gam

GAM Sophisticated UCITS update

Matt LambHead of Institutional and Fund Distribution (UK)

December 2011

This document is confidential and intended solely for the use of the person to whom it is given or sent and may not be reproduced, copied or given, in whole or in part, to any other person.

2

Sophisticated UCITS strategies

Source: GAM as at 31 Oct 2011* To be launched

Hedge fund thinking in a regulated product

Macro/Managed FuturesGAM Star Keynes Quantitative StrategiesGAM Star Emerging Market Rates GAM Star Discretionary FX GAM Star Global Rates GAM Star Global Macro*

Fixed IncomeGAM Star Diversified Market Neutral Credit GAM Star Global Convertible Bond

Equity Long/ShortGAM Star Absolute Europe GAM Star Global Selector

Funds of UCITS III FundsGAM Star Trading

AUM (USD millions)LiquidityDailyDaily

WeeklyWeeklyDaily

WeeklyDaily

DailyDaily

Weekly

450324

81805NA

76119

4377

28

Total USD 2 billion

3

Absolute Return – Risk correlations

Using hedge fund indices as a guide due to limited data on Absolute Return Funds

Correlation of HFRI indices to the S&P 500 index in USD to 31 Oct 2011

Source: HFR, Thomson Reuters

Index (USD) 3 years 5 years 7 years 10 years

HFRI Equity Hedge (Total) Index 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8

HFRI Relative Value (Total) Index 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6

HFRI RV: Fixed Income – Convertible Arbitrage Index 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6

HFRI Event Driven (Total) Index 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8

HFRI RV: Fixed Income – Corporate Index 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7

HFRI ED: Distressed/Restructuring Index 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7

HFRI Macro (Total) Index 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2

Correlation to equities

4

-15 %

-10 %

-5 %

0 %

5 %

10 %

15 %

Q2 10 Q3 10 Q4 10 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11

2.93.1

-0.6

-2.4

-1.3

3.6

-0.3

-2.1

4.3

3.0

-1.2

-2.8

2.7

-2.0-2 %

0 %

2 %

4 %

Q22010 Q42010 Q22011 Q42011

GAM Star Keynes Quantitative Strategies Newedge CTA Index in USD MSCI World Index in USD

GAM Star Keynes Quantitative Strategies – USDPerformance from 6 Apr 2010 (inception) to 24 Nov 2011

Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Performance is provided net of fees.Source: GAM, Bloomberg, MSCI

5

-6 %

-4 %

-2 %

0 %

2 %

4 %

6 %

8 %

10 %

Q2 10 Q3 10 Q4 10 Q1 11 Q2 11 Q3 11

8.2

11.6

5.5

8.1 8.3

25.5

29.3

-0.30 %

5 %

10 %

15 %

20 %

25 %

30 %

2004Part 2006 2008 2010

GAM Star Emerging Market Rates – USD GAM Emerging Market Rates Hedge - USD

GAM Star Emerging Market Rates and GAM Emerging Market Rates Hedge

Performance information provided for GAM Emerging Market Rates Hedge Fund excludes the performance of the L-1 and L-2 classes. The L-1 classes hold claims against Lehman Brothers International (Europe) Limited (LBIE), which amounted to 22.1% of the fund as at 1 Dec 2008. Performance of the USD L-1 class was -69.8% from 1 Dec 2008 to 31 Oct 2011. The L-2 classes hold certain assets custodied with LBIE, which amounted to 35.5% of the fund as at 1 Oct 2010. Performance of the USD L-2 class was 0.05% from 1 Oct 2010 to 31 Oct 2011. Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Performance is provided net of fees.

Source: GAM

Performance information provided for GAM Emerging Market Rates Hedge Fund excludes the performance of the L-1 and L-2 classes. Further details of the L classes are provided below.

From 28 Apr 2010 to 31 Oct 2011 From 31 Nov 2004 to 31 Oct 2011

6

-50 %

-40 %

-30 %

-20 %

-10 %

0 %

10 %

20 %

2008 2009 2010 2011

2.1

-9.4

-4.3

-10 %

-8 %

-6 %

-4 %

-2 %

0 %

2 %

2011YTD

GAM Global Macro Hedge – USD Open MSCI World Index in USD HFRX Macro Index in USD

GAM Global Macro Hedge – USD Open

Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Performance is provided net of fees.Source: GAM, MSCI, Hedge Fund Research

From 15 Oct 2007 to 21 Nov 2011 Returns YTD

The Macro Factor: The Optimal Strategy in a World of Debt, Deficits and Default

David MorrisonInvestment Director

8

GAM Global Macro Hedge – USD OpenMSCI World Index in USDHFRX Macro Index in USD

-60 %

-40 %

-20 %

0 %

20 %

2008 2009 2010

GAM Global Macro Hedge – USD OpenPerformance from 15 Oct 2007 to 21 Nov 2011

Source: GAM, MSCI, Hedge Fund ResearchPast performance is not indicative of future performance. Performance is provided net of fees.

9

GAM Global Macro Hedge

Sub-strategy returns Runs

Up months (%)

Largest up (%)

Largest down (%)

Wins (months)

Loss (months)

Equities 64 2.6 -2.2 8 5

FX 56 3.3 -1.8 9 4

Commodities 62 6.3 -3.7 7 4

Fixed Income 38.7 0.8 -1.4 7 6

Source: GAM as at 21 Nov 2011

Winning and losing runs by asset class

Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Underlying asset classes cannot be purchased individually and represent the component parts of GAM Global Macro Hedge.

10

GAM Global Macro HedgePerformance by asset class from 1 Nov 2007 (first full month of data) to 21 Nov 2011

Fixed Income

Equities FX

Source: GAMPast performance is not indicative of future performance. Underlying asset classes cannot be purchased individually and represent the component parts of GAM Global Macro Hedge.

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

07Jan2008

Jan2009

Jan2010

Jan2011

%

07Jan2008

Jan2009

Jan2010

Jan2011

-3.0

-2.0

-1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

%

Commodities

-6.0

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

07Jan2008

Jan2009

Jan2010

Jan2011

%

-1.5

-1.0

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

07Jan2008

Jan2009

Jan2010

Jan2011

%

11

-50 %

-40 %

-30 %

-20 %

-10 %

0 %

Maximum Drawdown

The largest loss, peak to trough based on monthly data

0 %

5 %

10 %

15 %

20 %

Annualised Standard Deviation

The higher the number, the greater the variability of performance / risk

GAM Global Macro Hedge – USD Open

MSCI World Index in USDAverage USD 1 Month Deposit RateHFRX Macro Index in USD

GAM Global Macro Hedge – MetricsPerformance from 15 Oct 2007 (inception) to 21 Nov 2011

Past performance is not indicative of future performance. Performance is provided net of fees. Funds do not have the security of capital which is characteristic of a bank deposit.Source: GAM, MSCI, Financial Times, Hedge Fund Research

12

The WorldEconomy

GAM Star Global Macro

● Every economic, financial, political and random event is reflected in the four major asset classes and the world economy

● Understanding the drivers of these five areas is the key to our investment philosophy

● These asset classes and their constituents do not always offer equal opportunities

● The skill is:– Gauging the likely future path of all asset

classes– Estimating the relationship between asset

classes for any given event or 'shock'– Selecting 'best of breed' opportunities from

within asset classes– Having a clear view of the true meaning and

measurement of risk

Investment philosophy

FX

Fixed Income

Equity Indices

Commodities

13


Coverage: In the main the portfolio invests as follows

Primarily Occasionally

Equity Indices S&P 500, Eurostoxx, FTSE, Hang Seng, Emerging Market ETF’s

Sector ETF’s, VXX

Foreign Exchange OECD countries -

CommoditiesWTI crude, gold, silver, base metals, corn, wheat, sugar, cocoa

Other metals, natural gas

Fixed Income US 10-year notes, bunds, giltsShort-dated interest rates

Theme development

Reject poor research however

apparently attractive

Formulate robust analytical

view

● Deep in-house proprietary research on selected economies, policies and issues

● The experience and ability to distinguish good research from deadline research

Arrive at and rank a set of conclusions

Finalisethemes

Check the consensus view, where possible

Check the technical position for confirmation

and timing

Check forcorrelations

14


● At the core of our investment philosophy and process is intensive proprietary research

– We are not dependant on any external source of information

● However, no matter how good, deep or extensive the team’s political, economic or financial research none of these disciplines is geared to help the timing of trades

● Timing may not be important over a five or ten year investment horizon, but

1. Investors have zero tolerance for a ten year result and

2. The modern world of instant information and soundbites is not conducive to patience

● Consequently, utilising the tools listed opposite, we regard the timing of the implementation and closing of positions as central to our management process

Timing Tools

● Technical analysis– Traditional Pattern Recognition– Ichimoku Cloud Analysis– Elliot Waves– DeMark Indicators

● Event risk awareness– Government and Central Bank meetings– Key data releases

● Positioning– Long and short exposures– Crowded trades– Worn out stories

The issue of timing

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● We begin by assuming equal opportunities exist across the four asset classes:

– Equity indices– FX

● However, we know that they are not equal. Therefore we risk adjust for:

– Knowledge and track record– Expected returns– Coalescence of fundamental and technical analytics – Liquidity and event risk

● A representative ‘normal’ allocation would be:

– Equities 30%

– FX 30%

● The portfolio will tend to have:

– 2-4 themes

– 8-15 positions

– 3-12 months expected holding period

– 30-60 minutes expected portfolio liquidation

– A wide variety of instruments but especially futures, forwards and exotic options

– Commodities exposure via ETFs

GAM Star Global MacroPortfolio construction

Rules and Guidelines

● Target returns of 8-15% p.a. – Volatility of 6-12% p.a.– Monthly VAR of 2-4%

● If portfolio VAR > 2% of NAV then max 70% of aggregate portfolio in one asset class

● If portfolio VAR > 2% of NAV than max single position size < 35% of total portfolio

– Commodities 25%– Fixed Income 15%

– Commodities – Fixed Income

Source: GAMAllocations and holdings are subject to change. There is no guarantee that targets will be achieved.

16


GAM Global Macro is a small team, which can have advantages:

1. A central decision-making person

2. Consistency of analysis, thought process and implementation

3. Only the portfolio manager can initiate or close a position

4. Clear communication within the team

5. Lionel Messi

● No dilution from committees, the average of views or time wasting disagreements

● Little to no chance of 'style drift', 'fat fingers' or non-FSA compliant behaviour!

● However, all team members have access to the live P&L

● Each trade confirmation is checked by at least three people

● There is a 'closed loop' – no avenue for ‘rogue trades’

● All members are in the same office

● No ‘dodgy’ transatlantic phone calls, misunderstood emails or Bloomberg chats

● QED

Is small beautiful?

17


1. Delivered by David Morrison at the GAM Investment Conference, Zurich, 3rd March 2009

2. Delivered by David Morrison at the GAM Investment Conference, Zurich, 17th March 2010

Target

Price

Buy

Risks

Prospective Return

Source: GAMViews expressed are those of the manager at the time and are subject to change. There is no guarantee that forecasts or targets will be achieved.* Correct Cobras and Ltd Edition Omega Speedmasters may rise 25-50%.** Based on ‘double no touch’ options.

WTI Futures Gold Futures S&P 500 Futures Base metals, Wheat & Corn

USD35-40/bl USD850-875/oz 750-800 Here and now

USD65- 85/bl USD1100-1500/oz 1050-1200 30-70% higher

Income generationVolatility pick-up

Volatility compression Value

BRL + MXN vs EUR, GBP, USD

VIX USD vs JPY, EURWTI, Asian FX

(AC Cobra, Omega)*

10-20% 20-40% 8-15 x premium** 5-25%

CB intervention EM meltdown

No major policy or economic shocks

Policies de-synchroniseCredit issues intensify

Renewed world recessionReduction in income

inequality

Recent views and opportunities

18

GAM Global Macro

Fundamental Analytics Depending on where the oil was, the marginal

cost was USD3-40/bl At USD120-140/bl, if sustained, there would

be massive demand destruction meeting whopping supply

Use of CIA satellite photography showed Saudi oil fields overflowing and laden tankers in the Straits of Hormuz

Strong conviction to sell crude This was our best trade of 2008

Technical Analytics Arguably a classic head and shoulders pattern

played out through the second half of 2008 The distance from neckline to head was

over USD40/bl so downside target was at least USD60/bl

WTI Crude Oil

Source: Bloomberg

Case Study 1: WTI Crude Oil

19

GAM Global Macro

Fundamental Analytics We joined GAM in September 2007 and

amongst the first positions we took was short the S&P 500

US and global monetary policy were too tight

– Consumer debt and housing debt were too high

– Oil was becoming a major ‘tax hike’ Central banks were wrong-footed into still

worrying about inflation

Technical Analytics Mid 2007 to early 2008 saw the formation of a

classic double top The distance from top to neckline was

approximately 150 points, giving a downside target of at least 1,250

The acceleration below this level was a ‘bonus’ This was our second best trade of 2008

S&P 500

Source: Bloomberg

Case Study 2: S&P 500

20

GAM Global Macro

Fundamental Analytics Many economists do not understand the notion

of equilibrium or sustainable exchange rates They keep saying the Yen is ‘overvalued’

– It isn’t

– It’s either at or below fair value Japan’s massive creditor surplus is the Yen’s

main prop Low interest rates elsewhere reduce a

long-standing negative

Technical Analytics USD/JPY has shown no classic patterns for a while However, the downwards-sloping channel has

longevity with current boundaries of 80 and 70 Cloud patterns yield no useful information

at present Double no-touch options have proved profitable for

the strategy in 2011

USD/JPY

Source: Bloomberg

Case Study 3: USD/JPY

21

GAM Global Macro

Fundamental Analytics The BRL is attractive due to

– High interest rates– A robust economy and – A stable political backdrop

However, Brazil’s diminishing current account surplus worried the authorities enough to intervene strongly with FX controls

Against fundamentals the BRL weakened dramatically

Technical Analytics The 2010/2011 downwards-sloping channel

appeared robust The clear breach of 1.65 implied the trend was over The fund was short USD/BRL but we had,

reluctantly, a stop at 1.675– Fortunately, this helped contain our loss

to manageable levels

USD/BRL

Source: Bloomberg

Case Study 4: USD/BRL

22

GAM Global Macro

Fundamental Analytics This may be the one to watch

– The CHF is overvalued on anybody’s measure of equilibrium

The Swiss economy is struggling badly Normally, FX intervention should be faded, but

1. The SNB may have been right to break the psychology of a forever rising franc

2. Swiss monetary policy is soft and

3. The Euro may survive a while longer

Technical Analytics Very interesting position: possible head and

shoulders base with head at 1.02 and neckline at approximately 1.26

Clear breach targets 1.50! Trendline resistance comes in around 1.25 so

1.25/1.26 is major barrier

EUR/CHF

Source: Bloomberg

Case Study 5: EUR/CHF

23


reland and the US have the same size government budget deficit (% of GDP)

o good was ever likely to come out of the Euro, it was a bad idea from day 1, badly implemented

erious funding issues are still probable given the expected slowdown in growth and inflation

nly Germany and Finland have adhered to the Maastricht Treaty’s fiscal criteria

ittle evidence that politicians have a robust economic grasp of the extent of the fiscal issue

ery few countries have budget surpluses

xcess debt weighs on confidence and impairs central banks ability to implement monetary policy

o PIIGS are in good fiscal shape, but Spain is the best placed of the herd

he United States has a larger public sector debt (% of GDP) than Greece

Total Debt

(% of GDP)

Central Government

Borrowing (% of GDP)

Gross Borrowing

Needs (% of GDP)

United States 339.0 -10.1 13.2

United Kingdom 532.7 -8.6 12.0

Germany 309.7 -2.0 8.1

France 331.0 -5.8 10.7

Netherlands 647.5 -3.7 8.8

Belgium 413.1 -3.7 9.4

Finland 276.3 -1.0 4.6

Portugal 456.9 -5.9 12.2

Ireland 1,082.2 -10.5 13.2

Italy 326.5 -4.0 14.1

Greece 253.2 -9.5 20.1

Spain 396.3 -6.3 10.9

Source: J.P. Morgan as at November 2011Views expressed are those of the manager at the time and are subject to change.

Current views and opportunities

24


For the foreseeable future there is little prospect of much economic growth in the developed world

The emerging economies and China will probably slow from their prior ‘hot spot’ status

Inflation in the developed world will be similarly microscopic and will ease further in China and emerging markets

Critically, however, there is no confidence either Political shenanigans, sovereign debt hangovers

and lack of governmental economic understanding imply most risks to most things are on the downside

US JapanEuro Zone China

Emerging Markets

2011 (e) 1.8 -0.5 1.5 9.0 6.0

2012 (f) 1.2 2.0 -0.5 7.8 5.2

Real GDP Growth %

CPI Inflation %


Emerging Markets

2011 (e) 3.0 -0.3 2.7 5.5 7.0

2012 (f) 1.2 -0.3 1.9 3.5 5.5

Source: IMF, Societé Generalé, GAM.Views expressed are those of the manager at the time and are subject to change.


Purchasing Managers Index


Emerging Markets

2011 (e) 54.8 50.4 52.2 51.5 n/a

2012 (f) 49.8 51.2 46.0 50.5 n/a

(e) = estimate (f) = forecast

25


● USD’s equilibrium exchange rate continues to decline, while the Yen’s continues to rise

● The USD could rise if US monetary policy became tighter sooner than major competitors; there is no sign of this yet

● Developed economies may be fortunate to achieve 3% nominal GDP growth in 2012

● As such, there is no reason to expect any reversal of Yen strength or softness in the USD

● EUR/USD and interest rate differentials are still closely correlated despite Greek and Italian issues

US

US cum. current account balance (USD bn) (LHS)USD trade-weighted index (RHS)

-8000

-6000

-4000

-2000

0

80

100

120

140

160

76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 0810Japan cum. current account balance (USD bn) (LHS) Japanese Yen trade-weighted index (RHS)

Japan

0

500

1,000

1,500

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

76 80 84 88 92 96 00 04 0810


Source: Bloomberg and various government departments. Views expressed are those of the manager at the time and are subject to change.

JPY/USD vs US 2-Year Interest Rates

EUR/USD vs 2-Year Interest Rate Differential

112006 2007 2008 2009 2010

2,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

1,000

2005 20112006 2007 2008 2009 2010

1.2000

1.3000

1.4000

1.5000

1.60002.50

1.00

-2.00

-1.00

0.00

2.00

80

90

100

110

120

26

Our assessment of the global growth outlook is that 2012 will be worse than 2011

We believe confidence and ‘animal spirits’ will be further subdued as taxpayers realise their tax bills will increase

This will be exacerbated by further evidence that US and European governments do not understand enough economics to deal with debts and deficits

From a macro perspective, equities are too high

– If the benchmark S&P 500 were 100 points lower they’d still be too high

Long-term we are bullish crude oil

– But over the next 12-18 months it could be closer to USD50/bl than USD100/bl

Despite seeming expensive, there may yet be more upside for bonds

S&P 500

2010 2011

2010 2011

US 10-Yr Notes

WTI Crude

GAM Star Global MacroCurrent views and opportunities

Source: BloombergViews expressed are those of the manager at the time and are subject to change.

2010 2011

27


Overhead supply likely to keep the lid on corn

The base metal seems ‘top heavy’ and will likely head lower in 2012

Gold

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Corn

Copper

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Upwards channel intact and USD2000/oz may come into view next year

Even given its strong rise since 2008, gold still benefits from:

1. Low interest rates thereby reducing the opportunity cost of holding the ‘barbarous relic’

2. Poor economic support for most fiat currencies

3. Sovereign debt chaos and concerns over ‘lenders of last resort’

The Gold metal will probably exceed USD2,000/oz

● Agricultural commodities are at the vagaries of the weather, the crop and, sometimes, government desires

● Corn seems ‘top heavy’ and may lead the ‘softs’ complex lower

● Copper is the king of the base metals

– But the likely slowdown in world demand, including Chinese, may lead prices lower

0

0.2m

0.4m

800

1200

1600

800

500

300

0

0.4m

0.8m

700

600

400

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000



28


● As Bucks Fizz said, it’s “making your mind up” time: the USD has been in a consolidation phase since 2006

● The USD has been relatively stable despite poor economic support

– Because other major economies are or have been either in worse condition or more in the spotlight

● As Presidential Election year unfolds this may change

● US monetary policy is too slack, fiscal policy is becoming tighter

– This is the opposite policy mix of the early Reagan years

● As such, it leaves the US currency very exposed to a potential collapse

● In a world awash with debts and deficits Japan is a major global creditor nation

● Until the Euro becomes a ‘hard core’ currency bloc it is the yen that is likely to remain the strongest G3 currency

USD

EUR/USD

USD/JPY

19951990 2000 2005 2010

2007 2008 2009 2010 201220112011

2007 2008 2009 2010 201220112011

Consolidation area more likely to break on downside,

perhaps leading to a 10-15% decline in the USD

Eur/USD may face more downside before bottoming

The trend is the Yen’s friend – as is the relative economic outlook and Japan’s net creditor status

70

80

90

100

110

120

1.301.351.401.45

1.551.60

1.50

1.251.20

80

90

100

110

120



29

Fund Type UCITS

Base Currency USD

Inception Date Expected December 2011

Dealing Day Daily

Subscriptions On any dealing day providing that three business days notice is given

Redemptions Redemptions on any dealing day, providing that three business days notice has been given prior to deal date. Where the final day falls on a non-business day, notice shall be given by the previous day

Purchase Fee Up to 5.00%

Performance Fee* 20%

Investment Manager and Sponsor Fees**

1.35%

GAM Star Global MacroFund features

Source: GAM* Performance fee of 20% is levied on the price appreciation on a high watermark basis. ** Excludes administration and custodian fee – please see prospectus for further details on fees.

30


Fund Objective To seek capital appreciation generated through macro investing, which aims to generate profits by forecasting changes in the prices of currencies, commodities, bonds and equity market indices

Manager David Morrison

Index for comparison MSCI World, HRFX Macro Index

Return Objective 8-15% p.a.

Target volatility 6-12% p.a.

Target monthly VaR 2-4%

Key characteristics

Source: GAMThere is no guarantees that forecasts will be realised.

31

David Morrison

Investment Director

David Morrison is an Investment Director, responsible for the management of a global macro fund. Prior to joining GAM in September 2007, David managed hedge funds for Titanium Capital and Vizor Investment Management. He has held a number of senior positions in investment banking, including that of general partner, co-head of research and chief international economist at Goldman Sachs. David began his career as an economist at the Bank of England. He holds a MA double honours degree in economics and statistics from the University of Glasgow.

32

Jessica Williams

Investment Analyst

Jessica Williams is an Investment Analyst responsible for providing financial analysis and investment ideas. Jessica joined GAM in March 2009 with a background in law, prime brokerage and operations. She holds a dual BA (Hons) in Philosophy and Political Science from Hartwick College in New York and a Graduate Diploma in Law from the College of Law in London. She qualified as a barrister in 2007 and was called to the Bar of England and Wales the same year. Jessica is currently undertaking a two-year Masters in Economics diploma at Birkbeck, University of London. She is based in London.

33

Disclaimer

Source: GAM unless otherwise stated. (Unless otherwise noted, where shown, performance is shown net of fees, on a NAV to NAV basis).This material is confidential and is intended solely for the use of the person or persons to whom it is given or sent and may not be reproduced, copied or given, in whole or in part, to any other person. It is aimed at sophisticated, professional, eligible, institutional and/or qualified investors who have the knowledge and financial sophistication to understand and bear the risks associated with the investments described herein. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice nor is it to be solely relied on in making an investment or other decision. It is not an invitation to subscribe and is by way of information only.Subscriptions will only be received and shares or units (‘Shares’) issued on the basis of the current prospectus for the fund. Copies of fund’s prospectus and financial statements can be obtained free of charge from GAM Fund Management Ltd, George's Court, 54-62 Townsend Street, Dublin 2. The fund is not subject to approval or regulation by the Financial Regulator in Ireland and is not subject to the benefit of any compensation arrangements. Shares are not available for sale in any state or jurisdiction in which such sale would be prohibited.The Shares of the fund have not been registered under the US Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the fund is not registered under the US Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “Company Act”). Accordingly, unless an exemption is available, such Shares may not be offered, sold or distributed in the United States or to US persons. However, pursuant to an exemption from registration under the Securities Act and the Company Act, the Shares may be sold or resold in the United States or to certain qualified US investors in transactions that do not constitute a public offering. The fund is not regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, consequently no protection is provided by the UK regulatory system. Moreover benefits available under the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme do not apply. The views expressed herein are those of the manager at the time and are subject to changes. The fund does not have the security of capital which is characteristic of a bank deposit. The price of Shares may go down as well as up and the price will depend on fluctuations in financial markets outside GAM's control, as a result an investor may not get back the amount invested. Past performance is not indicative of future performance and reference to a security is not a recommendation to buy or sell that security. Prices quoted refer to accumulation Shares unless otherwise stated. Historic data may be subject to restatement from time to time.Important information about hedge funds: Hedge fund strategies are speculative and are not suitable for all investors. GAM hedge fund products are only available to investors who are comfortable with the substantial risks associated with investing in hedge funds. An investment in hedge fund strategies includes the risks inherent in an investment in securities, as well as specific risks associated with limited liquidity, the use of leverage, short sales, options, futures, derivative instruments, investment in overseas securities, “junk” bonds and illiquid investments. Investors should recognise that they will bear asset-based fees and expenses at the fund of hedge fund level, and indirectly, fees, expenses and performance-based compensation of the investment funds in which funds of hedge funds invest. Hedge fund strategies may be leveraged and the volatility of the price of their interests may be great. The investment funds in which the fund of hedge fund strategies invest can be highly illiquid, are not required to provide periodic reporting or valuation information to investors and may involve complex tax strategies. The use of leverage may cause an underlying portfolio to liquidate positions when it may not be advantageous to do so in order to satisfy its obligations or to meet segregation requirements. Leverage, including borrowing, may cause an underlying portfolio to be more volatile than if the underlying portfolio had not been leveraged.In the United Kingdom, this material has been issued and approved by GAM London Ltd, 12 St James's Place, London SW1A 1NX, authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.

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