general management-sample qp
TRANSCRIPT
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Shrijani Education Foundation’s Govt. Regd No. GBBSD/234
National Academy of Management Studies
ISO 9001: 2008 certified first international B School
MARKS : 80 COURSE :
N. B.: 1) Attempt any Four Questions
2) All questions carries equal marks
Case: 1
TRI – STATE TELEPHONE
John Godwin, Chief executive of Tri – State Telephone, leaned back in his chair and
looked at the ceiling. How was he ever going to get out of this mess? At last night’s
public hearing. 150 angry customers had marched in to protest Tri – State’s latest
rate request. After the rancorous shouting was over and the acrimonious signs put
away, the protesters had presented state regulators with some sophisticated
economic analyses in support of their case. Additionally, there were a number of
emotional appeals from elderly customers who regarded phone service as their
lifeline to the outside world.
Tri – State Telephone operated in three states and had sales of over $3 billion.
During the last five years, the company had experienced a tremendous amount of
change. In 1984, the AT & T divestiture sent shock waves throughout the industry,
and Tri-State Telephone had felt the effects, as pricing for long distance telephone
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service changed dramatically. The Federal Communications Commission instituted
a charge to the effect that customers should have “access” to long – distance
companies whether or not they were in the habit of making long distance calls.
Consumer groups, including the Consumer Federation of America and the Congress
of Consumer Organizations, had joined the protest, increasing their attention on the
industry and intervening in regulatory proceedings wherever possible. The FCC
was considering deregulating as much of the industry as possible, and congress was
looking over the commissioner’s shoulder. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice
and Judge Harold Greene both of whom were responsible for monitoring the AT & T
divestiture) continued to argue about what business companies like Tri – State
should be engaged in.
In addition, technology was changing rapidly. Cellular telephones, primarily
used in cars, were now hand-held and could be substituted for standard phones.
Digital technology was going forward, leading to lower casts and requiring
companies like Tri – state to invest to keep up with the state of the art. Meanwhile,
rate increases negotiated during the inflationary 1970s were keeping earnings
higher than regulators would authorize. New “Intelligent” terminals and software
developments gave rise to new uses for the phone network (such as using the phone
for an a arm system), but as long as customers paid one flat fee, the phone company
could not benefit from these new services.
Godwin’s company has recently proposed a new pricing system whereby
users of local telephone services would simply pay for what they used rather than a
monthly flat fee. All of the senior managers were convinced that the plan was fairer,
even though some groups who used the phone with netable frequency (like real
estate agents) would pay more. It would give the company an incentive to bring
new services to their customers, and customers would be able to choose which ones
to buy. None of them had anticipated the hue and cry from the very customers who
would save money under the new plan. For instance, Godwin’s studies showed that
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the elderly were very light users of local service and could save as much as 20
percent under the new plan.
After the debacle at the hearing the previous night, Godwin was unsure how
to proceed. If he backed off the new pricing plan, he would have to find a different
way to meet the challenges of the future – may be even different businesses to
augment company income. Alternatively, the company could not stand the negative
press from a protracted battle, even though Godwin thought that the regulators
were favorably disposed toward his plan. In fact, Godwin himself believed the
company should help its customers rather than fight with them.
Questions:
1. Who are the stakeholders in this case?
2. Which stakeholders are most important?
3. What are the critical trends in Tri – State’s environment?
4. Why do you think Tri – State’s customers are so upset?
5. What should John Godwin do?
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CASE NO. 2
FRESH IDEAS AT FRESH FIELDS
Fresh Fields may be a supermarket, but what it’s super at selling is its image: “Good
for you foods.”
A New Age grocery store, Fresh Fields falls somewhere between a health food
store and a traditional supermarket. It is not merely a health food store, because it
carries a wider variety of foods including fresh pasta, baked goods, and seafood and
deli selections. What distinguishes Fresh Fields from supermarkets lies in what is
absent from the shelves, rather than what is present, for Fresh Fields shoppers will
not find foods containing lots of preservatives and artificial flavorings, such as Jell –
O and Oreos, that they can purchase at other supermarkets. What Fresh Fields
offers is “ organic and conventional produce, meats, seafood, dairy products, baked
goods from an in – store bakery, deli items gourmet and vegetarian prepared foods,
a wide array of cheese, a full grocery department, an extensive selection of
supplements, skin enriching cosmetics and natural health care products and
environmentally friendly household goods.”
The arrival of Fresh Fields coincides with that of the New Age, health –
conscious trend of the 1990s, and the company has not hesitated in taking
advantage of consumers’ new whopping preferences resulting from the trend.
According to a 1992 survey by Health Focus, a Pennsylvania – based research firm,
90 percent of shoppers say that health has become a factor in determining the food
they buy. This perhaps accounts for why many Americans are willing to pay up to
20 percent more for natural foods. Actually, the Fresh Fields premium tends to
hover closer to 5 percent, and when in season, Fresh Field’s locally grown organic
produce can even cost less than produce sold at other supermarkets.
A team of entrepreneurs began Fresh Fields in 1991. The team included 33
year old Mark Ordan, former Goldman Sachs investment banker as CEO and
President, 75 years Old Leo Kahn, founder of Staples, the prosperous office – supply
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sores, as chairman and 44 year old Jack Murphy, former manager of the Heartland
supermarket chain in New England, as Chief operating officer.
Within the first 19 months, five Fresh Fields locations opened in Maryland
and Virginia. Expanding into Pennsylvania and Illinois, by mid – 1994 Fresh Fields
had opened a total of 14 stores in the four states, with more in the planning stages.
Much of Fresh Field’s success can be attributed to the fact that the company
offers only the freshest produce, often from local growers. The company screens
growers to find those who use natural methods of pest management and apply the
least amount of agricultural chemicals. In addition, Fresh Fields seeks meat and
poultry from farms, not factories, to avoid the growth – promoting drugs often used.
Fresh Fields also makes an effort to get to know the people who catch the seafood,
and seeks out fish caught in deep, clean waters, not from coastal waters threatened
by pollution.
According to Kahn, though, the key to Fresh Field’s success lies in pleasing the
customer. “Everybody says the same things please the customer – but while
everybody says it, not too many practice it. The customer is smarter than all of us.
Here we’re building an organization that zeroes in and keeps customer satisfaction
in mind.”
Instilled in Fresh Fields is a warm, friendly caring culture that begins with
Kahn and travels through to all stakeholders: employees, suppliers, customers,
community members. Whereas at other stores, such as Wal – Mart, there is a single,
symbolic greeter by the door, every employee at Fresh Field is a sort of “greeter”,
and he or she looks up, smiles and says “hello” to shoppers as they pass by. Within
the company, there are no employees, there are only “associates” many of whom
Kahn knows by name.
Much of what Fresh Fields is about is relationship building. The warm
relationship between the company and associates lies at the heart. From there,
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associates build relationship with suppliers to add the personal touch that is
integral to the Fresh Fields quality image.
As shoppers walk through the stores, numerous samples are offered.
“Originally, I bought organic produce and spent $25 to $30 every week or two.” Says
Merri Mukai, a homemaker in Annandale, Virginia. “Then I tried the baked goods
and upped my spending by $60. Now I’m buying meats and eyeing the fish. They’ve
definitely got me hooked.”
Says Fresh Fields, “We guarantee your satisfaction unconditionally. You can
consider our guarantee as an opportunity to be adventurous and to try new
products, without risk. If for any reason you are less than completely satisfied with
something you purchase at Fresh Fields, we will cheerfully offer you a full refund.”
Questions:
1. What economic and social factors should Fresh Fields managers watch?
2. Suppose you manage a local supermarket and Fresh Fields comes to
town. How would you reinvent your organization to meet the challenges
posed by Fresh Fields?
Case: 3
RESPONDING TO ALLEGATIONS OF RACISM :
FLAGSTAR AND THE PLEDG
The 1990 s have witnessed an increased emphasis on valuing diversity. With both
the marketplace and the workforce becoming more and more diverse, many
managers have redesigned their company’s cultures to reflect and encourage
multiculturalism. Changing a company’s culture, however, is often more difficult
than managers might first believe. At Denny”s for example, promoting
multiculturalism required a reworking of its corporate culture from top to bottom.
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In the early 1990s, Denny’s found itself the target of numerous allegations of
racism, by both customers and employees. Black customers asserted that they were
not receiving the same treatment at Denny’s as white customers. Some complained
that they were either forced to wait for their food longer than white customers or
denied service entirely, others said that they were forced to pre-pay for their meals
while white customers in the restaurant were not. There were also allegations that
Denny’s restaurants would close if there were too many black customers. In
addition, Denny’s was accused of discriminatory hiring practices as well as
preventing blacks and other minorities from reaching management and franchise
positions. None of this garnered much attention, however, until a suit was filed on
March 24, 1993, by a group of minority customers in San Jose, California, who made
the all – too – familiar allegation that Denny’s had required cover charges and pre-
payment of meals from minority customers, but not from white customers.
In response to these charges, Denny’s parent company, Flagstar, formally
apologized to the customers, and Flagstar CEO Jerry Richardson dropped the cover
charge and pre-payment policies and explained that they had been intended to
prevent late night “ dine – and – dash” theft and that any discriminatory
implementation of them was in direct violation of corporate policies. Richardson
admitted, however, that he had been unaware that the cover charge and pre-
payment policies even existed within the company. Furthermore, Richardson began
talks with civil rights groups such as the NAACP. Flagstar also signed a consent
decree issued by the Justice Department that required spot testing of Denny’s
restaurants for discriminatory practices as well as an anti-discrimination training
program for all Denny’s staffers. “Our company does not tolerate discrimination of
any kind,” Richardson assured all, and his actions seemed to support his words.
Then, on May 24, 1993, six black Secret Service agents filed suit against
Denny’s for allegedly having denied them service at a Denny’s in Annapolis,
Maryland. The six men claimed that while they received deliberately slow service,
their white counter parts were served in a timely fashion. “Hearing the allegations
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made yesterday by Six African – American Secret Service agents on national
television that they were not treated fairly at Denny’s was a painful experience for
our company,” Richardson admitted.
The highly publicized suit served as a catalyst that set off a whirlwind of
changes throughout Flagstar. In a late May Richardson issued an internal memo
that marked the beginning of Richardson’s pledge to change. “I am distressed that
some people in our company haven’t gotten the message that we will not tolerate
unfair treatment of customers,” he wrote. “ The past year has been a trying
experience, particularly for many of our African – American employees who are
embarrassed by what happened. This is my personal pledge to them to restore their
pride in Denny’s.
Richardson stopped promising change and started creating it. On July 1,
1993, Flagstar reached an historic agreement with the NAACP. The agreement,
which was the most far-reaching arrangement the civil – rights organization had
ever signed, represented a breakthrough in relations between minorities and
businesses. The plan targeted several specific problem areas within Flagstar. For
example, of Flagstar’s more than 120,000 workers, 20 percent were black, but only
4.4. Percent of its managers were black. Under the agreement, at least 12 percent of
Flagstar’s managers will be black by the 2000. The company also wanted to
increase the number of black-owned franchises; only one of Denny’s 405 franchises
was owned by a black person as of 1993, but Flagstar planned to have at least 53
black-owned franchises by 1997. Flagstar also agreed to direct more marketing
funds toward minority advertising and to begin purchasing more goods and services
from minority – owned businesses. In addition, Flagstar promised to appoint at
least one minority to its board of directors. In the entire plan will direct more than
one billion dollars in jobs and economic benefits to minority workers and
companies by the year 2000.
Richardson also undertook efforts to restore Denny”s reputation as well as
his own. At the forefront of his efforts was “The Pledge”. “The Pledge” was the
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name given to a 60 – second TV spot, which aired in 41 television markets and on
the Black Entertainment Television network during a two-week period in June
1993. In it, Jerry Richardson and a representative sample of Flagstar’s 46,000
employees endorsed a solemn pledge to treat customers with “respect, diginity, and
fairness.” “The whole idea for the ‘pledge’ started with our desire to express
support for our own employees.” Explained David Hurwitt, Flagstar’s senior vice
president of marketing. “These people have been very much under the gun. We
chose television for this special campaign because we felt it was important to show
people exactly who the Denny’s employees are”. Overall, response to “The Pledge”
was favorable. “Our phone has been ringing off the hook since Denny’s aired this
ad,” said W. Gregory Wims, president of the NAACP in Rockville, Maryland, the
largest branch in the Washington, D.C.area. “About 90 percent of our members
approve of the commercials and the steps Denny’s has been taking to improve
relations with people of color.
Experience, however, had taught Flagstar that mere policy statements do
little good in the absence of training and monitoring. With this in mind, Flagstar
reaffirmed its commitment to its agreement with the Department of Justice by
steping up its multicultural training programs and agreeing to allow the NAACP to
conduct its own inspection of Denny’s restaurants. Denny’s also set up a hot line for
employees to use to report possible instances of discrimination. In addition,
Flagstar made significant management changes during the summer of 1993 by
installing three executives considered particularly sensitive to diversity in the
workplace: Norman Hill, Joe Russell, and Ron Petty. Russell was appointed head of
the diversity training program, and Hill came on board to oversee field hiring. “
There are companies that bury their heads in the sand and say, I’m going to conduct
my business the same way I’ve always conducted my business,” said Petty. “ And
then there are enlightened companies that say, “There are opportunities outside of
the way we’ve normally done business.”
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The steps taken by Flagstar have been significant, not only because of the
model the company has set for other companies, but also because of Flagstar’s own
holdings, including 530 Hardee’s fast food units, 1,400 Denny’s family restaurants,
200 Quincy’s steak houses, 120 El Pollo Loco outlets and more than 2,000 Canteen
Corp. Food and Recreation Service accounts. The community’s response to the
allegations against Denny’s confirm that multiculturalism can no longer be ignored.
Questions :
1. How would you describe the organizational culture at Flagstar ?
2. How does Flagstar deal with diversity?
3. What challenges could Flagstar face in its near future?
Case: 4
DISNEY’S DESIGN
The Walt Disney Company is heralded as the world’s largest entertainment
company. It has earned this astounding reputation through tight control over the
entire operation : control over the open – ended brainstorming that takes place 24
hours a day ; control over the engineers who construct the fabulous theme – park
rides; control over the animators who create and design beloved characters and
adventurous scenarios ; and control over the talent that brings the many concepts
and characters to life. Although control pervades the company, it is not too strong a
grip. Employees in each department are well aware of their objectives and the
parameters established to meet those objectives. But in conjunction with the pre-
determined responsibilities, managers at Disney encourage independent and
innovative thinking.
People at the company have adopted the phrase “Dream as a Team” as a
reminder that whimsical thoughts, adventurous ideas, and all – out dreaming are at
the core of the company philosophy. The over all control over each department is
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tempered by this concept. Disney managers strive to empower their employees by
leaving room for their creative juices to flow. In fact, managers at Disney do more
than encourage innovation. They demand it. Projects assigned to the staff “
imaginers” seem impossible at first glance. At Disney, doing the seemingly
impossible is part of what innovation means. Teams of imaginers gather together
in a brainstorming session known as the “Blue Sky” phase. Under the “Blue Sky”, an
uninhibited exchange of wild, ludicrous, outrageous ideas, both “ good” and “ bad”,
continues until solutions are found and the impossible is done. By demanding so
much of their employees, Disney managers effectively drive their employees to be
creative.
Current Disney leader Michael Eisner has established the “Dream as a Team”
concept. Eisner realized that managers at Disney needed to let their employees
brainstorm and create with support. As Disney president Frank Weds says, “If a
good idea is there, you know it, you feel it, you do it, no matter where it comes
from.”
Questions :
1. What environmental factors influenced management style at Disney ?
2. What kind(s) of organizational structure seem to be consistent with
“Dream as a Team” ?
3. How and where might the informal organization be a real asset at
Disney ?
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Case: 5
“THAT’S NOT MY JOB” – LEARNING DELEGATION AT CIN-MADE
When Robert Frey purchased Cin – Made in 1984, the company was near ruin. The
Cincinnati, Ohi-based manufacturer of paper packaging had not altered its product
line in 20 years. Labor costs had hit the ceiling, while profits were falling through
the floor. A solid quarter of the company’s shipments were late and absenteeism
was high. Management and workers were at each other’s throats.
Ten years later, Cin – Made is producing a new assortment of highly
differentiated composite cans, and pre-tax profits have increased more than five
times. The Cin – Made workforce is both flexible and deeply committed to the
success of the company. On-time delivery of products has reached 98 percent, and
absenteeism has virtually disappeared. There are even plans to form two spin – off
companies to be owned and operated by Cin-Made employees. In fact, at the one
day “Future of the American Workforce” conference held in July 1993, Cin-Made was
recognized by President Clinton as one of the best – run companies in the United
States.
“ How did we achieve this startling turnaround ?” mused Frey. “Employee
empowerment is one part of the answer. Profit sharing is another.”
In the late spring of 1986, relations between management and labor had
reached rock bottom. Having recently suffered a pay cut, employees at Cin- Made
came to work each day, performed the duties required of their particular positions,
and returned home-nothing more. Frey could see that his company was suffering.
“To survive we needed to stop being worthy adversaries and start being worthy
partners,” he realized. Toward this end, Frey decided to call a meeting with the
union. He offered to restore worker pay to its previous level by the end of the year.
On top of that, he offered something no one expected : a 15 percent share of Cin-
Made’s pre-tax profits. “ I do not choose to own a company that has an adversarial
relationship with its employees.” Frey proclaimed at the meeting. He therefore
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proposed a new arrangement that would encourage a collaborative employee-
management relationship “Employee participation will play an essential role in
management.”
Managers within the company were among the first people to oppose Frey’s
new idea of employee involvement. “My three managers felt they were paid to be
worthy adversaries of the unions.” Frey recalled. It’s what they’d been trained for.
It’s what made them good managers. Moreover, they were not used to participation
in any form, certainly not in decision making.” The workers also resisted the idea of
extending themselves beyond the written requirements of their jobs. “ (Employees)
wanted generous wages and benefits, of course, but they did not want to take
responsibility for anything more than doing their own jobs the way they had always
done them,” Frey noted. Employees were therefore skeptical of Frey’s overtures
toward “employee participation.” “We thought he was trying to rip us off and shaft
us,” explained Ocelia Williams, one of many Cin-Made employees who distrusted
Frey’s plans.
Frey, however, did not give up, and he eventually convinced the union to
agree to his terms. “ I wouldn’t take no for an answer,” he asserted. “Once I had
made my two grand pronouncements, I was determined to press ahead and make
them come true.” But still ahead lay the considerable challenge of convincing
employees to take charge :
I made people meet with me, then instead
Of telling them what to do, I asked them.
They resisted.
“ How can we cut the waste on his run ?” I’d
say, or “How are we going to allocate the
overtime on this order ?”
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“That’s not my job,” they’d say.
“But I need your input,” I’d say. “How in the
World can we have participative management
If you won’t participate?
“I don’t know,” they’d say. “Because that’s
not my job either. That’s your job. ?”
Gradually, Frey made progress. Managers began sharing more information
with employees. Frey was able slowly to expand the responsibilities workers would
carry. Managers who were unable to work with employees left, and union relations
began to improve. Empowerment began to happen. By 1993, Cin Made employees
were taking responsibility for numerous tasks. Williams, for example, used to
operate a tin-slitting machine on the company’s factory floor. She still runs that
same machine, but now is also responsible for ordering almost $ 100,000 in
supplies.
Williams is just one example of how job roles and duties have been redefined
throughout Cin-Made. Joyce Bell, president of the local union, still runs the punch
press she always has, but now also serves as Cin- Made’s corporate safety director.
The company’s scheduling team, composed of one manager and five lead workers
from various plant areas, is charged with setting hours, designating layoffs, and
deciding when temporary help is needed. The hiring review team, staffed by three
hourly employees and two managers, is responsible for interviewing applicants and
deciding whom to hire. An employee committee performs both short – and long –
term planning of labor, materials, equipment, production runs, packing, and
delivery. Employees even meet daily in order to set their own production schedules.
“We empower employees to make decisions, not just have input,” Frey remarked. “I
just coach.”
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Under Frey’s new management regime, company secrets have virtually
disappeared. All Cin-Made employees, from entry-level employees all the way to the
top, take part in running the company. In fact, Frey has delegated so much of the
company’s operations to its workers that he now feels little in the dark. “I now know
very little about what’s going on, on a day-to-day basis,” he confessed.
At Cin-Made, empowerment and delegation are more than mere buzzwords;
they are the way of doing business – good business. “We, as workers, have a lot of
opportunities,” said Williams. “If we want to take leadership, it’s offered to us.”
Questions:
1. How were principles of delegation and decentralization incorporated
into Cine – Made operations?
2. What are the sources and uses of power at Cin – Made?
3. What were some of the barriers to delegation and empowerment at Cin
–Made?
4. What lessons about management in a rapidly changing marketplace can
be learned from the experience of Cin – Made?
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CASE NO. 6
HIGH-TECH ANSWERS TO DISTRIBUTION
PROBLEMS AT ROLLERBLADE
When a manger finds that demand exceeds inventory, the answer lies in making
more goods. When a manager finds that inventory exceeds demand, the answer lies
in making fewer goods. But what if a company management finds that they just do
not know which situation applies?
This is the situation that recently confronted management at Rollerblade, the
popular skate manufacturer based in Minnetonka, Minnesota. Rollerblade has been
one of the leading firms in the fast growing high performance roller skate
marketplace, it matters a great deal for Rollerblade managers whether demand and
inventory are in balance, or not.
Rollerblade was in a bind. The product literally could not be shipped out the
door. The managers found that workers were not able to ship products because, as
a result of poor storage structures, they could not find the products. Once they were
found, overcrowded aisles, in addition to other space constraints, still prevented
efficient shipping because the workers could barely manage to get the products out
the door. “We were out of control because we didn’t know how to use space and
didn’t have enough of it,” said Ian Ellis, director for facilities and safety. “Basically,
there was no more useable space left in the warehouse, a severe backlog of
customer orders, and picking errors were clearly in the unacceptable range,” added
Ram Krishnan, Principal of NRM Systems, based in St. Paul, Minnesota.
The answer for Rollerblade was found in technology. High-tech companies
have introduced a collection of computer simulations, ranging in cost roughly from
$10,000 to $30,000, that assist managers in generating effective facility designs.
With the help of layout Master IV simulation software, developed by NRM,
Rollerblade Management was able to implement a new distribution design. As a
result of the distribution improvement, Rollerblade was able to increase the number
of customer orders processed daily from140 to 410 and eliminate order backlog.
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“Now we have a different business,” says Ellis. “The new layout has taken us from
being in a crunch, to being able to plan.
Questions:
1. With retailers as their primary customers, what customer competitive imperatives could be affected by Rollerblade’s inventory problems?
2. How appropriate might a just – in – time inventory system be for a product such as roller skates?”
3. What opportunities are there fore Rollerblade managers to see themselves? as selling services, instead of simply roller skates ?