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THE GENER L P GE

COVER STORY

g i v 2 m QEMER L. los ing venture pu bl ished bi -monthlypre t ty c lose to the middle o f January,March, May, July, September, an d Novem-ber. The General is publishe d b y The AvalonHill Company almost solely for the cul turaledif ication o f the serious game aficionado. thelps sell ou r merchandise, too.Art icles fro m subscribers are consideredfor pub l i ca t ion a t t he whim and fancy o fmembers o f our erudi te edi tor ial s taf f andcompany baseball team. To m er it considera-t ion, art icles mu st be typew ritten double-spaced and not exceed 1,000 words. Ac-companying examples and diagrams must bedrawn in b l ac k o r r ed ink. Payment foraccepted art icles is made according to thedictates o f the voting subscribers.A full-year subscription costs 4.98 (over-seas subscribers add 6.00 to cover airmail.)Back issues cost 1.00 each: out-of-stockissues are Vol. 1 No's. 1 2, 3, 4, 6; Vol. 3,No. 1; Vol. 4, No. 4.To fa cilitate correspondence, we suggestthat a l l envelopes to Avalon Hill be marked

in the low er le ft-ha nd corner as fol lows:Purchases o f Th e General: Subs criptionDept. - Gert rude Zom bro.Purchases o f games, play -by- ma il kits, an dgame parts: Order Dep t. - Christy Shaw.Questions concerning play: ResearchDesign Dept. - Randy Reed.Art ic les for publication: Edi tor- inchie f .Requests fo r Brochures: Advert ising Dept.Requests fo r Parts Lists: Parts Dept.Let ters to the Edi tor: Edi to r- inc hief .

You ve a t to let us know at least fourweeks t advance Besu re to let us know thezap code of both your old and new addrers

Typesett ing: Colonial Composit ionPrinting: Mon arch Of fice Services, lnc.Copyright 1971 The Avalon Hall CompanyBaltlmore, Maryland. Planted tn USA

"Put some tanks in a game, and I ll uaranteeyo u a winner," so spaketh our marketing directorand chief sales prognosticator. Well, i t takes nomen tal giant to f igure that one out. Sales o fgames over the p ast three years have beendirect ly proport ionate to the number o f tanksthat play a part in the games.Why the myst ique wi th tanks? Our market ing

people have collectively decided that much ofthis mystique can be attributed to nomenclature.And because we have not really emphasizednomenclature in any o f the "tank games" batt lemanuals , we hope to make up for this b i t ofoversight with the fol lowing excerpts appearingon pages 182-183 o f "Tank Data 2," an exc elle nts o ur ce e d i t e d b y E.J. Hof f s c hm i d t andW.H. Tan tum IV . T he b ook is available fro m We,Inc. publishers, O ld Greenwich, C onnecticut.German Armored Vehicles Nomenclature

The nomenclature used for German armyvehicles and components was somewhat similar to(continued page 3)

Avalon Hill Philosophy Part 3Why The Luftwaffe Never Looses

In spite of the fact th at the number o f loyal the hard core. Giving the Germans jets earA. H. fans grows largereveryday, we do no t bu y as makes them invincible when prope rly comany games as the general public. This means manded, bu t W HAT I F HIT LER had bethat even when we are wild about a game, it can obeyed back in 1941 when he ordered be withd raw n fro m sales because the general pro duc tion discontinued because he didn't nepublic is apathetic. them? To f in d out, play the Advanced gawithout any jets at all. Where jets are authorize

LU FTW AFF E was desianed to meet both use FW 190's.market demands. The Public wanted something These alternatives we,ve suggested are nwhich was not too diff icult and rather quick to balanced games. They are not meant toplay while the hard core wanted unlimited real- balanced for people with game expertise. Thism and a longer game. The general public will are designed to show wha t WOULD HAPPENprobably beyond the Tournament game For play balance instead of Historical accuraBut the Tourname nt game is merely a transit ional Paragraph A of the Optional Games specifies tvehicle t o teach th e advanced game and all its proceedures to follow. German prodoprlons.t i on if he wins too easily or increase it when

We did no t expect the hard core to stop wit hthe tournament or Advanced games or toFREEZE them into the formats used for ini t ia lpresentation. This is why we opened the door toexperimentat ion w i th paragraph A of theOPTIONAL GAMES section. We know that theAdvanced and Tournament games are balancedfor players who don't play to o often. Naturally,those who play frequently discover ways toachieve superiority w hich w il l n ot be learned bythe general public who plays occasionally. Thoseof you who are true fans have learned to makethe Luftwaffe unbeatable. Here's why this ispossible.The Germans win because the game is tooaccurate Ho w is tha t for a rapid f ire contradic-t ion ? Goering ordered his fighters t o ignoreAmerican fighter escorts and concentrate on thebombers only. I f the G erman player was forcedt o abide by G oering's orders in the game, therewould be a di f ferent outcome. (To play out thissituation, the close escort fires first at attackingfighters and extracts casualties before the surviv-ing attackers may trade shots with the bombers.)Because such a foolhardy tactic puts the Germanat a decided disadvantage, we wrote the rules sothat it would be impossible for the German toignore the escort. We couldn't see any point inforcing the German player t o l im it his tacticaloptions t o loosing tactics. Players who rack up astring of German victories recognize the value of

f ighter superiority and exploit it properly. Th is issomething Goering forb id his pi lots to do.All ied air commanders estimated that i f th eGermans had started using jets 6 months earlier,the LUFTWAFFE would have regained air superi-ority. The Advanced game shows what wouldhave happened IF the Germans had gotten theirjets as early as it was possible for them to getthem. What happens on the gameboard is wha twould have happened in real l i fe i f the Jerrieshad gotten their Jets sooner. While this is veryrealistic, it favors the Germans more as you learnhow to properly employ the jets. The publicthinks both sides have an even chance for victorybecause they do not play as often or as well as

loses too often."No tw o gamers have the same degree of sand this made it di f f icu l t t o determine the expoint of balance which is fairest for everyonDuring the past months we've had several wknown gamers work ing out the point at whithe game balances for them. Although wepublished their findings below, this does necessarily mean that you and your usual oppnent wil l f ind balance at the same point as oinvestigators. Since your degree of skill must greater or less than the investigators, their suggt ions wi l l hold l i t t le val idi ty unt i l you yourself against the same conditions they've trieThe investigators, almost t o a man, determin

that play balance was arrived at when tGerman Pr odu ction rate was lowered to rea"German needs 9 undamaged factories to maone replacement factor." Thi s was an adjustmet o the original "4 for 1" requirement for tTourn ame nt Game. Most claimed that this chaapplied also to th e Advanced Game.

Rule Revisions Now AvailableBut this did not prove to be the end of oinvestigators' suggestions. M any oth er factors cotribu ted towards the play imbalance of the orinal script. An d so thor oug hly were the y testeand so great was their validity, that many of thplay-balance changes have been incorporated the second print ing of the Instruction Foldenow available from the Parts Department forcents. (Make sure you ask for "Second Printingotherwise y ou are l iable to get a copy of toriginal rules that may still be sitting around.)Our thanks for taking m uch of their free t imt o conduct these experiments go especially Tyrone Bomba, Michael Forte, Michael DeaLeonard Devine, Rodger Hart, members of Intest Group Balt imore with Randy Reed, andhost of guinea pigs whose names were withhefro m us (because the y were losers, maybe ?). Anof course, t o T/Sgt Lou Zocchi who init iated texperiment under the program he t i t led, "FieMarshals' Handicap."

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P GE THE GENER

Panzerblitz Championship Situationsby Lenard Lakofka, President IFW

The 4th annual Lake Geneva Convention ishistory. The two day event, reported in theprevious issue, promoted tw o major events: theArmor Team Game and the Panzerblitz Tourna-ment. For those o f you who couldn t attend, weare presenting those exact Panzerblitz Touma-ment Situations (Games No. 2, No. 3, No. 41 foryour replay. We are setting up the three situa-tions similar in fashion to the way Situationsthru 12 are presented in the game. Objectives andforces are purposely printed separately from thevictory con ditions.

OVER STORY -;Zt;:dItha t followed by th e United States Army. Sepa-rate designations were assigned experimental andproduction vehicles. As a n example, the Germanexperimental tanks ordered by the Heereswaf-fenamt (German Army Ordnance Office) weredesignated as Vollketten Kraft Fahrzeug (full-tracked vehicle) and their prefix was VK, basedon a system as follows:

VK fX ) 1234, where the initial VK indicatedt h e Vollketten-Kraft-Fahrzeug; the ( X ) ,when used, indicated the manufacturer: thefirst tw o digits ( 12 ) indicated the weightclassification in tons; and the last two digits(34) the prototype number assigned thatseries. Thus the VK 4501 was a 45 tonexperimental tank and the first ( 0 1) of thatdevelopm ent series.Near the end of World War I1 another systemwas adopted in which th e VK prefix was droppedand the experimental vehicles indicated by theprefix Em and a series of digits, indicating th eweight o f t he vehicles in tons. When the vehiclewas standardized and adapted for service use, itsdesignation was changed to Sonder Kraft-Fahr-zeug (Sd. Kfz.) and a serial number assigned.Along with this designation, the tanks were alsonote d as Panzerkampfwagens (Pz. Kpfw.), such asth e seri es Pz.Kpfw. I, 11, and 111.Half-track vehicles all had model designationsstarting with the letters "HK" followed by anumber. T he basic chassis designation fo r suchvehicles was Zugfuhrer Wagen (Z.W.).The self-propelled artillery were called Selbst-fahrlafette, abbreviated Sf. o r Sfz. Dependent o nthe anti-tank vehicles' tactical mission, these wereca lle d Pa nzeja gerk anon e (Pjk.) o r Panzer-abwerkanone (Pak.) Some tank hunters or anti-tank vehicles were also called Panzerjagers(Pz.Jag.) with the gun carriages, Geschutzwagen(G.W.) Th e assault guns were called Sturmk anon e(Stu.K.)This nomenclature was developed from theactual German names and was typical of theircustom of combining root words to form a newword. Thus, where Panzer referred to armor,Jager meant hunter, Wagen meant wagon orvehicle, and Kampf meant war; the Panzer-kampfwagen (Pz.Kfw.) was an armored warwagon.

NorthPANZERBLITZ T ournamen t Game No. 2 German efenseTime Limit: 12 tu rns Board Configuration mlS o u t hObjective: Keep as many of the hill top s as possible on board one while holding hilltop s on boards t wo and three secondarily. Avoid excessive losses. Judgingwill be by a point system. Keep track on a piece of paper of all hills lost andall units lost and have you r opponent o k it at the end of turn 10.Forces: Set up on boards 1 and 2 only 2 CPs, 2 150 howitzers, 2 50 mm AT, roadblocks, 2 mines, 1 fortification, 4 rifle, 1 SMG, rucks, 2 81m m mortars,

3 M IV, 1 MV, 1 SG I I I Russian t o enter from north edge.Note: e nter losses of fighting units ONLY, o not coun t mines, road blocksor trucks.North

ANZERBLITZ Tournam ent Game No. GermanTime Limit: 1 turns toard ConfigurationObjective: Enter on north edge of board on e and move rmor off of s outh edge ofentir e board configuration; keep track of units that have exited and Unitstha t have been lost. Do not cou nt truck s or half tracks in either tabulation.Forces: 3 81 mm mort., 2 eng., 3 rifle, 3 SMG, 4 trucks, 4 tracks, 1 wirblewind, 2 SG111,5 M IV ,2 M V, 1 M,VI b.

NorthPANZERBLITZ To urnament Gam e No. 4 German o a r d l 11ConfigurationObjective: advance west if possible, otherw ise hold a mobile defense keeping as much S o u t hterrain with minimum losses. Keep track of all armor lost. Record th eposition of each armor unit, not dispersed, on turn 12; i.e. record on whichboard it is located (n ot grid num ber).Forces: Set up on the far eastern tw o boards only. 6 rifle, 3 SMG, 1 120mm mort,1 150m m how, 3 75mm AT, 1 Jgd Pz IV, 2 Jgd Pz V, 6 M IV, 2 M V,1 MVI b.

Th e German and Russian objectives within each situation ap pear on separa te pages to simulate thconditions at Lake Geneva where neither player was informed o f his opponent's objectives. Dw ing thchampio nship series, Situation No. 1 was not counte d. Winners were determine d from a poin t systemwhich overall totals were gleaned fr om play of Situations No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4.

POINT SYSTEM Victory Conditions)Game No. 2: Give the Russian one point for each German infantry o r armor unit destroyed plus thepoints fo r hill tops cap twe d by undispersed Russian units or thro ugh which the Russiwas the last to pass: 104, 126, 107 1 point each; 129, 132 2 pts. each; 109, 127, 1303 pts. each; 135, 123 4 pts. each. Give the German o ne point for each Russian infantrfor armor unit destroyed. (do not count wagons, tracks, or trucks).

Decisive German victo ry: Russian w ith 6 pts. o r lessTactical German victory: Russian with 10 pts. o r lessMarginal German victory: Russian with 15 pts. or lessMarginal Russian victory: Russian with 19 pts. or lessTactical Russian victory: Russian with 2 3 pts. or lessDecisive Russian victory: Russian with 24 pts. o r more

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P GEHE GENER LPANZERBLITZ Tournament Game No. 2 Russian attack

Objective: Capture as many hill tops as you can, give preference to the ones on boardone, but hills on boards 2 and 3 are of value. Keep track of each hill youcapture and of each unit you lose, for losses count fighting units onlydo not ount trucks and wagons in the loss column. Your opponent iskeeping a similar list. At the end of turn two compare lists. If there is anyargument as to hill ownership CALL A JUDGE The specific point value ofhills is known only by the judge. Avoid excessive losses.

Forces: 2 engineers, 2 recon., 2 guards, 2 rifle, 6 wagons, trucks, 2 SU 76,2 SU 85,2 SU 10 0, 2 KV 85 .2 JSU 122.1 SU 152.1 T34185. Russian may enter onthe two roads of the north edge of board three or the farthest west road onboard 1.

PANZERBLITZ Tournament Game No. 3 Russian

Objective: prevent German infiltration of this area and exiting from south edge of board.Avoid excessive losses.Forces: Set up Board one only: 3 rifle. 1 SMG, 1 120mm mort., 2 76mm AT,3 trucks, 2 T34176, 1 T34185. Board two only: 2 fortifications, 2 minefields,

2 guards, 1 120mm mortar, 2 SU 100, 2 tracks. Keep track of all ARMORthat you lose and all infantry units (including mortars and AT groups).

PANZERBLITZ Tournament Game No. 4 Russian2 turns

Objective: push the German back to the far eastern board, or reduce total German armorforces significantly with proportional losses. Keep track of each armor unitlost, count JSU, SU, KV, JS, and T3 4 only. Keep track of each armor unitthat enters the far east panel and is still there at the end of turn 12 in fightingposition (not dispersed).Forces: Enter on all roads on far western edge. 2 57mm AT, 1 120mm mort,I 122mm how, 2 engineers, 6 rifle, 2 guards, 4 wagons, 2 trucks, 2 tracks,

2 JSU 122,2 SU 10 0.6 T34185, 2 JS 11, 2 JS 1.2 KV 85,2 SU 85.

Game No. 3: Russian points: one per German ARMOR unit destroyed or dispersed in turn no. 12.German points: one per Russian ARMOR unit destroyed or dispersed in turn no. 12. 3 pointsfor each German m o r unit off south edge of board.Decisive German victory: German has 18 points or moreTactical German victory: German has 13 points-17 pointsMarginal German victory: German has 8 points-1 2 pointsMarginal Russian victory: German has 3 points-7 pointsTactical Russian victory: German with zero-2 points or Russian with 1-2 pointsDecisive Russian victory: Russian with 3 or more points.

ameNo. 4: German points: one point for each Russian ARMOR unit destroyed or dispersed in turnno. 12. 5 points for each German m o r nit on the far west board. 4 points for Germanarmor unit on the far west board no. 1 pts. each for German armor units on the easternboard no. 1.Russian points: one point for each GERMAN ARMOR unit destroyed or dispersed in turnno. 12; 4 points for each m o r unit in far eastern board; 3 points for each armor unit ineastern board no. 1 points for each armor unit in western board no. 1.

Only in Situation No. 3 have we altered fromthe original Lake Geneva script: here, it isextended to 12 turns; and one Russian T34/85has been added. Otherwise, you will be playingexactly as if participating in the Lake Genevachampionships.Here is how each side fared during the cham-pionships: Situation No. 2 produced 4 Russian and4 German winners; Situation No. 3 produced 3Russian and 1 German winner; and Situation No.

4 produced 1 Russian and 1 German winner.For readers interested in more complete detailson the championship series, and IFW informationin particular, I invite your continued conespond-ence.Lenard Lakofka, PresidentInternational Federation of Wargaming1806 N. RichmondChicago, Illinois

Bismarckby Mailby Alan AugenbraunAlthough face-to-face competition is udoubtedly more exciting and faster-paced thplay-by-mail, not every wargamer has the timeenergy available for the many hours (or danecessary to complete most wargames whplayed in person.Avalon Hi1 fortunately recognized this prolem and wisely provided PBM systems for mof its wargame line. It is no mere conincidenthen that the most popular wargames are athose which are playable by mail and hence mwidely played.I believe that almost any wargame can successfully adapted to play-by-mail. This artichopefully the first of others to come in the nfuture, is devoted to the game of Bismarck a

its adaptation to play-by-mail. Bismarck, one the three Avalon Hill naval games, contains tstandard naval wargame elements of stratesearch and tactical maneuvering while it is boshort and simple to play.The rules that follow give the step-by-step PBprocedure for the game. Unless otherwise spefied, all AH rules for Bismarck remain in effeAREA SEARCH:

Step 1: In their respective homes, both the r(German) and the blue (British) players motheir ship counters on the search board. Tstarts the game.Step 2: On a postcard, Blue lists the areaswhich his counters lie and which he wishes "call out." Blue mails this postcard to Red.a) If the Bismarck is not in any of the lisareas, Red so informs Blue, and plreverts to Step 1.b) If the Bismarck is in a listed area, pproceeds to Zone Search.

ZONE SEARCH:Step 3: On a postcard, Blue lists the zones the Bismarck s area in which he has his shcounters. Blue must also indicate what type ship(s) he has in each zone.Step 4: When Red receives the postcard, informs Blue of the results of his Zone Search.a) If the Bismarck s exact zone is not listRed has not been "sighted." Play reverts

Area Search, Step 1.b) If the Bismarck s exact zone is listed, Rhas been sighted.1. If sighted by a carrier or cruiser, Rmust inform Blue of the Bismarcexact zone location. Play then revertsArea Search, Step 1.2. If sighted by a battleship, play proceeto Battle.BATTLE PROCEDURE:

Step 5: In their respective homes, Red placthe Bismarck battle counter in the middle squaof the Battle Board, and Blue places the countefor each of his ships that sighted the Bismarckthe Zone Search on any of the outer squares the Battle Board. (NOTE: For purposes of u

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P GE THE GENER location, label the northernmost squares of theBattle Board from A in the northwest comerto G in the northeast corner. Next, label thesidemost squares from 1 to 7, starting with 1in the northwest corner and finishing with 7 inthe southwest corner. Using this grid coordinatesystem, the center square in which the Bismarckstarts is D-4. The southeast square whichcontains the stern portion of the ship illustrationis thus G6 . ship facings must be indicated bynoting the bearings after the square coordinates,e.g., G4, NE, as in the accompanying dia-gram)

Step 6: Blue records his ship movement on apostcard and sends it to Red.

Step : Red records the Bismarck s movementon a postcard. He also indicates his salvo count ,listing one stock for each salvo. If more than one

target is involved, Red must indicate exactly .whatships he is firing at.

Step 8: Blue records the results of Red'sattack. He also indicates the British salvo countand lists one stock for each salvo.

Step 9: Red records the results of Blue'sattack. Steps 5 through 9 are then repeated untilthe Bismarck or the British ships are sunk oruntil a withdrawal occurs through Chance Tableplay.CHANCE TABLES:

Search Board: If Blue has failed to locate theBismarck, he has the option of playing theChance Table. To save game time and unneces-sary postage, Blue may indicate on his Area orZone Search moves whether he wishes to play theChance Table in the event that he does not locatethe Bismarck,. Thus, in Step 2-a of the AreaSearch or Step 4-a of the Zone Search, Redwould also inform Blue of the results of Blue'sChance Table play, if any.

If Blue does not wish to play the ChanceTable, Red may elect to d o so. In this case, whenRed informs Blue of the negative results of Blue'ssearch, Red also lists a stock for the ChanceTable. When Blue sends his next search move, heinforms Red of the results of the Chance Table

Battle Board: If Red wishes to play the BattBoard Chance Table, he follows the proceduoutlined above. Red should indicate his ChanTable stock after Step 9 in the play procedurUpon receipt of his salvo results, Blue informRed of the results of Red's Chance Table plaBlue may then play the Chance Table himself this time.

If necessary, extra steps are inserted as dictateby the results of Blue s Chance Table play, aftwhich game play reverts to Step 5.It should be pointed out here that since thSearch portion of th is game depends very heavion the integrity of both players, Bismarck wnot be suited to tournament play unless a thrplayerlreferee supervises all moves on a thud sof game boards. Alternately, both players coumaintain an accurate record of all moves fcomparison at game's end.

Despite this minor drawback, the above rulwill provide a means of enjoying Bismarcthrough the leisurely PBM system, a chance aPBMing armchair admirals have certainly beeawaiting.

Alan Augenbraun1755 Ocean ParkwayBrooklyn, N.Y. 1 1223

...there never was a body of 15,000 menwho could make that attack successfull~y.

by Paul McBreartyBeing a Civil War buff (I dislike that word;

let us say historian ) from my earliest days, andmore recently an Avalon-Hill nut (here, there isno more appropriate word) I went into theplay of Gettysburg with interest, excitement, andenthusiasm. And thinking back on the few gamesI've gotten into compared with the more experi-enced Lees and Meades of the country, I can saythat the game was well worthwhile.

I read an article not too long ago by Mr.Augenbraun, (Vol. 8, No. I), which attempted toremedy the defects in the game he felt existedconcerning victory conditions. I felt these sameweaknesses and was moved to take pen in handand make a modest attempt myself to help clearup the question, I may at times criticize Mr.Augenbraun's work, but I am under no illusionsas to the difficulty of preparing an articlecontaining both valid and workable solutions tothe wargarmer's problems. Perhaps this article willonly serve to fuel the furnaces of discontent andoffer no real answers. I hope to at least en-courage interest and invite more worthy contribu-tions from others.

It was nearing dusk for the second day uponthe field and I, as Union Commander studied mysurviving men, who were many, in their positionson the Round Tops, along Cemetery Ridge, andon Cemetery Hill. In short, I had my artillery upand my postionsposition was classically excellent.My brother, posing the past hour as Robert E.Lee and dedicated to the proposition that allYankees were skunks, had retained th e best partof his army, losing perhaps in vital quality what Ilost in expendable numbers during the first two

day's fighting. He sat along Seminary Ridge.According to the rules, the South had to take theinitiative and attack or be lost. This would meansuicide for my brother with his relatively weakerforce. I threw caution to the winds and told mybrother he wouldn't have to knock himself outagainst my position for I would attack him, andhave him whipped, I thought to myself, in shorttime.

To get to the point, I went through a Pickett'sCharge in reverse, losing my men, the battle, andlengthening th e war for years. I was certain myforces were adequate enough to have over-whelmed my brother's line and beaten him if noteasily, at least decisively. But I lost.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Augenbraun of-fered some changes in the game which wouldhave called for a Northern offensive. He fails todefine what exactly an offensive consists of, butin any event he suggested this with the intentionof depriving the Union of the option of sittingupon his defenses and forcing the South to attackas per the rules. Both sides would be induced toattack, and any other situation that did not resultin elimination of one force or the other, wouldbe considered a draw. His other examples ofcat-and-mouse play are highly improbable if notridiculous and should be dismissed on that ac-count.

It is true that the South carries a burden in thegame in that it must attack easily defensibleground in the vincinity of Gettysburg. Butmaintain this is as it should be. After thinking itover on may occasions I have come to theconclusion that the Confederate forces must useevery opportunity they receive to deal death-

blows to isolated Federal units while praying ththe die leaves them with little or no casualties.

Rober t E. Lee was in Pennsylvania to dsomething. Above all, he had to accomplish somsort of victory. The burden of attack is withese men in grey. If they should leave the Norhaving made no decisive action, their hope fvictory in the war has evaporated. Lee wcommit ting himself t o a gamble, something was well acquainted with. Lee's superiors wetold they would have results, and some definivictory had to be obtained north of the MasoDixon Line to take the pressure away froVicksburg and the last hope on the Mississippi.

Mr. Augenbraun hinted at a general Northersuperiority in arms which early in the game simply not there. The South has the upper-hanthe entire first day. And artillery is the key that strength. Why Avalon-Hill chose to give thConfederate more artillery in its game than to thYanks is beyond me. In the actual engagemethe Union had more artillery and used it moeffectively. Anyway, the South must employ thearly advantage to its greatest potential (easisiad, I know). I have not yet determined whethe balance lies between exploiting this advantaand conserving your units. I shall leave this fothers to theorize.In the game, the defender with sufficienumbers will be able to break a considerabattack upon his position and form an effectivcounter-attack. This becomes more important later stages of the game when any Confederadominance begins to wane as Union artillearrives. The next time I find my Rebel brothperched upon any ridge in a situation thseemingly favors my launching an attack, I wpause, glance at my own ridge position anremembering Longstreet's words remark, Well,guess you've got your work cut out for you.

Paul McBrearty104 S. GarthColumbia, Missouri 6520 1

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THE GENER L

and their gaming record takes a nosedive as word gets around. So how cansuch an error be avoided in ANZIO?First let me assume that the rulesin this game include all optionals inGame 111, Extra Units, and GameVariations with SRT for combat

resolution.A key decision in the outcome of

This mon th's Award Winner is Norm anBeveridge's fine article th at first appear ed in theJuly issue of Spartan International Magazine,reprinted here with permission from SpartanInternational, 4121 Long Beach Blvd. LongBeach, Cal. 90807

look at ANZIO and thrill at theprospect of great battles with AV sit-uations and second combat carrying thelines at a lightening pace. I sitdown and spend 45 minutes sortingcounters and setting up. Three movespass and the U.S. Army bogs down. Astiff wall of German units inhabit thehills and river positions. The U.S.player attacks and gets slaughtered.By Novemeber IV, 1943 the U.S. playerhas had it. He might continue thestruggle for fifty more moves beforethe outcome of the game becomes inevi-table. But he quits because the gamehas bogged down and now he is bored.Six attacks at maximum odds of 1-1 allbomb out, losing 14 steps while theGerman lost 5, plus only gaining onesquare. Granted, he did force the en-emy off that river position, but a re-treat of only two squares on a threesquare front re-established the soliddefense line. During this time, theU.S. player replaced 12 of the 14 loststeps, while the German replaced allfive and actually accumulated an ex-cess of five. All this with only av-erage die rollsObviously, U.S. strategy lackssomething. His moves have become toostereotyped. (1) Invade Salerno. (2)Advance to capture Foggia. (3) Backto Naples. (4) Attack one key posi-tion at 1-1 each turn, once the Germanfinds a defensive position. (5) Pullwounded units out to take replacementssub in others to keep up the attack.(6) Hold some units at sea to keep theGermans worried.

GARBAGE. Anytime the enemy knowswhat you are likely to do, he can meetyou head to head and you have lost.Too many players lack inventiveness,

Anzioby Norman Beveridge, r.

the gamk lies with the U.S. player inselecting the first invasion beach.Salerno is nice, and the Allies actu-ally chose it, but that does not meanit is the best site. First of all, noother beach is so far from the objec-tives necessary for satisfying thevictory conditions. Further, thefirst turn advance of invading unitscould not capture enough of the gooddefense positions in the Pompeii-Avel-lino-Auletta-Val10 line to prevent theGerman from bottling the invasion onturn one. Capturing the Vallo hillsdoes little good, for the German candefend Eboli-Auletta-Sapri, and U.S.has abandoned the port of Salerno. IfU.S. goes for both Vallo and Salerno,the German can counterattack and blowthe Allied units right off the board.The one advantage at Salerno is thesmall chance of invasion reactiontroops. This does not offset the lossof the Italian units.Looking northward a bit, we see Na-poli. HG has the city and good place-ment of 16 Pz should severely restrictany ranger attack aimed at surroundingNapoli. That port must fall to theAllies if they want any chance of suc-cess, and an invasion right on thewharves can precipitate a battle veryquickly. Probably only a small partof the Rome Garrison leaves the board,and the chance of invasion reactionremains small. The beach is stillvery far from Bologna, and except forthe cramped positions below Vesuvio,this area is vastly superior to Saler-no.

Set your sights a bit farther northto Mondragone. The invasion squaresencompass a very important area ofGerman defense. Invading units canoccupy a cornerstone of the Cassinoline, providing 15 PzGr does not mindtoo much. Also Napoli lies exposed.Unfortunately, so do the initial posi-tions for the invading units, whichinvites a German counterattack. A 33%chance of invasion reaction troopsloom over the area, though the Romegarrison could bottle them up and de-lay a counterpunch one turn. And the

P GEbeach is quite a ways from the soend, of which I will speak on latThis site is risky for both sides.

Terracina enjoys the advantagehaving no garrison. HG and 15 Pzflank Mondragone, and the German haschoice of covering Salerno, Mondragoor Terracina. Salerno and Terraciboth have good defenses for the Germso 16 Pz usually goes somewhere neNapoli. Too bad Terracina is so costricted. 2 Para and 15 PzGr seal off very quickly. Invasion reactiand Rome Garrison have the same effeas Mondragone. No room for expansimakes this site of little value for intiial invasion.

Termoli or Pescara could work, siply because of the shock effect on tGerman player. Invasion reaction very unlikely, but so is Italian helAt Termoli, Foggia falls by defauland at Pescara the Cassino line streches a nit longer and weaker than tGerman might like. Slow buildup aL capabilities hinder the Alli

player too much for the German to tathese area seriously.What can I say about Rome? A lof Italian help, and 67% chance invasion reaction troops coupled wiopen positions points to one side the other gaining a great advantavery early. Paratroop drop on Roand a ranger attack force a Germcounterattack. Italians play havwith German roads, bonus replacementand capture of road junctions spurs the Allied player. Happy 4th of JulCititavecchia might surprise tGermans and the U.S. player as welUnopposed landings north of Rome lonice, but lack of defense and slbuildup make this area more risk the good guys than it is worth. Saapplies to Grosseto. These arecould turn out very important as seond invasion areas.Cecina invasion could capture Liorno, but then why not invade the Livorno beach? Nearness to North Italunits and probability of invasion reaction could kill the U.S. chancefrom the start. Also, 94 Inf at C-1makes a Genova invasion just as untenable.IL of 10 (+3 for paratroop rules*makes Rimini look sick. Italian unitmelt away, but very few invasion reaction troops appear. 2R SS and 24 Pcome automatically, though, and if thinvasion fails kiss good units goodbye. Remember that no good airbasefall easily to the Allies when theinvade north of Rome.The choice of an invasion area itough. If you know what the rest oyour strategy involves, pick the invasion area best suited to it. Avoichoosing an area and then looking foa strategy.Tactics used in the invasion caspell success for a few turns or aearly defeat. Often the best idea ito avoid combat on the first move unless high odds are possible. Eve

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PAGE THE GENERAthen th e pos si bl e lo ss es must come on-ly wi th a ga in o f a very good pos i t i ono r t h e a t t a ck i s w o r t h l e ss . Most a r e -as have such low IL value s th at nost ep s should be r iske d. Second combatmight look inv i t in g , b u t do no t fo rge tth at a t th e end of your move the Ger-man can at ta ck you i n re tu rn . Alwaysk ee p i n mind t h a t t h e f i r s t t u r n a -s h o re p r e s e n t s t h e b e s t c ha nc e f o rGerman re ac ti on , and th e invading un-i t s mus t have some pro te c t io n . Th isbr in gs up a very common qu es ti on :s h ou l d t h e A l l i e d p l a y e r p l a c e u n i t si n two weak s ta cks i n ad jacen t pos i -ti on s which th e German cannot s urrou ndo r shou ld he make one s t rong s ta ckth at Je r ry can ou t f l ank? I wouldch o o s e t h e l a s t co n f i g u r a t i o n . T h efollowing example shows why:A l l i ed u n i t s i n q u es t i o n : 5 6 and8 B r . i n f . German u n i t s av a i l ab l ef o r co u n t e r a t t ack : 1 Par a, 24 Pz,16 Pz, HG 15 PzGr. Oth er German un-i t s u se d t o s e a l o f f t h e b ea ch he ad .Po s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s f o r t h e U.S. u n i t s :P-60 o r P-61 o r bo th . The a t t ack ing

Germans can reac h almost any of th efollowing squar es: P-59, 4-59, 4-60,4-61, and P-62; a ls o P-60 and P-61 i fth e U.S. u n i t s a r e no t there . I f U.S.h o l ds b o t h, German a t t ack s l i k e t h i s :1 Pa ra, 15 PzGr, 26 Pz, HG ag a i n s t o n eu n i t a t 3 -1 o d ds . 1 6 Pz ag a i n s t t h eot he r a t 1-2 odds. With ERS un it s i nt h e s t ack s t o ab s or b any l o s s e s , t h e3-1 w i l l l i k e l y l e av e a b i g s t ack ad -j a ce n t t o t h e o t h e r B r i t i s h u n i t . I fthe 1 -2 works , scr a tc h two d iv is i ons .Second combat on the second unit couldmove th e st ac k down t o t he beach. Iadm it t h a t t h e ch an ces o f t h i s a r es m a l l , b u t w e l l w or th a t r y f o r t h eGerman. I f th e A ll i ed pla yer woulds t ack t h e two t o g e t h e r , t h e a t t a chwould be only a 1-1 surrounded. Je rr yhas much l es s chance of coming to th ebeach, al though th e U.S. pl aye r mustthen ex tr ac t h i s two un it s . Low oddsand a g re a te r chance o f h igh losse sprobably w i l l de t er th e German frommaking t he at ta ck . He may even f i ndsome of h i s own un i t s su r rounded , o rth e U.S. pl ay er may bre ako ut somewheree l s e . Fu r t h e r , I F t h e U.S. p l ay e rchooses P-61 fo r th e defense , on ly29 PzGr can make P-62, and Je r r y might

f i n d t h a t u n i t d e s t r o y ed and t h e twod i v i s i on s e s t r a c t e d . I d ou bt t h a t i fsome invas ion r ea c t i on t roop s d id no tcome t he German could make th e 1-1 a t -tack . I f they do come, then th e b igU.S. u n i t s a r r i v i n g Sep t . I 1 1 andSouth End Option un it s would out f la nkth e Germans and k i l l him. This i s on-l y on e s i t u a t i o n , and q u i t e a few IF 'Sa r e i n vo l ve d , b u t I t hi n k t h i s i l l u s -t r a t e s my p oi n t.

Another cr uc ia l dec isi on comes onthe second tu rn when th e Al l ie d p laye rmust dec ide on what un i t s t o use fo rBU . Strong un i t s usu al l y come on ,nat u ra l ly , r a th er than more numerousweak u n i t s . T h i s f o ll o w s t h e i d ea s e tf o r t h i n t h e p r e vi o us example that ones t r o n g s t ack b ea t s s e v e r a l weak o nes .Some s it ua ti on s may demand a la rg enumber of units t o c o v e r t h e p o s i t i o n sgained i n advance. But be ca re fu l .Qose r inky-d ink b r igade s d i sappearf a s tA ls o , I t h i n k an i n j u s t i c e i s d on et o t h e A l l i ed a rm or ed b r i g ad es . I a -g r ee t h a t two i s r e a l i s t i c f o r i nv a-s i o n p o i n t s . Tanks do take much moreroom than in fan t ry on the land ing bar -g es . But a more r e a l i s t i c s t ack i n gv a l u e f o r t h e s e u n i t s wou ld b e 1 I / ? .Count t h i s a s two f o r t h e f i r s t u n i tbu t on ly one f o r t h e s eco n d . s t acko f f o u r t h en co s t s s i x s t a c k i n g p o i nt sr a t h e r t h a n e i g h t . A maximum of f i v ecou ld occupy th e square . The d i f f er -ence i s s m a l l , b u t i t makes a g r ea td i f f e r e n c e i n t h e u s e f u l n e ss o f t h eu n i t s .Anytime an inv asi on comes i n anyare a sou th o f Rome, exp lo i ta t ion o fth e South End opt ion s could mean th ed i f f er enc e in the game. Bes ides he lp -i n g t o g e t more u n i t s o n t h e b o ar dt h an o t h e r w i se p o s s i b l e , u se o f t h i sr u l e f o r ce s t h e German t o d e l eg a t e anumber o f u n i t s t o bo t t l in g up th e un-i t s , o r e l s e he w i l l soon be ou t f lanh-ed and cu t of f from Rome. They ge ner -a l l y i u ve l i t t l e v a lu e f o r i n va s io nsnor th of Rome. They ge ne ra ll y havel i t t l e v a l ue f o r i n v as i o ns n o r th o fRome. I would go e i t h e r way a t Rome.Advance of s o u t h e r n u n i t s mi gh t f c r cct h e Germans t o abandon Napoli and may-b e t u r n h i s f l a n k , b u t i t m i g h t a l s oleav e th e U.S. invas ion un i t s outnwn-bered beg inn ing tu rn th r ee , whichc ou ld s p e l l d i s a s t e r .

Breaking out f rom t he beachhead ont h e s ec on d o r t h i r d t u r n c a u s e s manypla yer s problems, includi ng me. Quickexpans ion th rough a smal l ho l e cou ldl e av e s e ve r a l u n i t s c u t o f f i f J e r r yco u n t e r a t t ack s an d c l o s e s i t up. Moreof te n one o f th e enemy un i t s on th es h o u l d e r o f t h e h o l e p r e s en t s an ea s yt a r g e t . I wo ul d n ot s u g g es t h i t t i n ga ny u n i t s a t l e s s t h a n 3- 1 od ds a nd i fI co u l d n o t , I would exp lo i t th e ho le ,bu t very cau t ious l y . Of ten when noh o l e e x i s t s , a s ma ll s t a c k o r s i n g l eu n i t may p r o vi d e t h e A l l i ed p l ay e r t h emeans of cr ea t i ng one. I f two suchp o s i t i o n s o ccu r o n o n e t u r n , t a k e t h e

o ne w i t h t h e h i g h e r o d ds , even i fmeans moving south in st ea d of nor thJ e r r y ' s b i g weak ness i s r ep l ac i n g l o ss e s . E a r l y i n t h e game h e can h a r d la f f o r d t o p u l l u n i t s ou t o f t h e l i n eThe ex t r a ca su al t i es you cause by goin g the wrong way may provi de anot hee x c e l l e n t t a r g e t o n t h e n e x t t u r nEven when a hi gh er odds at ta ck workta ke car e when deci ding t o make a second combat a tt a c k. Where w i l l t hu n i t s end u p a f t e r t h e a t t a ck ? Anw i l l t h e r e s u l t s b e b e t t e r i f you a ttack r a th er than s imply moving ad jacen t and fo rc i ng th e enemy t o a t t acor withdraw? I .E., can th e U.S. r i st h e p o s s i b l e l o s s ? I n m os t c a s e s , doubt i t .Thi s does not mean th a t th e U.Sp l ay e r s ho u l d p l ay ch i ck en . I f a r i sky advance through an AV h o l e o r around a f lank o r maybe th e chance foadvance af t e r second combat would cuo f f German u n i t s and s t i l l g i v e t hs u r ro u n di n g A l l i ed u n i t s a f i g h t i nch an ce t o s u r v i v e , I s ay t ak e i t . Osi de o r the o t he r may end up wi th f at a l l y c r i p p l e d u n i t s , b u t e i t h e r wath e 1I.S. s i de ge ts more r ep lacemenand shou ld r ecove r sooner than thGerman. Such a chance i s ra re , unle sth e German i s tup id , and then he de-serves t o l o s e .

A t ime w i l l come when bot h s id ehave l i ne s comple te ly acros s the penins u la . The German may s t i l l r e t r eai n f r o n t o f t h e A l l i ed p l ay e r . T akca r e t h a t t h e A l l i ed u n i t s d o n o t overex tend th e i r 1 nes . The A1 1 ep layer may f e e l th a t he can gain p lent y o f squares wi thou t an a t t ack whicco u ld co s t s t ep s . T h i s i d ea can cot h e A l l i ed p l ay e r d ea r l y . B esi dl e t t i ng t he German have two moves ts e t up a p o s i t i o n , h e ha s a t l e a s t o nt u r n f r e e o f a t t a c k s t o r e p la c e l o s seI f t h e A l l i e d p l a y e r r i s k s o n l y o nw e l l - s e le c t e d a t t a c k , h e c a n f o r c e t hGerman t o co ntin ue f a l l i n g b ac k r a t h et h an s o l i d i f y i n g h i s l i n e . He re iwhere the Al l i ed p lay er wins o r los esNEVER le av e t h e Germans al on e f o r eveone tu rn. He may even ta ke th e offens i v e

Never ha ve I se en an AVZIO gamplaye d i n which th e German could nof or m a t l e a s t o ne f o r t r e s s l i n e a nho ld f o r many tu r ns . Here i s wheth e German wins. I f the Al l ied p layecan h i t a s q u a r e any wh er e a l o n g t hl i n e s a t 3-1 o r b e t t e r , do i t Thmay be th e on ly chance fo r b reak int h e l i n e w i t ho u t a n i n v a s i o n . I f n op i c k a n u n f o r t i f i e d s p o t a n d a t t a c k ia t 1-1. Choose th e s ta ck wi th thl e a s t s t e ps i n i t , u n l e s s t h a t p o st i o n i s meaningless t o t he German defense . Avoid 2 -1 a t ta ck s un le ss yoa r e v e r y d e s p e r a t e . O f t en o n e s p o t the German l ines can force the Germant o r e t r e a t i f l o s t .Find i t Look over th e s i tu a t iofrom an unattached view. Maybe a neut r a l r e s u l t o n t h e SRT c a l l i n g f on e i th e r s i d e t o r e t r e a t w i l l l e avy o u r u n i t s n ex t t o a r o ad wh ich an

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THE GENER Lre in fo rc em en ts must come down. Maybe I

P GEt h e l o s s o f o ne s t e p w i l l in ve r t a bn- 0i t . Maybe a one square advance w i l lcu t o f f p a r t o f t h e German u n i t s b e - U~ss~rnulat~ngcause o f ad ja cen t H igh Appeniness q u a r e s . I f t wo s u ch p l ac es ex i s t ,a t t a ck i n b o t h p l aces . Su cces s i n o n-IY one of them wi l l cause th e Germant o s w ea t . T h e b i g g es t m i s t ak e t h e A ll i e d p la yer can make i s t o l e t u p t h ep r e s s u re t o r e p l a c e u n i t s w it h o nl yo n e s t ep g on e. T h es e u n i t s c an t ak emany more losses than you imagineB ut o f c o u r s e t h e e a s i e s t way f o r

Simulation is not a very dependable way ofunderstanding human behavior and should beregarded with the greatest suspicion. What asimulation tests is not alternative courses ofbehavior and outcomes in real situations but only

the Art of War

the ~ l l i ~ dl ayer t o break a foriressl i n e is w i t h an invasion ~~~~~~i~~or pescara coul d break th e cassinol i n e f a i r l y ea s i l y f accompanied by abi g push i n some coord inat ed area. ~~tif t h e German has any junk to spare heg e n e r a l l y c o v er s a l l t h e c l o s e b ea ch esF or t h i s r e a s on t h e A 1 i e d p l a y e r mu stch oo se an a r e a f a r away f ro m t h e l i n e .Try f ind i ng an ar ea f a r enough awayfro m t h e A xi s r e s e r v es t o b e s ecu r e ,ye t impor ta n t enough t o fo rce th e Ger -man t o p u l l a t l e a s t a f ew u n i t s o f fth e l in e. Roma would hu r t t he Cassinol i n e b y c u t t i n g o ff t h e m aj or r o a ds .C i t i t av ec ch i a o r G r o s se t o w ou ld b r eaka Rome l i n e beca use i t o u t f l a n k s t h ep o s i t i o n s a n d t h r e a t e n s i s o l a t i o n . HOWmuch t o s en d i n cau s es s p e c i a l p r ob -lems. Enough shou ld be sen t t o sec uret he area and cause damage t o th e Ger-man much might weaken th e f ro ntl ines enough fo r a German cou nte rat -tack Nap1es Or Otherport. l i t t l e maylose uni ts and have l i t t l e ef fec t Onth e German f ro n t .

I th in k I sho uld end wit h some corn-ment on Genova. I f some op po rt un it ypresents ansome re la t i ve ly minor un i t s which cangrab good p o s i t i o n s i n t h e h i l l s w i t h -Out i t Isolating Genevao f t e n c a us e s t h e A l l i e d p la y e r t o l o s eI f t h e German g e t s t o o f a r beh i nd h emay conc en t r a te on ho ld i ng th e Genevaand Verona areas , coun t ing on coun ter -a t t a c k s t o h o l d o n t o Ve rona t o t h eend and maybe even opening theeas t edge t o Geneva. Usually the Gen-o a G ar r i s o n u n i t s s t a y t o o c l o s e * p lu ssevera l I t a l y uni ts within l os q u a r e s t o make t h i s move p r ac t i ca l .The main i d e a of t h i s a r t i c l e issuggest that the U - S - player wastemuch time un i t s thathave taken a One loss rather thanatt ack ing . The German no t onl y mustw it hd ra w t o r e p l a c e l o s s e s , h hasver y few replacemen ts Keep t h e Pre s-su re on h im and he w i l l run down veryqu ic kl y- But be aware t h a t one messedup attack can many many issues atthe t ime Britain sg r e a t e s t g e n e r a l s p r e f e r r e d toup and at Once* then stop^up* and again' Pattonpreferred push andnever give the enemy a moment estBoth s t r a t eg ie s may work i n most cas -e s9 but I cast my for George inANZIO.

Fauber

alternative courses of behavior and outcomespossible within the framework of the assumptionsof the simulation designer. It is all an Alice-in-Wonderland world. Depending on the quality ofresearch and design it may be very like the realworld, but it is still not the real world. Theoutcomes, then, have no scientific validity andsuggestive value only in some cases.One of the least valid attempts at simulationappeared n The General Val. 8, No. 2 J.E.Pournelle's "Simulating the Art of War Part111." From the beginning we 'may justly questionwhether he is describing Napoleonic warfare as itwas or as he wished it had been. He insists that abayonet charge "generally carried everything be-fore it: IF the preparation had been sufficient."It is well that he puts "i f' in all capitals. If theenemy infantry were already shattered bylery and under pressure from the flanks, theywould give way. If there were no units availableto support them, they would stampede. Thecharge was not the moment of glory; it was justthe unfortunate tactical finale needed to effectbreakthrough. Neither was the bayonet much of akiller. David Chandler in The Campaigns ofNapoleon asserts that they were best employed atthe Pyramids when bent into fish hooks toretreive Mameluke corpses from the river forplunder3s sake.

Marshal Bugeaud described a charge where theprep,tion had not been sufficient: u ~ b ~ ~ ~1,000 yards from the English line the menbecame excited, called out to one another, andhastened their march; the column began tobecome a little confused. The English remainedquite silent . This steadiness invariably pro-duces an effect on our young soldier s.. Thecontrast was striking; in our innermost thoughtswe a11 felt the enemy was a long time in firing,and that this fire, reserved so long, would be veryunpleasant when it came. At this momentof intense excitement, the English wall shoul-dered arms; an indescribable feeling would rootmany of our men to the sp ot .. The enemy'ssteady, concentrated volleys swept our ranks;decimated, we turned round seeking to recoverour equilibrium;" then the English charged, scat-tering the grognards in all directions.one also has to demur about the pursuit of abroken enemy by cavalry causing more casualtiesthan the main combat phase. During the initialphase of disintegration the attacker's kill wouldincrease sharply, but the main point of pursuitwas to accentuate disintegration, to prevent unitsfrom reforming. Their presence was most power-ful as an inducement for soldiers to toss awaytheir muskets and packs the better to run away.Such a pursuit, however, could hardly be effecteduntil the whole army was broken and routed, anextremely rare occurrence.Pournelle's tentative rules for Advanced Water-loo also leave one with questions. His stacking

rule is inane. Armies regularly deployed 20,00men in half mile squares. At Bautzen in 18Marmont delivered a charge with his VI Corptwo divisions of the Guard and two divisions cavalry in exactly such an area. At WaterloLobau, the Guard, and Jacquinot's cavalry dision formed up in a half mile square. Marcogne4,200 man division assaulted Wellington on front of 200 yards and at a depth of 52 yards.was a dumb thing to do, but rules ought permit plausible stupidity.It is equally a mystery why Pournelle wants permit cavalry to charge artillery before thartillery get to shoot, nor why the only riposallowed is a counter-charge. Cavalry should bpermitted to charge but so as to absorb lossesplace of infantry. At Waterloo the cavalry charing the English line were pelted by case and grapuntil the moment, whereupon the gunners witdrew into the red-coat squares, and the infantcompleted the execution. When the cavalry rtreated, the gunners resumed their posts anhastened the horsemen on their way. Even unsuported artillery crushed cavalry as Senarmont's 3guns managed handily at Friedland.Section 7 about headquarters units contaicertain peculiarities, but the most glaring is givia bonus to stacks fighting in the presence of NeNey's conduct on that day indicates that anunits he influenced were led to commit multipidiocies. It would be better for the French create a mistress counter and keep Ney Charleroi with her.The supply rule is illogical. The French infatrymen customarily carried fifty cartridges otheir bodies. By the time these were used utheir muskets were so fouled that they couldnfire anyway. In a three day span the need fsupply was minimal except for the artillery.The advantage of slightly over-lapping a line too great; forming front to flank was a standa

JUST ATS THE I~ISMAR

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P GE THE GENERprocedure. For a flank attack to have its dislocat-ing effect it should deploy along a two mile lineas did D avout's decisive maneuver a t Wagram.Pournelle is justly insistent t hat th e ideal gameneeds to reward the skillful use of combinedarms, but he overstates the A-H games's derelic-tions. In th e A-H game infantry attacks oughtalways to be supported by cavalry. The difficultyis that most of the kill ing th e attacker did ininfantry engagements was the result of the artil-lery. One might perhaps subtract from the attack-ing effectiveness of units not supported byartil lery and modify the zone of control rule toneutralize at least the frontal zone of control for

infantry units not supported by artillery.After that we would have to come up with anew com bat results table , after which we wouldpum p in some other modifications. The gamewould become nothing b ut ru les with no flexibil-ity. Hum an ingenuity would be expunged. Thewinner would be he who best understood therules and conformed; the excitement of the gamewould set the formaldehyde in your veins toboiling. Certainly the contrast between this com-plexity and probably the most profound of allth e strategy games could no t be greater. Th eJapanese game of Go has only one rule. Beyondthat t he mind is free.

As it is, Waterloo is a good game. There istension between the armies because each hstrengths and weaknesses. It also has the "favoof the real event. This is not only my opinibut also the view of my favorite opponent, t"Revolution and Napoleon" historian at Sacmento State College. A little flavor is all oshould ask of a game. If we are "to hear drums roll , feel the earth . . . we should at lebe willing as the losing Napoleon to spend fyears exile on C atalina Island in penalty.R. E. Fauber6601 Moraga DriveCarmichael, Cal. 95608

French Tact i cs in 9 4by Louis J. Jerkich

French Tactics. . . is a followup on JerkichSfine article in the previous issue Vo l. 8 No. 3dealing with French Strategy in 1914. Lastmonth, Jerkich to ld you what to do. This monthh e tel ls you h ow to do i t . .In 1914 the Germans have a superiority in thenumber and strength of combat units which, ifused correctly, can break a deadlock and bringruin to the French. The latter, however, canoffset this German superiority by the use ofvarious tactics.Terrain: In defense, the most important con-sideration of the Allied Commander is how tomake the most advantageous use of terrain. It isof practical value to defend o n terrain which youcan't be forced t o leave, such as rough terrain,forests, rivers, and ridges. A fort, as long as itholds out, is valuable on any kind of terrain.Unless a square is vital to the French line andreplacements are available, care should be takennot to leave units on clear terrain surrounded byany form of non-clear terrain. Units would thushave to lose two steps when attacked successfullyby the Germans. For example, units in Belfort(with th e fo rts destroyed) or on GG-25, are veryvulnerable to loss.In addition to these factors the French mustsecure their f lanks and try to form a s short andeasily defendable a line as possible. In the eventthat the Germans take Liege or cross the Meuseinto Belgium, the French will be able to form agood defensive line from the Antwerp forts to

Brussels along the river, th en across t o the forestsquare, through Charleroi to AA-14, and thensouth to Givet. This l ine can be formed in twoturns and should be held as long as possible, eventaking a two-step loss on the square south ofBrussels to prevent a German breakthrough.The central portion of the Allied line, althoughshort, is extremely important. A breakthroughhere by the G ermans would split the Allied linein tw o and could force both flanks to withdraw aconsiderable distance in order to form a new line.The defense of the center is best done along astraight l ine extending from Givet to the squarenortheast of Longwy. French forces cannot beforced from these border squares and their linewould be both short and strong. This l ine also

allows the French to move units along theimportant railroad which parallels the Meuse. Ifthe Germ ans haven't invaded Lux emburg at leastone of the French-Luxemburg border squaresshould be held as long as possible to prevent easylateral movement along the German line.In the south there are many combinations ofdefensive lines possible .ju st don't let theGermans get around your flank.The 2 4 3 Divisions: The French 2-4-3 divisionsare very useful when used to relieve front-lineunits needing replacements. They are best usedalong portions of the line which are under heavyattac k and good use of th em as relief troops cancompletely frustrate a German assault , no matterhow massive it may be.The Belgian Army: In the event that theGermans first cross into Belgium and build upeast of the Meuse, the Belgian Army should moveforward to a line behind the Meuse betweenLiege and Namur. When the Germans finally crossthe Meuse, they will be in a position to slowdown the Germans until the French can form adefensive line.Allied Counteroffensives: When the AlliedFront is about to crack under German assaultswhat can the French player do? Retreat? Yes, ifthere is good defensive terrain behind himself andhe has the ability to hold this second line.However, in certain places a retreat by theFrench can open up new victory points to theGermans.Should he stand firm and pray that his l inewon't, indeed, be broken? Possibly, bu t thiscould lead to a German breakthrough which nosecond line could repair.Should the Allies surrender? Never AsGeneral Foch once said, "The will to conquer isthe first condition of victory." Guns of August,p. 49.)The only alternative then is to do the mostunexpecte d thing counteratta ck Counter-attacks should not, however, be premature. Thereought to be som e goal in the player's mind whenhe attacks. This goal or objective can rangethrough a gamut of reasons such as recapturingkey cities or economic squares, re-establishingoneself on good defensive terrain, halting anenemy attack, or eliminating weak enemy forces.

These last two objectives are most likely have the greatest effect in Belgium or northeFrance. Here, in the clear open terrain, it may possible to not only push back a German advanbut also, with judicious attacks, to isolate enemunits and destroy them.There are tw o critical points t o look for assignal to launch a counterattack. One is to attawhen it's least expected. There is a tendency fthe offensive player to suddenly revert to tdefensive when faced with an unexpectecounterattack . He can be temporarily throw n obalance to the point of thinking defensively forfew turns. A s udden cou nterattack may thus githe defender a breather. The oth er point to lofor is when many of tRe German "A" and "RCorps have only two steps left. A counterattacthen, even if it means taking a risk, could putnumber of enemy units d own to their last steThis will precipitate a German panic and witdrawal, enabling the French t o regain ground anhopefully destroy a few enemy units. (The loss even one "A" Corps hurts )For example, if the Germans are pressing tAllies hard on the Antwerp Brussels CharlerGivet line, an allied coun terattack could leavenumber of German units with only one step leand cause a German withdrawal. Pressing tattack, the French could ho pe to trap thGermans with their backs to the Meuse, leavino opening for retreat. The tables would bturned, indeedThe British and Belgian units are best used counterattacks. Since these forces have little no replacement rates, they are very vulnerable. counterattacks they should be combined wiFrench units, so that the French forces can takany losses, leaving the Belgian and British uniintact. These units are easy victims when lealone to hold a square.

French Artillery is also good to use in counteattacks, as is cavalry. The latter can be used nonly for cutting off the retreat of enemy unibut also for holding a square from which successful attack was made, so that the victocan advance without fear of being cut off.While the gains from counterattacks can be loagain, the German player will fall far behind htimetable and the French will buy time fexecuting their own strategy.When you win a game of 1914 you havesense of accomplishment unequaled in any othgame. So go out and accomplish somethingLouis J. Jerkich418 E. 274th StreetEuclid, Ohio 4413 2

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THE GENER L P GE 1

Decision nalysis for Wargarners

First of Two Parts)by Mathew S. Buynoski

For the hard core wargamer whose "minor" isApplie d Math ematics, Bu ynoski has just the thingto turn you on. Here is the first o f tw o parts in ashort series on decision analysis; boiled downfrom notes he too k of a quarter-length graduatecourse and applying it to wargaming. So Onwardinto modern optimization mathematics .

Wargames are really a series of interrelateddecisions of how to best apply one's resourcesagainst the enemy in the uncertain atmosphere ofenemy actions and the die. Such resource alloca-tion problems are the domain of the branch ofapplied mathematics known as decision analysis.In its fullest form, decision analysis draws fromadvanced probability and utility theories, usesmasses of computer time, and is used to solveproblems involving hundreds of millions of dollarsworth of investment decisions.We will be concerned here with the basicaspects of the discipline and apply them to

wargaming. The mathematics will be kept assimple as possible and we will stress more thebasic ideas than wizardly tricks from math books.T h e Basic Ideas

Like any discipline, this one is founded o n acertain central idea. The primary one here is thatdecision analysis is nothing more than commonsense, set dow n and codified. I t seeks to tak e thedecision process from hunches and unconsciouscalculations onto a piece of paper where we canapply logic to it. Much of what is in decisionanalysis actually occurs each time we make adecision, although we do not follow a str ictlylogical process in t he subconscious.The next basic tenet is that no matter howmuch you try with statis t ics, you can no t removethe basic uncertainty from a situation. Manypeople foo l themselves in th is regard.Basic tenet No. 3 is that a good outcome doesnot imply a good decision, nor does a gooddecision imply a good outcome. Now that soundsas i the practitioners in the field are leavingthemselves a ready excuse, but what it reallymeans is an extension of the previous tenet. Thatis, if we analyze a problem correctly and takeaccount of all the possibilities, and still Fatedecrees against us, we are not at fault. Decisionanalysis can no more remove uncertainty and theprobabili ty of bad outcomes any more thananything else; what it will do is guide us to thechoice of alternatives which gives us the bestchance of success.

Tenet No. 4 is that values can be placed o n allthe outcomes in terms of a single measure (likedollars , or combat factor) . You may balk at that,many do , but w ith imagination i t can be donea difficult chore and good mental exercise, butsolvable. We will need this ability in order tomake choices between different outcomes.Tenet No. 5 is that we believe tha t th e axiomsof prob ability theory and utility theory are valid.You can get some arguments on semiphilosophi-cal grounds here; I will avoid all that by sayingthat it works in practice very well. No bettermodel has been proposed.

The ools of the TradeA decision analysis usually consists of four

phases:1. Deterministic2 Probabilistic3 Value of information4 DecisionThe first is outlining and modeling the basicstructure of the problem: what are the alterna-tives, th e possible outcom es, the values to us ofthe outcomes, the sequence of events, and so on.We must m ake every effort here to simplify thereal s i tuation in a model without removing thebasic flavor of the problem.The second phase is where our own experienceand knowledge are mixed in; we must estimate tothe best of our knowledge how likely eachoutcome is for each choice of action. This iswhere we play General Staff for ourselves.The Information value phase is of small use inmost wargames. It might have applicability inadvanced, limited-information wargames, but notenough to merit any discussion here. It alsorequires more mathematics than I wish to gointo; those interested will have to consult thereference.Th e last phase is th e decision itself.Through this process, we will need four tools:1. Modeling a complex situation2 Value Assignment3 Probabili ty estimation4 Risk averral assessmentModeling. Our first task is to take a realsituation and condense it until only the essentialsare left. Things otherwise become bogged down

in needless minutae. For example, if we areconsidering how man y of 100 available units tocommit, we do not have to consider all 101theore t ica l ly poss ib le a l te rna t ives (0 , 1 ,2 , . 100). The structure of the problem willnormally narrow things down into fewer alterna-tives. For instance, we might commit everything,none of i t , conduct a feint (say 10 units) , or trya minor, limited offensive (50). That may exhaustall the viable alternatives without quibbling overwhether 49 is a better number than 50. Youmust do this kind of pruning as much as possiblein order to make the problem manageable. How-ever, oversimplification is to be avoided; theessential e lements of the problem must not belost. If they are, the analysis is worthless.

After modeling the alternatives, we must cosider outcomes. Each significantly different oucome of a course of action must be listeincluding those that are not too likely. Tprobability estimation will be done later, nnow.Value Assignment. When the outcomes aspecified, we must place values on them in termof a single measurement (like combat factor victory points). One usual method is to ayourself how much of your resources you wougive up in order to achieve a certain outcomAnother one is to use some intrinsic value of toutcomes if there is such. In games with victopoints, this is often a superior method. Let memphasize that it is not always easy to redueverything t o value terms, but with a litthought on what an objective really gains you, should be possible.Probability Estimation. Now we come to tpoint where our military experience and judgment is called upon. Considering the forceterrain, length of front, e tc , e tc , we must maour best estimates as to how likely each outcomis for each alternative. If their probabilities avery small , we may choose to drop some oucomes here. A caveat though, do not go "pruing" to o drastically You mu st also be as accuraas you can in your assessments, rememberinthere are no "right" and "wrong" answers heonly differences of opinion. Hopefully, you wcome up with realistic estimates of the chancfor success and failure; the validity of the whoprocess rests on it.Risk Averral Assessment. Unless you are a raanimal known as the expected-value decisiomaker, we need to go into personal risk prefeences. There is a natural tendency in all of us magnify the effect of bad outcom es, a trait callrisk averral. It is not necessarily a bad habit; tmuch will sap initiative, bu t t oo little is just bad as it leads to more frequent disasters.If someone offered you a choice between beigiven X dollars or flipping a coin with $100 fheads and $0 for tails, how large would X hato be before you become indifferent between ttwo? If yo u answered $50 (th e expected value the coin f l ip , or lottery) then you have no riaverral; if X is less than $50, you prefer to avorisk; if X is greater than $50, you prefer to tarisks. The am ount of the difference between and 50 is a measure of how much you avoid prefer risk.Such tests of a certain equivalent (X) versusrisk-containing lottery (coin flip and associatepayoffs) are how one measures his utility curvThe lottery has a different value for each of uinstead of a rock-solid, measureable real valuWhen we evaluated outcomes earlier, it wasterms of real values: com bat factors, victopoints, or whatever. Now we have a way weighting these real values in the face of ucertain lotteries, and it is the utility.To codify your risk averral, you take a seriof tests similar to the co in flip above. See Figure

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P GE THE GENER Each of the sideways V's wi th the dot at thenotch represents a lot tery, wi th the numbers atthe ends being the rewards, and the numbers onthe branches being the probabilities that that

particular branch will be selected by Fate. Thenumber to the left of the double-headed arrow isthe cqttain equivalent , th e amou nt which youwould take instead of playing the lotte ry.

Start ing out , set the ut i l i ty of 100 value uni ts(you may use another number, positive, andreplace 100 by tha t number, if you desire) at 1,and the utili ty of zero value units to zero. Thatwe can do this is assured by utili ty theory. Thereare now four (or m ore) lot teries to be done. Startou t by asking yourself w hat X make you indif-ferent to the zero-one hundred lottery@. Plotthis value X versus a utility of , as on Figure 2.Now ask what amounts Y is equivalent to azero-X lotte ry,@ , and plot that value versus autility of . Do an X-100 lot tery and plot theresult, 2 versus a utility of . To interpolatedownward, determine what negative value, W,makes a W-100 lot tery have a worth of zero toyou. Plot W versus a utili ty of minus 1. These sixpoints should be sufficient to draw a curve, fromwhich you can read off the ut i l ity o n the vert icalscale, of any number of value units on thehorizontal scale. See Figure 2.Further points can be computed by taking anytwo known points bracket ing the desi red point ,set t ing up a lot tery likes,@, or @ , and p lo tt ingthe certain equivalent you think the lottery isworth versus a utili ty value equal to the averageof the two ut i l i t ies of the known points. Toextend the range, use a lottery like@, with oneknown point at the end of the range, and oneinside the range. Then ask yourself what valuemakes you indifferent between a certain equiv-alent of the end-range point and a lot tery of theinside-range point and the unknown point. Theutility U of the new point is equal to:u = 2(Uep %UiP)where Uep is the utili ty of the end-range point,

and UiD is the utili ty of t he inside-range point.Let it be noted that utili ty preferences (thecurve in Fig. 2) can change with time. This onerepresents a normal situation curve. If you'redesperate, things can change your preferences.That 's human nature. The most common curve-shape is bulging slightly upward, which indicatessome risk averral. If it sags in the middle, you fillinside straights. If it is a straight line, you are anexpected-value decision-maker, totally indifferentto risk.All our tools being in hand now, we wouldnormally proceed to the information value phase

of decision analysis. But since this is marginallyuseful to wargamers, we'll skip it and proceed tothe fianl phase, the decision.The alternatives and outcomes can be repre-sented as a tree like Figure 3, where:1. Th e bo x represents a decision point, an dbranches are alternatives.2. Th e do ts represent lotteries, and th ebranches from them represent outcomes. Th enumbers on these branch es represent probabilitiesfrom the probability estimation phase. The num-bers at the tips of the tree are the values of theoutcomes in our measurement of combat factorsor whatever.3. The Roman numerals represent a numberingof alternatives bookkeeping.

First, we convert all the lotteries into utili t iesby looking up the utili ty of each value andreplacing the value by the corresponding utility.Then we reduce each lot tery we can, those wi thno further dots or boxes beyond, to singlenumbers by summing the products of the ut i l i tyat the end of a branch times the probability onthe branch. The numbers so obtained are placedwhere the dots were, see Figure 4 stage I. Wethen work backwards through the tree. At eachbox point (decision), when each alternative has anumber at the end of i t , choose the branch wi th

Acknowledgement and ReferenceAll of the ideas in this article are gleaned fromthe notes of Dr. R.A. Howard's graduate cours

at Stanford University on decision analysis. Fothose further interested, an excellent place tlook is Vol. 4 of Systems Science and Cybernetics a journal of the I.E .E.E. This issue ientirely devo ted t o decision analysis.Mathew S. Buynoski136 BrentwoodSan Francisco, California 94127

the highest number ; this represents the choicethat gives us the best overall chances. See Figure In the final installment P artII Autho4, stage I and the second box point. This decision Buynoski renders an example of application ois made and the tree reduced to stage 11. When a the abo ve to a hypothetical bat tlefield situationtree reaches stage 11, and we pick the highest Space limitat ions preclude us from printing i t iutility branch, all decisions are made and we are this issue make sure you keep this issue handdone. for use with the Part I1 installment.

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THE GENER L P GE

Indispensablefor an istorianby J E. Po urnelle, Ph.D.

LUFTWAFF E is nearly indispensable for any-one wh o wants to understand t he air war overGermany, design an air war game, or simply havea good time fighting the world's most complexair campaign over again. It's quite playable andboth sides have a good chance if handled intelli-gently. Among them , Zocchi, Avalon Hill, andVercammen have designed a winner. In particular,Zocchi has brought the enormous mass of book-keeping into some kind of control, although, likeBattle of Britain, the game is better played withseveral persons per side; this is going to beinevitable when you get that many units on aboard, each with different characteristics.The game isn 't perfect, of course; but thecritiques I offer below should be read, keeping inmind the paragraph above. I like LUFTWAFFEand heartily recommend it to air war buffs.The problem with the game is that it reallydoesn't allow any experim ents with air warstrategies. T he players, particularly t he Alliedplayer, is stuck with the misconceptions of thetime. This may produce historical realism, AvalonHill's for te but it's frustrating to have game aftergame build strategic mistakes int o its rule struc-ture. This is particularly true of games in whichair warfare is either the principal or an importantfactor.The greatest myth of World War I is that"strategic bombing" was effective. It wasn't.Neither t he German attacks on Britain nor theU.S. attacks on German industry had much of aneffect on the outco me of the war; in fact, i t canbe argued that air attacks often increased warproduction, and they certainly had an effect onGerman morale: Goebbles figured tha t U.S.attacks on civilian populations were worth severalpanzer divisions.After Hamburg was ruthlessly destroy ed, manyworkers who had formerly been in nonessentialindustries went to work in war plants; munitionsand war materiel production in the area increasedas a direct result of the raid. Furthermore,according to the Strategic Bombing Survey madeby USAAF (United States Army Air Force) afterthe war, bombing of factories had nothing likethe effect the AAF generals thought i t had;buildings were knocked do wn, b ut t he toolsremained largely undamaged, while German re-covery capabilities were much greater than weimagined. It is strange that the similar experiencesof th e English didn't tip us off ; bu t we sufferedfrom believing our own propaganda about Ger-man morale and t he "inefficiency" of NationalSocialism.

As Zocchi's tables and the Strategic BombingSurvey show, German war production increasedsteadily from 1939 through 1 944 ; so did ammu-nition, weapons, armor, artillery, and naval con-struction. Our "strategic bombing" was a costlyfailure, as well as a moral outrage to our ownChristian heritage. With atomic bombs it may bepossible although morally ourtageous to win warsby killing helpless civilians atom ic weapon s cando it efficiently and in large numbers bu t withWWII technology it just wasn't possible.

Finally, in 1944, the operations researchpeople forced the USAAF and RAF BomberCommand to concentrate on worthwhile targets:transportation and oil. The effect was dramatic.Coal deliveries to factories in Bavaria fell by 50%before November. The interdicted Ruhr fieldspiled coal in larger and larger masses, while whatcoal that got ou t was subject to confiscation bythe railroad to supply locomotive requirements.Th e same was true of oil and gas; in June,1944, oil became a high priority target, andbefore September aviation petrol had fallen from175,000 tons/m onth to 5,000, while oil refineryoutp ut w ent from 3 16,000 tons/month in May to17,000 in September.The interdiction of transport and oil nearlycrippled the Reich. All the coun tless tons ofbombs rained down on civilians in cities had littleeffect. Yet, LUFTW AFFE make s victory con-tingent on blasting cities "with aircra ft factories"or "destroying" such cities by hitting them witha single raid. The optional rules make more sense.Of course, in the real world the Allies stub-bornly held to city busting as a winning tacticuntil quite late in the day. Faulty intelligencecoupled with over-enthusiastic reports of damagedone to the enemy made the generals all toowilling to listen to politicians who curried publicfavor with their accounts of "paying t he Hunsback in kind." Th e American people, after all,believe war t o be so evil that anyo ne who forcesus into it must be some sort of monster, not fi tto l ive on the same earth with us; what did wecare about German civilians. The fact that ourPresident had deliberately maneuvered us into awar he was elected t o keep us ou t of ("Again andagain I say that no t on e American boy is going todie on foreign soil") w asn't generally known ; atleast, not then.

The worst of the tragedy was that about 35%of the U.S. w ar effor t, and 60% of the British,was devoted to aircraft production, most ofwhich was wasted in "strategic bombing." Hadthe wasted effort gone into ground armies, ships,and battlefield aircraft the war might well haveended at least a year sooner. In any event Europewould no t have been redu ced to post-war beg-gary.Thus, Zocchi's game certainly reflects "real-ities" as seen by the strategists of the time. Wethought we were winning by bombing cities, evenif, as it turn s out , we should have been bet ter offto have left the aircraft at home, closed thefactories, and turned the productive forces tosomethin g else.The next fault of the game is in the bombingof bases. Again, I don't see quite what could havebeen do ne abou t i t . If we break up the bombercounters into smaller units , we couldn't play thegame; if we don't, attac ks on bases make nosense because there simply aren't enough bomberst o take out the bases in a wide area. Yet, thedestruction of enemy air bases is not onlyallowable under the laws of war (as we acceptedthem prior to throwing them out for "strategic"bombing ) bu t of great military value. Th e "roll-

up" attac k, in which the first waves go in to blanear bases, next wave deeper bases, etc. undeep penetration has been achieved is an extremly valuable kind of attack, while systemadestruction of all of an enemy's air bases togethwith his means of supplying them, can achieve asupremacy. It's true th at Europe of the timprobably had too many bases for this to hasucceeded: we don't know, since although tstrategy was ad vocated by certain air generalswas never adopted. Incidentally, it is nodefinitely known that had the Luftwaffe cotinued this strategy in the Battle of Britainstead of abandon ing it f or th e relatively uselecity raids and "strategic" attac ks on factorieEngland would have been knocked out of twar.The Zocchi rules presently allow a base to knocked out for the rest of the quarter bombed ; that 's probably no t enough, given thwe can have only one raid per quarter. I'm narguing that cratered runways can't be repaired that t ime, but that if you are attempting thkind of air war you'll run th e raids mofrequently.Air suprema cy is defined as "being able to fwhere you will, while the enemy is unable to fat all." To get it, you have to kill his air forcand y ou can't do that in the air , at least not veprofitably. You have to get i t o n the grouneither by destroying aircraft on bases, knockinout the bases, or denying him the fuel and othessentials required to op erate his planes. Onyou've done that, as the Israelis did to tEgyptians in the Six Day War, the rest is easy.

In other words, my crit ique of LUFTWAFFis concerned with the victory criteria and thorules which build the historical mistakes of WWinto the games; I w ouldn't l ike for our future astrategists who may be playing LUFTWAFFE make t he same m istakes again. As for the rest the game, it's excellent. I'm truly amazed at thwork that has gone into the air combat rules, tboard, target lists, aircraft capability simulationand all the rest of it. The quality of the gamequipment is also high, although I personally withat economics didn't dictate that AH use t"bookcase" format; the order of battle chahave to be folded, there are more folds in thboards, and it's just harder t o get everything bain the bo x witho ut mixing it all up. And, to toit off, just before AH went t o matchbox I weto the trouble of designing a whole shelf systeto hold the older sized boxesFor the real air war nuts, when you buLUFTWAFFE get an extra set of counters ansome cardboard to mark off into turn counterthat way you can keep track of the number oturns each unit has left in the air and not have employ the artificial rules which LUFTWAFFincludes in ord er to make the game playable. Th"turns to fly" problem gets particularly stickwhen the G erman player is staging his aircraft intercept a major raid, and a heavy cardboard made mine of plywood, but then I 'm a REAL awar nut) status board along with an extra set game pieces makes it all a lot easier.LUFTWAFFE isn't perfect; but so much wohas been done that it's indispensable for thowh o want to design air war in Europe games; anuntil the perfect game comes along sometime early 1994, I recommend that you get and plLUFTW AFFE . You'll like it if you like air wa

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Welcome to the first annual traditional Xmasgiftgiving recommendations on wargaming litera-ture.I t is quite possible that many of you havebeen unable to think of what to give your cousin,or Uncle Ned, or yourself for that matter. Asubscription to one or more of the periodicals weare about to describe might be a wise solution. Inalphabetical order, we'll begin with t he AHIKSKOMMANDUER, the official publication of theAvalon Hill International Kriegspiel Society.While basically a house-organ type, the societyhas much to offer. Especially since you must be amember to get anything worthwhile from itsmagazine.We feel that membership alone is very worth-while. I t is one of the few such societies made upsolely of mature individuals (we believe the 25and older restriction has been lifted) who playhistorical simulation map games by mail. Estab-lished in 1966 by adults who were tired o f easy.immature, sporadic, andlor disappearing oppo-nents. Ahiks exists to facilitate playing-by-mailand to minimize encounters with undesirable orunreliable opponents. The society has membersscattered throughout the globe. Nonmembers maysubscribe to the KOMMANDEUR at the rate of$214 issues from Editor Bob Johnson, P.O.Box134, Whippany, N.J. 07981. And as the case withmany wargame groups, there is at least one sisterpublication, AHIKS WEST available from TedHolcombe. Pacific Region Editor. 10012 ValleyBlvd. Apt. 38 El Monte. Cal. 91731. AHIKSWEST is not intended for nonmember distr ibu-tion but special arrangements can be made withits editor.

Typical of the newsletter a small club distrib-utes is BATTLE FLAG. Admittedly poor inphysical quality, it does list source informationfor both historical data and wargame supplies(such as hex sheets, catalogs, miniatures, etc.)BATTLE FLAG typifies what a small, inex-pensive magazine should be like. T ry a singleissue first. Write Golden Hegemony WargamingClub, 406Crockett Avenue, Philadelphia. Miss.39350. No price given.

Will there be another DER NEUE ANGREI-FER since its editor Mark Jumper is rumored tohave turned-off of wargaming? a shame becausethe last issue we received was well edited. Itscontributors listed impressive names, making it aworthwhile publication for the true sophisticatein wargaming. While it is the official publicationof New Aggressor, it is far from being a house-organ. The MayJune issue carried absolutelynothing of a political nature. I t did, however.carry the false rumor that we are planning todiscontinue Stalingrad. DER NEUE ANGREIFERis published bimonthly at 22 Williamsburg Road,St. Louis, Missouri 63141. Its printer, OliverWischmeyer happens to edit another magazine,EUROPE'44, which we have reen but don' thappen to have review copies at present. We areonly tol d that as a specialty magazine it is amongthe best. When you send in your I-year subscrip-tion for DER NEUE ANGREIFER ($2.50 wl3rdclass. $3.50 wl ls t class mailing) also ask aboutEUROPE '44.

Now we come to one of the giants. TheINTERNATIONAL WARGAMER is the 60-cent,monthly magazine of the IFW. Averaging 22pages per issue, i t is offse t reproduced withphotos. The top literary talent in the wargamingworld contribute to the pages of a magazine thatis quite broad in wargaming scope. Much space isdevoted to miniatures and 3- 0 games. I t alsocarries paid advertisements from professionalpeople and retail shops. The IFW is one of severalorganizations sanctioned by Avalon Hill to par-ticipate in Operation Contact, a referral pro-gram recently initiated. With members of the IFWvirtua lly in every geographic region in the U.S.,one of the services offered by the IFW is that ofpersonal contact between a regional member anda novice seeking help i n p laying wargames. This isa must get for the serious aficionado. John P.Bobek is the edit or. Subscription is $6.00lyear.But it may be more advantageous to become anIFW member for $7.00lyear and get the magazineplus all the literary supplements plus certainbenefits derived from membership itself. For this,write to Lenard Lakofka, 1806 N. RichmondStreet, Chicago, 111 60647.

PANZERFAUST is another one of thosediamonds-in-the-literary-rough. Editor DonaldGreenwood has that knack o f selecting theright material. Unti l recently, it wasn't wen aprofessionally p rinted magazine (it has just goneoffset) yet continued to rate the highest kudos

SOLUTION TO CONTEST NO. 45 involvedbi t of complex leapfrogging in order m obtenough auto-victories so that at the end of tcombat c or ti on of the turn, Red units a'I adjacent t o the cities (or captured them). T

from wargame fanatics. Its pages contain noclubpositio n papers nor is i t opinionated oneway or the other. This could be good and bad; itseems many commercial magazines thr ive oncontroversy. Apparently PANZERFAUST is soinherently good that it doesn't need controversy.Greenwood appears to insist on factual analysis inhis magazine philosophy. We say, try it you'llli-i-ike it. Greenwood unfortunately takes adilatory v iew of the financia l end; issue No. 48neglected to include its cost or mailing address.Try 124 Warren Street, Sayre, Pa. 18840 forcomplete details.

Probably the most prolifi