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8/6/2019 Gelpi Et Al - Iraq the Vote. Retrospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance
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Iraq the Vote: Retrospective and Prospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choiceand Casualty ToleranceAuthor(s): Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, Peter FeaverSource: Political Behavior, Vol. 29, No. 2, Special Issue: The Iraq War and the 2004 PresidentialElection (Jun., 2007), pp. 151-174Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500240 .
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8/6/2019 Gelpi Et Al - Iraq the Vote. Retrospective Foreign Policy Judgments on Candidate Choice and Casualty Tolerance
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
DOI 10.1007/s11109-007-9029-6
Iraqthe Vote: Retrospectiveand ProspectiveForeign
Policy Judgmentson Candidate Choice and
CasualtyTolerance
ChristopherGelpi?Jason Reifler*Peter Feaver
Publishedonline:13 March2007
@ SpringerScience+BusinessMedia,LLC2007
Abstract In this article,we model the effect of foreign policy attitudes on
both vote choice andcasualty olerance,usingsurveydatacollectedduring he
2004 election.We show that prospective udgmentsof the likelihoodof suc-
cess in Iraqandretrospectiveudgmentsof whetherthe war in Iraqwasrightare significantdeterminantsof both vote choice and casualtytolerance. The
prospective udgmentof success is key in predictingcasualtytolerance,whileretrospectivejudgmentof whether the war was right takes precedence in
determiningvote choice. In addition,there is an important nteractionbe-
tween the twovariables, o the effect of one is conditionalon the value of the
other.We believe this is compellingevidence thatforeign policymatters,and
that it matters n reasonableways.
Keywords Votingbehavior-Casualty olerance
Introduction
At firstglance,the parallelsbetween the 1992and2004 Presidentialelections
appear striking.Both elections featured an incumbentnamed George Bush
who had enjoyed tremendouspublic supportafter launchinga war in Iraq.Despite the high levels of support, both President Bushes soon found
C. Gelpi- P. Feaver
Departmentof PoliticalScience,Duke University,Durham,NC 27708,USA
J. Reifler(R)Departmentof PoliticalScience,Loyola UniversityChicago,6430N. Kenmore,Chicago, L
60626,USAe-mail: [email protected]
Springer
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152 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
themselves deadlocked in the polls against surprisingly obust Democratic
challengers,who were buoyed by widespreadperceptionsof a weakeconomyandskyrocketinghealth care costs. Yet Bush"43"eventuallywon reelection,while Bush "41"met defeat. What can explainthis changein electoral for-
tunes? There are many possible and complementaryexplanationsfor why
Bush 43 won despitefacinga dauntingelectoral environment. n thischapter,we focus on one explanationthat has been the subjectof extensive publiccomment: he role of the ongoing Iraqwar.
Punditsreconcile the different atesby statingthat "Commanders-in-Chief
do not lose elections in wartime." For this law-like aphorism to hold,incumbentsmust actuallybe able to obtain their party'snomination.HarryTrumanandLyndonJohnsonwere so unpopular-due in large partto publicdisenchantmentwith American participation n the Korean and Vietnam
wars-they abandonedtheir efforts to run for reelection.' Moreover, the
belief thatAmericanswill not oust incumbentPresident'sduringwartime liesin the face of the even more well-entrenchedview that Americans will not
tolerate casualties in war. The war in Iraq was barely a week old when
observersbegan to worrythat news of combat fatalitieswould cause public
support o collapse (Elder&Nagourney,2003, Purdum, 003;Ricks,2003). ByOctober of 2004, as Presidential elections loomed, more than 1,100 U.S.
militarypersonnelhad been killed in Iraq fightingagainstan insurgency hat
continued more or less unabated. Had most punditsforeseen this turn of
events,they surelywouldhavepredicteda complete collapseof publicsupportfor the Bush Administrationand for the warin Iraq.Moreover,they would
have predicteda lopsided electoral defeat for the Presidentin November.With these competingviews of how the warin Iraqwouldplayout politically,
punditsand politicalobservershad inadvertentlypitted the irresistible orce
(the effect of casualtieson public opinion) against the immovableobject
(an incumbentPresidentduringwar).The relationshipbetween the war in Iraq, Americancasualties,and the
Presidentialelection is-to saythe least-somewhat conflicted. n thisarticle,
we seek to make sense of these contradictoryexpectationsby providingamore systematicand nuancedargument inkingattitudes towardthe war in
Iraq, tolerance for U.S. militarycasualties,and Presidentialvote choice in
2004. We do so by unitingtwo distinctliteratures, oreign policy voting and
supportfor using the military/casualtyolerancewithin a single theoretical
frameworkderived fromFiorina's(1981) theoryof retrospectivevoting.The
economic voting literaturehas long examinedthe relativeweight of retro-
spective versus prospectiveevaluationsin explaining presidentialapprovaland vote choice. The literatureon supportfor the use of force andcasualty
tolerance literature s also keenly interestedin comparing he weight of ret-rospective and prospective evaluations. However, little work has tried to
1 Trumanwas eligibleto run but withdrewafterlosingin the New Hampshireprimaryo Estes
Kefauver.Johnsonannouncedhis decision not to runfor reelection afterthe Tet offensivein
Vietnamprompted hallenges rom Eugene McCarthy nd Robert Kennedy.
I Springer
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 153
integratethese two literatures.This paper is an effort to examine the con-
tributionof retrospectiveandprospective foreign policy evaluationsto both
votingandcasualty olerance.Moreover,ouranalysisbalances he importanceof normative udgments(retrospectiveevaluationsof the "rightness"of the
war) against empirical udgments(prospective udgmentsof the war's even-
tual success).We arguethat the willingnessof the publicto pay the costs of war and to
reelect incumbent Presidentsduringwartime are dependent on these two
attitudes and the interactionbetween them. In particular,we show that ret-
rospectivenormativeevaluationsof whether President Bush "did the right
thing"in attackingIraqand empiricalprospective udgmentsabout whether
the U.S. will ultimatelybe successfulin Iraq are two critical attitudes for
understandinghow foreign policy judgmentsaffect vote choice and one's
tolerance for casualties.Further,we show that the retrospectivenormative
judgmentsserve as a more powerful predictorfor vote choice, while the
prospectiveempiricalevaluationsof mission success betterpredictcontinued
supportfor the war in Iraq. These claims are consistent with the broaderliteratureon how foreign policyinfluencesvotingbehavior,and the literaturethat examines the public'sresponseto warand casualties.We also show thatthese retrospectiveand prospective judgmentsare interactive-a person'sattitudeon one conditions he effectof the other. Thisinteractionoperateson
"political"support (vote choice) as well as "mission"support (casualtytol-
erance).To our knowledge, no other work integrates political support for the
Presidentandsupport orAmericanwar efforts ntoa singletheoreticalmodeland uses the same predictorvariables to explain the separate dependentvariable measuresof vote choice andcasualtytolerance. This articlebridges
importantgapsin the literatureby usingone theoretical ramework o connecttwo separateresearchquestions:(1) whetherand how foreignpolicy affects
politicalevaluationandchoice,and(2) the conditionsunder which Americancitizens will bear the financial and human cost of militarymissions.To us,
these two questions seem inherently linked-support for missions shouldconnectto the Commander-in-Chiefesponsible or executingsuchmissions.Thesejudgmentsare connected,yet withimportantdifferences.We findthatthe retrospectivenormative udgmentsare more importantfor vote choice,and the prospectiveempirical udgmentsbetterexplain casualtytolerance.
LiteratureReview
Foreign Policy and Political Behavior
Scholars have long been troubled by Americans' inability to answer survey
questions "correctly." Poor performance on surveys has led observers to view
the American public as an ill-informed lot with little ability to think coher-
ently about the substance of politics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes,
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154 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
1960; Converse 1964), with issues playing a small to non-existent role in
shapingcitizens'votingdecisions.Foreign policy evaluationswere viewed as
among the least likely to affect political choices. When formingattitudesabout the performanceof the economy,citizens have their personal experi-ence to fall back on. But foreign policyis so removedfrom the everyday ives
of most citizens, it was argued,that it is simplyunreasonable o think thatwhathappenedbeyondU.S. borderswould have a large mpacton Americans'
politicalbehavior.In supportof this claimmanystudiesshowed,at best,weak
evidence thatforeignaffairsaffected the votingdecision(e.g. Almond, 1950;
Stokes, 1966). As Almond writes "Foreign policy attitudes among most
Americans ack intellectualstructureandfactualcontent."
Overthe pasttwo decades, however,two reinforcingines of researchhave
suggested that foreign policy judgmentsmay have a greater influence on
political behavior than previouslythought.First, John Hurwitz and Mark
Peffley (Hurwitz& Peffley,1987a,1987b;Peffley& Hurwitz,1993) demon-strate that citizens have reasonablystructuredattitudesconcerningforeign
policy. Moreover,their researchdemonstratesthat public attitudestoward
foreign policy affect political evaluations,and citizens respond in under-
standablewaysto changingworld events.Suchevidenceof a "rationalpublic"
regarding oreign affairs is widespread(Holsti, 1997;Shaprio& Page, 1988;
Wittkopf, 1990). Aggregate opinion on foreign and defense policy is
remarkablystable and changes "have seldom, if ever, occurred... without
reasonablecauses,such as the actionsof
foreignfriendsor enemies or
changesin the United States'positionin the world"(Shaprio& Page, 1988,pp. 220-
221). ChristopherWlezien (1995, 1996) shows additionalevidence that thatthe public's preferences or changesin defense spendingrespondwell to ac-
tual levels of spendingon defense, as well as to feelings about the Soviet
Union.
Second,not only does the publichave well-structured ndrelativelystable
attitudes about foreign policy, but mountingevidence suggests that these
attitudeshave an impacton politicalbehavior.It has long been known that
economic evaluationshave an effect on presidentialapprovalandvote choice(e.g. Kiewiet, 1983,Kinder & Kiewiet,1979,1981).An increasingamountof
evidencehasemergedshowing hatforeignpolicyjudgmentsmatteras well as,and in roughly equalmagnitude o, economic evaluations.For example,in a
timeseriesof aggregatequarterlypresidentialapprovaldata,Nickelsburgand
Norpoth (2000)showthatthe President s asmuch"Commander-in-Chief"s
"ChiefEconomist."Adding major oreignpolicyeventsaspredictorvariables
to theirmodel,these international vents matterat least as much as economic
evaluations.Using individualevel data from several nationalrandomsample
surveysconducted rom 1983 to 1987,WilcoxandAllsop (1991)findapprovalof Reagan's foreign policy is consistently a good predictor of Reagan's overall
approval, though its strength relative to domestic issues does depend on the
salience of economic or foreign policy issues. Taking one step further in the
causal chain linking attitudes and vote choice, Nincic and Hinkley (1992)
demonstrate that foreign policy attitudes influence candidate evaluations in
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 155
the 1980 and1984presidential ampaigns.Similarly,n an analysisof the 1980
and 1984Presidentialelectoralchoice,Aldrich, Sullivan,andBorgida (1989)find that foreign policy issues were just as powerfula vote determinantas
domestic issues. The impactof foreignpolicyon electoral choice does appearto wax and wane with the flow of currentevents. This pattern s hardlysur-
prising.As we note below, survey responses regardingthe nation's "mostimportantproblem"suggestthat the economyis nearlyalwayssalientin theminds of voters,while concernaboutforeignaffairsvariessubstantially.
In sum,we pointto threewell-supported indings oncerning oreignaffairs
and political behavior:(1) Citizen attitudesabout foreign policy are well
structured,2) Foreignpolicyevaluationsmatter orpresidentialapprovaland
presidentialvote choice, and (3) Citizen attitudes are generallystable, and
changesin attitudesreflectchangesin the internationalarena.
Whileanalystsgenerallyagreethatpublic opinionis stable andresponds o
events, substantialdifferences of opinion exist concerningwhether citizens
respondto the internationalevents themselves,or if foreignpolicy attitudesare mostlymediatedby elite rhetoric andframing.Of course,American cit-izens are (mostly)incapableof witnessing nternationalevents without themfirstbeingmediatedby the press.Thus,the press certainlyhas thepotentialto
uniformlyshape opinion-as long as the reporting rom different bureaus s
substantially imilar-regardlessof how well the reportingreflects the realityon the ground.If the presssystematically eports nternationalevents differ-
entlythanthey occur,then we shouldexpectcitizenopinionsto reflectmediacoveragemore than the "events themselves."The Tet Offensiveduringthe
Vietnam Warmay be a classicexampleof where the media were unifiedin
theirreporting,but where the reportingarguablydifferedsufficientlyrom the
actual events. Thus the resulting changes in opinion were moved by the
reporting,ratherthan the event. More specifically,while Tet was a tacticalfailure for the attackingCommunist orces, it was reportedto the American
public as a disaster for the U.S. and evidence of a stalemate (Johnson&
Tierney, 2006).
Even if thepress accurately eports nternational vents,politicalelitesmaybe able to control howthepublicunderstands he issues.Looking againto the
public'spreferencesfor changesin spendingfor defense,Witko (2003)finds
exactlythis-the publicdoes not respondto what the Soviet Union does, butrather to how policy elites talk aboutthe Soviet Union. Thisaccount is sub-
stantially n accordwith Zaller's(1992)account of mass opinionandattitude
change being drivenprimarilyby elites and in many ways. Berinsky (2007)goes one step furtherto arguethat responsesto internationalaffairsare pri-marilyendogenousto politicalpredispositions.
Importantquestionsremainthat we hope scholarswill address.First, towhat extent is presscoverageof militaryconflict"accurate"and how wouldwe measure such accuracy?Second, how much latitude do elites have toreframe press coverage of militaryconflict and how influential can their
framingefforts be? Third, to what extent are perceptionsof internationalaffairs endogenous to political predispositions?A similar debate recently
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156 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
startedtaking shape on whethereconomicperceptionsare endogenous(e.g.Evansand Anderson2006,Lewis-Beck2006).Whilepolitical predispositionsare likely to play a role in shapingindividual evel attitudes about interna-tional events (see Nyhan & Reifler, 2006; Reifler, nd for individual level
evidenceconcerningresponding o informationaboutinternational vents in
the context of IraqiWMD), it is also clearat the aggregate evel thatpeopleupdate their perceptionsin reasonableways. For example, over time the
percentageof thepublicwho believethatIraqhad an activeWMDprogramat
the time of the U.S invasion has greatlydecreased.
Fortunately, or our purposeswe do not need to resolve these debatesin
order to proceed with our analysis.Our central focus is the impactof per-
ceptionsof the war in Iraqboth on the willingness o continuefighting n Iraqand the propensity o vote for Bush. We remainagnosticon the questionof
whethertheseperceptions eflect"reality"or elite rhetoric, houghas we note
in our conclusion,we think that our researchfocuses new attention on the
importanceof addressinghis debate.The endogeneityof foreignpolicyviews,on the otherhand,is more of a concern and we return o thisquestionin the
discussion.
Buildingon EarlierResearch on WarandPublicOpinion
Ever since the VietnamWar,policymakershave worriedthat the American
publicwill
supportmilitaryoperationsonlyif the human costs of the
war,as
measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Mueller (1973) argued that
public supportfor the Vietnamand KoreanWarsdroppedin proportion othe log of casualties.In Mueller's words:"While [the Americanpublic]did
wearyof the [KoreanandVietnam]wars, hey generallyseemto havebecome
hardened o the wars' costs:they are sensitive to relativelysmall losses in the
earlystages,butonlyto largelosses in laterstages."Casualtiesdrainedpublicsupport,but only slowly.
This complex finding-that casualtieshave a more corrosive effect on
public supportearly in the war than they do later-gradually became sim-plified n the conventionalwisdomto the view thatthe publicwillnot tolerate
casualties.EdwardLuttwak ummarized he conventionalwisdomwell: "The
prospectof highcasualties,which canrapidlyunderminedomesticsupport or
anymilitaryoperations, s the key politicalconstraintwhen decisionsmustbe
madeon whichforcesto deployin a crisis,and at what levels"(Luttwak,1996,
p. 36).In otherwords,Muellerarguedthat the publicwas casualty ensitive.But
the conventionalwisdom,pushedin partby missions ike Somalia,translated
Mueller'sclaim into a convictionthat the publicwas casualtyphobic (Hyde,2000; Klarevas, 2000; Lane, 1998; Luttwak, 1994; Moskos, 1995; Record, 2000;
Sapolsky & Shapiro, 1996). Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a
cost of war;casualty phobia refers to a sensitivity so great that it amounts to an
unwillingness to support a military operation if even very low human costs are
incurred (Feaver & Gelpi, 2004). We hope to revise this conventional wisdom
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 157
by demonstratinghat the public'swillingness o pay the humancosts of war
and its propensity o punish ts leaders n the votingboothforusingforcevary
dependingon specificattitudesaboutthe war.
Casualty ensitivity s, to put it crudely,one'spricesensitivity o the human
cost of war. As with other formsof price sensitivity,some members of the
public are more sensitive to the costs than others. We see in the public acontinuumof casualtysensitivityranging rom the minimally ensitive-thosewho view casualtiesas a necessarycost of war and not a determiningactor n
shaping support-all the way to maximallysensitive,or those who supportonly militarymissions that guaranteevirtuallyno casualties.2Over the pastdecade,manyscholarshave worked to debunkthe mythof a strictlycasualtyphobicpublic.
While the view that the public is casualty phobic is widely entrenched
among policymakersand the elite (Destler & Kull,1999),somethingclose to
the oppositeconsensus has emergedin academicstudies of Americanpublic
opinion.Bruce Jentleson (Jentleson& Britton,1998;Jentleson,1992) finds
that the publicis "prettyprudent,"andwill supportpayingeven costlymili-
tary operationsprovidedthe mission rationaleconforms o certainstandards.Eric Larson(1996) argues hatthe publicuses a rationalcost-benefitmodel inwhich the public depends very heavily on elite cues; when there is an eliteconsensus(definedas congressionalsupport)in favor of a militarymission,casualtiesare not highlycorrosiveto support.James Burk(1999)showsthat
publicsupport ormissionsdidnot collapsewithcasualties,even in the "hard"cases of Lebanon 1983 and Somalia 1993. Destler andKull (1999)show that
public casualty oleranceeven in "unpopular"missions ike peace operationsin Bosniais muchgreater hanpreviously hought;moreover,publictoleranceof casualties s particularly functionof "international lite consensus" n theform of multilateral upportfor the militaryoperation.
Of course,even if the publicas a wholeis not casualtyphobic, t stillmaybethe case that some people are. Feaver and Gelpi (2004) argue that there is
significantvariationwithinthe publicregarding he use of force. They show
that publicattitudestowardthe use of force fit a quadripartite attern:solidhawks (roughly 30-35%) who will support virtuallyany militarymission
regardlessof the costs;solid doves (roughly10-30%)who will oppose almost
any missionregardlessof cost;casualty-phobics roughly 15-20%) who sup-port a missionprovided t is extremely ow cost;and defeat-phobics roughly15-40%) who supporta mission,despite mountingcosts, providedthat themissionis likely to succeed, but who turn on a mission if it looks like it isdoomedto failure. The quadripartite atternallows for variation n the pro-portionin each category,dependingon the specificsof any given mission.
Whilemanyfactorsmatter-stakes, elite consensus, ypeof mission,andsoforth-Feaver and Gelpi (2004) give pride of place to "expectationsof
2Some members of the public might also be insensitive to casualties because they are opposed to
the use of military force regardless of the number of U.S. casualties-that is some portion of the
public opposes the use of force even it results in no U.S. casualties. We account for this possibilityin our measurement of casualty tolerance.
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158 PolitBehav 2007) 9:151-174
success."When membersof the publicthinkvictory s likely, theywillsupport
payingthe human costs of war.When they thinkvictoryis not likely, evensmall costs will be corrosiveof publicsupport.In a comprehensiveanalysisof
aggregatepublicopiniontrendsfrom1981through2004,RichardEichenbergcomes to a similar conclusion:"successfulmilitaryoperations enjoy high
support,regardlessof other factors thatmay be present" (Eichenberg,2005,p. 11).
Bringingthe two literatures ogether-the role of foreign policy and the
impact of casualties on public opinion-produces the following baseline
expectation: mountingcasualtiesshould not by themselvesjeopardize the
politicalfortunesof an incumbent,but the Presidentdoes not have a blank
check.Instead,public support or the warandthe presidentwilldependupon
specificattitudesabout the war. The publicis able to reasonably ncorporateinformation rom the internationalarenainto its judgments,and thesejudg-ments affect presidentialapproval and vote choice. The public demandssuccess when its president goes to war, and it demandsthat the presidentprovidea good reason for the fighting.Neither of these factors-most espe-ciallyperceptionsof success-are entirelyunderthe control of policymakers,whichbringsus to the election of 2004.
ForeignAffairs as Salient Concern
If foreign policyjudgmentsaregoingto matter n decision-making,hen those
attitudesneed to be accessiblefor the decision-maker Aldrichet al. 1989).Not surprisingly, oreign policy was a salient issue duringthe 2004 election
campaign.After all, duringthe four years that had elapsed since the 2000Presidentialelection,the U.S. experienceda startlingdomesticattackfrom a
foreignenemyand the U.S. embarkedon high-profile onflicts n Afghanistanand Iraq. Lookingat the Gallup poll's most importantproblemover the lastseveralpresidentialelections,foreignaffairsdramatically tands out as more
salient in 2004. The Gallup survey reports that in 2004 roughlythe sameproportionof voters state internationalconcerns(22%) as economic issues
(26%)as the "mostimportantproblem."While 22%for foreignaffairs s the
highestsince1984,the economystilltrumpednternational oncernsby a 2-to-
1 margin (47% to 23%) in Reagan's reelection. In the three presidentialelections from 1992to 2000,mentionsof international ffairswere 5% or less.3
Pollingwe conductedalso showsthatrespondentsreport foreignaffairsas
an importantconcern in the voting decision. In six separatesurveysfrom
3 Gallup does not have apples-to-applesdata for 1988. In most years, the "most importantproblem" question allows respondentsto mention more than one problem, i.e. the same
respondentcould say both "the economy" and "foreignaffairs." Because of the multipleresponses, he cumulative otal of the marginals xceeds100%,sometimesby a widemargin. n
1988,Gallupused a singleresponse ormat. n the singleresponse ormat,9% mentionsomethingrelated o foreignaffairsor defensepolicyas the mostimportant roblem.Thisproportions stillmore than double what wasreported n the multipleresponse ormatduring he 1990s.
l Springer
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Polit Behav(2007)29:151-174 159
Table 1 Mostimportantssue
3/5-3/18 3/19-4/2 4/3-4/16 4/17-4/29 6/18-6/28 10/21-11/1
Foreignpolicyissues like Iraq 16% 19% 20% 24% 26% 30%
and heWaronTerrorismEconomic ssues likejobs and 72% 70% 67% 63% 61% 59%
taxesSocial issues like abortion 10% 9% 11% 11% 11% 10%
andgay marriageN 930 889 881 899 900 1,125
March 2004 to November 2004, we used a closed ended question to ask
respondentswhich issue (economy, foreign policy, social issues) was most
importantto them personallywhen choosingwhich candidate to vote for.4Becausewe onlypolledin thiselection,we cannot makeinferencesabout the
importanceof foreign affairscomparedto other years based on this dataalone. However,Table 1 shows that the proportionstatingforeign policy as
the most important ssue doubledbetweenthe conclusionof the Democratic
primarycampaignsand the generalelection in November.In the 2004election, then,foreignpolicywas a salientconcern.The warin
Iraqwas shapingup to be, in the wordsof Secretaryof Defense Rumsfeld,a
"long,hardslog"-with a mountinghumantoll, makingthe election of 2004an ideal place to examine the electoralpoliticsof war.
The Model
We build on Fiorina's(1981) model of retrospectivevoting to constructamodelthat uses the sameantecedentattitudesaspredictorsof vote choice and
casualty tolerance. Fiorina's landmark work successfully synthesizeswhat
manysawas the irreconcilableraditionsof behavioralism nd rationalchoice
by creatinga generalizedvoter's calculuscontainingthree distinctcompo-nents: (1) political predispositions, (2) retrospective evaluations of the
incumbent,and (3) prospective udgmentsor futureexpectations.We arguethat twologicallydistinctattitudes-one's willingness o continue
to pay a humancost in the war in Iraq and one's vote choice in the 2004election-are functionsof retrospectiveandprospective udgments,as well as
one's politicalpredispositions PartyID). Retrospectively,votersarejudgingwhetherthe decision to invadeIraqwas the rightone. Prospectively,votersarejudgingwhether the warin Iraqwill turnout to be successful.
The impact of these attitudes on vote choice and casualtytolerance are
stronglyintuitive. If the decision to invade
Iraqwas
wrong,then it makes
4 The surveyswereconductedby KnowledgeNetworks,whichmaintainsa panelof respondentsrecruited hroughRandomDigit Dialing (RDD), who are equippedwith WebTVandcompletesurveysonline. Detailed sampling nformation s availablefrom the companywebsite, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com.tudies have found that the Knowledge Networks samplingmethodology yields representative amples (Couper,2000; Krosnick & Chang, Unpublishedtypescript),withresultscomparableo RDD telephonesurveys.
L1 pringer
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160 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
sense to elect a leader who would make (or would have made) different
choices. Thus we expect retrospectivenormative attitudes about whether
attacking Iraq was the "right thing" to matter most in determiningvote
choice. If the war is hopeless, why continue to pay a price?Thuswe expect
prospectiveattitudes about the likelihood of success to have the greatest
impacton casualtytolerance.We expound on this intuition two steps further:we argue that (1) the
interaction of the retrospective (normative) and prospective (empirical)
judgmentsdeterminesvote choice andcasualty olerance,and(2) the relative
weight assignedto retrospectiveor prospective udgmentsdiffers,dependingon whetherit is vote choice or casualtytolerance that is in question.
We additionallyarguethat the effect of these two attitudeson vote choice
and casualtytolerancewill be interactive.Accordingto the logic outlined
above,we wouldexpectattitudesaboutwhetherattacking raqwas the "right
thing"to have little impacton casualtytolerancefor respondentswho feelthat success s unlikely.If victory s unlikely, he initialwisdomof the decision
to use force has little impacton the expectedbenefits(andthusthe tolerable
costs) of the war. But if victory s likely,then attitudesaboutwhether he war
was the "rightthing"should have a substantialmpacton the expectedben-
efits fromthe conflict and influencecasualtytolerance.
Similarly,he likely prospects or successshould have little impacton one's
judgmentaboutthe wisdomof usingforce if one does not believe thatusing
forcewas the "right hing" n the firstplace.However, f one believesthat theinitial decision to use force was the "right thing"to do, then one's attitude
about the likelihood of success should have a significant mpact on one's
judgmentof the overallwisdomof U.S.policy,and thuson one'swillingness o
reelect the President.
Data and Methods
We proposehere a latent variableapproach n place of an explicitlyspatialmodel. Rather thanutilityfunctions of competingcandidates,we see "Bush
support"and "casualty olerance"as underlyingattitudesexpressedas latent
variables.Individualspossess an amount of "Bush support"or "casualtytolerance",whichwe model as
Yi* =xif
+ Ei (1)
We keep this compatiblewith Fiorina(1981) by usingindependentvariables
consistentwith hisgeneralized
voter's calculus.We includeseparate
evalua-
tions for political predispositions (long-term past experience), political past
experience (near-term experience under an incumbent), and future expecta-
tions, which yields the following equation:
yi*= PIDi + RJi + PJi + ei (2)
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 161
Table 2 Dependentvariablemarginals
Vote choice Casualtyolerance
Kerry 40.5% Opposewith0 deaths 23.0%LeanKerry 6.6% Support ith0 deaths 23.7%Undecided 2.2% Supportwith1,500deaths 20.3%
Lean Bush 4.8% Supportwith5,000deaths 17.2%Bush 45.9% Supportwith50,000deaths 15.9%
In Eq. (2), yi* is how much "Bush support"or "casualtytolerance" one
possesses.The variablesxi are expressedgenerallyas the long term political
past experience (party ID or PID), political past experience under an
incumbent(retrospectivejudgmentsor RJ), and future expectations (pro-
spectivejudgmentsor PJ).Our Vote Choice and Casualty Tolerance dependent variables are both five
point ordinal scales. The data we analyzecome from polling we conducted
immediatelypriorto the November 2004 election. Table 2 reportsmarginalsand full question wording s available n the appendix.
Because we areusingordinalscales to representunderlyingatentattitudes,ordered logit is an ideal estimation technique.We estimate the followingmodels for both vote choice andcasualtytolerance:
yi* = o + 1PartyID + 32RightThing+ /3Success(3)
+ 23RightThing* Success + ei
yi *=o/ + /1Party ID + 32RightThing+ /3Success + /23RightThing * Success
+fl4Age
+ /5Education + /6Female + /37Minority+ ei (4)
PartyID is a standardpartisan dentificationquestion,coded as Democrat
(-1), Independent(0), and Republican(1). RightThingand Successare both
four-pointLikert scales.RightThingasks respondents f they approveof theoriginaldecisionto usemilitary orceagainstIraqand is coded from"StronglyDisapprove"(0) to "StronglyApprove"(3). Success asksrespondents f theythink theU.S. is likelyto succeedin Iraq,and is coded from "Not at all likely"(0) to "Very likely" (3). The independentvariablesare coded so that wewouldexpectto see positivecoefficients n the ordered ogistic regressions. notherwords,we expect a one unit increase n the independentvariableto beassociatedwith a respondentpossessinga greaterquantityof the underlyingattitudeunderinvestigation,whethervoting for Bush or casualtytolerance.
Table 3 showsthe estimates fromEqs. (3) and (4) for both VoteChoice andCasualty Tolerance.
As expected RightThings a significantpredictorof the both vote choiceand casualty tolerance-dependentvariables,as is Success. Also as hypothe-sized, there is a significant interaction term.
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162 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
Table 3 Orderedogisticregression esults
Vote choice Casualty olerance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4
PartyID 1.60*** 1.60*** 0.33*** 0.21*
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)Iraq RightThing 0.53** 0.54** 0.06 0.12
(0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13)Likelihoodof Success -0.06 -0.03 0.51*** 0.66***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)RightThing * Success 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.29*** 0.25***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)Female 0.33 -0.30*
(0.17) (0.12)Minority -0.31 -0.60***
(0.23) (0.17)
Age 0.04 0.11**(0.05) (0.04)
Education -0.09 0.28***
(0.09) (0.06)Pseudo R2 0.43 0.43 0.18 0.19
Log-Likelihood -645.15 -641.49 -1363.81 -1333.51
Log-Likelihoodx2 964.72 972.05 583.68 644.28
N 1,007 1,007 1,037 1,037
* p < .05
** p < .01
***p < .001
Because logit coefficients are extremely difficult to interpret directly, we
use predicted probability graphs to show the relationship between variables
and the importanceof the interaction erm.Figures1 and 2 show predicted
probabilitiesof voting for George W. Bush (estimated from Model 2).Consistent with our expectations (following from Fiorina) respondents'
PredictedProbabilityof VotingorBush
.e..-...-.--
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat StronglyDisapprove Disapprove Approve Approve
IraqWas RightThing
Likelihoodf Success inIraq
VeryLikely SomewhatLikely--- NotVeryLikely NotLikelyAt All
Fig.1 Vote choicepredictedprobabilities y RightThingestimated rom Model2)
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PolitBehav 2007) 9:151-174 163
PredictedrobabilityofVotingorBush
Likelihoodf Success
Iraq Right ThingStronglyApprove --*- SomewhatApprove
SomewhatDisapprove StronglyDisapprove
Fig.2 Vote choicepredictedprobabilities y Success estimated rom Model2)
retrospective udgmentson whetherattackingIraqwas the "rightthing"has
the greater mpacton vote choice. Figure1 shows how the predictedproba-
bilityof votingfor Bushchangesacrossvaluesof RightThing, nd the course
of this change dependson the values of Success.Althoughit can be hard to
discerndirectly rom Table 3, the graphshows thatRightThing lwaysmatters
in predicting he probabilityof votingfor Bush.Certainly,RightThingmatters
more as one ascendshrough
Success rom"Not at alllikely"
to"Very ikely."When we graph he predictedprobability f votingforBush as a functionof
Success (Fig.2), we find that this variable does not always matter. When
RightThing s "StronglyDisapprove,"Successhas little to no effect on the
predictedprobability fvoting or Bush(this s thegraphicalwaytointerprethe
non-significantoefficient orSuccess n Table 3 inModels1 &2).Theeffect ofSuccess s significantor all other values of RightThing.When we examine the
predictedprobabilityof votingfor Bush acrossthe valuesof Success,andseehow thechange s affectedbydifferentvaluesof RightThing,we see muchmore
modest differencesnthechangeacrossSuccess,but muchgreaterdifferencesnthe predictedprobabilityat the lowestpointin the scale("Notat all likely").Figures3 and4 show a nearlyidenticalpattern,but in reverse.Consistent
with ourexpectations,whenpredictingwhetherone will tolerate at least1,500casualties n Iraq,Success becomesmore importantand RightThing xplainsless of the action. When Success is "Not at all likely," the probabilityof
tolerating1,500casualties s equally owregardlessof thevalue of RightThing.(Again,this is the graphicalwayto interpret he non-significantoefficient or
RightThingn Models 3 & 4.) Success, however,is always significantand is
responsible or a big change n the predictedprobabilityof supportinghe warin Iraq,even if the U.S. suffers1,500casualties.
So what is the substantive ignificance f these attitudesand the interactionbetween them?Peoplewho holdboth beliefs-that the war wasrightand thatthe U.S. willwin-indicate thestrongest upport orcontinuingmilitaryactioneven in the face of mountingcasualties and for reelectingPresident Bush.
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164 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
PredictedProbabilityofToleratingt least 1500Casualties
------------------------------
Strongly Somewhat Somewhat StronglyDisapprove Disapprove Approve Approve
IraqWas Right Thing
Likelihood f Success in Iraq
VeryLikely-- SomewhatLikely
-------NotVeryLikely ----- NotLikelyAtAll
Fig.3 Casualty olerancepredictedprobabilities y RightThingestimated rom Model4)
PredictedProbabilityofToleratingt least 1500 Casualties
C- * - omwt.....o.-.S......g....y.p... . i
SomewhatDisapprove StronglyDisapprove
At ~ ~ ~ ~ "lkl ikl Lkl
Lieioo fSucs
IraqRihtThnStronglprv oewa prv
Somwhtspprve----Stongy isppov
Fig.4 Casualty olerancepredictedprobabilities y Success estimated rom Model4)
Likewise,people who hold the opposite view-that the war was wrongand
thatthe U.S. will lose-have the strongestoppositionboth to payinganymore
humancost and to reelectingBush.Think of the former as the "Bush Base"
and the latter group as the "VietnamSyndrome"crowd. The intermediate
attitudes-the "Noble Failure"view that the war was rightbut we will lose,andthe "PotteryBarn"view (youbreakit, you fixit) thatthe war waswrong
but we will win-operate in surprisingways.5The PotteryBarn crowdis, onaverage, more likely than the Noble Failure crowd to stomach continued
militaryaction. In contrast,the Noble Failure subgroup ndicatesstronger
supportfor Bush.
5 We adoptthe "PotteryBarn" abelfrom Friedman.
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 165
Table4 Predictedprobabilities
Vote Bush Support1,500+casualties
Bush Base (49%) 83% 89%
Noble Failure(8%) 53% 34%
PotteryBarn(15%) 26% 40%
VietnamSyndrome 29%) 13% 21%
What cantheseresultstell us aboutwhyBush 43was able to winreelection
despitea costlyand controversialwar?The war did not helpBush 43 because
the publicreflexivelyrefusesto oustthe Commander-in-Chiefuringwartime.After all, a significantproportionof the publicwas stronglyopposedto the
war andsoughtvigorously o remove the Presidentasa result.Instead, he war
probablyhelpedthe President o win reelection andmaintainsupportfor the
war because he was able to persuadea majorityof the publicof two simplepoints:(1) attackingIraqwas the "right thing"to do, and (2) the U.S. will
ultimately ucceed n Iraq.Specifically,we foundthat49%of ourrespondent'sfell into the "BushBase"categorydescribedabove,while15%were identified
as "PotteryBarn," 8% as "Noble Failure,"and 29% as in the "Vietnam
Syndrome" ategory.Support rom Bush Base and Noble Failurevoterskeptthe President in office, while Bush Base and Pottery Barn respondentsmaintainedpopularsupport or the war(see Table4).6 Of course, t is difficult
to say for certainwhetherthe war"helped"Bushwinreelection because theappropriate ounterfactuals not obvious.
To probethe robustnessof our results,we re-runthe analysesjust amongthosewhosay foreignpolicyis the mostimportantssueandamongthosewho
say economics s the mostimportantssue.We find that the issuerespondents
report as being most importantslightly changes the relative strength ofour predictorvariables,but that the overall causal story remains intact:
RightThings a betterpredictorof the vote,while Success s a betterpredictorof casualtytolerance(Table5).
Restrictingour analysisto just those respondentswho cite economic con-cerns almost perfectly reproducesour findings (which should be expectedgiven their preponderancen the dataset).Goodness-of-fit tatistics,such asmaximum ikelihood analogsto R2, drop.But this should also be expected;those who do not identify foreignpolicy as their primaryconcernought tohave less varianceexplainedwithmeasuresof foreignpolicy attitudes.
Replicating he ordered ogitsamongthe subset of respondentswho reportforeignpolicy as the most important ssue, we are able to explaina greaterproportionof the variance.If we are makinga claim about the explanatorypower of foreignpolicy attitudes, t stands to reasonthat our model shouldperformbetter amongthose who considerforeign policy the most important
6 The results nTable4 areestimated rommodelsnot presentedhere(thoughavailableonline).In thesemodels,we condense he fourpointscales nRightThingndSuccess o dummyvariables,and use the dummyvariablesas predictors.Resultsaresubstantivelydentical.We explainthesechoices in more detailin the discussion ection.
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166 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
Table 5 Logitmodelsby most importantssue
Dependentvariable Economymostimportant Foreignpolicymost important
Vote Casualty olerance Vote Casualty olerance
PartyID 1.65*** 0.19 1.63*** 0.35*
(0.15) (0.11) (0.35) (0.17)IraqRightThing 0.70** 0.15 0.24 0.27
(0.25) (0.17) (0.52) (0.27)Likelihoodof Success 0.10 0.61*** 0.01 0.98***
(0.25) (0.17) (0.43) (0.27)
RightThing * Success 0.29* 0.21* 0.87** 0.12
(0.13) (0.09) (0.31) (0.12)Female 0.27 -0.58*** 0.24 -0.07
(0.21) (0.15) (0.46) (0.21)Minority -0.13 -0.49* -0.85 -0.96**
(0.27) (0.21) (0.62) (0.34)
Age 0.11 0.18*** -0.25 -0.00(0.07) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06)
Education -0.09 0.25** -0.01 0.19
(0.11) (0.08) (0.24) (0.12)PseudoR2 0.36 0.15 0.62 0.24
Log-likelihood -437.90 -788.01 -104.22 -379.70
Log-likelihood 2 493.40 283.41 333.07 233.83
N 590 605 305 313
*p < .05
**p < .01
*** p < .001
issue. In explainingvote choice, the Pseudo R2 jumps.The interactionbe-
tween RightThingand Success continuesto be significantwhen we are pre-
dicting vote choice. However, when we examine casualty tolerance, the
interaction erm loses its significance.Droppingthe interaction erm fromthe
model leaves both RightThingand Successas significantpredictorvariables,withthe latterhavinga coefficientmorethan two and a half timesas largeas
the former.While the interaction erm is no longer significant,he relatively
greater importanceof Success as a predictorvariable conforms with our
overallstoryandexplanationof howdifferentattitudesaffectvote choiceand
casualtytolerance.The more one cares about foreignpolicy, the more one
focuseson the likelihoodof successas the critical actor n decidingwhether o
supporting he continuationof the war.
Discussion
While we are stronglyconfident n the strengthof our results,we would be
remiss if we did not also point potentialproblemsin our analyses.We see
three main threats to our inferences:(1) collinearitybetween our predictorvariablesof theoreticalinterest,(2) an underspecifiedmodel, and (3) prob-lems of endogeneity.Below we addresseach of these concerns.
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 167
Multicollinearity
As one might expect,people who see the warin Iraqas the "right hing"and
also more apt to believe it will be successful.Similarly, hose who thinkthat
warwasthe wrongthingare less optimisticaboutsuccess. Somemayview the
variablesassimply wo different ndicatorsof the same construct. f thatis thecase, then our coefficientsmay not be well estimated,leading us to positdifferingcausalsignificance o variables hat are not actuallydistinct.
The Success and RightThingvariables are highly correlated(rho = .66).While high, there is still a substantialamount of variationbetween the two.
Table 6 reportsthe correlationsbetween all of the independentvariableswe
use in the models above. As shouldbe expected,SuccessandRightThingbothcorrelatestronglywiththe interactionmade fromthose two variables.Table 7
presentsvariance nflationfactor(VIF) scores for several differentcombina-
tionsof ourindependentvariables.The VIFs are all below the standard ule-of-thumb hresholdof 10 for excessivecollinearty,except for the interactionof the four-pointLikertversionsof Success and RightThing.Of course, theinteraction should exhibit more collinearityas it is a function of the two
Table6 Correlations etween variables
RightThing Success RightThing Female Minority Age Education* Success
RightThing 1
Success 0.6599 1
RightThing 0.9004 0.8303 1* Success
Female -0.0810 -0.0453 -0.0724 1
Minority -0.2269 -0.1177 -0.2053 0.0061 1
Age -0.0253 -0.0560 -0.0171 0.0009 -0.1609 1Education -0.0226 -0.0416 0.0002 -0.0329 -0.1453 0.0131 1
Table 7 Variance nflation actor(VIF)values
Without With Without nteraction Withinteractioninteraction interaction term(dummy term(dummyterm term variables) variables)
RightThing 1.86 6.20
Success 1.78 3.78
RightThing*Success 11.25
Female 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Minority 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.13
Age 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03Education 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03
RightThing (dummy) 1.49 4.02
Success dummy) 1.41 2.43
RightThing*Success (dummy) 2.52
MeanVIF 1.30 3.63 1.18 2.43
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168 Polit Behav (2007) 29:151-174
variables.It is importantto note that the predicted probabilitiesreportedabove in Table 4 are calculated from a model using the dummyvariable
versionsfor two reasons.First, the four named sub-populationsare simplyeasier to calculatewithdummyvariables.Second,we arereportingpredicted
probabilitiesn which even the interaction erm has a VIF below the standard
rule-of-thumb utoff of 10.Does the level of multi-collinearityhreaten our inferences? We firmly
believe thatit does not. Our corearguments thatretrospective valuationsof
the rightness of the war better predict vote choice, whereas prospective
judgmentsof success betterexplaincasualty olerance.If we rerunthe model
without the interaction,we find even strongeroverallsupportfor the claim
that Success is a more powerful predictorof casualty tolerance and that
RightThings a betterpredictorof vote choice.As notedabove,we obtainthis
same resultif we model our interactionwiththreedummyvariables which n
effect represent the "Bush Base," "Noble Failure," and "Pottery Barn"subgroups).This specificationcapturesthe interactionargumentwith a sub-
stantiallylower level of multicollinearity-albeit without some theoretical
nuance-and yieldsthe sameempiricalresult.Thus the overallargument hat
success trumps rightnesswhen it comes to casualtiesis very stronglysup-
ported,as is the claim thatrightness rumpssuccess when it comes to voting.Table 8 presentsresults of our modelswithoutan interaction erm, and the
Table 8 Models without interaction terms
Vote choice Casualty.tolerance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Party ID 1.57*** 1.57*** 0.35*** 0.21*
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
Iraq RightThing 1.30*** 1.29*** 0.54*** 0.53***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)Likelihood of Success 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.94*** 1.03***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)Female 0.32 -0.31**
(0.17) (0.12)
Minority -0.35 -0.65***
(0.22) (0.17)
Age 0.10 0.20***
(0.08) (0.06)Education -0.08 0.30***
(0.09) (0.06)Pseudo R2 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.19
Log-likelihood -654.87 -650.60 -1374.81 -1333.51
Log-likelihood x2 945.29 953.82 583.68 644.28
N 1,007 1,007 1,037 1,037
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174 169
resultssupport he same substantiventerpretation-RightThingmattersmore
for vote choice and Successmattersmore for casualtytolerance.
Under SpecifiedModel
Another possible critiqueof the resultspresentedhere is that we have un-derspecifiedmodels. Certainly,there are many additional causes of votechoice that one could include-ideology, opinionon importantdomestic is-
sues,candidate raits, hermometer atings,perhapseven spatialplacementofthe competingcandidates or other NES-typevariables.We fully agree and
recognizethat testingalternatespecificationswith these additionalvariables
could lead to stronger nferences.Unfortunately,we do not have those data
and are unable to test other model specifications.Our principalaim duringdata collection was to test the public'swillingness o "pay"the cost of casu-
alties as the "body bags startedcominghome." As such,we elected to askfewer questionsand draw additionalsamplesat differentpointsin time (andtherefore at increasingcasualtynumbers).Clearly,this is a difficult radeoff.We believe that we have made the correct choice since the questionof the
public'sresponse to casualties and war in the context of an election is ofcentral concernto scholarsand policymakers at this time.
While we did not ask about candidateplacement or traits, we did ask
respondentsabout whether they believed that Bush or Kerrywould do a
better job handlingthe economy and social issues. We retained our morelimitedspecification,however,because we were not sufficiently atisfied hat
responses o questionsabout whichcandidatewouldhandle ssuesbetterwere
conceptuallydistinctfrom our vote choice question.Nonetheless,the resultsin Table 3 remainrobust even when we controlfor candidatepreferencein
handling he economyandsocial issues.Rememberalso that when we restrictour basic models only to those who say that "foreignpolicy"was the most
important ssue,model performancemproves.Anotherpossibleform of underspecificationoncernsthe extension of our
results to other warsand elections. In Feaver,Gelpi, andReifler(2005/2006),we presentaggregate evel results that the importanceof successin shapingcasualty tolerance is also present in other wars. We would acknowledge,however,that the impactof warson elections is likely to varydependingoncandidates'positions on the war in question. Brody and Page (1972), for
example, find that attitudes towardVietnam had little impact on electoralchoice in 1968becauseHumphreyandNixon differed ittle on this issue. Al-drich(1977),on the otherhand,findsthatVietnamhad a significantmpacton
votingin 1972becauseof the distinctpositions akenbyNixon andMcGovern.
TheIraqwar n 2004falls into the lattercategorybecauseBush andKerry ookdiffering positions on whether the war was-in retrospect-the "right thing" to
do (Kerry's initial vote for the war notwithstanding). If candidates do not take
different positions on the "rightness" of a war-or do not otherwise differ-
entiate themselves along some other prominent war dimension-we would not
expect public attitudes toward the war to influence vote choice substantially.
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170 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
Endogeneity
Finally,one of the problems nherent n attitudinal esearch s that the causal
directionis unknown-the dependentvariablemay be influencing he inde-
pendent variables.Choosingto vote for Bush or Kerry,for example,could
affect how one views the Iraq war. It is possible that the causal directionactually beginswith voting,and ends with evaluationsof war (or other pre-dictors in the model). In other work, we present additionalanalysesusinginstrumentalvariablesto try to isolate the causal influenceof perceptionsof
success and whether the war was the "right thing" to do. Moreover,we
conductexperiments hat allow us to identifythe causalimpactof success on
casualtytolerance.We have not yet been able to conductsuch experiments
regardingretrospectivejudgmentsof the "rightness"of the war and vote
choice, but we agreethat such research s importantand we hope to investi-
gate this issue in the future.It is worthnoting,however,that we controlfor partyidentification n our
analyses,which we would view as causally prior to vote choice. Thus our
estimated coefficientsalready account for any relationshipbetween parti-
sanshipand voters' prospectiveand retrospectiveevaluations of Iraq.As a
result, if vote choice created the coefficientswe observe for "success" and
"rightthing,"it must have been some aspect of vote choice beyond party
preferencethat did so.
FutureResearch
Perhaps the most pressingissue for future researchis to develop a more
refinedanswer o the question"how do citizens udgesuccess?" and perhapseven more importantly-"are citizensusingthe correct metrics n evaluating
success?").To a large extent, the argument presentedhere is agnostic to
whethercitizensmakedirect udgmentsaboutthe war(or,at least as direct as
possible giventhatthey areonly exposedto what the mediais able to report),
or whether citizens are mostly unawareof the "real" situationand simplyfollow elite level debate.We tend to come down moreon the side thatcitizens
follow what happensabroadvia the news and can formjudgments ndepen-dent of simplyparrotingwhat theirpreferredelite says.But the resultspre-sentedhere are not affectedby thispriorquestionof whereperceptionscome
from.
Nonetheless, two logical next steps that flow from our research are: (1)
developinga better and more complete accountingof how citizensprocessinformationabout internationalaffairs,and (2) developinga better under-
standingof how new pieces of informationabout foreign policy (includinghow they are framed) affect judgments. We believe there is some exciting
work in this area, especially in the use of experiments (e.g. Berinsky, 2007;
Boettcher & Cobb, 2006; Tomz, 2007).
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Polit Behav(2007)29:151-174 171
Conclusion
The presidentialelection of 2004 was profoundly nfluencedby judgmentsabout the warin Iraq.But the publicdid not reelectthe Commander-in-Chief
simplybecause therewas a waron. Instead,the public appears o be drawing
carefullyreasoned and reasonable udgmentsboth about the war and aboutthe election.Ouranalysis ndicates hat a singletheoreticalmodelcan be usedto describeboth American'swillingnessto supportcontinuedfightingandtheir willingnessto reelect the President.Specifically,we identify two atti-tudes-one prospectiveandthe otherretrospective-as key factors n shapingopinion.Consistentwithpreviouswork on electoral behavior(Fiorina,1981),we find that retrospective udgmentsabout the President'sdecision to useforceare most influentialn determining ote choice. Consistentwithpreviousworkon casualtytolerance(Feaver& Gelpi,2004),we find that prospectivejudgmentsabout the likelihood of success in Iraq are most importantin
determining upportfor continuing o fightin Iraq.
Acknowledgments This work is supportedby grantsfrom the CarnegieCorporation nd theNationalScienceFoundation.The authorswould like to thankan anonymous eviewer, he edi-tors of PoliticalBehavior,John Aldrich,and seminarparticipants t Duke University or their
helpfulcomments.
Appendix
MostImportantssue:Respondentswere asked "Whenchoosingforwhom to
vote, which of the followingissues are most important o you personally?"Answer categorieswere "Foreignpolicy issues like Iraq and the War on
Terrorism,""Economic issues like jobs and taxes," and "Social issues likeabortionand gay marriage."
RightThing:Respondentswere asked,"We wouldlike to know whetheryouthinkPresidentBush did the
rightthingby using militaryorce
againstIraq.Would you say that you stronglyapprove,somewhat approve,some what
disapproveor strongly disapproveof his decision?"[Stronglyapprove= 3,Somewhatapprove= 2, Somewhatdisapprove= 1, Stronglydisapprove= 0].
Success:Respondentswere asked,"Regardlessof whetheryou thinkthat thePresidentdid the rightthing,wouldyousaythatthe U.S. is verylikelysucceedin Iraq,somewhatlikely to succeed,not very likely to succeed,or not at all
likely to succeed?" [Very likely to succeed= 3, Somewhat likely to suc-ceed = 2, Not very likely to succeed = 1, Not at all likely to succeed = 0].
Vote: Respondents were asked "If the general election for President were held
today and the candidates were: George W. Bush, the Republican, John Kerry,the Democrat, Ralph Nader, the Independent for whom would you vote?" If
undecided, respondents were asked "Toward whom do you lean?" [Bush = 4,Lean Bush = 3, Undecided = 2, Lean Kerry = 1, Kerry = 0].
SSpringer
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172 PolitBehav(2007)29:151-174
CasualtyTolerance:To measurecasualtytolerance,we askedrespondentsa
series of questions, ncludinga split sampledesignto assessif the numberof
dead andwounded affectsopiniondifferently hanjustthe numberdead.We
foundno differenceby including nformationaboutthe numberwoundedin
addition o those killed.In the questions hatfollow,the extrawording or the
split sampleis included n parentheses.All respondents eceived the statement,"Regardlessof whetheryou thinkthe
Presidentmade the rightdecisionin attackingIraq,as you know the United
States is engaged in an ongoing military operationthere and has suffered
about 1,000militarydeaths(and over 7,000militarywounded)."
Respondentswere then asked, "Wouldyou supportcontinued U.S. militaryactionin Iraquntila new Iraqigovernmentcan take over if it resultedin no
additionalU.S. militarydeaths?"[If they said no CasualtyTolerance= 0, if
they said yes they were asked] "wouldyou supportcontinuedU.S. militaryaction in Iraquntil a newIraqigovernment an takeoverif it resulted n up to
1,500totalU.S. militarydeaths(andover 10,000militarywounded)?" Iftheysaid no CasualtyTolerance= 1, if they saidyes theywere asked]"Wouldyou
supportcontinuedU.S. militaryactionin Iraquntil a new Iraqi governmentcan take over if it resulted n up to 5,000total U.S. militarydeaths(andover
30,000militarywounded)?"[If they said no CasualtyTolerance= 2, if theysaidyes theywere asked]"Wouldyou supportcontinuedU.S. militaryaction
inIraq
untila newIraqigovernment
an takeoverif it resulted nup
to50,000total U.S. militarydeaths(andover300,000militarywounded)?" If theysaid
no CasualtyTolerance= 3, if they saidyes CasualtyTolerance= 4].
Age:Sevencategoryvariable[18-24 = 0, 25-34 = 1,35-44 = 2, 45-54 = 3, 55-
64 = 4, 65-74 = 5, 75+ = 6].
Education:Four categoryvariable[Highschool or less = 0, High school di-
ploma = 1, Some college = 2, Bachelors degree or higher = 3].
Female:Dummyvariable[Male= 0, Female = 1].
Minority: Dummy variable [White Non-Hispanic= 0; Black, Hispanic or
other = 1].
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