generationengerechtigkeit in alternden …...generationengerechtigkeit – ergebnisse im Überblick...

Generationengerechtigkeit in alternden Gesellschaften – ein OECD-Ländervergleich

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InhaltsverzeichnisEditorialDaniel Schraad-Tischler, Najim Azahaf 4

GenerationengerechtigkeitinalterndenOECD-Gesellschaften–einLändervergleich 4

DasWichtigsteinKürze 5

PolitikempfehlungenundDiskussionsvorschläge 8

MeasuringIntergenerationalJustice–TowardaSyntheticIndexforOECDCountriesPieter Vanhuysse 10

Introduction 10

1.TheenvironmentaldimensionofIJI:theecologicalfootprint 13

2.ThesocialdimensionofIJI:childpoverty 17

3.TheeconomicandfiscaldimensionofIJI:publicdebtratesperchild 20

4.Thepro-elderlybiasdimensionofIJI:theEBiSS 23

5.ConstructingthesyntheticIJI 29

6.Conclusionsandimplications: 38 policyreformsforboostingintergenerationaljusticeinpractice

Acknowledgement 44

Abouttheauthor 44

References 45

Endnotes 55

Impressum 62

Generationengerechtigkeit in alternden Gesellschaften – ein OECD-Ländervergleich

Editorial

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EditorialDaniel Schraad-Tischler, Najim Azahaf

Generationengerechtigkeit in alternden OECD-Gesellschaften – ein Ländervergleich

WiegenerationengerechtsinddieStaatenderOECD?Wie lässt sichGenerationengerechtigkeit

anschaulichmessen?WelcheSchlussfolgerungenlassensichauseinemLändervergleichfürdie

praktischePolitikziehen?

DievorliegendeStudievonPieterVanhuyssegibtAntwortenaufdieseFragen.Sieverstehtsich

dabei als ein Beitrag zu einer Debatte, die oftmals mehr polemisch als wissenschaftlich neut-

ralgeführtwird;dennGenerationengerechtigkeitisteinschwierigerundpolitischoftumkämpf-

terBegriff.Dochdarfesgeradenichtdarumgehen,dieInteressenalterundjungerGenerationen

gegeneinanderauszuspielenundfürpolitischeMachtkämpfezumissbrauchen.Vielmehrsollte

stetseinemöglichstobjektiveempirischeErfassung tatsächlichexistierenderUngleichgewichte

unddamitwomöglicheinhergehenderUngerechtigkeitenangestrebtwerden.

OhnehierbeifreilicheinenAnspruchsowohlaufempirischealsauchtheoretischeAbsolutheitund

Vollständigkeitzuerheben,liefertdervorliegendeReporteinigewichtigesachlicheErkenntnisse

undempirischeAnhaltspunktefürdenDiskursumGenerationengerechtigkeitinalterndenGesell-

schaften.WiebeiallenkomplexensozialenSachverhalten–unddieFragederGenerationenge-

rechtigkeitgehörtwohlzudenkomplexestengesellschaftlichenProblemstellungenüberhaupt–

isteineschlankeundallgemeinnachvollziehbare,dabeijedochgleichzeitigmöglichstexakteund

umfassendeVermessungsozialerRealitätenohneInformationsverlustekaummöglich.Indiesem

SpannungsfeldkonzentriertsichdieStudieimSinneeinerverständlichenMessungundDarstel-

lungderErgebnisseaufeinigeeinfache,nachvollziehbareIndikatorenundMessdimensionen,die

sichandendreiKerndimensionendesmodernenNachhaltigkeitsparadigmasorientieren.DieIndi-

katoren,dieindenIndexeinfließen,bildenentsprechendeinigewesentlicheökologische,ökono-

misch-fiskalischeundsozialeAspekteintergenerationellerGerechtigkeitab.

DieStudieistimKontextdesProjekts„SustainableGovernanceIndicators“(SGI)entstanden,mit

demdieBertelsmannStiftungseit2009regelmäßigdieStaatenderOECDeinemdetailliertenLeis-

tungsvergleichzumThema„NachhaltigesRegieren“unterzieht.DerneueIntergenerationalJustice

Index(IJI)behandeltdabeimitderspezifischenFragenachGenerationengerechtigkeiteinenwichti-

genTeilbereichderNachhaltigkeitsdiskussion.DieMessungvonGenerationengerechtigkeitbezieht

sich indiesemZusammenhangaufPolitikergebnisse, die eineLastenverschiebungzuungunsten

nachfolgenderGenerationenbedeutensowieaufUngleichheitenundDiskriminierungenzwischen

jungenundaltenheutelebendenGenerationen.Zudemwirdbetrachtet,inwiefernsichindenPoliti-

kenderOECD-Regierungenwomöglicheinesozialpolitische„Schlagseite“zugunstenbzw.zuunguns-

Editorial

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tenihrerheutelebendenjungenundaltenGenerationenausmachenlässt.AngesichtsderTatsache,

dassdurchdendemographischenWandelindenmeistenOECD-GesellschaftenältereMenscheneine

immergrößerwerdendeunddamitauchzunehmend„mächtigere“Wählergruppedarstellen,haben

dieErkenntnisseundSchlussfolgerungenderStudieeineunmittelbaredemokratiepolitischeRele-

vanz.AnwelchenStellengehtdieStudiedabeiüberbisherigeAnsätzezurMessungintergenerati-

onellerGerechtigkeithinausbzw.setztneueAkzente?Zunächstisthervorzuheben,dassderReport

politische„Outcomes“–dortwomöglich–ineinendirektenquantifizierbarenBezugzurdemo-

graphischenStruktureinesLandessetzt:SowirdbeiderBetrachtungderökonomisch-fiskalischen

DimensionintergenerationellerGerechtigkeitnichtetwadieHöhederallgemeinenStaatsschuldals

HypothekfürkünftigeGenerationenbetrachtet,sonderndasAusmaßdieserVerschuldungproKind/

Jugendlichem–alsoinAbhängigkeitderjeweiligenAltersstruktureinesLandes.

DanebenwerdeneinigeinteressantequantifizierbareVerhältnisgrößengebildet,dieAuskunftüber

intergenerationelleUngleichheitenhinsichtlichzentralersozialerOutcomesundPolitikmaßnahmen

geben.DazuzähltdasVerhältnisvonKinderarmutversusAltersarmutsowiedieinnovativeMes-

sungvonsozialstaatlichenAusgabenverteiltaufältere/jüngereGenerationen.Auchhierdiskutiert

VanhuyssedasunterschiedlicheAusgabenverhaltenderbetrachtetenOECD-StaatenimKontextder

jeweiligendemographischenEntwicklung.FürdieumweltbezogeneDimensionintergenerationeller

GerechtigkeitschließlichlegtdieStudiedensogenanntenÖkologischenFußabdruckzugrunde,der

alsMaßdafürverstandenkann,wasgegenwärtigeGenerationendurchihrKonsum-undProdukti-

onsverhaltennachfolgendenGenerationenannegativenökologischenFolgewirkungenhinterlassen.

MitdiesenintuitiveinfachverständlichenIndikatoren,dieinderAuswertungzudemdurchden

RückgriffaufSGI-Länderberichte(www.sgi-network.org)ergänztwerden,kommtdieStudiezueini-

geninteressantenErkenntnissen,diealsAusgangspunktfürkonkretepolitischeAbleitungendie-

nen.DiesepolitischenAbleitungenundEmpfehlungendürfteninvielerleiHinsichtkonsensfähig

fürkonkurrierendepolitischeParteiensein.DarüberhinauskommtVanhuyssejedochauchzueini-

genForderungen,dieinderDebatteumGenerationengerechtigkeitdurchausprovokativenCharak-

terhabenunddiehieralsAnregungzurweiterenkritischenDiskussionverstandenwerdensollen.

Das Wichtigste in Kürze

Unterdeninsgesamtbetrachteten29OECD-StaatenschneidetEstlandambesteninSachenGene-

rationengerechtigkeitab.AuchSüdkorea,Israel,Neuseeland,Ungarnsowiedienordeuropäischen

StaatenNorwegen,Dänemark,SchwedenundFinnlandbelegenvordereRänge.Deutschlandbefin-

detsich imGesamtranking imMittelfeldaufRang13.KlareSchlusslichterdesVergleichssind

dagegendieUSA,Japan,ItalienundGriechenland.DieseLänderhabeneinenerheblichenReform-

bedarf,wennsiefürmehrGenerationengerechtigkeitinihrenGesellschaftensorgenwollen.

* Die29indieserStudieuntersuchtenOECD-Ländersind:Australien,Österreich,Belgien,Kanada,Tschechien,Dänemark,Estland,Finnland,Frankreich,Deutschland,Griechenland,Ungarn,Irland,Israel,Italien,Japan,Niederlande,Neuseeland,Norwegen,Polen,Portugal,Slowakei,Slowenien,Südkorea,Spa-nien,Schweden,Schweiz,GroßbritannienunddieUSA.AufgrundmangelnderDatenverfügbarkeitund-vergleichbarkeitwurdendieLänderIsland,Luxemburg,TürkeiundMexikonichtindenLändervergleichintegriert.

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Dabeiistzubeachten,dassdasStärken-undSchwächenprofilderLänderindenjeweiligenMess-

dimensionensehrunterschiedlichausfällt.Zubeachtenistferner,dasssichdieAuswirkungender

globalenWirtschafts-undFinanzkrisenochnichtüberallindenErgebnissenniederschlagen.Wie

sehendieErgebnisseindeneinzelnenIndexdimensionenaus?

Staatsschulden pro Kind: geringe Belastung in Estland – Japan und Südeuropa

als Schlusslichter

GesamtspitzenreiterEstlandschneidetbesondersgutinderökonomisch-fiskalischenDimension

(HöhederStaatsschuldenproKind)ab,d.h.dieStaatsschuldisthier–verteiltaufdiejungeGene-

ration–amgeringstenimVergleichmitdenübrigen28OECD-Staaten.ZumVergleich:Während

aufeinKindinEstland„lediglich“rund6.400DollarStaatsschuldenentfallen,beträgtdasSchul-

denverhältnisinGriechenland299.000DollarproKind,inItalien308.000Dollarunddemhoch-

verschuldetenunddemographischbesonders„alten“Japansogar794.000Dollar.AuchDeutsch-

landschneidetindieserDimensionschlechtab:AufjedenMenschenunter15Jahrenentfallenin

Deutschlandrund267.000DollarStaatsschulden.VergleichsweisegutePlatzierungenerreichen

hingegen–nebenEstland–nochSüdkorea,Polen,dieSlowakei,TschechienundNeuseelandmit

jeweilszwischen50.000und65.000DollarSchuldenproKind.

Ökologischer Fußabdruck – alle OECD-Länder im globalen Maßstab nicht

generationengerecht

AucherreichtdaserstplatzierteEstlandimrelativenOECD-VergleichrechtguteWertebeimökolo-

gischenFußabdruck–miteinemAbdruckvon4,7ghapercapita(globalerHektarproKopf)liegt

Editorial

Generationengerechtigkeit – Ergebnisse im Überblick

Quelle: Berechnungen des Autors, siehe S. 29-38.

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dasLandimmernochimvordererenMittelfeldder29betrachtetenOECD-Staaten.Undtrotzsei-

nersehrgeringenLandflächeundeinerdamitverbundenengeringenökologischenAbsorptions-

kraft(Biokapazität),zähltdasLandzudensehrwenigenOECD-Ländern,dieeinen„ökologischen

Überschuss“verzeichnen.Dasheißt,dassdieBiokapazitäteinesLandesdenökologischenFußab-

druckseinerGesellschaftübersteigtundentsprechendabsorbierenkann.DiedreiOECD-Länder,

dienachfolgendenGenerationendenderzeitgeringstenökologischenFußabdruckproKopfhinter-

lassen,sindUngarn(3,6gha),Polen(3,9gha)undIsrael(4gha)–allerdingsverfügtkeinesdie-

serLänderübereineausreichendeeigeneBiokapazität,umdiesenAbdruckauchzukompensie-

ren.EinenbesondershohenökologischenFußabdruckproKopfweisendagegenDänemark(8,3

gha),dieUSA(7,2gha)undBelgien(7,1gha)auf.DeutschlandliegtbeiderökologischenDimension

desVergleichsimvorderenMittelfeldmiteinemFußabdruckproKopfvon4,6gha.Dochistauch

dieBiokapazitätDeutschlandsnichtausreichend,umdenökologischenFußabdruckseinerGesell-

schaftauszugleichen.ImglobalenMaßstabistzudembezeichnend,dassalleOECD-Staateneinen

ökologischenFußabdruckvorweisen,derdieplanetarenKapazitätenübersteigt:Umsichinnerhalb

derglobalenökologischenGrenzenzubewegenundnachfolgendeGenerationennichtzusätzlichzu

belasten,dürftederökologischeFußabdrucknichthöherals1,8HektarproPersonsein.

Kinderarmut und Altersarmut – nordeuropäische Staaten schneiden besonders gut ab

InderFragederKinderarmut–unddemindiesemKontextzusätzlichbetrachtetenVerhältnisvon

Kinder-zuAltersarmut–zeigtsichebenfallseinsehrgemischtesBild.HierkommtdasimGesam-

trankingerstplatzierteEstlandangesichtseinerKinderarmutsquotevon11,1Prozentnichtüber

einenPlatzimMittelfeldhinaus.EinhohesMaßanKinderarmutkannstarkenegativeFolgewirkun-

genhaben,diesichimweiterenLebensverlaufetwainschlechterenBildungs-,Job-undEinkom-

menschancenniederschlagen.GesellschaftenmithohenKinderarmutsratenhabendaherauchaus

intergenerationellerPerspektiveeingroßesGerechtigkeitsdefizit.WenndieKinderarmutineinem

LandzudemnochdeutlichhöherausfälltalsdiejeweiligeAltersarmut,dannistdiesesGerechtig-

keitsdefizitsogarnochgrößer.

DienordeuropäischenStaatenDänemark,Finnland,NorwegenundSchwedenhabenzusammen

mitSloweniendieniedrigstenKinderarmutsraten(zwischen3,7und7Prozent),währenddieUSA

miteinerKinderarmutsquotevondrastischen21ProzentzusammenmitIsraelunddensüdeuro-

päischenStaatenPortugal,SpanienundItaliendieunterstenRängedesVergleichseinnehmen.In

diesenStaatenbestehtsomiteinbesondersgroßerHandlungsdruck.

IndenNiederlanden,Kanada,Tschechien,Frankreich,ItalienundPolensindzudemKinderzum

TeildeutlichstärkeralsalteMenschenvonArmutbetroffen–indenNiederlandenetwaistdie

Kinderarmutsquote5,5malhöheralsdieAltersarmut,inKanadadreimalundinTschechien2,5

malsohoch.DeutschlandhatsichzuletztbeiderKinderarmutverbessernkönnenundkommtauf

eineQuotevon8,3Prozent,währenddieAltersarmutnachdenZahlenderOECDzuletztbei10,3

Prozentlag.IndenkommendenJahrendürftederKampfgegenAltersarmutzudengrößtensozi-

alpolitischenHerausforderungeninDeutschlandzählen.

Editorial

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Starke Ungleichgewichte bei den sozialstaatlichen Ausgaben verteilt auf Jung und Alt

InvielenOECD-StaatenzeigtsicheinstarkesUngleichgewichtbeidensozialstaatlichenAusgaben

verteiltnachJungundAlt.SowendenetwaPolen,Griechenland,Italien,dieSlowakeiundJapan

überproportionalmehrsozialstaatlicheAusgabenfürältereMenschen(ab65Jahre)alsfürdiejün-

gerenMenschenihrerGesellschaftenauf.DabeihängtdiesesAusgabenverhältnisinteressanter-

weisekeineswegsimmermitder jeweiligendemographischenStrukturdesLandeszusammen.

Dasdemographisch„alte“Griechenlandetwagibtsechsmalmehrfürseineälterenalsfürseine

jüngerenBürgeraus,währenddasdemographischähnlich„alte“Schwedennur3,4-malsovielfür

seineälterenBürgerausgibt.Nochdrastischer:Dasdemographischimmernochvergleichsweise

„junge“Polengibtsogarbereitsrund8,6-malmehrfüreinenälterenalsfüreinenjüngerenBürger

aus.ZumVergleich:Dasähnlich„junge“Neuseelandwendetdemgegenübernur2,7-malsovielfür

seineälterenBürgerauf.ÜbereinähnlichesAusgabenverhältniswiedassehrgutplatzierteNeu-

seeland(Rang3)verfügendieindieserMessdimensionführendenStaatenKorea(Rang1)und

Irland(Rang2)sowieBelgien(Rang4)und–erneut–Estland(Rang5).Interessantistauchder

Blickaufdievier„ältesten“GesellschafteninderOECD:WährendItalienundJapaninihremsozi-

alstaatlichenAusgabenverhalteneinesehrstarkeSchlagseitezugunstenderÄlterenaufweisen,ist

dieser„Bias“inDeutschlandnochvergleichsweisemoderat–hiersinddiesozialstaatlichenAus-

gabenfürältereMenschen„nur“4,2-malhöheralsfürjüngere.IndemnochälterenSchwedenist

diesesVerhältnissogarnochdeutlichausgewogener.Schwedenschafftesalso,trotzseinerstark

alterndenGesellschaftverhältnismäßigmehrinjüngereMenschenzuinvestierenalsdiesandere

–ähnlichalte–OECD-Staatentun.

Politikempfehlungen und Diskussionsvorschläge

AnwelchenStellschraubenkanndiePolitikindenalterndenOECD-Staatenansetzen,ummehr

Generationengerechtigkeitherzustellen?Woraufsolltenintergenerationellbesondersungerechte

StaatenwiedieUSA,Japan,ItalienoderGriechenlandverstärktachten?

Klügeres Ausgabenverhalten und gezielte Investition in die Fähigkeiten

(junger) Menschen

EineMöglichkeit,fürmehrGenerationengerechtigkeitzusorgen,bestehtineinemklügerenAusga-

ben-undInvestitionsverhaltendesStaates,dasVanhuysseals„doublewhammyintergenerational

earmarking“bezeichnet.Dabeiwerdenineiner„Doppelschlagstrategie“zumBeispielSteuern,die

zurStärkungeinesintergenerationellwichtigenHandlungsfeldeserhobenwerden–etwaEinnah-

menausumweltbezogenenSteuern–,gezieltzurStärkungeinesanderenintergenerationellwich-

tigenHandlungsfeldeseingesetzt,etwainGestaltvongezieltenunddirektenInvestitionenineine

gutefrühkindlicheBildungoderMaßnahmenzurbesserenVereinbarkeitvonFamilieundBeruf.

Editorial

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Editorial

Investitionen in frühkindliche Bildung aus Perspektive der

Generationengerechtigkeit zentral

Geradediegezielte Investition inqualitativhochwertige frühkindlicheBildung istangesichtsder

langfristigpositivenEffektederartigerInvestitionenauseinerintergenerationellenGerechtigkeits-

perspektivebesonderswichtig.DennderartigeInvestitionenhabennachgewiesenpositiveEffekte

aufdiespäterenschulischenChanceneinesMenschen,seineJobaussichtenundseinegesamtensozi-

alenAufstiegschancen.Staaten,diefrühzeitigundgezieltindieFähigkeitenundChancenderjüngs-

tenMitgliederihrerGesellschafteninvestieren,handelninsofernnichtnurmoralisch,sondernauch

ökonomischsinnvoll.Insgesamtistnichtzubestreiten,dassderartigeInvestitionenindieFähigkei-

tenderMenschen(humancapital)–unddiesschonabdemfrühestenKindesalter–einedeutlich

bessereAlternativezueinemteurerenspäterenfinanziellenGegensteuernimSinnekompensatori-

scheroderreparierendersozialstaatlicherMaßnahmendarstellen.VordemHintergrundderaktuel-

lenDebatteumdieWirksamkeitfamilienpolitischerLeistungeninDeutschlandgehteshierinsofern

umdierichtigestrategischeGrundausrichtungwohlfahrtsstaatlicherAusgabenpolitik.

Reform des Wahlrechts zugunsten von Familien als Anreiz und Druckmittel

für eine generationengerechtere Politik

EinweiteressehrwirksamesMittel,umindenalterndenOECD-Gesellschaftenmitihrenüberpropor-

tionalälterenWählerschaftendiePolitikzueinerstärkerenGenerationengerechtigkeitsperspektive

zubewegen,bestehtineinerReformdesWahlrechtszugunstenvonKindernbzw.Familien.Nachdie-

serweitreichendenIdeesolltejedesElternteilstellvertretendfürjedesseinerKinder,dasnochnicht

wahlberechtigtist,zusätzlicheine(halbe)Wahlstimmeextraausübenkönnen.Derartige„Proxy-Stim-

men“fürKinder–ausgeübtdurchdieEltern–würdeninmehrererHinsichteinensymbolischenund

tatsächlichenPerspektivwechselzugunsteneinergenerationengerechterenPolitikdarstellen:Kin-

derhätten(überihreEltern)erstmalseineechtepolitischeStimmealsvollwertigeBürgerihresLan-

des,sodassdieBelangevonKindernundFamilieninsgesamteindeutlichstärkeresGewichtinden

alterndenOECD-Gesellschaftenbekämen.AlsKonsequenzmüsstesichdiePolitikinihremHandeln

undinihrerProgrammatikstärkerandenInteressenderjüngerenGenerationorientieren.Ange-

sichtsgeringeroderzurückgehenderGeburtenratenindenaltenOECD-GesellschaftenwürdenEltern

miteinemderartigenextraWahlrechtzudemfürihrenwichtigenBeitragzurFortentwicklungund

StärkungderGesellschaftbelohnt–dieswärenachVanhuysseimÜbrigeneinepositivepolitische

AlternativezuanderenSteuerungsmodellen,dieeheraufeine„Bestrafung“vonNicht-Elternsetzen

(etwadurcheinehöhereBesteuerung).Schließlichkönntenderartige „Proxy-Stimmen“aufgrund

ihresAnreizcharakterszueinerstärkerenWahlbeteiligungvonElternundeinerzumindestetwas

stärkerausgeglichenenPartizipationsratevonjungenundälterenMenschenbeiWahlenführen.

FürdieDebatteummehrGenerationengerechtigkeitbirgtdieserVorschlagzweifellosdengrößten

Diskussionsstoff.DieIdeeisthierentsprechendalseinDenkanstoßzuverstehen–alsAufforde-

rung,beiderSuchenachLösungswegenfürmehrGenerationengerechtigkeitkeineswegsnuran

einemöglicheAnpassungherkömmlicher(redistributiver)sozialpolitischerInstrumentezuden-

ken,sonderndurchausauchtiefergreifendeIdeenindieBetrachtungeinzubeziehen.

The aim of this report is pragmatic and empirical: to construct a synthetic index enabling a

“snapshot” comparison of intergenerational justice in practice across 29 OECD countries.

10

Measuring Intergenerational Justice

Measuring Intergenerational Justice – Toward a Synthetic Index for OECD CountriesPieter Vanhuysse

Introduction

Intergenerationaljusticehasbeenakeyconceptwithintheoriesanddiscussionsofsocialjustice

since at least JohnRawls’s (1971)general Theoryof Justice and two seminal intergenerational

justice-focusedvolumes,R.I.SikoraandBrianBarry’s(1978)ObligationstoFutureGenerations

andDerekParfit’s(1984)ReasonsandPersons.Thesebooksmadeastrongcaseforsystematically

analyzingsocialjusticewithincountriesviewedastransgenerationalpolities(seealsoThompson

2009). Decades later, the deep political-theoretical foundations of intergenerational justice are

betterunderstoodbutremainfarfromcompletelyso,asthisconceptofjusticepresentsaquitepar-

ticularsetofintractableproblems.Thisincludesproblemssuchashowtoaccountforthe(tastes

of)unborngenerations, for future technologicalprogressand forunexpected futureexogenous

shocks.Furtherproblemsincludewhichtimediscountratestoadoptandhowtoaccountfornon-

overlappinggenerations,amongothertheoreticalconundrums.1Inthewordsofonecommentator

onthecurrentstateofknowledgeonintergenerationaljustice,theoriesregardingmoraldutiesto

younger(letalonefuture)generationsremain“onshakyground”today(Arrhenius2009:343).

Thisreportdoesnotintendtomakeacontributiontothephilosophical-theoreticalfoundationsof

intergenerationaljustice.Rather,inlinewithearlierworkbytheBertelsmannStiftungonsustain-

ablegovernanceandsocialjusticeindicators,2theaimistoconstructasyntheticintergenerational

justiceindex(hereafterIJI)enablingthemeasurementandcomparisonofintergenerationaljustice

inpractice across a total of 29OECDmember states.Comprised of a few intuitivelyplausible

dimensions,andfocusingona“snapshot”momentintime,theIJIasconstructedhereiseminently

pragmatic,empiricalandcross-sectionalinapproach.3Theunitofanalysisiscountries,andthe

IJIoughttobeunderstoodasamacro-levelvariablelinkedprimarily(thoughnotexclusively)to

governmentactivityratherthantoprivatebehavior.4Thesnapshotwastakenbasedontheyears

forwhichthemostcompleterecentdatawasavailable:theendofthe2000sorthestartofthe

currentdecade,dependingonthedimension.5

Therehavebeenmanyclaimsintheacademicandpopular-scientificliteraturesinrecentyears

thattheagingOECDmemberstatesfacealoominglegitimacycrisis,astheimplicitpost-World

WarII“welfarestatecontract”betweengenerationscrumblesduetotheincreasedpro-elderlybias

The intergenerational justice index captures (a) outcomes that leave legacies for future gene-

rations or constitute discrimination between younger and older living generations, and (b) the

bias of current policies toward older living generations.

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ofpublicspendingpatternsand/orincreasinglylopsidedpolicydemandsbyelectorallypowerful

elderlyvoters(forearlywarnings,seePreston1984;FuchsandReklis1992).Togivebutafew

recentexamples,publicationtitlessuchasTheRiseofGerontocracy?(Berry2012a),JiltedGenera-

tion:HowBritainHasBankrupteditsYouth(HowkerandMalik2010),WhatDidtheBabyBoomers

EverDoforUs?(Beckett2010),TheComingGenerationalStorm(KotlikoffandBurns2004)and

TheClashofGenerations(KotlikoffandBurns2012)allspeakvolumesinthisrespect.Sotoodoes

thefactthatin2008,evenformerGermanPresidentRomanHerzogwasmovedtopubliclystate

hisfearthat“weareseeingaforetasteofapensionerdemocracy…Itcouldendupinasituation

whereoldergenerationsplundertheyoungerones.”6

Someempiricalstudiesappeartosupporttheclaimthatcitizensincreasinglyperceiveagrowing

intergenerationalinjusticeinmanyOECDmemberstates.Forinstance,inarecentstudyonthe

intergenerationaljusticeperceptionsofmorethan2,000undergraduateuniversitystudentsfrom

a total of eight democracies across fourdifferent “worlds” ofwelfare capitalism, a remarkably

consistentpatternwasevidentacrosseachcountrysurveyed.7Studentsweregenerallyfoundto

perceive theagegroupcomposedof elderly citizens tobebetter rewarded (relative to its own

contributionstosociety)thanweretwootheragegroups–adultsandyoungcitizens.Whilethis

patternheldacrossalleightcountries, theclearestsuchresultwasseeninFrance,wherestu-

dentsshowedastraightforwardprofileintermsofperceptionsofintergenerationaljusticeintheir

society:theyoungertheagegroupinquestion,theloweritsperceivedrewardsandthehigherits

perceivedcontributions(SabbaghandVanhuysse2010).ThismaybebecausetheFrenchwelfare

stateuniquelycombinesahighlevelofstateinvolvementinwelfareprovisionwitharelatively

strong pro-elderly welfare spending bias (see section 4 below). Like many Southern European

welfarestates,andmoresothanallAnglo-SaxonwelfarestatessavefortheUnitedStates,Conti-

nentalEuropeanwelfarestatessuchasFrance(butalsoBelgiumandAustria)aresimultaneously

characterizedbyheavytaxburdensonlabor,averagetohighlevelsoflabormarketexclusionor

precariousemploymentforyoungeragecohorts,lowtoaveragelevelsofspendingoneducation

andactivelabormarketprograms,andgenerousearnings-relatedpublicpensions.Inotherwords,

youngcitizens–atleastsociallyadvantagedandwell-informeduniversitystudents–doappear

tobechallengingtheformoftheintergenerationalcontractasitexiststoday.Moreover,thischal-

lengemanifestsitselfinwaysthatcanbemadesenseofwhenlookingatthenatureofprevailing

publicpolicies.

TheconceptofsustainabilitythatinformstheIJIaspresentedinthisreportfollowsthephilosophy

underlyingtheBertelsmannStiftung’sSustainableGovernanceIndicators(SGI).Thestartingpoint

fortheIJIisthemoralintuitionthatsincesocietiesareunitsinwhichsuccessivegenerationsare

12


linkedtogetherinrelationshipsofobligationandentitlement,“enoughandasgood”oughttobe

leftbyeachgenerationtothesucceedinggeneration.TheIJIaimstocapturetwomajoraspects

ofintergenerationaljustice.Ontheonehand,itmeasuresoutcomesthatleavelegaciesforfuture

generationsorappeartoconstitutediscriminationbetweenyoungerandolderlivinggenerations.

Theseoutcomesareorderedalongthreeessentialdimensions–social,economic-fiscalandeco-

logicalperformance.Ontheotherhand,theIJIattemptstocapturethedegreetowhichcurrent

policyoutputisbiasedtowardolderlivinggenerations.Inotherwords,theindexnotonlylooks

atthesocial,economic-fiscal,andenvironmentalresultsproducedbypolities,butalsoatwhere

onthespectrumof intergenerational justicewelfarestatesarepositionedintermsof itspolicy

outputs(pro-elderlyspendingbias).

Withregardtooutcomes, the IJIassumesthat intergenerational justicecanonlybeachieved if

performanceissustainableacrossthreedimensions.First,theuseofecosystemresourcesideally

oughtnottoexceeditsnaturalregenerationcapacity.Wetaketheecologicalfootprintcreatedby

today’sgenerationsasanindicator.Second,socialoutcomesmustensurethatstartingconditions

and related life chances are largely the same for everyone, and will not deteriorate for future

generations.TheIJItakeschildpovertyasanindicatorinthisrespect.Third,economicandfiscal

outcomes ideallyoughtnot toshifta legacyofburdens to futuregenerations thatdonotyield

correspondingpayoffsforthesegenerations.Totalpublicdebtperchildistheindicatorusedhere.

Justoutcomesarecomplementedbyjustpolicies.Hence,intergenerationaljusticedemandsthat

currentpolicyoutputdoesnotunsustainablyfavoronelivinggenerationoveranother,butrather

provides younger and older cohorts with equivalent entitlements over time (see also Lee and

Mason2011).The IJIpresents theEBiSS,anewmeasureofwelfarestatespendingbias toward

elderlypersonsasitsfourthdimension,capturingthissecondaspectofintergenerationaljustice.

The “snapshot”natureof IJI ought tobe reemphasized.The indexessentiallymeasurespolicy

outcomesandeffortstoday.SoalowIJIvaluewouldstillmeanlittleforintergenerationaljustice

if,purelyhypothetically,thecountryinquestioncouldguaranteeitsyounggenerationsamuch

improvedperformanceonthesefourdimensionstomorrow(throughfastfuturetechnologicalinno-

vationandproductivitygrowth,renewedhumancapitalinvestment,andsoforth).

Clearly,performanceon intergenerational justiceneedstobeviewedin lightof theconstraints

imposedbydemographicchange:MostOECDmemberstatesareagingrapidlytoday.Theworking

assumptionhereisthatpopulationagingasademographicconceptmaybeviewedlargelyasan

ethicallyneutraldevelopmentforourpurposes–asociety,orcohortswithinit,arenotmorally

blamed for lower fertility andhigher life expectancy.But theway inwhich a country’spublic

policypackagesreacttothisdevelopmentisnotneutralfromanintergenerationaljusticeperspec-

tive.Obviouslyademographicallyyoungsocietymightbesaidtofacefewerconstraintsintreating

itscurrentlyyoungcitizenswellintermsof,say,publicspendingoneducation,trainingorfamily

benefits(dimension4).Butademographicallyoldercountrythatneverthelessmanagestoputa

comparativelysmallburdenonitsyoungcitizenswouldclearlybeintergenerationallyjust–argu-

ablyevenmorejustthantheyoungercountry.

13


Afurtherconceptualnoteonthechangingmeaningof‘populationaging’and‘oldage’isinplace

here.Asaresultofbetterhealthtechnologiesandhealthierbehaviorandlifestyles,achronological

(orbackward-looking)ageof,say,65simplydoesnotmeanthesamethingtodayasitdidthreeor

fourdecadesago.WideacrosstheOECDworld,citizensarelivingeverlonger.Inmanycountries

lifeexpectancycurrentlyincreasesbyamonthormoreperyear,everyyear.Asaresult,a65-year-

oldtodayhasmanymorelifeyearslefttolookforwardto,andcanthusbesaidtobe‘younger,’than

anotherwisecomparable65-year-oldinthesamecountrythirtyyearsago(SandersonandScher-

bov2008;2010).Forpurposesofdemographicforecastingortoassesscitizens’mentalorphysical

fitness or readiness to work, using an alternative forward-looking measure of age (how many

birthdaysdoesanindividualstillhavelefttocelebrate?)8isthereforeoftenmoreappropriatethana

standardbackward-lookingmeasure(howmanybirthdayshass/healreadycelebrated?)However,

forthepublicpolicyandsocialspendingpurposescentraltothisreport,backward-lookingcutoff

pointssuchasage65arestillmostrelevant,ifonlybecausemostpeopleeffectivelystillworkand

paysocialsecuritycontributionsonlyuntil(andoftenwellbefore)age65,andexpecttoretire,

drawpensionsandenjoyotherelderlybenefitsandservicesafterage65.

Inlightoftheabove,thisreportisstructuredasfollows.Thenextfoursectionseachpresentand

discussoneofthefourconstituentdimensionsoftheIJIonitsown.Westartwiththeoutcome

legacies:ecologicalfootprint(section1),childpoverty(section2)andpublicdebtperchild(sec-

tion3).Wecontinuewiththepolicyoutputbias:theelderly-biasindicatorofsocialspending,or

EBiSS(section4).Thefifthsectionnormalizesandvisualizesthesefourdimensionsintomagic

rectangles,andthenaggregatesthemintoasinglesyntheticIJIvaluepercountryaccordingto

twodifferentweightingmethods:researcher-imposedweightsthattakethesingularlysynthetic

natureoftheEBiSSdimensionmoreheavilyintoaccount,andbenefit-of-the-doubtweights,which

accordmorerespecttothe(revealed)preferencesofdemocraticallyelectedgovernmentsthem-

selves.Usingthelattermethod,it isconcludedthatthemostintergenerationallyjustcountries

intheOECDfortheyearsunderconsiderationare,rankedindecliningorderofIJIvalue:Estonia,

SouthKorea,Israel,NewZealand,Hungary,andthefourmainNordiccountries.Theleastintergen-

erationallyjustcountriesarefoundtobe,rankedinincreasingorderofIJIvalue:theUnitedStates,

Japan,Italy,GreeceandCanada.Thelastsectionsummarizesthesefindingsandoffersarangeof

policyrecommendations.

1. The environmental dimension of IJI: the ecological footprint

Thenaturallinkbetweenecologicalsustainabilityandenvironmentalprotectionontheonehand

andintergenerationaljusticeontheotherhasbeenwidelynoted,notleastbecauseofthestrong

intuitiveplausibility,inthecaseofsuccessivegenerations,oftheLockeanprovisothat“enough

andasgood”shouldbeleftforothers.9AsthelateVáclavHavel(2007)noted,thewayinwhich

currentgenerationsact(orfailtoact)todaytomitigateenvironmentaldamageandclimatechange

determinesthesizeofthemoralfootprintthesegenerationsleavebehind.Onewayofempirically

14


gaugingthisenvironmentaldimensionofintergenerationaljusticeisthroughtheecologicalfoot-

printmeasure.OriginallyconceivedbyRees(1992),theecologicalfootprintisanindicatorofthe

surfaceoflandandwaterrequiredbyaneconomytoproduceallgoodsconsumedinthateconomy,

andtoabsorballwastesgeneratedbytheirproduction.Itismeasuredin“globalhectares”(ghas),

whichareaggregatedunitsofsurfacemeasurementinwhichallkindsofbiologicallyproductive

areasareconvertedbymeansofequivalencefactors(e.g.,ahectareofpastureequals0.5global

hectares;ahectareofforestequals1.4globalhectares)10.Theintuitivelyappealingvalueofthe

ecologicalfootprintisthatitcapturesinasinglefigurethegeneralstateofhumandependencyon

nature,oralternatively,thepressureputbyhumansocietiesontheirnaturalenvironment.

Figure 1: Ecological footprint, 2008

global hectares per capita

Hung

ary

Pola

ndIs

rael

Port

ugal

Japa

nN

ew Z

eala

ndIta

lyG

erm

any

Sout

h Ko

rea

Slov

akia

Uni

ted

King

dom

Esto

nia

Spai

nN

orw

ayFr

ance

Gre

ece

Switz

erla

ndSl

oven

iaCz

ech

Repu

blic

Aust

riaSw

eden

Finl

and

Irela

ndN

ethe

rland

sCa

nada

Aust

ralia

Belg

ium

Uni

ted

Stat

esDe

nmar

k

Source: www.footprintnetwork.org, data extracted June 1, 2012.

0

2

4

6

8

10

Denmark leaves the largest ecological footprint, followed by the United States, Belgium,

Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden.

AsFigure1shows,Denmarkproducedthebiggestenvironmentalpressurein2008,withafoot-

printofovereightglobalhectaresperperson.ItwasfollowedbytheUnitedStatesandBelgium

(over sevenghaper capita), and thenbyAustralia,Canada, theNetherlands, Ireland,Finland,

andSweden(between6.7and5.7ghapercapita).11Ontheenvironmentallyfriendlysideofthe

spectrum,Hungary,Poland,Israel,Portugal,JapanandNewZealandallproducedanecological

footprintofbetween3.6and4.3ghapercapita.

15

Forricherinformationregardinganygivencountry’scurrentuseofnaturalresources,theabsolute

measureofhumanecologicalpressureprovidedbytheecologicalfootprintcanalsobeassessed

inrelationtotheactualcapacityofthenaturalenvironmenttosustainthatpressure,asgivenbya

biocapacitymeasure.Thismeasureestimatesthemaximumquantityofnaturalresourcesthatcan

beproducedwithoutharmingthepotentialforfutureproduction.12Comparingtheactualpressure

putbycurrentgenerationson thenaturalenvironmentwith thehypothetical levelofpressure

compatiblewithfullpreservationofthenaturalenvironment’spotentialproducesthenetecologi-

calsurplus,definedasacountry’sbiocapacityinagivenyearminusitsecologicalfootprintinthat

year.Inotherwords,anetecologicalsurplusoccurswhenthebiocapacityofacountryexceeds

its ecological footprint; similarly, anetdeficit occurswhen the footprint exceedsbiocapacity.13

Definedinthisway,netecologicalsurpluscanbeusedasaphysicalmeasureoftheenvironmental

reserves(ifpositive)ordeficits(ifnegative)createdbycurrentgenerationsandleftbythemto

subsequentgenerations.Whilethismeasuredoesnotdirectlymeasuregovernmenteffortsinthe

areaofenvironmentalintergenerationaljustice,itdoesserveasapartialandindirectmeasureof

suchefforts.For instance, thebiocapacity componentdependsonpolicy-amenabledimensions

suchasecosystemmanagement,agriculturalpracticessuchasfertilizeruseandirrigation,and

ecosystemdegradation(inadditiontolessdirectlypolicy-amenabledimensionssuchasweather

andpopulationsize),whiletheecologicalfootprintcomponentdependsonconsumptionandpro-

ductionefficiency,whicharealsoindirectlyrelatedtogovernmentpolicy.1415


Hungary leaves the smallest ecological footprint, followed by Poland, Israel, Portugal, Japan,

and New Zealand.

Only seven OECD nations, almost invariably with a low population density, are environmental

creditor countries: Canada, Australia, Finland, New Zealand, Estonia, Sweden and Norway.

OECDmemberstatesshowconsiderablevariationintermsofnetecologicalsurplus,rangingfrom

Canada’ssurplusof+8.5globalhectaresperpersononthe leftsidetoBelgium’sdeficitof5.8

globalhectaresperpersonontherightsideofFigure2.Onlysevenof29OECDnationsdemon-

stratedanecologicalsurplusin2008(lightbluecolumns),ledbycountrieswithalargelandmass

andconsequentlylowpopulationdensity,suchasCanada(+8.5globalhectaresperperson),Aus-

tralia(+7.9gha),Finland(+6gha),NewZealand(+5.9gha),Estonia(+4gha),Sweden(+3.8gha)

andNorway(+0.6gha).Whilehavingalargebiologicallyproductivelandmassisnotanecessary

requirementforproducinganetecologicalsurplus(asshowninthecaseoftinyEstonia),itclearly

helps.TheclearestexamplesareCanada,AustraliaandFinland,whichrankedrespectivelyfirst,

secondandthirdbestintermsofnetecologicalsurplusdespiteactuallyproducingrespectively

thefifth,fourth,andeighth-largestecologicalfootprintsintheOECD(Figure1).Bycontrast,New

Zealandmanagedtorankfourth-highestintermsofnetecologicalsurpluswhileproducingthe

sixth-lowestecologicalfootprint,andEstoniaandNorwayalsoproducedrelativelysmallecological

16


footprints.Bycontrast,countriessuchasPortugaland,evenmoreso,IsraelandJapan,produce

comparativeverysmallfootprints(Figure1),whichgivesthemanadvantageinthecalculation

oftheiroverallIJI(below).Yetoncetheirsmalllevelsofbiocapacityaretakenintoaccountthese

threecountriesaresignificantecologicaldebtornations(Figure2).

By far the largest environmental debtor nations are Belgium and the Netherlands, followed

by other high-density countries such as South Korea, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, the United

Kingdom, and Denmark, as well as Italy, Spain, Greece and the United States.

Figure 2: Net ecological surplus, 2008

global hectares per capita

Cana

daAu

stra

liaFi

nlan

dN

ew Z

eala

ndEs

toni

aSw

eden

Nor

way

Hung

ary

Slov

akia

Fran

cePo

land

Aust

riaCz

ech

Repu

blic

Ger

man

ySl

oven

iaIre

land

Port

ugal

Uni

ted

Stat

esG

reec

eSp

ain

Denm

ark

Italy

Uni

ted

King

dom

Japa

nIs

rael

Switz

erla

ndSo

uth

Kore

aN

ethe

rland

sBe

lgiu

m

Source: www.footprintnetwork.org, extracted June 1, 2012.

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

17

Nofewerthan22OECDcountriesshowedanetecologicaldeficit(darkblue),ledbyBelgiumand

theNetherlands,whichhasthehighestpopulationdensityintheOECD.Thesetwocountrieshad

deficitsofrespectively5.8and5.3globalhectaresperperson.NextwereSouthKorea,Switzer-

land,Israel,Japan,theUnitedKingdom,Italy,Denmark,Spain,GreeceandtheUnitedStates,all

withdeficitsofover3globalhectaresperperson.


Only New Zealand, Estonia and Norway combine a net ecological surplus with a small or

medium-size ecological footprint.

Again,landmassandpopulationdensityappearimportantbutnotcrucialinthisregard.While

theecologicaldebtorlistisdominatedbysmallercountrieswithhighpopulationdensitysuchas

Belgium,theNetherlandsandSouthKorea,italsofeatureslargercountrieswithsomewhatlower

populationdensityratessuchastheUnitedKingdom,Italy,andSpain.Inthislast-citedcountry,

forinstance,biocapacityremainedmoreorlessconstantbetween1961and2008(ataround1.2

ghaperperson),whilethepopulation’secologicalfootprintmorethandoubledinthesameperiod.16

Sweden,bycontrast,narrowlyreducedbothitsbiocapacityanditsecologicalfootprintinthissame

period.17

2. The social dimension of IJI: child poverty

Thecase for justpolicies isparticularlystrongwhendealingwithyouth,andevenmoreso in

thecaseofchildren.OnepotentialcandidateasanindicatorofthesocialdimensionofIJIcould

beyouthunemploymentascomparedtoelderlyworkers’unemployment.Youthunemployment

isundoubtedlyamajorsocialproblem,especiallyincontemporaryEurope,leadingtolegitimate

worriesabouta“scarred”or“wasted”generation.Forinstance,inearly2012,oneinthreework-

ersagedbelow25wereunemployed in Italy, IrelandandPortugal,andasmanyasone in two

inGreece and Spain (Annunziata2012). Moreover, these unemployment rates appear to some

degreetobepolicyrelated,oratleastrelatedtopolicyinaction.Youthunemploymentisnotjust

hightodayincountriessuchasItalyandSpain:Onaverage,ithasstoodat30percentinItalyand

at32percentinSpainoverthepast40years(Annunziata2012).Yettheplausibilityofrelative

youthunemploymentasanindicatorofsocialjusticeisweakenedbythefactthatthereisalso

asignificant,ifhardtomeasure,agencyaspecttoanyunemploymentindicatorofanyagegroup

(personaleffort).Thisrendersithardtoattributeunemploymentratessolelyandunambiguously

tosociallyunjustpolicies.Moreover,therearealsoexogenousstructuralfactorslargelyindepen-

dentofnationalpolicymakingthatliebehindyouthunemploymentlevels(suchaslargeexternal

shockscausedelsewhere),andevenlifestageaspects.Tobesure,youthunemploymentratesin

advancedeconomieshavehistoricallybeenhigherthanthoseofolderagegroups.Butthisispartly

becauseyoungpeople,bysheervirtueofbeingyoung,stillhavefewercontacts,lesson-the-job

experienceandlessjob-searchexperience,andalsobecauseyoungpeopletendtoleavejobsmore

18

oftentosearchforbetteropportunitiesandbecausetheyhavefewerdependentstocarefor(Morsy

2011;O’Higgins2012).Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thatdomesticpolicyhasnoeffectatallon

youthunemployment.Minimumwagesandemploymentprotectionlegislation,forinstance,are

disproportionatelylikelytohurtyoungerworkersandtoprotectolderworkers.18


On the high child-poverty side of the spectrum, the United States is an outlier, followed by

three Southern European countries, Israel, Canada, Japan, Australia and Poland.

Nordic countries occupy four of the bottom five ranks in terms of child poverty rates, along

with Slovenia. This group is followed by Austria, Hungary, Germany and the Czech Republic.

WeoptedforchildpovertyasabetterproxyforthesocialdimensionofIJI.Evenmoresothan

youth or adolescents, underage children are by nature an at-risk population group that has a

strongmoralclaimtoprotection.Obviously,forthemostpartchildrencanneithereconomically

fendforthemselvesnorcantheyhaveapoliticalvoice(butseesection6,below).Thisinvalidates

theagencyargumentmentionedabove,anditredirectstheburdenofresponsibilitymorefirmly

towardpublicpolicy.Cumulativeresearchinsociology,psychologyandeconomicsshowsthatchild

povertycancreatealegacyofproblemsdecadesintopoorchildren’sfutures,asithasdynamic

knock-on effects that reach far into their subsequent lives and which start from birth onward

– indeed, even frombeforebirth.These range from lower levelsof school readinessandearly

educationaloutcomes,tolowercognitiveandbehavioralskillsandlowerhighschoolcompletion

rates,andlaterstilltolowerwagesandhomeownershipratesandhigherratesofadultunemploy-

ment,welfaredependencyandpoverty,andsoon.19Poorchildrenhaveworseoutcomesatschool

thandotheirpeers,bothbecausetheirfamilieshavefewerfinancialresourcesandbecausetheir

parentsgenerallyhavelesseducation,higherratesofsingleandteenagedparenthood,andpoorer

health,oftenbecauseofcomparativelyunhealthylifestyles.20Inaddition,thereareenvironmental

effectsoflivinginneighborhoodsandgoingtoschoolswithhighpovertyrates.Forinstance,poor

childrenalsotendtogotohigh-povertyschools,acircumstancethatfurtherreducestheeduca-

tionalandlabormarketchancesofeventhemosttalentedpoorchildren.21Anysocietythatleaves

ahighproportionofitsyoungestcitizensinpovertythusclearlylacksinintergenerationallyjust

arrangements.

Figure3showschildrelativepovertyratesacrosstheOECDinthelate2000s(leftaxis,lightblue

columns).22Onthehigh-povertysideofthespectrum,theoutlierwastheUnitedStates,where

more than 21 percent of children lived in poverty, followed by Southern European countries

such as Portugal, Spain and Italy, as well as Israel and Canada (between 19 percent and 15

percent),thenJapan,Australia,Poland,GreeceandtheUK(between14percentand13percent).

Atthelow-child-povertyendofthespectrum,theNordiccountriesoccupiedfourofthebottom

five ranks, along with Slovenia (between 3.7 percent and 7 percent), followed by four other

19

CentralandContinentalEuropeancountries–Austria,Hungary,GermanyandtheCzechRepublic

(between7percentand9percent).

Highchildpovertyratesareworryingenoughinthemselves.Fromtheperspectiveof intergen-

erational justice, they are arguably worse still when they are much higher than poverty rates

amongelderlypeopleinthesamecountry.Figure3thereforeshedslightonjustsucharelative

ratio–childpovertyratesasdividedbyelderlypovertyrates(rightaxis,darkbluecolumns).This

indicatesthatcountriessuchastheNetherlands,CanadaandtheCzechRepublic,butalsoFrance,

ItalyandPolandhaveanadditionalcasetoanswerintermsofintergenerationaljustice(onwhich

morebelowinsection5).Childpovertyratesinthefirstthreecountrieswererespectively5.5,

threeand2.5timeshigherthanpovertyratesamongtheelderly,andtheyweremorethan70

percenthigherstillinthelatterthreecountries.Bycontrast,inSouthKorea,Denmark,Finland,

Estonia,SloveniaandAustralia,childpovertyrateswereonlybetween23percentand40percent

ashighaselderlypeople’spovertyrates.


Figure 3: Child poverty rates (left axis), and child poverty/elderly poverty ratios (right axis), late-2000s

child poverty rates child poverty/elderly poverty ratios

in percent

Denm

ark

Finl

and

Nor

way

Slov

enia

Swed

en

Aust

ria

Hung

ary

Ger

man

y

Czec

h Re

publ

ic

Fran

ce

Switz

erla

nd

Net

herla

nds

Belg

ium

Sout

h Ko

rea

Slov

akia

Irela

nd

Estla

nd

New

Zea

land

Uni

ted

King

dom

Gre

ece

Pola

nd

Aust

ralia

Japa

n

Cana

da

Italy

Spai

n

Isra

el

Port

ugal

Uni

ted

Stat

es

Source: OECD (2011).

Note: Thresholds for both child poverty and elderly poverty are defined as less than 50 percent of median equivalized household income.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

20

Putdifferently,theCzechRepublicandGermanymayhavehadsimilarchildpovertyratesinthe

late2000s,atjustabove8percent.Butwhiletheserateswerealmost2.5timeshigherthanpoverty

ratesamongtheelderlyintheCzechRepublic,theywere20percentlowerinGermany.Similarly,

CanadaandJapanhadsimilarchildpovertyrates,atjustabove14percent.Butwhilethispoverty

ratewasthreetimeshigherthanelderlypovertyratesinthefirstcase,itwas35percentlower

in thesecond.Perhapsmoststrikinglyofall, theNetherlandsandBelgiumhadessentially the

samechildpovertyrate,ataround10percent.Butthischildpovertyratewasmorethan5.5times

higherthanelderlypeople’spovertyratesintheNetherlands,butone-fourthlowerinBelgium.

Accordingly,childpovertyisfarmoreproblematicfromanintergenerationaljusticeperspectivein

theCzechRepublic,CanadaandtheNetherlandsthaninGermany,JapanorBelgium.


The Czech Republic and Germany have similar child poverty rates, but these are 2.5 times

higher than elderly poverty rates in the Czech Republic and one-fifth lower in Germany.

The same level of child poverty is more than 5.5 times higher than poverty among the elderly

in the Netherlands, but one-fourth lower in Belgium.

3. The economic and fiscal dimension of IJI: public debt rates per child

Theintergenerationaljusticeimplicationsofdebtlevelshavebeenacknowledgedandvigorously

debated by political economists, public finance experts and public choice theorists for many

decadesnow.23Withinpoliticalandlegaltheory,thisissueisarguablyatleastasold.Asearlyas

1790,U.S.foundingfatherThomasJeffersonwasdeeplyconcernedthatprofligatecurrentgenera-

tionsmightmortgagethefutureofsucceedinggenerationsbyextensiveborrowingandirrespon-

siblespendingpatterns,thuspassingonadebtburden(Wolf2008).Jeffersonthereforeproposed

legislation requiring that public debts be retired by the same generation that incurred them.

Anotherfoundingfather,JamesMadison,counteredthatsomedebtsmightbeincurredprimarily

inordertobenefitfuturegenerations,inwhichcasesuchdebtcouldbepassedonwiththebenefits

ifitcouldnotberetiredbeforethearrivalofthefuturegeneration.YetMadisontoowasconvinced

ofthegeneralneedtorestrainlivinggenerationsfromleavingunjustandunnecessaryburdensto

succeedinggenerations(Wolf2008:13–14).

Inpractice,OECDgovernmentshavegenerallyoverseensignificantincreasesindebtlevelsover

thepastfewdecades.Inthe20yearssince1980,publicdebtlevelshaverisenin18outof23OECD

countries, fromanaverageof39percentto63percentofGDP.Theonlysignificantexceptions

wereIreland,theUK,NewZealandandNorway.Populationagingwasagainamajorcontributing

factortohighdebtlevels,macro-fiscalimbalancesandhighnetdebtinterestpayments(Wagschal

2007:226;233;240).Tobesure,theconsequencesfacedbycurrentgovernmentsandcurrent

21

adultcitizensofhighdebtlevelsandhighdebtinterestburdensareseriousenough.Debtinterest

paymentsreducethecapacityofgovernmentsnotjusttosupplypublicgoods,butalsotogrowand

torefinancethemselves(Reinhartetal.2012;ReinhartandRogoff2010a,2010b).Thecontempo-

raryeurozonetroublesofferavividreminderoftheseverereal-lifeimpactofhighdebtlevelsand

relatedfiscalparametersoncurrentgenerationsinnationssuchasGreece,Italy,Spain,Portugal

andIreland(Corsetti2012).

Buttheconsequencesofhighpublicdebtlevelsforyounger(andfuture)generationsofcitizens

arearguablyparticularlydire.Highdebtlevelsnotonlyforceyoungergenerationstoforegoany

benefits theymighthavegained in the future frompresent investments.Highdebt levelsalso

shiftconsumptiontowardcurrentgenerationsandawayfromfuture(younger)generations,asthe

lattergenerationswilltypicallyberesponsibleforfinancingrepaymentofthisdebtthroughlower

consumptionor significantproductivity increases (Buchanan1964;Bowenet al. 1964).Recent

evidenceshows,forinstance,thatthemostpublicallyindebtedEUeconomiestodaywillalsoface

thehighestincreasesinpublicspendingrelatedtotheretiringbabyboomgenerationsoverthe

comingdecades(PeetersandGroot2012).Sowhereasamacro-socialcontextofpopulationaging,

andaconcomitantgrowthinsocietalspendingneedstowardelderlygenerations,shouldactually

requirecurrentgenerationstoincreasethestockofresourcestobelefttothenextgenerations,

highdebtlevelsinfactdopreciselytheopposite.Theyreducethatstock,therebycompounding

ratherthancorrectingintergenerationalinjustice.


Among high debt-per-child nations, Japan is a clear outlier, followed by Italy, Greece, Bel-

gium, Germany, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, Austria and Ireland.

Among low-debt-per-child nations, Estonia leads the pack, followed by South Korea, Poland,

Slovakia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, and two other Central European

countries.

Tocapturethisdimensionofintergenerational(in)justice,weanalyzedebtperchild,definedhere

asthetotalgeneralgovernmentdebtinagivencountry(inbillionsofU.S.dollarsin2011)divided

bythetotalnumberofpersonsinthatcountryagedbetween0and14years.Admittedly,suchan

analysiswouldideallyneedtobecomplementedbytheinclusionofreliableinformationonfuture

productivityandfutureeconomicgrowthrates,whichishardtocomeby.Note,however,thatthe

recenteconomics literaturepoints toanegativecorrelationbetweenpublicdebtandeconomic

growth.24AsFigure4shows,varianceindebtperchildwithintheOECDisverylarge.25Onthe

high-debtsideofthespectrum,theoff-the-scaleoutlierisJapan,whereeachpersonagedbelow

15facedanoutstandingamountofgovernmentdebtof$794,000in2011.Thoughsomedistance

behind,ItalyandGreeceoccupiedthenexttworanks,witharound$310,000to$300,000indebt

per child. They were followed by Belgium, Germany, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United

States,AustriaandIreland,witharound$270,000to$240,000debtperchild.

22

Attheotherendofthespectrum,Estoniacurrentlysaddlesitsyoungestgenerationwithcompara-

tivelyverylowlevelsofgovernmentdebt–lessthan$6,500perchild.SouthKorea,Poland,Slova-

kia,theCzechRepublicandNewZealandtoostillshowrelativelylowdebtrates(around$50,000

to$65,000perchild).TwootherCentralEuropeancountries,HungaryandSlovenia,alongwith

AustraliaandIsrael,follownextontherelativelylowdebt-per-childsideofthespectrum(between

$75,000and$85,000).Itisimportanttonotethatwhentheunequaldomesticownershipofgov-

ernmentdebtandconsequentlyunequalintra-familywealthtransfersaretakenintoaccount,pub-

licdebtlevelsperchildalsobecomeakeymeasureofintragenerationalinequality(seeAlbertiniet

al.2007;AlbertiniandKohli2013).Thatis,tothedegreethatthechildrenofcurrentdebtholders


Figure 4: Debt per child, 2011

thousands US dollars

Esto

nia

Sout

h Ko

rea

Pola

ndSl

ovak

iaCz

ech

Repu

blic

New

Zea

land

Hung

ary

Aust

ralia

Slov

enia

Isra

elSw

eden

Finl

and

Spai

nDe

nmar

kPo

rtug

alU

nite

d Ki

ngdo

mN

ethe

rland

sFr

ance

Irela

ndAu

stria

Uni

ted

Stat

esSw

itzer

land

Nor

way

Cana

daG

erm

any

Belg

ium

Gre

ece

Italy

Japa

nSources: IMF World Economic Outlook online database for debt data (April 2012).World Bank World Development Indicators online database for population data. Data were extracted October 4, 2012 for debt and October 26, 2012 for population.

Note: Debt per child chart values (left axis) are equivalent to total general government debt in a given country in US dollars in 2011 / number of persons in that country aged 0-14 in 2011. Debt data refer to general government gross debt in national currencies, current prices, converted to USD using OECD exchange rates.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

794

750

800

23


incountriessuchasJapan,Italy,GreeceorBelgiumcanbeexpectedtoinheritmuchofthiscapital

wealthfromtheirparents,highpublicdebtlevelsperchildcanbearguedtobemuchlessofa

concernfortheseparticularchildren,butallthemoresofortoday’schildrenofparentswhodo

notownorcannotbequeathgovernmentdebt.Fromapublicpolicyperspective,thiswouldpoint

totheuseofotherintergenerationaljusticeinstrumentsasredress,suchashigherinheritanceor

wealthtaxation,aswellasmeasurestoleveltheplayingfieldfrombirth,suchasearlychildhood

educationandcarespending(onwhichmoreinsection6,below).

4. The pro-elderly bias dimension of IJI: the EBiSS

InmostOECDcountries,acceleratingpopulationagingasacombinedresultoflongerlifespans

andlowerfertilityrateshasledtoagingelectoratesand,directlyandindirectly,toariseinthe

demand forold-age relatedcashand in-kindspending,andpossiblyalso to lowerpressure for

spendingdirectedtowardyoungergenerations.Afterall,elderlyvotershavebecomeanincreas-

inglypowerfulpoliticalconstituencynotonlybecausetheyaremorenumerous,butalsobecause

theytendtodisplayhigher-than-averagevotingturnoutrates(e.g.,Goerres2009;Vanhuysseand

Goerres2012;Vanhuysse2012).Forinstance,intheUnitedStates,politicalengagementbyretired

persons,onceamongtheleastpoliticallyactivegroups,hasincreasinglybeendrivenbyself-inter-

estanddependencyonsocialsecurityprograms.Thisdemographichasmountedmassivepolitical

mobilizationcampaigns tosuccessfullystifleandevenreversepastcutbacks inSocialSecurity

andMedicare(Campbell2002,2003).Manystudieshaveinvestigatedhowwelfarespendingon

particularsocialprogramssuchashealthcare,pensionprogramsorelderlycarehasevolvedover

timeasaresultofpopulationaging.Butveryfewscholarshaveinvestigatedhowwelfarestatesas

“syntheticwholes”or“socialpolicypackagedeals”haveevolved.WhichparticularOECDcoun-

triesarethemostbiasedtowardspendingontheelderly–andwhichtheleast?

4.1. Prior studies of pro-elderly bias: from the ENSR to the ENSS

OnlyinrecentyearshaveresearchersstartedtopointoutthatOECDcountriesincreasinglycluster

alongpro-old-ageversuspro-young lines in their overall spendingpatterns.26AsKuitto (2001:

359)notes,“Themaindividinglineinwelfareeffortandunderlyingwelfarepolicyarrangements

inEurope…(is)whetherwelfarepolicyfocusesontheprovisionofsocialservicesandcashtrans-

fersfortheworking-agepopulationoronsocialsecurityviacashtransfersespeciallyforpeople

inretirement.”Inapath-breakinganalysis,Lynch(2006)firstsetouttoanswerthequestionof

howsocialpoliciesin20OECDdemocraciesdifferentiallyprotecteddifferentagegroupsbetween

1985and2000,andhowthis“elderly/nonelderly”spendingbiasvariedacrosstheOECDwelfare

states.27Thedependentvariable forLynch (2006)was the“ageofwelfare,”operationalizedas

theratioofelderly(E) tononelderly(N)spending–theENSR.Inthismeasure,elderlyspend-

ing (thenumerator) includespensionsandservices for theelderly,adjusted for thenumberof

elderlypersons(definedtobethoseeitheragedsixty-fiveandaboveorthoseinformalretirement).

24

Nonelderlyspending(thedenominator)primarilyincludesunemploymentbenefits,activelabor

market policies, family allowances and family services, adjusted for the number of nonelderly

persons(definedtobethoseagedbelow65).Lynch’s(2006:5,30)ENSRrankingsshowedthat

Japan,theUnitedStates,andatsomedistancebehind,Italy,Greece,Portugal,Austria,Germany

andSpainweretheeightmostpro-elderly-orientedOECDwelfarestatesinthesample.Denmark,

Sweden,Ireland,Belgium,Finland,Australia,NorwayandtheNetherlandsoccupiedthebottom

eightranksoftheleastpro-elderly-biasedwelfarestatesinthelate1980sand1990s.Lynchnoted

thatthisENSRvariationdidnotaccordneatlywithanyoftheimmediatelyintuitiveexplanations,

suchaswelfareregimetype,levelsofGDPpercapitaorofgeneralsocialspending,oreventhe

shareofretirement-agedcitizenswithinthetotalpopulation.

To update Lynch’s initial study and enlarge the time period considered, Tepe and Vanhuysse

(2010)computedanaggregatemeasureoftherelativeoverallspendingbiastowardelderlyage

groupswithin21OECDwelfarestatesbetween1980and2003(anadditionaleightmoreyears

percountry)–theelderly/nonelderlyspendingshare,orENSS.TheENSSisdefinedasthetotal

(nonadjusted)spendingshareoftwoclearlypro-elderlyprograms(pensionsandsurvivalbenefits)

withina larger“six-programwelfarestate”consistinginadditionof(nonadjusted)spendingon

lessclearlypro-elderlyprogramssuchasincapacitybenefits,familyprograms,activelabormarket

programsandunemploymentbenefits.Largely in linewithLynch(2006),TepeandVanhuysse

(2010:233)findthatthecross-nationalvarianceinENSSvalues isremarkably large.Averaged

overtheentireperiodconsidered,theeightcountriesmostheavilybiasedintheirpublicpolicy

spendingpatternstowardelderlygenerationsareGreece,Japan,Italy,theUnitedStates,Germany,

Austria,PortugalandFrance.Attheleastpro-elderly-biasedsideofthespectrumareDenmark,

theNetherlands,Ireland,Australia,Sweden,Finland,NorwayandBelgium.Inotherwords,atthe

twoendsof thespectrum, theTepeandVanhuysse (2010) rankingoverlappedwith theLynch

(2006) ranking in15outof16cases.Perhapscounterintuitively,populationagingappearsnot

to explain much of the variance between countries in these ENSS values either. In fact, once

one controls for other relevant socioeconomic factors suchasGDPgrowth and the size of the

servicesectoreconomy,demographicallyoldercountriessimplydonothavesignificantlymore

pro-elderly-biasedwelfarestates(TepeandVanhuysse2010;seealsothelongitudinalsnapshotsin

BradshawandHolmes2013).TakecountriessuchasDenmark,FinlandandSweden,whichtoday

aredemographicallyrelativelyoldsocieties,with lowerold-agesupportratios(respectively3.7,

3.7and3.3)than,forinstance,theUnitedStates(4.7).ThesethreeNordiccountriesnevertheless

boastmuchlower,nothigher,ENSSvaluesthanthedemographically“younger”UnitedStates,in

greatpartthankstotheirgreaterandlongstandingcommitmenttoinvestmentinvariousfamily-

friendlypolicies,activelabormarketpoliciesandsimilarpro-youngpolicies(Moreletal.2012;

Vanhuysse2012;TepeandVanhuysse2013).


25

4.2. Constructing a new elderly-bias indicator of social spending: the EBiSS

The elderly-bias indicator of social spending (EBiSS) developed here represents a third, more

updatedandmoreinclusivestepintheefforttomeasurethegeneralpro-elderlyspendingbiasof

welfarestates,asitreferstotheyears2007–2008for29OECDdemocracies.LiketheENSRand

theENSSbeforeit,theEBiSSisasocialpolicyexpendituremeasure.28Assuch,itdoesnottake

intoaccountothermeansofpursuingsocialpolicygoalssuchasregulationortaxationmeasures,

notablytaxexpenditures,whichcanbesubstantialincountriessuchastheUnitedStates(Howard

2009;BurmanandPhaup2012;Garfinkeletal.2010).Norcansuchaspendingmeasuretakeinto

accountthelikelydifferenceinsocialrights(orentitlements)perceptions,andhencesocialpolicy

justiceor fairnessperceptions,betweencontribution-financedandgeneral-tax-financedwelfare

states.Intheformertypeofwelfarestates,votersmaybemorelikelytoperceiveprogramssuch

aspensionsandlong-termcareasacquiredrights.Contribution-financedsocialbenefitstendto

acquireaquasi-legalstatusasvestedentitlementsorpropertyrights,leading(elderly)citizensto

expecttodrawtheirearnedrightsoutofthesystemoncetheyretire(e.g.,Aaron2009;Scharpf

2000).AsFigure5shows,withintheOECD,socialsecuritycontributionsrangefrom0percent

ofGDPinAustraliaandNewZealandand1percentinDenmark,toaround15percentinAustria,

SloveniaandtheCzechRepublic,andcloseto17percentinFrance.Elderlycitizensincountries

ontheright-handsideofFigure5willgenerallyhavepaidinhigheramountsofsocialsecurity

contributionsduringtheirworkinglivesinreturnfortheimplicitpromiseofconcomitantreturns

duringthepension-drawingperiodof their lives.Allelsebeingequal,elderlycitizens inthese


Figure 5: Social security contributions, 2010

as percent of GDP

Aust

ralia

New

Zea

land

Denm

ark

Cana

daIre

land

Isra

elSo

uth

Kore

aU

nite

d St

ates

Uni

ted

King

dom

Switz

erla

ndPo

rtug

alN

orw

ayG

reec

ePo

land

Japa

nSw

eden

Hung

ary

Spai

nSl

ovak

iaFi

nlan

dEs

toni

aIta

lyN

ethe

rland

sG

erm

any

Belg

ium

Aust

riaSl

oven

iaCz

ech

Repu

blic

Fran

ce

Source: www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/oecdtaxdatabase.htm, accessed October 30, 2012.

0

5

10

15

20

26

countrieswouldthushavemuchstrongergroundsforgrievancesthanthoseincountriesonthe

left-handside,ifandwhenpensionspendingandrelatedsocialsecurityspendinglevelswereto

becutbacksignificantly.

Bearingthesecaveatsinmind,theEBiSSiscalculatedasfollows.Ontheelderly-orientedspending

side(thenumerator),thefollowingpublicspendingprogramswereincluded:(1)old-age-related

benefitsincash(pensions,early-retirementpensions,othercashbenefits)andinkind(residential

care/home-helpservices,otherbenefitsinkind);(2)survivorsbenefitsincashandinkind(funeral

expenses, other in-kind benefits), (3) disability pensions, (4) occupational injury and disease-

relatedpensions,and(5)earlyretirementforlabormarketreasons.


Poland, Greece and Italy spend respectively 8.6, 7.5, and almost 7 times as much on each

elderly person as on each nonelderly person. Slovakia, Japan, the Czech Republic, Portugal,

Slovenia, Austria, the United States and Hungary have very high EBiSS values as well.

Ten countries in a sample of 29 spend five or more times as much per elderly citizen as they

spend per nonelderly citizen.

The ten least pro-elderly-biased OECD welfare states are South Korea, Ireland, New Zealand,

Belgium, Estonia, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden.

On thenonelderly-oriented side of theEBiSS (thedenominator), the followingpublic spending

programswereincluded:(1)familybenefitsincash(familyallowances,maternityandparental

leave,othercashbenefits)andinkind(daycare/home-helpservices,otherin-kindbenefits),(2)

active labormarketprograms (employmentservicesandadministration, labormarket training,

youth measures, subsidized employment, employment measures for the disabled), (3) income

maintenancecashbenefits,(4)unemploymentcompensationandseverancepaycashbenefits,and

(5)educationspendingforalllevelsofeducationfromearlychildhoodtouniversity.29Toadjust

fordemographicstructure(spendingneed),theresultingelderly/nonelderlysocialspendingratio

ineachcountryhasbeenmultipliedbythecountry’sold-agesupportratio,thatis,thenumberof

personsaged20–64overthenumberofpersonsaged65ormore.

The EBiSS variance within OECD countries is very large (Figure 6).30 Poland is the most pro-

elderly-biasedwelfarestate,withanEBiSSvalueof8.6.Thismeansthat thePolishstatespent

more than8.5 timesasmuchoneachelderlypersonas itspentoneachnonelderlyperson in

thelate2000s.Followingatsomedistance,Greece31andItaly(EBiSSvaluearound7ormore),

Slovakia, Japan, theCzechRepublicandPortugal (between6and7),andSloveniaandAustria

(above5.5)allhaveveryhighEBiSSvaluesaswell.Alltogether,10countriesinthesampleof29

27

spentaroundfiveormoretimesasmuchperelderlypersonastheydidpernonelderlyperson.

Onthelow-EBiSSsideofthespectrum,thetenleastpro-elderly-biasedwelfarestatesintheOECD

areSouthKorea,Ireland,NewZealand,Belgium,Estonia,theNetherlands,Denmark,theUnited

Kingdom,Norway,andSweden.32


The demographically young Slovak society spends 6.6 times as much on every elderly citizen

as on every nonelderly citizen. Yet in the equally young Irish society, the state spends only 2.7

times as much.

The demographically young Polish society spends 8.6 times as much on every elderly citizen

as on every nonelderly citizen. Yet in equally young New Zealand, the state spends only 2.7

times as much.

Figure 6: The elderly-bias indicator of social spending EBiSS, 2007 – 2008

ratio

Sout

h Ko

rea

Irela

ndN

ew Z

eala

ndBe

lgiu

mEs

toni

aN

ethe

rland

sDe

nmar

kU

nite

d Ki

ngdo

mN

orw

aySw

eden

Cana

daAu

stra

liaSw

itzer

land

Finl

and

Ger

man

ySp

ain

Isra

elFr

ance

Hung

ary

Uni

ted

Stat

esAu

stria

Slov

enia

Port

ugal

Czec

h Re

publ

icJa

pan

Slov

akia

Italy

Gre

ece

Pola

nd

Source: Author’s computations from the OECD SOCX database and OECD (2011).

0

2

4

6

8

10

28

ItisimportanttonotethatpublichealthspendinghasnotbeenincorporatedintotheEBiSScalcu-

lations,asitisnotoriouslydifficulttodeterminepreciselywhatshareofhealthspendinggoesto

whichagegroups.Butitisalmostcertainthatmosthealthspendinggoestooldercitizensinall

countries,especiallybutnotsolelyintheUnitedStates(Aaron2009).ThisimpliesthattheEBiSS

asdefinedhereerrs,ifanything,ontheconservativeside,asitalmostcertainlyunderestimates

thepro-elderlybiasofwelfarespending.Evenso,theimplicationsoftheseEBiSSvaluesareoften

striking.Onthesideofthespectrumassociatedwithalowpro-elderlyspendingbias,theSouth

Korean,Irish,BelgianandEstonianstatesallspentroughly2.5tothreetimesasmuchperelderly

citizenastheyspentpernonelderlycitizen.ButSouthKoreaandIrelandaredemographicallyrela-

tivelyyoungcountries,meaningthattherewerestill6.5and5.6nonelderlypeopletosupporteach

elderlypersoninthesecountriesin2007.Bycontrast,BelgiumandEstoniaweredemographically

oldersocieties,withmuchlowerold-agesupportratiosofrespectively3.5and3.6.


The demographically old Greek society spends seven times more on every elderly citizen as

on every nonelderly citizen. But in the equally old Swedish society, the state spends only 3.4

times as much.

Alternatively,inthedemographicallyyoungSlovaksociety(old-agesupportratioof5.5),thestate

spent6.6timesasmuchoneveryelderlySlovakasoneveryyoungormiddle-agedSlovak.Yetin

theequallyyoungIrishsociety,thestatespentonly2.7timesasmuch.Morestrikingstill,inthe

demographicallyyoungPolishsociety(old-agesupportratioof4.8),thestatespent8.6timesas

muchoneveryelderlyPoleasoneveryyoungormiddle-agedPole.YetintheequallyyoungNew

Zealandsociety,thestatespentonly2.7timesasmuch.Bycontrast,inthedemographicallyold

Greeksociety(withalowold-agesupportratioat3.4),thestatespentseventimesmoreforevery

elderlyGreekasitspentforeverynonelderlyGreek.ButintheequallyoldSwedishsociety,the

statespentonly3.4timesmore.

OftheOECD’sfourdemographicallyoldestsocieties,ItalyandJapanhavedistinctlypro-elderly-

biasedwelfarestates,whereasGermanyisonlymoderately,andSwedenverylittlebiasedtoward

theelderly

Demographyisnotdestinywhenitcomestosocialpolicy.Ratherthandemographicconstraints,

itispolicychoicesasdeterminedbylongstandinggovernanceculturesthatdrivetheEBiSS.33Of

theOECD’sfourdemographicallyoldestsocieties,Italy(EBiSSvalueof6.8)andJapan(6.4)show

adistinctpro-elderlybiasintheirsocialspendingpatterns,whereasGermany(4.2)showsonly

amoderatepro-elderlybiasandSweden(3.4)showsrelativelylittlebias.InadditiontoSouthern

EuropeancountriessuchasGreece,ItalyandPortugal,CentralandEasternEuropeancountries

suchasSlovakia,theCzechRepublic,Slovenia,PolandandHungaryarealsointhehigh-EBiSS

spectrumoftheOECDsample.

29

5. Constructing the synthetic IJI

5.1. Normalizing and visualizing the four IJI dimensions

TonormalizethefourIJIdimensions(ecologicalfootprint,childpoverty,debtperchildandEBiSS),

foreachcountryiandeachdimensionxthedifferenceistakenbetweenthemaximumperformance

intheentireOECDsample(xmax)andtheactualperformanceofcountryi(Xi).Thisdifferenceis

thendividedbythedifferencebetweenthemaximum(Xmax)andminimum(Xmin)performance

inthe29-countryset.ThenormalizedvaluesXnicanthusbeexpressedas:

Xni =(Xmax -Xi)/(Xmax -Xmin)

In other words, the denominator is given by the difference between the maximum value and

theminimumvalueintheOECDcountryset.Thenumeratorisgivenbythedifferencebetween

the maximum sample value and the value achieved by the country under consideration. This

impliesthatabetterrelativeperformanceisassociatedwithahighervalue,witheachXnivalue

varyingbetween0and1.Inotherwords,thenormalizedvaluesmeasurethedistancefromthe

best-practicecountryoneachdimension,relativetotheempiricalrangeinthesample(seealso

Atkinsonetal.2002,Atkinson2005).Forthedimensionofchildpoverty,afurtheradjustmenthas

beenmadetopenalizetheparticularsubsetofcountriesinwhichchildpovertylevels(leftaxis

ofFigure3)arehigherthanelderlypeople’spovertylevels–thatis,wherechild/elderlypoverty

ratios(rightaxisofFigure3)areabove1.Forthissubset,thenormalizedvalueforchildpoverty

hasbeendividedbytheratioofchildpovertyoverelderlypoverty.Clearly,childpovertylevelson

theirownarewhatmattersmostforintergenerationaljusticepurposes.Forinstance,Spainand

Germanyhadthesamechild/elderlypovertyratiointhelate2000s(justabove.80),butchildpov-

ertylevelswere8percentinGermanyandmorethandoubleinSpain,renderingthelattercountry

muchlessintergenerationallyjustonthisdimension.Yetatthesametime,oneideallyalsowants

totakeintoaccounttheintuition,discussedinsection2,thatacountryA(suchastheNetherlands

inFigure3)withthesamechildpovertyrateasanothercountryB(suchasBelgium)butwitha

higherchild/elderlypovertyratio,oughttobedeemedaslessjustthanBfromanintergenerational

justiceperspective.Hence,bywayofasymmetricpenalization,wedivide thenormalizedchild

povertyvaluesbytheratioofchild/elderlypovertywherethelatterexceedsthevalueof1.

Theresultingnormalizedvaluesforallfourdimensionsareillustratedwithsixselectedcountry

examplesbymeansof“magicrectangles”infigures7to12below,wherealldimensionsarescaled

from0 (worstperformance in the sample) to1 (bestperformance). Themeaningof themagic

rectangles is therefore intuitive (MelynandMoesen1991).Themore the sizeof the rectangle

expandsinanyoralldirections,themoreintergenerationally just isthesocietyinquestion.A

noteofcautiononinterpretationisinplacehere.Theoreticallyitisofcourseimpossibletospecify

aparticularvalueortippingpointbelowwhichanyoneofthefourdimensionsofIJIisunambigu-

ously intergenerationallyunjuston itsown.But thenormalizationapproachadoptedheredoes


30

clearly show a country’s value on any one of the four IJI dimensions relative to the empirical

rangewithintheOECD.Soalowstandardizedvalueon,say,EBiSSdoesshowthatthecountryin

questionperformsbadlyrelativetothebest-andworst-practicecaseswithinanaturalcomparison

sample–theworld’sotherrichdemocracies.Moreover,aggregatingthenormalizedvaluesonthe

fourIJIdimensions(seebelow)providesmorethanthesumofitsparts,inthesensethatthesingle

syntheticindicatoroffersamorecompleteindicationofacountry’scombinedperformanceonthe

fourdimensionsthatplausiblyformpartofanyempiricalmeasureofintergenerationalinjustice.


0.59

1.00

Debt per ChildESTONIA

Child Poverty

Ecological Footprint

EBISS

0.75

0.94

1.0

Figure 7: The IJI rectangle – Estonia

Source: Author's computations.

1.0

1.0

1.0

31


Figure 8: The IJI rectangle – South Korea

0.63

0.95 Debt per ChildSOUTH KOREA

Child Poverty


EBISS

0.78

0.89

1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0


Figure 9: The IJI rectangle – Germany

0.74

0.67

Debt per ChildGERMANY

Child Poverty


EBISS

0.79

0.73

1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0


32


Figure 11: The IJI rectangle – Japan

0.000.41

Debt per ChildJAPAN

Child Poverty


EBISS

0.87

0.36

1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0


Figure 10: The IJI rectangle – USA

0.00

0.69

Debt per ChildUSA

Child Poverty


EBISS0.23

0.6

1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0



33

Figure 12: The IJI rectangle – Italy

0.62

0.21

Debt per ChildITALY

Child Poverty


EBISS

0.8

0.29

1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0


Figures7and8showcasetwoIJIsuccessstories–EstoniaandSouthKorea.Bothcountriesperform

wellonallfourdimensionsofIJI.Withtheslightexceptionofthechildpovertydimension,these

rectanglesarebothrelativelysymmetricandlarge,withanoverallsquareratherthanrectangular

shape.ThesameistrueofGermanyinFigure9,althoughtheoverallsquaresizeissomewhat

smallerduetothecountry’slowerperformanceonthreeofthefourdimensions,notablyEBiSS

anddebtperchild.Theformervariableislikelytobeincreasedfurtherasaresultofafederal

governmentdecisiontoincreasestatepensionlevelsfor20millionpensionersby1.1percentin

2008and2percentin2009(afederalelectionyear).TheestimatedcostofE12billionbytheend

of2012istobepaidformainlybycurrentworking-agegenerationsinGermany–employersand

employees.This ledtoformerPresidentHerzog’sdeclarationthatthecountryisturningintoa

pensionerdemocracy(DeutscheWelle2008a;2008b;seealsoSinnandUebelmesser2003).In

addition,anewfederallawintroducedinMay2009guaranteedthatnonominalcutsinpensions

wouldoccur.Asaresult,theGermanpensionsystemfacesadditionalburdensofaboutE10billion

through2013(SGIcountryreports34).SuchpressuresarelikelytoincreasefurtherasGermany,

todayalreadytheOECD’sfourth-oldestsocietywithanold-agedependencyratio(personsaged

15–65relativetopersonsaged65+)of31percent,issettoagefurtherinthenexttwodecades,

reachingaprojectedold-agedependencyratioof46percentby2030(Gasioretal.2011).

34

Ontheotherhand,debt-per-childlevelsmaybeimprovedinfutureyearsbyaconstitutionaldebt

limitintroducedin2009,whichrestrictstheGermanfederalgovernment’scyclicallyadjustedbud-

getdeficittoamaximumof0.35percentofGDPandrequiresbalancedcyclicallyadjustedbudgets

fortheindividualfederalstates.Thisdebtrulewillbecomebindingforthecentralgovernmentin

2016andforthestatesin2020(SGIcountryreports).Germanyalsoperformedrelativelywellin

termsofchildpovertyin2008,thoughtheproblemstillrequirestargetedpoliticalaction.Today

itisestimatedthatmorethan3millionGermanchildrenliveinpoverty,including35percentof

allchildrenincitiessuchasBerlin.AndwhilepensionersaremuchbetteroffinGermanytoday,

thiscannotbeextrapolatedintofuturedecades.Aftermanyyearsofhighlevelsofunemployment,

lowHartzIVwelfarepayments,decreasingwageincomesandunsteadyworklives,anincreas-

ingshareofthepopulationwillbefacedwithpovertyinretirement.Inaddition,changestothe

pensionformulainrecentyearshaveaimedatreducingpensionbenefitpayments(SGIcountry

reports;Sciubba2012;Hering2012).

TheUnitedStates,JapanandItalyarethreeclearexamplesofcomparativelyintergenerationally

unjustcountries.InFigure10,acomparativelymediocreU.S.performanceondebtperchild,poor

performancesintermsofEBiSSandecologicalfootprint,andasample-worstperformanceonchild

povertyadduptoalopsidedandsmallIJIrectangle.Withrespecttodebt,thenear-termfuture

outlookismarredbychallengesassociatedwiththeObamaadministration’snecessaryfiscaland

budgetaryexpansionpoliciesinreactiontothe2008crisis.Noraretheprospectsforlong-term

fiscalconsolidationpromising,evenafterthe2012PresidentialandCongressionalelections,as

bothmainstreampartieshaveruledoutbroadtaxincreases,onepartyisstronglycommittedto

taxreductions,andthebulkofspendingoccursinrelativelyshelteredprogramssuchashealth

programs,pensions,defenseandnetinterestpayments(SGIcountryreports).

Japan and Italy also have small IJI rectangles. In Japan it is a comparatively small ecological

footprint and a sample-worst performance on debt per child that are the main sources of the

IJI rectangle’s lopsidedness (Figure11).Bycontrast, theshapeof the rectangle in Italy isvery

different(Figure12).Anaverageperformanceondebtperchildandagoodecologicalfootprint,

combinedwithverylowvaluesonchildpovertyandtheEBiSS,adduptoalongandnarrowsmall

rectangle.Italyisofcourseaclearexampleofa“familialist”welfarestate,inwhichthestateleaves

largechild-care,elderly-careandwelfare-provisionburdenstofamilies,especiallytowomen(e.g.

Esping-Andersen1999;2009).Asa result,working-age citizens tend tobeoverburdenedwith

tasks andunderprovidedwith state support, except for relatively generous rules onmaternity

leave(paidforbysocialinsurance)andlimitedtaxdeductionsforchildren(SGIcountryreports).

In sum, the United States, Italy and Japan clearly show a low degree of intergenerational jus-

tice in their current policies. Yet as democracies, they remain able to implement reforms. For

instance,contradictingfrequentclaimsthattheseagingdemocraciessufferfrompolicysclerosis

andreform-inability,bothItalyandJapan(likeGermany)haveinrecentyearsmanagedtoimpose

significantpolicyreformsthathaveeitherboostedtheinterestsofyoungergenerationsorhurtthe


35


interestsofoldervoters(Sciubba2012).Andpriortothelarge-scaleecologicaldisruptionscaused

bytheFukushimadisaster,JapanimplementedasignificantsociallawinMarch2010providing

forfinancialsupportforhouseholdswithschool-agedchildren(SGIcountryreports).Inaddition,

then-PrimeMinisterYukioHatoyamarenewedapre-electionpledgeinSeptember2009toachieve

a30percentreductioninCO2levelsby2020comparedto2005,ontheconditionthatallmajor

emittersreachedatreatysettingfairandrealisticreductionlevels(SGIcountryreports).

Theprospects forsignificant reforms favoringyoungergenerationsappearmore limited in the

caseoftheUnitedStates.35Yetsignificantattemptshavebeenmadeeventhere.Forinstance,the

AmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentAct,passedinthewakeofthe2008recession,contained

measures such as the extension of employment benefits; increases in benefits, education and

housing;largerbenefitsforfamilieswithchildren;biggerfoodstampbenefits;andlargertaxcred-

itsfortheworkingpoor(SGIcountryreports).Inthesamevein,theObamaadministrationhas

increasedsupportforyoungergenerationsby$2billionthroughtheChildCareandDevelopment

Fund,ablockgrantgoingtostategovernments,andproposedasapartofits2011budgetproposal

todoublethechildanddependentcaretaxcredit(SGIcountryreports).Regardingecology,the

February 2009 stimulus package included roughly $100 billion for environmental and energy

efficiencymeasures,suchassupportforinsulatingbuildingsandincentivesforthedevelopment

ofrenewableenergies.InJune2009,theHouseofRepresentativespassedtheAmericanClean

EnergyandSecurityAct,whichmandatedtheintroductionofacap-and-tradesystemwithabind-

ingceilingforgreenhousegasemissions,thoughitwassubsequentlydefeatedintheSenate.The

capwouldhavereducedemissionsby17percentbelow2005levelsby2020andby83percent

by2050 (SGI country reports).Morebroadly, theU.S. academicandpolicymakingcommunity

appearstobemovinggraduallytowardtheideaofacarbontax(MuroandRothwell2012;Rausch

andReilly2012).

5.2. Aggregation: researcher-imposed weighting

In a second step, an aggregation of the four normalized IJI dimension values was performed

accordingtothefollowingresearcher-imposedweights:.2forchildpoverty,.2fornetecological

surplus,and .2fordebtperchild,andtwicethisweight(.4) forEBiSS.Thisgreaterweighthas

beenassignedonthegroundsthatEBiSSisasingularlycomprehensivesyntheticindicatorinits

ownright,andonewhichcapturesgovernmenteffortsintheserviceofintergenerationaljustice

especiallywellasitisapurespendingmeasure.Figure13showstheseIJIvaluesasconditioned

by the researcher-imposedEBiSS-heavyweights. Themost intergenerationally just countries in

thisregardareEstonia,SouthKoreaandNewZealand(IJIvaluesof.91,.87and.85),followedby

Norway,Israel,andSweden(IJIvaluesof.81,.81and.79),andthenbytheUnitedKingdom,Fin-

land,Hungary,Ireland,Germany,Switzerland,DenmarkandBelgium(allwithIJIvaluesbetween

.75and.70).ThefiveleastintergenerationallyjustcountriesareJapan,theUnitedStates,Poland,

Greece,andItaly(allwithIJIvaluesbetween.40and.44).TheyarefollowedbyPortugal,theCzech

Republic,SlovakiaandCanada(with IJIvaluesbetween0.55and0.56).These IJIvaluesareat

36

bestweaklylinkedtodemography.Ifanything,demographicallyyoungercountriesappeartobe

slightlymoreintergenerationallyjust.36

5.3. Aggregation: benefit-of-the-doubt weighting

Wehavearguedabovethat there isastrongcase forattributingacomparatively largerweight

to theEBiSSdimension,as it isasingularlycomprehensivemeasureofgovernmentactivity in

supportof intergenerational justice.Yet it isalsostronglyarguablethat,at least intheOECD’s

liberaldemocracies,governmentsmay legitimatelyattach theirown (cross-nationallydifferent)

prioritiestothevariousdimensionsoftheIJI.Asanalternativeto“playingGod”byimposingthe

sameresearcher-determinedweightsforallcountries,thereisanequallystrongcasetobemade

forrespectingtheseindividualnationalprioritiesastheyaresetbyautonomous,democratically


Figure 13: IJI with researcher-imposed (.2/.2/.2/.4) weighting


0.0

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Using an EBiSS-heavy weighting, the most intergenerationally just OECD countries are Esto-

nia, South Korea and New Zealand, followed by Norway, Israel, and Sweden.

Using an EBiSS-heavy weighting, the least intergenerationally just OECD countries are Japan,

the United States, Poland, Greece, and Italy.

37


electedgovernments.Inordertotakethesedemocraticautonomyandlegitimacyconsiderations

intoaccount,wehavedevelopedanalternative“benefit-of-the-doubt”weightingmethodfor the

IJI,basedona techniquepioneeredbyMelynandMoesen (1991) for thepurposeofassessing

macroeconomicperformance.37Thistechniqueweightsthecomponentsof thesyntheticperfor-

manceindicatorsoastogiveeachcountrythebenefitofthedoubtwithrespecttoitsownpolicy

choices.Thatis,thehighestweightsareattachedtothedimensiononwhichtheparticularcountry

showsitscomparativelybestperformance,thesecond-highestweighttothedimensiononwhich

itperformssecondbest,andsoon.

Theworkingassumptionhereisthatabetterperformanceinthissensemoreadequatelyreveals

thecountry’struepreferences.Inotherwords,aparticulardimensionoftheoverallIJIisdeemed

tobe important (andgivenahigherweight) for a country if the country inquestionperforms

well in thatparticulardimension.Forexample, it isassumedthat thepolicymakersofacoun-

trythatperformswellwithrespecttonetecologicalsurpluswillprobablyattachaparticularly

highimportancetoensuringintergenerationaljusticeforyoungergenerationsbymaintaininga

smallecologicalfootprint.Therevealedpreferencesassumptionmadebythebenefit-of-the-doubt

methodisthatactualperformancefiguresreflectthecountry’s“true”policypriorities,andthat

thesechoicesneedtoberespectedondemocraticautonomygrounds.Specifically,acountry’sbest-

performingdimensionisgivenaweightof.4,itssecond-best-performingdimensionaweightof.3,

itsthird-bestdimensionaweightof.2,anditsworstdimensionaweightof.1.Figure14showsthe

IJIvaluesobtainedwiththis.4/.3/.2/.1benefit-of-the-doubtmethod.

Figure 14: IJI with benefit-of-the-doubt (.4/.3/.2/.1) weighting


0

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38

Withthisalternativeweightingmethod,indecliningorderofjustice,themostintergenerationally

justOECDcountryisEstonia,withanear-perfectIJIvalueof.99.EstoniaisfollowedbySouthKorea,

IsraelandNewZealand(IJIvaluesof.90,.89and.89),andthenbyHungaryandthefourNordic

countries,Norway,Denmark,SwedenandFinland(IJIvaluesbetween.85and.81).Theleft-hand

sideofFigure14showsthat,indecliningorderofinjustice,theleastintergenerationallyjustOECD

countryistheUnitedStates(IJIvaluesof.50),followedbyJapan(.54),Italy(.58),Greece(.59)and

Canada(.62).Aswaspreviouslythecasewiththeresearcher-weightedIJI(andtheEBiSS),these

benefit-of-the-doubtIJIvaluesareonlyweaklylinkedtodemography.39Notealsothatcompared

totheEBiSS-heavy.2/.2/.2/.4weightingmethodinFigure13,thebenefit-of-the-doubtmethodin

Figure14producesasimilarbutnotidenticalcountryranking,withonlyrelativelyminororder

reversals (the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two sets of IJI values is +0.91). For

instance,Estonia,SouthKoreaandNewZealandare rankedfirst, secondand fourthusing the

benefit-of-thedoubtmethod,andfirst,secondandthirdusingthe.2/.2/.2/.4method.TheUnited

States,JapanandItalyreceivethefirst-,second-andthird-lowestrankingsusingthebenefit-of-the

doubtweighting,andthesecond-,first-andfifth-lowestrankingswiththe.2/.2/.2/.4weighting.

OnenotabledifferenceisthatwiththeexceptionoftheCzechRepublic(whichgainsonerank),

the ranking of every one of the Central European countries studied here drops, often signifi-

cantly,whenusingtheEBiSS-heavyweightingascomparedtothebenefit-of-the-doubtmodel.For

instance,Hungarydropsfromthefifth-highestIJIrankunderbenefit-of-the-doubtweightingtothe

9th-highestIJIrankwiththeEBiSS-heavyweighting,whileSloveniadropsfromthe10th-tothe

18th-highestIJIrank.Polanddropsevenmoresignificantly,fromthe19th-highest(or11th-lowest)

tothe26th-highest(orthird-lowest)IJIrank.IntheseCentralEuropeancountries,withwelfare

statesthatalreadyshowaveryhighpro-elderlybiastoday,thefutureoutlookforintergenerational

justiceappearstobeespeciallyworrying.Legaciesassociatedwithearlypostcommunistpolicies

suchasinadequatehealth-carepractices,internationallyverylowlabormarketparticipationrates

amongwomenandolderworkersandhistoricallyunprecedentedearlyanddisabilitypensioner

boomshavepreparedthesecountriesbadlyforthecomingthreedecades,whentheirsocietieswill

enteraperiodofparticularlyfastdemographicaging(Vanhuysse2004;2006;2009b).40

6. Conclusions and implications: policy reforms for boosting intergenerational

justice in practice

ThisreporthasproposedtheIJI–asynthetic,four-dimensionalindexthatenablesacomparison

ofintergenerationaljusticeinpracticeacrossadvancedmarketdemocracies.TheIJIisa“snapshot

of the present moment” measure capturing (a) policy outcomes with respect to child poverty,

publicdebt levelsper childandecological footprints that leave legacies for futuregenerations

orappeartoconstitutediscriminationbetweenyoungerandolderlivinggenerations,and(b)the

degreetowhichcurrentsocialspendingisbiasedtowardolderlivinggenerations.Usingabenefit-

of-the-doubtweightingmethodthatisrespectfulofthe(revealed)preferencesofdemocratically


39

electedgovernments,wehaveseenthataroundthelate2000sandtheearlyyearsofthepresent

decade,themostintergenerationallyjustcountriesamongasetof29OECDmemberstateswere

Estonia,followedbySouthKorea,IsraelandNewZealand,andthenbyHungaryandallfourNordic

countriesstudiedhere.Interestingly,theintergenerational justiceindexvaluesofthe29OECD

societieswereessentiallyunrelatedtothesesocieties’demographicagestructures.


Using a benefit-of-the-doubt weighting, the most intergenerationally just country is Estonia,

followed by South Korea, Israel and New Zealand, and then by Hungary and all four Nordic

countries.

Using a benefit-of-the-doubt weighting, the least intergenerationally just countries are the

United States, Japan, Italy, Greece, and Canada.

TheleastintergenerationallyjustcountrieswerefoundtobetheUnitedStates,Japan,Italy,Greece,

andCanada. In this lattersetofcountries,not reformingcurrentpolicypatternswouldsimply

mean that a high degree of injustice would continue to be inflicted upon younger and future

generations.Insuchcases,stickingtothestatusquowouldactuallybeequivalenttoperpetuating

abaddealforyounggenerations.

Clearly,beforedrawingstrongconclusionsaboutintergenerationaljusticeinparticularcountries,

thesnapshotpictureprovidedbytheIJIinthepresentreportwouldneedtobecomplementedby

furthersnapshotsencompassingpastandfuturepointsintime,especiallyinviewoftherecent

andongoingeconomiccrisisinmanyOECDcountries.Suchlongitudinalmonitoringmightbethe

taskofanIntergenerationalJusticeObservatory,tobesetupinonecountryoracrossmany.The

highlysyntheticanalysispresentedhereideallyoughttobecomplementedbyin-depthcountry

casestudiesandpolicydomainstudiesaswell.Nevertheless,totheextentthatimprovinginter-

generational justice is a matter of moral urgency, particularly in democracies such as Greece,

Japan,theUnitedStates,andItalythatfeatureatthelow-scoringleftsideofbothfigures13and

14,anumberofimportantpolicyprescriptionsdofollow.Iwillbrieflyaddressthese,albeitwith

varyingdegreesofpoliticalutopianism,asregardsthesupplyside,theinstitutionalsideandthe

demandsideofpublicpolicymaking.

Onthesupplyside,seemingly“obvious”measureslongdebatedinthevariouspolicyliteratures

arguablymeritacloserlookinlightoftheIJIperspective.Tonamejustafew,theseincludefiscal

andsocialsecuritybenefitsorcreditstorewardparentsand/orcarersforraisingchildrenorcar-

ingforelderlyfamilymembers,practicesthatoftenentailsubstantialprivate(opportunity)cost

whileproducingsocietalbenefit.Otherobviouslysensiblepolicyreformsmightincludetheadjust-

mentofofficialpensionagesandsubsequentpensionbenefitstreamstoadapttocontinuously

risinglifeexpectancies,orecologicallymotivatedregulationsor(better)taxframeworks,suchas

40

carbontaxes.Carbontaxes,forinstance,arealreadyinplacetodayincountriessuchasSweden

andAustralia,andincreasinglycommandsupportfrompolicyanalystsandacademiceconomists

acrossthepoliticalspectrumevenintraditionallymoreresistantcountries(e.g.,MuroandRoth-

well2012;RauschandReilly2012).Thereisaparticularlystrongcaseforspendingrelativelymore

onyoungergenerations–inparticular,forspendinginsmarterwaysthroughsocialinvestment

policiesaimedatnurturing, renewingand increasinghumancapitalandskills,astrategy that

alsopromisestoboostagingwelfarestates’fiscalbasesintheprocess.NordicEuropeleadsthe

wayinthisregardaswell,asitdoes,remarkably,onmostotherintergenerationallyjustandsound

policiesmentionedhere.

Apromisingpolicyinnovationiswhatcouldbelabeledintergenerationalearmarking.Here,some

portionof(perhapsnewlyraised)fiscalrevenueswouldbeearmarkedforexpenditurespecifically

ontheimprovementofoneofthedimensionsofintergenerationaljustice(suchassmarthuman

capitalinvestmentinyoungergenerations).Alternatively,revenueraisedfromboostingonedimen-

sionofintergenerationaljustice(suchasenvironmentaltaxation)couldbeusedforfundingthe

welfarestateinagingsocieties.41Theintergenerationalearmarkingelementinsuchapproaches

mightactuallymakehighertaxationmorepalatabletovoters.Bythesametoken,doublewhammy

intergenerationalearmarkingcouldbemoreeffectivestill.Here,extrarevenuesraisedtoboost

one dimension of intergenerational justice (such as those from environmental taxes) could be

earmarkedspecifically forspendingonanotherdimensionof intergenerational justice (suchas

humancapitalinvestment).


Intergenerational justice can be boosted by “double whammy intergenerational earmar-

king,” whereby extra revenues raised to improve one IJI dimension are used specifically to

make progress in another IJI dimension.

Childtaxcredits,generousfamilyallowancesandparentalleavepoliciescanclearlyhelpparents,

especiallymothers,toshouldertheburdenofraisingchildrenandbuildingtheircareers.Promis-

ing, ifmoreexotic,policy reformsalso include“child trust funds”establishedbygovernments

andtoppedupbyparents,whichcouldbeaccessedbyadolescentsuponreachingmaturity(Fin-

layson2008),andcontext-sensitive“childbounties”giventoparentswhoraiseachild’sexpected

valuetosocietyabovewhatcouldbereasonablyexpected(Coleman1993).42Butamonghuman

capital policies, investment inhigh-quality early childhood education and careprograms, long

advocatedbyeconomistssuchasJamesHeckmanandsociologistssuchasGøstaEsping-Andersen,

isaparticularlypromisingavenue forpolicyreformsaimingtomarryeconomicefficiencyand

intergenerationaljustice.43

The best available knowledge shows that even when viewed from a purely economic point of

view,suchearlychildhoodprogramsconstituteanefficientuseofpublicresources.Comparedto

randomlyassignedcontrols,participantsintheseprogramsscoresystematicallybetteronawide

41

rangeofvariablesmeasuringeducationalachievementsandhigh-schoolgraduationrates,aswell

as inlater-in-lifemeasuressuchasemploymentrates,monthlyearnings,welfarereceiptstatus

andcrimerates.Onereason is thatyoungerchildrenhave longer timehorizonsoverwhich to

recoupthebenefitsofhumancapitalincreases.Thishorizonargumentalsomoregenerallyindi-

cateswhyyoungcitizens’interestsdeservespecialprotectionbygovernments:boththepositive

andthenegativeimpactsofpublicpoliciesonyoungcitizensarelikelytolastlonger.Moreover,

earlychildhoodinvestmenthaslong-lastingbenefitsforthesamereasonthatchildpovertyand

youth unemployment carry long-lasting costs or scarring effects. Skill formation is a dynamic

andstronglycumulativeprocess:earlylearningmakeslaterlearningeasierandmoreeffective.44

Withincountries,thisisofcoursethecaseespeciallyforthosechildrenwhohadthemisfortune

tohavebeenborninsociallydisadvantagedenvironmentsthatcannotorwillnotofferthemthe

privateresourcesandthesocialandculturalcapitalneededtocompensateforalackofadequate

publicpolicies.Thus,thispolicywithitsprovenpotentialtoboostintergenerationaljusticeislikely

tohavethebeneficialsideeffectofsimultaneouslypromotingintragenerationaljustice.45


On the policy supply side, human capital investment in high-quality early childhood education

is a particularly promising avenue for marrying economic efficiency and intergenerational

justice.

On the demand side, a powerful means of boosting intergenerational justice in aging socie-

ties would be to give each parent one-half extra proxy vote, to be used on behalf of each

underage child until that child reaches legal voting age.

Ofcourse,where“obviously”soundsupply-sidepoliciesarenotalreadysufficientlyimplemented,

theyarehardlylikelytoberealizedsimplythroughwishfulthinking.Ifpolicymakersaretobe

pressuredintodevotingmoreresourcestoimprovingtheintergenerationaljusticecontentofpub-

licpolicies,thedemandsideandtheinstitutionsinvolvedinthepolicymakingprocessneedto

bereformedaswell.Withrespect to institutions, theestablishmentoffiscal,childwelfareand

ecologicalgoldenrules,guardiansorwatchdogs–or,asmentioned,anIntergenerationalJustice

Observatory–couldwellserveasmeansofnudging,namingandshamingpolicymakerstoward

boostingintergenerationaljustice.

Yetindemocracieswithagingelectorates,hard-powerconsiderationsarestilllikelytooverrule

thesoftnudgesofinstitutionalrulesandwatchdogs.Oneintergenerationallyprogressivereform

withpoliticalbite is the ideaofgivingparentsproxyvotes tobeexercised inpursuitof their

children’s interests.Longdiscussedbypolitical theoristssuchasPhilippeVanParijsandKarl

Hinrichsand,separately,bydemographerssuchasPaulDemeny,thetimemayhavecomeforthe

ideaofgivingeachparentone-halfextravote(oralternativelyeachmotheronefullextravote),to

beusedonbehalfofeachunderagechilduntilthatchildreacheslegalvotingage.46Theseproxy

42


votes for children, to be exercised by their parents as trustees, could be made conditional on

parentsmeetingminimumchildwelfareandchildeducationalstandards.Theycouldbefurther

regulatedaccordingtootherpublicinterestorcivicparticipationrequirements,suchashavinga

longstandinghistoryofresidenceoroftaxorsocial-securitycontributions.Proxyvotesoughttogo

handinhandwiththemostextensivepossibleprovisionofpublicresourcestoassistthoseadults

whowishbutstruggletobecomeparents.

Proxy votes for children can be defended on deontological grounds: They apply the demo-

cratic one-person, one-vote principle consistently, and they reward parents for the significant

contributions to society made by raising children.

Theintroductionofproxyvotesforchildrenwouldaddadegreeofhardpowertotheintergenera-

tionalpoliticsgamebecause,onceenacted,itwouldchangegovernments’electoralincentivesin

favorofyoungergenerations.Whatismore,theawardofthesenewrightswouldbelessvulnerable

tosubsequentdiscretionaryreversalsbyfuturegovernmentsthanwouldbefunctionallyequiva-

lentmonetarypolicies,suchashumancapitalspending,childtaxcreditsorchildtrustfunds.If

thesenewrightswereconstitutionallyenshrined,reversalsofproxyvoterightswouldevenbe

near-impossible.47Proxyvoteswouldalsoconstituteahighlysignificantsymbolicshiftinfavorof

intergenerationaljusticeinagingsocietieswithlowfertilityratesandincreasinglifeexpectancies.

Ondeontologicalgroundstheycanbedefendedasanintrinsicallygoodidea.First,proxyvotes

rewardchildren,albeitindirectly,byconsistentlyandsymmetricallyapplyingthequintessentially

democratic one-person, one-vote principle. They treat the very young as full political citizens

within their polity, just as the very old are already treated today. At the same time, awarding

proxyvotes toparents circumvents the obviousproblemof children’sdemocratic competence,

whichalsoplaguessomeoftheveryold(whoareneverthelessnotdisenfranchisedbylaw).48But

equallyimportantly,proxyvotesrewardparentsdirectlyforthesignificantcontributiontosociety,

aboveandbeyondtheirprivatewelfare,thatparentstypicallymakebyraisingchildren.Asmany

analystshavenoted,raisingchildrenendowedwithhighlevelsofhumancapitalalsoamountsto

contributingtoapublicgoodwithpositiveexternalities(Folbre1994;2008;Coleman1993).

Givingextrapoliticalrightstoparentsviaproxyvotesconstitutesanonpunitive(andnonmon-

etary)rewardtoparentsforcontributingtosociety’snextgenerationbyraisingachild,anditis

arguablyamoreliberalalternativetotaxingorotherwisepenalizingnon-parentsfornotraising

children.Throughpay-as-you-gopensionsandsimilarsocialbenefits,aswellasthroughdeficit

spendingandpublicdebt,non-parentswillmakesignificantfutureclaimsupontheearningsof

futureworking-ageadults,despitehavingasmallerroleinthecareofthesefuturegenerations.In

Folbre’s(1994:89)words:“Publicpolicyliterallytransfersresourcesfromparentstonon-parents

byprovidingsocialinsurancebasedonparticipationinpaidemploymentwithoutexplicitlyvalu-

ing time, effort, ormoneydevoted to children.… Infiscal terms, children represent apositive

externality.”49Proxyvotesforchildrenareaforcefulwaytoredressthisinherentintergenerational

43

justicewithrights,notbenefitsorservices.Socialjusticeintertwineswithdemographyhere.Nor-

matively,sucharedressismostpertinentwhereverthenumericalbalancebetweenyoungerand

olderpopulationgroupsistiltingrapidlyinfavorofthelatter.AsubsetofagingOECDsocieties

todaymay alreadybe locked into low fertility traps. InGerman-speakingEurope, for instance,

newlyemerging,self-reinforcingsocialnormsmaybeintheprocessofpermanentlyloweringthe

desireofyoungercohortstohavechildren,asevermoreyoungadultsperceivesmallfamiliesas

thenaturalidealandperceiveprocreationasamerematterofindividualpreference.50


Proxy votes can be defended on consequentialist grounds. They certainly redress the nume-

rical underrepresentation of parents as eligible voters, they probably increase the electoral

participation of parents as actual voters, and they potentially reduce younger citizens’ political

disengagement by giving them a stake in democracy.

On consequentialist grounds, however, proxy votes for children would not necessarily amount

toawatershedchangeinthevotingpowerbalanceofadvanceddemocracies.AsSandersonand

Scherbov(2007:546,549)estimateforGermany,JapanandtheUnitedStates,comparedtothe

policystatusquotoday,thisseeminglyradicalreformwouldreducetheexpectedshareofpen-

sionerswithinthevotingpopulationbyverylittle–indeed,byjustfive,sixandfivepercentage

pointsrespectivelyby2050.51Seeminglymorefeasiblereforms,suchasreducingthelegalvoting

ageto16or15,wouldconsequentlyhavestillmorenegligibleelectoral-numericaleffects.52But

proxyvotesarelikelytoaffectthedynamicsofintergenerationalpoliticsbeyondthesedefinite,

ifperhapsmarginal,changesinthenumericalbalancebetweenyoungerandoldereligiblevot-

ers(electors).Theyalsopromisetoinduceadditionalbehavioralchangesintheintergenerational

politicsgame,withsomeofthesechangesmorepredictablethanothers.

Forinstance,proxyvotesarelikelytoincreasethedefactoelectoralparticipationratesofparents

asactualvoters(notelectors),thuscounterbalancingoldercitizens’notoriouslyhigherparticipa-

tionrates.53Higherturnoutratesamongparentscouldariseasthecombinedresultoftwoeffects.

First,proxyvotesleadtoaverysignificantimprovementintheinstrumentalcost/benefitcalculus

toparentsofgoingtothevotingbooth.Second,theymayinduce“trickle-up”effectswherebymore

politicallyawareanddemocraticallyinvolvedchildreninfluencetheirparentstocasttheirvotefor

them.Thisalonewouldundoubtedlyreduceyoungergenerations’oft-mentioneddisappointment

inanddisengagementfrompolitics.Itwouldincreasetheirsenseofhavingastakeinthedemo-

craticgameofdistributionalconflictamongclasses,generationsandotherinterestcoalitions.In

sum,proxyvotesforchildrenareapolicyreformwithpoliticalbitethatcanbedefendedonstrong

deontologicalgroundsandonplausible,ifmoreuncertain,consequentialistgrounds.Theyoffera

“Rawlsian-Machiavellian”roadtowardfurtheringtheimportantgoalofintergenerationaljustice,

bymodifyingthefuturecourseofelectoralcalculationanddemocraticengagementinagingOECD

societies.

44

Acknowledgement / About the author

Acknowledgement

Forhelpfulcommentsonapreviousdraftofthisreport,Iamgratefultoseminarparticipantsat

theBertelsmannStiftunginGütersloh,theHertieSchoolofGovernanceinBerlin,theUniversity

ofOldenburgandtheIdeasFairofthe2012GlobalEconomicSymposiuminRiodeJaneiro;and

especiallytoHelmutAnheier,StefanEmpter,AndreasEsche,KatrinGasior,MartinHeidenreich,

Claus Offe, Ricardo Rodrigues, Tillman Schwörer, TomásšSobotka, Markus Tepe, Jana Vobecká,

andChristopherWratil.AspecialthankyouisowedtoNajimAzahafandDanielSchraad-Tischler

foraccompanyingthedevelopmentofthisreportinaconstantlycurious,critical,andconstructive

manner.Allerrorsremaintheauthor’s.

About the author

PieterVanhuysse,PhD(LSE)isHeadofResearchandDeputyDirectorattheEuropeanCentrefor

SocialWelfarePolicyandResearchinVienna(affiliatedwiththeUnitedNations).Hisresearch

focusesonthecomparativepoliticsandpoliticalsociologyofwelfarestates,publicpolicies,inter-

generational policy conflict, and population aging. He has published more than thirty journal

articles,hasco-editedPost-CommunistWelfarePathways(PalgraveMacmillan,2009)andAgeing

PopulationsinPost-IndustrialDemocracies(Routledge/ECPR,2012),andhasauthoredDivideand

Pacify:StrategicSocialPoliciesandPoliticalProtestsinPost-CommunistDemocracies(CEUPress,

2006), whichwas nominated for the AmericanSociologicalAssociation’s Best BookAward for

PoliticalSociology.

Email: [email protected]

Homepage: www.euro.centre.org/vanhuysse

45

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Endnotes

Endnotes1 Forrecentcontributions,seeespeciallyLaslettandFishkin(1992),GosseriesandMeyer

(2009)andFishkinandGoodin(2010);forareviewofthelatterseeVanhuysse(2013).See

alsoArrhenius(2009),Gosseries(2010),IntergenerationalJusticeReview(2005;2008),Kohli

(2006),RoemerandVeneziani(2004),Tremmel(2010;2012).Ontheconceptof‘generation’

inpublicpolicy,seeKohli(2006),Goerres(2009),GoerresandVanhuysse(2012),May(2013).

Onsocialjusticeandpensionpolicy,seeSchokkaertandVanParijs(2003).

2 SeeespeciallySchraad-Tischler(2011).ForUK-focusedapproachestointergenerational

fairnessindexingandintergenerationalequityinredistribution,seerespectivelyLeachand

Hanton(2012)andBradshawandHolmes(2013).

3 These29OECDcountriesare:Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Switzerland,theCzech

Republic,Denmark,Spain,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,

Israel,Italy,Japan,SouthKorea,theNetherlands,NewZealand,Norway,Poland,Portugal,

Sweden,Slovakia,Slovenia,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates.

4 Formoreonmethodologicalchoicesandvaluejudgementsinmeasuringprogresswithsocial

indicatorsandonthe“problematicrelationship”ofsuchindicatorswithpublicpolicy,seefor

instanceAtkinson(2005),Atkinsonetal.(2002).

5 Clearly,thisimpliesthattheintergenerationaljusticeimplicationsofmanyimportantbut

morerecentevents,suchasthoserelatedtotheglobaleconomiccrisisthatstartedinlate

2007andtherelatedeurozonecrisisthatdominated2011–2012,arenotyetfullyvisiblein

thepresentIJI.Itisthereforeimportanttoexercisecautioninextrapolatinginformationabout

intergenerationaljusticeintheOECDaftertheperiodconsideredhere,especiallyinthose

countriesmostheavilyhitbythesecrisesfromaneconomicandmacro-fiscalviewpoint,such

asGreece,Ireland,SpainandItaly.

6 SeeDeutscheWelle(2008a).DiscussingGermanyinthesamevein,SinnandUebelmesser

(2002)notethatthebeginningof2010sis“thecountry’slastchanceforapartialtransition

toafundedpensionsystem.Thereafter,thecountrywilleffectivelybeagerontocracy.”

DiscussingEurope,Sinn(2005)claimsthatthecontinent“isgraduallybeingtransformed

intoagerontocracyinwhichtheoldruletheroost.....Thistrendwillbeconsolidatedinthe

future.”MoremeasuredapproachesareLindhetal.(2010),andDavidson’s(2012)critique

ofBerry(2012b).Forempiricalrefutationsofalarmistpoliticaleconomyclaimsaboutrising

gerontocracy,seeTepeandVanhuysse(2009,2010).

7 SeeSabbaghandVanhuysse(2010).Foratwo-countrystudyofperceivedpensioninjustice,

seeSabbaghandVanhuysse(2012).Ontheeffectsofpopulationagingonsocialpolicy

attitudesandintergenerationalsolidarity,see,forinstance,Boerietal.(2001),Emery(2012),

LynchandMyrskylä(2009),Busemeyeretal.(2009),Saraceno(2008);GoerresandTepe

(2012).Ontheelectoralandpartysystemconsequencesofpopulationaging,seerespectively

Goerres(2009)andHanley(2012).

56

Endnotes

8 Asithappens,atthemacrolevelsuchprospectivemeasuresofpopulationagingbasedon

remaininglifeexpectancygenerallytendtoproducelessdramatictrendsincurrentand

projectedlevelsofpopulationagingformostOECDcountries(SandersonandScherbov2010;

2008).

9 See,forinstance,SteinerandValentyne(2009),Wolf(2009);seealsoRoemer(2005).

10 SeeWackernageletal.(2005).Aglobalhectare(gha)isdefinedas“productivityweighted

areausedtoreportboththebiocapacityoftheearth,andthedemandonbiocapacity

(theEcologicalFootprint).Theglobalhectareisnormalizedtothearea-weightedaverage

productivityofbiologicallyproductivelandandwaterinagivenyear.Becausedifferentland

typeshavedifferentproductivity,aglobalhectareof,forexample,cropland,wouldoccupy

asmallerphysicalareathanthemuchlessbiologicallyproductivepastureland,asmore

pasturewouldbeneededtoprovidethesamebiocapacityasonehectareofcropland.Because

worldbioproductivityvariesslightlyfromyeartoyear,thevalueofaghamaychangeslightly

fromyeartoyear.”Seewww.footprintnetwork.org/

11 TheaverageecologicalfootprintinthesampleshowninFigure1is5.24ghapercapita,with

astandarddeviationof1.12.

12 SeePonthiere(2009).Specifically,biocapacityisdefinedbyFootprintNetworkas:“the

capacityofecosystemstoproduceusefulbiologicalmaterialsandtoabsorbwastematerials

generatedbyhumans,usingcurrentmanagementschemesandextractiontechnologies.

‘Usefulbiologicalmaterials’aredefinedasthosedemandedbythehumaneconomy.Hence

whatisconsidered‘useful’canchangefromyeartoyear(e.g.,useofcorn(maize)stoverfor

cellulosicethanolproductionwouldresultincornstoverbecomingausefulmaterial,and

thusincreasethebiocapacityofmaizecropland).Thebiocapacityofanareaiscalculated

bymultiplyingtheactualphysicalareabytheyieldfactorandtheappropriateequivalence

factor.”Seewww.footprintnetwork.org/

13 Ifthereisanecologicaldeficit,itmeansthatthecountryisimportingbiocapacitythrough

tradeorliquidatingregionalecologicalassets,oremittingwastesintoaglobalcommonssuch

astheatmosphere.Seewww.footprintnetwork.org/

14 Inaddition,theecologicalfootprintmeasureissubjecttoanumberofdeeperphilosophical

critiques,butitmostlysharesthoseallegedweaknesseswithrivalsustainabilityindicators.

Ponthiere(2009),forinstance,notesthatecologicalfootprintstudiessufferalsofromthe

factthatthenumberoffuturepeopledependsoncurrentgenerations’actions,fromthe

possiblenon-existenceoffuturegenerations,andfromthesensitivityoffuturepeople’stastes

tocurrentgenerations’decisions.Note,however,thateventhislargelycriticalassessment

ofecologicalfootprintusesforintergenerationaljusticeassessmentpurposesconcludes

thatdespiteitsimperfections,ecologicalfootprintindicatorsdohave“thevirtuetoopenthe

possibility,forhumans,tobecometheownjudgesoftheiractions,and,hence,tobeableto

act,onthebasisoftheirjudgments,inamorefairwaywithrespecttofuturegenerations.All

57

Endnotes

thismightwellbeonlyapromise,butapromiseofjusticemaybethefirststeptowardjustice

itself”(Ponthiere2009:692).

15 Theneedforgovernmentinterventionderivesfromthefactthatenvironmentaldamageisan

externality,asindividualactorstypicallyhavelittleornoincentivetotakethedamagethey

causetotheenvironmentintoaccountintheirprivatebehavior:mostofthedamageisspread

acrosssocietyatlargeratherthantheindividualpolluter.

16 See:www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/trends/spain/

17 See:www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/trends/sweden/

18 Forinstance,between1996and2008,long-termtrendsofemploymentprotection

legislationforregularcontracts(whichlargelycorrespondwithinsiderjobsthattendtobe

disproportionatelyheldbyolderworkers)andtemporarycontracts(outsiderjobsheldmore

oftenbyyoungerworkers)showascissor-shapedpattern.Regularcontractshaveonaverage

enjoyedaremarkablestatusquoinprotectionlevelsacrosstheOECD.Buttemporaryjob

contractshavesufferedfromoftenseverereductionsinprotectionlevels(TepeandVanhuysse

2013).Thismeansthatyoungerworkersareoftenfirsttobefired,particularlyduring

recessionperiods(O’Higgins2012).Inthesamevein,educationspendingandactivelabor

markettrainingcanhavesignificanteffectsonyouthunemployment.Thesetwopoliciesare

coveredintheEBiSSdimension,below.

19 See,forinstance,Bowlesetal.(2005),DuncanandMurnane(2011),Esping-Andersen(2002,

2008,2009),Esping-AndersenandSarasa(2002),GreggandMachin(2001),Havemanand

Wolfe(1995).Onbefore-birtheffects(i.e.,effectsofbeingborntopoorordisadvantaged

mothers),seeespeciallyCurrie(2011).

20 SeeIsaacs(2012:5-6),whonotesthatintheUnitedStates,thegapinschoolreadiness

betweenpoorandmiddle-to-highincomechildrenis27percentagepoints.Thisrawpoverty

gapisreducedtoastillsignificant10pointsaftercontrollingfordemographicfactorssuchas

parentaleducationlevel,maritalstatus,mother’sageatbirth,race,immigrantstatus,gender

andageinmonths.

21 SeeDuncanandMurnane(2011),GornickandMeyers(2003),Pong(1997).Forinstance

DuncanandMurnane(2011)pointoutthatstudentsfromhigh-povertyschoolshavelower

subsequentlabormarketearninglevelsevenaftercontrollingforacademicperformance.They

arguethatthiscanbeexplainedbythefactthatstudentsinhigh-povertyschoolsarecutoff

fromvaluableprofessionalcontactsthatcanhelpoutingettingstartedinthelabormarket.

22 AveragechildpovertyinthesampleshowninFigure3is11.1percent,withastandard

deviationof4.32.Notealsothattherelativedefinitionofchildpovertyemployedmeansthat

thismeasureinherentlyreflectssocieties’largerincomedistributionstructure,specificallyat

thebottompartofthedistribution.

23 See,forinstance,Bowenetal.(1964),Buchanan(1964),Tullock(1964),andother

contributionstoFerguson(1964).

24 Moreover,thiscorrelationbecomesparticularlystrongwhenpublicdebtapproaches100%

ofGDP(ReinhartandRogoff2010a,2010b;butseePannizzaandPresbitero2012).Itmight

alsobeobjectedthathighdebtperchildlevelsareamisleadingindicatorofintergenerational

justice,asdebtmightbeincurredinordertofavoryoungergenerationsby,say,combating

childpoverty(dimension2)orspendingmoreonsocialprogramsforyoungergenerations

(EBiSS,dimension4below).Thisappearstohavelittleplausibilityintheory.Empirically,the

Pearsoncorrelationcoefficientbetweendebtperchildlevels(Figure4)andtheEBiSS(Figure

6below)is-0.26;thatbetweendebtperchildlevelsandchildpovertylevels(Figure3)is

essentiallyzero(+0.06).

25 TheaveragedebtperchildvalueinthesampleshowninFigure4is$184,490,witha

standarddeviationof$142,859.

26 See,forinstance,Castles(2008),Esping-AndersenandSarasa(2002);Gamliel-Yehoshuaand

Vanhuysse(2010).

27 SeeIsaacs(2009)forasimilarapproachontheUnitedStates,andAaron(2009)foracritique.

ForareviewofLynch’sseminalbook,seeVanhuysse(2009a).

28 Foranalternativeapproachbasedonnationaltransferaccounts,seeforinstanceLeeand

Mason(2011).

29 DataonthefirstnineofthesespendingprogramsweretakenfromtheOECDSocial

ExpenditureDatabaseSOCX(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SOCX_AGG)

andreferto2007;dataoneducationspendingweretakenfromtheOECDFactbook2011:

Economic,EnvironmentalandSocialStatisticsandreferto2008orthelatestavailableyear.

FormethodologicalandempiricalbackgroundanalysisbehindtheSOCXdatabase,seeAdema

andLadaique(2009).

30 TheaverageEBiSSvalueinthesampleshowninFigure6is4.51,withastandarddeviationof

1.60.

31 NotethatGreeceisdistinctwithintheOECDsampleasnodatawereavailableonthe

followingthreecomponentprogramsoftheEBiSS:ontheelderlyspendingside,occupational

injuryanddiseaserelatedpensions(incapacity-relatedcashspending)andearlyretirement

forlabormarketreasons(unemployment-relatedcashspending);andonthenonelderly

spendingside,incomemaintenancecashprograms.Moreover,educationspendingdataused

forGreecewereolderthanforothercountries,asthelastavailabledatawerefor2005.

32 ItistellinginthisrespecttonotethatthisEBiSSranking,coveringtheperiod2007–2008,

onlypartiallyoverlapswithLynch’s(2006)ENSRrankingforthe1985–2000period,

discussedinsection4.1.Onthehighpro-elderly-biasside,theEBiSSrankingnowfeatures

58

Endnotes

59

Endnotes

fourpost-communistcountrieswhichwerenotincludedinLynch’ssample.Onthelowpro-

elderly-biasside,theEBiSSandENSRrankingshaveonlytwocasesincommonwithinthe

bottomeightranks(BelgiumandDenmark).

33 ThePearsoncorrelationcoefficientbetweentheseEBiSSvaluesandthe2007old-agesupport

ratiosis-0.18.

34 AllSGIreferencesbelowaretotheBertelsmannStiftung’sSustainableGovernanceIndicators

countryreports,whichareaccessibleinfullat:www.sgi-network.org

35 SeeforinstancePreston(1984),FuchsandReklis(1992),Aaron(2011),Isaacs(2009;2011).

36 ThePearsoncorrelationcoefficientbetweentheseresearcher-imposedIJIvaluesandthe2007

old-agesupportratiovaluesis+0.21.

37 SeealsoMoesenandCherchye(1998),Cherchyeetal.(2007),andmoregenerallyAtkinson

(2005).

38 OnecaveatappliestothecaseofIsrael,whereacomparativelyverysmallfootprint(Figure

1)isreflectedinthisdimension’sheavybenefit-of-the-doubtweight(.4)andthusinahigher

benefit-of-the-doubtIJIvalue(.89)andranking(third)ascomparedtoitsresearcher-imposed

IJIvalue(.81)andranking(fifth).Yet,aswehaveseeninsection1,itisimportanttobearin

mindthatdespitethissmallfootprintIsraelisalsotheOECD’sfifth-highestecologicaldebtor

nation(Figure2).Bycontrast,PortugalandJapan,whichalsocombinesmallfootprintswith

ecologicaldebtorstatus,havelowoverallIJIrankings.

39 ThePearsoncorrelationcoefficientwiththe2007old-agesupportratiovaluesis+0.26.

40 CulturalaspectssuchasunhealthylifestylesareafurtherprobleminCentralandEastern

Europe.Asmentionedinfootnote8,usinganalternativeforward-lookingmeasurefor

societies’old-agedependencyratesproduceslessdramatictrendsincurrentandprojected

levelsofpopulationagingformostOECDcountries.Butthereisanotableexceptiontothis

rule:theCentralandEasternEuropeansocieties,whereprospectiveold-agedependency

ratesarealsocomparativelyhightoday,andaresettoincreaseveryfastinthecomingthree

decades(SandersonandScherbov2010).

41 InLuxemburg,forinstance,revenuefromenvironmentaltaxationiscurrentlysetasideforthe

financingoflong-termcareinsurance(DavorDominkus,personalcommunication).

42 IamgratefultoClausOffeandHelmutAnheierforpointingmetothesetwoideas.

43 See,forinstance,Esping-Andersen(2002;2008;2009),Heckman(2000;2004),Carneiroand

Heckman(2003),Doyleetal.(2009).Withinthepublicpolicyliterature,seealsoMoreletal.

(2012),Vandenbrouckeetal.(2011),andVanhuysse(2008).

44 SeeCarneiroandHeckman(2003:90),whoarguethathumancapitaldeficitsdonotarise

primarilyfromparentalcreditconstraintsatthetimeofchildren’sadolescence,butrather

60

Endnotes

frominadequatelearningenvironmentsinthefamilyduringearlychildhood(seealsoEsping-

Andersen2008,2009).

45 Inaninterestingparallel,MeirickandWackman(2004)showthatchildrenexposed

topoliticalinformationcampaignsatschoolsubsequentlydemonstratebetterpolitical

knowledge,andthattherelativeknowledgegapbetweenricherandpoorerchildrenwas

reducedasaresult.Thatis,thosechildrenwhowerefurthestremovedfrompolitical

participationactuallygainedmost.

46 Indemography,anearlyproposalisDemeny(1986);seealsoSandersonandScherbov(2007)

andDemeny(2012).Insocialandpoliticaltheory,seeespeciallyVanParijs(1998;2011)and

Hinrichs(2002).OnpoliticalattemptstoimplementthisideainGermany,seeDeutscheWelle

(2008c);foraninsightfulanalysisofitselectoralconsequencesseeGoerresandTiemann

(2009).

47 Thisdiscussionadmittedlybegsthedeeperpoliticaleconomyquestionofwhyandhowproxy

voteswouldbegrantedinthefirstplace.Onthepoliticalprocessesbehindhistoricalsuffrage

extensionsandthelatter’sconsequencesforsubsequentpoliticaldynamics,seePrzeworski

(2009a).

48 Foradiscussionofadifferentideathatismuchhardertodefendinourview–childrenas

votersdirectly–seeRehfeld(2011),Lau(2012).Onchildren’sdemocraticcompetence,see

footnote45.

49 Folbre(1994:86)furthermorearguesthat“individualswhodevoterelativelylittletimeor

energytochild-rearingarefree-ridingonparentallabor.”SeealsoFuchsandReklis(1992),

Folbre(2008).Inthiscontext,itisinterestingtonotethatinGermanytoday,childlesspeople

arerequiredtopayanadditional0.25%ofgrosswagesasanobligatorycontributiontolong-

termcareinsurance(DavorDominkus,personalcommunication).

50 SeeGoldsteinetal.(2004)andLutzetal.(2006),whosuggestanumberofsocialmechanisms

explainingwhysocietiesexperiencinganinitiallow-fertilityshockmayovertimestaytrapped

inalow-fertilitycourse.Youngcohortsgrowingupinsocialenvironmentswithsmallcoreand

extendedfamiliesarelikelytoadjusttheirownnormsofidealfamilysizedownward,thereby

perpetuatinglowfertilityinsociety.Forsociologicaltreatmentsofchangingfamilynorms,see

Esping-Andersen(2009),Kotkinetal.(2012),Coleman(1993).

51 SandersonandScherbov(2007:548)redefinethevotingagepopulationafterintroduction

ofproxyvotesforchildrenas“thepopulationatorabovethelegalminimumageforvoting

weightedbythefactoroneplusthenumberofchildrenineachperson’scustody.For

simplicity,wecanthinkofwomenvotingforalltheirunderagefemalechildrenandmenfor

theirunderagemalechildren.”

52 Note,however,thatcombiningtwosensibleifdifficultreforms–proxyvotesanda50-50

splitoflifeexpectancygainsamongbetweenlongerworkinglivesandlongerpensionlives–

61

Endnotes

wouldreducetheexpectedpopulationshareofpensionerssignificantlymore:respectivelyby

10,11.5,and13percentagepoints(SandersonandScherbov2007:546,549).

53 Historically,secularincreasesinoverallelectoralparticipationrateshavebeenlargelydue

tosuffrageextensions(newelectors)ratherthantoincreasedactualturnoutamongalready

eligiblevoters(Przeworski2009b).Proxyvotesforchildrenconstituteaninterestingmixture:

theyessentiallyextendsuffrage,buttheydosobyallocatingextravotestoalreadyeligible

voters,onbehalfoffutureelectors.Onyoung-oldparticipationgaps,seeGoerres(2009);on

proxyvotes’consequencesforelectoralchoices,seeGoerresandTiemann(2009).

6262

Impressum

©2013BertelsmannStiftung

BertelsmannStiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße256

33311Gütersloh

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Verantwortlich

Dr.DanielSchraad-Tischler

NajimAzahaf

Lektorat

BarbaraSerfozo,Berlin

Gestaltung

MarkusDiekmann,Bielefeld

Titelfoto

melpomen/panthermedia

Impressum

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

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Adresse | Kontakt

Bertelsmann Stiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256

33311 Gütersloh

Telefon +49 5241 81-0

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Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler

Telefon +49 5241 81-81240

Fax +49 5241 81-681240

[email protected]

Najim Azahaf

Telefon +49 5241 81-81411

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