game theory v. price theory. game theory focus: strategic interactions between individuals. tools:...
Post on 15-Jan-2016
225 views
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Game theory v. price theory
![Page 2: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Game theory
• Focus: strategic interactions between individuals.
• Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc.
• Outcomes: In many cases the predicted outcomes are Pareto inefficient.
• But remember the Coase Theorem!
![Page 3: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Price theory
• Focus: market interactions between many individuals.
• Tools: supply and demand curves
• Outcomes: In many cases the predicted outcomes are Pareto efficient. (This is the working of the invisible hand.)
• But remember the underlying assumptions and what can go wrong…
![Page 4: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Assumptions of price theory
1. Each buyer and seller is small relative to the size of the market as a whole, and so each buyer and seller is a price-taker who takes the market price as given.
2. Complete markets: there are markets for all goods (and therefore no externalities).
3. Complete information: Buyers and sellers have no private information.
![Page 5: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Price-taking assumption
• Each buyer and seller is small relative to the size of the market as a whole, and so each buyer and seller is a price-taker who takes the market price as given.
• If this assumption is not met, some buyers and/or sellers have market power, e.g., monopoly, monopsony, duopoly, etc.
• Resulting inefficiencies?
![Page 6: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Complete markets assumption
• Complete markets: there are markets for all goods (and therefore no externalities).
• If this assumption is not met, there are externalities, either positive or negative.
• Resulting inefficiencies?
![Page 7: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Complete information assumption
• Complete information: Buyers and sellers have no private information.
• If this assumption is not met, there can be asymmetric information.
• Resulting inefficiencies?
• Example: the market for lemons (from Akerlof’s Nobel Prize-winning paper)
![Page 8: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
The market for lemons
• Consider a used car market in which sellers know the quality of their car, but buyers cannot tell if a given car is a peach or a lemon.
• What is the effect of this asymmetric information on the market?
• Until Akerlof’s paper, economists thought that there was no major effect.
![Page 9: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
A numerical example
• Imagine that sellers’ cars are equally divided among 4 values: $4800 (the peaches), $2300, $1500, and $1000 (the lemons).
• Buyers cannot distinguish between them, so they’re only willing to pay the average value (i.e., expected value) for a used car.
• What is the expected value if all 4 types of cars are sold?
![Page 10: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Expected value if $1000/$1500/ $2300/$4800 cars are all sold?
$1,500 $2,000 $2,400 $2,800 $3,300 $4,200
0% 0% 0%0%
10%
90%1. $1500
2. $2000
3. $2400
4. $2800
5. $3300
6. $4200
![Page 11: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
A numerical example
• Sellers’ cars are equally divided among 4 values: $4800 (the peaches), $2300, $1500, and $1000 (the lemons).
• If all 4 types of cars are sold, buyers are only willing to pay the average value (i.e., expected value) for a used car: $2400.
• But sellers of $4800 cars (the peaches) won’t sell for this amount!
![Page 12: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
A numerical example
• We can’t have a market where all 4 types of cars are sold, but maybe we can have a market where 3 types are sold: $2300, $1500, and $1000 (the lemons).
• Again, buyers are only willing to pay the average value (i.e., expected value). What is that value if cars are equally divided between these 3 types?
![Page 13: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Expected value if $1000/$1500/ $2300 cars are all sold?
$1,000 $1,200 $1,400 $1,600 $1,800 $2,000
0% 0% 0%0%
100%
0%
1. $1000
2. $1200
3. $1400
4. $1600
5. $1800
6. $2000
![Page 14: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
A numerical example
• We can’t have a market where even 3 types of cars are sold, but maybe we can have a market where 2 types are sold: $1500, and $1000 (the lemons).
• Again, buyers are only willing to pay the average value (i.e., expected value). What is that value if cars are equally divided between these 2 types?
![Page 15: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Expected value if $1000/$1500/ cars are all sold?
$1,100 $1,250 $1,400
2% 0%
98%1. $1100
2. $1250
3. $1400
![Page 16: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
The market for lemons
• In the numerical example, we have complete unraveling and only the worst-quality cars (the lemons) are sold. This is called adverse selection because the cars that are sold appear to be selected adversely.
• A more important example of adverse selection: health insurance.
![Page 17: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
A numerical example
• Imagine that consumers’ likely health care expenditures are equally divided among 4 values: $200, $2700, $3500, and $4000.
• Insurance companies cannot distinguish between them, so in order to avoid losing money they have to charge at least the average cost for health insurance.
• Who are the peaches and who are the lemons?
![Page 18: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Who are the peaches and who are the lemons?
Peaches are $200,lemons are $4000.
Peaches are$4000, lemons are
$200.
10%
90%1. Peaches are
$200, lemons are $4000.
2. Peaches are $4000, lemons are $200.
![Page 19: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
A numerical example
• Consumers’ likely health care expenditures are equally divided among 4 values: $200, $2700, $3500, and $4000.
• If all 4 types of consumers buy health insurance, companies have to charge at least the average cost, ¼(200)+¼(2700) +¼(3500)+¼(4000) = $2600.
• But the peaches won’t pay that much!
![Page 20: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
A numerical example
• So maybe we can have a market where 3 types buy insurance: $2700, $3500, and $4000.
• Again, insurance companies have to charge at least the average cost, which is 1/3(2700)+1/3(3500)+1/3(4000)=3400.
• Again, the low cost buyers will choose to self-insure.
![Page 21: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
A numerical example
• We can’t have a market where even 3 types of consumers buy insurance, but maybe we can have a market with 2 types are sold: $3500 and $4000 (the lemons).
• But insurance companies must charge at least the average cost ($3750) and at this price the lower-cost consumers will self-insure, leaving only the lemons.
![Page 22: Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many](https://reader033.vdocuments.net/reader033/viewer/2022051621/56649d4c5503460f94a2993f/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Assumptions of price theory
1. Each buyer and seller is small relative to the size of the market as a whole, and so each buyer and seller is a price-taker who takes the market price as given.
2. Complete markets: there are markets for all goods (and therefore no externalities).
3. Complete information: Buyers and sellers have no private information.