mercenary service “in the wider Mediterranean world” (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 179) and not

from Hanson’s middling farmers nor van Wees’ aristocrats. According to Hale, “these men

fought not on the fields of Greece but overseas, as pirates, raiders, mercenaries, bodyguards,

land-grabbers, and generals for hire.” (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 179) Hale holds up fragments

from Archilochus and Athenaeus as his main sources of proof that mercenaries were operating in

the Mediterranean.

Archilochus actually tells us that he is a soldier of fortune: “I am servant of lord Enyalius

[Mycenaean Greek name for Ares] and skilled in the lovely gift of the Muses.” (D. Gerber 1999,

77) It is important to note that Archilochus was real and not a fiction. Athenaeus presents us with

an account of a drinking song by “Hybrias the Cretan”. Hale cites the following passage to

support his argument for the existence of Greek soldiers of fortune:

I have great wealth: a spear, a sword, and the fine leather shield which protects

one’s skin. For with this I plough, with this I harvest, with this I trample the

sweet wine from the vines, with this I am called master of serfs. Those who dare

not hold a spear, a sword, or the fine leather shield which protects one’s skin,

all cower at my knee and prostrate themselves, calling me ‘Master’ and ‘Great

King’. (Athenaeus 695f-696a)

Lastly, Hale refers to work from Hans van Wees in Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities.

Van Wees supports the idea of mercenaries working abroad:

“The kingdoms of Egypt and the Near East had hired soldiers for their expeditionary

forces, garrison troops, and rebel armies since the Late Bronze Age, and they had

employeed Greeks at least since the seventh century.” (van Wees, Greek Warfare Myths and Realities 2004, 42)

Van Wees ties the mercenary adventures back to the polis. He feels the men fighting

abroad did so to bring “honour and profit” back to the community or polis.


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I feel that Hale contradicts himself on this point as well. He writes: “Greek hoplites of the

seventh and early sixth centuries, then, seem more likely to have been professionals fighting in

foreign wars than part-time amateurs fighting for their own cities at home.” However, he

continues “It may be that the sporadic wars between city-states and political factions in the

seventh and sixth centuries were fueled in part by returning mercenaries…” (Kagan and

Viggiano 2013, 185-186) Hoplites cannot be both mercenaries fighting in foreign wars and

hoplites fighting at home.

Point four of the hoplite orthodoxy holds that middling farmers transformed Greek values

and encouraged the rise of the polis. Hale argues against the theory of farmers transforming

Greek values and argues that Greek mercenaries were true entrepreneurs and felt they were the

masters of their own destiny.

Their successful exploits became an economic engine that pumped vast wealth

and cultural baggage from more advanced cultures into the formerly

impoverished Greek heartland. (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 191).

Hale provides a strong case that there were Greek mercenaries operating in the Near East

and that these men strongly influenced the rise of the hoplite warrior. However, he does not

present enough evidence to prove that hoplites emerged solely from mercenaries. I feel that Hale

has further muddied the hoplite debate by introducing this mercenary strand. In Table 1, I have

summarized the prevailing points of argument from the orthodox, the revisionists and John Hale

who should also be considered within the revisionist camp.


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Orthodox Definition Victor Davis

Hanson

Hans Van Wees John R. Hale

Sudden changes in

arms and armor

Yes. No. Slow adoption. Yes. Adopted from

Carians. Maybe.

Hoplite phalanx

depended on close

order battle

Yes. No. Battle was open ordered.

Yes. Emerged from beach landing tactics.

Middling group

within a polis that

bought their own kit

Yes. No. Hoplites emerged

from the Aristocratic leisure class.

No. Returning

mercenaries with kit and wealth.

Middling group

transformed Greek

values

Yes. No. Aristocrats

fought for their individual polis.

Yes.

Table 1: Orthodoxy versus Revisionists

My original thesis in Analysis of Hoplite Orthodoxy Arguments proposes iterative

evolutions of hoplite arms, armor, tactics, increasing wealth, and the rise of the middling farmer

leading to increases in political power for the middling class and subsequently, a rise of the polis.

These iterations happened over hundreds of years.

There was a gradual shift from the open order battle favored by Hans van Wees to the

phalanx as the full panoply of the hoplite infantryman was adopted. In order to afford the cost of

the panoply, new wealth had to be created. Hanson believes this wealth was created by a rise of a

farmer class. Van Wees believes the wealth was already in the hands of the aristocratic leisure

class. Hale believes this wealth was created by traders, raiders, and mercenaries returning home

from overseas expeditions in the Near East flush with wealth gained from their exploits. I feel

Hale’s concept fits within my iterative model.

Below is a revision of my Iterative Hoplite Cycle. I have included Hale’s mercenary

strand in the cycle.


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Table 2 Iterative Hoplite Cycle v1.1

I am comfortable allowing for Hale’s proposed strand of mercenary service abroad

contributing to the emergence of hoplites. I am not comfortable with the it being the only strand

as Hale would have us accept. I propose folding Hale’s hoplite evolution into my iterative

approach. Hale’s mercenary returned home to join the phalanx of his polis and demand voting

rights. The hoplite was a combination of militia man, entrepreneur (farmer or professional

soldier) and voter. This rise of the hoplites lead to changes in the political structures of ancient

Greece and the rise of poleis. Hale even suggests support of this iterative approach, “Mercenary

Land pressure

Evolutions in farming techniques and increase in private

trading/raiding/mercenary expeditions

Creation and growth of the middling farmer class and mercenaries returning

home

Wealth creation / Wealth injection

Increased adoption of

hoplite panoply

Infantrymen closing ranks as farmers learn from

mercenaries

Fully formed

phalanx

Influence of militia man,

businessman, and voter grows

Rise of the polis


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service and raiding expeditions were part of the environment in which Greek hoplites

EVOLVED [my emphasis].” (Kagan and Viggiano 2013, 182)


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References

Gerber, Douglas. Greek Iambic Poetry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Gerber, Douglas L. Greek Elegiac Poetry. Cambridge: Harvard, 1999.

Hanson, Victor Davis. The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece. New York:

Knopf, 1989.

Herodotus. The Landmark Herodotus. Translated by Andrea L. Purvis. New York: Anchor

Books, 2007.

Kagan, Donald, and Gregory F. Viggiano. Men Of Bronze. Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2013.

Lally, Michael A. "A Proposed Alternative to the Hoplite Debate." Fairport, February 17, 2014.

Luraghi, Nino. "Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-History of Greek Mercenary Soldiers in

the Eastern Mediterranean." Phoenix 60, no. 1 (2006): 21-47.

Snodgrass, Anthony. "Carian Armourers - The Growth of a Tradition." The Journal of Hellenic

Studies (The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies) 84 (1964): 107-118.

van Wees, Hans. Greek Warfare Myths and Realities. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004.

van Wees, Hans. "The Homeric Way of War: The 'Iliad' and the Hoplite Phalanx (II)." Greece

and Rome (Cambridge University Press) 41, no. 2 (1994).

further examination of the hoplite debate

Education

hoplite orthodoxy

greek hoplite

hoplite panoply

origins of hoplite warfare

origin of hoplite warfare

early hoplites

john hale

hale attempts