geografiska annaler. series b. human geography 1982 but timer musing on helicon root metaphors

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MUSING ON HELICON: ROOT METAPHORS ANDGEOGRAPHY

BYANNE BUTTIMER*

On MountHelicondwelt the nineMuses,eachpresiding ver aspecialart:Clio(history),Melpomenetragedy),Calliope epicpoetry) Erato (lyric poetry), Thalia (comedy and pastoralpoetry), Euterpe (music), Polhymnia(rhetoric and mime),Terpsichore (dance and choral singing), and Urania(astronomy).It was told that the beautifulNarcissus, in hissixteeneth year, first saw his reflectionon one of the manyfountainsof Helicon. He didnot listento the Muses;ratherhefell in love with his own reflectionand was transformednto aflower.KnowThyself- Delphicand Socraticdictum

A recent upsurge of "humanistic" interest inEuro-America has evoked curiosity about con-nections between Geographic thought and theuniversal geographical experiences of human-kind. With it comes a fresh perspective on thehistory of ideas, a somewhat belated response toJohn K. Wright's invitation to "the mostfascinating terrae incognitae of all-those thatlie within the minds and hearts of men" (Wright,1947). Given certain characteristic values of theWest, however, for instance, the sovereignty ofintellect, it is to the minds of men that attentionhas been drawn: to those technical and ideologi-cal constructs deemed significant in shaping theface of the earth. Whatever there may be ofemotion, intuition, faith or fancy in the hearts ofmen remains largely sub rosa.The point in the Helicon story is to dramatizethose starkly contrasting outcomes of self-re-flection: the Narcissist and the Socratic.Narcissus fell in love with his own reflectionwhile Socrates persisted on the journey towardcritical self knowledge and emancipation from allthat might impede the full adventure of reason(logos). So appealing indeed were the loftyclaims of Reason, and so apparently triumphantits technology and power, that a-Musement toocould be logically (rationally) organized. NationStates would readily create Chairs, curricula,and eventually Muse-ums. Among the twentiethcentury devotees of Clio and Urania, however,one finds again the countervailing moods of

* Dr AnneButtimer,Department f HumanGeography,LundUniversity,Solvegatan13,22362 Lund,Sweden.

Narcissus and Socrates. What if, on this visit toHelicon, one were really to listen to the Muses?Might one not recognize how persistently Thalia,Melpomene, Polhymnia and the others havebeen playing in human descriptions of the earthand narratives of human experience? De-veilingthe masks of alleged "objectivity" and absolutistclaims to truth, would the open-minded pilgrimnot recognize the poetic, the tragic or comic, themoral and symbolic modes of understanding lifewhich have all the time been serving the interestsof Reason?The fountains most commonly visited on Heli-con today yield distinct and only partially re-latable reflections. Some encourage episte-mological clarity, a critique of knowledge pre-suppositions unfettered by constraints assumedduring the Positivist era when virtually exclusivepreoccupation with method flourished. (Gre-gory, 1978; Smith, 1979; Sack, 1980). Meanwhilemodernist philosophers cast doubts on the verynotion of foundations for knowledge (Feyer-abend, 1961, 1962; Rorty, 1979; Schrag, 1980).Others point to social or sociological enquiry,exploring the material and ideological conditionswithin which thought has been produced andreproduced, a route allegedly "liberated" fromthe discourse of instrumental action and favoringmutual understanding and improved communi-cation. (Habermas, 1968, 1979; Gadamer, 1975)Others still would focus on language itself, jostlewith lexical as well as logical nuance, seekingevidence for the archeological foundations ofinherited epistemes-at least those expressed inthree major vernaculars, French, German, andEnglish (Foucault, 1969, 1977; Wittgenstein,1960, 1969; Olsson, 1979; Claval, 1980). The col-lage of all these and other reflections, however,does not seem to yield any whole picture. Couldit be that one has not listened to the Muses at all?It sounds like a truism in our day to remarkthat underlying most scientific theories and chefd'oeuvres of art and literature in Western historythere are implicit hypotheses or beliefs about thenature of the world, time, fate, society and thephysical earth (Glacken, 1968; Galtung, 1981;

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BUTTIMERNakamura, 1980). One could even claim that thebulk of Western scholarly energy, stirred by theSocratic dream, has been devoted to renderingsuch beliefs and myths cognitively credible, or atleast aesthetically or ideologically acceptable(Barrett, 1962; Ricoeur, 1975; Merleau-Ponty,1973). Scholars have, of course, quite explicitlyacknowledged how culturally diverse are imagesof Nature and resources; geographers havedocumented the landscape correlates of differentworld views. But how successful have we reallybeen in promoting better communication be-tween or mutual understanding of essentiallycontrasting world views-even at home?Perhaps one has not explored deeply enough?William William-Olsson once asked "Hurskall varlden se ut?" sketching a map of Europeon aximuthal projections based in Beijing(China), Moscow (USSR) Urbana, 111. (USA),and Johannesburg (S. Africa) in order to showhow ethnocentric and myopic ordinary picturesof the world are. (William-Olsson, 1975)A wholegeneration of geographers has explored "mentalmaps", perceptions and cognitions of space andenvironment (Moore and Golledge, 1976).Slowly but surely it is dawning on us that there ismore to the experience of world than the visualand the cartographic. Humans, it seems, notonly see and cognitively schematize their "worldviews"; they feel, believe, hope, love and hatecertain symbols of the world. In fact, if Cassirer,Langer, and others are right, this propensity tomake symbolic transformations of reality is themost characteristically human activity of all, andit expresses itself in languages and cultures, na-tions and states, boundaries and fences, institu-tions and art forms. "The development of civili-sations" one writer claims, "is essentially aprogression of metaphors" (Doctorow, 1977,231-2).If one were to identify some of those keymetaphors of world which have becomesedimented in the conventional language andlore of groups and nations, and most especially ifwe could get to the roots of our own, we might bein a better position to learn something from thisencounter with out terrae incognitae.Metaphor, it has been claimed, touches adeeper level of understanding than "paradigm",for it points to the process of learning and dis-covery-to those analogical leaps from the fami-liar to the unfamiliar which rally imagination andemotion as well as intellect. Variously defined as90

"the dreamwork of language" (Davidson, 1978),"the intellectual link between language andmyth" (Cassirer, 1946), as literary trope (Jakob-son, 1960), as "mode of argument" (White,1973), metaphor has aroused curiosity and ex-citement in art, philosophy, music, history aswell as in the social sciences. (Shibles, 1971;Sacks, 1978; Morgan, 1980; Harrison andLivingstone, 1981) In fact, the volume of proserecently generated around this theme may soonlead to the kind of semantic inflation whichthreatened to banalize the notions of image andtheory in the sixties and paradigm in the seven-ties. Scientists and philosophers of science haveno doubt a primary interest in the cognitive im-port of metaphor (Black, 1962; Leatherdale,1974), and each discipline will selectively screenout whatever meaning may be appropriate for itsown stated ends, but social scientists and geo-graphers may indeed have a lot to lose by simplyfollowing this bias toward the exclusively cogni-tive. "Squeezing out the cognitive juices" (Pep-per, 1942), and ignoring the mytho-poetic andheuristic aspects of metaphor may simply be themodern day expression of what Heidegger refersto as the "technification" of thought, for what-ever lofty aims this process is directed. (Heid-egger, 1971; Schrag, 1980)Geographic language is thoroughly metaphori-cal. Have we not described the "face" of theearth in terms of "eyes", "nose", "mouth","neck" and "profile", named and claimed itsphysiognomy with every conceivable analogy tothe human anatomy and society? Regions andhamlets have been likened to "organisms",roadways and canals to "arteries of circulation",industrial complexes as "growth poles" and"generators" of economic development. Oncethese expressions become sedimented and com-mon place in textbooks and atlases one forgetsthe metaphor and ascribes a literal meaning tothese same words. Foolhardy it would be in thisshort essay to even touch on that vast panoramaof insight which could be gleaned from semioticand semantic scrutiny of language in geography.Wise, however, it might be to ask if there areenduring gestalt-type metaphors of the world asa whole which could be discerned in the tradi-tions of the discipline in Western countries. Onemajor opinion on such world gestalts may sufficeto illustrate the direction in which research andreflection could be entertained.

Stephen Pepper (1942) claimed that there wereGEOGRAFISKA ANNALER ?64 B (1982) 2


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MUSING ON HELICONreally only four relatively adequate world hypo-theses which have stood the test of time andintellectual scrutiny in the West: Formism,Mechanism, Organicism, and Contextualism.Even if this list is not exhaustive, or even if onemay seriously question the grounds on whichothers are dismissed, it may serve a heuristicfunction to ask how these key world theorieshave found expression in Western geography.This adventure may at least serve to illustratethe value of looking at some of the root differ-ences underlying contrasting modes of analysisand description which have been cultivated inthe discipline. It may also illustrate how limitedis any study which directs attention exclusivelyto the cognitive aspects of metaphor.Underlying each of these world hypotheses,Pepper claims, is a root metaphor which gener-ates its analytical categories and substantiates itsclaims to truth. Formism grounds itself on thecommon sense experience of similarity; its cog-nitive claims rest on a correspondence theory oftruth (Pepper, 151-185). In geography this meta-phor expresses itself most typically in "map-ping"-chorology and morphology, cartographicand mathematical representations of patterns inspace. Its world picture is a dispersed one: eachform may be analyzed and explained in terns ofits own nature and appearance. (de Geer, 1923;Hettner, 1927; Hartshorne, 1939; de Jong, 1955)Mechanism takes the common snese experienceof the machine as its root metaphor. Our midcen-tury enthusiasm for "spatial systems" and"functional mechanisms" may well qualify asthe geographic expression of this metaphor(Berry, 1964; Boulding, 1960; von Bertalanffy,1968). Mechanism offers an integrated worldview while also affording guidelines for detailedanalysis. Its claims to cognitive validity rest on acausal adjustment theory of truth (Pepper,221-231). Organicism also offers an integratedpicture of the world, its aims synthetic ratherthan analytical. It tends to regard every event inthe world as more or less concealed process, alleventually reaching maturation (and trans-cendence) in the organic whole. Throughout thenineteenth and twentieth centuries geographershave been attracted or repelled by the notion of"organism" (von Humboldt, 1845-62; Herbert-son, 1905; Thomas, ed., 1956; see also Stoddart,1967; Berdoulay, 1980, Harrison and Living-stone, 1981). Cognitive claims of an organicistworld view rest on a coherence theory of truth

(Pepper, 280-314). Contextualism sees the worldas an "arena" of unique events, and tries tounravel the textures and strands of processesoperative in, or associated with, particularevents. Its world view is thus also a dispersedone, although its descriptive style is synthetic; itespouses an operational theory of truth (Pepper,268-279; see also Dewey, 1925; James, 1940;Schutz, 1973). The contextual approach is mostclearly evident among cultural and historicalgeographers (Wright, 1966; Lowenthal, 1961;Tuan, 1977; Harris, 1978) but the term "arena"can evidently have other connotations as well(Hagerstrand, 1975; Tornquist, 1981).It should immediately be noted that rarely, ifever, are particular authors identifiable with oneof these root metaphors. Most creative thinkersplay quite freely with a variety of metaphoricalstyles, and with the exception of dogmatists,most thinkers feel at home with more than one;many indeed have been eclectic and incon-sistent. Metaphors, as I am using the term here,could perhaps best be regarded as the DramatisPersonae of Western intellectual history, the ac-tual narrative and plot of particular pieces stagedin the material and ideological contexts in whichscholars thought and practiced their professions.These four root metaphors do not, of course,exhaust the full range of world conceptions evi-dent in geographic research and teaching (Butti-mer, 1981). They do, however, offer a usefulmacro perspective within which to note the con-vergence of theory and praxis in differentbranches of the field.] I have found it peda-gogically useful to look at the record of urbangeography, for instance, from the vantage pointof these metaphors. The city as "organism" wasa favored image among scholars who describedthe social experience of immigrant groups,patterns of competition, succession, and ano-mie, being considered as critical indicators ofpeople's levels of adaptation to new milieux(Park & Burgess, 1925). Designers of GardenCity movements have been the most overt de-votees of organic analogies (Howard, 1897; Ged-des, 1915) but visionaries of centralized com-munications systems within the city have alsoused biological and cybernetic analogies (Meier,1960). The city as "mechanism" may be evenmore readily recogniseable to students of post-war urban geography (Berry & Horton, 1970).Within each activity, be it manufacturing, retail,or service delivery, one assumed that there were

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BUTTIMERmechanisms at work which would lead toward anoptimal spatio-temporal articulation of life viacentral-place hierarchies of production or supplypoints. But the older, and perhaps more deeplyrevered, habit of mapping spatial form has al-ways characterized the work of geographers andplanners-formal patterns of space-time occupa-tion, rather than functions generating topologicalsurfaces. For this formal tradition the wholepicture, if any, was a map: a mosaic of zones,sectors, and discretely bounded regions, eachcircumscribed by legal or physical limits on whatactivities could or should be housed therein(Murphy, 1966;Mayer, 1954). Finally, the city asarena of unique events was frequently foundamong writers of liberal or laissez-faire orienta-tion (Jacobs, 1961; Clay, 1974). One sought toshow how the urban context affected life styles,values, and attitudes, emphasis resting on theunique rather than the general, the spontaneousrather than the planned. (Eliot Hurst, 1975)Now each of these metaphors spells a distinctdesign for the physical and functional arrange-ments of space, time, and activities on theground; their often incompatible demandseventually becoming legible in the texts andtextures of urban life. Which metaphor, or com-bination of metaphors, will endure or dominateat any particular moment will, of course, be afunction of economic and political power in-terests; but at any moment, if one had the eyes tosee, then the urban landscape could be read as atext, or as a "mirror" of the civilization whichproduced it (Vidal de la Blache, 1922).Looking at geographic thought now, would itnot be interesting to explore particular milieuxand the values of particular periods and settingsin order to understand why, for example, the"map" became a favored metaphor at one peri-od, "mechanism" at another, why "organism"evoked such acclaim or disdain, and why theworld as "arena" has, by and large, been themetaphor of only a few?I suggest that each metaphor, when faced withthe challenges of particular values and milieux,undergoes a kind of adaptive radiation into threediscrete forms: (1) rhetorica (diplomatic or phi-losophical rationale and "prose"), (2) techne-(mode of instrumentation in analysis and pre-sentation), and (3) praxis (relationship to so-cietal interests and problem-solving). The me-taphor as a whole will be evaluated, rejectedor accepted, in terms of how the profession at a

particular moment ranks these three sets of in-terests. In fact, each of these forms can developa narrative of its own-pry itself loose from theroot metaphor-depending on the overridingdemands of a particular discipline. A few exam-ples from American experience may illustratethe point.Consider the twenties, a time when Americangeographers sought to establish disciplinaryidentity in an otherwise rather indifferent milieu.High ranking values were disciplinary auton-omy, rejection of environmental determinism,some democracy of effort, and especially rele-vance to practical problem-solving in theoptimistic business-entrepreneurial spirit ofBowman's New World. Of our four root meta-phors, the "map"-chorology and morpho-logy-seemed the best candidate for satisfyingall requirements. Imported organicist rhetoricamay have appealed for Presidential Addresses oras preamble for school textbooks, but did it notcontain elements which were ideologicallyoffensive? Besides, where in all of NorthAmerica could one find the kind of pays or Ge-meinschaft for which "organism" might be anappropriate metaphor? More importantly, "or-ganism" did not prove tractable in terms oftechne or praxis, both of which were deemed socrucial in the emerging criteria of "science" atthe time. So chorology and morphology couldbegin their own narrative emphasizingtechne-an emphasis later to be bolstered byPositivist conceptions of science and eventuallyoutshining (even ridiculing) any possible critiqueof its own knowledge presuppositions. By thetime of World War II, however, the "map" itselfbecame transformed. The world from the airopened up new vistas, and postwar reconstruc-tion/development interests demanded morepowerful techne and praxis. "Mechanism", ametaphor which had proved itself so effective inoperations research during wartime, (Morse andKimball, 1951) gained appeal for the rational re-construction of economic and technological pro-cess in a postwar world.In terms of favored root metaphors, American(possible Anglo-American-Nordic) experiencesuggesta a general preference for the categorialframeworks of Formism and Mechanism, twoanalyticallyoriented world hypotheses whichcomplement each other and are most amenableto technical and instrumental human interests.Their convergence in the 1960's could be re-

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MUSINGON HELICONgarded as the key to geography's "new para-digm" (Haggett, 1965; Davies, 1972). So deeplydid "map" and "mechanism" evidently impressthemselves that a generation later rebel voiceswould still use these metaphors in their critiqueof the "establishment" and in proposals foralternatives. Marxist, Structuralist andMaterialist critique tended to use the categoriesof mechanism (Harvey, 1972; Peet, 1977;Castells, 1977) whereas humanistic and pheno-menological critique often favored the categoriesof formism (Ley and Samuels, 1978). But in thepost- 1968 period questions of techne were lessinteresting than those of praxis: cognitive issuesrendered almost incidental to an overriding ethi-cal concern for justice or revolution (Harvey,1973; Santos, 1975; Smith, 1979). One wonderswhy contextualism-so closely akin to AmericanPragmatism-made so little headway? Was itthat it did not promise direct response to thedemands of disciplinary autonomy, practicalproblemsolving, or that from the beginning itdemonstrated relatively greater adequacy withthe unique event rather than the general pattern?

Although proponents and opponents of differ-ent approaches to geography have generallycouched their arguments in epistemological ormethodological terms, it seems obvious thatquestions of aesthetic and ideological choice, ofcultural and social values, have entered quiteinfluentially into the formation of disciplinaryprose. Some parallels with the field of historymay be instructive here. Popper's invectiveagainst organicist and mechanist interpretationsof history could find echoes within geography(Popper, 1961). No doubt an Anglo-Saxonpenchant for empiricism could go a long way toexplain the overriding preference for mappingand the disdain expressed for such "continen-tal" abstractions as organism and mechanismduring the first half of the twentieth century. Butsuch cognitive preferences do not help explainthe popularity of mechanist thinking among thepost World War II generation.Hayden White's study of four nineteenthcentury master historians (Ranke, Michelet, deToqueville and Burckhardt) probes some of theimplicit pre-critical grounds on which authorslater built their theoretical constructs. (White,1973) He uses the notion of literarytrope-metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche andirony-as the most appropriate way to describean author's mode of "prefiguring" the historical

field (cf. Jakobson, 1960; Levi-Strauss, 1966).Within any one of these major tropes, an authormay achieve explanatory effect by combininglogical argument, style of narrative, and ideo-logical implication. He refers to Pepper's schemeof world hypotheses as "mode of argument",and adds two further considerations, viz., modeof employment in Romantic, Comic, Tragic, orSatirical style (cf. Frye, 1957; Burke, 1969) andmode of ideological implication in Anarchist,Radical, Conservative, or Liberal tone (cf.Mannheim, 1946). However one is to regard thisjuxtuposition of schemata, his conclusion is in-deed plausible: "the best grounds for choosingone perspective on history rather than anotherare ultimately aesthetic or moral rather thanepistemological" (White, 1973 xii, 426-434).

Meta-schemes, like Helicon, may be appealingfor some and repulsive for others. White's the-ory of tropes raises provocative questions aboutdisciplinary prose style and also about con-sistencies between ideology and root metaphor.It has been observed, for example, that radicalarguments for societal change and/or rational re-construction have often been couched inmechanistic language, and that conservativewriters often emphasize the uniqueness of thingsand the randomness of events (White, 1973, 21).Both anarchists and conservatives have shownpreferences for organicist conceptions of worldreality. Romantic writers may play with varietiesof Comedy and Tragedy, all of which are tabooto the Satirist (ibid., 7-11). At the meta-level,however, one is dealing with abstractions and astyle of reading texts which still bears the stampof Herrschaftswissen: they will no doubt reflectback whatever one's a priori curiosities pose tothem.To review permutations and combinations ofsymbolic, aesthetic, and ideological features ofWestern geography serves only to re-iterate themore fundamental issue of contrasting andhostile world views and does not necessarily leadto mutual understanding. But metaphor, how-ever faded, can point beyond itself. If one wereto read those same texts hermeneutically, thelanguage and nature of interpretations might alsobecome more emancipated. Imaginations couldbe directed toward those mythical and cosmo-logical sources from which conventional ex-planations of reality spring. If one were to dis-cern those Greek and Vedic sources of our fourroot metaphors perhaps one could more readily

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BUTTIMERunderstand the enduring hold of Helicon onWestern thought. One might then appreciatewhy so many contemporary humanists staketheir orthodoxy claims on citations fromGraeco-Roman and Enlightenment myths ofhumanness, and their doggedly hostile attitudestoward science and technology.Is it not time one moved beyond the fadedmetaphors and jaded jargon of Helicon? Insteadof breast-beating over the fragmentation of ex-pertise, and tiresome mea culpa on the Midastouch of applied science and technology, whynot instead seek new metaphors, revive or dis-cover other values to guide humanity's relation-ship to earth and world? Could the encounterwith terrae incognitae not be an occasion forsuch discovery and emancipation from thosetechnical interpretations of thought which havebeen cultivated in the West since Socratic times(Gadamer, 1975; Heidegger, 1971). In thejourney itself we may discover a world as"event" rather than "picture", in the encounterwith contrasting myths/values we may learn howto discover the world.The root metaphor approach can, I believe,afford an opening for this journey. It can helpelucidate some of the connections between de-scriptive and normative practice, and thus helpus transcend some of the impasses of communi-cation between generations and practitioners ofdifferent styles at this moment in geography. Itcan also affirm a plurality of potential stances onthe diversity of geographical experience byaffording an opportunity to observe simul-taneously the social, epistemological, and mate-rial contexts in which certain types of consenseshave been reached within the discipline. And ifwe succeed in reaching some clarity on our owntaken-for-granted traditions in the West, perhapswe may then be in a better position to ask aboutthe root metaphors and myths of other civiliza-tions.Hur skall vdrlden se ut? Who knows, thequestion we may be able to discuss with othercivilizations is Hur skall varlden vara?

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