in " v •b

H , WEJN& GER. Th y w nt i • r p dly could.

0 prov 1

Th t' rl ht. A •oon as h G ra 1'1• go paTli

0 I want to ask you bout a now so.a hat d •puted incident. That f 11 tbere w a a NATO exere •• bY the n••• of Able Archer -- 1 co-and post nucl r rel ue exercise.

I" 1 jus ell e KGB Qlief n LoD~n at an q at. ami he la er

J:ae ~o.u • ve ••t hi • R•

0 Do y o ny par icula~ al r . o .

about th s, no. Bu I do r m•mb r--and th 5ame ~ay on our s'de -- ch t i is

to ell th f.ference be wee.n an ors t we

-•·~~....le:::..v r:Y h~r. -! was particularly b cau e hey were :nov ng a hell of

of stufl in pos · tion nd v rybody kn w it w $ just a m n uver and it was an nnu 1 ex rci$e, but I go~ qui e a1a~med, because I kept s ying ''wh t if it isn't.? We've lost about !iv days of time." So the difference b tween a realistic ey. rciae or

neuver and what could be preparation• fo~ an att~ck, th t line is so111e imes quit blurred. I don't re111elllber anything sp c:ifioallY •bou that. I do reaember that my feeling was that the sovie s had walked ~ut of the negotiations, as they were. They weren't reallY negot ations. W.e were just sitting around the table with a bunch of guys who wouldn't. bend an inch -- was a natural event t-0 be

xpected when we deployed. ')

~ And I was ex

~.J rea•ons. e was deploy.ent was going to latt. I boped t wbuld, but the ovie a

pwere a1••Y• sure they could block deploya•nt and they had aounted huge deJDOnst-rations from 1.981 on and ne1ter fou d one tMt said anybody demonatrat>ing against the ss-20. But a lot of the e -• and so I wanted to deplor nd we bad urged cSeploya · nt 4 _ thtt BUrop.eu aoun riea bad, in very cout: geou-s ded.a OJ18, ae~;c:e)) ect deplopent.

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