future nuclear weapon policies james m. acton [email protected]
TRANSCRIPT
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(Some) elements of nuclear posture
• Force size and structure• Deployed and reserve systems; readiness status
• Military Organization• Troops; training; procedures; operations
• Enabling systems• Command and control; early warning; ISR; targeting
• Infrastructure• Warhead production/maintenance facilities; industrial base; test facilities
• Declaratory policy• Statements; training and exercises; domestic discourse
• War plans• Treaty obligations
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Questions raised by reductions
• Can U.S. fulfill “deterrence” requirements?• Will weapons reach target?
• Reliability; pre- and post-launch survivability • Will weapons destroy target?
• Yield, accuracy and target location error• Can requirements be revised?• How will allies/adversaries view U.S. resolve and capability?• What will the effects on “strategic stability” be?• …
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Current U.S. force structure
Platform Missile Warhead
ICBM (Silo based) Minuteman III W78; W87
SLBM Ohio-class SSBN Trident-D5 W76-0/1; W88
Heavy Bombers B-2 (Gravity bombs) B61-7/11; B83-1
B-52H ALCM W80-1(+ gravity bombs)
“Tactical” fighters F-15E; F-16C/D (Gravity bombs) B61-3/4/10
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Future of the triad
• Political context crucial; in practice force structure will be determined by politics of the moment as much as nuclear strategy• ICBM replacement will probably be delayed further (beyond
2020); early abandonment very unlikely (jobs!)• Very strong support for SLBMs• Multiple decision points related to heavy bombers and tactical
fighters coming up• Air leg most vulnerable
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Arguments for heavy bombers and tactical fighters
• Unique ability to hold buried targets at risk• But, how much do these targets really matter?
• Stealth as alternative to speed for defense penetration• But, how likely is effective BMD?
• Recallable• But, how many war plan options include only aircraft?
• Forward deployment as tool for assurance• But, are there alternatives?
• Signaling as tool for crisis management
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A growing role for conventional weapons in strategic war plans?
DoD is directed to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable. Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.
Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States (2013)
• Probably not about large-scale replacement.
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Types of target in a “counterforce” attack against North Korea
• Fixed, soft targets• ICBM sitting on a launch pad
• Fixed, buried targets• Warhead storage facilities; leadership; command and control• Probably tens, potentially hundreds of metres deep
• Mobile, soft targets• Road-mobile missiles
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Massive ordnance penetrator
• Total mass: 13,600 kg• HE mass: 2,400 kg• Can reportedly
penetrate to 20 m in reinforced concrete (much less than nuclear weapons)
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Physics of conventional penetrators
• From Nelson (2002)
Young Penetration Equation (SI Units)
D: Depth S: Penetrability of targetN: Nose performance coefficientm: Mass A: Cross sectional areaV: Speed
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CPGS technological approaches
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Comparison of penetrator effectiveness
• Ratio of penetration depths: 1.3-2.1• CPGS penetrator would only contain about 10% of
the HE that MOP does.
MOP CPGS
V (m/s) 500 [?] 1,000-1,200
m/A (kg/m) 27,000 14,000-21,000
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Mobile missile hunting
• Need to locate and track missiles• If using standoff weapons need to provide inflight target updates
(or risk waiting until they’re stationary)• North Korea has hundreds of mobile ballistic missiles
• Only a small fraction might contain a nuclear warhead, but very hard to tell which is which
• 1991 Gulf War: 1,460 sorties; 0 confirmed kills• 2006 Israel-Hizbollah war: 80-90% of Hizbollah’s medium- and long-
range rocket launchers destroyed. But, took time and relied on attacking launchers after missiles has fired.
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Nuclear v. conventional options
• Lethal radius from flechette weapon: <100 m, possibly much less (my calculation)• TEL can traverse this distance in 10 s
• Lethal radius from 100 kT nuclear weapon: 2,900 m (McKinzie et al. 2001)• TEL can traverse this distance in 260 s
• Hunting mobile missiles with conventional weapons much harder than nuclear weapons