game theory overheads

64
Game Theory Overheads

Upload: gwidon

Post on 07-Feb-2016

37 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

Game Theory Overheads. Games. A game is a formal representation of a situation in which a number of decision makers (players) interact in a setting of strategic interdependence. By that, we mean that the welfare of each decision maker depends not only on her own actions, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Game Theory Overheads

Game Theory

Overheads

Page 2: Game Theory Overheads

A game is a formal representation of a situationin which a number of decision makers (players)interact in a setting of strategic interdependence

Games

By that, we mean that the welfare of each decisionmaker depends not only on her own actions,but also on the actions of the other players

Page 3: Game Theory Overheads

Structure of a Game

Players or decision makers

firms

consumers

poker or chess players

Page 4: Game Theory Overheads

Rules of the game

Structure of a Game

Who moves when

What do players know and when

What actions are available at various points

Page 5: Game Theory Overheads

For each possible set of actions by the players,what is the outcome of the game?

Structure of a Game

Outcomes

Page 6: Game Theory Overheads

Structure of a Game

Payoffs

What are the payoffs with each outcome?

How do the player's rank the outcomes?

Page 7: Game Theory Overheads

Players or decision makers

Structure of a Game

Rules of the game

Outcomes

Payoffs

Page 8: Game Theory Overheads

Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory

A set of strategies in a game is called a Nashequilibrium if, holding the strategies of allother firms constant, no firm can obtain ahigher payoff by choosing a different strategy

In a Nash equilibrium, no firm wants tochange its strategy

Page 9: Game Theory Overheads

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Two criminals

Al “Scarface” Capone

Jack “Machine Gun” McGurn

Major crime

Murder of 7 people on St. Valentine’s Day

Page 10: Game Theory Overheads

Minimal evidence connecting them to massacre

Plenty of evidence linking them to bootlegging

Page 11: Game Theory Overheads

Police interrogate them in separate rooms

Police offer them each a deal

Finger the other guy, and walk if he don’t talk

You both stay mum, we lock the both of youup for a year for bootlegging

You both talk, its 20 years in the slammer

But if he talks and you give us the silent treatment,its 40 years at hard labor for you

Page 12: Game Theory Overheads

The Game in Matrix Form

Scarface

Stay Mum

Machine Gun

Al gets 20Jack gets 20

Collaborate

Stay Mum

CollaborateAl walksJack gets 40

Al gets 40Jack walks

Al gets 1Jack gets 1

Page 13: Game Theory Overheads

Rules of the game

Structure of a Game

Who moves when -- at the same time

What do players know and when -- nothing

What actions are available at various points

Collaborate

Stay mum

Page 14: Game Theory Overheads

Outcomes

Al gets 20Jack gets 20

Scarface

Stay Mum

Machine Gun

Collaborate

Stay Mum

CollaborateAl walksJack gets 40

Al gets 40Jack walks

Al gets 1Jack gets 1

Structure of a Game

Page 15: Game Theory Overheads

Structure of a Game

Payoffs

What are the payoffs with each outcome?

How do the player's rank the outcomes?

Years in the slammer for the player

Players prefer less years in the pen

Page 16: Game Theory Overheads

Best response for Al “Scarface” Capone

What if Jack stays mum?

Page 17: Game Theory Overheads

Stay Mum

Machine Gun

Scarface

Stay Mum

CollaborateAl walksJack gets 40

Al gets 1Jack gets 1

Jack stays mum

Page 18: Game Theory Overheads

Al gets the least years by collaborating

What if Jack collaborates?

Page 19: Game Theory Overheads

Scarface

Stay Mum

Collaborate

Jack collaborates

Machine Gun

Collaborate

Al gets 20Jack gets 20

Al gets 40Jack walks

Page 20: Game Theory Overheads

Al has found a dominant strategy for this game

Al sells out and collaborates

Al gets the least years by collaborating

Page 21: Game Theory Overheads

Best response for “Machine Gun” McGurn

What if Al stays mum?

Page 22: Game Theory Overheads

Scarface

Stay Mum

Al stays mum

Al gets 40Jack walks

Al gets 1Jack gets 1

Machine Gun

Stay MumCollaborate

Page 23: Game Theory Overheads

Jack gets the least years by collaborating

What if Al collaborates?

Page 24: Game Theory Overheads

Al collaborates

Machine Gun

Stay MumCollaborate

Scarface

CollaborateAl gets 20Jack gets 20

Al walksJack gets 40

Page 25: Game Theory Overheads

Jack gets the least years by collaborating

Jack has found a dominant strategy for this game

Jack sells out and collaborates

Page 26: Game Theory Overheads

In fact

Both Al and Jack sell out and get 20 years

Page 27: Game Theory Overheads

Dominant strategies

A strategy that is best for a player, no matterwhat strategy is chosen by the competing playeris called a dominant strategy

A dominant strategy is a strategy that is best for aplayer regardless of the strategy of the other player

Page 28: Game Theory Overheads

If each player in a game has a dominant strategy,it is easy to find the equilibrium of the game

If a player has a dominant strategy in a game, wecan assume that the player will play that strategy

It is simply the outcome that occurs when eachplayer plays the dominant strategy

Page 29: Game Theory Overheads

Equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma

Al and Jack get 20 years

If both stayed mum, each would get 1 year

Page 30: Game Theory Overheads

The Turkey Pricing game

Two stores

Hy-Vee

Fareway

Rules of the game

Game played 7 days before Thanksgiving

Turkeys are the same quality

Page 31: Game Theory Overheads

Stores place a weekly advertising supplementin the local paper stating a price for turkeys

Two possible actions for each store

Low Price

High Price

The stores do not know the price that will besubmitted by the other store

Page 32: Game Theory Overheads

Outcome Matrix

Fareway

High Price

Hy-Vee

F 1000H 1000

Low Price

High Price

Low PriceF 1500H 500

F 500H 1500

F 1200H 1200

Page 33: Game Theory Overheads

Payoffs

Each store gets the number in the table in dollars

Store managers prefer more dollars to less

Page 34: Game Theory Overheads

Best response for Fareway

What if Hy-Vee chooses a low price?

Page 35: Game Theory Overheads

Hy-Vee chooses low

Hy-Vee

Low Price

Fareway

High Price

Low PriceF 1000H 1000

F 500H 1500

Page 36: Game Theory Overheads

Fareway gets the most dollars with a low price

What if Hy-Vee chooses a high price?

Page 37: Game Theory Overheads

Hy-Vee chooses high

Fareway

High Price

Low Price

Hy-Vee

High Price

F 1500H 500

F 1200H 1200

Page 38: Game Theory Overheads

Fareway gets the most money with a low price

Fareway has a dominant strategy for this game

Fareway chooses a low price

Page 39: Game Theory Overheads

Best response for Hy-Vee

What if Fareway chooses a low price?

Page 40: Game Theory Overheads

Fareway chooses low

Fareway

Low Price

Hy-Vee

Low Price High Price

F 1000H 1000

F 1500H 500

Page 41: Game Theory Overheads

Hy-Vee gets the most dollars with a low price

What if Fareway chooses a high price?

Page 42: Game Theory Overheads

Fareway chooses high

Hy-Vee

Low Price High Price

Fareway

High PriceF 500H 1500

F 1200H 1200

Page 43: Game Theory Overheads

Hy-Vee gets the most money with a low price

Hy-Vee has a dominant strategy for this game

Hy-Vee chooses a low price

Page 44: Game Theory Overheads

Equilibrium in the turkey pricing game

Hy-Vee and Fareway choose low prices

If both chose high prices, individual andtotal profits would be higher

The outcome (high, high) is Pareto superiorto the outcome (low, low)

Page 45: Game Theory Overheads

An outcome is said to be Pareto superiorto another outcome if both both players are better off with the Pareto superior outcome

Page 46: Game Theory Overheads

Other examples of the prisoner’s dilemma

Arms race

Advertising

tobacco

eye-glasses

Common resources

oil field

pasture

Page 47: Game Theory Overheads

Noncooperative oligopoly as a game

Zucchini pricing game

2 players or firms -- Hank and Ken

Actions: number of zucchini brought to market

Firm doesn’t know other firm’s quantity

Outcome is market price

Payoff to each firm is its profit given price and costs

Page 48: Game Theory Overheads

Outcome Matrix

Hank

Ken

H $36K $36

4 boxes

3 boxesH $30K $40

H $40K $30

H $32K $32

3 boxes 4 boxes

Page 49: Game Theory Overheads

Ken chooses 3

Hank

Ken

H $36K $36

4 boxes

3 boxes

H $40K $30

3 boxes

Page 50: Game Theory Overheads

Ken chooses 4

Hank

Ken

4 boxes

3 boxesH $30K $40

H $32K $32

4 boxes

Page 51: Game Theory Overheads

Hank should always choose 4 boxes

Now what about Ken?

Page 52: Game Theory Overheads

Hank chooses 3

Hank

Ken

H $36K $363 boxes

3 boxes

H $30K $40

4 boxes

Page 53: Game Theory Overheads

Hank chooses 4

Hank

Ken

3 boxes 4 boxes

H $40K $30

4 boxes H $32K $32

Page 54: Game Theory Overheads

Ken should always choose 4 boxes

Both of them should always choose 4 boxes

The equilibrium is (4,4)

Page 55: Game Theory Overheads

Cooperative Oligopoly

Explicit collusion

An association of firms that explicitly agreesto coordinate its activities is called a cartel

A cartel that includes all the firms in anindustry is, in effect, a monopoly

Page 56: Game Theory Overheads

Zucchini Example with Collusion

Explicit collusion will lead to (3,3)

Profits are ($36, $36) as compared to ($32, $32)

Page 57: Game Theory Overheads

But the cartel will collapse

Why?

If Hank produces 3, Ken will want to produce 4

And vice versa

Page 58: Game Theory Overheads

Members of cartels always have an incentive to cheat

Why?

Page 59: Game Theory Overheads

Explicit collusion is illegal in many countries

Firms must therefore consider the benefits ofcollusion versus the costs of getting caught

OPEC was a very successful cartel for many years

Page 60: Game Theory Overheads

Tacit Collusion

Any time firms cooperate without an explicitagreement, they are engaging in tacit collusion

Typically, players adopt strategies alongthe following lines:

“In general, I will set a high price”

“If my rival sets a low price this time, I willpunish him by setting a low price next time."

Page 61: Game Theory Overheads

This is called a tit for tat strategy

The idea is that the rival will catch on and bothplayers will set a high price over time

Page 62: Game Theory Overheads

Another type of tacit collusion occurs when thereis an acknowledged price leader in the industry

This leader firm acts first and the others follow

Page 63: Game Theory Overheads

When cheating on the cartel is likely

It is difficult to observe other firms’ prices

Market demand is unstable

There are a lot of other firms in the industry

Page 64: Game Theory Overheads

The End