geography, politics and culture: electoral insularity in british columbia

Société québécoise de science politique

Geography, Politics and Culture: Electoral Insularity in British ColumbiaAuthor(s): R. Jeremy WilsonSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 13,No. 4 (Dec., 1980), pp. 751-774Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3230242 .

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Geography, Politics and Culture: Electoral Insularity in British Columbia*

R. JEREMY WILSON University of Victoria

In all societies the evolution of social, economic and political patterns is shaped by the interplay between geography and applied technology. In British Columbia the collision between geography and the technological developments associated with the worldwide communications revolution has been very intense. The awesome barriers to interaction which are inherent in the province's geography are no more striking than the assault on these barriers which has been at the core of its post-settlement history.1 Extension of the communications and transportation infrastructures, and rapid growth in the possession of amenities such as automobiles and telephones have brought the scattered communities which dot the province's valleys and plateaus into much closer contact with one another. While it is difficult to assess precisely the impact of these developments on patterns of exchange within the province, a number of indicators suggest that the communications revolution had major effects on mobility and access to extra-local messages. We know, for example, that the number of long * I am grateful to David Elkins, Don Blake and two anonymous referees fortheir helpful

criticism. 1 For details on British Columbia geography see J. Lewis Robinson (ed.), Studies in

Canadian Geography: British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). On the development of the transportation and communications network, see Harold A. Innis, "Settlement and the Mining Frontier," Part 2 in A. R. M. Lower and Harold A. Innis, Settlement of the Forest Frontier in Eastern Canada and Settlement and the Mining Frontier (Toronto: Macmillan, 1936), chaps. 5 and 6; F. W. Howay, W. N. Sage, and H. F. Angus, British Columbia and the United States: The North Pacific Slope from Fur Trade to Aviation, ed. by H. F. Angus (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1942), chap. 10; Patricia E. Roy, "The Rise of Vancouver as a Metropolitan Centre, 1886-1929" (B.A. essay, University of British Columbia, 1960), 67-75; Patricia E. Roy, "Railways, Politicians and the Development of the City of Vancouver as a Metropolitan Centre, 1886-1929" (M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1963); Bruce Ramsey, PGE: Railway to the North (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1962); and this author's thesis, "The Impact of Modernization on British Columbia Electoral Patterns: Communications Development and the Uniformity of Swing, 1903-1975" (Ph.D. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1978), 228-43.

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XIII:4 (December/ decembre 1980). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada



R. JEREMY WILSON

distance telephone calls within the province increased eightfold between 1951 and 1971,2 and that the number of motor vehicles per 100 population grew from 6 to 39 between 1921 and 1971.3 Gasoline consumption per capita quadrupled between 1931 and 1966,4 while the proportion of dwellings with radios jumped from 36 per cent in 1931 to 84 per cent in 1941.5 There was a 470 per cent increase between 1956 and 1974 in the number of airplane trips between Vancouver and 13 smaller centres throughout the province which were surveyed in aviation reports.6

In spite of developments like these, geography remains an influential force on social and economic patterns in British Columbia. No community has been untouched by the communications revolution but many remain, by today's standards at least, very isolated from the province's metropolitan and submetropolitan centres. For example, towns like Kemano, Tahsis and Ocean Falls are linked to larger centres only by costly air or boat journeys, while roads to communities such as Port Hardy and Dease Lake have only recently been completed. Many other communities, such as Mackenzie, Masset and Bella Coola are separated from larger centres by considerable distances and difficult terrain.

How does the isolation of communities like Ocean Falls and Mackenzie affect their integration into social and political systems? Are isolated communities insulated from political forces which operate on less remote communities? Are "deviant" political cultures more likely to persist in such places? Does geography continue to constrain patterns of political influence dispersal or has the impact of geography in this regard been thoroughly neutralized by the twentieth century communications revolution?

Writings on political integration and the spatial characteristics of political interaction patterns provide support for the argument that, in a

2 Data on telephone traffic volume were provided by Mr. Tony Farr, company historian, B.C. Telephone Company.

3 For 1921 to 1951 see M. C. Urquhart (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), Table S 235; and for 1961 and 1971, Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Statistics Canada), The Canada Yearbook, 1963, 1973.

4 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (Statistics Canada), The Canada Yearbook, various years.

5 For 1931, Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. 5, Table 57; and for 1941, Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. 9, Table 18.

6 See Canada, Air Transport Board, Origin and Destination Statistics: Mainland Scheduled Traffic Survey of Revenue Passengers, 1955-59 (Ottawa, 1961); Canada, Air Transport Board (Committee); Airline Passenger Origin and Destination Statistics: Domestic Report, 1966 (1967) (Ottawa, n.d.); and Canada, Statistics Canada, Airline Passenger Origin and Destination Statistics: Domestic Report, 1975, Catalogue No. 51-204 (Ottawa, 1976). The airports surveyed were Castlegar, Cranbrook, Fort Nelson, Fort St. John, Kamloops, Penticton, Prince George, Prince Rupert, Quesnel, Sandspit, Smithers, Terrace and Williams Lake.

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Geographie, politique et culture: l'insularite electorale en Colombie britannique

Cet article cherche a expliquer la variation du degre de deviation electorale manifeste'e par les communaute's de l'hinterland de Colombie Britannique lors des elections provinciales de 1972 et 1975. La deviation electorale d'une communaute se mesure par la divergence entre le deplacement effectifdu vote lors des deux e'lections et le deplacement anticipe compte tenu des caracteristiques des communautes. On postule que les communautes re'agissent d'abord aux forces provinciales et regionales plutot qu'aux forces locales. Ainsi, on postule que les communaute's qui sont de la meme region etpartagent les memes caracteristiques devraient produire les memes deplacements electoraux. Notre these est que cette assertion sera vraisemblablement inexacte dans les cas des communautes isolees. Les forces provinciales et re'gionales devraient moins atteindre les communautes isolees et par conse'quent, ces communautes devraient devier du re'sultat attendu etproduire des scores eleves sur la mesure de la deviation electorale. Nous faisons l'hypothese que les facteurs geographiques et culturels peuvent bloquer la diffusion des influences electorales d'une localite' l'autre et ainsi laisserdes communaute's a I'ecart des principales forces a l'oeuvre lors d'une election.

Dans la premiere partie de l'article, nous incorporons plusieurs variables dans des equations pour pre'dire le deplacement du vote en 1972 et 1975 pour le Cre'dit social et le NPD. Ces variables incluent des mesures de la region, de la composition socio-economique des communaute's et de la situation electorale. Une mesure resume la deviation absolue entre le deplacement effectifdu vote et le deplacement predit par les equations; cette variable devient la variable dependante utilise'e dans la seconde partie de l'article. Les deux hypotheses de base sont alors confirmees. Les communautes e'loignees et une large proportion de celles qui sont marginales avaient davantage tendance a s'e'loigner de la performance attendue suggerant ainsi qu'elles evitaient ou deviaient plus facilement les vents electoraux prevalants. On peut donc pretendre qu'il existe une liaison entre l'insularite electorale des communautes et la gracilite des liens unissant ces communautes a un ensemble politique plus vaste. Aucune communaute de Colombie Britannique ne fut epargnee par la pousse homogeneisante de la modernisation. Toutefois a cause des facteurs geographiques et culturels, on retrouve un variation considerable dans le degre d'integration a la politie provinciale des communautes dispersees sur le territoire.

general sense, geography should matter. Rokkan and Deutsch,7 for example, link the political integration process to communications

7 See, for example, Stein Rokkan, with Angus Campbell, Per Torsvik and Henry Valen, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (New York: David McKay Co., 1970); Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (1961), 493-514; Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); and essays in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964). For a good review of the



R. JEREMY WILSON

developments which modify the effects of geography, while Cox8 relates the impact of local contexts on individuals' political behaviour to the spatial extensiveness of their social networks. But these and other students of geography and politics provide little specific advice about the political relevance of the kind of geographical realities which face British Columbians at the present time.

In this article we take an exploratory step towards answering questions about the political consequences of British Columbia geography. We focus on communities which are most affected by geographical isolation-those in the nonmetropolitan part of the province-and consider electoral swings in the 1972 and 1975 provincial elections. The analysis explores the roots of what we term "electoral deviation." This concept, which indicates the divergence between a community's actual electoral shifts and those we would expect given its characteristics, should reflect the impact of prevailing electoral forces on the community.

We assume, in concurrence with a model of electoral change put forward by Donald Stokes, that provincial, regional and local forces operate to bring about shifts in party support.9 These electoral forces can be conceptualized as composites of the influences operating on voters. Some of these influences have a province-wide distribution. That is, barring imperfections in communications networks, they should have an impact on all voter aggregates throughout the province. Others are regionally- or locally-bounded. Aggregates in one region will be subject to influences which are different from those affecting voters in the next, and each community will be moved by forces which are idiosyncratic to that locality.

In framing our hypothesis, we begin by postulating that communities will shift in response to provincial and regional forces. When common forces operate on aggregates of similar characteristics the result should be electoral shifts of parallel direction and magnitude. Thus, according to our postulate, communities which are in the same region as one another and of the same characteristics should produce similar swings. Our thesis is that this assumption is most likely to be

literature on the relationship between geography and political integration see R. J. Taylor and R. J. Johnston, Geography of Elections (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), Part 2.

8 Kevin R. Cox, "The Spatial Structuring of Information Flow and Partisan Attitudes," in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Social Ecology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969).

9 Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in Walter Dean Burnham and William Nisbet Chambers (eds.), The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 182-202; and Donald E. Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in John M. Claunch (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science (Dallas: Arold Foundation, 1965), 61-85.

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inaccurate, and local forces most likely to have an impact, in communities which are insular. Insular communities tend to escape or deflect provincial and regional forces so they should diverge from expected swings and produce high scores on our electoral deviation measure.

We will explore two possible reasons for electoral insularity. Our principal hypothesis focusses on geographical isolation. If distance and terrain are barriers to the flow of electoral influences, then remote places should be prone to electoral deviation. Our second hypothesis argues that what can be termed cultural factors also have barrier effects. Specifically, we examine the idea that the presence in above average proportions of people who are poorly integrated into the social system may contribute to a community's insularity.

The exploratory character of our analysis should be underlined. The model of barrier effects is extremely simplistic. Although theories of spatial interaction and diffusion do give a place to the factors identified in our hypotheses, spatial geographers would argue that much more elaborate models would be required to capture the full complexity of reality.10 It should also be emphasized that this study does nothing more than test for a relationship between variables which, according to our conceptualization, occupy opposite ends of the causal chain. A different kind of study would be required to examine the role of intervening variables and processes. We speculate that certain types of communities are tenuously connected to markets for the exchange of political influences, and thus are less likely than others to feel the impact of higher order (provincial or regional) forces of electoral change. While our results may increase the credibility of this theory, they cannot mediate between alternative theories of electoral insularity.1 Research employing survey or participant observation techniques would be required to explicate more fully this central intervening variable.

This article should then be seen as an initial inquiry into the roots of electoral deviation. In a sense, we will follow the dictum that we advance our empirical knowledge by focussing on the deviant cases, by exposing and analyzing cases which do not fit the generalizations which summarize our present knowledge.l2 The first part of this article

10 For a review of such theories see Ronald Abler, John S. Adams, and Peter Gould, Spatial Organization: The Geographer's View of the World (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), chaps. 7 and 11.

11 Our premise is that insular places are less likely to be in contact with higher order forces. An alternative conceptualization might suggest that extra-local communications do penetrate these communities. However, because of the persistence of local particularisms, these forces may have a different impact than they would in less isolated communities with similar characteristics. Thus our conceptual schema could be refined to allow us to distinguish between electoral insularity and what may be termed electoral "innoculation." The scope of this project does not, however, allows us to operationalize this or other theoretical refinements.

12 John W. Tukey and M. B. Wilk, "Data Analysis and Statistics: Techniques and

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presents generalizations about the relationship between the characteristics of British Columbia's nonmetropolitan communities and their shifts in the 1972 and 1975 elections. The second part examines the residuals from the prediction equations which summarize these generalizations. That is, after exposing cases which behaved differently than expected, we turn to questions about the differences between these cases and others which are less deviant. Our initial efforts will be guided by our notion of insularity and by the hypotheses elaborated above. After testing these hypotheses we will adopt a more inductive approach and examine cases with extreme deviation scores. Features shared by these cases may suggest additional insights about the roots of electoral deviation.

Calculating the Electoral Deviation Scores

For the purposes of this study the hinterland part of the province is taken as the area north and east of the lower Fraser Valley on the mainland, and the area included in the Vancouver Island ridings of Cowichan-Malahat, Comox and Alberni.l3 We examine the electoral shifts of 149 cases in these 23 nonmetropolitan ridings. Ninety-eight of these cases are incorporated cities, towns, villages or district municipalities, while the other 51 represent rural parts of ridings which fall within distinct census subdivisions.14

The electoral deviation score for each case reflects the divergence between its actual percentage point shifts in party support in 1972 and 1975, and the shifts expected given its characteristics. Expected swings are calculated using multivariate prediction equations which incorporate regional and socioeconomic composition variables along with indicators of the "electoral situation" in each community. These variables will be introduced below.

New Democratic party and Social Credit swings in both 1972 and 1975 are considered. Each community's overall deviation score is computed by averaging across the scores which are calculated for each of the four swings. We can illustrate by looking at a pair of communities from our sample. In 1975, Lumby's swing towards Social Credit marked it as much less deviant than Cumberland which swung away from Social Credit. In the case of Lumby we predicted a Social Credit swing of 16.9

Approaches," in Edward R. Tufte (ed.), The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970).

13 The constituencies considered are Alberni, Atlin, Boundary-Similkameen, Cariboo, Columbia River, Comox, Cowichan-Malahat, Fort George, Kamloops, Kootenay, Mackenzie, Nelson-Creston, North Okanagan, North Peace River, Omineca, Prince Rupert, Revelstoke-Slocan, Rossland-Trail, Shuswap, Skeena, South Okanagan, South Peace River and Yale-Lillooet.

14 Thus, for example, the part of the Mackenzie riding in the Mount Waddington- Subdivision A census area is one case, the part of Mackenzie in the Sunshine Coast-Subdivision A census area is another, and so on.

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percentage points. This prediction was based on its scores on variables in the prediction equation calculated for Social Credit swing in 1975. Lumby's actual swing matched this expectation very closely. Cumberland, on the other hand, shifted away from Social Credit and in so doing deviated by more than ten points from the predicted swing. If these tendencies were paralleled for the other three swings examined, then Lumby would rank low on our summary measure of electoral deviation and Cumberland high.

Data on party vote in 1969, 1972 and 1975 were coded for each case, and percentage point swings were calculated.l5 Data from the 1971 census on various aspects of composition were also coded, with the rural area cases assigned the census scores reported for the unorganized part of the appropriate census subdivision.

Our goal in the first part of the analysis is to develop comprehensive multivariate prediction equations. We want to take into account as fully as possible differences in the nature and impact of electoral forces operating across the society. Variables measuring electoral situation, socioeconomic composition, and regional position will be considered. These will be introduced in turn.

First, we include three types of variables in order to test the relationship between swings and certain facets of the electoral situation faced by the parties. Most importantly, we want to take into account what can be termed the "iron law" of swing-percentage point shifts in a party's support relate negatively to that party's share of the vote in the first election of the pair. Thus, for example, across our 149 cases the correlation between Social Credit support in 1972 and the swing in Social Credit support between 1972 and 1975 was -.36-shifts towards Social Credit in 1975 were larger where its share of the popular vote was smaller in 1972 and vice versa.

One reason why these regression effects operate should be quite apparent. We are measuring change within a range with absolute limits; that is, no party can improve on a first election (E,) support level of 100 per cent or do worse than a level of zero. As a consequence parties with high E, support levels are limited to potential percentage point gains which are smaller than those within the grasp of parties with low E, support. The converse point can be made about the way percentage point losses are differentially constrained at the opposite end of the spectrum. What can be termed "empirical" limits may also constrain the size of percentage point shifts from different base support levels. For example, the party with E, support of 20 per cent may have an easier time achieving a percentage point gain of 10 per cent than a party with E, support of 80 per cent. The party in the latter situation would probably be more likely to lose support. Underlying this argument is the premise 15 For the rural area cases we first aggregated the electoral results in the polls situated

within the area defined by census and riding boundaries.

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that, from a party's perspective, the previously nonsupportive portion of the electorate (100 per cent minus its E, support) comprises strata which are successively less conquerable, while the E, support base comprises strata which are successively less prone to defection.16

Whatever the reasons for the strong relationship between E, support and swing, the nature of this connection is such that any investigation into the correlates of swing should deal with the coefficients which obtain after the effects of the base level of support have been taken into account. By entering this variable at the first stage of our regression analyses we control for its effects and avoid a potential source of spuriousness.

A second important facet of the electoral situation pertains to the "pattern of contest" in the constituency. In the elections under scrutiny there was considerable variation across ridings in the presence on the ballot of the minor parties-the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives. In 1972, three of these nonmetropolitan ridings were contested by three party slates and twenty by four party slates.17 In 1975, there were three head-to-head contests between the NDP and Social Credit, thirteen where these parties were joined by either the Liberals or the Conservatives, and seven involving all four parties.

Although there has been much speculation in British Columbia about how the votes totals of the NDP and Social Credit are affected by minor party entrances and exits, there is little reliable evidence about migration between the major and minor parties.'8 But initial analysis of our data indicates that the pattern of contest factor had very pronounced effects in 1975. The average swing to Social Credit across all 149 cases was 13.1 percentage points. The average was 15 points in constituencies where four-party contests in 1972 were replaced by three-party races in 1975, and 17.5 points in the three ridings which featured straight fights between the NDP and Social Credit in 1975. In order to take into account

16 It should be noted that the opposite logic is sometimes pursued in what might be labelled the "rich get richer" argument. Basically this is the argument that a strong support base provides a context or climate which is favourable to further gains. Within certain support ranges (say perhaps the 20 per cent to 50 per cent range) the forces envisaged in the rich get richer argument might neutralize those introduced in the strata argument but our evidence suggests that, overall, the relationship between swing and E, support is negative. See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), 305-07. For further discussion on these questions, see Wilson, "The Impact of Modernization," chap. 2.

17 In 1969 there were three-party (Social Credit, NDP and Liberal) races in all 23 ridings examined. Note that in this discussion we ignore the role of independent candidates and those from fifth parties like the Communists.

18 For an analysis of patterns of cross party affinity in an earlier era see David J. Elkins, "Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: The B. C. Party System in the 1952 and 1953 Provincial Elections," B. C. Studies, No. 30 (1976), 3-26. See also Norman J. Ruff, "Party Detachment and Voting Patterns in a Provincial Two-Member Constituency: Victoria, 1972," B. C. Studies, No. 23 (1974), 3-24.

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this source of variance we include dummy variables designed to reflect variation in contest patterns.19 It should be remembered that differences like those noted above may be either reduced or exaggerated once we enter these variables into multivariate analysis.

A third aspect of the electoral situation which may be relevant is competitiveness. Our tests here are extremely preliminary since arguments about the connection between competitiveness and swing must rest on debatable assumptions. If decisions by party strategists and governments about the allocation of campaign effort and the distribution of spoils are guided by perceived variation in the

competitiveness or "safety" of ridings, and if these allocative decisions have the desired effect, then differences in competitiveness should help to predict variation in swing.20 In order to take account of this possibility we include in our model a crude measure of competitiveness based on margin of victory in the previous election. We assume that party strategists perceive ridings with smaller margins as more competitive and more deserving of party effort than less competitive ridings.

Variation in swing across our cases should also relate to differences in socioeconomic composition. Studies of individual voter preferences during the 1972-75 period indicate substantial variation in party support across class, ethnic and religious categories,21 and our preliminary exploration of the relationships between aggregate characteristics and swing turn up a number of significant relationships. We tested the relationships between thirty measures of socioeconomic composition and the four swings.22 The base level of support variable was controlled. Income stands out as the best overall predictor. In 1972 there was a significant positive relationship between shifts to the NDP and average income level. In 1975 this relationship was reversed-swings away from

19 For example, the model used in regression analysis of the 1975 swings will include a dummy contest pattern variable which will take the value "1" in ridings where there were two-party contests in 1975, and the value "0" otherwise. On the use of dummy variables in regression analysis see Donald Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism in Canadian Voting Patterns," this JOURNAL 5 (1972), 55-81.

20 For a discussion of electoral "safety" indices see J. A. A. Lovink, "Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive," this JOURNAL 6 (1973), 341-79. An interesting attempt to use a competitiveness variable as a predictor of government outputs in the British Columbia context is John Munro, "Highways in British Columbia: Economics and Politics," Canadian Journal ofEconomics 8(1975), 192-204. Forresearch which tests the relationship between swing and measures of competitiveness in B.C. elections from 1903 to 1975 see Wilson, "The Impact of Modernization," chap. 4.

21 See Daniel J. Koenig and Trevor B. Proverbs, "Class, Regional and Institutional Sources of Party Support within British Columbia," B. C. Studies, No. 29 (1976), 19-28; Daniel J. Koenig, Gary R. Martin, H. G. Goudy and Marlene Martin, "The Year that British Columbia Went NDP: NDP Voter Support Pre- and Post-1972," B.C. Studies, No. 24 (1974-75), 65-86.

22 The indicators tested included 10 measures of ethnic-religious composition, 19 measures of occupational or industrial composition, and average family income.

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the NDP were more likely (and stronger) in communities and areas where income levels were above average. In both elections significant coefficients of the opposite sign marked the relationships between Social Credit swings and income level. All 30 composition variables are included in the model used to generate multivariate prediction equations. As noted below, a small number of "best-predictor" variables were selected from the list.

Although discussions of regionalism in British Columbia politics have tended to focus on metropolitan-hinterland differences,23 our study shows that there are fairly marked regional differences within the hinterland. For the purposes of the analysis, the hinterland is divided into six regions-Peace, Northern Interior, Island and Coastal Mainland, Central Interior, Okanagan, and Kootenays.24 Our preliminary investigations suggest that regional effects are quite marked. For example, across our 149 cases the average swing to the NDP in 1972 was 8.8 percentage points. But the average for the Peace River Region was 2.1 points, while averages for the Island-Coast, Central Interior and Kootenays regions all exceeded 10 points. For the NDP swing in 1975 the regional averages ranged from +9.2 for the Peace and +3.9 for the Okanagan to -10.8 for the Central Interior. We would expect some of this disparity to diminish once we control for the base level of support variable. Our regression model includes dummy variables representing five of these regions with the sixth, the Central Interior, serving as the comparison region.

For each of the tour swings, we calculate multivariate prediction equations using a procedure designed to achieve a trade-off between comprehensiveness and parsimony. The base level of support and pattern of contest variables are entered into the equations first, as control variables. The regional variables are entered next, followed by composition and competitiveness variables which can significantly add to the amount of variance explained by the equation. That is, after entering the base level, contest pattern and regional variables, we employ a stepwise regression technique to select best predictor 23 See, for example, E. R. Black, "British Columbia: The Politics of Exploitation," in

R. A. Shearer (ed.), Exploiting Our Economic Potential: Public Policy and the B. C.

Economy (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), esp. 25; Martin Robin, "The Politics of Class Conflict," in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), esp. 36-37; and Patricia Marchak, "Class, Regional and Institutional Sources of Social Conflict in B.C.," B. C. Studies, No. 27 (1975), 30-49.

24 The constituencies included within each region are: Peace-North Peace River and South Peace River; Northern Interior-Atlin, Fort George, Omineca, and Skeena; Island and Coastal Mainland-Alberi, Cowichan-Malahat, Comox, Mackenzie, and Prince Rupert; Central Interior-Cariboo, Kamloops, and Yale-Lillooet; Okanagan -North Okanagan, South Okanagan, Shuswap, and Boundary-Similkameen; and Kootenays-Columbia River, Kootenay, Nelson-Creston, Revelstoke-Slocan, and Rossland-Trail.

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variables from a set which includes the 30 composition indicators and the competitiveness variable.25

The equations chosen by this procedure are presented in Appendix A. It should be emphasized that a variable's selection is an indication of its predictive significance and not necessarily of its causal importance. Our purpose is not to identify or estimate the causal significance of any variable or set of variables. Rather, as a preliminary step to establishing each community's level of electoral deviation, we want to insure that the major factors which determine variation in the distribution and impact of electoral forces have been taken into account. If the proportion of variance explained by the equations is an indication, then we have been successful in this regard-on the average these equations explain over 60 per cent of the variance in swing.

The prediction equations represent generalizations about the relationship between the characteristics of our voter aggregates and their swings. Thus, for example, we know that with other things held constant strong swings to Social Credit in 1975 were more likely where its share of the vote in 1972 was low, where the average income was high, in Peace River and Island-Coast communities, and so on. We now turn our attention to the matter of deviation from the expectations based on these generalizations. We know, for example, that a community situated in the Island-Coast region with a high proportion of native Indians, and a low percentage in the trade and finance sector should have swung relatively strongly towards the NDP in 1972. We want to focus on the deviation between expected results like this one and actual results.

It is the absolute magnitude of the deviation between actual and expected swing which will be of concern to us in the remainder of the article. The present section was devoted to explaining both the direction and magnitude of deviation. Now that we have exhausted the predictive ammunition which is available for that task, we can consider explanations of deviation per se. Deviation scores were calculated for each of the four swings examined and the signs dropped. Thus, each of the 149 cases is assigned four scores which indicate the absolute difference between its actual swings and the swings predicted. By averaging across the residuals for the four swings we obtain a summary deviation score for each case.26 This score now becomes our dependent variable.

25 Only those variables which could enter with an F value greater than 3.0 were chosen. An F value slightly greater than 3.0 would be required for a significance level of .05 to be attained.

26 This averaging was designed to achieve parsimony in further stages of the analysis, and undertaken after checks indicated that there were positive and statistically significant relationships between the deviation scores calculated for the 1972 and 1975 swings. The correlation between the deviations for the 1972 and 1975 Social Credit swings is .22 (significant at the .01 level), while the correlation for deviations from

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Explaining Electoral Deviation

Our first hypothesis is that geographical isolation is one of the factors which may insulate communities from provincial and regional forces, and thus lead them to deviate from expected electoral shifts. If we conceive of these electoral forces as composites of influences, then what should be crucial is the degree of isolation from the centres which disseminate electoral messages. Given the state of our knowledge we can only speculate about the spatial characteristics of political influence channels within the province. But it seems safe to assume that the Vancouver-Victoria conurbation, which is the centre of mass media activity and the home of the major political and economic institutions, plays the central role in the dissemination of electoral influences.27 However, we should also examine the possibility that electoral messages are dispersed through a two-stage process, with submetropolitan centres like Kamloops, Dawson Creek and Prince Rupert playing key roles.28 Opinion leaders in these centres may simply relay messages originating in higher order centres. Or, alternatively, they may compete with metropolitan opinion leaders by intercepting messages and placing regional interpretations on them.

This speculation about the spatial characteristics of influence dissemination networks suggests that we should explore the effects of remoteness from both metropolitan and submetropolitan centres. Thus, each case is assigned two scores-one to reflect its remoteness from Vancouver, the other its remoteness from the nearest regional centre.

NDP swings is .15 (significant at the .05 level). These findings may appear to indicate "rebound"-voting-that is, the tendency of places which swing strongly towards a party in one election to swing strongly against it in the next, as the party regresses (or progresses) back to its normal support level. This, however, cannot be the case because the effects of such shifts have been removed by inclusion of the base level of support variable in the equations used to produce these residuals. It must be stressed, in other words, that we are dealing here with deviation which remains after the effects of regression away from extreme support levels have been taken into account. While the correlations are not substantial, they are strong enough to suggest a general consistency in the tendency to deviate and to justify hypotheses positing relationships between enduring community characteristics and deviation. At the same time, however, it is clear that some of the electoral deviation has its roots in factors which are salient in one election and not the other. The second stage of our analysis should illustrate some of the reasons for this election-specific deviation, but separate analyses of the four sets of residuals would be needed to identify all cases where election-specific factors had a major impact.

27 On the Vancouver-Victoria metropolis see Walter G. Hardwick, "The Georgia Strait Urban Region," in Robinson, Studies in Canadian Geography: British Columbia.

28 On regional submetropoles see J. Lewis Robinson, "Areal Patterns and Regional Character"; and K. G. Denike and Roger Leigh, "Economic Geography, 1960-70," in Robinson, Studies in Canadian Geography: British Columbia. For research on shifts in the importance of mass media disseminating from metropolitan and

submetropolitan centres and an argument about the bearing of these shifts or electoral

patterns, see Wilson, "The Impact of Modernization," 250-62.

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On both measures remoteness is treated as a joint function of (a) the distance between the two places, and (b) the quality of the connecting transportation linkages.29 A third measure is based on an impressionistic judgment of overall isolation. Careful scrutiny of maps, and consideration of descriptive sketches in The British Columbia Source Book preceded assignment of cases on this scale.30 Ninety-eight communities were given scores on the three remoteness indicators. The remoteness levels of the 51 rural area cases could not be measured because these cases represent areas (often fairly large ones) rather than points on a map.

It should be emphasized that we do not claim to be measuring actual isolation from overarching communications networks. We are exploring the connection between two concepts which are posited as being at opposite ends of the causal chain-geographical isolation and electoral deviation. Both distance and the quality of linkages should be barriers to the movement of interpersonal messages and to penetration by extra-local mass media, so it seems plausible that geographically isolated communities will be tenuously connected to networks for the dissemination of political influence. This theory could certainly be refined if we were able to establish levels of actual communications isolation but, as mentioned above, research of a type very different from that undertaken here would be required in order to measure variation in this regard.

The hypothesized relationship between isolation and deviation does obtain. The Pearson correlation coefficients shown in the first column of Table 1 indicate the existence of a strong positive relationship. As can be seen on the right hand side of the table, this relationship persists after we control for the effects of population size. We introduce this control in order to counteract a potential source of spuriousness. Communities with small populations are more likely than larger places to be both remote and electorally volatile. Smaller places, that is, are more prone to large election-to-election vote fluctuations and this may mean that they are more likely to swing in ways which are at

29 The following are designated as regional centres-Nanaimo, Victoria, Kamloops, Vancouver, Prince George, Prince Rupert, Dawson Creek, Powell River, Trail or Nelson (whichever was closer) for the Kootenays, and Vernon, Kelowna or Penticton (whichever was closer) forthe Okanagan. The judgments concerning the quality of the linkage were made after an impressionistic consideration of maps. We took into consideration the texture of the road (whether it was paved, gravel or dirt, for example), the nature of the terrain, and special circumstances such as the necessity of ferry travel. The exact weight given to the linkage quality variable was based on an estimate of how much normal travel speed on the route would fall below the 50 mile per hour rate. Thus, for example, communities 100 miles away from a regional centre by gravel road were judged to be about as remote as those 150 miles distant by paved road, since travel time in both cases would be about three hours.

30 W. D. Cross, C. F. Goulson, and A. E Loft (eds.), The British Columbia Source Book (Victoria, n.p., 1966).

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odds with expectations. Controls on population size should neutralize any problem in this regard. Where the impressionistic measure of remoteness is concerned the partials are marginally weaker than the bivariate coefficients but for the two other measures of remoteness the partials are just as strong. Thus, we can conclude that isolation is a good predictor of electoral deviation even after the impact of community size is taken into account.

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ISOLATION AND ELECTORAL DEVIATION

(N = 98 COMMUNITIES)

Partials Pearson (population

coefficients size controlled)

Remoteness from Vancouver .37*** .36***

Remoteness from nearest regional centre .36*** .34***

Impressionistic judgment of remoteness .21* .16*

Significance levels: *** .001; ** .01; * .05.

Our second hypothesis rests on the argument that the characteristics of a community's population may also determine its insularity from provincial and regional electoral forces. We contend that insularity is more likely where those who are marginally connected to the societal mainstream are found in above average proportions. Those who are marginal are less likely to reach out for, or connect with, the channels which convey information and influence across the society. From the reverse side of the coin the argument is that communities containing high proportions of well-integrated voters should be less insular because such voters are more likely to be "in tune" with regional and provincial influences.31

Several interrelated indicators of marginality are tested. Our hypotheses, advanced in a very speculative vein, are as follows: (a) if education relates to literacy, an interest in politics, or the ability to

31 The opposite arguments might be made, of course. Locally generated forces may have less impact on marginal members of society because they are more likely to get their information from the impersonal mass media which, in the cases of smaller places at least, will be beamed into the community from outside. Thus, marginal groups may be more in touch with regional and provincial influence networks than they are with local ones.

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follow politics, then the poorly educated should tend to be insulated from current electoral forces, and a community's educational composition should predict its level of electoral deviation;32 (b) recent immigrants and those not of British origin should be more marginal, and thus their presence should correlate with deviation; (c) the residential transience of a community's population should be an indicator of its integration into wider networks and a correlate of electoral deviation;33 and (d) the environment of the frontier town should provide a context which shields against cross-community flows of electoral influence, and exaggerates the impact of the geographical isolation which is also usually characteristic of the frontier town. Deviation should be associated with characteristics such as age, gender and marital status which are commonly accepted as differentiating resource-based, frontier communities from those with more diverse economic bases and more settled social systems.34 (The frontier areas, of course, have above average proportions of males, and young, unmarried adults.)

These hypotheses are tested using both the 98-case community sample, and the expanded 149-case sample. All versions of the marginality hypothesis except that involving education are supported by the results of correlation analysis. As the coefficients in Table 2 indicate, electoral deviation relates to the ethnicity-nativity, transience and frontier dimensions of marginality. High deviance scores are more apt to be found where there are below average proportions of British, above

32 On the effects of education on participation and interest see, for example, Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 42-43, 53, 54, 122-24; Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 56-62, 83-84, 248-49,258-59,315-24; and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 97-100, 180-81, 253-59. A counterargument would note that those with lower education are generally less committed in a partisan sense, and suggest that because of this, those with lower education are more likely to be swept up by trends.

33 The counterargument made in introducing the marginality-deviancy linkage is particularly applicable here. Where residential permanency is high locally unique traditions of response may be more likely to develop. And it could be argued further that those who have moved into the community from outside (especially from other parts of the province) should contribute to the erosion of local response patterns because they are more likely to have ties to extra-local influence networks. The 1971 census provides data on migration within the province which allow investigation of these possibilities. Tests with these data lend no support to the idea that insularity declines as the proportion of recent immigrants from other parts of the province increases.

34 On frontier communities see S. D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), chaps. 1, 5 and 7; S. D. Clark, The Social Development of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1942), Part 4; Ira M. Robinson, New Industrial Towns on Canada's Resource Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, 1962); and Rex A. Lucas, Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of a Single Industry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).

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R. JEREMY WILSON

average proportions of new immigrants, high rates of transience, and above average proportions of those whose presence is taken to signal the frontier community environment.

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SOCIETAL MARGINALITY AND ELECTORAL DEVIATIONt

Nonmetropolitan Nonmetropolitan communities and

Measures of communities rural areas marginality n = 98 n = 149

% of population over age 15 with grade 10 education or less -.05 .06

% immigration from outside Canada, 1966-71 .36*** .22** % British origin -.19** -.29***

% nontransientstt 1966-71 -.21* -.12

% age 20-34 .28** .27*** % single .18* .32*** % male .27** .37***

Significance levels: *** .001; ** .01; * .05. t Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients.

tt Nontransients are those who remained in the same community.

It is, of course, very unlikely that we have identified several distinct causes of electoral insularity. The marginality variables are intercorrelated, and certain variables in this constellation relate to geographical isolation. In fact, what we probably have is a complex of factors which produces, or at least goes with, electoral deviation. It seems sound to suggest that the frontier label, which we attached to one set of variables tested above, may aptly describe the general syndrome.

Multivariate techniques were used to explore the existence and nature of the posited syndrome. These techniques should indicate whether the explanatory variables which we have considered until now explain the same portion of the variance as one another, and thus offer some guidance as to whether these variables do represent only one causal dimension. A stepwise regression procedure was used. Variables were drawn into a prediction equation one by one in order of their

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predictive power, with only those able to explain significant amounts of variance entering the final equation. Those variables chosen by this procedure should not be taken to signify the precise roots of electoral deviance. Rather, they should be seen as the best predictor representatives of one or more causal configurations.

For trials with the 98-case community sample, the summary measure of deviation was regressed on an equation including all of the remoteness and marginality variables. For trials with the larger sample, the regression equation could not include the remoteness variables because scores were not assigned to the 51 rural area cases. In both tests we find that a few variables explain almost as large a proportion of the variance as the total set of variables tested. In the case of the community sample, we find that the remoteness from Vancouver variable is the best predictor and, somewhat surprisingly, that its sister variable, remoteness from the regional centre, makes a further significant contribution.35 Indicators of remoteness are not part of the model tested on the larger sample but the results indicate that other variables take up the slack. The percentage male and percentage single variables are the best predictors, with no other variable able to augment significantly the variance explained by these two variables.36

While it is impossible to interpret these results with certainty, both of our hypotheses gain a measure of support from these findings. Electoral deviation seems to be affected by a set of interrelated factors uncovered by our analysis. It seems appropriate to call this configuration of factors the frontier syndrome because the characteristics of frontier resource towns-isolation, and higher than average proportions of young and unmarried adults, new immigrants, males, and transients-all predict deviation from expected electoral swings. We have been unable to establish whether the crucial determinant is the geographical isolation of frontier towns or the marginality of their populations. However, it seems safest, and not unreasonable, to conclude that these related dimensions both contribute to electoral deviation. Electoral insularity probably does have both geographical and cultural roots.

For assistance in generating further ideas about the causes of deviation, we will turn in the final section of the article to a case-by-case consideration of the places which deviated most strikingly from expected swings in 1972 and 1975. Scrutiny of these cases should suggest further insights about the electoral sociology of the province.

35 The coefficients were .0018 (F = 9.7, significant at .01) for the remoteness from Vancouver variable, and .0028 (F = 8.7, significant at .01) for the remoteness from regional centre variable. This equation explains 21.1 per cent of the variance.

36 The coefficients were .29 (F = 11.8, significant at .001) for the per cent male variable, and .12 (F = 5.5, significant at .05) for the per cent single variable. This equation explains 16.8 per cent of the variance.

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R. JEREMY WILSON

Examination of Cases with Extreme Electoral Deviation Scores

We established a list of extreme cases by singling out those communities and areas which had scores at least one standard deviation greater than the average level of electoral deviance.37 Seventeen cases met this criterion. The list was reduced by application of what we have learned about the causes of insularity from the above analysis. In five of the cases, significant amounts of deviation were explained by the two predictor variables singled out in the multivariate analysis just reported, gender and marital status.38 We were then left with 12 cases which met our criteria of extreme cases. These were Stewart, Invermere, Sparwood, Kamloops, Nelson, Osoyoos, Kitimat, and Hazelton, along with census areas contained within the ridings of Atlin, Mackenzie, Nelson-Creston, and Prince Rupert.

In at least three of twelve cases on the list, extreme electoral deviation seems to have been the result of bloc voting by traditional, and seemingly insular, ethnic communities. The part of the Atlin riding included in the Kitimat-Stikine census area is nearly 50 per cent native Indian, and its swings in 1972 and 1975 suggest that native villages voted heavily for the riding's sitting MLA, Frank Calder. The special circumstances brought about by Calder's switch from the NDP to Social Credit prior to the 1975 election also helped to boost this area's deviation score. In most parts of the province such a switch might cause voters to experience some conflict between personal and party loyalties but there can be no doubt about which were stronger in this riding. Personal ones prevailed and huge party swings resulted. In one of the larger communities in this subdivision, Aiyansh, Calder won 97 per cent of the vote as an NDP candidate in 1972, and then 92 per cent as a Social Creditor in 1975!

Bloc voting by native communities and the presence of barriers against the penetration of extra-local electoral influences also probably explain the electoral deviation of the section of the Prince Rupert riding in the Kitimat-Stikine census subdivision. The southwest corner of the Nelson-Creston constituency (including communities such as Thrums, Crescent Valley, and Pass Creek) appears on the list because party support levels in this area changed remarkably little between 1969 and 1975. This area is a true hotbed of NDP support-its share of the vote did not fall below 80 per cent in the three elections between 1969 and 1975. The area is heavily populated by Doukhobors, and this probably 37 Across four tests (two swings in two elections), we find that the average deviation

score for the 149 cases was 4.5 percentage points. The standard deviation was 2.5 points, so all of the cases selected diverged by an average of more than seven percentage points from the swings expected in the 1972 and 1975 elections.

38 Those cases remaining produced deviation scores which are more than one standard deviation greater than the scores predicted given their scores on the gender and marital status variables, and the equation: Expected deviation = - 13.7 + (.29 x % Male) + (.12 x % Single).

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accounts for its apparent insulation against trends prevailing elsewhere in the province and region.

These cases, then, suggest that our notions about the impact of cultural isolation could be refined or extended. The homogenizing thrust of the twentieth century may have eradicated the cultural distinctiveness of many communities, but in some of our cases traditional ethnic solidarities remain strong. We have seen three examples where cultural isolation seems to contribute to political insularity. These results suggest that in the earlier analysis, additional amounts of the variance in electoral deviation levels would have been explained by variables measuring ethnic homogeneity.

A number of other cases can be accounted for by explanations which remind us that electoral deviation is caused by special local circumstances prevailing in specific elections as well as by insularity based on enduring characteristics. As we mentioned, the special circumstances brought about by Frank Calder's switch help explain the deviation of the Atlin (Kitimat-Stikine subdivision) area. The deviation of Stewart, which is also in the Atlin riding, is no doubt also connected to the Calder switch. An additional factor helped to upset predictions in the latter community. A Liberal candidate from Stewart made an unusually strong showing there in 1972, and deviant swings around the two major parties in both 1972 and 1975 were an offshoot. In a similar way, the behaviour of another northwest community, Hazelton, seems to stem from the strong showing of the Progressive Conservatives there in 1972. The Conservatives, who were the only party to field a Hazelton resident as their candidate, won nearly 58 per cent of the town's vote in 1972, when their support in the Skeena riding as a whole was under 9 per cent. As a result of this abnormality, Hazelton swung strongly away from both Social Credit and the NDP in 1972 and then, on the rebound so to speak, strongly towards both parties in 1975, when the Progressive Conservative candidate made a uniformly poor showing across the constituency.

In at least three other cases on our list, deviant behaviour seems to be explained by election-specific circumstances pertaining to the impact, real or expected, of government actions. The deviation of the part of Prince Rupert in the Kitimat-Stikine subdivision is, as we said, a sign of bloc voting by native communities. Also relevant in this case is the fact that the largest community in this area, Port Simpson, was almost totally dependent on an industry whose future swayed with the political winds during the 1972-75 period. The NDP government gave financial support to the fish cannery operated by a native cooperative (The Pacific North Coast Native Cooperative) at Port Simpson and the community, which had given Social Credit 91 per cent of its vote in 1972, rewarded the NDP with 75 per cent in 1975. The deviant swings of Ocean Falls can be accounted for with the same kind of explanation. The

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town's sole industry, a pulp mill "saved" by government intervention during the NDP regime, was perceived to be threatened by a possible Social Credit government. A strong pro-NDP swing in 1975 resulted, pushing support for that party over 90 per cent in the Ocean Falls poll, and over 70 per cent in the Ocean Falls census area. Similarly, threats to major local industries probably had much to do with Nelson's appearance on the list. The NDP government went into the 1975 election with high support levels in Nelson and faced only Social Credit opposition. Thus, it would have been expected to suffer major losses. But Social Credit gained by only four percentage points even though, according to the prediction equation for Social Credit swing in 1975 (see Appendix A), two-party contests were, on average, worth nine extra points to Social Credit in that election. Fears about the future of Notre Dame University and Kootenay Forest Products under a Social Credit government probably had much to do with the NDP's strong showing.

The peculiar behaviour of the remaining places on the list-Invermere, Sparwood, Kamloops, Osoyoos and Kitimat-is less easily accounted for but speculation can be offered about most of these cases. Sparwood's claim to a place on the list rests on the fact that it was one of the few places in the province to produce a pro-Social Credit swing in 1972. The large influx of new voters into the community in the 1969-1972 period may be a key to understanding why its swings were not in harmony with expectations. In the case of Kitimat, answers might appear if we studied local issues, and the role of the town's prominent and trouble-plagued breakaway smelter workers union. With over 60 per cent of its work force in trade, finance and service industries, Invermere is far from a typical Kootenay community, and geographically it is situated in a far corner of the region with which we expect it to be "in tune." Communications between Invermere and places like Calgary may be more intense than those with Vancouver or with Kootenay centres like Nelson and Cranbrook. Thus, it is not surprising that this community, whose deviation was most marked in 1975 when its swing against the NDP was stronger than predicted, was not in line with regional and provincial norms. In a different sense, the geographical position of Osoyoos may provide the answer to its deviation which was most apparent in 1972 when the community virtually stood pat. Osoyoos is situated in one of the most interesting constituencies in the province, Boundary-Similkameen. This riding encompasses the southern end of the Okanagan valley, where Social Credit vote is high, as well as the Similkameen communities to the west and Boundary communities to the east, where support for the NDP has traditionally been strong. Few other constituencies in the province are as electorally heterogeneous, and the behaviour of Osoyoos may reflect the operation of conflicting pressures from the different nearby contexts.

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Conclusion

This article has sought to explain variation in the degree of electoral deviation manifested by hinterland British Columbia communities in the provincial elections of 1972 and 1975. A community's electoral deviation is indicated by the divergence between its actual shifts in party support in these two elections and the shifts expected given its region, electoral situation and composition. The task of exploring the roots of electoral deviation has been approached in two different ways.

In the final part of the article, we undertook a case-by-case analysis of communities and areas which produced extreme deviation scores. Consideration of these cases produced one expected result-some of the electoral deviation was related to election-specific factors. Local candidates and issues can still override provincial or regional stimuli in importance. As long as governments are heavily involved in the economy, and as long as British Columbia contains a number of one-industry towns, we will continue to find communities like Ocean Falls bucking province or region-wide electoral trends. Local candidates will probably continue to be very important in some situations and might even increase in importance if there is any move to "congressionalize" the system of parliamentary government as it operates in British Columbia.

Our main concern was to explicate causes of electoral deviation which seemed to be rooted in enduring aspects of the community's composition or situation. We hypothesized that both geographical and cultural factors might block cross-locality dispersal of electoral influences and thus leave a community insulated against the electoral forces prevailing in an election. Both hypotheses were supported by the data. Remote communities and those with large proportions of the marginally situated were more likely to deviate from expected electoral performance, suggesting that they were more likely to escape or deflect the prevailing electoral winds. Further consideration of the evidence suggested that the geographical and cultural sources of electoral insularity are probably intertwined.

The case-by-case analysis suggested one way in which our thinking about cultural barriers should be extended. Among our list of extreme cases we identified at least three whose deviation seemed partially attributable to bloc voting by traditional ethnic communities. Developments have failed to eradicate certain local idiosyncracies which are based on traditional ethnic solidarities.

It should be stressed that all of the findings presented here are preliminary. There is a relationship between variables at opposite ends of a hypothetical chain of causality. We have provided no direct evidence to support our arguments about the intervening processes or our contentions about the way in which patterns of electoral interaction and influence are constrained by geographical and cultural factors. The

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relationships demonstrated are consistent with these arguments and thus enhance their credibility. But studies focussing on media penetration, media use patterns, and the spatial characteristics of the networks along which interpersonal political communications flow, are needed to establish the validity of these arguments. We hope that future survey research will include banks of questions on matters such as media use and friendship patterns which would allow exploration of these questions.

Elsewhere I have argued that twentieth-century developments, especially those relating to the modernization of the province's communications infrastructure, eradicated the electoral insularity of many of British Columbia's scattered and diverse communities.39 Modernization seems to have diminished the extent to which hinterland communities were insulated against extra-local forces and in this way undermined the bases of the electoral localism which was relatively pronounced in elections prior to 1952. This article has analyzed communities which, because of geographical factors or unevenness of the development process, remain, by today's standards at least, very isolated. By showing that these communities, which are in a sense less modern, are more likely to manifest the electoral insularity which was generally characteristic of earlier elections, we support the argument that modernization substantially altered the characteristics of British Columbia political society. There seems to exist a connection between the tenuousness of a community's links with the wider political community and its electoral insularity. No British Columbia community has been untouched by the communications revolution. But because of geographical and cultural factors there remains considerable variation in the extent to which the province's scattered communities are integrated into the provincial polity.

Appendix A: Equations Used to Predict Social Credit and NDP Swings in 1972 and 1975

The following equations are derived from analysis of the sample of 149 nonmetropolitan communities and rural areas. The equation given for each of the swings includes the base level of support variable and region dummy variables along with socioeconomic composition and competitiveness variables selected by application of a modified stepwise regression procedure.

For Social Credit Swing in 1972

Expected Swing = 8.23 - (.43 x SC 1969) + (4.89 x Contest 72a) - (9.20 x Dummy North) -

39 Wilson, "The Impact of Modernization."

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(6.32 x Dummy Peace) - (5.28 x Dummy Island-Coast) - (.99 x Dummy Okanagan) - (.71 x Dummy Kootenays) + (.20 x % Native Indian) + (1.03 x % Managerial-Administrative Occupations) + (.08 x Margin of Victory 1969b) - (.0009 x Average Family Income) + (.14 x % United Church) F (12,136) = 21.2 R2 = .65

For NDP Swing in 1972

Expected Swing = 21.10 - (.26 x NDP 1969) + (2.25 x Contest 1972a) - (3.0 x Dummy North) - (13.90 x Dummy Peace) + (4.15 x Dummy Island-Coast) -

(3.21 x Dummy Okanagan) - (.64 x Dummy Kootenay) - (.39 x % Native Indian) - (.34 x % Trade and Finance Industry) + (.35 x % Transport Industry) + (.49 x % Dutch) F (11,137) = 11.7 R2 = .48

For Social Credit Swing in 1975

Expected Swing = -9.7 - (.48 x SC 1972) + (5.1 x Contest 1972 XC) + (8.95 x Contest 1975 yd) + (.39 x Dummy North) + (8.1 x Dummy Peace) - (11.06 x Dummy Island-Coast) - (4.86 x Dummy Okanagan) - (6.6 x Dummy Kootenays) + (.0022 x Average Family Income) + (. 14 x % Trade & Finance Industry) - (.83 x % Transport Industry) + (1.1 x % Transportation Occupations) + (.30 x % Native Indian) + (.19 x % Britisf) + (.48 x % Dutch) - (.30 x % Professional Occupations) + (,22 x % Farmer Occupations) F (17,131) = 16.7 R2 = .68

For NDP Swing in 1975

Expected Swing = 39.78 - (.58 x % NDP 1972) - (5.52 x Contest 1975 XC) + (3.33 x Dummy North) + (10.24 x Dummy Peace) + (13.0 x Dummy Island-Coast) + (9.99 x Dummy Okanagan) + (12.64 x Dummy Kootenays) + (.0019 x Average Family Income) - (.23 x Margin of Victory 1972) - (.33 x % Public Administration Industry) - (.32 x % Farming Occupations) F (11,137) = 19.9 R2 = .62 a Contest 72, a dummy variable taking the value 1 in constituencies where either the

Liberal or Conservative parties were not contestants in 1972, and the value 0 otherwise. b Margin of Victory 1969, the absolute difference between Social Credit and NDP

support in 1969.

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c Contest 1975 X, a dummy variable taking the value 1 in constituencies where both the Liberals and Conservatives were contestants in 1972 but where one of these parties did field a candidate in 1975, and the value of 0 otherwise.

d Contest 1975 Y, a dummy variable taking the value 1 in constituencies where neither the Liberals nor Conservatives contested the 1975 election, and the value of 0 otherwise.



geography, politics and culture: electoral insularity in british columbia

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