german advisory council on global change (wbgu) new

New Structuresfor Global Environmental Policy

New Structuresfor Global Environmental Policy

German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)

H.-J. SchellnhuberJ. KokottF. O. BeeseK. FraedrichP. KlemmerL. Kruse-GraumannC. NeumannO. RennE.-D. SchulzeM. TilzerP. VelsingerH. Zimmermann

EAR THSCAN

Members of the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)(as on 01.10.1999)

Prof Dr Friedrich O. BeeseAgronomist: Director of the Institute for Soil Science and Forest Nutrition in Göttingen

Prof Dr Klaus FraedrichMeteorologist: Professor of Meteorology at the University of Hamburg

Prof Dr Paul KlemmerEconomist: President of the Rhine-Westphalian Institute for Economic Research in Essen

Prof Dr Dr Juliane Kokott (vice chairperson)Lawyer: Professor of International Law, International Economic Law and European Law at the Universityof St. Gallen, Switzerland

Prof Dr Lenelis Kruse-GraumannPsychologist: Professor of Psychology (specialist in environmental psychology) at the University of Hagen

Prof Dr Christine NeumannPhysician: Professor of Dermatology at the University of Göttingen

Prof Dr Ortwin RennSociologist: Executive Director of the Center of Technology Assessment in Baden-Württemberg, Professorof Sociology at the University of Stuttgart

Prof Dr Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber (chairperson)Physicist: Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Professor of TheoreticalPhysics at the University of Potsdam

Prof Dr Ernst-Detlef SchulzeBotanist: Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for Biogeochemistry, Jena

Prof Dr Max TilzerLimnologist: Professor of Limnology at the University of Konstanz

Prof Dr Paul VelsingerEconomist: Professor of Political Economy at the University of Dortmund, specializing in regional economics

Prof Dr Horst ZimmermannEconomist: Head of the Public Finance Group at the University of Marburg

German Advisory Councilon Global Change

World in Transition

Volume 2

New Structures for GlobalEnvironmental Policy

Earthscan Publications Ltd

London and Sterling, VA

EAR THSCAN

German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)SecretariatReichpietschufer 60–62, 8th FloorD-10785 BerlinGermany

http://www.wbgu.de

Time of going to press, German version: 30.09.2000, entitledWelt im Wandel: Neue Strukturen globaler Umweltpolitik. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York, 2000.ISBN 3-540-41343-X

First published in the UK and USA in 2001by Earthscan Publications Ltd

Copyright © German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), 2001

All rights reserved

ISBN: 1 85383 852 7

Printed and bound in the UK Translation by Christopher Hay, DarmstadtCover design by Erich Kirchner, Heidelberg using the following illustrations:United Nations, 5th COP UNFCCC, Flags (Federal Press Office),Executive Director UNEP, Negotiations (IISD/Leila Mead)

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (Germany)World in transition volume 2: new structures for global environmental policy / German Advisory Council on Global Change.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references (p. ).ISBN 1-85383-852-7 (cloth)1. Government policy--Germany. 2. -Government policy--Germany.

3. Sustainable development--Government policy--Germany. I. Title

QH77.G3 W57 2001333.95'16'0943--dc21

2001023313

This book is printed on elemental chlorine free paper

This report would not have been possible without thecommitted and untiring effort of the staff of theCouncil Members and the Council’s Secretariat inBremerhaven.

The Council wishes to express its fullest gratitudeto all those research fellows who participated in thework of the Council when this report was written:

Prof Dr Meinhard Schulz-Baldes (Director, Secre-tariat Bremerhaven), Dr Carsten Loose (DeputyDirector, Secretariat Bremerhaven), Dr Frank Bier-mann, LL.M. (Secretariat Bremerhaven), Dr ArthurBlock (Potsdam Institute for Climate ImpactResearch), Dr Astrid Bracher (Alfred Wegener Insti-tute for Polar and Marine Research, Bremerhaven),Dipl.-Geogr. Gerald Busch (University of Göttin-gen), Dipl.-Psych. Swantje Eigner (University ofHagen), Ref.-jur. Cosima Erben (University of St.Gallen), Dipl.-Ing. Mark Fleischhauer (University ofDortmund), Dr Georg Heiss (Secretariat Bremer-haven), Dr Dirk Hilmes (University Hospital Der-matology and Venerology, Göttingen),Andreas Klin-ke, M.A. (Academy for Technology Impact Assess-ment, Stuttgart), Dr Jacques Léonardi (University ofHamburg), Dr Roger Lienenkamp (University ofDortmund), Dipl.-Volksw. Thilo Pahl (University ofMarburg), Dr Benno Pilardeaux (Secretariat Bre-merhaven), Dipl.-Geoökol. Christiane Ploetz (MaxPlanck Institute for Biogeochemistry, Jena), Ass.-jur.Kaija Seiler, LL.M. University of Washington (Uni-versity of St. Gallen), Dr Rüdiger Wink (Universityof Bochum).

The Council also wishes to thank Vesna Karic-Fazlic and Ursula Liebert (Secretariat Bremerhaven)for providing organizational and logistical supportwhen the report was written, and Martina Schneider-Kremer, M.A. (Secretariat Bremerhaven) for com-prehensive editorial work and support.

The Council also owes its gratitude to the impor-tant contributions and support by other members ofthe research community. This report builds on com-ments and reports in particular from:

Prof Dr Alfred Endres, Dipl.-Ing. agr. M. Finus,University of Hagen, Department of Economics:

Ansätze zur Herbeiführung von Verhandlungslösun-gen im Bereich globaler Umweltpolitik.

PD Dr Cord Jakobeit, Gesellschaft für Entwick-lungs- und Umweltforschung b. R.: Innovative Finan-zierungsmechanismen zur Finanzierung globalerUmweltaufgaben: Analyse und Handlungsempfeh-lungen.

Stefan Kuhn, ICLEI European SecretariatFreiburg: Auswertung der Agenda 21: Lokale Agen-da 21.

Dr Sebastian Oberthür, Ecologic – Centre for In-ternational and European Environmental Research,Berlin: Reform des internationalen Institutionensys-tems in der globalen Umweltpolitik.

Moreover, the Council also wishes to thank DrJürgen Ritterhoff, Northsea Action Conference, Bre-men, Dr Gudrun Henne, Berlin and Dr Hans Payer,Germanischer Lloyd, Hamburg, who provided valu-able support.

Finally, the Council is much indebted to the per-sons who received the delegation visiting the UnitedStates from February 19–26, 1999. Many experts frompolitics, administration and science offered guidedtours, prepared presentations and were available forin-depth discussions and conversations:

Adnan Amin: UNEP Regional Office NorthAmerica; Ray Ankers, President: World Environ-ment Center; Ambassador Bagher Asadi, Iran; PeterBacklund: Harvard University; Prof Scott Barrett:Paul H. Nitze School of International Studies(SAIS); Dr R. Bierbaum: Office of Science and Tech-nology Policy (OSTP); Prof Dr Edith Brown Weiss:Georgetown University Law School; Dr WolfgangBurhenne: The World Conservation Union (IUCN);Brian T. Castelli, Chief of Staff Energy Efficiency andRenewable Energy: Department of Energy (DOE);James Connell: Office of German Affairs, Depart-ment of State (DOS); John Cusack, President:Innovest Corporation; Robert Dahlberg: AmericanCouncil on Germany; Under Secretary-General Ni-tin Desai, Head: Department of Economic and SocialAffairs, United Nations Organization; JoAnne Di-Sano, Director: United Nations Organization; FelixDodds, Head: United Nations Environment and De-

Acknowledgements

velopment Steering Committee; Andrea Durbin:Friends of the Earth; Christopher Flavin: WorldWatch Institute; Susan R. Fletcher, Senior Analyst inInternational Environmental Policy: CongressionalResearch Service (CRS); Louise Fréchette, DeputySecretary-General: United Nations Organization;Bryan Hannegan, Congressional Research Fellow;A.George Furth: Office of Environmental Policy, Bu-reau of Oceans, Environment and Science, Depart-ment of State (DOS); Ian Johnson: World Bank; LisaJordan: Bank Information Center; Ambassador DrDieter Kastrup, Head: Permanent Mission of Ger-many in New York; Dr Inge Kaul, Head: Office ofDevelopment Studies: UNDP; Kenneth King: GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF); Dr Kramer, Desk Offi-cer for Science and Technology: German EmbassyWashington; BR Krapp: Permanent Mission of Ger-many in New York; Envoy Martin Lutz, Head: Eco-nomics Department: Permanent Mission of Ger-many in New York; Dr Mauch, Director: GermanHistorical Institute; Christopher J. Miller, Professio-nal Staff Member: US Senate Committee on Envi-ronment and Public Works; Hemanta Mishra: GlobalEnvironment Facility (GEF); Sascha Müller-Kraen-ner, Director: Heinrich Böll Foundation; Shirley J.Neff, Staff Economics: US Senate Committee onEnergy and Natural Resources; A. P. EtanomareOsio, Envoy: Nigeria; Danielle Parris, Senior Adviserof Frank E. Loy (Under Secretary of State for GlobalAffairs); Prof E. A. Parsons: Harvard University; Ni-gel Purvis, Senior Adviser of Frank E. Loy (UnderSecretary of State for Global Affairs); Frank Rittner:Global Environment Facility (GEF); Espen Roenn-eberg: United Nations Organization, Office for SmallIslands Affairs; Kenneth Ruffing: Commission onSustainable Development (CSD); Helmut Schaffer,German Executive Director: World Bank; StephenSeidel, Deputy Director: Office of Atmospheric Pro-grams, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);Rashid Shaikh: New York Academy of Sciences; DrMichael M. Simpson, Specialist in EnvironmentalTechnologies: Congressional Research Service(CRS); Trigg Talley, Deputy Office Director: Officeof Environmental Policy, Bureau of Oceans, Environ-ment and Science (OES), Department of State(DOS); Prof Dr Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director:United Nations Environment Programme; MarcUzan: Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee; Fred-erick van Bolhuis: World Bank; Nicholas van Praag:World Bank; Prof Dr Konrad von Moltke, DirectorEnvironmental Studies Program, Dartmouth Col-lege; Robert Watson: World Bank; Susan Wickwire:Office of Environmental Policy, Bureau of Oceans,Environment and Science, Department of State(DOS); Mr Wollin, Staff of the Desk Officer for Sci-ence and Technology: German Embassy Washington.

The Council also thanks Christopher Hay (Über-setzungsbüro für Umweltwissenschaften, Darm-stadt) for his expert translation of this report intoEnglish from the German original.

VI

A

BB 1B 2B 3B 4

CC 1C 2C 3C 4C 5

DD 1D 2D 3

EE 1E 2E 3

Acknowledgements V

Outline of Contents VII

Contents IX

Boxes XIV

Tables XV

Figures XVI

Acronyms and abbreviations XVII

Summary for policymakers 1

Who is steering Spaceship Earth? 11

The situation: Global environmental trends 19Syndromes of global change 21Global environmental problems 23Linkages among global environmental problems 52Intergovernmental actors for sustainable development 60

Institutional deficits and remedies 67Institutions and organizations 69The role of institutions in setting agendas 70Institutionalization and regime dynamics 77Improving compliance with international agreements 89Local and national implementation: Education and Local Agenda 21 98

Institutional interplay 105International trade regimes and the environment 107Interplay with financial institutions 115Interplay with development institutions: UNDP and the environment 121

Global environmental policy: Assessment, organization and funding 125Assessing environmental problems 127Reforming the organizational structure of global environmental policy 132Raising and allocating funds for global environmental policy 142

Outline of Contents

Earth Alliance: Approaches and a vision for restructuring 169Contributing to the World Summit on Sustainable Development 171Earth Assessment: Ethical authority and scientific competence to assess environmental issues 173Earth Organization: Integrating global environmental policy 175Earth Funding: Financing global environmental policy 180

References 183

Glossary 197

The German Advisory Council on Global Change 203

Index 207

FF 1F 2

F 3F 4

G

H

I

J

VIII

Contents

A

B

B 1

B 2B 2.1

B 2.1.1B 2.1.2B 2.1.3

B 2.1.3.1B 2.1.3.2B 2.1.3.3

B 2.2

B 2.2.1B 2.2.2

B 2.2.2.1B 2.2.2.2B 2.2.2.3

B 2.3B 2.3.1B 2.3.2B 2.3.3

B 2.3.3.1B 2.3.3.2B 2.3.3.3

Acknowledgements V

Outline of Contents VII

Contents IX

Boxes XIV

Tables XV

Figures XVI

Acronyms and abbreviations XVII

Summary for policymakers 1

Who is steering Spaceship Earth? 11

The situation: Global environmental trends 19

Syndromes of global change 21

Global environmental problems 23Climate change 23Causes 24Need for action 24Institutional arrangements 24Prevention 24Adaptation 26Mitigation of effects 26Global environmental effects of chemicals: Stratospheric ozone depletion andpersistent organic pollutants 26Causes and need for action 28Institutional arrangements 28Prevention 28Adaptation 29Mitigation of effects 29Oceans at risk 30Causes 31Need for action 33Institutional arrangements 33Prevention 33Adaptation 34Mitigation of effects 35

X

Biodiversity loss and deforestation 35Causes 36Need for action 36Institutional arrangements 38Prevention 38Adaptation and mitigation of effects 40Soil and land degradation 40Causes 41Need for action 42Institutional arrangements 43Prevention 43Adaptation and mitigation of effects 43Freshwater scarcity and pollution 44Causes 44Need for action 45Institutional arrangements 45Prevention 45Adaptation 47Mitigation of effects 48Regime-relevant attributes of global environmental problems 48

Linkages among global environmental problems 52Common causes 52Interplay among global environmental problems 53Overview 53Examples of interplay 55Climate change and biodiversity loss and deforestation 55Climate change and soil degradation 56Climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion 57Consequences for the institutional design of global environmental policy 58

Intergovernmental actors for sustainable development 60Relevant UN specialized agencies 60Relevant programmes of the United Nations 61UN Commission on Sustainable Development 62Relevant conventions 62Relevant financing bodies 63

Institutional deficits and remedies 67

Institutions and organizations 69

The role of institutions in setting agendas 70Introduction 70Agenda setting in ozone policy 70The ozone issue on the international and national agenda 70The role of institutions and organizations 71Agenda setting in climate policy 72The climate issue on the international and national agenda 72The role of institutions and organizations 74Agenda setting in soil policy 74The soil issue on the international and national agenda 74The role of institutions and organizations 76Recommendations for action and research 76

B 2.4B 2.4.1B 2.4.2B 2.4.3

B 2.4.3.1B 2.4.3.2

B 2.5B 2.5.1B 2.5.2B 2.5.3

B 2.5.3.1B 2.5.3.2

B 2.6B 2.6.1B 2.6.2B 2.6.3

B 2.6.3.1B 2.6.3.2B 2.6.3.3

B 2.7

B 3B 3.1B 3.2

B 3.2.1B 3.2.2

B 3.2.2.1B 3.2.2.2B 3.2.2.3

B 3.3

B 4B 4.1B 4.2B 4.3B 4.4B 4.5

C

C 1

C 2C 2.1C 2.2

C 2.2.1C 2.2.2

C 2.3C 2.3.1C 2.3.2

C 2.4C 2.4.1C 2.4.2

C 2.5

C 3C 3.1C 3.2

C 3.2.1 C 3.2.2

C 3.3

C 3.3.1 C 3.3.2

C 3.4C 3.4.1C 3.4.2

C 3.5C 3.6

C 3.6.1C 3.6.2C 3.6.3C 3.6.4

C 3.7

C 4C 4.1C 4.2

C 4.2.1C 4.2.2

C 4.3C 4.3.1C 4.3.2

C 4.4C 4.4.1C 4.4.2

C 4.5C 4.5.1C 4.5.2

C 4.5.3

C 5C 5.1C 5.2

C 5.2.1C 5.2.2

C 5.3C 5.4

D

D 1D 1.1

D 1.2

D 2D 2.1D 2.2

Institutionalization and regime dynamics 77Introduction 77The ozone regime: Institutionalization and dynamics 77The process of institutionalization 77Effects of specific institutional design 77The regime for the protection of the marine environment: Institutionalizationand dynamics 78The process of institutionalization 78Effects of specific institutional design 79The biodiversity regime: Institutionalization and dynamics 81The process of institutionalization 81Effects of the specific institutional design 81Alternative avenues: International cooperation with non-state actors 82Lessons from game theory for international negotiations 84Introduction to game theory 84Strategic design of negotiations 85Strategic design of the content of negotiations 86Outlook 87Recommendations for action and research 87

Improving compliance with international agreements 89Introduction 89Compliance among the institutions for transboundary water resources management in North America 89Background 89Compliance and monitoring 89Combating soil degradation in drylands: Compliance and monitoring 90Introduction 90Compliance and monitoring 91Compliance in climate policy 92Introduction 92Compliance and monitoring 92C 4.5 Recommendations for action and research 94Procedures for acquiring information on the state of implementation 95Procedures for assessing reports and for deciding on international responses toimplementation deficits 96Tools for responding to difficulties and implementation deficits 96

Local and national implementation: Education and Local Agenda 21 98Introduction 98Learning for sustainable development – status and progress 98CSD initiatives 98National activities on education for sustainable development 99Successful Agenda 21 activities 101Recommendations for action and research 102

Institutional interplay 105

International trade regimes and the environment 107Globalization processes – the millennium challenge for internationalenvironmental policy 107The WTO and international environmental standards 108

Interplay with financial institutions 115The World Bank Group and global environmental policy 115Interdependencies between the IMF and global environmental policy 117

XI

Interplay with development institutions: UNDP and the environment 121UNDP activities for environmental protection 121Moves for UNDP reform 121Strengthening UNDP as a financing and coordinating body 122

Global environmental policy: Assessment, organization and funding 125

Assessing environmental problems 127Introduction 127An independent body for assessment and early warning 127The role of scientific policy advice 128The IPCC experience 128Supporting global environmental policy by scientific panels 129The role of the CSD 130Assessing global environmental problems: Recommendations for action 131

Reforming the organizational structure of global environmental policy 132Introduction 132The functions of restructuring 133Towards a new architecture 135Step 1: Improving cooperation 135Step 2: Coordinating umbrella organization with independent committees 138Step 3: Centralization and concentration within one organization? 139Recommendations for action and research concerning the organization ofglobal environmental policy 140

Raising and allocating funds for global environmental policy 142The significance of funding 142Innovative approaches to financing 144Introduction 144Direct contributions of funds from national tax revenues 145Levying charges on the use of the global commons 146The basic idea of user charges 146Use of air space 147Use of the oceans 149Use of the geostationary orbit 152Compensation for abstaining from using a resource 154Options for insurance and compensation for regional damage resulting fromglobal environmental change 154Other financing mechanisms 156Foreign currency turnover tax (‘Tobin tax’) 156Environmental lotteries 157Involving private players in financing 157Efficient spending of funds 159The issues 159The role of voting and decision-making procedures in the case of the GEF 160A system of determinants for assessing how efficiently funds are spent 161The importance of analysing efficiency in the allocation of public funds 161The individual determinants 162Hypotheses and recommendations relating to the determinants 164Efficiency analysis of non-commercial national trust funds for environment anddevelopment 165Conclusion 167

D 3D 3.1D 3.2D 3.3

E

E 1E 1.1 E 1.2E 1.3

E 1.3.1E 1.3.2

E 1.4E 1.5

E 2E 2.1E 2.2E 2.3

E 2.3.1E 2.3.2

E 2.3.3E 2.4

E 3E 3.1E 3.2

E 3.2.1E 3.2.2E 3.2.3

E 3.2.3.1E 3.2.3.2E 3.2.3.3E 3.2.3.4

E 3.2.4E 3.2.5

E 3.2.6E 3.2.6.1E 3.2.6.2

E 3.3E 3.4

E 3.4.1E 3.4.2

E 3.4.3 E 3.4.3.1E 3.4.3.2

E 3.4.4E 3.4.5

E 3.5

XII

F

F 1

F 2

F 2.1F 2.2F 2.3

F 3F 3.1

F 3.1.1F 3.1.2F 3.1.3

F 3.2

F 4F 4.1F 4.2F 4.3

F 4.4

G

H

I

J

Earth Alliance: Approaches and a vision for restructuring 169

Contributing to the World Summit on Sustainable Development 171

Earth Assessment: Ethical authority and scientific competence to assess environmental issues 173Establishing an Earth Commission 173Strengthening scientific policy advice 173The CSD as the forum for debate 174

Earth Organization: Integrating global environmental policy 175Towards an International Environmental Organization 175Introduction 175Three steps for reform 175Concrete implementation of structural reform 177Specific actions relating to sectoral environmental regimes 177

Earth Funding: Financing global environmental policy 180Making multilateral organizations more efficient 180Levying user charges for the global commons 181Promoting interlinkage with governmental and private-sector financing tools 181Making the most of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 182

References 183

Glossary 197

The German Advisory Council on Global Change 203

Index 207

XIII

Boxes

Persistent organic pollutants 30Double-hulled ships as a precaution against oil pollution 34Disparities in the negotiating positions of nations on climate change: The example of forest use 73Compliance in ozone policy 94Pilot bottom-up projects: Implementing sustainable water supply 101Article XX of GATT 108The World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle – An environmental evaluation 110Example from the specialist literature of one possible formulation of a decision by the WTO Ministerial Conference on Trade and the Environment 113The Töpfer Task Force 136Use of the genetic resources of the high seas 151

Box B 2.2-1 Box B 2.3-1 Box C 2.3-1

Box C 4.4-1 Box C 5.3-1 Box D 1.2-1 Box D 1.2-2

Box D 1.2-3

Box E 2.3-1 Box E 3.2-1

Table B 1-1 Table B 2.1-1

Table B 2.2-1

Table B 2.3-1

Table B 2.4-1

Table B 2.5-1

Table B 2.6-1

Table B 2.7-1 Table B 3.1-1 Table B 3.2-1 Table E 3.1-1

Table E 3.4-1

The 16 syndromes of global change 22Climate change: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements 25Global environmental effects of chemicals (stratospheric ozone depletion andpersistent organic pollutants): Causes, need for action and necessary institutionalarrangements 29Oceans at risk: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements 32Biodiversity loss and deforestation: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements 37Soil and land degradation: Causes, need for action and necessary institutionalarrangements 42Freshwater scarcity and pollution: Causes, need for action and necessaryinstitutional arrangements 46Regime-relevant attributes of global environmental problems 49Causation of global environmental problems by syndromes 53Interactions among global environmental problems 54Official Development Assistance (ODA) transfers of OECD countries in 1993 and 1998 143Overview of international funding institutions of relevance to global environmental policy 159

Tables

Figure B 3.2-1 Figure B 4-1Figure B 4.4-1 Figure B 4.4-2 Figure B 4.4-3 Figure B 4.4-4 Figure C 2.3-1

Figure F 1-1

Interplay among the global environmental problems 55Institutions of environmental relevance within the UN system 61The bodies of the Biodiversity Convention 63The bodies of the Montreal Protocol 64The bodies of the Desertification Convention 65The bodies of the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 66Divergent goals of forest use as a function of per-capita income and forest area 73Reform of the United Nations in the field of environment 172

Figures

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOSISARGE

ASEANASSOD

BMU

BMZ

CBDCCOLCDCCDMCHMCITES

COPCSDCSTDCECEECOSOCEEACEEZEPAESSCEUFAOFSCGATTGEFGLASODGTZ

IATAIBRDICSIDICSUIDAIFADIFC

Alliance of Small Island StatesArbeitsgemeinschaft Neue Bundeslotterie für Umwelt und Entwicklung[Working Group for a Federal Lottery for the Environment and Development(Germany)]Association of South East Asian NationsAssessment of the Status of Human Induced Soil Degradation in South andSoutheast Asia (FAO, ISRIC, UNEP)Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit[Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety(Germany)]Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)]Convention on Biological DiversityCo-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (UNEP)Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USAClean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC)Clearing House MechanismConvention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna andFlora (UN)Conference of the PartiesCommission on Sustainable Development (UN)Comittee on Science and Technology (UNCCD)Development CooperationEconomic Commission for Europe (UN)Economic and Social Council (UN)European Environmental Advisory CouncilsExclusive Economic Zone Environmental Protection Agency (USA)European Society for Soil ConservationEuropean UnionFood and Agriculture Organization (UN)Forest Stewardship CouncilGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGlobal Environment Facility (UN)Global Soil Degradation Database (FAO, UNESCO)Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit [German Society on Development Cooperation]International Air Transport AssociationInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)International Centre for Settlement of Investment DisputesInternational Council of Scientific UnionsInternational Development Association (World Bank)International Fund for Agricultural Development (FAO)International Finance Corporation (IBRD)

XVIII

Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (UN)International Financial Institution Advisory Commission/Meltzer CommissionIntergovernmental OrganizationsInternational Joint Commission (USA and Canada)International Labor OrganizationInternational Monetary FundInternational Maritime OrganizationIntergovernmental Panel on Biological Diversity (recommended)Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (WMO, UNEP)Intergovernmental Panel on Land and Soils (recommended)International Soil Conservation OrganizationInternational Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNESCO)International Soil Science and Reference Centre (ICSU)The World Conservation UnionInternational Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (FAO)International Union on Soil SciencesMan and the Biosphere Programme (UNESCO)International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ShipsMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (IBRD)North American Free Trade AgreementNational Aeronautics and Space Administration (USA)Non-Governmental OrganizationOfficial Development AssistanceOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOffice of Internal Oversight Services (UN)International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by OilOrganization of Petroleum Exporting CountriesPrototype Carbon Fund (World Bank)Persistent Organic PollutantRisk Assessment Panel (recommended)Subsidiary Body on Implementation (UNFCCC)Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (UNFCCC)Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice (CBD)Special Drawing Rights (IMF)Global and National Soil and Terrain Digital Database Program (FAO, ISRIC,UNEP)Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen [Council of EnvironmentalExperts (Germany)]Technical CooperationUmweltbundesamt [Federal Environment Agency (Germany)]United NationsUnited Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa United Nations Conference on Environment and DevelopmentUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaUnited Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUnited Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUnited Nations Office for Project ServicesUnited Nations Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (former UnitedNations Sahelian Office)World Business Council for Sustainable Development

IFFIFIACIGOIJCILOIMF IMOIPBDIPCCIPLSISCOISDRISRICIUCNIUPGRIUSSMABMARPOLMIGANAFTANASANGOODAOECDOIOSOILPOLOPECPCFPOPRAPSBISBSTASBSTTASDRSOTER

SRU

TCUBAUNUNCCD

UNCEDUNCLOSUNCTADUNDPUNEPUNESCOUNFCCCUNIDOUNOPSUNSO

WBCSD

WBGU

WHOWMO WSSDWTOWWF

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen[German Advisory Council on Global Change]World Health Organization (UN)World Meteorological Organization (UN)World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002World Trade Organization (UN) World Wide Fund for Nature

XIX

Summary for policymakers

Technical progress in the 20th century has revolu-tionised the transport of people, goods and informa-tion. Greater and greater speed and distances are be-ing achieved at ever-lower cost per unit moved.Along with the transmission of energy and transpor-tation of materials, the world’s information highwaysare gaining in significance.The direct beneficiaries ofthese forms of transport – both real and virtual – arebusiness and industry, which organise production,trade and investment today on a global scale. An in-direct result of global transport, global business andglobal information is that the ‘Western’ life-style isleaping borders rapidly. Many traditional cultures areeither being suppressed or are disappearing altogeth-er. Religions, art, handicrafts and languages are par-ticularly affected, but ultimately every variety of so-cial norm and value is influenced.

The process of ‘globalization’ gives rise to undeni-able economic and social opportunities; but it alsoputs three-fold pressure on the planet’s environment:First, growth in production, services and consump-tion will imply a steady depletion of natural re-sources and sinks unless some ‘green technologicalrevolution’ progresses to the point of making re-source use and waste disposal considerably more ef-ficient on a global scale than they now are. Second,environmentally polluting patterns of productionand consumption are spreading across the planet,while sustainable patterns and practices are not. Thisdivergence is leading in particular to site-inappropri-ate management of soils and fresh water resources.Third, the multiplicity of national legislative barriersand loopholes often present an opportunity for eva-sion of ecological standards – for example, for emis-sions and ambient pollution.

Can the institutions in place today within theUnited Nations system (Fig. 1a) cope with this greatchallenge? Their reputation is currently at an all-timelow. Instead of strengthening them, there is talk ofstreamlining them, limiting their focus to core tasksor even disbanding them altogether.The incidents onthe periphery of the ministerial conference of theWorld Trade Organization in 1999 in Seattle are thewriting on the wall.This is a drastic state of affairs, in-deed, because the condition of the Earth System callsfor speedy, internationally concerted redress.

True, eight years after the Rio Summit, more than900 bi- or multilateral environmental agreements arein force, but the most urgent environmental prob-lems remain unsolved. The pressure of global envi-ronmental problems has even grown: greenhousegases are being emitted with increasing rates; thethinning of the ozone layer above Arctic and Antarc-tic is spreading over ever-larger areas; more andmore soil is being irreversibly degraded; 1200 millionpeople have no certain access to clean drinking wa-

ter; primary forests are being chopped down; and bio-logical diversity faces irreversible losses.

The lack of coordination and collaboration amongindividual activities to preserve the natural basis forhuman life is painfully obvious. In an era of globali-zation – meaning also global accountability for theenvironment of the planet as a whole – humanitymust unite in a common effort for the sustainable co-evolution of nature and human society.Yet global en-vironmental policy does not today enjoy a prioritycommensurate with the magnitude of the problems itaddresses. This is why now, shortly before the WorldSummit on Sustainable Develepment (WSSD), theGerman Advisory Council on Global Change(WBGU) proposes a new Earth Alliance as a visionfor the restructuring of international environmentalinstitutions and organizations.

Restructuring the United Nations in theenvironmental sphere: creating an Earth Alliance

The Council’s vision of an Earth Alliance to reformthe framework of international environmental insti-tutions and organizations builds on existing struc-tures and develops them further as needed. TheEarth Alliance (Fig. 1b) breaks down into three cross-cutting areas – Earth Assessment, Earth Organizationand Earth Funding – to be linked to one anotherthrough mutual commitments for information andcommunication exchange, joint activities and com-mon financing models.

The Advisory Council proposes the establishmentof an independent entity to serve as a special author-ity for the evaluation of environmental problems.The duty of this authority would be to issue timelywarnings of environmental risks. This authority, ofdeliberately limited size, would have certain rights ofproposal vis-à-vis scientific panels – some of whichare yet to be established – and would be entitled toaddress the public as needed (Earth Assessment).

Further, the Advisory Council recommendschanges in the organizational hub of internationalenvironmental policy (Earth Organization). At thecentre are institutional and organizational reforms ininternational environmental policy: these are alreadybeing discussed with an eye to the WSSD. Firstly, theAdvisory Council urges improved cooperationamong the various organizations and programmes:that is, closer linkage among the secretariats of the in-ternational environmental conventions and their sci-entific panels, which for the most part do not yet evenexist. A second step would be to set up a coordinat-ing umbrella organization with its own panels. Theuniting of international environmental policy within

4 Summary for policymakers

EARTH ALLIANCE

EARTH FUNDINGEARTH ORGANIZATION

Project implementationthrough UN agencies

International

ex-UNEP

EARTH ASSESSMENT

Earth Commission E

nvironmental Organizatio

n

Informationneed

Informationneed

Monitoring,Early warning,

Information

Financing,Debt relief

Financing,Debtrelief

Usercharges

IPCC (climatechange)

RAP(risks)

IPS(soils)

IPBD(biodiversity)

Scientificpanels

Scientificpanel

Scientific advice

Scientificadvice CSD

Agreements

Agreements

Furtheragreements

Trustee-ship

UNFCCC

UNCCD

CBD

World Bank

GEF

UNDP

Trusts

Sponsors

Donors

High seas

Air space

Outer space

Trusteeship for the global commons

Publicfunds

Public funds

Private funds

Private funds

Project implementation through UN agencies

UNEP


CSD

UNFCCC

UNCCD

CBD

World Bank

GEF

UNDP

Trusts

Sponsors

Donors

Deep-sea floor(UNCLOS)

Informationneed

Scientificadvice

a

b

Environment anddevelopment fund

Figure 1 Reform of the United Nations in the field of environment: (a) today’s status and (b) vision of a reform.Source: WBGU

5Summary for policymakers

a single, central organization should be consideredonly if the desired improvements fail to come about.

In addition to legal certainty and good gover-nance, sufficient financial resources are necessary tocounter growing global challenges successfully. How-ever, the reluctance of the industrialised countries toprovide adequate funding – which has become in-creasingly entrenched over the years – poses an ob-stacle to the raising of sufficient funds to protectglobal environmental resources. In view of this fact, afinal section includes recommendations for financingglobal environmental policy (Earth Funding).

The three pillars of the Earth Alliance

Earth assessment: setting up scientific panels andthe Earth Commission

Knowledge and knowledge assessment are the keysto risk management. Following the example of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC), the Advisory Council recommends the es-tablishment of comparable scientific bodies to adviseand support, for example, international soil and bio-diversity policy. Recognised scientists could meet to-gether as an Intergovernmental Panel on BiologicalDiversity (IPBD) or an Intergovernmental Panel onLand and Soils (IPLS) and – working on an indepen-dent, on-going basis – could offer advice on scientificpolicy. In this system, the peer-review process of theIPCC should serve as a model, but not its relativelycumbersome structure. In addition to these sectoraladvisory bodies, a Risk Assessment Panel (RAP)might then serve as a network cluster point where thevarious national surveys and reports on environmen-tal threats can be systematically collected, and globalrisks identified.As part of its vision for structural reconfiguration ofglobal environmental and developmental policy, theAdvisory Council sees the need for an independententity with the ethical and intellectual authority toidentify and evaluate the problems of global change.The Advisory Council recommends that the FederalGovernment of Germany reviews the idea of found-ing an Earth Commission and present correspondingproposals to the United Nations.The Earth Commis-sion should provide the long-term thinking needed toprotect the environment and the rights and interestsof future generations and also give impulses for re-search and political action. The Earth Commission –appointed by the UN General Assembly and consist-ing of 10 to 15 members – should be composed ofleading figures who can command the attention of aglobal audience, roughly as the Brandt or Brundtland

Commissions have. The Earth Commission, with itsscientific panels, should achieve four accomplish-ments in particular:• An overall perspective: by employing existing

monitoring systems optimally for an accurateassessment of the state of the Earth System.

• Early warning: based on current systems and fur-ther scientific data and findings, with timely noticeto the world’s people and particularly the UnitedNations of impending and potentially irreversibleenvironmental damage.

• Guard-rails: guiding international environmentalpolicy towards the prevention of irreparable envi-ronmental damage by delineating both transitionareas falling within admissible parameters and cir-cumstances that are inadmissible.

• Reporting: through an annual report to the Gen-eral Secretary of the United Nations in which themost important environmental problems and de-velopments are assessed according to the latestscientific information and standards.

In the Council’s recommended structure for EarthAssessment, the Commission for Sustainable Deve-lopment (CSD) would assume an important role infostering linkage and dialogue among the variouscountries involved, the UN organizations, the EarthCommission, the scientific community and non-gov-ernmental organizations. The Earth Commissioncould also be accorded a right of proposal for debatewithin the CSD of topics that, from a scientific pointof view, are particularly critical but which have notyet attracted the political attention they merit. TheCSD, to whom the major NGOs can present theirconcerns and proposals for solutions, could also be-come the forum for discussion of Earth Commissionreports, being, as it is in any case, the central forumfor environment and development issues. This struc-ture would to some degree amount to an internation-al version of the German Council for SustainableDevelopment.

Earth Organization: upgrading UNEP

As a result of the frequently perceived lack of coor-dination and effectiveness of global environmentalpolicy, the call for a comprehensive reconfigurationof international institutional and organizationalstructure has in recent years become audible.The UNEnvironment Programme (UNEP) has only 530 em-ployees to carry out its global mandate, whereas theGerman Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), forexample, has about 1,050 and the American Environ-mental Protection Agency (EPA) 18,000. This is whythe Advisory Council has supported the founding ofan international environmental organization in earl-


ier reports. Prominent European politicians havelong lent their support to this idea as well. In view ofthe wide divergence among the various proposals,however, certain essentials for any restructuring ofglobal environmental institutions must be definedfirst:• All initiatives must be multilateral and launched

jointly by industrialised and developing countries.The Advisory Council therefore expressly recom-mends forming coalitions with key developingcountries in order to ensure acceptance of a polit-ical initiative right from the start.

• North and South should have equal rights in deci-sion-making – the North-South decision-makingparity of the Montreal Protocol, the Ozone Fundor the Global Environment Facility (GEF) couldserve as a model.

• The reform should not lead to the establishmentof an authority with a mandate to implement pro-jects on its own. On-site projects should continueto be carried out by the UNDP, the World Bank,the FAO, UNIDO and similar players.

• The restructuring should not involve the creationof a financing organization in addition to theUNDP, the World Bank or the GEF.

The Advisory Council proposes the restructuring ofthe existing system in a series of steps. In the process,it is not to be assumed a priori that all of the steps becompleted, so that in the end the third level is neces-sarily reached. Instead, in the beginning, only the firstlevel is to be realised and its effectiveness tested: thenext step is then to be weighed only if the previousone has not brought about the desired results.

Step 1: Improving cooperation

The first step involves improved cooperation amongthe various organizations and programmes: partnerscontinue to work together on an equal basis. Duringthis process, the several functions now exercised bythe CSD, GEF, the various conferences of the parties,the convention secretariats, and the environmentaldivisions and programmes of the respective special-ised agencies are not to be altered. Possibly UNEPcould, even at this point, be assigned a different insti-tutional structure within the UN system. Thisstrengthening of UNEP could be modelled on theWorld Health Organization – that is, on a UN special-ised agency with its own budget and membership – oron the UN Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), as an internal UN entity.

Step 2: Setting up a coordinating umbrellaorganization with its own, independent panels

If improved cooperation among international orga-nizations and programmes does not eliminate short-comings within the system, coordination among theplayers involved should be improved in an effort tostrengthen environmental protection. This would ne-cessitate a certain amount of hierarchy within the or-ganizational structure, for which the World Trade Or-ganization (WTO) might serve as a model. Alongsimilar lines, it might be advisable to integrate thevarious conferences of the parties to internationalenvironmental agreements within a frameworkagreement establishing an international environ-mental organization.They could then continue to ex-ist as separate and largely independent committeesto the ministers’ conference, as in the case of theWTO. In all probability, however, the founding ofsuch an umbrella organization will not be acceptedby either developing or industrialised countries un-less both sides are ensured a clear voice in that orga-nization’s further development. Appropriate herewould be the application of decision-making proce-dures based on North-South parity analogous tothose of the Montreal Protocol.

Step 3: Centralising and uniting within in a singleorganization?

The common goal of current proposals for a thirdstep is to centralise and establish a hierarchical orderfor international environmental policy-making. De-cision-making processes should be speeded up bymoving beyond the consensus principle and/or by in-troducing smaller decision-making bodies – an ‘envi-ronmental security council’ for example. Minoritiesshould lose their veto power. Such form of hierarchy,which strongly delimits sovereignty, will certainly en-counter considerable resistance in both North andSouth.

Proposals for good regime design

But in addition to a cross-cutting reform of UN envi-ronmental bodies, the numerous sectoral regimesthat already exist (e.g., on climate, biological diversityor combatting desertification) can also be optimised.The Advisory Council has evaluated experience fromnegotiating processes to this end, and has compiledproposals for good regime design.


Using protocols to advance the purposes offramework agreementsToday, the strategy that for the most part prevails isto draw up framework agreements only on broadgoals and possible instruments and to leave the con-crete terms to further rounds of negotiations, whoseresults then take the form of protocols that supple-ment the convention and make it more precise andmore strict.The Advisory Council rates this approachas positive, because in this way it is possible to drawinto the negotiation process even countries that tendto hold back. In view of the steady intensification ofglobal environmental problems, however, it must beurgently pointed out that the period of time betweenentering into a convention and actually overcomingthe problem on the local level is for the most part toolong; this is why protocol negotiation, ratification andimplementation must proceed with greater dispatch.

Making voting procedures more flexibleVoting procedures are a decisive factor in flexible re-gime evolution. The Advisory Council urges that aneffort be made in the direction of softening the con-sensus principle in international negotiations, espe-cially when an irreparable loss of environmental as-sets may otherwise result. The principle of ‘tacitacceptance’, especially, should be used more fre-quently. In modifying protocols or annexes, North-South parity decisions based on qualified majorityvotes should be promoted, since they are the mostlikely to gain consensus. Furthermore, in decisionsthat impact the human heritage as a whole, a modifi-cation of the formal principles ‘one state, one vote’ orin agreements about financial contributions the com-mon practice of ‘one dollar, one vote’ should be re-considered in favour of a ‘one person, one vote’ dis-tribution.

Strengthening the right of access toenvironmental information and linking it toreporting proceduresIn addition to the introduction of more flexible pro-cedures, the way of international compliance controlfunctions is a major criterion for a regime’s success.Experience shows that the obligation of memberstates to report on the fulfilment of their commit-ments is an indispensible tool for monitoring interna-tional compliance. The Advisory Council recom-mends, however, that these reports be scientificallyappraised to maximise their usefulness at the confer-ences of the parties. The recourse to internationallyagreed indicators plays a vital role by increasing com-parability and practical use of the reports. Fartherranging rights to access information should also beintroduced as needed.

Possibilities of flexible reaction tocomplications encountered duringimplementationCooperative solutions are an increasingly commonreaction to complications arising during implementa-tion, since such solutions – achieved in a spirit ofpartnership – strengthen both international relation-ships and transparency for all. Guaranteed instru-ments to assist compliance that are not attached toany kind of conditions can, however, blunt the moti-vation to meet one’s obligations on one’s own hook.And in some instances strict sanctions have helped toeliminate implementation shortcomings. In view ofthis variance, the Advisory Council rejects any dog-ged adherence to either confrontational or non-con-frontational policies. When complications arise dur-ing implementation, the Advisory Council recom-mends, instead, a flexible approach that is adapted toeach individual instance. Existing regional/continen-tal institutions (such as those of ASEAN or the EU)could also play a more active and extensive role incontrolling and monitoring compliance with interna-tionally agreed standards.

Integrating non-governmentalorganizations as partners in environmentalprotection Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providevaluable links on all levels – from local to interna-tional – and ensure that social factors are taken intoconsideration.The participation of environmental as-sociations has proved particularly effective for gath-ering and distributing information on site and for lo-cal implementation of agreements. The AdvisoryCouncil therefore supports approaches that integrateNGOs into the implementation process on the basisof their consultative and participatory rights. Votingrights and autonomous decision-making power forNGOs are problematical, however, because of thedifficulty of establishing standards for legitimacy inregard to them.

Ensuring that environmental certificationsystems are fairWorld-wide product certification is another activitythat is well suited to international non-governmentalcooperation for environmental protection. Whetheror not international cooperation among enterprisesor certification initiatives can make a contribution tothe long-term, sustainable use of global resourcescannot be determined at present. However, the Advi-sory Council decidedly perceives in such certificationan incentive system that – in addition to internation-al governmental cooperation – must not be ne-glected. One possibility for managing environmentalcertification or labelling would be accreditation by


the Earth Commission, which could perhaps supplyappropriate criteria.

Earth Funding: increasing efficiency and findingnew methods

The Advisory Council recommends three measuresfor financing global environmental policy which – inaddition to a desirable increase in available funds –would lead above all to a more efficient use of thesefunds: reorganising of both internal and external con-trolling structures in multilateral institutions, levyingutilisation fees for resources belonging to the globalcommunity, and stepping up integration of both pri-vate and public financing mechanisms.

Making multilateral organizations moreefficientThe Advisory Council assumes that in future, the pri-mary instrument for global environment and devel-opment policy will continue to be financing of globaltasks through appropriations from national budgets.This system offers, significantly, the advantages of di-rect and regular control by national democratic insti-tutions and constant pressure on money-distributingbodies to demonstrate accountability vis-à-vis suchinstitutions. Numerous international organizationshave come under the scrutiny of the national parlia-ments of OECD countries for non-transparent orless than efficient handling of funds; willingness toprovide financial support for UN organizations iswaning. On the other hand, the UN organizationspoint to high acceptance in most developing coun-tries as a result of positive experiences with UN ca-pacity-building performance, in that projects arebased on participatory procedures in which eachcountry, whatever its economic strength, has a voice.Within existing multilateral organizations, it shouldbe constantly reviewed to what extent – the use of funds can be concentrated on a single,

narrowly defined environmental problem orwhether interplay with other environmental prob-lems must be taken into account as well,

– auditing procedures within the organization areproducing incentives for increased efficiency,

– external control might be improved by additionalcontrolling bodies and different consultation pro-cedures,

– lack of efficiency in recipient countries can beovercome by capacity-building measures that in-tegrate local initiatives,

– the time, structural and spatial aspects of the pro-cess of adjustment needed to cope with global en-vironmental problems are being taken into ac-count,

– the organization of funds utilisation is geared tothe type of environmental protection measuresneeded (from individual projects on up to compre-hensive economic structural reforms).

Levying user charges for global commons The linking of private market price mechanisms tothe use of natural resources is in many instances thedecisive factor in conscientious resource manage-ment. These mechanisms have their limits, however,due to the non-existence of property rights. Numer-ous natural assets – such as international air space,the high seas, or space – are ‘open-access’ resourcesand as such constitute resources belonging to theglobal community as a whole. Since it is impossible toput a price on such resources, only placing them with-in a common global trusteeship can prevent theiroverexploitation for exclusive use. In the Earth Fun-ding system, the levying of user charges for the tap-ping of such global community resources provides animportant alternative to appropriations from govern-ment budgets for financing global environment anddevelopment policy. The Advisory Council wishes todraw attention in this context to three aspects thatare indispensable for the understanding of and termsgoverning such payments:• The charges must serve a clear purpose which is

directly linked to access to the global commons. Ageneral environmental tax of some kind is not un-der discussion.

• The decision as to the type, amount and uses ofutilisation fees is to be geared to the unique natureof each individual global community resource. Inmany cases, there can be recourse to existing mul-tilateral or private organizations. It may prove im-possible to derive additional revenue from someglobal resources; however, even in these cases in-centives for greater efficiency can be producedthrough the granting of and trade in individual userights or emission rights.

• The trusteeship is to be subjected to constantmonitoring and approval by individual govern-ments or their designated regulatory bodies.

Strengthening private financing instrumentsThe Advisory Council has already pointed out anumber of times in previous reports the growing sig-nificance of the private sector and innovative financ-ing instruments on local and national levels. This ele-ment is an important factor for– taking advantage in individual cases of the famil-

iarity of players with on-site conditions and thecorresponding parameters for action,

– using a decentralised and intelligible structure forgreater efficiency, which exerts greater competi-tive pressure in the private sector and among dif-


ferent localities, to the good of global environmentand development policy,

– increasing basic motivation by means of more di-rect access to global environment and develop-ment projects.

‘Global players’ assume a growing role in the use ofglobal resources and sinks. Multinational corpora-tions frequently plan their activities in accord withtheir own environmental standards; many people inindustrialised countries are active in environmentalorganizations and patronage; and many national andglobal NGOs are in a position to influence the behav-iour of individuals, groups and organizations. It is atprecisely the point where government standards donot apply effectively that private initiatives can takeover. The Advisory Council recommends support forthis process of private acceptance of responsibility –for example, through prizes and awards, centralisedpurchasing, and targeted awareness-raising.

The Advisory Council rearticulates its call for thecreation of institutional framework conditions thatcan galvanise the private sector and strengthen na-tional, non-commercial funds – e.g., in combinationwith a world-wide debt-relief initiative. The EarthFunding needs competition among a variety of indi-vidual, innovative financing schemes, whose respec-tive efficiency will determine how widely they aretaken up in other countries, sectors or problem areas.In the combination of the various financing instru-ments lies a distinct opportunity: the first successfulsteps toward reform could inspire an openness to fi-nancial agreements on specific global community re-sources – agreements that appear almost utopian to-day.At the same time, a firm focus must be steadfast-ly maintained not only on gaining revenue but on theefficient deployment of available financial resources.

Making the most of the World Summit onSustainable Develepment

The vision of an Earth Alliance presented by theAdvisory Council cannot be realised in the short runbut should serve as a model for a long-term but im-perative reform of global environmental policy. Inparticular, the follow-up conference to the 1992 RioUN Conference on Environment and Developmentto take place in 2002 (WSSD) should serve as an op-portunity to get some elements of this structural re-form underway.As early as 1997, the Federal Repub-lic of Germany spoke out for setting up an interna-tional environmental organization. In June 2000,French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced theintention to revive debate on an international envi-ronmental organization during France’s presidencyof the EU. The first international Environmental Mi-

nisters’ Conference in Malmö also highlighted theneed for organizational reform of global environ-mental policy. This auspicious political momentshould, in the view of the Advisory Council, beseized, and an initiative launched – possibly by theEU – with Germany and France as forerunners.

Who is steering Spaceship Earth? A

Breathless and fragmented, the world lurches intothe new millennium. A transformative process is atwork which widens the gap between rich and poor,old and young, religion and science, urban and rural,nature and technology. The overall dynamic, how-ever, is increasingly dominated by a new kind of con-tradiction, that between globalization and particular-ization of civil society which is radically transformingthe traditional cosmos of economic, social and eco-logical rifts. This transformation can be categorizedas the ‘fifth step’ in the evolving self-organization oflife in the Earth System (Jolly, 1999). Ultimately itwill determine our sustainability. The buzzword‘globalization’ denotes a process that takes place onfour causally linked levels of reality: technology, theeconomy, culture and the environment.

Technological progress in the 20th century has rev-olutionized the mobility of people, goods and infor-mation. As costs per unit moved fall, higher speedsand greater distances are achieved than ever.‘All is influx’ on this planet, and further acceleration is tocome. One example is air transport, where globalfreight movements double every ten years, and in theyear 1998 amounted to almost 100,000 million tonne-kilometres (UNDP, 1998). The number of passengerscarried rises by 5–6% annually. According to esti-mates from the World Tourism Organization, by 2020it will increase to around 1,600 million.The volume ofthe world merchant fleet also continues to swell. In1998 it reached the record level of 531.9 million grosstons (85,828 vessels) compared to only 490.7 milliongross tons back in 1995 (Lloyd’s Register, 1999).

Beside the real flows of energy and materials, theworld’s information highways are also steadily gain-ing in importance.The Internet is one of the key tech-nologies which diffused more swiftly than any other:It took no more than four years for the number ofusers to reach 50 million – it was 38 years beforeradio reached a similar audience. The number ofservers on the Net has reached 43 million, supportingmore than 300 million users (Nua, 2000), andbetween September 1999 and March 2000 alonethese were joined by 100 million new users.

The direct beneficiaries of the real and virtualtransport services are business and industry, whichtoday organize production, trade and investment ona global scale. As a direct effect, the total value of allexports has almost tripled since 1985 to US$5.5 mil-lion million (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1998) which,among other things, means a noticeable increase inthe share of exports in gross world product. Notinsignificant contributions to these rates of growthcame from the modern key sectors of data process-ing, telecommunications and biotechnology (Brownet al., 1999).

Although the economic significance of Internet-based ‘e-commerce’ is still comparatively small, vir-tual market processes are beginning to take the placeof material ones. A globalized Internet economy isjust around the corner, as the international capitalmarket has demonstrated for some time: in 1993direct cross-border investments rose by around 40%to US$313,000 million (UNCTAD, 1995), and againin 1998 by 19% to US$400,000 million. The dailyglobal turnover in foreign exchange transactions isnow around US$1.5 million million – meaning thatvolume has grown over the last 30 years by a factor of83.

The greater part of this growth is due to some39,000 multinational corporations with over 270,000subsidiary and participation companies abroad.According to a recent study (Anderson andCavanaugh, 1996) the turnover of the 200 largest cor-porations on Earth corresponds to 28.3% of grossworld product and, at US$7.1 million million, isgreater than the cumulative gross domestic productof all nations on Earth, minus only the nine strongestnational economies.

The consequences of globalizationAn indirect consequence of global transport, globalbusiness and global information is that the Westernlifestyle is expanding across borders at lightningspeed. The main catalyst for this is the electronicmedia, with entertainment programmes that haveeven succeeded in reaching the Stone-Age Dini tribein Irian Jaya. The Internet, too, will lead to a massiveshift in values in many regions. For example, in theMiddle East more than 70% of all users are 21–35years old (Zonis, 2000), an age at which new, previ-ously unknown life expectations and value concep-tions can rapidly gain in appeal. The impact of this isthat established cultures are swamped or simply dis-integrate. Worst affected are religions, art forms,handicraft styles and languages, and ultimately alsosocial norms, attitudes and values of all kinds.

A few statistics may illustrate this general obser-vation. Responsible in part for the global mingling ofstyles is the world trade in art objects and craft prod-ucts which, according to UNESCO data, reached avolume of over US$200,000 million in 1991 and thusincreased threefold in the period from 1980 to 1991.The ‘linguistic imperialism’ of English and of othernational and regional languages favours culturalhomogeneity (Beisheim et al., 1999). The GermanPress Agency not long ago put forward the scenariothat in the next hundred years one-third of existinglanguages will be eliminated, in favour of the domi-nant national and regional languages. Out of approx-imately 15,000 languages that probably existed10,000 years ago – at a time when the Earth’s inhabi-

14 A Who is steering Spaceship Earth?

tants numbered around one million people – todayaround 6,000 remain.

All the globalization processes outlined con-tribute substantially to changes in the planet’s envi-ronment – by helping to establish a worldwide pat-tern of civilization based on high consumption andshort-term orientation, and by optimizing the cross-border commercial exploitation of the Earth’s nat-ural resources. Particular impulses for this expansionalways arose when previously inaccessible regions ofthe world opened up, voluntarily or involuntarily: theend of the Second World War and, more recently, thefall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent end of theSoviet Union mark such watersheds. The fall of theIron Curtain gave a turbo-like boost to globalization(Jung, 1999a).

The environmental aspects of globalization whichare central from the Council’s point of view willreceive more detailed attention later on.At this pointa few quantitative facts will serve our purpose:despite all efficiency gains, the worldwide transporta-tion of products and commodities is costing more andmore energy – in absolute and relative terms. In 1980transportation accounted for only 37.2% of globalenergy consumption, in 1996 this ratio was already48.4% and for 2010 the forecast ratio is 53%. Apartfrom the high costs, this development causes a criticalsurge in carbon dioxide emissions and thus con-tributes to accelerating human-induced global warm-ing. The global character of this is patently clear inthat a locally emitted volume element of carbondioxide spreads throughout the Earth’s atmospherewithin a week and remains there for up to 200 years.

Another problem of drastic and growing signifi-cance is the worldwide release of persistent organicpollutants. The scientific basis justifying acceptableintake criteria for these substances (chemical proper-ties, distribution and decomposition) remains flimsyhowever: of around 100,000 chemicals on the marketprior to 1981 when a more stringent registrationregime was introduced in the European Union, 5,000are produced in considerable quantities and emittedinto the environment, but only 300 have so far beenevaluated in terms of their environmental chemistry(BUA, 2000). For a range of chlorine compounds (thepesticides HCH, HCB, DDT and some PCBs) it hasbeen shown that global distribution, particularly lati-tude variation, depends greatly upon physico-chemi-cal properties (Calamari et al., 1991).

The opportunities of globalizationThe globalization process was ultimately initiated bythe technological impulses of the 19th and 20th cen-turies, and the ultra-technologies of the 21st centurywill accelerate it further. Few believe that this devel-opment can be restrained, let alone halted, but

assessments diverge widely. Nevertheless even now,several direct advantages and disadvantages can bediscerned for all those participating, voluntarily orinvoluntarily, in the round-the-Earth race.

Thus it is entirely undisputed that globalizationmakes a massive contribution to worldwide eco-nomic output. By overcoming physical, administra-tive and political barriers, there is a tendency to beincreasingly able to exploit the comparative advan-tages of all economic actors and locations on Earth tothe full. This means in particular tapping the planet’sresources of energies, materials and capacities andhence unleashing all humanity’s productive forces atthe pace dictated by the ‘invisible hand’ of the worldmarket. Gross world product has grown more thantenfold since 1970 to some US$29 million (WorldBank, 2000b); in view of the future economic growthof 3% expected or hoped for in the industrializednations, and 8–10% in the developing countries, hun-dredfold growth could be a reality in a matter ofdecades.

It is equally undisputed that, overall, this multi-layered process considerably raises the fundamentalopportunities of countless individuals to attain a rea-sonable quality of life. Security of the basic needs offood, clean water, shelter, clothing, health and mobil-ity is not only achieved economically but also by amultiplicity of cross-border socio-political processes,ranging from routine technology transfer to interna-tional humanitarian missions (as recently seen inMozambique and Ethiopia). An almost equivalentinfluence is exerted by the possibilities, in a diverselyinterconnected world, of fulfilling elementary humanrights and having a stake in general educational andscientific progress.

Disparities of globalizationWhat remains disputed, however, is whether themajority of the world population is likely to enjoy thebenefits of globalization in the near future, orwhether this might even automatically give rise to theemergence of a planetary state of social justice. Evenin the powerhouses of globalization, the tigereconomies, despite rising profits, inequality seemsnot to be in decline. The question as to why global-ization is linked to greater inequality, especially indeveloping countries, remains open, in the opinion ofthe American economist Paul Krugmann (Kaubeand Schelkle, 2000). But even given identical startingconditions, the global competition between locationswould probably soon lead to major individual andcollective disparities in wealth. And there is littlecomparability among the participants in globaliza-tion: for example Silicon Valley in California and theRift Valley in East Africa belong in two different uni-verses, and not just geographically. It is difficult to

15Who is steering Spaceship Earth? A

imagine that the first-mentioned location would beprepared to put its development on hold for severaldecades to let the second location catch up.

This is why we cannot expect that the unbridledsearch for investment, information and consumptionopportunities will somehow automatically iron outthe disparities that exist between regions, culturesand social classes (Zook, 2000). Instead this processwill further reinforce a series of social gradients, evenif the proposition by J. Mazur (Mazur, 2000) thatglobalization leaves behind dangerous instabilitiesand growing inequalities and has dramaticallyincreased inequality between and within nationsdoes seem exaggerated. The World Bank arrives at amore differentiated portrayal which includes undeni-able blackspots (World Bank, 2000a).

A recent report from the consultancy firm A.T.Kearney reads along the same lines.After all, the dis-posable capital of the Earth’s 200 richest citizensgrew between 1994 and 1998 from US$440,000 mil-lion to US$1.042 million million; the latter figure cor-responds to the current total income of the poorest41% of the world’s population! And 93% of all Inter-net connections are owned by the wealthiest one-fifth of humankind, whilst the one-fifth with nomeans has to make do with 0.2% (UNDP, 1998).

The principal reason for this development is thefact that the omnipotent powers of transnationalcompetition to differentiate are not countered bybalancing political forces of similar range and impact.To some extent the regime borders defined bytoday’s nation states with their federal substructuresform a semi-permeable membrane: almost com-pletely penetrable for the opportunistic dynamism ofhighly mobile global players, but practically impene-trable for normative forces to protect the competi-tively weaker factions in regional societies or localpopulations.

Globalization of environmental crisisThis sceptical assessment applies in more acute formto the problem of nature and environmental protec-tion (Schellnhuber and Pilardeaux, 1999). The his-toric battle over the conservation of the long-termresource base sustaining human life will largely befought in the so-called developing countries, wherepolitical, technological and economic capacities aregenerally inadequate to cope with the global envi-ronmental crisis.

Over and above the North’s moral obligation, theindustrial nations cannot remain indifferent to thesedeficits since the geophysical, biochemical and civil-isatory knock-on effects in the Earth System ensurerapid and intense export of the resulting damage. Forexample the large-scale conversion of particularecosystems (for instance the tropical or boreal

forests) does considerable harm to key stabilizingmechanisms of the biosphere.

Globalization – as already indicated – exercisesthreefold pressure on the planet’s environment:firstly, growth in production, services and consump-tion without development will imply a steady deple-tion of natural resources and sinks unless a ‘greentechnological revolution’ immediately brings aboutfar more efficient resource use and waste disposal ona global scale. Secondly, environmentally harmfulpatterns of production and consumption andlifestyles are spreading around the globe, while sus-tainable practices are not. A particular result of thisis site-inappropriate management of soils (WBGU,1995a) and freshwater resources (WBGU, 1998a).Thirdly the multiplicity of national legislative barri-ers and loopholes often present an opportunity toglobal players of any provenance to evade ecologicalstandards, for example for emissions and ambientpollution.

This can only result in further deterioration of thealready precarious state of the global environment.This at any rate is the prognosis of a comprehensivetwo-year study recently presented by 175 scientists,which was jointly commissioned by the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP), theUnited Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),the World Bank and the World Resources Institute(WRI, 2000). This points out that half of the originalwetlands and forests on Earth have had to retreat inthe 20th century in the face of ‘civilization’, and thatthe capacities of the multinational fishing fleetsexceed the productivity of the oceans by 40%. Butthe drastic warning that the conservation of theplanet’s life-sustaining resources could represent themost difficult challenge ever faced in the history ofhumankind is unlikely to make much of an impact onthe public at large. The current high priority placedon economic growth and increased employment isvirtually blinkering us to the dynamic of the ecologi-cal crisis that is even now spiralling beyond control-lable limits. It is symptomatic that there is only grudg-ing recognition of the mounting evidence of the long-term human impact on the climate system, aftermany years in which the dispute over scientific proofwas stirred up and instrumentalized as an ideologicalstruggle by various interest groups.

In this report the Council will highlight the needfor environmental policy action by giving a compactcharacterization of the six most pressing global prob-lems (Chapter B).The picture presented in that chap-ter underscores that serious strategies for copingwith the problems are difficult to envisage withouteffective and efficient international institutions. Theworld market, for example, considerably raises theearning potential of Indian software specialists, but


cannot prevent droughts which will increasinglydescend on the subcontinent if global warming con-tinues unabated. The disaster in spring 2000 withwater shortages in large areas of western India givesmerely a foretaste of what may face the 90% of therural population in that region that is dependent ondeep wells. To avoid or alleviate dramatic climaticconsequences of this kind, a worldwide climate pro-tection treaty is needed to set out, implement andenforce major reductions in greenhouse gas emis-sions, agreed by fast-track decision-making processesif need be.

On track towards ‘green globalgovernance’?But how can powerful and sustainable environmen-tal politics be made to work with the almost 200 sov-ereign nation states on Earth? This question exposesa fundamental dilemma: We are setting out to over-come the challenges of the 21st century using struc-tures which, at best, are borrowed from the 19th cen-tury and in no way do justice to the virtual shrinkingof the planet. Naturally this dilemma would beresolved by the creation, in parallel with technologi-cal-economic globalization, of a worldwide state withhomogenous liberal-democratic institutions (some-what after the model of the USA). However logical itmay seem from an environmental perspective tomove towards ‘Earth Politics’ (von Weizsäcker, 1997)with global constitutional and executive structures: itwould be a rare politician or scientist today whobelieved that this vision could be realized in the fore-seeable future. This assessment is borne out in thecatchy but superficial slogan ‘Global governanceinstead of global government!’.

In reality the worldwide trend towards politicaland social particularization, mentioned at the outset,is evident as an antithetical but concomitant trend ofglobalization: economically motivated attempts atdeeper regional integration, for instance in the Euro-pean Union, contrast with strong efforts for auton-omy in many places on Earth, in the Balkans, EastAfrica or Southeast Asia for instance. This puts thenation state, a democratic derivative of Europeanabsolutism, under pressure from without and within,but in the absence of alternatives it grinds along unal-tered as the political frame of reference.

The state’s inner loss of significance in its currentform is driven forward even more powerfully by therapidly growing autonomy of the individual in anopen and integrated world society. With the techno-logical and cultural contraction of the Earth into aquasi-urban space (global village) the characteristicsand paradoxes of the metropolis are reproduced on aplanetary scale: anonymity induced by close proxim-ity, loss of attachment induced by oversaturation of

social valences, short-term orientation induced byoverwhelming stimulation, self-organization in spe-cialized ethnic, professional or hedonistic groups bymeans of hyper-communication. Thus the world citi-zen rises up as a particle of a superfluid mass withnegligible cohesion. The flitting migration of so-called ‘high potentials’ on the world labour market isonly one facet of a realistic vision of the future. Eventoday, Germany suffers an annual net loss of 20,000specialist and management personnel in the occupa-tional migration process.

So where are the counter-forces that could pre-vent the disintegration of the community of nationsinto globally displaceable social fragments and estab-lish the basis for Earth Politics to define the essentialconcerns of humankind? The classic answer to thisquestion might be found in the system of institutionsand the institutional setting of the United Nations.These are typical products of the post-war period,when the gradual progress in the development ofhuman organization from the League of Nations tothe global state had not yet been discredited by therealities. While the process originally intended hasalmost come to a complete standstill, it has produceda mighty apparatus of bodies, authorities and projectsforming a complex network of relationships with anarray of more or less independent institutions (WorldBank, International Monetary Fund, World TradeOrganization, etc). Out of this network, since around1960 a series of development policy initiatives withvery concrete results (e.g. ‘green revolution’) andenvironmental policy initiatives (e.g. Agenda 21)have emerged.

On the whole, however, today the public standingof the existing global institutions is at an all-time low:instead of bolstering them up, the talk among manypolicy strategists is of slimming them down, breakingthem up or even abolishing them.This attitude unitesthe most diverse camps in society, from the ultra-con-servative to the deep-ecology fringe of the politicalspectrum. Accordingly the main criticisms form avivid melange of sometimes contradictory views.Besides the traditional imputations of inefficiencyand incompetence, these institutions are accused atthe same time of strengthening (or weakening) inter-national regimes, trading off the economy against theenvironment (or vice versa), intervening too heavy-handedly (or too timidly) in national sovereignty, fos-tering neo-liberal (or paleosocialist) tendencies, andso on.

The third summit of the World Trade Organizationin Seattle at the end of November 1999 and thespring conference of the governors of the Interna-tional Monetary Fund in Washington in mid-April2000 acted as magnets for critics from all parties andregions.The mixture of justified concerns, unfounded

17Who is steering Spaceship Earth? A

mistrust and sheer ignorance was unveiled in the par-allel demonstrations, some of them scandalous. Thisdid, however, expose the weaknesses of the struc-tures concerned to the glare of publicity and initiatedcertain processes of critical reflection among theresponsible politicians and administrators. The harshinsider’s analysis delivered by the World Bank’s for-mer chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz (2000), may havecontributed to this by directly or indirectly giving cre-dence to common accusations against the IMF (arro-gance, secrecy, lack of preparation and sound objec-tives for campaigns, neglect of social aspects anddemocratic checks and balances, etc). But the mostthat these events have achieved so far are vague pro-posals for improving the existing structures andprocesses. The global problems of the environmentare barely mentioned in this context, let alone givenconsideration.

This is a dramatic finding, because the state of theEarth’s ecosystem demands swift, concerted interna-tional remedies. There are two possible methods ofproviding institutional support for an appropriateaction programme: either reforming the key interna-tional organizations and institutions specifically forthe purpose, or else creating novel global policy insti-tutions for sustainable decision-making and imple-mentation processes.

Reforming the institutions of globalenvironmental policyIn this report the Council will concentrate on the firstapproach, which allows palpable successes to beachieved within a reasonable timescale. To this end,the primary issue for investigation is how the existinginstitutions under the aegis of the United Nations canbe used optimally, reinforced suitably and supple-mented innovatively (Chapter C).

As part of this, particular attention must be turnedto the instrument of the treaty under internationallaw, an instrument that now exists in over 900 mani-festations and is represented most significantly andvisibly by the treaties on stratospheric ozone, climate,biodiversity and desertification. The associated con-ferences of the parties are often hampered by con-sensual decision-making mechanisms, which are notconducive to agreeing the painful but effective mea-sures needed to deal with the core problems of globalchange. Also, reciprocal coordination of the separateenvironmental regimes is not taking place (WBGU,1998a). Unfortunately there is an ever-present dan-ger that, in the competing interests of opportunisticcoalitions of nations, the various globally significantecological assets will be traded off against one other.

The present report takes this as its starting pointand, from the analysis of recent international envi-ronmental policy, develops ideas for improving the

institutional foundation as it pertains to policy-mak-ing practice. In Chapter C the Council begins bydevising concrete proposals for optimizing the insti-tutions of global environmental policy, from theirdesign through to final monitoring. Among otherpoints the Council discusses,– how institutions contribute to raising the status of

environmental problems in politics (agenda set-ting) (Section C 2);

– how environmental policy negotiations can beimproved and accelerated (Section C 3);

– how the implementation of agreements underinternational law can be guaranteed (Section C 4);and

– how global environmental policy can be advancedby institutional innovation on the national level(Section C 5).

These points are complemented in Section E 3 withideas for raising and allocating the vital funds, andthe Council does not shy away from putting forwardinnovative methods (such as charges on the use ofthe global commons).

After these structural proposals, which principallytarget the aspects of efficiency and budgeting, Chap-ter E addresses the crucial issue of effectiveness:How will environmental problems on a global scale,as depicted in Chapter B, in fact be solved? Inresponse, the Council suggests a gradual reform ofthe relevant international network of institutions inits entirety, which in the long term should lead amongother things to an ‘International EnvironmentalOrganization’ under the auspices of the UN.

These suggestions are pursued further in ChapterF and embedded within a political vision that takesaccount of the imperatives and subsidiary conditionsof globalization.The concept under discussion here isan organizational structure for international environ-mental policy resting on three pillars of an EarthAlliance:The first pillar represents a coordinated andintegrated system for continual analysis and evalua-tion of the global environment and development sit-uation (Earth Assessment). The second (and central)pillar concentrates and structures all relevantregimes and trusteeships, in particular the centralenvironmental conventions (Earth Organization).The third pillar unites the totality of all financial andother resources for effective Earth System manage-ment, in which payment for use of the global com-mons and precautionary adaptation and compensa-tion funds play an essential role (Earth Funding).

The Council is convinced that there is no sensiblealternative to progressing in the multilateral politicalprocess towards this vision. However this only par-tially answers the original question as to who is steer-ing Spaceship Earth (Schellnhuber, 1999). Perhaps inthe long term, technological globalization will ‘self-


organize’ forces to oppose the atomization of civilsociety. The exponential growth in means of commu-nication, for example, can favour the emergence of(at first) informal mechanisms of tele-democraticopinion forming and decision-making.And the Inter-net is only an initial quantum leap, heralding a seriesof qualitative innovations that humankind is about tobring forth. Viewed like this, the transition to theglobal environmental regime with appropriate inter-national or even supra-national structures is proba-bly just a question of time – and of being in time...

The situation: Global environmentaltrends

B

B 1Syndromes of global change

To an unprecedented degree, globalization is weav-ing ever tighter webs around the world. Falling fron-tiers, opening markets, rising mobility and worldwidecommunication through the Internet and mobilephones are bringing people and regions ever closer.Commodities, news and information from all aroundthe world are accessible almost everywhere andintensify the impression of being part of a global civ-ilization. Nonetheless, there is also a resurgence ofnational and regional interests, born above all of theunemployment problems prevailing in many coun-tries. One consequence of this has been that, of late,the problems of global change and the messages ofthe 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations Conferenceon Environment and Development (UNCED) areno longer prominent in the minds of many players insociety, politics and the media. However, globaliza-tion is intensifying the problems faced by humansociety and the natural environment, and is exportingthem to other regions of the world. It is thus moreurgent than ever to face the ‘globalized’ environmen-tal problems.

To highlight the need to preserve the natural basesof human life and development and to underscorethe urgency of the problems, the following Section B2 initially sets out the six most pressing global envi-ronmental problems. The order of presentationimplies no ranking, but progresses rather from globalphenomena to those which, though more regional intheir frame of reference, require globally coordi-nated countermeasures due to their worldwide ubiq-uity:1. Climate change,2. Global environmental effects of chemicals: Strato-

spheric ozone depletion and persistent organicpollutants,

3. Oceans at risk,4. Biodiversity loss and deforestation,5. Soil and land degradation,6. Freshwater scarcity and pollution.Each problem is first characterized briefly. Causesare analysed and the problem-specific need foraction identified. This is followed by recommenda-tions for institutional arrangements for prevention,

adaptation and mitigation. Section B 2 concludeswith a cross-cutting analysis, identifying the commoncharacteristics of the six most pressing environmen-tal problems that are critical to regime formation andinstitutional solutions.

The causal analysis of the global environmentalproblems builds mainly upon the syndrome method-ology developed by the Council, which classifies pro-totypical worldwide manifestations of environmentaldamage and identifies causal patterns (WBGU,1995a, 1998a, 2001; Table B 1-1).

Syndromes as functional patterns of globalchangeRegionalized analysis of global change illustratesthat in many regions of the world human/environ-ment interactions follow typical patterns. The Coun-cil terms these functional patterns of environmentuse and damage ‘syndromes of global change’. Theyare undesired, characteristic, negative trajectories (orenvironmental degradation patterns) of natural andcivilizational trends and their interplay, which can beidentified in many regions of our world. They can beused to reduce the complex global environment anddevelopment problematique to a discrete number ofsyndromes.

The Council distinguishes between three groupsof syndromes (Table B 1-1):1. ‘Utilization’ syndromes: Syndromes as a conse-

quence of inappropriate utilization of naturalresources as factors of production;

2. ‘Development’ syndromes: Human/environmentproblems resulting from non-sustainable develop-ment processes;

3. ‘Sink’ syndromes: Environmental degradationdue to inappropriate disposal of the effluents ofhuman society.

Each one of these ‘clinical profiles of the Earth Sys-tem’ represents a discrete underlying pattern ofhuman-induced environmental degradation. Thismeans that each specific syndrome can – in principle– emerge and develop independently of the others.This is particularly the case where syndromes arecharacterized by self-reinforcing mechanisms, so-

22 B The situation: Global environmental trends

called ‘loops’ or ‘vicious circles’. Mass tourism is pro-totypical: Its consequences make a region increasing-ly unattractive for tourists, so that they seek new re-gions or attractions and the typical pattern of theMass Tourism Syndrome spreads further. Moreover,syndromes are often mutually reinforcing, such as theRural Exodus and Favela syndromes. If, as in the firstsyndrome, rural infrastructure and living conditionsof rural populations deteriorate due to rural exodus(Rural Exodus Syndrome), this at the same time gen-erates further pressure towards migration to thecities (Favela Syndrome). The Council’s 1996 annualreport sets out the syndrome approach in detail(WBGU, 1997).Table B 1-1 lists references to each ofthe individual syndromes in past reports of the Coun-cil, and other sources in which the syndromes are dis-cussed in fuller detail.

Interplay between the environmentalproblems The interdisciplinary cross-cutting approach to thecauses of global environmental problems using the

syndrome-based analysis makes it possible to iden-tify, in Section B 3.1, a number of key factors drivingthe dynamics of global change. Measures tailoredspecifically to individual environmental problemscan thus be supplemented by approaches tackling thecommon causes of the problems.

Just as syndromes can reinforce each other, sothere is also direct interplay between the global envi-ronmental problems.These – mostly reinforcing – in-teractions are generally given too little attention, be-cause the usual sectoral approach to problems, withthe resulting specialization of experts, provides littleopportunity or incentive to consider side-effects inother fields. Only an interdisciplinary, integrativeapproach to the problems of global change will per-mit analysis of these systemic interactions, which canbe highly significant. In Section B 3.2, the WBGUattempts to identify these interactions and to deriverecommendations for institutional action for a num-ber of examples. Section B 3.3 then summarizes theconsequences of these cross-cutting analyses for theinstitutional design of global environmental policy.

Syndromes

UTILIZATION SYNDROMES

Sahel Syndrome: Overcultivation of marginal land.

Overexploitation Syndrome: Overexploitation of natural ecosystems.

Rural Exodus Syndrome: Environmental degradation caused by abandonment oftraditional forms of land use.Dust Bowl Syndrome: Non-sustainable industrial management of soil and waterresources.Katanga Syndrome: Environmental degradation caused by extraction of non-renewable resources.Mass Tourism Syndrome: Development of and damage to near-natural areas forrecreational purposes.Scorched Earth Syndrome: Environmental degradation through military activities.

DEVELOPMENT SYNDROMES

Aral Sea Syndrome: Environmental damage caused by large-scale projects aimedat restructuring natural landscapes.Green Revolution Syndrome: Environmental degradation caused by theintroduction of site-inappropriate farming methods.Asian Tigers Syndrome: Neglect of environmental standards in the course ofhighly dynamic economic growth.Favela Syndrome: Environmental degradation caused by uncontrolledurbanization.Urban Sprawl Syndrome: Landscape degradation caused by planned urban andinfrastructure expansion.Major Accident Syndrome: Singular anthropogenic environmental disasters withlonger-term impacts.

SINK SYNDROMES

Smokestack Syndrome: Environmental degradation caused by long-range, diffusedispersal of mostly persistent substances.Waste Dumping Syndrome: Appropriation of environmental space through thecontrolled and uncontrolled dumping of wastes.Contaminated Land Syndrome: Local contamination of environmental assets,mainly at industrial production sites.

Sources

WBGU, 1997; Petschel-Held et al.,1999; Lüdeke et al., 1999WBGU, 2001; Cassel-Gintz andPetschel-Held, 2000WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997, 2000a

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1998a

WBGU, 1998a; Pilardeaux, 2000b

WBGU, 1997; Block et al., 1997

WBGU, 1998a

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

WBGU, 1997

Table B 1-1The 16 syndromes of global change.Source: WBGU

B 2Global environmental problems

B 2.1Climate change

Humankind is in the process of altering the global cli-mate (IPCC, 1996a; Grieser et al., 2000). Anthro-pogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing globalwarming at a rate without precedent over the past10,000 years (IPCC, 1996a, b). Since the onset ofindustrialization, atmospheric greenhouse gas con-centrations have risen significantly: Carbon dioxideby 30 per cent, methane by 145 per cent and oxides ofnitrogen by 15 per cent (IPCC, 1996a).Almost three-quarters of all anthropogenic emissions come fromfossil fuel use (e.g. coal, mineral oil or natural gas)and about one-quarter from land-use change,notably as a consequence of the clearing of tropicalforests (WBGU, 2000a). This has led since the late19th century to a mean warming at the Earth’s sur-face of 0.3–0.6°C (IPCC, 1996a), whereby 1998 regis-tered as the warmest year since records began in 1854(Jones et al., 1999). Clear indications of climaticwarming are given by, for instance, the shrinkage ofmean sea-ice thickness in the Arctic by approx. 2mwithin the past 28 years (Johannessen et al., 1999) orwidespread coral reef bleaching (Hoegh-Guldberg,1999).

Volcanic eruptions, which spew considerableamounts of dust and aerosols into the atmosphere,such as Pinatubo in 1991, cause short-term cooling,but this does not alter the longer-term warming trend(Roeckner et al., 1998). Climate models now leavescarcely any doubt that, as a consequence of the fore-cast doubling of CO2 levels by 2100, the Earth willwarm by a global average of 2°C (EU, 2000); in manyregions, this value will probably even be exceeded(IPCC, 1996a). Climate change on this scale would bea severe global environmental problem, for wide-ranging impacts upon ecosystems, human health andeconomies are to be feared.

The predictive power of present climate modelsdoes not suffice to make reliable forecasts, notably ofregional climatic changes or the occurrence ofextreme events (Lozán et al., 1998). Nonetheless,

general statements on the probable consequences ofglobal climate change can be made.

The glaciers in the European Alps have alreadylost half of their mass, and their retreat will acceler-ate further (Lozán et al., 1998). As a consequence ofthe melting of mountain glaciers and the thermalexpansion of the upper layers of the oceans, sea lev-els could rise by about 50 cm by the year 2100. Thiswould have severe impacts upon low-lying coastalzones – particularly in developing countries. Thesezones are home to more than half the world’s popu-lation, which would then be exposed increasingly toclimate-induced environmental risks such as storms,flooding, coastal erosion and salination.

Agriculture is particularly sensitive to climaticchanges. Climate change is expected to alter not onlytemperature distribution but also the distribution ofprecipitation. This will lead to shifting climatic andvegetation zones, with severe ecological conse-quences for marine and terrestrial ecosystems incoastal areas, for inappropriately managed agro-ecosystems and for forest ecosystems close to thetree line in high latitudes or in mountain regions(IPCC, 1996b, 1998; Section B 2.4).

Developing countries with arid regions mustexpect intensified desertification. This would affectabout 1000 million inhabitants of arid or semi-aridareas. In these regions, economic capacities for adap-tation by means of water-resources management orsoil improvement are often small, so that many ofthese countries are already unable to cope with nat-ural climate variability (IPCC, 1998). Due to its bio-geophysical and socio-economic situation, Africa isconsidered the continent most vulnerable to climaticchanges (WBGU, 2001).

As a consequence of the intensification of theglobal hydrological cycle, disparities between aridand moist climatic regions could grow. Seasonalweather can also be expected to change: In Europe,for instance, increased precipitation in winter andmore dry days in summer are expected, with a simul-taneous increase in the frequency of extreme rainfallevents. In general, the frequency of extreme weather


events may increase in step with global warming(IPCC, 1996a; WBGU, 2000a).

Due to the largely non-linear dynamics of the cli-mate system, human-induced perturbation may leadnot only to gradual changes but also to sudden dra-matic system swings. These can be triggered by self-reinforcing feedback effects, such as sudden releaseof large quantities of greenhouse gases from per-mafrost soils, or by shifts in ocean currents that deter-mine the climate of a region. In the event that green-house gas emissions continue to rise, an ocean cur-rent (North Atlantic Current) which branches outfrom the warm Gulf Stream could peter out, forinstance, which would have fatal consequences fornorth-western Europe – the climate there wouldapproach that of Siberia or Canada within a fewdecades (Rahmstorf, 2000). In its previous reports,the Advisory Council has highlighted the various cli-matic risks repeatedly and in detail (WBGU, 1996,1998a, 2000a).

B 2.1.1Causes

Fossil fuel consumption is continuing to rise and isthe prime cause of human-induced climate change(accounting for about three-quarters of emissions,amounting to 6.3±0.6 gigatonnes C per year; IPCC,2000). The growth rates are caused mainly by indus-trial structural change, urbanization and growingworld trade flows (Table B 2.1-1). Globalization willultimately intensify these developments, which areboth cause and consequence of several syndromes ofglobal change:The Smokestack Syndrome (unconsid-ered disposal of ‘effluents’ to the atmosphere) or thedevelopment syndromes such as the Urban SprawlSyndrome and Asian Tigers Syndrome (WBGU, 1997;Table B 1-1). The populations of the burgeoningcities, in particular, are consuming growing amountsof energy and raw materials due to changinglifestyles and rising transport volumes (UNCHS,1996).

Structural change in agriculture and forestry is afurther main cause of climate change, accounting forabout a fourth of emissions at approx. 1.6±0.8 giga-tonnes C per year (IPCC, 2000; WBGU, 1998b, 2001;Section B 3). The broad-scale clearing of forests(Overexploitation Syndrome) and the reclamation ofwetlands (followed in both cases by agricultural use;Green Revolution Syndrome, Dust Bowl Syndrome)lead, through the associated mineralization of largequantities of biomass (e.g. in fire clearing), to consid-erable greenhouse gas emissions and at the sametime to a reduction of biospheric carbon sinks. Theclearing of boreal forests, in particular, can con-

tribute to abrupt and irreversible changes in the cli-mate system, because the climatic conditions imposeconstraints upon regrowth of these forests, whichcontributed to stabilizing the climate after the lastice-age. It must be feared that the release of methanefrom the boreal soils will add to the growing concen-trations of atmospheric greenhouse gases.

B 2.1.2Need for action

The growing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-sions to the atmosphere must be stopped. Global cli-mate policy thus has the challenging task of develop-ing and implementing emissions reduction strategiesand measures relating directly to the complex causesof global warming. This calls for international man-agement. The need for environmental policy actionappears all the greater when we consider that,despite the intentions declared, the conventionssigned and the legislation amended, scarcely any realreductions in greenhouse gas emissions have yetbeen observed in industrialized countries.This is whya broad majority of climate scientists consider afuture increase in the mean global temperature to behighly probable (Wallace, 1999; IPCC, 1996a). It isthus essential that institutional arrangements con-tinue to step up preventive measures. Greater con-sideration will also need to be given to risk reductionstrategies aimed at adaptation to the changes whichmay already be inevitable and, in particular, at pre-paredness for more frequent extreme weather eventsworldwide. This should not, however, be taken tomean that preventive measures should have lowerpriority.

B 2.1.3Institutional arrangements

B 2.1.3.1Prevention

Limiting emissions from industry, humansettlements and transportThe Advisory Council welcomes the emissions limi-tation and reduction provisions agreed upon in theUN Framework Convention on Climate Change andin the Kyoto Protocol, although a need still remainsto give specific shape to such aspects as compliancemechanisms (Section C 4.4.1). Globally agreed emis-sions quotas and mechanisms for ensuring their com-pliance would be easier to enforce if the parties to the

25Climate change B 2.1

convention were to establish a qualified majority vot-ing system (Section C 3.6).

The Climate Convention currently embraces 165parties, but only a few states have yet ratified theKyoto Protocol. Germany should therefore supportor enter into coalitions among parties that mightadopt a pioneering role in international climate pro-tection policy, in order to ensure that the overallobjective of the convention is met. Inclusion of bio-logical sinks in emissions reduction arrangements isproblematic as long as the G-77 has not accepted anyreduction commitments and as long as the dangerpersists of such inclusion creating counterproductive

incentives to clear-cut primary forests (WBGU,1998b).

The Kyoto Protocol’s provisions on trading emis-sion rights (‘certificates’) are promising, but need tobe further developed, detailed and implemented. Inthe opinion of the Advisory Council, limited trade incertificates can be an effective and efficient instru-ment contributing to meeting emissions quotasbecause it can contribute to the market-appropriateintroduction of measures in regions in which emis-sions reductions can be implemented cost-effectively.It remains to be examined whether the World Bankcomes into question as the body issuing these certifi-cates.

Table B 2.1-1Climate change: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU

Primary causes

STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN

INDUSTRY, URBANIZATION

AND MOBILITY

(Smokestack, UrbanSprawl and Asian Tigerssyndromes)• Increasing consumption

of fossil fuels• Industrialization• Growing transport volu-

mes• Growing global trade

flows• Spread of Western con-

sumption patterns and lifestyles

• Common access problem

LAND-USE INTENSIFICATION

AND EXPANSION

(Overexploitation Syn-drome, Green RevolutionSyndrome)• Increased food produc-

tion • Converted natural ecosy-

stems• Decline in traditional far-

ming practices• Increasing consumption

of fossil fuels

Immediate triggers oreffects

• Increased concentrationsof radiatively active tracegases and aerosols in theatmosphere

• Intensified human-indu-ced global warming

• Loss of biospheric carbonstocks (e.g. forests, wet-lands)

• Loss of biospheric carbonsinks

• Release of bound met-hane

Prime need for action

• Limit consumption offossil fuels

• Promote climate-friendlypatterns of productionand consumption

• Enhance social accep-tance of climate-friendlyproducts, services andmeasures

• Ensure effective emer-gency response

• Secure funding for pre-cautionary measures andmeasures designed tomitigate effects

• Provide compensationfor countries affected

• Adapt agricultural andsilvicultural practices inan ecologically and soci-ally acceptable manner

• Preserve or strengthensink function (e.g. bystopping destructiveexploitation of primaryforests)

Institutional arrangements

• Ratify Kyoto Protocol • Define and implement emission

rights trading schemes (with assig-ned amounts of emissions)

• Introduce a qualified majority sys-tem for decision-making in the UNFCCC process

• Promote internationally coordina-ted climate-friendly tax and finan-cial policies, and best practices inclimate protection

• Accelerate technology and mana-gement transfer

• Promote environmental education• Utilize the potential of insurance

schemes for extreme events • Introduce catastrophe bonds• Promote compensatory insurance

funds• Improve logistics and organizatio-

nal structures in internationalemergency response and nationalemergency prevention, prepa-redness and response programmes

• Promote technology and know-ledge transfer relating to emer-gency response measures and tech-niques

• Adopt a legally binding instrumenton forests

• Promote ecologically acceptablereforestation, reward voluntarycessation of use

• Establish data bank on appropriateagricultural practices


Adapting land use to climate strategiesBecause of non-sustainable land-use practices (e.g.conversion of natural ecosystems; Section B 2.4),there is a risk of the biosphere losing its stabilizing,regulating function for the physical and chemicalproperties of the atmosphere and for the biogeo-chemical cycles of the Earth (Section B 2.1). TheAdvisory Council considers it crucial to act to main-tain these functions, by stopping the destruction ofprimary forests and – where ecologically appropriate– pursuing reafforestation (also in its function as car-bon sink). As a matter of urgency, negotiationsshould commence on a legally binding internationalforest conservation instrument (e.g. a forest protocolunder the Biodiversity Convention; WBGU, 2001).The preconditions for offsetting sinks against emis-sions set out in detail in the Advisory Council’s 1998special report (WBGU, 1998b) need to be observed.For instance, it is essential to prevent the clear-cut-ting of primary forests with subsequent reafforesta-tion from being credited as a climate protection mea-sure creating new sinks (Section B 3.2.2.1).

B 2.1.3.2Adaptation

Lack of economic incentives and politicalattractivenessThe further development of insurance services is animportant measure for adaptation to the conse-quences of climate change. Such services are an effec-tive form of making financial provision for the risksassociated with the consequences of extreme climaticevents, and can thus at least enhance economicresilience. Introducing mandatory insurance in par-ticularly endangered regions can at the same timeprovide an economic incentive for risk-reducing con-struction methods and settlement structures. Undercertain conditions, mandatory insurance (or possiblya fund scheme) is therefore recommendable.

To reduce the vulnerability of developing coun-tries to environmental risks, the downward trend inpublic-sector development cooperation inputs needsto be reversed (Section E 3). In many countries, thenecessary improvements in infrastructure and self-help capabilities can only be achieved with externalsupport. Finally, it should be examined to what extentthe issuance of catastrophe bonds might be an incen-tive instrument (Section E 3.2.5).

B 2.1.3.3Mitigation of effects

Appropriate compensation for countriesaffectedTo provide adequate compensation in the event ofdamage a compensatory insurance fund could be setup for countries affected directly by climate change,for instance small island states. Such internationalinsurance schemes could function as follows: Allcountries would pay a premium based on their spe-cific greenhouse gas emissions, from which a reservecould be established that is paid out to a core groupof particularly endangered states when climate-related disaster damage occurs and the insured eventarises. Premium rates could be designed flexibly inorder to provide financial incentives both for mea-sures to reduce potential damage in insured statesand measures to reduce causal emissions in individ-ual donor states.

Effective emergency responseThe failure of international emergency aid after theflooding in Mozambique in March 2000 demon-strated once again the inadequacy of internationalemergency management logistics and instruments.No international aid was deployed at all to the east-ern Indian region of Orissa, affected six months pre-viously by a hurricane and floods, where 10,000 died.There is an urgent need for permanent rescue strikeforces for relief missions; these should be establishedor expanded at all levels. The German national reliefservices (Technisches Hilfswerk) could provide amodel. International emergency aid needs to becoordinated with the International Strategy for Dis-aster Reduction (ISDR). National emergency pre-vention, preparedness and response programmes indeveloping countries need to be further developedand promoted by strengthening human and institu-tional capacities (WBGU, 2000a). Furthermore, self-help capabilities should be improved by intensifiedtransfer of technologies and knowledge relating tothe emergency response measures and techniquestried and proven in many industrialized countries.

B 2.2Global environmental effects of chemicals:Stratospheric ozone depletion and persistentorganic pollutants

The reduction of stratospheric ozone concentrationscounts among the most drastic changes in the atmos-phere over the past decades (WBGU, 1994, 1995a).Although ozone (O3) in the upper layers of theatmosphere has only a comparatively small concen-

27Global environmental effects of chemicals B 2.2

tration (max. 10 ppm; Graedel and Crutzen, 1994), itperforms a crucial radiation protection function forthe biosphere. Ultraviolet (UV) light splits oxygenmolecules (O2) into oxygen atoms, which combinevery rapidly with other oxygen molecules to formozone. Irradiation with ultraviolet light causes theozone to decompose again. Thus under normal envi-ronmental conditions there is a dynamic equilibriumin the stratosphere between ozone formation anddepletion with the consequence that the energy-richUV fractions of incident sunlight are absorbed(Graedel and Crutzen, 1994).

For a few decades now, this equilibrium is beingdisturbed by halogenated hydrocarbons which donot occur naturally (especially by chlorofluorocar-bons, CFCs). One of the great advantages of CFCs inindustrial use, namely their nonreactivity and thusnontoxicity in the troposphere, is thus reversed into adisadvantage: Due to their longevity, they rise up intothe stratosphere within a few years. Here, at altitudesabove 20–25km, solar irradiation is energy-richenough to split the CFC molecules, releasing chlorineatoms and chlorine monoxide molecules. These arehighly effective catalysts of ozone depletion, but arethemselves decomposed only slowly.The present rateof chlorine input to the stratosphere is five times thatof natural inflows, caused for instance by volcaniceruptions. This ultimately leads to a distinct reduc-tion of the ozone concentration in the stratosphereand thus to intensified irradiation of harmful ultravi-olet light (UV-B radiation) at the Earth’s surface.This effect is most pronounced over the Antarctic atthe end of the austral winter, where, at air tempera-tures below 193°K, polar stratospheric clouds (PSC)consisting of water ice and nitric acid form, on which,through heterogeneous catalysis, chlorine gas andother halogens are released. After the end of thepolar night, photochemical reactions form halogenradicals, which cause ozone depletion.

The human-induced ‘ozone hole’ at the South Polewas one of the most surprising discoveries of the1980s. Since then, a steady downward trend in atmos-pheric ozone levels has been observed, reaching apreliminary low in 1998: A thinning of continentalscale formed over the Antarctic. The ozone holeremained stable for almost 100 days – longer thanever observed before. In September 1998, it coveredan area of approx. 27.3 million km2 (more than twicethe area of Europe) and in November still measureda considerable 13 million km2 (WMO et al., 1998).Evaluations of images gained by a NASA satelliteshowed that in 1999 the ozone hole was only slightlysmaller than in 1998 (approx. 25 million km2 in Sep-tember 1999; NASA, 1999).

In the North Polar region, a noticeable depletionof the ozone layer was measured for the first time in

the winter of 1992–1993, but one cannot speak of an‘ozone hole’ comparable to that over the South Pole.However, in 1996–1997 new peak levels of ozonedepletion emerged in the northern hemisphere:Ozone reduction reached up to 48 per cent of theaverage ozone concentration, the reduction evenreaching 60 per cent at an altitude of 20km. Recentstudies suggest that very warm air currents in theArctic region are responsible for this (Hansen andChipperfield, 1998; EC, 2000). Here, too, polarstratospheric clouds are the precondition to ozonedepletion. In the winter of 1999–2000, particularlyextensive clouds developed and remained over theArctic for a longer period than in previous winters.Ozone reductions up to 60 per cent occurred again.Researchers of the NASA SOLVE project now pre-sume an additional connection to human-inducedglobal warming. The greenhouse gases emitted byhuman activities evidently promote increased forma-tion of polar stratospheric clouds. Model computa-tions suggest that tropospheric warming, such ascaused by greenhouse gases, may be accompanied bya cooling of the stratosphere, which would furtherpromote ozone depletion.

The reason for the different development of Arc-tic and Antarctic ozone reduction is the winteratmospheric circulation and extremely low stratos-pheric winter temperatures at the South Pole. Duringthe austral winter, a vortex isolates the Antarcticstratosphere, preventing atmospheric exchange. Assoon as this collapses in the Antarctic spring(November), ozone-bearing air can penetrate againand closes the ozone hole. However, this ozoneexport also means that the ozone layer over the mid-dle latitudes is becoming increasingly thinner; modelcomputations suggest that it will continue to declinesubstantially over the next 10–20 years. This trend isin principle reversible. However, due to the longevityof CFCs, despite emission control measures a further100 years may pass until an ozone hole no longerforms over the Antarctic (Waibel et al., 1999).

The risks posed by mounting ozone loss arediverse and extend far beyond possible direct dam-age to human health. Scientific studies have exam-ined rising melanoma frequency, impacts upon agri-cultural production or possible damage to infrastruc-ture and building materials (Tevini, 1993). Scientificunderstanding of the effects of intensified UV-Bradiation upon ecosystems is only rudimentary. Ris-ing UV irradiation, as is to be expected as a conse-quence of stratospheric ozone depletion, can cause a5–10 per cent reduction of primary production inAntarctic plankton algae (Smith et al., 1992); how-ever, the intensity of this effect varies among the dif-ferent algae species (Davidson et al., 1996). The


thereby reduced capacity to sequester CO2 from theatmosphere could contribute to intensifying climatechange (Section B 3). On the other hand, ozonedepletion has caused a cooling of the lower stratos-phere, which may have balanced the effect of othergreenhouse gases by 30 per cent since the 1970s(WMO et al., 1998).

If the distinct reduction in ozone concentrationsover the Arctic that has been recorded in recentyears continues, large parts of Europe and NorthAmerica could also be impacted. Due to the meteo-rological conditions, ozone depletion in the north isless marked, but could affect larger ecosystems.Moreover, in the northern hemisphere the amount ofpeople and assets affected – and thus the potentialdamage – is considerably larger.

B 2.2.1Causes and need for action

CFCs are non-toxic, non-flammable and simple tohandle, which has led to their widespread use inindustry and households. They have been and con-tinue to be applied as foaming agents in plastics, assolvents and cleaning agents, propellants in spraycans, and refrigerants in refrigerators or air-condi-tioning units. Inadequate technology assessment andabsent waste management legislation in conjunctionwith ever shorter life-cycles of products have all con-tributed to CFC emissions causing massive stratos-pheric ozone depletion.

The Smokestack Syndrome typifies the presumedharmless disposal of volatile effluents by dilution inenvironmental media (WBGU, 1997). The UrbanSprawl Syndrome characterizes similar develop-ments (Table B 1-1). Here the spread of Western pat-terns of consumption and lifestyles and high levels ofsubstance and energy consumption are importantfactors. The Asian Tigers Syndrome (Block et al.,1997) identifiable in many newly industrializingcountries, with the dominant objective of rapid eco-nomic structural change in the industrial centres ofproduction, while neglecting necessary environmen-tal standards, is an important causal pattern (Table B2.2-1).

Many individual states and the international com-munity have already responded to the problem andhave adopted national and international regulationsdesigned to prevent the use of ozone-depleting CFCs(e.g. the Montreal Protocol, Sections C 2.2.1 and C3.2, Box C 4.4-1). As a result, consumption of thesesubstances has dropped from 1.1 million tonnes in1986 to 160,000 tonnes in 1996, as the industrializedcountries no longer produce, use or export these sub-stances (UNEP, 2000). These measures have already

impacted upon the total concentration of ozone-depleting substances in the atmosphere: Followingthe peak in 1994, levels have dropped steadily(WMO et al., 1998). However, the regulations inplace do not suffice. For instance, developing coun-tries will also need to stop the production and use ofCFCs and other ozone-depleting substances.


B 2.2.2.1Prevention

Designing and implementing precautionarymeasuresThe international ozone regime, whose developmenthas been positive in the past (Sections C 2.2.1; C 3.2),could be jeopardized by the mounting demand forhazardous substances in the populous countries ofthe developing world. While up into the 1980s theindustrialized countries were the main generators ofthe ozone problem, today it is above all China andIndia, but also Malaysia and Indonesia.Therefore theMontreal Protocol needs to be reviewed in terms ofthe permitted maximum quantities, particularly forthese countries. Important steps in this direction havebeen taken by the Beijing Amendment to the Mon-treal Protocol: For phase-out of CFC production by2010, China and India will receive financial supportfrom the Multilateral Fund for the implementationof the Montreal Protocol amounting to US$150 mil-lion and, respectively, US$82 million. It merits con-sideration whether the German government shouldlaunch a new initiative for accelerated reduction.

To cope with the great amount of new chemicalsubstances and their release, a convention on themanagement of persistent organic pollutants is to beadopted in 2001. However, at present this only coversthe so-called ‘dirty dozen’ (Box B 2.2-1). In order tobe able to identify potentially risky chemicals withregard to their potential environmental damage, theregional convention on air pollution control devel-oped by the UN Economic Commission for Europe(UN/ECE) should be expanded to include new sub-stance classes. International regulations should com-prise monitoring and controlling functions in orderto be able to monitor production cycles permanentlyand respond rapidly where necessary. The UN RiskAssessment Panel (WBGU, 2000a) proposed by theAdvisory Council could undertake these tasks (Sec-tion E 1).

29Global environmental effects of chemicals B 2.2

Substituting harmful substance groupsAs persistent organic pollutants can, in the mostunfavourable case, have a global extent of damagewith irreversible consequences, it is essential toundertake research to develop replacement sub-stances and processes (WBGU, 2000a). For this, thenecessary basic research needs to be enhancedthrough appropriate investment incentives. How-ever, substitutes also need to be assessed in terms oftheir impacts in other environmental spheres, e.g.global warming, and with regard to extreme environ-mental conditions.

B 2.2.2.2Adaptation

Impact researchIn many areas of research on the impacts of stratos-pheric ozone depletion knowledge gaps still prevail.

Concerning human health, for instance, this appliesto impacts upon skin diseases and rising incidence ofcataracts and skin tumours and the effectiveness ofprotective measures. Concerning ecosystems, there isinsufficient knowledge on impacts upon agricultureand upon food chains in the biosphere, and particu-larly on the combination with parallel climaticchanges. Further long-term studies are necessary inorder to receive robust predictions of possible dam-age.


Measures of this kind generally only serve damagelimitation. However, in view of the high persistencyand ubiquity of the problematic substances, it isessential to give preference to precautionary mea-sures. The Advisory Council therefore urgently rec-

Table B 2.2-1Global environmental effects of chemicals (stratospheric ozone depletion and persistent organic pollutants): Causes, need foraction and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU

Primary causes



(Smokestack, Urban Sprawl and Asian Tigerssyndromes)• Demand for new chemi-

cal production substancesand their disposal

• Industrialization• Growing global trade

flows• Spread of Western con-

sumption patterns andlifestyles

• Common access problem


AND EXPANSION

(Dust Bowl Syndrome,Green Revolution Syn-drome)• Demand for new plant

protectants

Immediate triggers or effects

• Emissions of ozone-depleting substances

• Toxicity through accumu-lation of POPs

• Application of persistentbiocides


• Substitute ozone-deple-ting substances and POPs

• Close knowledge gaps• Carry out environmental

risk assessments world-wide

• Substitute persistent bio-cides


• Further amend the Montreal Pro-tocol, notably in developing coun-tries

• Adopt POPs convention• Establish UN Risk Assessment

Panel• Standardize environmental impact

assessments internationally • Expand scope of EIA convention

to cover new substance classes• Introduce spatial and temporal

containment strategies for newsubstances

• Promote international monitoringand controlling of product cycles

• Accelerate development of repla-cement substances

• Provide investment incentives forbasic and impact research

• Provide financial support for sub-stitution processes

• Introduce strict export conditionsfor nationally prohibited POPs

• Intensify knowledge and techno-logy transfer in the plant protec-tion sphere

• Integrate environmental standardsin trade agreements

• Promote precautionary measuresinternationally

• Carry out long-term studies(human health, ecological impactsetc.)


ommends undertaking initiatives for worldwide edu-cation on specific changes in patterns of behaviourand use that can serve to contain hazards. Moreover,there is a need for emergency prevention, prepared-ness and response instruments for accident-relatedreleases; these should increasingly be implementedin the form of mobile international emergencygroups.

B 2.3Oceans at risk

The threats posed to the oceans and their livingresources have continued to mount in recent years.Rising amounts of inorganic and organic substancesare discharged into coastal zones through rivers, dif-fuse coastal sources and atmospheric precipitation.Many of these substances are toxic, accumulate inorganisms or impair growth and reproduction.Residues of these substances in the tissue of fish andshellfish pose threats to human health when they areconsumed. High inputs of nutrient salts lead toeutrophication of coastal waters and can triggershifts in the species composition of plankton algae.Rising inputs of suspended matter and sediment par-ticles to coastal zones are jeopardizing coral reefsaround the world. The sensitivity of these mostspecies-rich marine habitats to elevated seawatertemperatures as a consequence of climate change has

already been discussed above (Section B 2.1). Over-fishing natural fish stocks can have far-reaching con-sequences. For large parts of the coastal population,fish is one of the main sources of protein; destructiveexploitation of this resource can jeopardize foodsecurity.

Land-based inputs, which account for some 80 percent of total ocean pollution, impair mainly regionsclose to the coast and shallow water areas. In additionto pollution by residential and industrial wastewaterfrom point and diffuse sources, overfertilized or pes-ticide-contaminated soils are washed out (GESAMP,1990). Inputs from port areas can contain residues ofantifouling paints, which have an endocrine-disrupt-ing effect or contain high heavy metal concentrations(Goldberg, 1986; Greenpeace, 1999). Soil erosion incoastal zones leads to inputs of suspended matterthat can also be severely contaminated (GESAMP,1990). Despite prohibition of direct dumping ofwastes at sea (König, 1997), large amounts of wastesenter the oceans annually through shipping opera-tions, inappropriate landfills, tourism and offshoreinstallations. Some 2.5 million tonnes of oil that enterthe marine environment annually from illegal dis-charges or accidents cause severe damage (Tügel,1999).To this day, 80 per cent of the world trade fleetstill uses residue oils and inefficient motors (CON-CAWE, 1997; Corbett et al., 1999), whose flue gasespollute the air. These various sources are joined bythe dumping of radioactive waste, which is still per-

Box B 2.2-1

Persistent organic pollutants

The use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) is associ-ated with risks resulting in a phenomenon similar to theCFC problem (yet one with very different effects). Chemi-cal industry is continually developing new substance classeswhose environmental risks – sometimes global – are firstrecognized only after massive use has occurred (WBGU,2000a; Table B 2.2-1).

Persistent organic pollutants are artificial organic sub-stances. Due to their toxicity and environmental longevity,they can cause major damage. Of approximately 100,000xenobiotics, of which 5,000 are produced in considerableamounts and enter the environment, only about 300 sub-stances have been tested thus far in Germany in terms oftheir potential hazards to human health and the environ-ment (BUA, 2000). The environmental impact of POPs ischaracterized by great uncertainty in terms of the probabil-ity of occurrence and consequences, ubiquitous distributionand a long delay effect (WBGU, 2000a).

Due to their global distribution and effects, 12 sub-stances or substance groups are of particular impor-tance –the so-called ‘dirty dozen’ (WBGU, 2000a) – which includenine pesticides (aldrin, chlordane, DDT, dieldrin, endrin,hexachlorobenzene, heptachlor, mirex, and toxaphene), the

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and the polychlorinateddibenzo-p-dioxins and polychlorinated dibenzo-p-furans(PCDDs and PCDFs). Altogether, the ‘dirty dozen’ com-prise several hundred individual compounds. The produc-tion and use of many of these substances is prohibited inindustrialized countries, while some are already bannedworldwide.

POPs enter the environment through production or dis-posal leaks as well as through targeted use and application(e.g. of biocides). Not only are their effects acutely toxic inthe environment, but they may also spread across vast dis-tances according to their chemical properties. Even tracesof these substances located far from their site of origin canhave chronic, toxic effects. Some accumulate in consider-able concentrations in the food chain.

Established ecotoxicological testing methods are inade-quate, particularly in terms of possible combination effectson individual organisms, effects on the ecosystem as awhole, and coverage of complex environmental processes(Lammel and Pahl, 1998). A foresighted assessment of newsubstances must keep all relevant system levels in mind,ranging from the toxic effects on individual organisms tothose on the global environmental system (WBGU, 2000a).Due to worldwide distribution of the products and theirpossible environmental consequences, international regu-lation is necessary. Negotiations on a POPs Convention areexpected to conclude in 2001 (Section C 3.3.1).

31Oceans at risk B 2.3

missible for military purposes (Tügel, 1999), andlegal discharges of irradiated wastewater.

Moreover, shallow water areas are frequently thesites of hydrocarbon deposits (mineral oil and nat-ural gas). These are increasingly being developed inorder to extract energy. The resultant environmentalproblems range from construction interventions insensitive habitats (drilling platforms) over contami-nation during extraction operations through to theconsequences of accidents (oil spills, fires, destruc-tion of platforms by extreme weather events). Deepsea mining currently plays no major role due to itspoor profitability, but could gain importance in thefuture (Section C 3.3). Estimates suggest that thedeep ocean floor holds methane hydrates containingtwice as much energy as all other fossil fuel stockstaken together (Hydrates, 2000). The potential haz-ards posed by the anticipated extraction of thesestocks are considerable, as a roughly 160-fold volumeof gaseous methane could be released explosivelyfrom the frozen gas hydrates (Pietschmann, 1999).

In immediate coastal areas, valuable ecosystemsare being destroyed by construction measures orother uses (conversion). This is particularly affectingcoastal zones in the tropics, which harbour species-rich and biologically productive biotic communities(coral reefs, mangroves). About 58 per cent of theworld’s coral reefs are at risk, overexploitation (36per cent of all reefs) being the main threat (Bryant etal., 1998; WBGU, 2001). This is destroying habitatswhose biological diversity is indeed comparable tothat of the tropical rainforests (Section B 2.4). Man-groves are also being cleared all around the world,often to make way for aquaculture with high pesti-cide inputs. It is estimated that more than 50 per centof all mangroves have already been destroyed today(Spalding et al., 1997).

Particular importance attaches to the overfishingof the oceans: 35 per cent of all fish stocks are over-exploited, 25 per cent are fished to full capacity, only40 per cent of stocks still offer prospects forincreased yields (FAO, 1997; WBGU, 2001). In someregions, populations of certain fish species can col-lapse completely. Moreover, certain fishing methods(e.g. beam trawling, gill netting) decimate the faunaof the sea-floor, and marine mammals and seabirds(WBGU, 2001). In the developing world, the liveli-hoods of 300–500 million people depend directly orindirectly upon fishing. High population densities incoastal areas lead to a marked intensification of arti-sanal fisheries and contribute to degradation ofcoastal and shallow sea areas (BMZ, 1998). Coralreefs are used for fisheries and exploited for jew-ellery production (corals, sponges). In contrast to thefish species of the high seas, coral fish species are fre-quently under threat of extinction (BfA, 1999;

WBGU, 2001). Overfishing and ecosystem conver-sion in coastal areas also jeopardize stocks of high-sea fishes whose juvenile development phases takeplace in coastal biotopes. The discharge of ballastwater taken up by ships – together with its flora andfauna – in other regions of the world can lead to theinvasion of alien species in coastal areas, which fre-quently impacts negatively upon local biologicaldiversity (WBGU, 2001).

B 2.3.1Causes

Several syndromes of global change contribute asprime causal complexes to the degradation of theoceans (Table B 2.3-1). Food production plays a cen-tral role. In coastal areas, in particular, food produc-tion from the seas has intensified greatly.With a highlevel of energy consumption and using high-perfor-mance technologies, fish stocks are undergoingdestructive exploitation in many marine areas. Mod-ern tracking systems, high-technology fishing gear,high engine performances and large on-board refrig-eration capacities of fishing vessels leave the fish nochance. These vessels are often referred to as the‘vacuum-cleaners of the seas’ (Overexploitation Syn-drome).

Marine aquaculture generally involves high pesti-cide and antibiotic inputs. It causes problems stem-ming from coastal ecosystem conversion, the intro-duction of alien species and emissions of nutrientsand contaminants (Dust Bowl Syndrome). As thespecies reared are predominantly predatory fish, fedwith, among other sources, the by-catch of ocean fish-eries, by-catch must be included in fisheries balancesand allowable catches.

Structural change in agriculture, which plays a cru-cial role in both the Dust Bowl Syndrome and theGreen Revolution Syndrome, causes considerablemarine pollution through inputs of particulates anddissolved substances. Nutrients and biocides, in par-ticular, impair water quality. Intensive agriculturepollutes not only groundwater and river water – therelease of gaseous nitrogen compounds as a conse-quence of overfertilization can also intensify nitro-gen loading of the oceans through atmospheric pre-cipitation.

Urbanization and industrialization contributesubstantially to air pollution, to localized impairmentof the water quality of the oceans and to the conver-sion of coastal ecosystems.These complexes are char-acterized by the Waste Dumping,Asian Tigers, Favela,Urban Sprawl and Smokestack syndromes. Specifi-cally they involve direct discharges, the dumping ofwastes at sea and the anticipated extraction of nat-


Table B 2.3-1Oceans at risk: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU

Primary causes

OVEREXPLOITATION OF

MARINE FISH STOCKS

(Overexploitation Syn-drome)• Industrialization• Burgeoning megacities• Population growth• Spread of Western con-


INTENSIFICATION OF THE

USE OF COASTAL AREAS

(AQUACULTURE)(Dust Bowl Syndrome,Green Revolution Syn-drome)• Spread of Western con-


• Advances in biotechno-logy and genetic enginee-ring



(Urban Sprawl, Favela,Smokestack, Major Acci-dent, Waste Dumping andAsian Tigers syndromes)• Industrialization• Burgeoning megacities• Population growth• Spread of Western con-


INTENSIFICATION AND

EXPANSION OF AGRICUL-TURE

(Dust Bowl and GreenRevolution syndromes)• Soil erosion (increase of

sediment loading ofrivers)

• Conversion of naturalecosystems


• Overuse of marine ecosy-stems

• Damage to ecosystemstructure and function

• Conversion of naturalcoastal ecosystems

• Water pollution by emis-sions from intensiveaquaculture

• Risks posed by release ofgenetically modifiedmarine organisms

• Direct discharges (wastemanagement, dumping,accidents)

• Pollutant inputs throughatmospheric precipitationand indirect land-baseddischarges

• Damage to ecosystemstructure and function

• Land-based sediment,nutrient and biocideinputs (diffuse sources)


• Safeguard conservationof marine ecosystems

• Design arrangements forsustainable use of thestocks of marine orga-nisms

• Design aquaculture in asustainable fashion

• Reduce pollutant inputsto marine ecosystems

• Safeguard watercourseand air quality

• Reduce pollutant inputsto marine ecosystems

• Promote sustainableforms of land use


• Enter into international agree-ments for allowable catches, fishingtechniques, protected zones, mora-toriums, monitoring and bans, andintroduce sanctions for non-com-pliance

• Establish reliable data on sustaina-ble yields, set up expert panels atthe FAO to set allowable annualcatches and to designate protectedareas

• Reduce fleet capacities by windingdown subsidies

• Partly substitute fisheries operati-ons by environmentally soundaquaculture operations

• Designate protected zones forendangered habitats and species

• Develop and implement standardsfor sustainable aquaculture

• Technology and knowledge trans-fer for sustainable aquaculture

• Enforce international agreementsfor minimum air and water qualitystandards

• Establish, through reporting proce-dures, a formal record of infringe-ments

• Create preconditions for monito-ring compliance (e.g. by surveying,evaluating and networking waterquality data)

• Implement, financially support andpromote the transfer of pollutioncontrol measures

• Provide international support forthe cleanup of polluted coastalareas

• Designate protected zones for coa-stal areas, shelf seas and the deepocean

• Establish regulations for the redu-ced application or prohibition ofchemical fertilizers and pesticides

• Promote organic farming systems• Promote adoption of the POPs

Convention and link it to the UNFCCC

33Oceans at risk B 2.3

ural resources from the deep ocean. In addition,growing world trade flows and the globalization ofmarkets (structural change in industry) have led toocean-going shipping gaining prominence, with ton-nages mounting from year to year. This gives rise tothe danger of marine pollution through waste and oilresidue discharges or as a consequence of collisionsand accidents (Major Accident Syndrome). It alsoincreases the risk of alien species invasions throughtheir transport in ship ballast water.


Because the greater part of the oceans is a commonasset that can be used by all (common access prob-lem), international agreements are indispensable toprovide effective protection for the oceans by abat-ing pollution and destructive exploitation (Section C3.3.2). A further aspect is that pollutants are trans-ported far across national boundaries by the air andocean currents, so that generators and affected par-ties are far removed from each other. Here numerousinternational agreements have already been adopted(e.g. UNCLOS, MARPOL; Section C 3.3), but a needfor action remains to further develop these regimesand, in particular, to enforce them. The UNEPregional seas programmes provide promising inter-national approaches, under which institutional envi-ronmental policy arrangements are agreed amongthe coastal states of specific regional seas. However,implementational problems, such as inadequatefunding, have meant that enforcement capabilitiesare still lacking (Section C 3.3).

Above all, fish catches must be controlled strictly,because the setting of and compliance with totalallowable catches is an essential precondition to sus-

tainable management of fish stocks. Improving theenvironmental performance of management prac-tices and technologies in all sectors concerned(industry, shipping, agriculture, fisheries, aquacul-ture) abates pollutant inputs and can thus consider-ably reduce the damage to ecosystem function andstructure.


B 2.3.3.1Prevention

Setting and complying with allowablecatches and establishing protected areasAlthough an array of international agreements andcommissions for the conservation of worldwide fishstocks are in place, the overfishing of numerous fish-ing grounds has not been prevented (Peterson, 1993).Therefore internationally valid rules need to beagreed for the determination of allowable catchesand techniques, and for the designation of protectedzones, including coastal areas and the deep ocean.Overcapacities of fishing fleets have now been rec-ognized as a principal cause of overfishing; conse-quently, subsidies for fishing vessels, e.g. within theEU, need to be reduced.

In addition to FAO’s monitoring of fish stocks,fishing fleets at sea also need to be monitored. Anexpert body should be set up at the FAO with thetask of setting annual allowable catches and pro-tected areas on the basis of the most important fish-ing grounds as defined by the FAO and the determi-nation of their degree of overexploitation (fullyfished, overfished, depleted, recovering; Beisheim et

Primary causes

GROWTH OF WORLD TRADE

FLOWS

(Waste Dumping, Smoke-stack and Major Accidentsyndromes) • Growing volumes of

ocean-going shipping• Industrialization


• Human-induced alienspecies invasions

• Pollutant inputs (acci-dents, illegal and legaldischarges)


• Prevent ship-generatedpollutant inputs (e.g.dumping, tank flushing)

• Improve environmentalstandards for ships

• Reduce accident risks(e.g. tankers)


• Enforce minimum internationaltechnical standards for ships (e.g.double hulls for tankers)

• Provide better training for shipcrews

• Link standards to harbour feesand implement strict controls

• Only give docking permission iftechnical standards are compliedwith

• Establish international rapid emer-gency response groups for acci-dents

Table B 2.3-1 (continued)Oceans at risk: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU


al., 1999).Allowable catches should be lower than themaximum yield that would result from the naturalannual regeneration of each species, in order toreduce the risk of jeopardizing stocks in the event ofunpredictable losses.

Allowable catches do not as yet include by-catch,which can be up to 50 per cent of the total catch andis frequently used for feeding in aquaculture.This by-catch not only reduces fish stocks, it also affectsCITES species (e.g. dolphins or turtles) and foodavailability for commercially utilized fish species. Asthe by-catch can be used commercially, there is noincentive to reduce it at present.

Ensuring minimum quality of inflowingwaters and pollutant concentrations in theairIntensified efforts need to be made to set and imple-ment minimum air and water quality standards byinternational agreements in order to safeguard waterquality, particularly in near-coast marine areas. Suchefforts could be modelled on the acid rain regime,which was designed to abate transboundary air pol-lution and is generally considered to be successfuland effective (Zürn, 1997; WBGU, 2001). In order toprovide weaker countries ‘help towards self-help’,the Advisory Council recommends knowledge andtechnology transfer of technological and organiza-tional options for reducing emissions and wastewaterdischarges.

Reducing ship-generated pollution andaccident probabilitiesThe training of ship crews in environment and healthprotection in on-board operations needs to be inten-sified. Evidence of such training could be made a pre-condition for the use of certain near-coast shippingroutes and for docking permits, if such a system couldbe set up internationally in a binding form. In orderto reduce the probability and magnitude of damageof ship accidents, there is a need for minimum stan-dards applicable worldwide, particularly for oiltankers (Box B 2.3-1).

B 2.3.3.2Adaptation

Aquaculture has been introduced increasingly inboth sea- and freshwater in order to reduce depen-dence upon naturally regenerating fish stocks and tomitigate their overfishing. However, the productionof ‘luxury foods’ such as shrimps and salmon, whichaccount for the bulk of marine aquaculture today,cannot solve the food problem of developing coun-tries and is currently associated in most cases withhigh inputs of fish meal and fish oil, pesticides, theintroduction of alien species, destruction of coastalecosystems and nutrient and pollutant emissions.TheAdvisory Council notes that it is essential to complywith the rules of environmentally sound manage-

Box B 2.3-1

Double-hulled ships as a precaution against oilpollution

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollu-tion from Ships (MARPOL) regulates, among other things,requirements upon ships to reduce oil pollution arisingfrom e.g. tanker spills. An important impetus for the AnnexI supplement was the Exxon Valdez tanker spill (1989).

Double hull plating for ships, especially for oil tankers, isregarded as a measure that in the future will avoid orgreatly reduce oil pollution caused by spills. Alternativedesigns are possible, but they must be at least equivalent tothe double-hull design in terms of their oil outflow poten-tial.

If oil tankers of a specific size are not double-hulled,they may no longer enter harbours in the United States ofAmerica after a transition period (USA Oil Pollution Act,1990). After the Erika oil spill off the coast of Brittany,France demanded stricter international regulations.

According to Germanischer Lloyd, the internationalclassification society headquartered in Hamburg, Germany,a double-hulled tanker design can indeed greatly reducethe risk of oil pollution caused by spills, but in some casessuch a design can also contribute to an increase in the riskof a spill:

• Since the steel weight of double-hulled ships should notbe greater than that of single-hulled ships, both of theindividual hull walls are thinner, i.e. they are, in princi-ple, less resistant to wear.

• The bending strength of the ship’s hull is not necessarilyincreased in a double-hulled ship; the risk of the ship’shull breaking apart is thus not necessarily reducedthrough double-hulled design (the Erika accident, forexample, would not have been prevented).

• Leakage in the oil tank can result in volatile gases seep-ing into the air space between the hulls if the ship’s innerhulls are leaky, which can lead to the risk of explosionthere. However, such a risk could be reduced if the airspace were filled with an inert gas.

• Corrosion may occur in areas of the double hull that arehidden from sight or that are inaccessible. Such areas areeither not discovered or cannot be remedied because oftheir inaccessibility.

The use of double-hulled ships represents an effective andviable precautionary measure against oil pollution causedby tanker spills. However, through further supplements toMARPOL regulations, it is necessary that structural impro-vements to double-hulled ship design continue, as well asthat the introduction of equivalent or better alternativedesigns is not prevented.

Source: Payer (personal communication)

35Biodiversity loss and deforestation B 2.4

ment if the rapidly growing aquaculture industry is tomake its contribution to feeding the world (Naylor etal., 2000; WBGU, 2001). Care further needs to betaken that neither by-catch nor commercial fishtaken in excess of set allowable catches are processedto feedstuffs for marine aquaculture, as is currentpractice (Naylor et al., 2000). This practice under-mines rules and incentives to minimize by-catch andcomply with allowable fish catches. A possible solu-tion to this problem would be to introduce manda-tory proof of origin of feedstuffs or correspondingcertification (labelling) of the products of aquacul-ture.


The possibility of imposing moratoriums or bansshould be taken into consideration in cases of non-compliance with prescribed allowable catches ortechniques in designated protected areas. Becausesanctions and court rulings are hard to enforce ininternational law, at least formal declarations ofinfringement should be made through reporting pro-cedures; such reports could be prepared by the FAO(WBGU, 2001).

Polluted coastal areas that cannot be restored byfinancially weak states themselves should be cleanedup with international support because in such cases aglobal asset is at risk (this is similar to the freshwatersituation, Section B 2.6).

Furthermore, an international emergency groupshould be established (WBGU, 2000a) that canrespond to accidents, notably tanker spills. It needs tobe considered whether rather national or transna-tional groups should be established for the 200-milezone, and international emergency groups for inter-national waters.

B 2.4Biodiversity loss and deforestation

The loss of biological diversity in terrestrial andaquatic ecosystems is a global environmental prob-lem. This concerns not only the extinction of species,but also the genetic impoverishment of populationsand the restructuring of the biosphere that is takingplace through conversion of natural ecosystems intocultural landscapes (these issues are set out in detailin WBGU, 2001).A process of particular relevance inthis context is the rapid clearing of primary forests –from tropical rainforests to boreal coniferous forests.

The cause of this problem is the restructuring ofthe biosphere by humankind. Present species extinc-

tion rates are 1,000 to 10,000 times higher than thenatural background rate (Barbault and Sastrapradja,1995; May and Tregonning, 1998). These, however,are only rough estimates, as there are still major gapsin knowledge on biological diversity and the extentof its threats. Thus, for instance, the total number ofspecies on Earth is estimated with the substantialrange of 4 to >100 million species (Heywood, 1997).According to – as yet still rough – estimates, there isa risk that about 10–50 per cent of all species are lostworldwide within the next 50 years (WBGU, 1996).This human-induced wave of extinction is so dra-matic, even compared to the disasters in geologicalhistory, that it has been described quite rightly as ‘thesixth extinction’ (WBGU, 2001). Among traditionalcrop varieties, too, there is rapid loss and geneticimpoverishment. This is narrowing the genetic basefor further development of crop species and is gener-ating wide-ranging risks to food security (FAO, 1996;WBGU, 2001).

As a large part of biological diversity is harbouredby tropical forests, the development of deforestationrates is an important indicator of the threat posed toterrestrial biological diversity. In Europe, NorthAmerica and Northeast Asia, the greater part ofdeforestation already took place before 1700 –whereby, however, most European tree speciesescaped extinction. In Southeast Asia and SouthAmerica, large-scale clearing of primary forests andexpansion of agriculturally utilized areas only tookplace from 1950 onwards. In the period from 1960 to1990 alone, 15-30 per cent of the tropical forests weredestroyed, with high attendant species losses (Bryantet al., 1997). Protected areas, which cover about 5 percent of the land surface worldwide, are unable to pro-vide adequate protection for biological diversity, asthey are mostly too small, are inadequately con-nected and are insufficiently protected against dis-turbances (WBGU, 2001). The rising incidence oflarge-scale forest fires (e.g. in Indonesia and theAmazon region) is posing a growing threat to theremaining forest areas.

Species extinction not only presents fundamentalethical questions. It also jeopardizes the many valuesthat emerge from the use of biological diversity(WBGU, 2001). This concerns not only the materialutilization of natural resources such as timber, butalso the human experience of nature, and the ‘greengold’: Genetic resources that are essential to develop,for instance, new medicines or resistant crop species.Moreover, it is still largely unclear which conse-quences the loss of biological diversity has for ecosys-tem functions, as these are based on complex and fre-quently non-linear mechanisms. Over the short term,a part of the immediate ecosystem functions can alsobe provided with a relatively small number of species


and functional groups (e.g. N2-fixing organisms).Long-term functionality, however, always remainsdependent upon a large species assemblage. What isbeyond doubt is that when a species dies out this is anirreversible process. Restoration of species diversityafter an extinction event takes many millions of years(Kirchner and Weil, 2000). The clearing of primaryforests is also an irreversible process on a humantime scale, for regeneration can take thousands ofyears.

B 2.4.1Causes

The direct and indirect utilization of naturalresources by humankind and the associated land-usechanges are the main causes of biodiversity loss andforest destruction (Sala et al., 2000). Structuralchange in land use plays a pivotal role (Dust Bowl,Sahel and Green Revolution syndromes; WBGU,1997, 1998a).This involves both the intensification ofland use and the expansion of agriculture. Naturalecosystems are either converted directly into agricul-tural lands or their structure and function is impairedby chemical inputs (pesticides, nutrients) or soildegradation. The use of genetically modified organ-isms in agriculture can generate new risks to biologi-cal diversity (WBGU, 2000a). Moreover, the declineof traditional farming practices is leading to danger-ous losses of the genetic diversity of crop plants anddomesticated animal breeds.

An equally important cause is the destructiveexploitation of natural ecosystems, notably forestsand marine and coastal ecosystems (OverexploitationSyndrome;WBGU, 2001). Failure to take a long-termperspective, uncontrolled access to natural ecosys-tems (common access problem), inadequate valua-tion of ecosystem services and, finally, subsidies, pol-icy failure, lobbyism and corruption are leading tothe short-term overuse, conversion and fragmenta-tion of natural ecosystems. In the developing world,indebtedness can further drive the substitution ofnatural ecosystems by cash crops.

The increasing levels of energy and raw materialconsumption generated by industrial structuralchange (industrialization, globalization of markets,large-scale engineering projects) further heightensthe pressure upon natural resources (Smokestackand Aral Sea syndromes). The growth of global tradeflows is accelerating the rate of anthropogenic intro-ductions of alien species, which is a further importantcause of biodiversity loss (Sandlund et al., 1996;Bright, 1998). Persistent pollutants from industry andagrochemicals also place serious pressures upon nat-ural ecosystems (Section B 2.2). Pressure upon nat-

ural resources will continue to rise in future, above alldue to population growth, rising aspirations and thespread of Western consumption patterns andlifestyles. In industrialized and developing countriesalike, urbanization is an important cause of the lossof ecologically valuable areas to new settlement,commercial and transport uses (Urban Sprawl,Favela and Mass Tourism syndromes).

Over the medium and long term, human-inducedclimatic changes will also have a severe impact uponthe biosphere. Mass coral bleaching is already con-sidered to be a consequence of climate change (Sec-tion B 2.1). Other animal and plant species, too, willnot be able to adapt or migrate quickly enough whenclimatic zones shift. This is an aspect that needs par-ticular consideration in the future design of theglobal protected area system.

A basic problem associated with the loss of bio-logical diversity is that many ecosystem services –such as carbon sequestration or flood protection –are not included in economic valuations because theyare difficult to express in monetary values. However,according to estimates made by Costanza et al.(1997) these values are substantial. He estimates thevalue of global ecosystem services and products atUS$33 million million per year – almost twice asmuch as the gross world product.


To conserve and sustainably use the biosphere (TableB 2.4-1), the integrity of bioregions must be pre-served, the long-term regulative functions of thebiosphere (e.g. for the climate) must be maintainedand the global natural heritage must be conserved(WBGU, 2001).

The system of international institutional arrange-ments, comprising the Biodiversity Convention andan array of further specific organizations and institu-tions (WBGU, 2001), does not suffice as a whole toredirect wrong turns in development into sustainablechannels. The loss of biological diversity is not onlyunabated, it is even accelerating. The institutionalsystem therefore needs improvement; proposals forthis are set out in the following (Section B 2.4.3;TableB 2.4-1). Each institutional solution needs to do jus-tice to the complexity of the biosphere problem.Complementary, regionally viable approaches needto be integrated that permit use of the diverse bios-pheric services without jeopardizing them irre-versibly.

Decisions on how to manage biological diversityare generally taken on site from the economic per-spectives of users, often under conditions of acute


Primary causes

INTENSIFICATION AND

EXPANSION OF AGRICUL-TURE

(Green Revolution andSahel syndromes)• Population growth• Decline of traditional far-

ming practices• Globalization of markets• Rising aspirations, lifesty-

les• Advances in biotechno-

logy and genetic enginee-ring

OVEREXPLOITATION OF

NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS

(Overexploitation Syn-drome)• Neglect of long-term per-

spective• Common access problem• Inadequate valuation of

ecosystem services• Policy and market failure• International indeb-

tedness• Globalization of markets


INDUSTRY

(Smokestack, UrbanSprawl and Asian Tigerssyndromes)• Industrialization• Globalization of markets• Growth of worldwide

trade flows• Implementation of large-

scale engineering projects(Aral Sea Syndrome)

• Rising aspirations, lifesty-les

Immediate triggers or effects

• Conversion and fragmen-tation of natural ecosy-stems (e.g. tropicalforests)

• Biogeochemical overloadof ecosystems (e.g. POPs,nutrients)

• Overexploitation of bio-logical resources

• Loss of traditional varie-ties and breeds

• Risks posed by release ofgenetically modifiedorganisms

• Broad-scale degradationand fragmentation ofnatural ecosystems (e.g.tropical forests, coastalecosystems)

• Loss of natural sub-stances and active agents

• Biogeochemical overloadof ecosystems (e.g. POPs,nutrients)

• Introduction of alien spe-cies

• Unfair access to geneticresources

• Trade in endangered spe-cies

• Growth of tourism• Low environmental stan-

dards as competitiveadvantage


• Create protected areanetworks

• Pursue sustainable, multi-functional land use

• Integrate nature conser-vation in land-use con-cepts

• Develop indicators• Stop genetic erosion• Improve consumer infor-

mation• Create economic alterna-

tives for rural populati-ons in developing coun-tries

• Preserve or restore theglobal natural heritage

• Conserve the regulativefunctions and biopoten-tial of the biosphere

• Create incentives to con-serve natural ecosystems

• Strengthen science andeducation

• Provide safeguardsagainst alien speciesintroductions

• Prevent trade in endan-gered species

• Establish fair access togenetic resources

• Develop decentralizedalternatives to large-scaleprojects

• Ensure market access forcompanies with highenvironmental standards


• Give shape to CBD provisions(such as Articles 6, 8, 10), e.g.through guidelines or protocols,and implement these nationally

• Apply the concept of differentiatedland use

• Implement bioregional manage-ment

• Strengthen the MAB programme• Reduce and restructure agricultu-

ral subsidies by rewarding ecologi-cal services

• Safeguard and expand gene banks• Draw up Red List of endangered

varieties and breeds• Harmonize the IUPGR with the

CBD• Establish IPBD, strengthen bios-

phere research• Ratify and implement biosafety

protocol• Develop and support labelling for

sustainable agricultural products

• Adopt legally binding instrumenton forests

• Give protected status to 10-20% ofthe land surface (incl. hotspots),organize and finance global, repre-sentative protected area system

• Implement CBD provisions – here:financing incremental costs

• Modify the law governing founda-tions

• Develop private-sector ‘naturesponsorships’

• Support labelling systems (e.g.Forest Stewardship Council andMarine Stewardship Council)

• Amend trade and transport regime– apply guidelines for alien species

• Improve CITES monitoring system• Specify CBD’s access provisions

and transpose into national law• Utilize bioprospecting opportuni-

ties• Amend credit award guidelines of

World Bank and IMF and for Ger-man government-backed Hermesexport credit guaranties

Table B 2.4-1Biodiversity loss and deforestation: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU


market or policy failure. Conservation of biologicaldiversity entails concrete costs, but the benefits ofconservation are hard to monetarize, are thus diffi-cult to argue for and frequently only become evidentto later generations, whereas the conversion of nat-ural ecosystems promises quick profits.To tackle thisproblem, institutional solutions need to be found andapplied.


B 2.4.3.1Prevention

Promoting sustainable land useSustainable patterns of land use are crucial to solvingthis global environmental problem. At the local andregional levels, the Advisory Council recommendsdifferentiated, multifunctional land-use concepts(WBGU, 2001) such as bioregional management,permitting on-site integration of conservation andsustainable use. Above all, it is crucial to involve asmany of the relevant actors as possible, to elaborateregional indicators and monitoring systems and tocreate appropriate economic incentive systems (e.g.by reducing and partly diverting agricultural subsi-dies in a direction that rewards ecological services;WBGU, 2001). Certification schemes involving thelabelling of sustainable agricultural products andefforts to integrate environmental education mea-sures can build useful bridges to consumers.The bios-

phere reserves designated under the MAB pro-gramme are promising pilot projects for improvedintegration of different demands upon the naturalenvironment; greater use should be made of theunderstandings derived from this programme. Ulti-mately, all regions, with their various species comple-ments, need to be included in the analysis, for no onecan say today which species or which ecosystem func-tion is important for future human use and where itoccurs.

Safeguarding biological resources, stoppinggenetic erosionConserving the diversity of genetic resources forfood and agriculture is extremely important forglobal food security. This is a further reason why it isessential to promote forms of agricultural productionthat are multifunctional and as diverse as possible(WBGU, 2001). There is a need for an internationalinventorization and early warning systems for threat-ened crop varieties and animal breeds, as many tradi-tional varieties and breeds are at risk of being lostirrevocably. Many of the ex-situ collections of rareplant species (gene banks) are themselves at risk.These need to be secured, supplemented and net-worked globally.

The unresolved legal issues surrounding ex-situcollections and Farmers’ Rights need to be clarifiedand harmonized with the requirements of the Biodi-versity Convention. This necessitates a legally bind-ing revision of the International Undertaking onPlant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture(IUPGR), possibly as a protocol to the BiodiversityConvention.

Primary causes

URBANIZATION AND

MOBILITY

(Urban Sprawl, Favela andMass Tourism syndromes)• Unsustainable settlement

forms• Urban sprawl• Rising mobility• Rising aspirations, lifesty-

les

CLIMATIC CHANGES

(Smokestack Syndrome)• Rising aspirations, lifesty-

les• Mobility


• Loss of ecologicallyvaluable areas throughsettlements and transportinfrastructure

• Exacerbation of negativeconsequences of land use

• Overstepping of adaptivecapability of natural eco-systems (e.g. coral blea-ching)


• Promote sustainable tou-rism

• Harmonize demandsupon and conservation ofresources

• Enforce sustainable land-use planning

• Reduce emissions• Preserve natural carbon

stocks and sinks• Plan protected area

systems in a forward-loo-king manner


• Develop guidelines for sustainabletourism

• Apply or develop regulations forsustainable spatial planning andsustainable land use

• Implement UNFCCC• Design Kyoto Protocol provisions

in a manner promoting biodiversity

Table B 2.4-1 (continued)Biodiversity loss and deforestation: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU


Efforts to develop international standards on theuse of traditional knowledge and on access to geneticresources, their sustainable use and benefit-sharingwithin the scope of the Biodiversity Conventionprocess should press ahead swiftly; support needs tobe given to their national implementation.This offersopportunities not only for the conservation of bio-logical diversity, but also for the natural substancesindustry.

Enforcing nature conservation worldwideand preventing destructive exploitationAs a ‘guard rail’ for the biosphere, the AdvisoryCouncil has recommended a worldwide representa-tive system of protected areas extending over 10–20per cent of the world’s land surface (WBGU, 2001).This system should both include the ‘hotspots’ hold-ing a great number of wild species in a small area(Myers et al., 2000), and should represent the diver-sity of ecosystem types. Furthermore, for global foodsecurity it is important to include the ‘Vavilov centresof genetic diversity’ that hold a large genetic diversityof crop species or their wild relatives (Vavilov, 1926;Hammer, 1998).

Some areas of the biosphere have particularimportance because of the functional importance oftheir ecosystems to the global environment (theseinclude the Atlantic coastal area of Amazonia, theeastern Sahel zone, southern China and Indochina;WBGU, 2001).

New protected areas need to be designatedaccording to ecological criteria, existing areas placedin connection to each other and further developedtowards a robust, integrated protected area systemthat can also follow the anticipated shifts in vegeta-tion zones caused by climate change. Closing the pre-vailing financing gaps for such a protected area sys-tem should not be an impossible task. The corre-sponding funds could be redirected by reducing andrestructuring subsidies, for instance those for agricul-ture. Biological diversity occurs mainly in developingcountries which, in contrast to industrialized coun-tries, do not command over the necessary funds forconservation. This presents the need for compen-satory payments for lost use. The Biodiversity Con-vention already provides for the financial compensa-tion of the agreed full incremental costs, but thefunds made available for this are far from sufficient.Conversely, care needs to be taken that development,infrastructure and structural adjustment measures,such as those financed by the IMF or the WorldBank, do not countermand efforts to conserve nat-ural ecosystems.Above and beyond governmental orinternational measures, the commitment of private-sector actors will also be necessary and needs to bepromoted, for instance by creating appropriate

framework conditions (Section C 3.5). Consequently,current efforts to create a privately operated and tax-exempted biosphere fund should be given politicalsupport.

Because forests hold a large proportion of overallbiological diversity, a legally binding internationalforest conservation instrument (e.g. a forest protocolto the Biodiversity Convention; WBGU, 1996, 2001)would be an important milestone for the conserva-tion of biological diversity and would at the sametime provide a valuable tool to combat soil degrada-tion and climate change. A further important ele-ment of efforts to prevent destructive exploitation iscertification of the products of sustainable forestmanagement (Section C 3.4).

Making industry, trade and tourismbiodiversity-friendlyWithin the scope of the Biodiversity Convention, thepossibility to establish common standards for themanagement of alien species should be promoted(e.g. a commitment to replace ballast water at sea).As a matter of principle, the parties responsibleshould be made liable even for the unintended intro-duction of alien species. The necessary uniform defi-nition of concepts needs to be agreed internationallyand harmonized with those applying to the introduc-tion of genetically modified species, as the issues aresimilar. Under the Washington Convention on Inter-national Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), themonitoring system needs to be improved throughcertification and identification methods, and a bene-fit-sharing mechanism introduced.

In the opinion of the Advisory Council, elaborat-ing tourism guidelines within the Biodiversity Con-vention process would be a step in the right direction.Such guidelines could form an important element ofa future overarching international instrument on sus-tainable tourism.

Closing knowledge gapsThe glaring lack of knowledge is perhaps the mostimportant aspect in the biosphere debate. Not eventhe order of magnitude of the overall number ofspecies worldwide is known. The available data onthe current state of the biosphere and its broad-scaleecosystems (biomes) is inadequate.These knowledgegaps currently impede measures both to conserveand sustainably use biological diversity. Closing themis, among other aspects, a precondition to developingindicators; consequently, corresponding projectsdeserve support (e.g. the Millennium EcosystemAssessment; Ayensu et al., 1999). There is further aneed for improved organization and clear prioritiesin international biosphere research. The AdvisoryCouncil has previously already called for improve-


ment of scientific policy advice in this sector and hasrecommended establishing an IntergovernmentalPanel on Biological Diversity (IPBD) modelled onthe IPCC (WBGU, 2001; Section E 1.3.2).

Improving implementation and internationalcomplianceIn recent years, many countries have made consider-able progress in elaborating their legislation on themanagement of biological resources, and have joinedinternational agreements such as CITES, the Biodi-versity Convention or the Ramsar Convention.Nonetheless, implementational deficits abound atthe local and national levels: Protected areas onlyexist on paper, programmes of action are non-bind-ing and are not implemented, national reports arenot written at all. This indicates a need for moreeffective international mechanisms by which toensure compliance (Section C 4). To monitor imple-mentation, it is essential to develop cross-nationalindicators. Important approaches to improvingimplementation include promoting the exchange ofinformation (e.g. through the Clearing-house Mecha-nism), capacity building and environmental educa-tion. A further helpful step would be to remove theveto right of individual states in the above-men-tioned international convention processes.

B 2.4.3.2Adaptation and mitigation of effects

In this field, adaptation to and mitigation of effectsare not discussed explicitly, because many of themeasures set out above promote prevention, adapta-tion and mitigation at the same time. Moreover, theloss of biological diversity is irreversible: An extinctspecies or a lost ecosystem type cannot be restoredby mitigative measures. Ecosystem restoration onlyhas a basis if sufficient populations of the species orareas of the ecosystem still occur; this aside, for therestoration of broad-scale and complex ecosystemsin particular, the knowledge base will presumably belacking for a long time to come. Specific precondi-tions to restoration measures include, for instance,the strict conservation of remaining fragments of nat-ural ecosystems, the preservation of indigenousknowledge on nature and the environment and,finally, the establishment of ex-situ collections.

B 2.5Soil and land degradation

As the Council stated in detail in its 1994 annualreport, soil and land degradation is a global problem

(WBGU, 1995a). Some 15 per cent of ice-free landareas worldwide show signs of degradation, 15 percent of which is classified as severe, i.e. soils which areno longer fit for cultivation and only remediable atvery great financial expense. 1 per cent of soils havealready been irredeemably lost. The majority of soildegradation is classified as slight (38 per cent) ormoderate (46 per cent) meaning that either partialagricultural use of such soils is possible, or that suchuse is severely curtailed. Where soils are moderatelydegraded, major efforts are necessary to return theaffected land to a state in which it can be used to thefull. In slightly degraded soils, full productivity can beregained by adopting different soil management.Land showing signs of slight degradation merits spe-cial attention because this is where there is scope forreversing the symptoms of degradation. Soil and landdegradation affects the developing countries most ofall but also ranks among Europe’s more serious envi-ronmental problems (European EnvironmentalAgency, 1999). In Asia alone, 39 per cent of soils aredegraded, followed by Africa (25 per cent), SouthAmerica (12 per cent), Europe (11 per cent), NorthAmerica (8 per cent), and the Southwest Pacific (5per cent). Soil and land degradation is concentratedin the Earth’s arid regions and in this context it is alsoknown as ‘desertification’. Around 40 per cent of theEarth’s land surface is in arid zones, and 70 per centof these are affected by soil and land degradation(BMZ, 1997). Around 1,200 million people arethreatened by desertification and drought, i.e. everysixth human inhabitant of Earth. This direct risk inarid zones was the motivation for ratifying the Con-vention to Combat Desertification (Sections C 2.4and C 4.3).

A new study in Asia made it clear that substan-tially more land area is affected by degradation thanthe initial collection of data indicated (van Lyndenand Oldeman, 1997). The greatest increments inareas affected have been registered in the categoriesof slight soil degradation (288 per cent) and severe toextreme soil degradation (146 per cent). This aug-mentation in degraded areas cannot be attributedsolely to a rising trend towards degradation, but alsoreflects the availability of better and more accuratedata.

The main types of soil degradation are water andwind erosion, physical degradation through com-paction (e.g. mechanization of soil cultivation) andsealing (e.g. road building) as well as degradationthough loss of nutrients (e.g. through overexploita-tion), salination (e.g. defective irrigation), contami-nation (e.g. overapplication of fertilizer) and acidifi-cation.These types lead to longstanding, perhaps per-manent disruption to soil functions, or even theircomplete loss. The use function of soils is their most

41Soil and land degradation B 2.5

important globally relevant function, since soils are afundamental resource for agricultural production.

In addition, soils also perform significant regulat-ing functions in global biogeochemical cycles. Soilsare crucial to the water cycle on the continents, andto the energy balance of the atmosphere; they aresources and sinks for greenhouse gases, stores andtransformers of nutrients, and buffers, filters, trans-formers and stores of pollutants. Soils also have ahabitat function because they harbour a high biodi-versity of plants, fungi, animals and microorganismswhich provide essential support for regulative andproduction functions in the form of microbial con-version (WBGU, 1995a). Finally soils, as the founda-tion supporting all other conditions in a given region,also possess a cultural function.

Any impairment of these functions can have seri-ous impacts on humankind’s natural resource base.The first of these is the risk to global food securityfrom soil and land degradation. This affects thedeveloping countries in particular, since the vastmajority of their inhabitants live directly from agri-culture and the loss of this source of income will, inmost instances, immediately jeopardize livelihoods.Here, soil and land degradation overlaps with theproblem of absolute poverty. Given the currentprogress of soil and land degradation, in combinationwith dynamic population growth in the developingcountries, food security is liable to worsen due tostagnating or declining production in the foreseeablefuture (especially in Africa). Soil loss also reduces thesoils’ sink function for greenhouse gases, thus accel-erating climate change. Soil and land degradationalters water cycles because the soils’ water storagecapacity is greatly reduced. The extent to which thesoils’ regulating function in global biogeochemicalcycles is impaired by degradation remains largelyunknown. Finally, soil destruction always means afurther loss of biodiversity.

B 2.5.1Causes

The main causes of global soil and land degradationare overexploitation for agriculture and forestry(deforestation, overgrazing), together with diffusecontamination from fertilizer application and a pro-gressive sealing of soils, especially in industrializedcountries (WBGU, 1995a). The main causes of soiland land degradation bear a strong similarity to thoseof biodiversity loss. The foremost problem is struc-tural change in land use (Dust Bowl Syndrome, SahelSyndrome, Green Revolution Syndrome), especiallythe intensification of agriculture, rising food produc-tion and expansion of the area used for agriculture.

Soil degradation is largely the result of inappropriateproduction techniques, such as poverty-inducedover-use (e.g. loss of vegetation cover) or industrialfarming (e.g. loss of fertility, salination, contamina-tion).

Industrial agriculture, which is normally highlysubsidized, has especially serious consequences:Prime locations are used for monoculture farming,using high inputs of capital, energy and technology tomaximize yields (Dust Bowl Syndrome). Yet thisform of agricultural use is not restricted to industrial-ized countries; in fact it is also applied in the produc-tion of cash crops in developing countries (on theconnection between globalization and food security:BMZ, 2000). The Sahel Syndrome has quite differentunderlying causes: Here the foremost problem is theoverexploitation of natural resources to safeguardhuman survival. The degradation of natural ecosys-tems, particularly worldwide deforestation, alsomakes soils prone to devastation (OverexploitationSyndrome). Likewise, large-scale engineering pro-jects can bring about soil degradation, as demon-strated by the widespread soil salination beside theAral Sea following the expansion of farming withirrigation (Aral Sea Syndrome). Here, increaseddemand for food but also the necessity for intensivecash-crop production to generate foreign currencyearnings are key issues.

Global food security was also the background tothe spread of the ‘Green Revolution’ which was par-ticularly successful in Asia but failed in Africa.Because the Green Revolution demands precise,carefully timed and site-appropriate use of agricul-tural inputs, in many cases it turned out to be aninappropriate technology with corresponding nega-tive impacts on soils (e.g. salination, contamination,compaction, erosion; WBGU, 1998a). Being a large-scale planned strategy to modernize agriculture withimported agrarian technology on a standard model, itwas almost incapable of taking special regional fea-tures into account (Green Revolution Syndrome).

Land-intensive urbanization is another develop-ment contributing, by surface sealing, to the loss ofusable agricultural land and the ‘disappearance’ ofsoils (Urban Sprawl Syndrome). The effects that cli-mate change will have on soils cannot yet be pre-dicted. It is largely unknown how quickly they willadapt to new climatic conditions and what theaccompanying socio-economic consequences will be.In the case of progressive global warming, a large-scale thawing of the Siberian permafrost soils isexpected.The sudden availability of new agriculturalland would be counterbalanced by likely losses ofland in the Sahel and an abrupt massive release of thegreenhouse gas, methane (Section B 2.1).What is cer-tain is that soil and land degradation will have


impacts and repercussions on the climate system, e.g.through a global change in surface albedo or alteredevapotranspiration activity.


The conservation and sustainable use of soilsrequires a whole package of measures that unite con-servation and use interests in the spirit of sustainabledevelopment (Table B 2.5-1). Being an insidious

process, however, soil and land degradation must becategorized as particularly risk-laden since we cannever know the point at which it may lead or con-tribute to irreversible and critical changes in naturalenvironmental systems. Another especially seriousproblem is that people fail to perceive soil and landdegradation as a risk.

With regard to existing international agreements,which have hitherto related to conservation of soilsin arid zones (Section C 4.3), the Council has repeat-edly recommended the development of an interna-tionally cross-cutting regime for conservation and

Table B 2.5-1Soil and land degradation: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU

Primary causes

LAND USE EXPANSION

(Sahel Syndrome, Overex-ploitation Syndrome)• Absolute poverty• Threat to food security• Population growth• Common access problem

INTENSIFICATION OF AGRI-CULTURAL USE

(Dust Bowl-Syndrom,Grüne-Revolution-Syn-drom, Aralsee-Syndrom)• Threat to food security• Increased food produc-

tion • Globalization of markets

URBANIZATION

(Urban Sprawl, Contami-nated Land and WasteDumping syndromes)• Mobility• Migration• Lifestyles

CLIMATIC CHANGES

(Smokestack Syndrome)• Lifestyles • Mobility


• Overcultivation of landin marginal locations

• Conversion of naturalecosystems

• Non-location-appropriateuse

• Biogeochemical overloa-ding of ecosystems

• Market and policy failure(subsidizing overproduc-tion)

• Urban Sprawl• Land sealing, land appro-

priation• Contamination

• Thawing of permafrostsoils and availability ofnew soils

• Increase in soil and landdegradation throughchanges in water cycles


• Improve the knowledgebase

• Apply multifunctional,location-appropriate landuse strategies

• Internalize soil protec-tion into prices

• Establish security of thelaw

• Promote multifunctional,location-appropriate landuse

• Encourage market condi-tions for agricultural pro-duction which reflectenvironmental concerns

• Promote sustainableurban development

• Promote awareness ofsoil

• Improve adaptability ofagricultural systems topredictable climatic chan-ges


• Introduce a global soil convention• Establish an Intergovernmental

Panel on Land and Soil (IPLS)• Support more balanced distribu-

tion of land ownership• Reinforce development coopera-

tion

• Introduce a global soil convention• Establish an Intergovernmental

Panel on Land and Soils (IPLS)• Dismantle agricultural subsidies

and allocate released funds toreward ecological services

• Support more balanced distribu-tion of land ownership

• Apply integrated systems of fertili-zer use, irrigation and drainage,mixed cropping and crop rotation,and give incentives for organic far-ming

• Develop location-appropriate cropvarieties

• Strengthen technology and know-ledge transfer for integratedsystems

• Reduce land appropriation• Promote ‘unsealing’ of urban areas• Clean up contaminated sites

• Give integrated consideration toclimate and soil protection:improve interplay between theconventions

• Breed adaptable crop varieties

43Soil and land degradation B 2.5

sustainable use of soils (WBGU, 1995a, 2000a, 2001).Development cooperation is needed as much as ever,because environmental and developmental problemsare concentrated in the developing countries. Butaction is also needed in the industrialized countries.In particular, this applies to the need for reform ofagricultural subsidies, e.g. in the European Union(WBGU, 2001).


B 2.5.3.1Prevention

Improving the knowledge baseA major problem of international soil policy is thecurrent deficit of knowledge. Admittedly the GlobalSoil Degradation Database (GLASOD) has been inexistence since 1990, when the first scientific globalinventorization was carried out, but this work has notbeen continuously advanced and refined. Also theGLASOD data are mainly qualitative assessmentsbased on expert opinions (Oldeman, 1999). A bettermapping of the Asian region has since been com-pleted by the Assessment of the Status of Human-Induced Soil Degradation (ASSOD) project. Thanksto the availability of better and more accurate data itbecame clear that substantially more land wasaffected by soil degradation than had been noticedpreviously (van Lynden and Oldeman, 1997).To gaindetailed insight into soil degradation worldwide, theadvancement of the Global and National Soil andTerrain Digital Database Program (SOTER) shouldbe supported.The development of SOTER is a coop-erative effort of the International Soil Reference andInformation Centre (ISRIC), the FAO and UNEP.Over the next 10–15 years, SOTER is expected toresult in a global database on soils, soil use and soildegradation (Oldeman, 1999).

In the long term, however, a structure is neededwhich monitors changing soils as a follow-up toSOTER. There is also an urgent need for advice onthe role of biological sinks in the implementation ofinternational environmental regimes, on settingglobal ‘guard rails’ for soil and land degradation (‘tol-erable windows’), and on developing a basic set ofglobal indicators. Hence the Advisory Council rec-ommends the establishment of an IntergovernmentalPanel on Land and Soil (IPLS) (Section E 1.3.2).Themeasures to improve the knowledge base apply par-ticularly to the regime to combat soil and land degra-dation in arid regions (United Nations Convention toCombat Desertification, UNCCD), where the devel-

opment of a core set of global indicators and guardrails for soil and land degradation is still outstanding(Section C 4.3).

Forging a global agreement binding underinternational lawDevelopments in the follow-up processes since Riotogether with new scientific insights have reinforcedthe Council’s belief that it is right to renew its call tocreate a much-needed global soil convention(WBGU, 1995a, 2001). A series of other institutionshave since backed this recommendation (TISC, 1998;SRU, 2000).This aim seems most likely to be attainedby extending the Convention to Combat Desertifica-tion, for instance by adding new regional annexes(WBGU, 2000a, 2001). However this proposal willonly be practicable as and when the interests of thedeveloping countries are adequately taken intoaccount (Pilardeaux, 1999). Such a global soil con-vention should be built on the cornerstones of tech-nological and scientific advice, compliance controland secure financing (Chapter C).

Implementing national action programmesAmong the central instruments for implementing theaims of the Convention to Combat Desertificationare the national action programmes which have beenconceived in almost all the affected countries since1999. It is crucial that the practical implementation ofthese measures receives financial and technical sup-port from the industrialized nations.

B 2.5.3.2Adaptation and mitigation of effects

Local adaptation and diversification ofnational agricultural development policiesIn advancing the development of land-use systemsthe defining principle is never to repeat the mistakesof the past, especially those of the Green Revolution(WBGU, 1998a). Regional adaptation of systems iscrucial, in which account should be taken of indige-nous knowledge, and mixed cropping systems shouldbe given preference over monocultures. By using anintegrated system of fertilizer application, irrigationand drainage with multiple and rotational croppingsystems, lasting improvements can be made to soilquality and food security can be enhanced. Toaddress overexploitation due to poverty, the bestrecipe for improving the situation remains a combi-nation of creating alternative income-generatingpossibilities and introducing measures for landrestoration, together with a package of socio-politicalmeasures. Certainly the principle of diversity of use is


not only more resilient against crisis but also lessdetrimental to soils.

Ensuring the place of climate change inagricultural researchTo make agricultural systems more adaptable to theexpected climatic changes, the development of suit-ably adaptable crop varieties by the internationalagricultural research community is recommended.Bearing in mind that, although the latest modelledpredictions anticipate higher global rainfall overallas a result of global warming, lower rainfall is to beexpected in arid and semi-arid regions (WBGU,1998a), further research on the development ofdrought- and salt-resistant crops is urgently required.

Little prospect of remediation andmitigation of effectsCompletely degraded soil is irreplaceable. Moder-ately and severely degraded soils can only be reme-diated with great financial and technological com-mitment. Already about 16 per cent of soils world-wide must be viewed as more or less beyond redemp-tion. All that mitigation measures can achieve is tocushion the socio-economic impacts for thosedirectly affected and to staunch overspill of the prob-lem into neighbouring regions. This is why theemphasis should be placed primarily on preventiveand adaptive measures.

B 2.6Freshwater scarcity and pollution

The freshwater crisis has become more acute inrecent years and regional disparities in freshwatersupply have become greater (WBGU, 1998a; Gleick,1998). Today around 1,200 million people live with-out access to clean drinking water, especially indeveloping countries (Cosgrove and Rijsberman,2000). Fifty countries on Earth are already domi-nated by major water scarcity and this might be anaggravating factor in future conflicts over water.

Aside from scarcity, the second central feature ofthe water crisis is pollution. Nutritive salts and cont-aminants from agriculture and industry impair theutility of inland water bodies and groundwater.Worldwide only around 5 per cent of dischargedwastewater undergoes any kind of treatment, andeven in the OECD nations one-third of wastewater isnot treated (WBGU, 1998a).The vast majority of theburgeoning megacities in developing countries haveno wastewater treatment facilities, a fact which alsorepresents a rising burden on the world’s oceans(Section B 2.3). To date, where efforts to restore

inland water bodies have succeeded, this has hap-pened almost exclusively in industrialized countries.

Freshwater is the most important limiting factoron food production, with agriculture already account-ing for 70 per cent of global water consumption. Tosafeguard or increase water yield, over 40,000 damsare operated worldwide. Nevertheless, in manyregions on Earth crop failures are already occurringdue to inadequate irrigation facilities or wrongly con-structed irrigation (WBGU, 1998a; Cosgrove andRijsberman, 2000).

Risks to health are also on the increase: Some3,300 million people lack a clean water supply forsanitation. Over 50 per cent of the world population,particularly in emerging economies and developingcountries, are affected by water-borne diseases.Every year 3.4 million people die as a result of impu-rities and germs in their drinking water (WHO,1999).

The spread and intensification of agriculture islinked to the destruction of aquatic ecosystems (wet-lands, lakes, watercourses) which frequently harboura particularly high degree of biological diversity. InGreat Britain and The Netherlands 60 per cent ofwetland areas have already been lost, and the figurein California is as high as 90 per cent (Finlyason andMoser, 1991; Dahl, 1990). Water pollution andgroundwater contamination are of special ecologicalconcern because of major delay effects, and becauseof their persistency. Many pollutants can accumulateover long periods in aquatic systems before revealingtheir effects, sometimes only when they combine withother substances. Altogether, the extent and signifi-cance of the present freshwater problem may havesown the seed of a global social and economic crisis(WBGU, 1998a).

B 2.6.1Causes

A key reason for the freshwater crisis in numerousregions is the extremely unequal distribution offreshwater on Earth due to climatic and biogeophys-ical factors. Water yield is very sensitive to the influ-ence of climatic changes, particularly in marginal cli-matic locations (e.g. in the Sahel zone) so that thefreshwater crisis has every potential to become moreacute (Section B 2.1).

Freshwater plays such a central role in society thatclose to every syndrome of global change contributescausally to the water crisis (Table B 2.6-1). Withregard to land use, the Dust Bowl, Green Revolutionand Aral Sea syndromes are the most significant. Butthe Favela and Urban Sprawl syndromes centring oncities, and their interplay with the Waste Dumping

45Freshwater scarcity and pollution B 2.6

and Contaminated Land syndromes, play an equallycritical role in the complex web of causality of thefreshwater crisis (WBGU, 1998a).

Structural change in agriculture is a substantialdriving force of water scarcity. The rise in farmingwith irrigation – growing produce for export to earnforeign currencies (cash crops) or basic foodstuffs inresponse to population growth – accounts for a con-siderable proportion of the worldwide rise in waterconsumption. The farming of location-inappropriatecrops can result in an arid country ‘exporting’ itsscarce water in the agricultural produce, thus under-mining local water supply (e.g. citrus fruit productionin Israel; Falkenmark and Wildstrand, 1992).Increased meat consumption is responsible for a fur-ther rise in the water requirements for food produc-tion. In comparison to purely vegetable-based foods,a diet which contains only 20 per cent meat leads to adoubling of agricultural water requirements (Klohnand Appelgren, 1998). Large-scale engineering pro-jects (e.g. dams; Aral Sea Syndrome) are intended tohelp to cover the increased demand for water, but arefrequently associated with social rifts (e.g. throughresettlement programmes) and create other ecologi-cal problems (McCully, 1996;WCD, 1999).The inten-sification of farming leads to nitrogen loading ofgroundwater and surface water, reducing its suitabil-ity as drinking water due to excessive nitrate concen-trations. Added to this are the biocides which may ormay not accumulate in the food chain.

At the same time, lifestyle shifts in the wake ofurbanization and industrialization are leading toincreased consumption and pollution of freshwater.As a consequence of urbanization, yields of usablewater are falling due to surface sealing. Rising aspi-rations and the spread of Western consumption pat-terns and lifestyles are driving forward structuraltransformation in industry and the higher consump-tion of energy and raw materials also gives rise to agreater demand for water (e.g. Asian Tigers Syn-drome). Nutrient and pollutant inputs from insuffi-ciently purified domestic and industrial effluentslead to rapid eutrophication and pollutant accumula-tion in the aquatic environment (especially as a resultof the Favela Syndrome). The subsidization or evenfree provision of freshwater can contribute to care-less and wasteful water management, yet at the sametime it is indispensable to ensure the basic supplyneeded by the lowest-income groups. Poor efficiencyof the water supply system and of water use restrictsthe availability of the scarce resource of freshwater.In many cities, leaking pipes and illegal tapping ofwater supplies cause losses of 20–50 per cent (Zehn-der et al., 1997).


When only the freshwater problems in Central andWestern Europe and North America are considered,the situation is far from constituting a global envi-ronmental problem. Yet in many other regions onEarth there is a considerable need for action inresponse to water scarcity and pollution. Overall theanalysis shows that the freshwater crisis that ismounting worldwide will become more acute infuture. Therefore an immediate political response isneeded, to lower the risks and achieve a reversal ofthe trend.

The guiding vision for freshwater managementdeveloped by the Council in its 1997 annual reportpoints the way: Maximizing efficiency while takinginto consideration the imperatives of equity and sus-tainability. Based on this vision the Council hasdeveloped approaches for solving the water crisis inspecific policy areas (WBGU, 1998a).

Implementing the guiding vision and the guard-rail approach necessitates a global strategy, the essen-tial elements of which are outlined here. Each partic-ular cause and associated trend is listed in Table B2.6-1 along with detailed proposals for the institu-tional action required. Priority should be given toprevention.


B 2.6.3.1Prevention

The right to waterThe German federal government should take anactive role in the worldwide enforcement of a right towater. In this process, the primary concern is toensure that the technical preconditions are met forfree access to water supplies in all countries – in com-pliance with the minimum standards for water qual-ity set out by the World Health Organization(WHO). A (regionally determined) minimum percapita supply of water must be guaranteed across theboard for the lowest-income social groups in everycountry. This should take place by providing ‘waterassistance’ payments (analogous to housing assis-tance in Germany) or using an appropriate tariffstructure, i.e. charging the quantity of water estab-lished as the minimum individual consumption atlow-cost tariffs.


Table B 2.6-1Freshwater scarcity and pollution: Causes, need for action and necessary institutional arrangements.Source: WBGU

Primary causes


AND EXPANSION

(Green Revolution, DustBowl, Sahel and Aral Seasyndromes)• Increased food produc-

tion• Production of cash crops• Exploitation of marginal

land• Market and policy failure

(subsidization)• International debt


INDUSTRY

(Green Revolution,Katanga, Waste Dumpingand Asian Tigers syndro-mes)• Rising aspirations, lifesty-

les• Industrialization• Market and policy failure• Globalization of markets

URBANIZATION AND MOBI-LITY

(Favela, Urban Sprawl andMass Tourism syndromes)• Rising aspirations, lifesty-

les• Population growth• Growth in socio-econo-

mic disparities, poverty• Unsustainable forms of

settlement• Sprawl• Increase in tourism• Increase in mobility


• Increased water con-sumption and change inlocal water balance

• Expansion of irrigation,large-scale engineeringprojects

• Pollution of groundwaterand surface water withnutrients and biocides

• Failure of water prices toreflect scarcity of waterresources

• Contamination of waterresources

• Lowering of the ground-water table

• Contamination of surfacewaters and groundwaterwith nutrients and pol-lutants


• Promote sustainable,location-appropriateforms of land use

• Only carry out large-scale projects whichremain within environ-mental and social guardrails

• Improve the efficiency ofirrigation technology

• Transfer water-intensiveproduction to countrieswith an adequate wateravailability

• Improve efficiency of use• Ensure minimum water

quality• Organize water manage-

ment on transparent andparticipatory principles

• Avoid interventionswhich distort the market

• Secure basic supply ofdrinking water

• Introduce transparentand participatory watermanagement in RiverBasin Districts


• Promote organic agriculture andlabelling systems

• Take greater account of water-rela-ted standards in development pro-jects (e.g. World Bank)

• Promote breeding of salt- anddrought-resistant crop varieties,and deploy new technologies forwater-saving land use

• Promote technology and know-ledge transfer relating to effectiveand efficient (including traditional)irrigation systems

• Enforce regulations to reduce orban utilization of agrochemicals

• Institutionalize water markets• Develop, apply and transfer appro-

priate water supply technologies• Promote and implement pollution

control technology for residentialand industrial wastewater

• Agree minimum internationalstandards for freshwater quality(e.g. drinking water, irrigation)

• Dismantle subsidies for water sup-ply and wastewater management

• Strengthen environmental educa-tion on the water problematique

• Extend research and developmentprojects on seawater desalination

• Guarantee the ‘human right towater’

• Introduce World Water Charterand World Water Fund

• Support poor groups in societyfinancially to safeguard their drin-king water supply

• Establish early warning of epide-mics (e.g. networking of health aut-horities)

• Apply River Basin Management• For cross-border waters, deploy

transnational commissions and dis-pute settlement mechanisms

• Improve global monitoring of fres-hwater resources and ecosystems

• Promote clean-up of polluted sur-face waters and groundwater

47Freshwater scarcity and pollution B 2.6

World Water Charter and Global ActionProgrammeIn its 1997 annual report, the Council recommendedthe initiation of a ‘World Water Charter’ which allgovernments, municipalities, international organiza-tions and non-governmental organizations wouldhave the option of signing (WBGU, 1998a). Thenature of this agreement is a global code of conduct,politically committing all the players to overcomingthe freshwater crisis. Building on this, a ‘Global Planof Action’ should be developed to flesh out andimplement the agreed principles. The recommenda-tions of the 2nd World Water Forum are along thesame lines.

Global Water FundAll opportunities for reducing the debt-servicingburden on developing countries threatened by watercrisis should be exploited, not neglecting to examinepossibilities for links with water policy programmes.The establishment of a Global Water Fund replen-ished via robust international financing mechanisms(e.g. by levying a World Water Penny) should also beexplored.

Basic needs and water marketsReliable and efficiently operated systems of watersupply and disposal must be established; on the onehand, these systems should set water prices whichreflect the scarcity of water resources while, on theother hand, safeguarding the right to sufficient waterto meet basic needs and fulfilling minimum environ-mental standards. The best approach is the introduc-tion of water markets based on competition, and ofproperty rights to water supply and treatment sys-tems (WBGU, 1998a). Decentralized supply struc-tures and arrangements should be given preferencesince they are generally more efficient, easier forthose concerned to comprehend and better adaptedto particular regional characteristics than rigid cen-tral solutions. However, governmental competencefor putting the framework conditions in place andoverseeing progress must be assured. The coordina-tion of water resources should be organized to coin-cide with the relevant catchment areas or riverbasins.The concept of integrated river basin manage-ment forms a suitable framework for this process.

Development cooperationGovernments affected or threatened by water crisismust receive better support. Specific needs centre onthe modernization of existing irrigation systems inagriculture, the rehabilitation and extension of watersupply networks and the establishment or continueddevelopment of drinking water supply, wastewaterdisposal and recycling systems. It is important to

transfer technology and expertise to guarantee socio-cultural and ecological water standards, especially forregions affected by water crisis and for the protectionof world natural heritage; methods should place spe-cial emphasis on water conservation, environmen-tally and culturally sound practices, and appropriate-ness to the particular location.

Monitoring and early warningThere is a lack of monitoring capacity for controllingwater quality in freshwater ecosystems. Existingmonitoring systems should be examined for suitabil-ity and applicability in developing countries andemerging economies, and their installation should bepromoted with organizational support and capacitybuilding. Furthermore a European and global net-work is required which integrates national healthauthorities and international forums such as the Cen-ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) andthe WHO, in order to build up an international earlywarning system for epidemic risks and for bettermanagement of epidemics.

Use and protection of cross-border watersIn the case of cross-border bodies of water, transna-tional agreements can be useful with permanentcommissions responsible for the management offreshwater issues throughout the catchment area.The International Joint Commission in the borderwaters regime between the USA and Canada mayserve as one example (Section C 4.2).

Avoiding conflictMany international conflicts are rooted in unequaluse of water resources by upstream and downstreamriparians of rivers. Pilot projects on balanced use ofcross-border rivers should be promoted, interna-tional mediators should be provided for settling suchconflicts, and compliance with equity principlesshould be included as a criteria for developmentcooperation.

Education measuresThe participation of all actors in water managementdecisions should be accompanied by education andtraining measures. These education measures shouldcommunicate the connections between water, healthand the environment.Traditions, ways of life, the roleexpectations of the people concerned and, mostimportantly, their potential for self-help must be inte-grated into programmes tackling local water prob-lems.


B 2.6.3.2Adaptation

Water conservationAn effective reduction of water consumption canonly be attained by exploiting all potential savings tothe full (irrigation technology, wastewater and rain-water use, farming of location-appropriate crops,water recycling, public education). Techniques andprocedures for recycling residential or industrialwastewater and for multiple use of non-potablewater and rainwater should be improved and sup-ported by means of appropriate research, pilot pro-jects and knowledge and technology transfer.

Irrigated farmingIn agriculture, effective traditional irrigation tech-niques should be promoted (e.g. subak irrigation inBali). The deployment of new technologies and thefarming of salt-tolerant crops or those adapted towater scarcity can help to save water. However therisks of biotechnological procedures should be bornein mind (WBGU, 1998a).Water-intensive productionin agriculture and industry should be shifted wherepossible to countries with sufficient water availabil-ity, something that could be achieved by economicincentive systems and cost-covering water prices, forexample. The construction of major hydraulic engi-neering projects (e.g. large dams) should only begiven financial support after careful consideration ofthe social and ecological consequences.


The rehabilitation of degraded freshwater resourcesis considerably more expensive and less effectivethan appropriate preventive measures. Nevertheless,in individual cases it will have to be supported withnational or multilateral financing. A further optionfor mitigation of effects is seawater desalination, butbecause of the extremely high energy consumptioninvolved, at present this can only be a feasible routein exceptional cases and in regions with sufficientrenewable primary energy sources.

B 2.7Regime-relevant attributes of globalenvironmental problems

The cause-and-effect structures of global environ-mental problems have very different attributes –these are of major importance to the institutionaldesign of environmental policy. Thus, for instance,

once the scientific linkages are known, a monocausalproblem can be solved at its root by targeted techni-cal modifications to the political or economic system,whereas quite a different approach is required for amulticausal problem in which the cause-and-effectrelationships are particularly complex.

There are many general attributes that are of greatsignificance in the consideration of all global envi-ronmental problems, e.g. the major differencesbetween North and South in terms of economic per-formance and biogeophysical makeup. Similarly, allenvironmental problems display, to differing degrees,some spatial segregation between problem-generat-ing parties and damaged parties. This is best illus-trated by climate change, which can be expected toaffect small island states most although these havecontributed least to its causation. However, environ-mental problems with more regional or local modesof manifestation usually also have a global compo-nent of causation, for instance through global eco-nomic conditions (world trade order). Socio-eco-nomic disparities between those generating environ-mental problems and those affected by them are afurther important basic characteristic in which globalenvironmental problems differ, as are disparities infinancial and technological capabilities for coping,adaptation and prevention. These general factorsplay an important role in the design of regimes fordealing with such problems.

There are several further attributes that stem fromproblem-specific and societal constellations and arefundamental to the design of solutions.The followingpresentation concentrates on the specific attributeswhich especially distinguish environmental problemsfrom one another, and to which regimes geared todealing with these problems must give particularattention. The discussion of important attributes andassociated key issues makes no claim to beingexhaustive (Table B 2.7-1; WBGU, 2000a).• Causality: Is the environmental problem essen-

tially attributable to a clearly definable primarycause? Are simple technical solutions to this con-ceivable? Depletion of the stratospheric ozonelayer, for instance, is caused above all by anthro-pogenic CFC emissions, for which harmless substi-tutes are already available.The causes of biodiver-sity loss are so diverse and dependent upon suchdisparate factors that a simple technical fix is outof the question; instead, regionally appropriatestrategies need to be found.The easier it is to iden-tify and gain an overview of causal patterns, theeasier it is to operate a global regime successfully.

• System complexity: How complex is the causalweb of the system? Must nonlinearities or suddensystem swings be feared – perhaps even at theglobal level? The climate system, for instance, is

49Regime-relevant attributes B 2.7Ta

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characterized by highly complex and nonlinearcause-and-effect mechanisms that are not yetunderstood satisfactorily and are of a fundamen-tally global nature.There is a risk of sudden systemswings with wide-ranging consequences, forinstance in the form of shifts of ocean currents(Section B 2.1). Complex consequences cannot bebroken down into impact chains subject to indi-vidual influence, which might then be tackledindependently from each other. Such a problemmust be solved in its entirety – this complicatesregime negotiation and adaptation. Addressingnonlinear systems, which can also behave in acounterintuitive manner, demands particulareffort on the part of the scientific community tocommunicate the situation and requires carefulmonitoring in order to recognize surprising devel-opments as soon as possible. Changes in ‘guardrail’ assessments need to be transposed rapidlyinto corresponding regulations. This means thatregimes must be able to respond flexibly, forinstance by adopting supplementary protocols.

• Uncertainty: How good is the knowledge on theenvironmental problem? Are the scientific issueslargely resolved? Are there models, indicators,complete data sets? Here, too, environmentalproblems differ greatly. For the freshwater prob-lem, interconnections at the regional level arefairly well understood (gaps persist rather at thelevel of global synopsis), while the biodiversityregime will presumably have to cope with funda-mental gaps in knowledge for a long time to come.It is easier for political and legal systems to controla well known problem for which there are mea-surable indicators or even reliable models. Conse-quently, where the knowledge base is inadequate,there is a particular need to promote internation-ally coordinated research charged with two tasks:To elaborate basic knowledge and to keep track ofthe current state of affairs by means of indicator,monitoring and early warning systems. Regimesneed to be adaptable and must be able to respondflexibly to changed understandings or situations(Munn et al., 2000).

• Common access: Can access to the desiredresource be restricted? How simple is it to allocateand enforce property rights? Access to the atmos-phere for the purpose of emitting greenhousegases or CFCs is available to everyone worldwide.Similarly, the high seas have open access, be it foruse as a sink for pollutants or as a source of bio-logical resources. Land, in contrast, can be madesubject to property titles. Personal interests andindividual responsibility in resource managementare linked closely to the security of propertyrights. Global common-access resources often suf-

fer overexploitation because individual responsi-bility scarcely enters into the equation. Conse-quently, overarching regulations are especiallyimportant here. User charges are a particularlysuitable tool for conserving such resources (Sec-tion E 3.2.3).

• Spatial disparity: Does the cause-and-effect pat-tern embrace the entire globe, or is the environ-mental problem essentially an accumulation oflocal or regional problems? In some instances, thegenerating and the affected parties can quite wellbe located on different continents (climatechange, stratospheric ozone depletion). In suchcases global agreements are indispensable, as onlyconcerted action worldwide has the potential toremedy the problem. In the case of predominantlylocal and regional issues, such as the freshwaterproblem, generating and affected parties are usu-ally connected at the regional level (here: catch-ment areas). Global agreements are then lessessential, but can nonetheless be important as amedium for international financial and technolog-ical transfers. Environmental problems in whichregional impacts accumulate to global effectsdemand a mix of global regulations and regionalor local solutions (e.g. soils, biodiversity).

• Temporal disparity, delay: How much time elapsesbetween causation and occurrence of harmfulenvironmental effects? Do major time lags createa false sense of security? Discharging untreatedwastewater to a river very soon has measurableeffects. Other environmental problems are oftencharacterized by a substantial time lag betweencause and effect. The global climate system, forinstance, has considerable inertia and will respondonly slowly to reduced anthropogenic emissions,just as it responds slowly to rising emissions. Suchdelay effects can only be recognized if knowledgeof the system is good. They are of particularimportance to regime formation, as in some cir-cumstances costly preventive strategies must beenforced before any perceptible and communica-ble damage has occurred. Measures that areunpopular but necessary from a scientific perspec-tive therefore require special ‘marketing’ tools bywhich to communicate the precautionary action.

• Irreversibility, persistency: Are the effects of theenvironmental problem reversible? What are thetime scales? If we assume that the ‘human mea-sure’ of manageable time scales is in the order ofmillennia, then the six major environmental prob-lems can be classified roughly into two equallylarge groups: Climate change, the loss of biologicaldiversity and many forms of soil and land degra-dation are irreversible, because soil formationrates and species formation processes, for

51Regime-relevant attributes B 2.7

instance, are slower by several orders of magni-tude than the present rates of loss. In contrast, ifsuitable measures are taken, the freshwater prob-lem, stratospheric ozone depletion and the oceanproblem (with some exceptions, e.g. radioactivewastes) can in principle be resolved on time scalesranging from a few decades to a few centuries. Par-ticular caution must of course be exercised whendealing with irreversible changes to the globalecosystem (WBGU, 1998a). These call for envi-ronmental regimes that concentrate above allupon preventing and avoiding such occurrences.

Many of these attributes underscore the key role ofresearch for policy formulation. A general implica-tion, therefore, is a fundamental need for improvedenvironmental research in order to reduce uncertain-ties concerning causes, system mechanisms andeffects. But improving knowledge alone is notenough; particular efforts also need to be made tocommunicate findings at the science/policy and sci-ence/public interfaces. Scientific policy advice andscientifically based reporting in the media are there-fore essential tools that must be refined and used.

Linkages among global environmental problemsB 3

Global environmental problems do not develop inisolation from each other. There are many interac-tions, which only seldom exert a dampening influenceand much more frequently have an amplifying effect.Linkages are of two types:• Environmental problems can have common

causes.• Environmental problems can influence each other

reciprocally (interfaces).It is not always possible to distinguish interfaces andcommon causes unequivocally. The distinction istherefore made pragmatically. Common causes rep-resent indirect linkages between environmentalproblems, while interfaces represent direct relation-ships (effects). The two types of linkage require dif-ferent institutional approaches.

B 3.1Common causes

The causal analysis conducted in Section B 2 illus-trates that many of the environmental problems havecommon causes.Tables B 2.1-1 to B 2.7-1 list the maincausal syndromes for each environmental problem.The present section summarizes and supplementsthese. Table B 3.1-1 provides an overview of whichsyndromes participate causally in the emergence ofthe six global environmental problems.

The number of causally implicated syndromes isan indication of the complexity of the global envi-ronmental problem. Moreover, the overview alsoprovides an indication of whether efforts to remedyindividual syndromes may have positive effects uponseveral environmental problems.

The same societal drivers can play a pivotal rolefor different syndromes and environmental prob-lems. The following discussion therefore highlightswhich of these drivers (the ‘Primary causes’ columnin the tables for the individual environmental prob-lems in Section B 2) have particular relevance formany of the environmental problems. There arethree key themes, each relating to different levels ofthe problems:

• Common access:A main problem in the utilizationof global environmental resources is their overuseand overloading, as reflected in, for instance, theextinction of certain species, the exhaustion ofresources and damage to natural ecosystems. Freeaccess for all often leads to resource overuse andthus to environmental damage, because each userpursues his or her individual aspirations but noone can be held directly responsible for transgres-sions of limits in use (Frey and Bohnet, 1996;McCay and Jentoft, 1996; Section E 3.2.3). If peo-ple can make use of resources that are withoutcost to them or if such use is at least possible with-out major effort, then this leads to the often cited‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968). A possi-ble institutional approach is to introduce pay-ments for the use of common property resources(Section E 3.2.3).

• Unsustainable land use: Almost all syndromes ofglobal change and many of the global environ-mental problems have links to land-use issues.Unsustainable land use is one of the prime phe-nomena of global change. Environmental prob-lems resulting from land-use changes occur inalmost all countries. In Africa, Asia and SouthAmerica, deforestation and the overuse and over-grazing of soils, in conjunction with agriculturalactivities, are the main causes of human-inducedsoil degradation (Section B 2.5; WBGU, 1995a).Moreover, demand for new utilizable land is risingsteadily, with the associated conversion of naturalecosystems (WBGU, 2001).This process generatesan array of amplifying impacts upon other envi-ronmental problems (e.g. climate change; SectionB 3.2). Biodiversity loss, climate change and themodification of global biogeochemical cycles areall influenced crucially by land use. The problemcorrelates with the growing global population andgrowing wealth (through, among other factors,changes in dietary habits). A particularly impor-tant driver of unsustainable land use in the devel-oping world is poverty, which, for lack of alterna-tives, forces people to overexploit marginal land tosecure their survival.

53Interplay among global environmental problems B 3.2

• Lifestyles: Industrial lifestyles, the spread of west-ern patterns of consumption, mobility and urban-ization also have a role in the causation of manysyndromes and environmental problems. Industri-alization and increasing urbanization, in particu-lar, are characterized by inefficient and risingenergy and resource consumption.They are linkedinseparably with lifestyles and lifestyle changes, sothat today efficiency gains in resource utilizationare overcompensated by the absolute growth ofper-capita consumption in industrialized countriesand population in developing countries. Consider-ing that today about 2500 million people have noelectricity and more than half of the world’s popu-lation lives in poverty, aspirations to catch up onamenities will surely be enormous. This makes theforecast that worldwide energy and materials con-sumption will at least double by the middle of the21st century appear highly probable. It is crucial tomeet the challenge of conserving global environ-mental resources while at the same time providingsufficient energy as a precondition to economicgrowth and quality of life. This can only beachieved through forms of sustainable growththat, over the long term, rely to a much greaterdegree on renewable sources of energy and uponresource recycling.

Global environmental policy needs to tackle theseoverarching themes, as this can generate broad-based

effects for sustainable development. Section B 3.3discusses the consequences for the institutionaldesign of global environmental policy.

B 3.2Interplay among global environmental problems

B 3.2.1Overview

The analysis of environmental problems has alreadyshown that in many cases the various problems influ-ence each other strongly.This interplay adds a furtherlevel of complexity to the picture of global change,for the various problems cannot be examined orsolved independently of each other. However, not allenvironmental problems are interconnected, and theimport of such coupling varies.Table B 3.2-1 gives anoverview of reciprocal effects. Many are insuffi-ciently understood, so that a number of the tableentries are still of a hypothetical nature; the appraisalof the strength of effects is also subject to majoruncertainties. Unfortunately, conventional sectoralor disciplinary approaches to global environmentalproblems result in researchers concentrating on theproblems and their causes as such, while attaching

Climate Stratospheric Oceans Biodiversity Soil Freshwaterchange ozone at risk loss and degradation scarcity and

depletion deforestation pollution

Sahel S.

Overexploitation S.

Rural Exodus S.

Dust Bowl S.

Katanga S.

Mass Tourism S.

Scorched Earth S.

Aral Sea S.

Green Revolution S.

Asian Tigers S.

Favela S.

Urban Sprawl S.

Major Accident S.

Smokestack S.

Waste Dumping S.

Contaminated Land S.

Table B 3.1-1Causation of global environmental problems by syndromes. means that the syndrome plays a leading role in the causationof the environmental problem; indicates a less marked influence.Source: WBGU, 1997, modified


too little importance to possible linkages with otherenvironmental problems.

Most connections have an amplifying effect,meaning that the manifestation of one environmen-tal problem exacerbates the causes or effects ofanother. The sole exception is stratospheric ozonedepletion, which may possibly have a dampeningeffect upon climate change (Section B 3.2.2.3). FigureB 3.2-1 illustrates schematically the interplay amongthe environmental problems and the associatedglobal environmental agreements.

In a further step, the synergistic effects of jointlyoccurring environmental problems should lead tonew points of departure for the institutional design ofthe environmental regimes in question. For example,soil degradation, freshwater scarcity and pollutionand biodiversity loss and deforestation are coupledvery tightly at the regional level. These interactions

are thus best encompassed and managed by an inte-grative regional strategy (bioregional management,integrated catchment area management; WBGU,1998a, 2001).

Other problems and their interfaces relate directlyto global biogeophysical system control functions,such as the interplay between climate change, soildegradation and biodiversity loss and deforestation.This calls for a global institutional approach treatingthese interactions in an integrative manner, forinstance by means of intensified collaborationamong the existing convention processes or throughnew overarching institutional structures (SectionF 2).

The following sections examine in more detailthree examples of interplay and their institutionalconsequences.

Table B 3.2-1Interactions among global environmental problems. The effects exercised by the problems are given in the respective columnsheaded by them. Strong interactions are indicated by bold type.Source: WBGU

Effect of

upon

Climate change

Stratosphericozone depletion

Oceans at risk

Biodiversityloss anddeforestation

Soildegradation

Freshwaterscarcity andpollution

Climate change

Possiblepromotion ofpolarstratosphericclouds (PSCs)

Shifting biomeboundaries,coral bleaching

Desertification,consequences ofprecipitationchanges

Changingprecipitationpatterns,desertification


Possibledampening ofthe greenhouseeffect

Reducedprimaryproduction dueto elevated UVirradiation

Radiationdamage toorganisms

Oceans at risk

Species lossthrough over-exploitation andecosystemconversion

Biodiversityloss anddeforestation

Loss of CO2sink function

Loss ofecosystemfunctions

Increasederosion throughloss ofvegetationcover

Changed localwater balancethroughdeforestation

Soildegradation

Loss of CO2

sink function,albedo changes

(indirectlythroughpollutantloading ofrivers)

Ecosystemconversion anddegradation

Changed localwater balance,pollutant inputs

Freshwaterscarcity andpollution

Pollution ofcoastal regions

Ecosystemconversion anddegradation,species loss

Salination


B 3.2.2Examples of interplay

B 3.2.2.1Climate change and biodiversity loss anddeforestation

Effects of climate change upon biodiversityloss and deforestationHumankind not only influences worldwide ecosys-tems through direct interventions (e.g. ecosystemconversion and fragmentation; Section B 2.4). Inaddition there are – besides other important interac-tions – strong indirect effects of climate change uponthe loss of biological diversity (discussed in detail inWBGU, 2001).

The climatic effects relevant to agriculture andforestry, in particular, have been identified fairly reli-ably by field experiments and models (McGuire etal., 1995; Peterson et al., 1999). These have includedstudies of the changes in plant growth brought aboutby elevated CO2 concentrations, which forecast anexacerbation of the global imbalance in food supply(Hörmann and Chmielewski, 1998). There are find-ings concerning reactions to climate change in indi-vidual natural ecosystems and plant species in certainregions (Markham, 1998). However, due to the lackof reliable forecasts of the regional manifestations ofglobal warming, the consequences for the ecosystemsof the world can not yet be anticipated in detail(Graßl, 1999; WBGU, 2001). Furthermore, there hasnot been conclusive study of whether the inability ofsome species to move fast enough from one habitat

to another will lead to biological diversity declining(IPCC, 1996b).

As concerns forests, it is considered probable thatforest boundaries will shift polewards (Neilson andDrapek, 1998). In this process the expansion of thenorthern forest boundary in the northern hemi-sphere will probably be so slow that it will not com-pensate for the losses at the southern boundary. Cli-mate change will therefore probably affect borealforests more strongly in structure and function thane.g. tropical forests (Beerling, 1999).

The mass occurrence of coral bleaching in recentyears can be attributed to elevated sea temperatures,which suggests a link to climatic changes (Hoegh-Guldberg, 1999; CBD, 2000). Over the longer term,the anticipated sea-level rise (by up to 1m over thenext 100 years; IPCC, 1995) can be expected to posea further threat to coral reefs.

Sala et al. (2000) draw the conclusion that infuture climate change will be second only to land-usechanges as the most important worldwide determi-nant of biodiversity loss. This applies particularly forecosystems which are already exposed to climaticextremes.

Effects of biodiversity loss anddeforestation upon climate changeThe interplay between the biosphere and the climatesystem within the Earth System is so intensive thatfor an impact analysis a separate consideration insubsystems would only deliver unsatisfactory results(WBGU, 2001). Broad-scale biospheric changes,notably of vegetation structures, will thereforealways entail changes in the climate system.Humankind is currently restructuring the biosphere

UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol

UNCLOS, Marpol, etc.

CBD, UNFF, etc.UNCCD

Montreal Protocol

No global agreements

Biodiverlity lossand deforestationSoil degradation


Climate change

Freshwater scarcityand pollution

Oceans at risk

?

?

Couplingimportant for global regulating functions

Tightcoupling within bioregions

Figure B 3.2-1 Interplay among the globalenvironmental problems.Arrowheads indicateamplifying effects, the circleindicates a dampeningeffect. Bold arrows and thebold circle indicate strongeffects, outline arrows standfor weaker effects. The greyshaded fields state relevantglobal negotiating processes.Source: WBGU


through land-use changes. Clearing and slash-and-burn of primary and secondary forests, in conjunctionwith humus-depleting land-use techniques, areincreasing the biogenic sources of greenhouse gasesand reducing the sinks. One-quarter of all anthro-pogenic greenhouse gas emissions stem from land-use change, with corresponding consequences for theclimate system (WBGU, 1998b; Section B 2.1). Dueto the non-linear dynamics of the coupled systemsinvolved, sudden swings in system behaviour may betriggered. Earth System analysis is not yet able toreproduce these complex interrelations in a way per-mitting precise forecasts of all effects. However, whatis definitely emerging is that not all regions have thesame importance for these mechanisms. In its 1999annual report, the Council carried out a biogeo-graphical criticality analysis and identified a numberof key regions which have particular functionalimportance within the Earth System (WBGU, 2001).

ConsequencesIn view of these scientific uncertainties, in the opin-ion of the Council the inclusion of all interactionswithin a comprehensive, interconnected explanationof global climate-biosphere interactions remains anunaccomplished task for the scientific community(WBGU, 1997).

Scientific policy advice on biodiversity within aglobal setting still has deficits (Section F 1). The newscientific advisory body proposed by the Council –the Intergovernmental Panel on Biological Diversity,IPBD – would need to cooperate closely with itscounterpart in the climate sector – the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC – in order todo justice to this important interplay.

As yet, the international policy negotiationswithin the context of the Biodiversity Conventionand Climate Convention processes have also giventoo little attention to the impacts of climate changeupon the biosphere, and to climate-biosphere cou-pling within the Earth System. A further reason call-ing for closer networking and cooperation betweenthe two convention processes is that measures takenwithin the context of the climate process can havefar-reaching consequences for biological diversity.Both synergisms and conflicts are conceivable, whichmakes close consultation between the two processesnecessary. Particular attention needs to be given topossible side effects upon biodiversity when design-ing the details of the Kyoto Protocol and includingbiological sources and sinks in emissions reductioncommitments. In particular, care needs to be takenthat the crediting of sinks in developing countries, forinstance through afforestation projects, does not leadto increased conversion of natural ecosystems andthus to accelerated loss of biological diversity. The

Council has made proposals for preventing thesenegative effects in a previous special report on thisissue (WBGU, 1998b).

B 3.2.2.2Climate change and soil degradation

Effects of climate change upon soildegradationDoes climate change also play a role in soil degrada-tion, in addition to the definite human impact and theinfluence of socio-economic settings? At present, theinfluence of climate change is scarcely comparable tothat of direct human activities as a generator of soildegradation. However, the increased frequency ofdrought does lead to greater susceptibility of soils todegradation; arid areas, in particular, are extremelyvulnerable (IPCC, 1996a, b). On the other hand,short-term fluctuations in precipitation cannot betaken as an indicator of the influence of climatechange upon desertification, for these are typical ofsemi-arid and arid regions. Nonetheless, we can cur-rently assume with some certainty that the rise inmean global temperature by 1.5–4.5°C will lead to arise in mean annual precipitation worldwide by 3–15per cent (IPCC, 1996a, b). While increased precipita-tion increases water yield, the higher temperaturealso has opposite effects, e.g. through elevated evap-otranspiration. Even if a positive overall global neteffect of climate change upon water availability isassumed, major uncertainties remain with regard tothe regional and temporal distribution of precipita-tion. In the event of climate change as currentlyanticipated, changes in temperature, evapotranspira-tion and precipitation will probably differ greatlyfrom region to region. There will be ‘winner regions’and ‘loser regions’ in this respect (WBGU, 1998a).

It has been observed for some time now that inseveral regions of Chile precipitation levels aredeclining, particularly in areas where the El NiñoSouthern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon occurswith greater intensity. The ENSO phenomenon islinked to a warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific.It occurred increasingly in the early 1980s and 1990s,and was associated with a wave of drought in Africaand other regions and further extreme weatherevents. If, as presumed, climate change intensifiesENSO activities, then this will have an enormousimpact upon the future development of soil degrada-tion.

In the Sahel zone, too, precipitation levels over thepast 25 years have not reached the average levels ofthe years 1931–1960. Although similar dry periodshave already occurred in recent Earth history, thereis much to suggest that the dry periods of the last


decades in the Sahel are part of an aridification on acontinental scale (Nicholson, 1994). Increased pre-cipitation variability, which according to observa-tions by Hulme (1992) is mounting worldwide, is atypical accompanying symptom of this process.Thesehighly variable conditions can trigger or intensify soildegradation. In a global perspective, however – apartfrom the Sahel zone and the regions influenced bythe ENSO phenomenon – no increase is to beobserved of drought frequency or intensity in aridand semi-arid areas (IPCC, 1996a, b).

While most terrestrial ecosystems have somecapacity for buffering climatic changes, this does notapply to arid and semi-arid zones. Here even smallclimatic changes can already overstep stress limits,triggering irreversible soil degradation. Arid andsemi-arid regions may therefore be among the firstwhose ecosystem dynamics undergo sustainedchange due to global environmental changes (Westet al., 1994).

The influence of climatic changes upon soil degra-dation thus cannot be stated definitely at present,and has the potential to become an important factorin the future.

Effects of soil degradation upon climatechangeWhat is the reverse relation? In principle, it is possi-ble that desertification has repercussions upon localand global climate (IPCC, 1996a, b). When vegeta-tion cover is reduced in arid and semi-arid areas, thesurface temperature generally rises. A reduced mois-ture content in the soil leads to more rapid warmingof the air, as less energy is ‘lost’ on evapotranspira-tion. Overexploitation of marginal soils not onlyinfluences the biosphere directly, but also the func-tions of vegetation for the local hydrological cycle. Ifthis reduces water retention capacity, then ecosystemstability is also reduced and even minimal climaticchanges can lead to sudden system swings. In addi-tion, every sustained degradation of vegetation coverleads to the release of the greenhouse gas CO2. Inthe final analysis, however, the precise influence ofsoil degradation upon global warming is still largelyunknown (WBGU, 2001).

ConsequencesThe major uncertainties in the assessment of regionaland global interactions between soil degradation andclimate change highlight a wide knowledge gap inthis sphere. The Council consequently considers iturgent to improve scientific policy advice for interna-tional soil conservation in a manner modelled on theIPCC (Section C 4.3). One focus of this should be onthe dynamics between ‘loser and winner regions’.While the ‘loser regions’ will have to adapt to wors-

ened environmental conditions on a relatively shorttime scale, the ‘winner regions’ (e.g. areas with thaw-ing permafrost soils) will face new challenges, as, in aglobal perspective, they will have to provide com-pensation for the areas lost to agricultural produc-tion elsewhere.This underscores the need to developover the medium term not only technical, but alsosocial solutions.

B 3.2.2.3Climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion

Effects of climate change uponstratospheric ozone depletionMounting research interest has centred in recentyears on the interplay between ozone depletion, UVradiation and the greenhouse effect. Several studieshave predicted that elevated CO2 concentrationsmay lead to a cooling of the stratosphere, and thuscould cause an intensification of arctic ozone deple-tion. Changes in the hydrological cycle and conse-quently altered circulation patterns could also have astrong impact upon ozone depletion. For instance,the influence of ocean temperatures in the tropicsupon the water vapour content of the atmospherecould lead to altered atmospheric transport andchanges in the critical temperatures for ozone deple-tion (Kirk-Davidoff et al., 1999). Shindell et al. (1998)have shown that elevated concentrations of green-house gases favour colder, more stable Arctic vor-texes in winter, which accelerates the depletion ofozone at high altitudes.

Effects of stratospheric ozone depletionupon climate changeThe warming of the Earth’s atmosphere and thus cli-mate change could be slowed down by ozone deple-tion: The increased UV irradiation caused by lowerozone levels leads to rising concentrations of freehydroxyl radicals in the troposphere, which con-tribute to decomposing methane, a greenhouse gas. Itis estimated that this effect contributes to a 20–40 percent slow-down in methane increase. More recent cli-mate models take into consideration the influence ofchanges in the ozone layer upon cloud formation.Hansen et al. (1997) compute in their model that theEarth’s surface is warming by 20–30 per cent lessthan would be expected from other factors.

According to the figures of WMO et al. (1998) theoverall influence of stratospheric ozone depletionmay have compensated up to 30 per cent of theglobal warming effect generated by greenhousegases. This means that, over the last two decades,without the loss of stratospheric ozone, warmingwould have been greater by 0.1°C. It is consequently


thought to be possible that rapid restoration of theozone layer may lead to the loss of its attenuatingeffect upon global warming.

ConsequencesThe inaccuracy of such estimates is still very great, asunderstanding of the complicated interplay betweenclimatic warming and ozone depletion remains rudi-mentary. However, it can be expected that theseinterconnections have a much greater import thanpreviously thought. There is a need in this field forgreater coordination of research and intensifiedefforts. It is also recommendable to improve cooper-ation among the bodies of the Montreal Protocol andthe Climate Convention in order to ensure an inte-grated approach to combat human-induced changesto the overall atmosphere.

B 3.3Consequences for the institutional design ofglobal environmental policy

Section B 2.7 elaborated those attributes of environ-mental problems to which greater considerationneeds to be given in the global environmental-policyprocess when further developing global environmen-tal regimes, in order to improve the precision of goalsand their level of attainment. Moreover, the causalanalysis of global environmental problems revealedthe primary causes and mechanisms underlying themechanisms of degradation and identified potentialstarting points for integrated actions (Section B 3.1).Finally, the interplay between the environmentalproblems and their common causes was demon-strated. The outcome of that analysis was that theinterfaces between the problems and the approachesto the common causes of these problems call forimproved institutional coordination (Section B 3.2).The following conclusions result for the design ofglobal environmental policy.

CausesSection B 3.1 identified the following three keythemes for the ‘primary causes’ of global environ-mental problems. Unrestricted access to common re-sources (‘common access’), land use (and rural po-verty) and energy- and resource-intensive lifestyles(in connection with the industrialization and urban-ization trends). Stepping up efforts to target theseoverarching causes can provide ‘relief’ for manyenvironmental problems simultaneously.

For the last two key themes, poverty plays animportant role. Rural poverty has a major influenceupon land use in developing countries, which ismainly for subsistence, and hampers the transition to

sustainable development. About one quarter of theworld’s population still has to manage on less thanUS$1 per day, although life expectancy and literacyrates have improved almost everywhere and nutri-tional status has also improved on average.

Population growth presents a particular challenge,as it has a fundamentally amplifying effect upon allenvironmental problems. Nonetheless, it is plain thatreducing population growth alone does not guaran-tee that global environmental problems are miti-gated. The level of resource throughput – and thusalso the potential environmental impact – is deter-mined, besides the absolute number of people, aboveall by their per-capita throughput and by the techno-logical and organizational quality of resource usage.In developing countries with high population growthand low per-capita resource consumption, measuresshould initially seek to reduce population growth, inparticular by improving the socio-economic situationof the poor. In industrialized countries with low (oreven negative) population growth and high per-capita resource consumption, the focus should beplaced on reducing resource usage. The overall effi-ciency of resource use needs to be improved substan-tially. A global environmental policy that workstowards reducing per-capita consumption, promotinginnovative and efficient technologies and organiza-tional structures and facilitating socio-economicdevelopment in poor countries is ultimately moreeffective than a policy focusing solely upon popula-tion-related measures.

Assessing global environmental problemsIn all global environmental problems, the science-policy interface plays an important role. Exchangeneeds to function in both directions. The latestresearch and monitoring findings need to be commu-nicated to the policy realm as a basis for its negotia-tions and decisions; conversely, the scientific commu-nity needs to learn which problems and issues areconsidered particularly important in society or in thepolicy realm. Global environmental policy needs togive greater consideration to the system-specificattributes of global environmental problems (SectionB 2.7), which in turn presupposes a functioning flowof information to the scientific community.

A further crucial function of this interface is itsrole as a precondition to improving enforcement. Inmany environmental problems, there is a major dis-crepancy between the planning and implementationof measures. Compliance with international agree-ments has been inadequate in the past and needs toimprove substantially. An important precondition tothis is that problematiques can be measured andcompared, and likewise the successes achieved. Thismakes appropriate indicator and monitoring systems

59Consequences for the institutional design of gloal environmental policy B 3.3

essential. The scientific and political challenges asso-ciated with developing such systems are not to beunderestimated.

In many instances, the available knowledge onenvironmental problems and their causes and effectsis still unsatisfactory. In all global environmentalproblems, a need remains for further study. In partic-ular, research needs to be intensified on the develop-ment of indicators, monitoring systems and earlywarning systems. The associated task of organizingresearch, which needs to be addressed in closeexchange with the policy realm, has not been tackledwith the same vigour for all global environmentalproblems.

The conclusion for public policy and regimedesign is that it is essential to ensure that science isintegrated into negotiating processes, and that insti-tutional structures and arrangements, in particular,must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changingknowledge. For this, it is expedient to make provisionfor the possibility of expanding framework agree-ments by additional provisions negotiated later on inthe process, for instance in the form of protocols.

With the exception of the climate regime, thereare scarcely any institutional structures that haveorganized this science-policy interface effectively.Here there is a fundamental need for reorganization(Section F 1). These structures need to be not onlyproblem-focused and interdisciplinary, but must alsopromote integrative perspectives.

ImplementationBecause many political and economic decisions thatimpair the global environmental situation are takenat lower spatial or political levels and are generallydecisions of individual entities, it is important topoint global environmental policy in a more actor-specific direction. Relevant actors must be involvedin policy design (e.g. through education, informationand participation). Prime tools include creatingincentive systems and motivating individuals toengage in more environmentally sound behaviour.

Regional peculiarities require distinct strategiesand decentralized steps for operationalization, par-ticularly with respect to soils, freshwater, land use,biodiversity and adaptation to and mitigation of theeffects of climate change. Accordingly, global envi-ronmental policy needs a stronger regional focus.

Although an array of international agreementsare already in place, environmental pressures persistunabated. This is exemplified by climate change:Despite the undisputed necessity to intensify climateprotection efforts, the Council considers it justified todoubt whether a preventive strategy can still beimplemented in time (WBGU, 1996, 1998a). Consid-ering the risk that it may by now be impossible to pre-

vent undesired climatic warming, the Council sees aneed for further action to supplement global envi-ronmental policy with strategies for adaptation andmitigation of effects and to reduce vulnerabilities toglobal environmental changes.

InterconnectionsNo environmental problem can be solved in isola-tion. Section B 3.2 has shown that the number andimport of interconnections among the global envi-ronmental problems is too large for isolated solu-tions to be able to achieve sustained improvements.For global environmental policy design, this meansthat no single global environmental institution canhave sustained success if the impacts and effects ofother global environmental problems are ignored orneglected. Integrative approaches and concepts canyield solutions that usually contribute to abating sev-eral environmental problems at the same time andgenerate synergisms. They also help to avoid mea-sures that would be counterproductive for anotherenvironmental problem. The present institutionalstructure is essentially issue-focused and poorlysuited to taking an integrative perspective beyondthe narrow confines of the specific problems that thevarious institutions were created to address. Thereare already first moves towards improving coopera-tion among individual environmental conventions.However, the Council doubts that the present struc-tures are adequate to this task. The Council sees anurgent need to strengthen assessment, coordinationand integration functions at the global institutionallevel (Section F 2).

Intergovernmental actors for sustainable developmentB 4

Within the United Nations (UN) system, a greatnumber of specialized agencies, programmes andconventions are concerned with global environmen-tal problems. The Council’s 1996 annual report(WBGU, 1997) describes in detail the scientificallyfocused international programmes and committeeson global change, most of which were established byone or several UN specialized agencies and ICSU(International Council of Scientific Unions). Theseprogrammes and committees include the World Cli-mate Research Programme (WCRP), the Interna-tional Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP),the DIVERSITAS biosphere programme, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), theInternational Human Dimensions of Global Envi-ronmental Change Programme (IHDP) and theUNESCO programme ‘Man and the Biosphere’(MAB). The following overview presents the institu-tions within the UN system that are of particular rel-evance to the present report (Fig. B 4-1).

B 4.1Relevant UN specialized agencies

UN specialized agencies are international organiza-tions established by intergovernmental agreementthat address, at the global level, one of the tasks setout in Article 57 of the UN Charter (Unser, 1997).Specialized agencies can only be established with theapproval of the UN General Assembly and mustreport regularly to ECOSOC (Economic and SocialCouncil of the United Nations). Besides the WorldBank Group (Sections B 4.5 and D 2), the followingUN specialized agencies have particular relevancefor international environment and development pol-icy:

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization; Rome)is the largest autonomous organization within theUN system. The mandate of FAO is to raise the lev-els of nutrition and standards of living of the popula-tions of member countries, to secure improvementsin the efficiency of agricultural production and toimprove the conditions of rural populations.Areas of

FAO activity include agricultural production,forestry, fisheries, food security and trade. Focalthemes include sustainable agriculture, rural devel-opment and long-term strategies for the conserva-tion of natural resources (FAO, 2000).

IMO (International Maritime Organization,renamed in 1982; seated in London) was founded in1948. Its objectives are to stimulate the creation ofuniform rules governing international merchantshipping, to introduce the highest possible standardsof safety and to prevent and control pollution of thesea caused by ships. In 1999, IMO had 158 memberstates and two associate members.The most recent ofthe five main committees is the Marine EnvironmentProtection Committee (MEPC), which was estab-lished in 1985; this is concerned mainly with interna-tional agreements to prevent and control pollutioncaused by ships, and their enforcement (IMO, 2000).

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scien-tific and Cultural Organization; Paris, 60 countryoffices) was founded in 1945. Its main areas of activ-ity are education, sciences, culture, communication,peace and human rights. UNESCO addresses envi-ronmental issues mainly within the context of its pro-gramme on sciences, environment and socio-eco-nomic development. Here the fields of geosciences,Earth System management, ecology, natural disasterreduction, ‘Man and the Biosphere’, water resources,oceans and social transformation and developmentare addressed. Today 188 states are full and five areassociate members (UNESCO, 2000; Unser, 1997).

WMO (World Meteorological Organization;Geneva) commenced its work in 1951. Its objectivesare to facilitate international cooperation in theestablishment of networks of observation stations, topromote the rapid exchange of meteorological infor-mation, and to promote the uniform publication ofobservations and statistics. Furthermore, WMO fur-thers the application of meteorology to aviation,shipping, water problems and agriculture andencourages research and training. In 1996,WMO had185 members.

61Relevant UN specialized agencies B 4.1

B 4.2Relevant programmes of the United Nations

Programmes of the United Nations are subsidiaryagencies of the General Assembly set up by it toundertake special tasks. Most of these are agenciesfor financing and implementing development assis-tance programmes (Hüfner, 1992). UN programmesmust report annually to the UN General Assembly,generally through ECOSOC. The General Assemblyis empowered to take decisions binding upon theprogrammes. In contrast to the UN specialized agen-cies, the programmes have neither a specific basis

under international law nor do they have separatelegal personality; they do, however, have limited legalcapacity.

UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development; Geneva) was founded in 1964 andis the main organ of the UN for integratedapproaches relating to trade, finances, technology,investment and sustainable development. Its objec-tive is to promote international trade for the eco-nomic development and integration of developingcountries into the global economy. UNCTAD is con-sidered an important forum for developing opinionsand forging consensus within North-South dialogue

Programmes

Spec

ialize

d agencies of environmental relevance

Conventions

World BankGroup

UNDPUNCTAD

UNFCCCfinancial mechanism

financial mechanismCBD

IMO

UNCCD

ECOSOC

General Assemblyof the United Nations

GEF

coor

dina

tes

conv

entio

ns

project implementation through executing

agencies

...CITES

BaselCMS

Ozone

CSD

WMO

WHO

UNIDO

UNESCO

FAO

hold

s G

EF

fund

in tr

ust

recommen-dations

UNEP

Figure B 4-1Institutions of environmental relevance within the UN system.Source: WBGU


(Unser, 1997). The Conference meets every 3–4years. In the interim periods, the Trade and Develop-ment Board (TDB) operates as a permanent body.188 states are members of UNCTAD.

The objective of UNDP (United Nations Devel-opment Programme; New York) is to strengtheninternational cooperation for sustainable humandevelopment and serve as a major substantiveresource on how to achieve it. The overriding goal isto eradicate poverty. UNDP operates 132 countryoffices and works in 170 countries and territories(UNDP, 1998).

UNEP (United Nations Environment Pro-gramme; Nairobi) was established in 1972 by the UNConference on the Human Environment in Stock-holm. Its objectives are to support national activitiesand regional cooperation in environmental protec-tion and nature conservation, and to develop, assessand monitor international environmental and con-servation law.The activities of UNEP include hostingand coordinating various convention secretariats(Basel, CITES, CBD, CMS, Multilateral Fund,Ozone), creating databanks and preparing environ-mental status reports (Global Environment Outlook– GEO), advising governments and financingadvanced training and regional programmes.The UNmember states are members of UNEP. Non-memberstates, other IGOs (intergovernmental organi-zations) and NGOs (non-governmental organiza-tions) have observer status. The bodies of UNEPinclude the Governing Council and divisions for (1)environmental information, (2) environmental policydevelopment, (3) environmental policy implementa-tion, (4) industry and environment, (5) regional rep-resentation and (6) coordination of conventions(Korn et al., 1998).

B 4.3UN Commission on Sustainable Development

The CSD (UN Commission on Sustainable Develop-ment; New York) is a subsidiary body of ECOSOC,the latter being one of the principal organs of the UN.It was established as a follow-up to the UN Confer-ence on Environment and Development (UNCED)in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, in order to implementUNCED agreements, notably Agenda 21, enhanceinternational cooperation and identify long-termstrategic targets for sustainable development (Sec-tion E 1.4). Membership (53 members) rotates overthree-year periods. Non-member states, other IGOsand NGOs participate as observers.The CSD has metyearly at the UN headquarters since 1993. The Divi-sion for Sustainable Development of the UN Depart-

ment of Economic and Social Affairs functions as theCSD secretariat.

B 4.4Relevant conventions

The international community has adopted numerousconventions for international environmental protec-tion.Among these, only the ones of particular impor-tance for the present report are presented brieflyhere. Chapter C discusses selected conventions inmore depth. For a more detailed overview, the readeris referred to Beyerlin (2000).

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD;Montreal) was adopted at UNCED in Rio deJaneiro. Its principal objectives are the conservationof biological diversity, the ecologically sustainableuse of its components, and the fair and equitablesharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization ofgenetic resources (Section C 3.4). Main organs of theCBD are the Conference of the Parties and the Sub-sidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technologi-cal Advice (SBSTTA) (Fig. B 4.4-1). The GEF is thefunding mechanism of the CBD for technology trans-fer projects, for technical and scientific cooperationprojects and for incentive measures for implement-ing the Convention. A Clearing House Mechanism(CHM) facilitates the exchange of information. Twoworking groups of experts are concerned with theProtocol on Biosafety (adopted in February 2000)and with marine and coastal biodiversity (JakartaMandate). 175 states have signed the Convention todate.

The Convention on International Trade in Endan-gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES;Geneva) regulates the protection of certain speciesfrom overexploitation. The Convention permits reg-ulation of international trade in endangered speciesthrough a worldwide system of import and exportcontrols and permit requirements. The CITESAppendices currently list some 34,000 plant and ani-mal species. 151 member states have signed the Con-vention.

The Vienna Convention for the Protection of theOzone Layer (Nairobi) was adopted in 1985 and reg-ulates the commitments of states to protect the ozonelayer jeopardized by CFCs and to cooperate in scien-tific research for an improved understanding ofatmospheric processes. The Montreal Protocol (Fig.B 4.4-2) on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layerwas adopted in 1987; since then, its provisions havebeen tightened five times (Sections C 2.2 and C 3.2).The final objective of the Protocol is to reduce andultimately terminate emissions of ozone-depletingsubstances.

63Relevant financing bodies B 4.5

The United Nations Convention to CombatDesertification in those Countries ExperiencingSerious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularlyin Africa (UNCCD; Bonn) was put on track atUNCED in 1992, and entered into force in 1996. Theobjective is to combat land degradation in aridregions and to mitigate the effects of drought (Sec-tions C 2.4 and C 4.3). For the purposes of the Con-vention, desertification means ‘land degradation inarid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resultingfrom various factors, including climatic variationsand human activities’.The bodies of the UNCCD arethe Conference of the Parties and the Committee onScience and Technology (CST). Conceptually, theUNCCD revolves around the National Action Pro-grammes, which serve to implement the goals of theConvention with the active participation of civil soci-ety (Fig. B 4.4-3). To date, 159 countries have ratifiedor acceded to the Convention.

The United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC; Bonn) was adopted inMay 1992 and entered into force in March 1994 (Fig.

B 4.4-4). The ultimate objective of the Convention isto stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerousanthropogenic interference with the climate system(Sections C 2.3 and C 4.4). Such a level should beachieved within a time frame sufficient to allowecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, toensure that food production is not threatened and toenable economic development to proceed in a sus-tainable manner. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in1997, sets out binding commitments on the reductionof greenhouse gas emissions. The Convention hasbeen ratified by 181 states. The Kyoto Protocol hasbeen signed by 84 states and ratified by 29.

B 4.5Relevant financing bodies

The World Bank (a specialized agency of the UnitedNations; Washington) was founded in 1944 and istoday the largest source of environment and devel-

Convention on Biological Diversity

Developingcountries

Parties

Industrializedcountries ad

vise

s

guid

es

assi

sts

guid

es

fund

ing

guid

ance

Secretariat

administers

constitute report to

Clearing-houseMechanism

Subsidiary Bodyon Scientific, Techni-cal and Technological

Advice (SBSTTA)

Ad-hoctechnical expert

groups

Financialmechanism

(GEF)

Conference of the Parties

report tosets up

exch

ange

of i

nfor

mat

ion

finan

ces

agre

ed fu

ll in

crem

enta

l cos

ts

Figure B 4.4-1 The bodies of theBiodiversity Convention.


opment finance (Section D 2.1). The objective of theWorld Bank is to reduce poverty and raise standardsof living in developing countries. The Bank grantsloans and provides political advice based upon sectoranalyses, technical assistance and, increasingly, ser-vices for knowledge exchange. The World BankGroup comprises five closely linked institutions: TheInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-ment (IBRD) grants loans and provides develop-ment assistance for medium-income countries andcreditworthy poorer countries. The assistance pro-vided by the International Development Association

(IDA) concentrates upon the poorest countries, towhich it grants loans with no interest charge; beyondlending, it also provides further services.The Interna-tional Finance Corporation (IFC) works closely withprivate investors and provides financial resources forcommercial companies in developing countries. TheMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA;formally not a UN specialized agency) promotes for-eign direct investment in developing countries byprotecting investors from non-entrepreneurial risks.The International Centre for Settlement of Invest-ment Disputes (ICSID) creates the preconditions for

implementing agencies

Multilateral Fund

determines mandatory contributions of

industrialized countries

Eastern Europe andRussian Federation

Montreal Protocol

Subcommittee on Monitoring,Evaluation and Finance

Fund Secretariat

Subcommittee onProject Review

Executive Committee(with equal North-South representation

in decision-making)

UNEP(assessments)

scie

ntifi

c ad

vice

fund

ing

7 members 7 members

proj

ecti

mpl

emen

tatio

n

contributions

determines reduction commitments


supports projectsGEF

UNEP

UNDPbilateralprojects

UNIDO

Weltbank

non-Article 5(industrialized)countries (53)

Article 5 (developing)

countries (119)

assists

assists

Ozone Secretariat

Figure B 4.4-2 The bodies of the MontrealProtocol.

65Relevant financing bodies B 4.5

settling disputes between foreign investors and theirhost countries. Today more than 180 states are mem-bers of the World Bank. These determine generalpolicy and the budget of the Bank once a yearthrough representatives (governors). Each of the fivelargest shareholders (Germany, France, the UnitedKingdom, Japan, USA) appoints an Executive Direc-tor; a further 19 Executive Directors are appointedby country groups, whereby China, Russia and SaudiArabia form their own groups, each appointing anExecutive Director of its own. The President of theWorld Bank comes traditionally from the USA. Thepriorities in granting loans are: Health and educa-tion, environmental protection, supporting privateeconomic development, strengthening the capabilityof governments to provide services efficiently andtransparently, supporting reforms to attain stableeconomic conditions allowing long-term planning,and social development and poverty reduction.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF;Washing-ton) is an independent institution for the purpose of

financing projects in four focal areas: Biodiversityand natural resource management; energy conserva-tion and renewables; threats to the oceans, coastaland inland waters; and support for the phase-out ofozone-depleting substances in Eastern Europe (Sec-tion E 3.4.2). Soil protection projects can receiveindirect support insofar as they involve the conserva-tion of biodiversity or of freshwater resources. TheGEF received its present structure in 1994, followinga three-year pilot phase. Projects are implemented bythe ‘implementing agencies’ UNEP, UNDP and theWorld Bank. NGOs, the scientific community and theprivate sector all play an important role in pro-gramme design and implementation. The GEF has165 members, which meet every three years in theAssembly. The Council, the main governing body ofthe GEF, consists of 16 representatives from devel-oping countries, 14 representatives from developedcountries and two from countries with economies intransition to a market economy.The GEF Secretariatis supported administratively by the World Bank.The

other(industrialized)

countries

Desertification Convention

determines reporting duties of developing

countries and reviews

Committee on Science and Technology

(CST)

Ad-hoc panels with

max. 12 members

scientificadvice

assists

repo

rt to

assi

sts

report on support activities


establishes report to

assists in drawing updr

aw u

p an

d im

plem

ent

Secretariat

finances indirectly, when climate or

biodiversity are involved

finances desertification

control

GEF

bi- and multilateral

development cooperation

are involved in drawing up and implementing

affected(developing)

countries

assist through DC/TC

have participation rights

informs about available finan-cial resources

Global Mechanism(UNDP, IFAD, World Bank

and others)

NGO

NationalAction

Programmes

Figure B 4.4-3 The bodies of theDesertification Convention.Source: WBGU


GEF serves as the financing mechanism for the Cli-mate Convention and for the Biodiversity Conven-tion. For the Montreal Protocol on Substances thatDeplete the Ozone Layer, the GEF is a supplemen-tary partner: While the Multilateral Fund for theImplementation of the Montreal Protocol supportsdeveloping countries in substituting ozone-depletingsubstances, the GEF can support transition countriesin cases where their high levels of production andconsumption of these substances exclude them fromreceiving financial resources from the MultilateralFund (GEF, 2000).

The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation ofthe Montreal Protocol (Montreal) was established in1990 and provides financial support for developingcountries in reducing ozone-depleting substances. Ofthe 172 states signatory to the Protocol, 128 aredeveloping countries. From 1991 to 1999, 32 industri-alized countries channelled just under US$1000 mil-lion to the fund. UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO and theWorld Bank implement country studies and projects

in the developing countries. In addition, severalindustrialized countries provide assistance on a bilat-eral basis.

IPCC

Annex B(industrialized)

countries

non-Annex B(developing)

countries

Executive Councilfor Environmentally Sustainable

Development (Clean Development Mechanism)

Climate Convention and Kyoto Protocol

determines reduction commitments of

industrialized countries

decides on use of financial resources

provides financial resources to meet the agreed full

incremental costs

determines reporting duties of developing

countries

GEF

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological

Advice (SBSTA)

scientificadvice

advi

ses

repo

rt to

repo

rts

to

repo

rt to

assi

stsassists


Secretariat

Subsidiary Body for

Implementation(SBI)

Figure B 4.4-4 The bodies of the ClimateConvention and the KyotoProtocol.Source: WBGU

Institutional deficits and remedies C

C 1Institutions and organizations

Institutions and organizations are at the heart ofevery type of environmental policy. ‘Institutions’ arecommon arrangements established (instituere –establish) by actors in society to regulate their rela-tions, ranging from the United Nations prohibition ofthe use of force, through to the institution of mar-riage. In political science, the particular politicalimportance of institutions has led over the pastdecade to a renaissance of the study of institutionswith theories of ‘New Institutionalism’. In interna-tional politics, the key institutions are termed ‘inter-national regimes’, the term referring to a body ofcommon principles, norms, rules and decision-mak-ing procedures among international actors (usuallystates). In most instances, institutions in internationalrelations are connected intimately to ‘organizations’,the latter term meaning administrative units withtheir own budget, personnel and letterhead.This def-inition of organizations refers to establishments asadministrative units with the above attributes, andnot to the status under international law that any‘organization’ within the UN system may have (Sec-tion E 2).The climate regime, for instance, is an insti-tution that regulates the behaviour of its parties inthe interests of climate protection and imposes cer-tain obligations upon them; the Climate Secretariatin Bonn is a small international organization.

Institutions and organizations are created in thepublic policy process, and can be modified and opti-mized by that process. This has motivated the Coun-cil to examine in the present report the issues sur-rounding the reform and improvement of the systemof international institutions and organizations, and‘institutional arrangements’ (von Prittwitz, 2000) inglobal environmental policy in general. The presentChapter C provides the tools for this analysis: Proto-typical examples of existing institutions are exam-ined using a systematic matrix of analysis, and lessonsare derived for designing new institutions andimproving existing ones.

The Council follows the policy cycle commonlyused in political science, modified slightly in order totake into account the conditions prevailing in globalenvironmental policy and the needs of applied policy

advice.Thus the role of institutions and organizationsduring agenda setting – the formulation and firstnegotiation of political issues – is discussed first (Sec-tion C 2). This is followed by a discussion of institu-tional issues in the phase in which international insti-tutions are negotiated and refined (Section C 3) andan examination of the problems of implementationand compliance (Section C 4). These analyses pro-ceed in the main from three global environmentalpolicy problems selected for their analytical fertility;one is an exemple of success, one a moderately suc-cessful case and one a less satisfactory regime. Inaddition, the Council discusses the lessons that canbe drawn from game theory and the prospects of pri-vate-sector transnational collaboration to protectglobal environmental resources.

Global environmental policy can only succeed if itis also implemented nationally and locally. For globalenvironmental policy, the motto ‘think globally, actlocally’ is apt. Nonetheless, in the present report theCouncil concentrates on policy processes as they per-tain to international institutions, because theirnational and local implementation has already beendiscussed in depth in a series of previous annualreports, for instance on soil conservation policy(WBGU, 1995a), water resources conservation policy(WBGU, 1998a) and biosphere conservation policy(WBGU, 2001). Section C 5 makes explicit referenceto these texts for the national implementation ofglobal environmental policy, and once again high-lights Local Agenda 21 processes and education pol-icy aspects which the Council considers crucial.

The role of institutions in setting agendasC 2

C 2.1Introduction

What is the role played by institutions and organiza-tions in the initial phase of an international negotiat-ing process, when problems are defined, agendasstructured and the process of negotiating a regime isput on track? Why do some environmental problemsgain higher priority in international politics than oth-ers, even though the latter are perhaps just as severein ecological terms? To what extent do institutionsand organizations contribute to global environmen-tal problems entering the international policyagenda, and what role do they play in the agenda-set-ting phase of a policy cycle? To analyse these issues,the Council has selected three key problems of globalchange (ozone depletion, climate change, soil degra-dation) that are regulated internationally with differ-ing degrees of effectiveness and – this is decisive fortheir selection – have succeeded in attaining differentlevels of priority on the international policy agenda.Beyerlin (2000) provides a comprehensive overviewof international environmental law.

C 2.2Agenda setting in ozone policy

The response of the international community to theadvancing depletion of the stratospheric ozone layeris widely viewed as an exemple of effective interna-tional environmental policy. In the meantime, the useof chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) has been phased outalmost completely in western industrialized coun-tries. Overall, the ozone regime has cut worldwideconsumption of CFCs, halons and methyl chloroform(MCF) by some 80 per cent; if we include all ozone-depleting substances, weighted accordingly, totalconsumption has dropped by 70–75 per cent(Oberthür, 1997, 1999a) (Section B 2.2).

C 2.2.1The ozone issue on the international and nationalagenda

The threat of stratospheric ozone layer depletioncaused by CFC emissions was only discovered in1974 (Luhmann, 1996). Concern over the ozone layerarose first in the industrialized countries, which in themid-1980s were responsible for almost all CFC pro-duction. The proponents of an international agree-ment included notably the USA; CFC use in spraycans was already banned in the USA and a numberof Scandinavian countries by the end of the 1970s.

Because measures taken by only a few states werebound to fail on account of the global scope of theproblem, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-land and the USA – the so-called ‘Toronto group’ –launched an effort in the early 1980s to bring aboutan international treaty to combat ozone depletion(Kindt and Menefee, 1989; Parson, 1993; Benedick,1998). However, at that time the other industrializedcountries were still sceptical and sought a softerregime than the Toronto group. It is impossible tostate conclusively which factors gave rise to thisdivergent degree of concern among industrializedcountries. In the USA cultural factors, such as thehigh public standing of NASA and space research,may have played a certain role (Benedick, 1998).Later on, the particularly large potential hazardposed to the population at high latitudes – Canadaand Scandinavia – contributed to the ozone problembeing given high priority in these countries.

While ozone depletion was a subject of debatesince the mid-1970s in the USA and Scandinavia, andto a lesser extent also in Japan and the EuropeanCommunity, the developing countries expressed nointerest of their own in this environmental problem.Only 12 developing countries sent delegates to theVienna intergovernmental conference in 1985. Evenat the final Montreal conference in September 1987,which adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layer, only 30 developingcountries were represented (Biermann, 1998b).

71Agenda setting in ozone policy C 2.2

How can this lack of interest in the negotiatingprocess be explained? There is a widely shared per-spective on intergovernmental environmental policythat casts such problems in terms of a conflictbetween generators of transboundary environmentalpollution and those affected by it. In this view, ‘gen-erator states’ block regime formation, while those‘affected’ are more likely to take an initiative to pressfor comprehensive rules. In the case of the ozoneproblem, the industrialized countries are the maingenerators. In the mid-1980s, they consumed 90 percent of total worldwide CFC production, corre-sponding to 20 times the per-capita consumption ofdeveloping countries. Moreover, limiting CFCrelease was considered expensive: For the USAalone, conversion cost estimates ranged from US$3thousand million according to the US EnvironmentalProtection Agency to US$135 thousand million esti-mated by the DuPont chemical corporation(Benedick, 1998).

In the initial phase, the lack of activity on the partof developing countries can be explained by a lack ofinformation on the ozone problem, which UNEP andUS diplomacy sought to remedy from the late 1980sonwards by means of information campaigns. How-ever, information deficits were not the sole cause ofthe initial disinterest in the South. It rather appearsthat the major developing countries at first deliber-ately boycotted the negotiations or at least the sign-ing of the 1987 Montreal Protocol, because its spe-cific institutional design, notably its distribution ofburdens among the states, was viewed as disadvanta-geous and ‘unjust’ with respect to their economicinterests (e.g. for India, see Rajan, 1997). In theNorth, demand for CFC-containing refrigerators,refrigerating systems and air-conditioning systemswas largely saturated, while developing countries,based on their economic growth, anticipated a steeprise in demand for these goods. The increased use ofthese goods was in turn viewed as a basis for furthereconomic growth. To the extent that developingcountries themselves produced CFCs, CFC-contain-ing products or products dependent upon CFCs, theywould have had to apply a part of their investmentcapital to convert production processes, althoughtheir sole benefit would have been the repair of anenvironmental problem generated primarily by pastproduction and consumption patterns and lifestylesof industrialized countries.

The outcome of all this was that in the South thedebate on reducing CFC usage was not understoodas an environmental problem, but essentially as aNorth-South problem and as a development prob-lem. Even today, in India, for instance, national ozonedepletion control activities are not itemized in theenvironmental plan as a part of environmental policy,

but as an element of ‘international cooperation’(Chatterjee, 1995; Biermann, 1999). This indicatesthat the country continues to see no need to takeaction itself.

C 2.2.2The role of institutions and organizations

There can be no doubt that, with respect to industri-alized countries, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) played a crucial agenda-settingrole in the 1980s.As early as 1977, UNEP establishedthe Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer(CCOL) and adopted a global plan of action for theprotection of the ozone layer. In 1981, the UN expertconference on international environmental law heldin Montevideo assigned top priority to elaboratinglegal norms for the protection of the ozone layer.The1985 Vienna Conference on the Protection of theOzone Layer was similarly an outflow of a UNEPresolution. In the early 1980s when, following the banon CFC use in spray cans, public interest in the issuewaned, it was above all UNEP that kept the interna-tional debate alive on the threat to the ozone layer(Benedick, 1998).

UNEP also played an important role in the policyformulation process in developing countries.This wasparticularly because, as a part of the UN system, itwas viewed as politically neutral in the North-Southconflict and was thus able to provide the necessaryacceptance for the ozone problem in the South.UNEP hosts the Secretariat of the Vienna Conven-tion and its Montreal Protocol, and organizesthrough its Paris office the transfer of CFC-free tech-nology to developing countries. UNEP advises theOzone Focal Points that have been set up in theadministrations of most developing countries, whosetasks include raising awareness of the issue in theircountries and seeking solutions in dialogue withindustry. Not least, UNEP has organized the scien-tific assessment process on the state of the ozoneproblem, the numerous ‘ozone assessments’ (Jung,1999b). It was the research carried out in the majorindustrialized countries, notably in the USA, thatmade this assessment process possible at all. How-ever, it was UNEP that gave the research of individ-ual countries the necessary stamp of political neu-trality and acceptability, particularly in developingcountries (Watson, 1998, personal communication).

Other UN organizations and programmes alsoplay an important role, for instance in initiating, plan-ning and implementing CFC conversion projects indeveloping countries. Likewise, these organizationsprovide information on the problems in the EasternEuropean states and particularly in the Russian Fed-

72 C Institutional deficits and remedies

eration. In sum, we may state that without theseinternational organizations – and particularly with-out UNEP – in most states the ozone problem wouldnot have attained the priority in North and South northe acceptance in the South that it has gained sincethe 1980s.

Although the ozone regime is widely consideredone of the greatest success stories of internationalenvironmental policy, it needs to be kept in mind thata series of special factors contributed to this. Mostnotably US industry, having developed CFC substi-tutes early on, put up no resistance to the MontrealProtocol at the end of the 1980s, but in fact lobbiedvigorously for its comprehensive implementation inas many countries as possible. To that extent, theozone problem was a win-win situation for the indus-try of the North, which thus gained access to a signif-icant new global market for substitutes and alterna-tive production processes – a market tapped in manyinstances by the very same companies that had previ-ously generated considerable revenue from sellingCFCs.

C 2.3Agenda setting in climate policy

In contrast to international cooperation on the pro-tection of the ozone layer, climate policy has not yetsucceeded in bringing about any substantialimprovement in the environmental situation (Sec-tion B 2.1). CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissionscontinue to rise worldwide. Human-induced globalwarming having become a topic of scientific debatein the late 1960s, it advanced to become an issue inthe international policy arena in the late 1980s. Thisculminated in the negotiation of the United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) from 1990 onwards, which was openedfor signature in 1992 at the Rio de Janeiro EarthSummit. Building upon this foundation, the partiesadopted the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention in1997, setting out for the first time binding quantita-tive obligations of the industrialized countries toreduce their greenhouse gas emissions (WBGU,1998b).

C 2.3.1The climate issue on the international andnational agenda

It was already considered proven in the late 1960sthat the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere is ris-ing steadily. In the 1980s, the issue entered the inter-national political agenda through a broad array of

conferences. First the World Commission on Envi-ronment and Development (WCED) – the ‘Brundt-land Commission’ – took up the issue in its 1987 finalreport. In 1988 it was debated for the first time at ahigh political level, at the G7 summit in Toronto andin the UN General Assembly.A further conference inToronto in the same year put further developmentson track, with a call to cut CO2 emissions by 20 percent (from a 1988 base-line) by the year 2005. For adecade, this ‘Toronto target’ was the benchmark ofinternational climate policy.

Here the active role of international organizationswas crucial. As early as 1988, the World Meteorolog-ical Organization (WMO) and UNEP, which haduntil then been the principal forums of internationalscientific debate, established the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Bodansky, 1993).The assessments delivered by the IPCC have becomethe widely recognized scientific basis of internationalclimate policy (Section E 1).

The negotiations on a framework convention onclimate protection initially encountered a wide rangeof conflicts of interest. The differences among theindustrialized countries became apparent early on(Bodansky, 1993; Enquete Commission, 1990). In theone camp were the ‘laggards’, which included,besides the USSR and Japan, above all the USA.These states called attention to the scientific uncer-tainties and argued against wide-ranging commit-ments on emissions reduction (Breitmeier, 1996). Inthe case of the USA and the USSR (later: RussianFederation) it needs to be kept in mind that these twoare among the world’s largest coal, oil and gas pro-ducers. The open US political system, in particular,offers good opportunities for industry representa-tives to lobby for their interests.As concerns Russia’sposition, its perception of itself as a potential ‘winner’of global warming was and continues to be of rele-vance (Oberthür, 1993; Oberthür and Ott, 1999).

In the other camp, the Europeans, in particular,spoke out in favour of binding commitments on thelimitation of greenhouse gas emissions. However theimpacts of global warming (sea-level rise, desertifica-tion etc.) were not the Europeans’ only concerns.Their great dependence upon fossil fuel imports alsomakes climate protection measures relatively attrac-tive, as these serve to reduce imports. Moreover, thepenetration of environmental interests (associationsand green parties) to actors across the political land-scape had become and remains widespread. Box C2.3-1 presents an example of the disparate negotiat-ing positions of various nations on the issue of forestuse.

Over a long period, the developing countries hadno particular interest in the climate change problem(Bodansky, 1993). However, in contrast to the case of

73Agenda setting in climate policy C 2.3

the ozone regime – and precisely because of theexperience gained there that early decisions deter-mine future negotiations – they were not slow to takepart in the climate debate. They pointed particularlyto the principal responsibility of industrialized coun-tries for global warming, rejected for that reason anybinding commitments of their own and called forfinancial and technology transfer (Biermann, 1998b).However, in this group, too, divergent interestsrapidly became apparent in the early 1990s. Twogroups articulated positions vehemently that devi-ated from the majority of developing countries. Theoil-exporting OPEC countries, spearheaded by SaudiArabia, resisted effective CO2 emissions limitation,which they perceived as a threat to their export mar-kets. In contrast, the Alliance of Small Island States(AOSIS), which saw its very survival threatened by

sea-level rise, called early on for far-reaching emis-sions reduction commitments (Oberthür, 1993).

This actor constellation remained relatively stablethroughout the 1990s. However, a number of non-European industrialized countries, in particular,which had originally represented the EU positionand had formulated challenging national climate pol-icy objectives, switched to the camp of the laggards(thus e.g. Canada) (Oberthür and Ott, 1999). Onefairly persuasive analysis of this is that whereas theearly phase of international climate policy placed theecological dimension of the problem in the fore-ground (Bodansky, 1993), in the course of the 1990sthis was increasingly dominated by economic aspects.

Box C 2.3-1

Disparities in the negotiating positions ofnations on climate change: The example offorest use

In the international climate change negotiations, a distinc-tion is generally made between the concerns of the indu-strialized nations and those of developing countries, along aNorth-South gradient. The Kyoto Protocol even enshrinesthis differentiation by distinguishing between Annex I sta-tes, which enter into emissions reduction commitments, andnon-Annex I states, which are permitted to trade in carbonunits without having entered into any reduction commit-ment of their own. However, the further negotiations on thespecific instruments for implementing the Kyoto Protocolhave now shown that the interests of the nations are morecomplex than the dichotomy suggests. This is illustrated bythe example of forest area distribution and forest manage-ment interests.

Six nations (Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Russia, USA andZaire) have 58 per cent of the global forest area (25 nationshave 85 per cent) (FAO, 1999).The goals pursued with theseassets vary greatly and depend upon the economic startingpoint: Per-capita income and per-capita forest area (Fig. C2.3-1). Countries with high per-capita income are CO2 sour-ces, countries with low per-capita income are CO2 sinks.

It is apparent that countries with high per-capita forestarea use this forest above all for economic development,even if this is incompatible with environmental goals. Coun-tries with low per-capita forest area and income dependupon timber imports from countries with large forest areas.This does not result in an alliance between countries thatare CO2 sources (Annex I states), but rather an allianceamong countries that use the forest for economic purposesor are dependent upon imports, against those countries thatpursue environmental goals. There are indications in theKyoto Protocol that there, too, economic goals are moreimportant than environmental goals (Clean DevelopmentMechanism, CDM). To enforce environmental goals, therewill be a need for major efforts to dismantle this constella-tion.

Figure C 2.3-1Divergent goals of forest useas a function of per-capitaincome and forest area.Source: WBGU

Forests forenvironmental protection

Forests forsustainable development

Forests forsubsistence

Forests foreconomic developmentP

er-c

apita

inco

me

Per-capita forest area

DenmarkGermanyJapanThe NetherlandsUnited Kingdom

ChinaIndiaKenyaPhilippinesSomalia

AustraliaCanadaFinlandSwedenUSA

BrazilGabonIndonesiaMalaysiaRussia



Until official negotiations on a framework conven-tion commenced,WMO and UNEP had a prominentposition in the climate debate. They organized,together with the International Council of ScientificUnions (ICSU), a non-governmental organization,the first conferences on global climate change andthe important World Climate Conferences. More-over, WMO and UNEP financed the World ClimateProgramme and established in 1988 the IPCC(Enquete Commission, 1990; Loske, 1996; van derWurff, 1997). Both initiatives made an important con-tribution to providing the scientific foundations forpolitical action to combat global warming (SectionE 1).

In the shape of the IPCC, both UN institutionscontinue to influence the progress of internationalclimate policy.The IPCC itself has become one of themost influential international institutions in climatepolicy. In 1990, the IPCC even submitted a draft con-vention as a basis for the negotiating process(Oberthür, 1993). However, not all states – particu-larly not all developing countries – always felt them-selves represented by WMO, UNEP and the IPCC(Bodansky, 1993). One reason for this was the ini-tially inadequate representation of developing coun-tries in the IPCC (Enquete Commission, 1990).

The developing countries therefore insisted thatclimate negotiations be institutionalized at a higherpolitical level, namely the UN General Assembly(Bodansky, 1993). For UNEP, which had also soughtto receive this mandate, this meant a defeat and a lossof importance in the climate policy arena (Oberthür,1993). A growing number of additional actorsentered the arena in the course of its development.For instance, climate protection became a focus ofthe Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Ehrmann,1997), which was entrusted with providing the financ-ing mechanism for the Climate Convention.

The ozone regime provided a model for the emer-gence and development of the climate changeregime. This applies both to the legal structure of thetreaty system (framework convention plus protocols)and to the approach of aggregating the controlledsubstances in a ‘basket’ and weighting them accord-ing to their harmfulness. However, there is also evi-dence of a negative orientation to the ozone model:In some instances, climate policy ‘laggards’ have lob-bied successfully against a transfer of those aspects ofthe Montreal Protocol that are considered particu-larly effective.

C 2.4Agenda setting in soil policy

C 2.4.1The soil issue on the international and nationalagenda

The scale of worldwide land degradation first cameto the attention of the wider international public inthe early 1990s with the publication of the first globalsurvey of soil degradation (GLASOD; Haber et al.,1999).This survey of the known cases of soil and landdegradation, which had only previously been studiedin a localized way, now revealed how these added upto an overall problem of dramatic proportions. Build-ing on this foundation, the Council included theproblem of soil and land degradation in its complexclinical pictures, or syndrome analysis, of environ-mental change (WBGU, 1995a). These analyses clar-ified the global nature of the problem of soil degra-dation and the need for international regulations. Inparticular it is necessary to draw together the existingnon-binding declarations and to convert them into aform that is binding under international law. Thiswould break new ground given that the complextheme of soils has only been tackled in a limited wayup until now.

The first pedological associations established inthe 1920s largely addressed soil as a factor of pro-duction. Then, however, the impression made by theobservations of soil and land degradation gave rise inthe 1960s to the first international scientific organi-zations whose aim was soil conservation: the Interna-tional Soil Conservation Organization (ISCO) wasfounded in 1960, the International Soil Referenceand Information Centre (ISRIC) of the InternationalCouncil of Scientific Unions (ICSU) followed in1966, and the European Society for Soil Conserva-tion (ESSC) in 1980. In 1998 at the internationalworkshop on Soil Protection Policies within theEuropean Union, mounted by the EU Commission,the German Federal Environment Ministry (BMU)and the German Federal Environmental Agency(UBA), the Bonn Memorandum on Soil ProtectionPolicies in Europe was drafted and in 1999, the firstsession of the European Soil Forum organized by theEuropean Environment Agency called not only forglobally oriented strategies but also for an interna-tional base-line catalogue of indicators.

The first political instrument for soil conservationwas the European Soil Charter of 1972. The plannedcreation of a legally binding instrument foundered inthe early 1990s.Another important decision at Euro-pean level is the Council of Europe’s Recommenda-

75Agenda setting in soil policy C 2.4

tion R(92)8 of 1992, in which governments are calledupon to adhere to a series of principles for soil con-servation.

Since the first Conference on the global Environ-ment held in Stockholm in 1972, which called for abetter level of information on the status and degrada-tion of soils, worldwide soil conservation has alsocome into the United Nations’ sphere of interest. Inthe aftermath of the disastrous droughts in the Sahel,public attention at the time was concentrated on soiland land degradation in arid regions. In 1977 theUnited Nations convened the World Conference onDesertification, but the Plan of Action subsequentlyadopted foundered due to financial and planningdeficiencies. Finally, in 1981 under the auspices of theFAO, the World Soil Charter was adopted. At aboutthe same time, the World Conservation Union(IUCN), UNEP and the World Wide Fund forNature (WWF) were developing the World Conser-vation Strategy (1980). In 1982, soil conservation wasincorporated into the World Charter for Nature. Thetheme gained new impetus from the 1992 UnitedNations Conference on Environment and Develop-ment (UNCED), when the problem of worldwideland degradation was addressed in several chaptersof Agenda 21, although not in a separate chapter.Finally in 1996 the UN Intergovernmental Forum onForests (IFF) passed an action programme for forestmanagement dealing with soils and soil conservationin connection with plantation management and vul-nerable ecosystems. These declarations have onething in common, which is their non-binding statusunder international law and hence their limitedeffectiveness. Nevertheless, this process has givenrise to an international frame of reference fromwhich the actors could take their orientation andwhich contributed to wider public awareness of theproblem.

International soil conservation policy gained anew quality when UNCED adopted a convention toprotect soils in arid regions, the United Nations Con-vention to Combat Desertification in those Coun-tries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertifi-cation, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD).This bindinginstrument under international law came into beingprimarily at the instigation of the African countries,which see the UNCCD as ‘their’ convention. NGOsand the scientific community played an importantrole in negotiating the UNCCD through to comple-tion, which is reflected in the prominent positiontaken up by NGOs in the implementation of the con-vention (Corell, 1999). Also the OECD countriespushed for NGOs to have a prominent position in thehope that the implementation of the convention’saims would bring about processes of democratiza-tion. For NGOs and for governments alike, this aspi-

ration will call for a parallel learning process. Giventhis institutional design, the UNCCD could functionas a future role model (Danish, 1995b).

Since the UNCCD is restricted to (arid, semi-aridand sub-humid) drylands, it only partially coversglobal land degradation, having come into being inthe aftermath of the large-scale droughts in the Saheland the failed 1977 Plan of Action to Combat Deser-tification. Thus the UNCCD has explicit links withpoverty and is distinct in this respect from the othertwo Rio conventions on climate and biodiversity.

But the linkages to soils are becoming ever clearerin the parallel negotiation processes on climate andbiodiversity. The discussion on counting biologicalsources and sinks towards commitments to reducegreenhouse gases is relevant to soil conservation, asis the debate on biodiversity conservation. Thesedevelopments show that where global soil conserva-tion is concerned, there is a regulatory gap at theinternational level and this gives rise to the questionof whether the restriction of the binding regulationsunder international law to drylands only is still inkeeping with the times (Pilardeaux, 1999).

The Council recognized this development at anearly stage and as long ago as 1994 recommended thecreation of a global soil convention, which con-tributed a decisive impulse to this debate (WBGU,1995a). In 1997, the Protestant Academy in Tutzing,Germany took up this proposal and held an interna-tional conference attended by leading environmentalscientists who recommended the preparation of adraft global soil convention. Finally, in 1998 a firstmultilingual draft was presented (TISC, 1998).ISRIC and UNEP also took a leading role in pro-moting awareness of worldwide land degradation bycompiling the GLASOD database. In gathering thisdatabase which presents worldwide soil destructionon the basis of expert assessments the extent of thisinsidious process was exposed for the first time on aglobal scale. Since then work has progressed on thecompilation of a new global database on the condi-tion of soils (Haber et al., 1999).

Meanwhile this proposal has also gained the sup-port of the two major pedological organizations, theInternational Union on Soil Sciences (IUSS) andsince 1996 the International Soil Conservation Orga-nization (ISCO). Another decisive step is that theWorld Conservation Union’s (IUCN) Environmen-tal Law Centre in Bonn established a sustainablesoils working group in 2001.The most recent supportfor a global soil convention comes from the GermanCouncil of Environmental Advisors (SRU) whichalso gives its backing to this proposal in its annualreport for 2000 (SRU, 2000).



It was the scientific community that first took aninterest in soils, initially as an object of study, then asa resource requiring conservation. This stimulated aseries of non-binding political declarations of intenton soil conservation. Critical experiences for theinternational community were the droughts andfamines in the arid regions of Africa in the 1960s and1970s, which made it clear that loss of soils could haveexistential consequences. Even today, these eventshave a strong imprint on the public perception of thecontinent in crisis.An initial political response by theUN was the convening of the World Conference onDesertification in 1977. Building on experience fromthe Plan of Action which was adopted there but laterfoundered, in the run-up to the Rio de Janeiro EarthSummit (1992) the African countries initiated theagreement of a convention on soil conservation,albeit restricted to arid regions. The Earth Summitwas a historic opportunity to put this proposal intoaction successfully. The agreement of the UNCCDwas thus also dependent on good timing and theexploitation of a favourable moment, in which theemphasis was on putting into practice the much-invoked spirit of Rio.

Another decisive step in heightening awareness ofsoil degradation was the presentation in 1990 of afirst global status report on soils, which exposed thisinsidious process before the eyes of the internationalcommunity. Thus the impulse for discussion of aglobal soil convention came once again from the sci-entific community. Carried forward by a GermanNGO, this discussion has now taken on an interna-tional character and a momentum of its own. If thereis to be any extension of the UNCCD, the principalconcern will be to take into account the backgroundto its emergence and the interests of the developingcountries, especially the link with poverty (Pilar-deaux, 1998). Overall, past experiences show that inthe initial negotiation phases of global environmen-tal regimes, the NGOs, scientific establishments andthe United Nations can assume an important pio-neering role. At the same time, the timing of such amajor advance is central to its success.

C 2.5Recommendations for action and research

From the divergent experience gained in the ozone,climate change and soil conservation regimes, theCouncil concludes for the agenda-setting phase:

• International organizations that address environ-mental problems in a targeted manner are indis-pensable actors in periods in which no major stateis willing to take the lead in developing and imple-menting solutions. They are also indispensable intheir function as forums for states willing to take aleadership role, where such states can canvass fortheir initiatives within the community of nations.

• Independent scientific advisory bodies, such as theIPCC in the climate change regime, have specialimportance. Establishing an IntergovernmentalPanel on Soils could therefore be a way to raisethe priority of soil degradation on the interna-tional and national agendas.

• The priority accorded to environmental problemsvaries according to the specific setting and coun-try; in developing countries, in particular, the envi-ronmental policy debates of the North can quicklybecome perceived as a threat to economic devel-opment goals. Consequently care needs to betaken in such cases from the very outset, includingthe agenda-setting phase, to ensure multilaterallyacceptable institutional design in which economicand development policy issues, as components ofthe guiding vision of sustainable development, arenot relegated to second place behind the environ-mental issue.

C 3Institutionalization and regime dynamics

C 3.1Introduction

How can international agreement on certain prob-lems of global change be reached in a better mannerand more quickly? This section centres on the ques-tion of the extent to which certain ‘institutionaldesigns’ or ‘institutional arrangements’ (von Prit-twitz, 2000) are suited to ensuring swift and appro-priate reactions to deficiencies in coping with exist-ing problems or responses to new problems. Thesequestions are discussed taking the example of threeinstitutions, but also from the perspective of a gener-alizable arrangement that may serve as a model forfuture institutional designs.

C 3.2The ozone regime: Institutionalization anddynamics

C 3.2.1The process of institutionalization

One cornerstone of the success of the ozone regimeis that a multi-stage process was pursued, movingfrom a framework convention over a protocol to sub-sequent, regular tightenings. Thus the 1985 ViennaConvention for the Protection of the Ozone Layerdoes not yet itself contain any concrete commitmentsto limit emissions of CFCs and other ozone-depletingsubstances, but only calls for ‘appropriate measures’and creates a framework within which to cooperatein scientific research and systematic observationsand to exchange information. In addition, it providesfor regular conferences of the parties at which todebate the state of scientific research and consult onfurther measures (Greene, 1992). It was only the 1987Montreal Protocol that introduced specific obliga-tions of the parties to reduce the production and con-sumption of certain ozone-depleting substances. Aremarkable aspect is that the Montreal Protocol

already distinguishes between industrialized anddeveloping countries, giving the latter a special posi-tion (Article 5).

However, the provisions of the Montreal Protocolwere not yet sufficient, because the reduction targetsdid not go far enough, only some of the harmful sub-stances were covered and important states such asChina and India remained outside of the regime. Afirst amendment to the Protocol was therefore madein 1990. Importantly, this improved the conditions fordeveloping countries, leading to China and India rat-ifying the Protocol (Hurlbut, 1993). By 1998, two fur-ther amendments and a total of four tightenings(‘adjustments’) of reduction targets were made. In1999, further amendments and tightenings of reduc-tion targets were decided on in Peking, but are notyet in force.

C 3.2.2Effects of specific institutional design

Which institutional designs have proven particularlyapt to promote the success of this regime and couldtherefore be transferred to other issue areas? A firstnoteworthy aspect is that a framework-convention-cum-protocol approach was chosen for the ozoneregime, whereby each protocol must be ratified sepa-rately and is therefore only binding upon the ratify-ing states. Although this approach harbours the riskthat many states make general declarations of intentwithout entering into any concrete commitments, theozone regime has in fact shown that this must not bethe case if commitments are linked to acceptableconditions. A related important aspect is that asmany states as possible are integrated at an earlystage into the regime and that a negotiating environ-ment is created that facilitates later consensus. TheCouncil therefore considers this to be a suitablemodel, considering that a convention imposing strictcommitments would from the very outset keep alarge part of the community of states away from fur-ther debate.


The Vienna Convention and the Montreal Proto-col were accepted by industrialized and (following1990) developing countries alike, regardless of thefact that, to this day, the ozone problem has notgained any particular prominence within developingcountries (Section C 2.2.2). The fact that nonethelessmuch more than half of all the states that have rati-fied the Montreal Protocol until now are developingcountries is attributable above all to the circum-stance that the Protocol addresses their special needs(Birnie and Boyle, 1992).

This is done through the ‘common but differenti-ated responsibilities’ relating to reduction targets(Benedick, 1998) but also and particularly throughthe establishment of a multilateral fund to cover theincremental costs incurred by developing countriesin implementing their commitments. The developingand industrialized countries each provide half of thevoting members of the Executive Committee of thefund. Decisions must be taken by a two-thirds major-ity; balance within this majority is ensured by therequirement that it must comprise separate simplemajorities among the developing and industrializednations.

The provisions on technical assistance are alsoimportant. In addition to the commitment to providetechnologies and ozone-benign substitutes to thedeveloping countries under favourable terms, theMontreal Protocol also expressly states that thecapability of developing countries to comply withtheir commitments depends upon the sufficient pro-vision of financial and technical assistance (Parson,1993).

Voting procedures have also been crucial to thefurther development of the Montreal Protocol.Amendments to the Protocol require ratification ineach case in order to become binding; however,annexes to the Protocol or their adjustment (this con-cerns essentially the inclusion in the lists of con-trolled substances of new substances found to havean ozone-depleting effect) are binding through atwo-thirds majority decision, even upon states thatdid not vote in favour. Such states have the opportu-nity to reject the decision expressly and in writingwithin a certain deadline (‘tacit acceptance’ proce-dure).

A particularly noteworthy aspect is the procedurefor adjusting to new scientific findings ozone deple-tion potential (ODP) values and reduction targetsfor substances already controlled in the annexes:Here a two-thirds majority decision is binding, with-out individual states having the opportunity to rejectthe decision.To ensure balance between the industri-alized and developing countries, here, too, decisionsmust be supported by separate simple majorities ofeach of the two groups. Such a procedure permits

swift response to new scientific findings while at thesame time giving due consideration to group inter-ests. At the level chosen here, the loss of sovereigntyassociated with such voting procedures is slight. TheCouncil therefore proposes to promote the use ofsuch a procedure for comparable decisions in otherissue areas, and recommends the system of majoritydecisions together with the rejection option in orderto achieve a good compromise within the bounds ofwhat is feasible.

Review mechanisms are a further institutionaltool of the ozone regime. By these, the parties com-mit themselves to review, at certain intervals, theagreed control measures on the basis of new scien-tific findings. To prepare these reviews, the partiesuse a panel of experts to be convened specifically forthe assessment. The Council considers such reviewmechanisms, and particularly the pressure created bydeadlines, to be an important tool for ensuring con-tinuous debate and adjusting the regime to newdevelopments and findings. This system is readilytransferable to other issue areas.

Furthermore, the Montreal Protocol prohibits(applying differentiated deadlines) trade in ozone-depleting substances with non-party states. One pur-pose of this is to prevent competitive advantages aris-ing for non-party states. For an environmental prob-lem the solution of which depends upon the globalaction of all states, such a measure is crucial, as itincreases the attractiveness of accession to theregime, particularly for such states that may be ableto profit from financial and technical assistance.

Non-governmental actors have influenced theozone negotiations decisively, for instance by pro-moting research projects and influencing publicopinion and governments (Benedick, 1998). Suchactors have no participation rights, but can receiveobserver status at the meetings of the parties uponrequest, as long as this is not rejected by at least two-thirds of the states. The Council therefore reiteratesits recommendation, already made in previousreports, that the rights of environmental associationsto be heard in international environmental regimesbe strengthened.

C 3.3The regime for the protection of the marineenvironment: Institutionalization and dynamics


Hardly any other problem of global change has sucha complex web of causes and effects as the protection

79The regime for the protection of the marine environment C 3.3

of the world’s oceans, one of the oldest activity areasof global environmental policy. Marine environmen-tal policy is characterized by a unique degree of inter-play between global and regional problematiquesand interdependencies. While the ecosystems ofregional seas are jeopardized by the discharges oftheir coastal states, they are potentially also damagedby global factors: International shipping, the activi-ties of distant water fishing nations, long-range airpollution and, not least, stratospheric ozone deple-tion and impending climate change.

Political institutionalization is correspondinglycomplex. Instead of only one institution, as is the casefor climate protection, here states have agreed uponcommon rules for specific issues in several dozenglobal and regional treaties and programmes ofaction. There is a considerable institutional dynamicin international marine environmental protection.For instance, the 1954 OILPOL regime was modifiedrepeatedly, until it was finally replaced by the MAR-POL agreement (MARPOL, 1973), which was nolonger limited to oil discharges. MARPOL itself hassubsequently been specified by a series of annexes,which generally require specific ratification; these, inturn, have undergone numerous amendments andtightenings (Beckert and Breuer, 1991; Biermann,1994).An agreement adopted in 1972 largely prohib-ited the deliberate disposal at sea of wastes (dump-ing), apart from a few types of residues; here, too, theinitially still weak agreement was successivelystrengthened through step-wise tightening (König,1997).

In contrast, marine pollution from land-basedsources, ranging from the pollution loads of riversthrough to long-distance air pollution, is far less insti-tutionalized (Nollkaemper, 1996). The only actiontaken here was the adoption, in 1995 in Washington,of a Global Programme of Action for the Protectionof the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activ-ities. Its implementation since then has been sluggish(Biermann, 1998a, b). The only issue to have beenaddressed is that of discharges of persistent organicpollutants (POPs), for which a special regime underinternational law has been negotiated since 1998,which is expected to lead to an outcome in 2001(Biermann and Wank, 2000).

C 3.3.2Effects of specific institutional design

What lessons can be learnt from the specific institu-tional design of international marine environmentalpolicy? It first needs to be noted that the main prob-lem of marine environmental policy is land-basedpollution, which is responsible for 80 per cent of total

marine pollution. This includes long-range air pollu-tion, pollutant discharges via rivers and from coastalsettlements. The urbanization and utilization ofcoastal zones, particularly in developing countries, iscontinuing to intensify and will trigger mountingmarine pollution (Section B 2.3). As yet, the onlyinstitutional response to this is the 1995 Global Pro-gramme of Action. This, however, has neither com-prehensive global decision-making procedures normonitoring and implementation procedures such asthose available to the climate or ozone regimes.Marine pollution from land-based sources is first ofall a problem of individual regions; however, the con-sequences of regional failure, such as the loss of near-coast biological diversity and, in particular, of corralreefs, makes land-based marine pollution a coreglobal problem, too.

Until now, UNEP has tackled land-based emis-sions primarily through its Regional Seas Pro-gramme.This has succeeded in adopting, step by step,institutional arrangements for environmental protec-tion among the coastal states of specific regional seas(Dejeant-Pons, 1987; Hohmann, 1989; Biermann,1994). This UNEP initiative has primarily targetedAfrica, Asia and Latin America, as the industrializedcountries had already established regional marineenvironmental institutions of their own accord in the1970s (Haas, 1993). The UNEP programme has hadstriking initial successes. Nonetheless, the Councilwould ask whether it suffices for African states toagree among each other to reduce their land-baseddischarges, or whether this regionalism of financiallyoften overburdened developing countries should notrather be supported and supplemented by a globalassistance initiative for regional seas.

The Council therefore recommends pressingahead with implementation of the 1995 Global Pro-gramme of Action. It further suggests that suchefforts should include providing financial, technicaland administrative assistance to the overburdenedstates in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Further-more, the Council reiterates its recommendation,already made in 1995, to establish stronger interna-tional institutions for combating land-based marinepollution. In the same vein, the legally non-bindingGlobal Programme of Action should be substitutedover the medium term by a convention binding underinternational law, with comprehensive monitoringand reporting duties, appropriate mechanisms for thetransfer of finances and technology, and an intensi-fied programme of research, advice and training.Thiscould be modelled on selected elements of the con-ventions launched at the Rio Earth Summit, such asthe Desertification Convention with its national andregional action programmes, or the BiodiversityConvention. Where there is definite scientific proof


of regional interdependence among coastal states, itmay be appropriate to introduce an emissions trad-ing scheme among these coastal states for certainemissions, as long as corresponding monitoring sys-tems can be established.

In comparison, efforts to control pollution fromshipping appear successful in general, althoughrecurrent tanker spills bear testimony to the continu-ing need for action; it would be premature to declarethe problem solved. The experience gained in thismore than 40-year process of institutionalizationcannot be transferred in all details to other issues, butdoes illustrate the importance of specific institutionaldesign.This includes in the opinion of the Council thefindings of Mitchell (1994), who attributed the initialfailure and later success of the regulations designedto combat oil discharges at sea to changes in the spe-cific design of the respective prohibitions: Maximumemission standards only make sense if they can bemonitored by enforcement agencies, particularly atsea, but also in other issue areas – this is the main les-son to be learnt from the early OILPOL regime.

The success of the MARPOL regime is also basedupon its specific system comprising a framework con-vention and annexes, in other words a system thatlinks a general treaty, that can embrace almost all rel-evant states, to specific annexes. Some of theseannexes are binding upon all parties, but some areonly binding upon such states that wish to accept theannex in question. Upon the request of the coastalstates of a regional sea – and with the agreement ofthe other state parties – annexes can be tightened ordelimited, particularly endangered marine areas(termed ‘Special Areas’, such as the North Sea forcertain types of discharge). Despite this essentiallyfavourable assessment of the institutional design ofthe MARPOL regime, the Council considers furtherpolitical efforts indispensable. In particular, it recom-mends to the German government that it shouldwork towards broader application of the MARPOLstandards. As this will generally concern developingcountries, it will involve providing further financial,technical and administrative assistance.

A further institutional innovation of the MAR-POL regime is its specific procedure for developingits annexes. This makes amendments agreed bymajority decision binding upon all states, unless theyobject expressly (‘tacit acceptance’ procedure)(Oberthür, 1997). The Council considers such a pro-cedure to be an ideal compromise between therequirement of being able to react swiftly to changingsituations and the continuing insistence of statesupon their sovereignty. This insistence makes truemajority decisions, such as are possible under Article2 para 9 of the Montreal Ozone Protocol (Section C

3.3.1), appear improbable at present in other issueareas.

A further interesting aspect of marine environ-mental policy is that it highlights the decisive role ofinternational organizations. Thus the Secretariat ofthe International Maritime Organization (IMO)played a critical role in initiating, planning and imple-menting the decisions taken within the MARPOLregime. The World Maritime University (WMU) setup by IMO in Sweden, one task of which is to trainadministrative officials from developing countries, isanother innovative element.

UNEP has also played a crucial role. In particular,the regional seas programmes in Africa, Asia andLatin America would not have got under way with-out the initiative of UNEP as the global institutionalcentre for these regional efforts. However, it needs tobe noted that the initiative of UNEP, a relativelysmall institution, meets its limits here: UNEP canraise awareness in the capital cities of the coastalstates of the need for regional policies to protect themarine environment and can disseminate informa-tion worldwide. Even a certain initial financing ispossible, as was provided when the MediterraneanAction Plan was initiated in the mid-1970s(Skjærseth, 1993; Biermann, 2000a). However, UNEPcannot provide comprehensive financial and techno-logical assistance for developing countries.This is thecrux in the South, with its very densely populatedcoastal cities and almost complete absence of coastalenvironmental protection infrastructure. There arealso numerous examples of the important role playedby non-governmental organizations. For instance, thewhaling ban regime would not have been put in placeso quickly without the commitment of private-sectorenvironmental groups; for some species it wouldprobably have come too late altogether (Peterson,1992).

A special feature of marine environmental policyis the broad-scale change that its political fundamen-tals have undergone, particularly through the recog-nition of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastalstates of up to 200 sea miles.This amounts de facto toan allocation of property rights to what was previ-ously a common property resource – and on a majorscale, considering that more than 90 per cent of fishstocks worldwide are situated today in the EEZs(Gündling, 1983). According to the theory of com-mon property resources, we might expect that thisallocation of property rights improves marineresource conservation. There are indeed indicationspointing in this direction. As a consequence,improved use of stocks in the EEZs has led to inten-sified competition over fish stocks in the remaininghigh seas. This has created new lines of internationalconflict, as evidenced by the ‘halibut war’ between

81The biodiversity regime C 3.4

the European Union and Canada. A new interna-tional agreement to be concluded in 1994, part of theRio follow-up process, shall now improve this situa-tion.

In summary, the Council wishes to note that theuse of the high seas in particular, but also of theEEZs, for transportation and resource extraction(mining and fishing) may require stronger interna-tional institutions.While in many environmental pol-icy arenas decentralized approaches are morepromising, the ‘freedom of the seas’ presents anexample of the need for international authoritiesthat, as trustees of the global commons representedby the oceans, introduce certain uniform standardsfor the transport, fishing and mining industries. IMOin London and the International Seabed Authority inKingston, Jamaica, represent first steps in this direc-tion. It is recommendable to strengthen the regula-tory powers of these organizations (see also WBGU,1996).

C 3.4The biodiversity regime: Institutionalization anddynamics


The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)is a milestone in biosphere conservation policy. TheCouncil analysed and evaluated this in great depth(WBGU, 2001), so that reference can be made hereto the detailed recommendations elaborated in thatreport.

Concerning the institutional treatment of thisproblem, it is important to note that both the use ofand threats to biological diversity are decentralized.The issue is thus not one of preventing worldwideemissions of certain substances, as is the case in theclimate change and ozone regimes. Because, more-over, knowledge on biological diversity remainshighly incomplete – there are no comprehensive sta-tus analyses, not to mention threat analyses, and mea-surements and comparisons are highly problematic –efforts to conserve and use biological diversity in asustainable way and to share the benefits arisingfrom the use of genetic resources remain exceedinglycomplex tasks.

Consequently, the CBD, which entered into forcein 1993, contains no concrete, quantitative commit-ments for the 177 parties (still without the USA), butinitially establishes, by formulating overarchingobjectives, principles and standards, a shared under-standing of how to manage biological diversity

(Suplie, 1995). The Convention thus contains neitherspecies nor ecosystem lists, nor goals concerningoverall areas to be given protected status, nor does itstipulate ‘hard’ restrictions. Instead, it creates theconceptual foundation for biodiversity management,by combining conservation, sustainable use and ben-efit-sharing. Implementation of this global frame-work needs to take place above all at the nationallevel, in which the Convention provides assistancethrough knowledge and technology transfer andthrough its financial mechanism (Glowka et al.,1994).

In January 2000, a first Protocol to the Conventionwas adopted: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.This Protocol, which has been signed in the mean-time by more than 60 states, aims to promote the safemanagement of genetically modified organisms. Itbears testimony to the developmental and functionalcapability of the Convention. The InternationalUndertaking on Plant Genetic Resources maybecome a further protocol. The Undertaking is cur-rently being renegotiated under the auspices of FAOin order to harmonize it with the CBD.A ‘Forest Pro-tocol’ as proposed by the Council (WBGU, 1996,2001) would be a possible and purposeful comple-ment to the CBD.

A second avenue of substantive development isalso open to the Convention: Working on sectoralthemes by developing programmes of work or guide-lines. Over the years, the Conference of the Partieshas discussed a series of ecosystem types and cross-cutting issues. Nonetheless, institutional deficitsremain (WBGU, 2000a), which led to a review of theexisting institutional structures in the regime in orderto identify critical points and possible gaps. Thus itwas found that there is a need to improve the inte-gration of scientific expertise and the review ofimplementation, and corresponding proposals weremade for further institutional development.

C 3.4.2Effects of the specific institutional design

Considering the unabated loss of biological diversity(WBGU, 2001), the impact of biodiversity policy isinsufficient. In the following, the Council analyseswhether the lack of success to date is attributable todesign errors in the institutional architecture. Theanalysis examines only the CBD; the other agree-ments (e.g. CITES, CMS, Ramsar) and organizationsfor biosphere conservation are not discussed here(see on this WBGU, 2001).

Under the Convention, all states are subject to thesame commitments, apart from the special commit-ment of industrialized countries to provide technol-


ogy transfer and to meet the agreed full incrementalcosts incurred by developing countries in implement-ing their commitments under the Convention. TheConvention takes into consideration not only theconcepts of nature conservation and access to geneticresources, which are particularly important to theindustrialized countries, but also those of sustainableuse and benefit-sharing, which are important objec-tives for developing countries. Consideration is thusgiven to the interests of both groups of states; this isan important precondition to the broad acceptanceof the Convention (Biermann, 1998b).

The involvement of non-governmental organiza-tions and of the scientific community (both withinand outside of delegations) in negotiation processeshas proven beneficial to the further development ofthe Convention. Here, again, the framework-conven-tion-cum-protocol approach appears to be success-ful, as it has facilitated broad acceptance of the Con-vention and, moreover, permits flexible adjustmentto newly emerging regulatory needs. The step-wisetreatment of specific issues (ecosystem types, cross-cutting issues) by the Conference of the Parties islikewise expedient to provide concrete conceptualsupport to the parties in the process of implementa-tion.

However, there is a major need to improve theinstitutional integration of scientific input. The roleof the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical andTechnological Advice (SBSTTA) lacks clear defini-tion: Neither can it provide independent, scientificexpertise, nor is it an entirely politically controlledbody. SBSTTA is exhibiting a tendency to become a‘mini-COP’. Valuable negotiating time is often usedfor politically motivated debates. The result is, giventhe voluminous agendas of the meetings, that littletime is left for scientific work.This work is then dele-gated to external workshops or to the conventionsecretariat, which is not really a solution. There is alack of coordinated input from the scientific commu-nity comparable to that already realized by the cli-mate regime in the shape of the IPCC (Section E 1).Regular reports from an ‘Intergovernmental Panelon Biological Diversity’ (IPBD), as already proposedby the Council elsewhere (WBGU, 2001), could rem-edy this situation and ensure the necessary indepen-dent scientific advice. SBSTTA would then functionas a transmission belt between science and policy,using the IPBD reports to forge scientificallyfounded draft resolutions for the Conference of theParties. In order to ensure broad acceptance of thereports, notably in developing countries, care wouldneed to be taken that the selection of IPBD scientistsis geographically balanced.

The voting procedure of the Convention currentlyrests on the principle of unanimity. This can lead to

gridlock situations, which delay negotiations. Conse-quently, in view of the unabated loss of biologicaldiversity, the Council recommends moving awayfrom the veto principle towards a system of qualifiedmajority decisions, modelled on, for instance, that ofthe Montreal Protocol, which provides for separatesimple majorities among the developing and indus-trialized nations.

At present, the fact that no clearly quantifiabletargets are stipulated and successes can therefore notbe measured readily is hampering national imple-mentation. There is a lack of jointly adopted, con-crete and measurable goals, such as protected areatargets or guard rails (WBGU, 2001). This is com-pounded by unresolved methodological issues ofindicator development, and also fundamental resis-tance against the development of cross-national indi-cators. It would be valuable if the data for such indi-cator parameters could be published in the pre-scribed national reports. This would, first, facilitate aglobal overview of the state and trend of biologicaldiversity and, second, would also generate politicalpressure in the states party to the Convention – thiscan accelerate implementation and awareness-build-ing.

Thanks to the wealth of experience that NGOshave in practical implementation, collaboration withthem is generally constructive and beneficial to thegoals of the Convention. Involvement of NGOs inthe Convention process – in many instances also innational delegations – has positive effects but can stillbe improved. The importance of side events duringConvention meetings, at which environmental asso-ciations hold workshops or presentations on specificitems of the agenda or on new issues or initiatives, isalso not to be underestimated.

The notion of designing the Biodiversity Conven-tion as an umbrella agreement had to be abandonedearly on in the negotiations, because, among otherreasons, the various biodiversity-relevant conven-tions have different membership constellations.Nonetheless, the example of collaboration with theRamsar Convention in the sphere of inland watershas shown that it is indeed possible to tackle issuesjointly, avoid duplication of efforts and divide labour.This example provides a model for cooperation withother conventions and organizations in overlappingareas.

C 3.5Alternative avenues: International cooperationwith non-state actors

Global environmental policy extends beyond gov-ernmental regulation through international regimes.

83Alternative avenues: International cooperation with non-state actors C 3.5

Increasingly, international environmental solutionsare being formulated and implemented in processesof consultation and negotiation among state andnon-state actors. Over the past decade, an array ofinternational cooperative arrangements haveemerged according to the motto ‘governance withoutgovernment’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Young,1994; Zürn, 1998), in which private-sector actors, suchas multinational corporations and environmentalgroups, have played a leading role. In his address tothe 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, UN Sec-retary-General Kofi Annan called upon internationalcorporations to enter into a global pact in which theycommit themselves to observe in their operationscertain principles of human rights, labour rights andenvironmental protection, thus supporting corre-sponding government policies. This calls for a pre-cautionary approach in environmental protection,and for initiatives to promote heightened environ-mental awareness and to develop and disseminateenvironmentally sound technologies.

In many instances, economic and civil societyactors pursue common international environmentalprotection goals upon the basis of voluntary commit-ments. Empirical studies on globalization haveshown that strategic alliances among companies havereceived a fresh impetus since the mid-1980s (Mur-ray and Mahon, 1993; Beisheim et al., 1999).The aimsof such alliances are to cut costs through jointresearch, tap new markets and distribution channelsor have a say in the development of internationalenvironmental standards. The World Business Coun-cil for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and theEuropean Business Council for a Sustainable EnergyFuture (e5) are prominent examples.

The WBCSD, for instance, is a coalition of 120companies drawn from 30 countries and 20 majorindustrial sectors united by a shared commitment toenvironmental protection and sustainable develop-ment.The WBCSD argues for this coalition by point-ing out that an orientation to sustainable develop-ment is in companies’ best interests, also with a viewto competitive advantages and prospects of new salesmarkets and distribution channels (Schmidheiny,1992). The WBCSD aims to participate in shapingframework conditions and promote sustainabledevelopments and sees three preconditions to this:Economic growth, environmental balance and socialprogress (WBCSD, 1998, 1999). A further aim of theWBCSD’s global network is to contribute to sustain-able development in developing nations and nationsin transition. The WBCSD seeks to define animproved understanding of what sustainable devel-opment really means for companies.When it is a mat-ter of environmental quality targets, sustainableproducts, production processes or environmental

management, companies often cooperate not onlywith other companies, but join forces with environ-mental groups, too, thus leading to the emergence ofnetworks of cross-border and global alliances.

Worldwide product certification initiatives, fre-quently termed ‘stewardship councils’, are furtherplayers in this international non-state cooperationfor environmental protection. For instance, in thecertification of timber and fish products, companiescommit themselves in cooperation with environmen-tal associations and government agencies to utilizenatural resources in a sustainable manner and tosupply consumers with products that have been har-vested and processed in an environmentally soundfashion.

The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), for exam-ple, was founded in 1993 as an internationally inde-pendent, non-profit institution bringing together rep-resentatives from environmental groups, the timbertrade, the forestry profession, indigenous peoplesand forest product certification organizations. TheFSC is an institution with official membership, andhas a General Assembly as supreme body. The Gen-eral Assembly has two chambers, each of which hasvoting rights and meets every 2–3 years. The firstchamber represents economic interests with 25 percent of voting rights, the second represents environ-mental interests and social concerns with 75 per centof voting rights. In each chamber, voting rights aredistributed equally between developing and industri-alized countries.

The objectives of the FSC are to support environ-mentally appropriate, socially beneficial and eco-nomically viable management of the world’s forests.The FSC does not certify products itself; rather itassures consumers that certification organizationsare credible. The FSC provides this assurance byevaluating, accrediting and monitoring certifiers. Theorganizations thus accredited by the FSC carry outforest inspections and grant certificates if the criteriadefined by the FSC are met. The FSC criteria can beapplied to all types of timber. Their design is so flexi-ble that national and regional standards are takeninto consideration. Furthermore, national certifica-tion systems are strengthened by promoting forestmanagement capacities through training andnational certification initiatives.To this end, national,regional and local working groups are formed thatensure that certification is based upon actual, locallydefined management practices.

In these policy avenues, particular importancethus attaches to the environmental associations:Theygenerally represent public interests, such as the wishof consumers to have environmentally sound prod-ucts. They also play an important role as opinionmakers, by disseminating information and knowl-


edge on certified products to the public and thus con-tributing to their marketing. Moreover, environmen-tal groups assist in implementing agreements and inmonitoring these (Schmidt and Take, 1997; Take,1998; Schmidt, 2000). Environmental groups not onlymonitor projects, but also provide back-up and sup-port (Sollis, 1996). Due to lacking capacities andresources, political systems in developing countriesare frequently unable to implement projects them-selves, so that environmental associations from theNorth forge alliances with these countries (Bichsel,1996;Take, 1999). In these strategic alliances, the gov-ernmental institutions involved don’t play a regula-tory role, but rather adopt a moderating function, forinstance by supporting communication and coordi-nation. It yet remains to be seen whether interna-tional cooperation among private-sector companiesor certification initiatives will contribute to the sus-tainable use of global resources. Be this as it may, theCouncil views this as an incentive system that shouldbe kept in mind as a valuable complement to inter-governmental cooperation.

C 3.6Lessons from game theory for internationalnegotiations

C 3.6.1Introduction to game theory

Our look at agenda setting (Chapter C 2.2.2) showedwhy the political and public debate and mediareporting tend to concentrate on particular environ-mental policy topics and negotiations. This height-ened interest results from the experience that there isgenerally a yawning gulf between expectations uponthe outcome of a round of negotiations and theresults actually achieved for the global environment.Disappointment is registered over the duration ofthe negotiations, agreements that lack concrete goalsor set unambitious targets, and poor enforcement.

One explanation for the problems encountered inarriving at tangible and effective negotiation out-comes in international environmental policy is pro-vided by the theory of games in economics.The appa-ratus of game theory has been extended and refinedover the past years in order to take account of thepeculiarities of international negotiations relating toenvironmental policy (Barrett, 1997a; Endres andFinus, 2000; Finus, 2000). Game theory aims toanalyse individually rational behaviour in specificnegotiation situations. Individually rational behav-iour on the part of politicians, staff within authoritiesand voters frequently prevents international agree-

ments from coming into being and from being com-plied with. Global environmental problems are spe-cial in that they require concerted action by manycountries. For an individual country, therefore, incen-tives for freerider behaviour arise; in other words,countries rely on other countries investing in envi-ronmental protection in order to reduce the damage.In this way they attempt to avoid the economic andsocial costs of environmental protection and the pos-sible social conflicts associated with it in their owncountry. According to this view, a country behavesrationally if it waits for others to act. At the sametime, an individual country on its own can only con-tribute very little to the protection of the global envi-ronment. The worldwide significance of Germany asan emitter of greenhouse gases is too small for it tomake much of an impact on the global climate on itsown by reducing emissions. In the extreme case, thiscould produce a constellation of circumstances inwhich individually sensible behaviour by individualstates leads the negotiations into an impasse, in otherwords:• No international agreement is reached because

each country is afraid of being taken advantage ofby the others, and of being unable to make anyreal impact itself on the global environment.

• An international agreement is reached but it isbased on such a low common denominator that itwill in fact do nothing to change existing environ-mental hazards.

• An international agreement is reached but it is notactually implemented, because violations of theagreement cannot be monitored nor sanctionsimposed.

Thus the expectation that an international treaty willbring positive impulses overall for the global envi-ronment is not enough in itself to bring it about andensure its implementation. Rather, in a world madeup of individual sovereign states, for a country toenter into an agreement and also comply with it suchan agreement needs to hold benefits for that country.This also enhances the certainty of expectations andindependence from ethical-moral behaviour. If anenvironmental agreement benefits every country,then there is greater assurance that it will be imple-mented; there is also added protection againstchanges in the political balance of power and eco-nomic or social crises (Pies, 1994; Wink, 2000).

Most global environmental problems, however,are not very well suited to producing constellationsthat can offer benefits to every country via a jointagreement on environmental protection (Klemmeret al., 2000). Obstacles to this include– the fact that countries are affected in different

ways by environmental damage, an example of

85Lessons from game theory for international negotiations C 3.6

this being the geographical differences in theexpected consequences of global warming,

– the fact that countries view environmental dam-age, and the significance of the time horizon till itoccurs, very differently, as can be seen for examplein the different views regarding the loss of futureoptions on use of the biosphere,

– the fact that the costs of preventing environmentaldamage differ, for example the divergent costs ofrestructuring power stations so as to reduce green-house gases,

– the fact that countries take different views of costsarising in connection with prevention of environ-mental damage, for example during a process ofeconomic development in developing countries orin a period of structural unemployment in westernindustrialized countries.

As a rule, additional incentives are needed to encour-age individual countries to participate, and these canbe provided by international negotiations or by thecontent of environmental agreements. The economictheory of games has developed models for examiningthe impact of different designs of negotiations andtreaty content on countries’ willingness to enter intoenvironmental agreements and to adhere to them.Finus (2000) and Bloch (1997) give an overview ofthe hitherto prevailing models of ‘reduced games’and ‘dynamic games’. Because of their theoreticalorigin, the results of game theory analyses can only inrare cases be transposed onto concrete environmen-tal problems and negotiations. Despite its limitedsuitability for providing advice on concrete policy, itis nevertheless possible to distil from it some generalconclusions that can highlight shortcomings in exist-ing processes and at the same time provide clues as topromising strategies for the behaviour of state repre-sentatives in international negotiations.

C 3.6.2Strategic design of negotiations

Positive incentives for negotiations are produced,first, by creating a climate for transacting throughrepeated negotiating and, second, by forming coali-tions. Repeated negotiations situations are createdby the agreement to hold regular conferences of theparties to international agreements, and by thesequence of general declarations of intent in conven-tions and continuous concretization of these in fol-low-up protocols. From a game theory point of view,repeated negotiations offer an opportunity for eachpartner in the negotiations to ‘learn’ from the experi-ences of the previous period (Camerer et al., 1993;Wink, 2000). Contraventions of agreements orunconstructive behaviour in negotiations then carry

the threat of sanctions being brought by other part-ners in the negotiations.As it cannot be foreseen howoften such follow-up negotiations will take place, thedynamics of the negotiations intensify overall andthe certainty of expectations grows that concrete out-comes will be achieved. Moreover, by interlinkingindividual negotiations – for example the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change and the Conventionon Biological Diversity – or by linking environmen-tal agreements to the WTO, the IMF or the WorldBank, a climate for transactions can be developed inwhich each of the partners in the negotiations hasmore to lose in the event of the negotiations failing oragreements being breached, than it can gain by short-term ‘freeriding’. In this context, special emphasismust be given to the impact of such negotiations interms of a country’s reputation (Hoel and Schneider,1997).

Coalitions among individual countries make senseespecially in the case of certain environmental prob-lems where there is a high degree of heterogeneityworldwide in terms of how countries contribute togenerating environmental damage or to preventingit, and in terms of how environmental damage isviewed (Barrett, 1997b; Botteon and Carraro, 1997;Finus and Rundshagen, 1998). Such heterogeneitymakes it unlikely that worldwide solutions of sub-stance can be arrived at via negotiations. An agree-ment among just a few individual states, if thosestates are important as regards a particular environ-mental problem, can achieve greater impulses forglobal environmental protection than laboriouslytrying to arrive at a universal agreement that includesall countries. Thus, for climate protection we canassume that an agreement to reduce greenhouse gasemissions among the Annex I parties would be ableto contribute significantly to solving the problem ifcountries such as China and India could be per-suaded to join in a coalition.

In contrast, game theory models show that littleimpact is likely to be achieved by individual countriestrying to take on the role of pioneer, although thereare often calls for this (Hoel, 1991; Endres, 1997;Finus and Rundshagen, 1998). Unilateral emissionsreductions as a rule take the pressure off other coun-tries and simply encourage them to exploit the will-ingness of the pioneer to carry on doing the ground-breaking work in future, too. In the worst-case sce-nario what happens is that pressure on the globalenvironment is reduced less and the pioneer countryis faced with additional adjustment costs. Often it ismore important to increase incentives for otherimportant emissions-producing countries to enterinto coalitions and to agree to joint implementation.The Council therefore recommends to the Germangovernment that at future negotiations on interna-


tional environmental policy it should devote moreattention to the importance of coalitions of majoremitters and to the incentives that repeated negotiat-ing creates.

C 3.6.3Strategic design of the content of negotiations

The concrete attractiveness of any negotiations andof any agreement is inseparably linked to the effectsexpected from the outcome of the negotiations. Fivebasic options are available for enhancing incentivesto conclude an international agreement:Transfer andcompensation agreements, sanctions, issue linkages,monitoring commitments, and agreements on con-crete instruments.

Agreeing transfer and compensation measures isto be recommended especially in cases where there isa high degree of heterogeneity among the countriesinvolved and a treaty has international distributionaleffects. In this way it is possible to cushion againstsocial hardships and build technological and institu-tional capacities for fulfilling the treaty. With such anagreement it is important to pay attention to incen-tive effects (Mäler, 1990; Heister, 1997). From theperspective of the donor countries, precautions mustbe taken to ensure compliance with provisions relat-ing to implementation, while for the recipient coun-tries the reliability of the transfer is crucial. Discipli-nary effects are to be achieved by setting short timelimits for checking up on the disbursal and use of usercharges, and through structures for reciprocal con-trol; the latter are in place in some funds in the shapeof a double majority requirement for decision-mak-ing (a majority among both donor and recipientcountries). However, the attractiveness of such rulesmust be assessed in the light of each individual envi-ronmental problem. Arguments against non-mone-tary transfers such as technology and equipmentinclude the fact that decisions on the part of thedonor countries may not ‘fit’ the circumstances ofcapital-poor countries, and the lack of flexibility inthe event of breaches of agreements. The Council istherefore in favour of reviewing the design of trans-fer agreements on a case-by-case basis. The Councilalso places special emphasis on the importance of alinkage with measures geared to strengthening theinvolvement of private investors (Chapter D).

In game theory models the intensity of agreedsanctions is a gauge for assessing the predictability oftreaty compliance (Barrett, 1992; Finus and Rund-shagen, 1998). Rational actors will only adhere totreaties if the expected costs of adjustment to thetreaty do not exceed the sanctions that may beexpected in the event of contravening the treaty –

taking into account the likelihood of the contraven-tions being exposed. Ideally, a sanction should betough enough to have the effect of deterring partiesfrom violating the treaty.At the same time it has to besoft enough to bind violators to the treaty subsequentto sanctioning, but not so soft as to encourage viola-tions.And lastly it should not entail disadvantages forthe other parties to the treaty. In view of these diffi-culties, it is no wonder that we have seen poor treatydiscipline and few tough sanctions to date (ChapterC 4.5.1). However, case-by-case examination isrequired to ascertain how incentives to comply withtreaties can be developed. ‘Soft’ sanctions, such aspublicizing treaty violations and linking timely sig-nalling of problems relating to implementation withtransfers, frequently prove more effective than‘tough’ measures. Indeed, the low level of politicalmobilization among the general public concerningcertain areas of environmental policy compared tointernational trade agreements curbs any orientationtowards ‘tough’ measures.

In referring to trade agreements we are at thesame time touching on a kind of agreed treaty con-tent that is based on issue linkages (Heister, 1997;Botteon and Carraro, 1998; Finus, 2000). These pack-ages contain elements that are considered to beadvantageous for each country while at the sametime containing concessions vis-à-vis other countries,which entail adjustment costs. In contrast to transferpayments, what is offered in return here relates toother areas of policy.Thus, signing up and adhering tothe content of a treaty can be linked to access to par-ticular technologies or markets, as was the case forexample in the Convention for the Protection of theOzone Layer. Difficulties arise, however, where ele-ments of the treaty are not entirely stable, or they areexclusive, or they are incompatible with other bodiesof regulation (such as those of the WTO). This strat-egy is therefore best suited to persuading individualespecially significant emitters to become involved intreaty coalitions, or to pushing through an agreementto counter immediate environmental hazards.

In the case of most international environmentalagreements, monitoring has often been agreed anddeveloped only over the course of time (Chapter C4). Through monitoring, incentives for adhering tothe agreement are strengthened, and occasionallyinternational ‘benchmarking’ processes are intro-duced in order to present a positive image to theinternational public. Problems arise as a result ofindividual countries having poor incentives to moni-tor themselves or to expose contraventions of thetreaty in their own countries. Impulses for bettermonitoring can come from involvement of non-gov-ernmental organizations, but also from labellingstrategies pursued by private enterprises (Karl and

87Recommendations for action and research C 3.7

Orwat, 1999). A precondition for effective monitor-ing, however, is interest on the part of the global pub-lic. Not until treaty violations become the subject ofpublic debate and domestic political power processesdo the results of monitoring begin to carry weightand are quests for innovative systems of environ-mental protection triggered. The Council thereforerecommends that the German government shouldsupport the setting up of independent monitoringsystems and private-sector information tools.

The attractiveness of international environmentalagreements may be influenced not least by the choiceof tools adopted to promote compliance with theprovisions agreed. From an economic point of viewthe efficiency potential of flexible instruments basedon market processes, such as international trade inemissions certificates or agreeing international liabil-ity rules, is given special emphasis (WBGU, 2000a).Set against this, however, lack of practical experienceand greater uncertainty with regard to the distribu-tional consequences and feasibility of implementingthese makes international emissions quotas appearthe preferable option (Endres, 1997; Finus and Rund-shagen, 1998). Climate policy nevertheless showshow important it can be to link emissions quotas withmechanisms for international trade in emissions.From a game theory perspective this course seemsparticularly suited to achieving relatively rapid andstable outcomes from negotiations. The Counciltherefore recommends to the German governmentthat it should participate to a greater extent in devel-oping international emissions trading mechanisms inthe context of the Framework Convention on Cli-mate Change, while taking into account the need todefine more precisely how carbon sinks are to bedealt with (WBGU, 1998b).

C 3.6.4Outlook

Game theory analysis of negotiations in interna-tional environmental policy is still in its infancy. Inparticular, application of theoretical findings to con-crete negotiations is lacking, as are efforts to arrive atmore realistic assumptions concerning the level ofinformation and the conditions for action of thoseinvolved (Becker-Soest, 1998; Endres and Ohl, 2000).In future, research impulses are expected especiallyin the following areas– taking into account politico-economic incentives,– taking into account uncertainty relating to envi-

ronmental risks and in the course of adjustment tointernational agreements,

– including incentive effects in multi-level institu-tional systems like the EU,

– taking into account an evolutive perspective onnegotiations along institutional time paths,

– analysing learning processes that take place dur-ing negotiations.

In spite of the above, however, the Council sees theavailable findings of game theory as an importantlead into the analysis of international negotiations.


Institutional design is not the sole determinant of thesuccess of a regime; external factors are also decisive.It is, for instance, striking that the problem of ozonedepletion has attracted great attention worldwide,not only among scientists, but also among thebroader public and is generally perceived as a directthreat. The same cannot be said of the problems ofland-based marine pollution and biodiversity loss,and this may well have contributed to the relativesuccess of the ozone regime. The complexity of thesethree issues differs similarly. For the ozone regime wecan say that certain substances are responsible forozone depletion, and that the obvious answer to theproblem is therefore to stop the production and con-sumption of these substances. The causes of the pol-lution of the oceans and of biodiversity loss are morediverse. Both aspects have played a major role in thedevelopment of the three regimes.

Nonetheless, expedient institutional design isessential for a successful regime. Besides concretecommitments geared to solving the problem as such,an important goal of institutional design is to achievea high level of acceptance of the agreements andmechanisms established. Such acceptance facilitatesimplementation and rapid and issue-focussed furtherdevelopment of the regime. The experience madewith the international institutions analysed hereyields a number of lessons for expedient institutionaldesign in order to facilitate negotiations:• The framework-agreement-cum-protocol appro-

ach is successful. The model of general, broadlyacceptable framework agreements in combinationwith specific protocols or annexes that do notneed to be approved by all states has proven itsutility.This was the approach chosen for the ozoneregime, the MARPOL regime and the biodiversityregime. Although the reason for this choice wasrather that the signatory states were initiallyunable to agree on concrete commitments, at leastthe first two above-mentioned regimes subse-quently institutionalised repeated tightenings oftheir provisions that gained broad-based support.Proponents of an idealistic, but scarcely realisticmaximum position, who complain that a frame-


work-agreement-cum-protocol approach weak-ens environmental protection because individualstates do not go beyond signing the frameworkagreement, fail to realize that these states wouldnot support stricter agreements from the outsetand thus might possibly walk out of the negotiat-ing process early on. A framework-agreement-cum-protocol approach has the advantage of inte-grating as many states as possible from the outsetinto further negotiations.

• Promoting the tacit acceptance procedure. A fur-ther common attribute of the Montreal Protocoland the MARPOL regime is the use of a tacitacceptance procedure for the further develop-ment of annexes. In one important area the Mon-treal Protocol even goes a step further, providingfor qualified majority decisions to tighten reduc-tion targets for substances already listed in theannexes. Both procedures serve to accelerate deci-sions considerably.The tacit acceptance procedureis certainly suited for transfer to other regimes.

• Giving consideration to the special needs of devel-oping countries. One reason for the great successof the Montreal Protocol is that it gives considera-tion to the special needs of developing countries.This is done in particular through the agreementson financial and technical assistance, and throughthe system of ‘common but differentiated respon-sibilities and respective capabilities’. It is thanks tothese agreements that the Montreal Protocol hasgained high acceptance among developing coun-tries. These countries generally command overneither the financial nor the technical capabilitiesto implement environmental agreements effec-tively. Moreover, they fear that their developmentprocess may be impeded, and frequently assumethat the problems were generated in the past bythe industrialized nations. Consideration of thespecial situation of developing countries willtherefore continue to be crucial in future negotia-tion processes. The Biodiversity Convention,which is more recent than the Montreal Protocol,also gives attention to the special needs of devel-oping countries, although the financing mecha-nism has not yet been determined conclusively. Itshould further be noted with respect to global andregional interdependencies that problems whichmay initially appear regional can develop globalrelevance if actors in a certain region initially lackfinancial and technical resources and global inter-ests, such as biodiversity conservation, are endan-gered. In such cases global institutions and strate-gies are essential.

• Strengthening regime review mechanisms. In theopinion of the Council, the review mechanism is afurther successful tool of the ozone regime. This

effectively forces state parties to review the provi-sions of the regime regularly in the light of newfindings. In this connection, the deployment of sci-entific panels whose expertise forms the founda-tion for negotiations is particularly important.Such a review mechanism is particularly suited topromote the further development of a regime andis readily applicable to other problems. Care needsto be taken to ensure geographic balance in theappointment of panel members, in order to ensureacceptance of the panels in developing countries.

• Intensifying advisory input from private interestgroups. The Council reiterates its recommenda-tion made in previous reports to furtherstrengthen the hearing rights of private interestgroups in international institutions and organiza-tions, whereby balanced representation of groupsfrom the North and the South would be desirable.One way to achieve this goal would be to providefinancial support for conference participation bycivil society representatives from the developingworld. Greater support for civil society ‘thinktanks’ in developing countries would also be con-ceivable.

• Building the capacities of international organiza-tions and programmes. International organiza-tions are important actors in a number of issueareas, notably in the initiation, support and reviewof regime formation processes, and should there-fore be strengthened accordingly.

C 4Improving compliance with international agreements

C 4.1Introduction

It does not suffice to create ambitious internationalinstitutions for environmental protection – these alsoneed to be implemented in practice. How can policyensure, through appropriate institutional design, thatthe implementation of global agreements is moni-tored adequately and – if necessary – non-compli-ance sanctioned? Here three elements need to beconsidered:• Suitable procedures and mechanisms for collect-

ing information on the status of implementation.• Appropriate procedures for assessing reports and

other findings and for engaging in initial debate oninternational responses to implementationaldeficits.

• Tools by which to respond to any difficulties orimplementation deficits identified.

These are the elements of appropriate institutionaldesign for improved implementation of internationalagreements.They are discussed in the following usingthree case studies: The regime for the protection ofthe Great Lakes in North America (as an example oftransboundary water resources), the desertificationcontrol regime and the climate change regime.Because of the (once more) particularly innovativerole of the ozone regime, its compliance procedure isalso presented in a Box.

C 4.2Compliance among the institutions fortransboundary water resources management inNorth America

C 4.2.1Background

Since the early 20th century, the USA and Canadahave cooperated closely in monitoring water pollu-tion in the Great Lakes region (WBGU, 1998a). In

1909, the two countries concluded the BoundaryWaters Treaty, containing first provisions governingthe prevention of water pollution and mechanismsfor settling disputes, notably those concerning waterquality. In view of major problems with phosphatepollution and eutrophication in some of the GreatLakes, the two countries adopted in 1972 the GreatLakes Water Quality Agreement, which wasexpanded in 1978. A 1987 implementation protocolattempts for the first time to implement effectivelyan ecosystem approach with the goal of safeguardingwater quality.

To some degree, implementation of the Agree-ment is organized decentrally, in that both nationalgovernments have devolved principal responsibilityto the regional states or provincial governments.However, the International Joint Commission (IJC) already established by the 1909 Boundary WatersTreaty plays a crucial role. Of the six members of thisCommission, three come from each country,appointed in the USA by the President and inCanada by the Prime Minister. The mission of theCommission is to prevent and resolve disputes relat-ing to water use and quality and to advise the gov-ernments of both countries. In the meantime, allboundary waters between the USA and Canada areregulated by the IJC.

C 4.2.2Compliance and monitoring

The IJC, which is charged with monitoring imple-mentation of the decisions taken in the two countries,is responsible for ensuring compliance with theboundary water agreements. To help it in this, theCommission has set up more than 20 boards, whichprovide advice on compliance and monitoring.Theseare joined by eight task forces with specific responsi-bilities, which develop strategies for implementingcertain goals of the agreements. In all bodies, expertsfrom the USA and Canada have equal representa-tion. A noteworthy point is the duty upon the IJC tosubmit biannual reports on goal achievement to the


participating federal and regional governments;these are based upon the information received fromthe monitoring and advising bodies. The budget ofthe Commission only meets the costs of its own work,but does not permit any financing of environmentalpolicy programmes.This disparity between the powerto issue instructions for implementation of the goalsset out in the agreements and the lack of funding toimplement these is a main cause of frustration anddisappointment experienced by many stakeholdergroups in the region (Renn and Finson, 1991).

There are in total four advisory bodies for theGreat Lakes (Science Advisory Board, Water Qual-ity Board, Council of Great Lakes Research Man-agers,Annex-II Advisory Committee), and the Inter-national Advisory Board on Air Pollution as asupraregional advisory body. These bodies have animportant supervisory function, as they support sci-entifically the monitoring programmes, assess theseand identify problems.The resulting information andrecommendations are submitted to the IJC.

Among these bodies, the Water Quality Board andthe Science Advisory Board are the most important.The Water Quality Board is the principal adviser tothe IJC on all aspects relating to compliance with theGreat Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The mem-bers of this body represent the federal and regionalstate authorities responsible for drafting and enforc-ing environmental policy. The task of this body is totranspose the recommendations of the Commissioninto practical directives for the authorities and toevaluate the effectiveness and appropriateness ofprogrammes by comparing, inventorying andanalysing all data and information.The Science Advi-sory Board was set up in 1978 to provide the Com-mission and the Water Quality Board with scientificadvice relating to their tasks. According to Renn andFinson (1991) the Water Quality Board is far morecautious and conservative in its political formula-tions than the Commission and the Science AdvisoryBoard. This is presumably a reflection of the admin-istrative preference for continuity of established pro-grammes and for taking decisions in agreement withthe – often conflicting – stakeholder groups.

For their part, the two parties to the agreementsmeet annually to coordinate the action plans forimplementation of the agreements and to reviewprogress. The 1978 agreement stipulates a commit-ment of the two countries to report on their policiesimplemented to ensure compliance with the agree-ments, but a regular report is only required every sixyears. For certain programmes (including the furtherdevelopment and implementation of the RemedialAction Plans and Lakewide Management Plans),which are listed in the Annex to the Agreement, thetreaty parties must submit since 1987 biannual

reports to the Commission. In 1988 the first series ofreports was compiled in the USA by the nationalGreat Lakes programme office of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), in Canada by the govern-ments of Canada and Ontario. The difference in thelocus of responsibility for the reports also reflects thediffering strategies of the two governments in imple-mentation (Renn and Finson, 1991). The obligationof the governments to prepare reports on work relat-ing to the Great Lakes leads to adjustments of theenvironmental policies of both countries and to anongoing process of evaluation of the successes andfailures of previous policies. These country reportshave thus enhanced accountability and communica-tion.

C 4.3Combating soil degradation in drylands:Compliance and monitoring

C 4.3.1Introduction

There are no precise base line data or monitoring sys-tems (Oldeman, 1999) for the observation and evalu-ation of soil and land degradation in drylands (Sec-tion B 2.5). Similarly, the United Nations Conventionto Combat Desertification in Countries Experienc-ing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particu-larly in Africa (UNCCD) also contains no concretereduction commitments with specified timetables, forinstance for soil and land degradation. Nonetheless,the mechanisms described in the following aim tocontribute to providing an international evaluationof implementation status, and to identify and remedydeficits.

National action programmes are reviewed regu-larly by the Conference of the Parties, where statesreport on progress made (Art. 10 para 2 UNCCD).Some of the regional annexes for Africa, Latin Amer-ica, Asia and the northern Mediterranean makehighly detailed stipulations concerning the imple-mentation of these action programmes. An innova-tive element in this context is the obligation of devel-oping countries to involve civil society in the elabo-ration, implementation and evaluation of NationalAction Programmes (NAPs,Art. 10 UNCCD).Whileunder the ozone regime NGOs have no participationrights, in the Desertification Convention process theyare a component of the official programme and anessential catalyst of implementation.Thus the NGOs,which already played a part in the negotiation of theUNCCD, are integrated more comprehensively than

91Combating soil degradation in drylands: Compliance and monitoring C 4.3

in any other convention (Danish, 1995a; Rechkem-mer, 1997; Corell, 1999).

The key monitoring tool of the DesertificationConvention is the obligation to submit detailedreports to the Conference of the Parties, which atirregular intervals determines the timetable for suchsubmission (Art. 26 UNCCD). Where a need arises,the Secretariat supports countries in preparingreports. The reporting obligation relates above all tothe elaboration and implementation of NAPs; how-ever, the industrialized countries, in their donor func-tion, are also involved and report for their part ontheir technical and financial assistance. Industrializedcountries have not only a supportive function inimplementation – a considerable number of industri-alized nations count themselves among the group of‘affected countries’, for instance Australia, the USA,Canada and the northern Mediterranean countries(apart from France).

The first national reports on implementation ofthe goals of the Desertification Convention weresubmitted in 1999 at the third Conference of the Par-ties (Pilardeaux, 2000a). However, there are majordeficits concerning the review of these reports by theConference of the Parties, which did not carry outany in-depth analysis. Therefore, in December 2000an ad hoc working group to review national reportswas established.


Efforts of the Conference of the Parties (COP) toassess all implementation measures are based notonly on the national reports, but also and above allupon the recommendations made by the Committeeon Science and Technology (CST). However, tempo-ral overlap of COP sessions and CST meetings makeit impossible to feed the scientific outcomes effec-tively into the Conference of the Parties. It is there-fore recommendable to convene CST meetings atdifferent dates than the COP sessions, as is commonpractice in the biodiversity and climate changeregimes (Section E 1).

Furthermore, the CST has been unable to fulfil itsfunction sufficiently until now because its member-ship comprises mainly political negotiators instead ofscientists; as yet, it has devoted too little attention tothe scientific issues of implementation (Pilardeaux,2000a). However, the CST can draw from a roster ofexperts to set up ad hoc working groups; these haveat most twelve members and membership must beregionally balanced. In the opinion of the Council,issues presenting a major need for additional knowl-edge include, in addition to the detailed analysis and

evaluation of national reports, the examination of theClean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change and itsrelevance to the Desertification Convention, andalso the question of guard rails for soil and landdegradation. Whether present knowledge needs canbe met by the CST will depend upon its future modeof operation. Alternatively, it merits considerationwhether scientific expertise might not better be insti-tutionalized externally, for instance in the form of anIntergovernmental Panel on Land and Soil (IPLS).The relationship between the IPLS and the CSTcould be analogous to that between the IPCC and theSBSTA in the climate process, the function of theCST being to present scientific findings to the Con-ference of the Parties in a form suitable for politicaldeliberation.

A ‘Global Mechanism’ is responsible for thefinancial issues relating to implementation. Thismechanism, which is administered by the Interna-tional Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),receives support from UNDP, UNEP, the WorldBank, GEF, FAO, the Secretariat of the Desertifica-tion Convention and the regional developmentbanks.The main purpose of the Global Mechanism isto provide information to affected countries on thefunds available through bilateral and multilateralcooperation. Bilateral and multilateral developmentcooperation, which was already in operation beforethe convention existed, thus provides the main finan-cial basis for its implementation (besides the owncontributions of affected countries). However, thenational reports of donor countries do not make itsufficiently transparent how the funds available forcombating desertification have developed overrecent years. One reason for this is presumably thatall measures for rural development, poverty allevia-tion or food security also contribute to combatingdesertification and a clear attribution of funds is dif-ficult. What is certain, however, is that the contribu-tions of OECD countries for development coopera-tion, measured as percentages of gross national prod-uct, have now reached the lowest level for fifty years(Section E 3).

The Desertification Convention defines no crite-ria for the level of the financial commitment of theNorth. Consequently, when the 0.7 per cent targetcalled for by the ‘world conferences’ of recent years(such as UNCED, Habitat II, the World Summit forSocial Development or the World Food Summit) isnot met, we cannot speak of ‘non-compliance’,although this certainly affects implementation of theconvention directly, as it is financed mainly throughbilateral and multilateral cooperation. The GEF hasno dedicated window for the Desertification Con-vention because it only supports developing coun-


tries in projects that are in the global environmentalinterest. Only incremental costs are covered. In theview of the GEF, desertification until now is not aninherently global problem (Kürzinger, 1997).Nonetheless, since 1996 funds can be deployed fordesertification control measures if these relate to cli-mate change or biodiversity.

International soil conservation policy shares withbiodiversity policy (WBGU, 2001) a lack of sufficientscientific advice. A first scientific overview has beencreated in the shape of the FAO/UNESCO Soil Mapof the World, the 1990 Global Soil Degradation Data-base (GLASOD) and the annotated World Atlas ofDesertification created by UNEP in 1992. However,this work has not been updated and refined on anongoing basis. Moreover, GLASOD data are primar-ily qualitative and based upon expert opinions(Oldeman, 1999).An interesting recent developmentis the establishment of a Global and National Soiland Terrain Digital Database Program (SOTER).SOTER shall create over the next 10–15 years a data-base on soils, soil uses and soil degradation (Olde-man, 1999). Over the long term, however, there is aneed for a post-SOTER structure that monitors soilchanges. This goes along with by a pressing need foradvice on the role of biological sinks in the imple-mentation of international environmental regimes,on the estimation of global guard rails for soil andland degradation and on the development of indica-tors. Establishment of an ‘Intergovernmental Panelon Land and Soil’ would be a valuable step. Such abody could bring together leading worldwide scien-tific expertise, as has already been done in the cli-mate change regime.

C 4.4Compliance in climate policy

C 4.4.1Introduction

The first commitment period under the Kyoto Proto-col to the UN Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) is due to commence in the year2008 (Section C 2.3). Compliance procedures are oneof the most important points in the negotiations pre-ceding the Protocol’s entry into force. This concernsboth the obligation to prepare national annualreports on greenhouse gas sources and sinks and onmeasures taken including an assessment of their suc-cess, and the obligation of the parties listed in AnnexB to the Kyoto Protocol (industrialized countries) tolimit their emissions. Provisions on this were alreadyagreed upon in the Convention and in the Kyoto Pro-

tocol, but need to be specified further. Negotiationson compliance mechanisms under the FrameworkConvention itself are also ongoing.

The agreements provide for a Multilateral Con-sultative Process, the purpose of which is to provideadvice to parties experiencing difficulties in imple-menting the Convention, promote the understandingof the Convention and prevent disputes from arising.This process can be initiated by an individual party, agroup of parties or the Conference of the Parties, butnot by the Secretariat. No decisions have yet beentaken on the size and composition of the institution.This has been above all because of disagreement onthe issue of whether experts should be appointedaccording to geographically balanced quotas orshould be nominated with equal representation fromindustrialized and developing countries (Oberthürand Ott, 1999).

The basis for ascertaining compliance with thecommitments under the Kyoto Protocol is providedby the national communications of the parties andthe reviews of these communications. These commit-ments are regulated in Articles 7 and 8 of the KyotoProtocol.Article 8 provides ‘expert review teams’ forthe review process.These are coordinated by the Sec-retariat and report to it.The Secretariat forwards thereports to the parties and informs the Meeting of theParties to the Protocol. The terms of reference of theexpert review teams have not yet been specified. Pro-posals range from a review of national emissionsinventories, over regular expert meetings, through tovisits of the state parties by the experts. More far-reaching proposals to involve private sector auditorshave also been made (Hargrave et al., 1999). Modelsof such auditing schemes already exist in the armscontrol regime, the International Labour Organisa-tion (ILO) and the UN Human Rights Committee(OECD, 1998). The involvement of intergovernmen-tal organizations, such as the National GreenhouseGas Inventory Programme of the IPCC, OECD andIEA, in the review of national inventories and inmonitoring compliance with commitments is a fur-ther option that merits consideration (OECD, 1999).


Article 18 authorizes the Meeting of the Parties tothe Protocol to take action in the event of non-com-pliance or to delegate this authority to another body.The critical importance of compliance demands theestablishment of a permanent Compliance Body inorder to secure continuity of work and thus create asetting in which trust can grow (Hargrave et al.,1999). A small organization is envisaged, comprising

93Compliance in climate policy C 4.4

scientific, technical and legal experts. Negotiations onthe composition of this body are currently under way.Three alternatives are being discussed: Geographi-cally balanced representation from the five regionalUN groups, equal representation of Annex-I andnon-Annex-I Parties or, finally, a stronger represen-tation of Annex-I states that are affected by the deci-sions of the Compliance Body. The consultation ofexternal experts remains a controversial point.

The arguments put forward for involving the pri-vate sector in the review process are cost efficiencyand low prices due to competition among firms ten-dering their services. The argument is that this wouldprevent the emergence of bureaucratic structuresand would provide more immediate contacts on theground in the countries being reviewed, this permit-ting swifter responses to potential non-compliance.Further advantages put forward include the estab-lishment of a larger pool of auditors, their indepen-dence from governments and their accountabilitywhen mistakes are made.The main argument put for-ward against involving private auditors is that theirindependence is jeopardized by excessive financialdependence upon the client. It is further argued thatthe complexity of the tasks could require a largerorganizational structure than private auditors candevelop.

An essential precondition to involving private-sector auditors would be to establish a system ofquality assurance through certification by the Secre-tariat or by a body charged with this task. It is equallyimportant that the function of auditors is limited tothat of an ‘initial’ technical audit in which details arechecked, the findings of this audit then being submit-ted as readily accessible inventories to the Secre-tariat and to the ‘expert review team’. These bodiesmust retain responsibility for the maximum accuracyof information.Whether the two components of com-pliance – facilitative measures and enforcement mea-sures – should be addressed in one or separate bod-ies and how the transition between the two should beregulated is a further unresolved issue. The EU andmany environmental associations prefer, forinstance, a Compliance Committee with two separatebranches, arguing that facilitation and enforcementcall for fundamentally different approaches.

Nor has it yet been agreed upon which informa-tion can be used to trigger action by the ComplianceBody. Proposals range from limiting information tothat provided by the parties to the other extreme thatthe Body can decide itself which sources it considersappropriate. The latter proposal would imply thatindependent experts – and thus also environmentalgroups – could submit information to the Body, theSecretariat or another organization that passes theinformation on to these.The Council considers a lim-

itation to information provided by the parties as toorestrictive; the admission of independent expertsshould therefore be considered.

Various models have been proposed to preventnon-compliance arising at the end of a commitmentperiod. These include an annual review of the bal-ance between emission rights and actual emissions(Hargrave et al., 1999). Emissions trading will be aspecial feature of the Kyoto Protocol. There is a dan-ger that parties sell emissions rights prematurely, andthen need them themselves at the end of the com-mitment period. This could be remedied by prohibit-ing the sale of emission rights over which a party doesnot yet effectively command, for instance because itanticipates these rights as an outcome of futureabatement measures. A further issue important inconnection with emissions trading is that of liability,i.e. whether the seller, the buyer or both are liable inthe event of non-compliance of the selling party(Hargrave et al., 1999).

It has not yet been decided how the procedure fordetermination of non-compliance is to be designedand which consequences can follow. Prior informa-tion on the consequences of non-compliance pro-motes predictability and compliance efforts. A par-ticularly important aspect is, in the opinion of theCouncil, that the consequences of non-complianceare such that the damage caused by non-compliance(that is to say the excess emissions) is remedied bymeasures that save at least the same quantity ofgreenhouse gases without any major delay. An inter-esting proposal in this context is the establishment ofa Compliance Fund (Wiser and Goldberg, 1999) intowhich parties could pay that are at risk of non-com-pliance. The fund would be used to finance projectsthat have a reliable greenhouse gas abatementimpact. This fund would have the potential todevelop an additional technology transfer benefit ifprojects were carried out preferentially in develop-ing countries. The drafts of the working group thatare to be debated at the next sessions of the Confer-ence of the Parties also discuss a ‘compliance actionplan’ that would give the parties the opportunity toprepare a detailed restoration plan soon after deter-mination of non-compliance.

As possible forms of punishment for non-compli-ance, political, economic or Protocol-internal sanc-tions are under debate.This could mean, for instance,the loss of voting rights in the Meeting of the Partiesto the Protocol, public announcement of non-compli-ance, money fines and trade restrictions, or, finally, anobligation to purchase emission rights or a curtail-ment of the right to engage in emissions trading. Inthe interests of achieving the objectives of the Cli-mate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, itis key that an expedient balance between ‘soft’ man-


agement measures and ‘hard’ punishment measuresis found that enjoys broad-based acceptance, pro-vides strong incentives to implement commitmentsand thus largely prevents non-compliance.

Because of the particularly important role of theozone regime, not least in the design of the climatechange regime, its compliance system is presented inBox C 4.4-1.


The case studies present an array of useful elementsof institutional design that play a considerable role

within the context of international compliance sys-tems. Previous sub-sections have already highlightedcontinuing deficits in design and possible improve-ments to the various regimes.The institutional designof international compliance systems harbours a spe-cial potential to contribute to the success of the over-all regime and should therefore be organized accord-ingly. Although the specific structure of each coreproblem of global environmental change can call forspecial features, the characteristics set out in the fol-lowing are particularly promising.

Box C 4.4-1

Compliance in ozone policy

As in other issues, too, the ozone regime was innovative incompliance issues and pointed the way for the developmentof the climate change regime. At first sight, both the 1985Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layerand its 1987 Montreal Protocol make provision for the nor-mal methods under international law by which to handlenon-compliance of individual states with a treaty. Thus par-ties can submit a case to the International Court of Justice(ICJ), can establish arbitration tribunals or seek the ‘goodoffices’ of third parties, and enter into mediation and con-ciliation procedures. However, such bilateral and – particu-larly with regard to the ICJ – more confrontational methodshold little promise of success in real implementation. Afterall, a state usually does not infringe such important agree-ments as the Montreal Protocol deliberately, but rather dueto lack of capacity or due to general financial problems.

Consequently, the states agreed in 1987 in Montreal tocreate a special non-compliance procedure which wasfinally enshrined in 1992 when the Montreal Protocolentered in force (Ehrmann, 1998; Ott, 1998; Victor, 1998).This procedure revolves around an autonomous body of thestate parties, the Implementation Committee, made up often representatives of states elected by Meetings of the Par-ties according to a regional key. This Committee has twofunctions. The first is information procurement: It collectsdata on potential non-compliance by individual parties, cancommission the Secretariat in Nairobi to collect furtherinformation, and can also carry out investigations itselfwithin the countries concerned with their approval.

In addition, the Implementation Committee is also aforum for negotiations on agreeing appropriate measures ifa state is actually found to be in non-compliance. Everyparty can submit complaints about other parties to theCommittee and the Secretariat can notify the Committee ofpotential non-compliance by individual states. Not least,parties can notify the Committee themselves if they areunable to comply with reduction commitments under theTreaty or other provisions.

In such cases, the Committee should seek to arrive at asolution by common consent. In each case the Meeting ofthe Parties takes the final decision, and has already adopted

a list of conceivable remedies. The Meeting of the Partiescan thus provide positive incentives to bring the state backinto compliance, for instance by offering to provide assis-tance in the form of funding and pollution control tech-nologies.Theoretically, the Meeting of the Parties could alsocreate negative incentives, for instance by withdrawing cer-tain rights of the parties, or imposing trade restrictions pur-suant to Article 4 of the Protocol. In the case of a develop-ing country, the right to financial and technology transfercould be withdrawn as a ‘punishment’ for non-compliance.However, it is scarcely conceivable that the entitlement of adeveloping country pursuant to Article 5 to delay for tenyears its compliance with the control measures set out in theProtocol is really withdrawn if the country fails to complywithin that ten-year grace period. Moreover, the LondonAmendment to the Protocol determined de facto (althoughnot de jure) that developing countries are to be exemptedfrom the non-compliance procedure if the country can fur-nish proof that non-compliance was caused by inadequateassistance being provided by the industrialized countries(Biermann, 1998a, b).

Until now, the non-compliance procedure has con-cerned mainly Russia and other eastern European states. In1987, when they still acted jointly within the context of theCouncil for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON),these countries had agreed to the same reduction commit-ments as the western industrialized countries. However, fol-lowing the upheavals of 1989, it became plain that in east-ern Europe and the Russian Federation the phase-outschedule for CFCs and the other substances would nolonger be achievable. Moreover, most eastern Europeanstates failed to make their payments into the MultilateralOzone Fund for developing countries, demanding insteadfinancial support for themselves. Here the ImplementationCommittee has pursued a cooperative strategy: The GEFprovides funds to advance CFC phase-out in easternEurope and Russia, and the relevant international organi-zations and programmes (UNEP, UNDP, UNIDO and theWorld Bank) contribute to supporting Russia (Victor,1998).

The great ‘test’ of the non-compliance procedure willcome when the developing countries as a group are obligedto cease producing and using CFCs and other ozone-deplet-ing substances.The Council recommends continuing to pur-sue here, as before, the cooperative, non-confrontationalapproach of the Montreal Protocol.


C 4.5.1Procedures for acquiring information on the stateof implementation

The case studies have shown that efforts to gatherrelevant information on the state of implementationrest above all on reporting. The in some cases highlydetailed obligation of governments to report on theirnational implementation efforts permits a review ofsuccesses and failures of past policies, thus building abasis for improved, forward-looking measures.• Past experience shows that the obligation to report

on policies taken by member states to implementtheir commitments is an indispensable prerequi-site to international compliance systems. At thenational level, the obligation to take stock ofefforts and outcomes yields a review of the rele-vant policy measures while at the same timestrengthening the accountability and communica-tion of national authorities. In order to ensure thatreports are uniform and comparable, it is recom-mendable to prescribe detailed, standardizedinternational reporting formats. The example ofthe desertification regime shows that it is expedi-ent for the secretariat to provide support to coun-tries in preparing their reports where any suchneed arises.

• Moreover, the Council recommends more far-reaching information acquisition rights, such asthe queries and ad-hoc on-site inspections byinternational bodies provided for in the ozoneregime and in the CITES regime. Where there is aneed, targeted queries can be made to clarifyimprecise or incomplete statements. Besidesenhancing the information value and thus compa-rability of reports, such procedures can have a pre-ventive effect by inducing states to provide infor-mation that is as precise and truthful as possible.

• The example of the desertification regime showsthat, besides state reports, participation and sup-port by non-governmental organizations is impor-tant, particularly in the early stages of complianceprocedures. In the desertification regime, NGOscan participate in the elaboration and initial exe-cution of action programmes, and are thusinvolved directly in implementation. NGOs serveas a valuable interface between the local, nationaland international levels, and ensure that civil soci-ety concerns are heard. The Council recommendsalso creating such communication channels inregimes in which NGO participation is not inte-grated directly. At the very least – as in the GreatLakes regime – regular workshops should ensuresuch feedback.

• Involvement of environmental groups has alsoproven useful in gathering and processing infor-mation, and in preparing guidelines for implemen-tation and training programmes. CITES is anexample of valuable cooperation in this regard(WBGU, 2001). In other regimes where there arereservations against or reticence vis-à-vis an insti-tutionalized transfer of tasks, it is important toselect NGOs in such a way that trust is built. Theimplementation of the goals of the DesertificationConvention means a learning process for govern-ments and NGOs alike; as a result, the Conventionfulfils an important function in promoting ‘goodgovernance’. Because, due to its strong links topoverty alleviation, the Desertification Conven-tion has, as a ‘development convention’, a specialposition among global environmental agreements,it could also be used by donor states to providestronger support to the social development ofpoor countries.

• An interesting option is under debate in the cli-mate change regime, namely to involve certifiedprivate-sector auditors in the acquisition of infor-mation. These would need to be linked formally,through appropriate reports, to the secretariat or –where such a body exists – a special committee.This would have the advantage that such auditorswould be on site more often, possibly continu-ously, in the countries party to the agreement, andcould check country data independently andpainstakingly.

• The role of (already existing) autonomous scien-tific bodies in compliance systems also needsstrengthening. As exemplified by the desertifica-tion regime, more effective monitoring of compli-ance requires the development of a ‘core set’ ofglobal indicators and guard rails. In contrast to theClimate Change Convention and the MontrealProtocol, the Desertification Convention processhas not (yet) stipulated any quantitative, definableand verifiable reduction or protection targets for agiven period. This would presuppose the defini-tion of, for instance, permissible maximum limitsof soil and land degradation. To determine such areference parameter, guard rails of worldwide soildegradation would need to be estimated (WBGU,1998a), i.e. concrete values whose transgressionwould lead to a state of the environment that isirreversible and poses a threat to human life. Inthis field there is an urgent need for research.

• By providing the most recent scientific knowl-edge, regular scientific-technical inventories of theenvironmental situation make it possible to con-cretize treaty commitments, for instance by identi-fying guard rails as a basis for reduction or protec-tion targets. This enhances international


responses. Appointments to such a scientific bodyshould be geographically balanced. Membersshould be independent scientific experts; this isessential in order not to create a second politicalsubsidiary body and in order to ensure that it con-cerns itself exclusively with scientific tasks. In gen-eral, the way in which such a body is organized andoperates could be modelled on the IPCC, whichfulfils this task within the context of the climatechange regime.

• For the above reasons, the Council proposes theestablishment of an international, independentscientific panel of experts for global soil protec-tion – an ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Land andSoil’. The output of such a panel could lend moreobjectivity to the debate on international soil pro-tection. The scientific community would also ben-efit from improved coordination and networking.When establishing a land and soil panel, the Coun-cil recommends building upon the experiencegained with UNEP and the IPCC in order to avoiddesign flaws from the outset.

C 4.5.2Procedures for assessing reports and for decidingon international responses to implementationdeficits

When assessing available information, appraisal anddecision-making functions remain the purview of theprincipal organs in which representatives of stateparties meet (Conference of the Parties, Joint Com-mission). In regimes with a large number of memberstates, these are often preceded by reviews and sum-maries carried out by, for instance, the secretariat(ozone regime), expert review teams or an imple-mentation committee.• Past developments in the regimes studied under-

score the expedience of transferring the task oforganizing and summarizing national reports tothe secretariat or a special body. This facilitatesprocessing, assessment and summarising – of bothfactual and legal aspects – of the numerous andvoluminous reports.

• Concerning response measures, the Council rec-ommends considering the establishment of a spe-cial, legitimized body. This makes it possible toaddress implementation difficulties rapidly and tofind solutions by common consent, even duringthe intersessional phases between meetings of theConference of the Parties. In the ozone regime,this strategy has demonstrated its value in the caseof Russia and a number of eastern Europeanstates, and appears transferable to other regimes.The sessions of this body should permit the fol-

lowing procedural steps, among others: Evalua-tion of relevant information, questioning of themember state concerned, analysis of reasons forimplementation deficits, deliberation and negotia-tion on necessary measures and, where the caserequires, taking a decision or making a recom-mendation concerning a measure to the Confer-ence of the Parties, with an explanation of the rea-sons for this decision. In view of its crucial deci-sion-support tasks, the body should be composedof representatives of states according to a previ-ously defined key, to which a number of expertsand scientists are attached. Firm procedural crite-ria can build trust. Continuity of work can beensured best through a standing body thatbecomes active upon the request of previouslyspecified actors or bodies.

• The desertification regime illustrates the problemthat implementation is often reduced to elaborat-ing national action programmes and their financ-ing by OECD countries. The Desertification Con-vention, however, provides a much broader frame-work, because it has the potential to serve as thestarting point for developing comprehensive sus-tainability policies for the countries concernedand for developing democratic structures. Its spe-cial value lies in this function as a catalyst of com-prehensive social development. The Council istherefore of the opinion that stronger financialcommitment is essential for the conventions abil-ity to continue to advance its goals. The Councilrecommends reversing the downward trend infunding for official development cooperation, inorder not to jeopardize the implementation of theDesertification Convention over the long term.Asthe Council has recommended repeatedly else-where (WBGU, 1994, 1998a–2001), it would beappropriate in view of the mounting pressures inthe age of global change to aim at a target of 1 percent of gross national product for official develop-ment cooperation (WBGU, 2000a). The WorldSummit on Sustainable Develepment could beused as a springboard from which to take theplunge.

C 4.5.3Tools for responding to difficulties andimplementation deficits

Concerning responses to implementation deficits, thecase studies reveal a great variety of arrangements.While in the Great Lakes regime the Joint Commis-sion can only make recommendations, there wouldappear to be agreement in the climate change regimethat provision should certainly be made for political,


economic or protocol-specific sanctions for non-compliance. Although hard responses could havebeen forthcoming, in the ozone regime the Imple-mentation Committee took a largely cooperativestance in the case of Russia and a number of easternEuropean states. In the desertification regime, too,hard measures would not appear to make any sense,as non-compliance can scarcely be determined. Forthis, there is a lack of both concrete commitmentswith specified schedules, and sufficiently accuratebase line data and monitoring systems for observingand assessing soil and land degradation in aridregions.

These findings and the fact that most instances ofnon-compliance are attributable more to incapacitythan to a lack of will bring cooperative avenues to thefore. Such non-confrontational measures enhanceinternational relations through their partnershipaspects and thus promise more transparency andhonesty. However, guaranteed tools to support com-pliance that are not linked to preconditions can beundermine the motivation to implement commit-ments out of a party’s own financial means. More-over, it needs to be noted that in some cases con-certed sanctions have indeed contributed to swiftlyremedying implementational deficits (CITES is acase in point, see WBGU, 2001). The Council there-fore recommends providing for various avenues bywhich to respond to implementation difficulties andnon-compliance, in order to permit flexible decision-making from case to case that is appropriate to thereasons for the implementational difficulties. Thepainstaking evaluation of all relevant informationthat this requires can be ensured by the special com-mittee discussed above. The option of being able totake both confrontational and non-confrontationalmeasures also has the benefit of reducing the riskthat, due to reliance upon external assistance, lessnational budget funds are earmarked for implemen-tation activities from the outset.

The concrete implementation of response deci-sions should be supported by the implementationbody recommended above. After an appropriateperiod of time, it is further recommendable to reviewthe impacts and expedience of the measure chosen.

Particularly considering the present debate oncompliance in climate policy, it is essential to concen-trate on non-confrontational measures in order toplace countries in a position to implement their com-mitments. Overall, this would do more good to theclimate than strict sanctions, which could have thefurther disadvantage of making accession to the Pro-tocol and adoption of commitments unattractive tomany states. Nonetheless, there is a tendency formany states to desire a stricter compliance system,because the legally binding nature of the commit-

ments and the binding goals of the Protocol requiremeans by which to enforce them. Consequently,besides supportive policies, for competition reasonsamong others it is necessary that the compliance sys-tem is not all too weak, in order to encourage partiesto implement targets and avoid ‘freeriding’. Conse-quently, the Council is opposed to introducing ‘bor-rowing’, i.e. utilizing emission rights from later com-mitment periods.

In the technical review of compliance, an involve-ment of the private sector in the shape of certifiedauditors is recommendable. However, arrangementsmust be found that guarantee strict neutrality ofreview. Here a participation of private actors assources of information (via submission of such infor-mation to the secretariat) and as observers in non-compliance procedures is desirable.

Concerning the debate on automatic sanctions,the degree to which these should be introducedneeds to be weighed carefully. An indicative list ofconsequences of non-compliance is albeit called forby Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, and has thepotential to shorten protracted negotiations and toprovide a reliable basis for predictable responses.Nonetheless, both the negotiation of such a list andits later application are problematic. An all too strictapplication of automatic sanctions could lead tosome states feeling themselves treated unjustly andothers shying away from signing and ratifying theProtocol. The Council therefore considers it advis-able to keep responses to infringements of obliga-tions flexible within certain limits and to adjust themto the individual case in hand.

Local and national implementation: Education and Local Agenda 21C 5

C 5.1Introduction

The effect of international agreements is only asgood as the implementation of their global aims onthe national and local level, and the extent to whichthis is done effectively, efficiently and equitably. Con-ventions must ultimately manifest themselves inchanges to products and production practices, butalso in changes to environmentally relevant attitudes,values and patterns of behaviour, in other words, tolifestyles in general. These types of implementationcan initially be launched through laws or economicmeasures with immediate effect, but also by means ofstrategies for raising awareness over the longer term.Such strategies include public discourse, round tablesor environmental education programmes geared todifferent target groups.

Most international agreements on global environ-mental problems commit governments to promotingawareness-raising and transforming lifestyles, butalso to increasing knowledge and transferring skillsrelevant to more prudent use of natural resources. Inthis context, explicit reference is made to educationprocesses in schools and universities, and indicationsare given of the range of non-school contexts inwhich learning for sustainable development takesplace. Thus the Framework Convention on ClimateChange (Article 6), the Biodiversity Convention(Articles 12 and 13), the Desertification Convention(Article 19), the Rio Declaration (Principle 10) andAgenda 21 (Chapters 28 and 36) contain appeals toall governments to support and implement such edu-cational processes. An important forum for an inte-grative discussion of environment and developmentproblems is the UN Commission on SustainableDevelopment (CSD) (Section E 1.4).

Implementation of Agenda 21 and CSD recom-mendations takes place on different levels. Thus inthe EU, for example, numerous institutions havebeen set up and entrusted with national implementa-tion of solutions to (global) environmental anddevelopment issues. These have produced such pro-

grammes as the 5th (EC) Environmental Action Pro-gramme as instruments for implementing the aims ofsustainable development. There is intensive ex-change between the various committees and workinggroups of the EU and the CSD. In the EU, EUROSTAT

provides a statistical foundation for sustainabilitypolicy. EUROSTAT is also involved in the CSD workprogramme to develop sustainability indicators. In1993, the European Environment Agency (EEA)came into existence, an institution devoted to provid-ing environmentally relevant information.

For activities relating to worldwide education pro-grammes, the responsible body is UNESCO. Thusany CSD activities in the educational sphere comeinto UNESCO’s remit, whereas other CSD projectsare managed by the CSD Secretariat in New York,which makes unified or networked activities moredifficult.

C 5.2Learning for sustainable development – statusand progress

In this chapter, illustrative analysis will be made oftwo action areas that are closely interlinked.The firstconcerns approaches in the area of formal education(e.g. in schools or universities), and the second con-cerns programmes and activities at municipal andregional level (especially those pursuing LOCAL

AGENDA 21 (LA-21) processes).

C 5.2.1CSD initiatives

Principles for the learning processIn 4th and 6th sessions of the CSD, a work pro-gramme was passed for implementation of Chapter36 of AGENDA 21 on ‘Promoting Education, PublicAwareness and Training’. In 1997 an internationalconference was held in Thessaloniki, Greece, on thistheme for which UNESCO had prepared the pio-neering document ‘Educating for a Sustainable

99Learning for sustainable development – status and progress C 5.2

Future: A Transdisciplinary Vision for ConcertedAction’. This cleared away a number of misconcep-tions surrounding the concept of ‘learning for sus-tainable development’:• The objective is not learning about sustainable

development but learning for sustainable devel-opment (including the options for action).

• Learning for sustainable development is notrestricted to environmental education, but mustalso include and take equal account of social andeconomic dimensions.

• Learning for sustainable development is not theresponsibility of the education ministries alone,but touches on all policy areas (environment,employment, transport, etc.) and affects all socialgroups (and not just school and university stu-dents).

• Learning for sustainable development must not beconfined to children, but needs to be understoodin sustainability terms as part of a lifelong process.

UNESCO carries out information work in anattempt to disseminate this specific understanding ofthe concepts.At the CSD’s 6th session (1998), educa-tion for sustainable development was given furtherconcrete definition.

Public awareness and understandingFor people to be able to participate effectively inactivities on sustainable development, they need tohave some prior background knowledge. Local activ-ities present the best prospects of success in thisrespect, because they are more likely to awaken indi-vidual interest, which opens up the opportunity forinformal education processes at municipal level, aswell as for local environmental programmes in indus-trialized and developing countries (UN-CSD, 1998).

Since the facts underlying environmental anddevelopment issues are very complex, and hence dif-ficult to communicate, educational approaches forsustainable development must start with simpleexamples from everyday life without neglecting,however, to place the problem in its global context. Itfollows that education for sustainable developmentmust be geared to the specific target group, embracemany domains of knowledge, and integrate learninginto all spheres of life. This necessitates improvedcooperation between the different disciplines of thesocial and natural sciences (WBGU, 1996; UN-CSD,1998).

Changes required in the formal educationsystemIt is of prime importance to make space in the cur-riculum for the interrelationships between ecology,economy, culture, and social development. This alsoincludes the transmission of ethical values, coopera-

tive behaviour and solidarity of action. Thesechanges must be carried through at all levels (school,vocational training and professional development)(UN-CSD, 1998).

Interdisciplinary approachEducation for sustainable development calls forinterdisciplinary analysis and problem solving.Admittedly, subject-specific theory is a prerequisitefor deep-seated knowledge and understanding; how-ever, many discoveries which bring about importantfuture advances are made at the boundaries betweendifferent disciplines (WBGU, 1994, 1997). The rigidboundaries that still persist between academic disci-plines should be made more flexible; the same oppor-tunities for professional advancement must be madepossible within interdisciplinary contexts (WBGU,1994; UN-CSD, 1998).

C 5.2.2National activities on education for sustainabledevelopment

Since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, educational activ-ities have been initiated in almost all nations of theworld which transcend mere environmental protec-tion to cover the complexity of the sustainable devel-opment approach (WBGU, 1996).A general increasein educational endeavours can be noted, but thisvaries widely from nation to nation. Now as ever it isdifficult to gain a systematic overview and thus toundertake any evaluation of global activities. How-ever the following examples of national initiativesgive a good insight into the breadth of variationamong the programmes.

In Germany environmental education has been afamiliar concept for over 20 years. Since UNCED theeconomic and socio-cultural dimensions haveincreasingly been integrated, in line with the princi-ple of education for sustainable development. Inspite of this, the term ‘sustainable development’ isonly familiar to 13 per cent of the German popula-tion (Kuckartz, 2000). In 1998, in a forward-lookinginitiative the Permanent Committee of the FederalGovernment and the Federal States on Education,Planning and Research Promotion (BLK) issued aguidance framework on education for sustainabledevelopment (BLK, 1998). Meanwhile a comprehen-sive project was launched under the title ‘Learning toshape life in the 21st century’, one element of whichis implementation of the CSD-defined model in thesecondary school curriculum of each German federalstate (BLK, 2000). The total volume of funding forthe project, in which 14 federal states are involved,amounts to DM25 million over five years. Likewise,


concepts for higher education contain similar objec-tives to those developed in the CSD papers. Thus, inaccordance with the guidelines, there should beincreasing promotion of cooperation between thenatural and social sciences, environmental educationshould be oriented towards ‘ecological futuresresearch’ and should incorporate the idea of feed-back loops between human action and natural sys-tems. Research and theory should also contribute tofinding local solutions to problems.To this end, trans-parency must be improved between universities,business, local government and citizens (BLK, 1998).

In The Netherlands the government programme‘Extra Impulse to Environmental Education’, com-parable to the BLK guidance framework, is overseenby the National Committee for International Coop-eration and Sustainable Development (NCDO). Fur-thermore there is also a Dutch Inter-DepartmentalSteering Group on Environmental Education, a com-posite body from six ministries. Such a pooling of sus-tainability activities has been seen in very few othercountries to date.This approach offers special advan-tages in international consultation and cooperation.It is a way of avoiding duplication of effort and par-allel developments.

Where can evidence be found in school and non-school learning contexts of the reforms to educa-tional institutions which are so widely called for?

In Germany, school-based education still oftenplaces the emphasis on the environmental dimen-sion. But here and there, some schools are alreadyaddressing the theme of sustainable development onseveral levels. For instance, in Duisburg there is an‘Agenda school’ where the school curriculum, archi-tecture, equipment and school routine have beenredesigned according to aspects of Agenda 21. Themotto ‘Think globally, act locally’ is borne out, forexample, in the use of rainwater for flushing toilets, inthe rooftop planting schemes and in the pedagogicemphasis on social learning and environmental andmedia education (caf/Agenda-Transfer, 1999).Within higher education, the concept of the Sustain-able University of Lüneburg is an equivalent exam-ple. The German UNESCO Commission launchedan Internet training programme for teachers in thesummer of 2000 to deliver professional training onsustainable development (www.blk21.de).

An evaluation of non-school-based environmen-tal activities in Germany from the years 1998/99revealed that, with approx. 4,600 institutionsinvolved, a far greater number of activities in thesphere of environmental education were on offerthan had been thought (Giesel et al., 2000). Howeverthe themes of Agenda 21, energy production andenergy saving, consumption and quality of life, whichshould gain in importance as the discussion proceeds

on a sustainable Germany, are only dealt with inbarely a third of the environmental education estab-lishments surveyed. This shows that the progress ofpublic discourse on sustainable development out-paces the capacity of institutions to respond to it suc-cessfully. Studies demonstrate that there are manyinstitutions critically examining the classic environ-mental issues of exploration of, experience of andsensitization to nature, and the ‘traditional’ style ofeducation on environmental protection and natureconservation. For these establishments, extendingtheir programmes across all the themes of Agenda 21including the social and economic aspects wouldentail a fundamental change of identity. The Councilrecommends founding new institutions which spe-cialize in tackling the issues of technology, consump-tion, mobility, etc., to move them forward with cam-paigns and to support them financially. In the evalu-ation it was shown, moreover, that most of the insti-tutions tend to follow traditional teaching methods:Innovative and participatory methods, such asfutures workshops, interactive learning programmesand creative methods are only in use in less than one-tenth of the institutions. The Council recommendsraising awareness of these methods by presentingsuccessful examples and supporting professionaldevelopment for such approaches.

Thanks to a multinational initiative launched bythe United Kingdom, Germany,The Netherlands andSweden entitled ‘Sustainability Centres in the NorthSea Region’ (SCNR), support has been granted forthe establishment of so-called sustainability centresin Europe. Some of the goals to be pursued in thesecentres are establishing indicators and criteria forsustainable spatial planning, and gathering pilot pro-jects in which the principles of sustainability havealready been manifested in practice. The projectinvolves local authorities working together withplanners, universities, NGOs and private actors. Asubsidiary goal of the SCNR is the formation of auniversity network for sustainable development, theSustainability Centres Universities Network. Suchnetworks still have great rarity value and the Councilrates them as outstanding models which are worthyof support.

In the Czech Republic more than 1,000 schools areinvolved in 15 environmental education projects. Inpart these are international projects (e.g. GLOBE onthe subject of ozone).The projects have undergone atransformation from purely knowledge-based tolargely activity-based learning units. A pilot projectfor environmental education exists in NorthernBohemia, the region with the worst damage to thelandscape and the highest levels of air pollution inthe Czech Republic. In cooperation with a Germanpartner organization, model programmes are to be

101Successful Agenda 21 activities C 5.3

developed here. To step up the LA-21 process, whichhas not yet advanced very far in the Czech Republic,better communication shall be fostered betweenlocally active organizations and institutions andteacher training events shall be supported.

The Baltic coastal states have given birth to theBaltic Sea Project, a school-based environmentaleducation project.The emphasis of the programme ison raising pupils’ awareness of environmental prob-lems which affect the Baltic Sea and its cultural,social and ecological dimensions.The ‘Baltic Sea Pro-ject’ is a positive example of international network-ing of educational initiatives in the school sector.Such networking should be reinforced by ensuringthat initiatives launched by the various conventions,LA-21 activities and individual organizations (e.g.UN, UNESCO, OECD) and NGOs are coordinatedto avoid competition or duplication of effort.

International conferences, even if they are notalways productive in scientific terms, are important inthat they draw attention to cross-border problemsand appropriate management strategies. Interna-tional conferences on environmental education havein the past been organized by individual nations, suchas the 7th Conference of Environmental Educationin Europe, in Italy (2000). A world conference oneducation for sustainable development could pro-mote the theme even better.

C 5.3Successful Agenda 21 activities

The aims of AGENDA 21 and various conventions areto some extent also implemented by means of LA-21processes (WBGU, 1998a). There has been a strongupturn in these activities worldwide. In 1996, 1,812LA-21 processes were counted in 64 countries(ICLEI, 1997). The bulk of these processes were inEurope: 1,576 European municipalities (87 per cent)engaged in a LA-21 process, 236 LA-21 processes (13per cent) were counted in Africa, Asia, Australia, theMiddle East, North America, the Caribbean andSouth America. Despite these figures it should beborne in mind that public awareness of such projectsis still very low: Thus in Germany only 15 per cent ofrespondents stated that they had heard of a LOCAL

AGENDA 21 group in their own district (Kuckartz,2000). According to ICLEI estimates, by now thereare around 5,000 municipal bodies working on theissues of LA-21. The trend has shifted since 1997:Most of the LA-21 processes are still being carriedout in Europe (approx. 75 per cent), but a rising num-ber of local authorities are involved in Africa, Asiaand South America (ICLEI, 2000). In many coun-tries, thriving examples of bottom-up movements canbe seen, for instance implementing local water pro-jects. Often these projects are not directly attribut-able to the LA-21 initiative, but nevertheless it is pre-

Box C 5.3-1

Pilot bottom-up projects: Implementingsustainable water supply

Time and again the importance of bottom-up movements isemphasized if projects are to operate successfully. This isdemonstrated for example by the Water Bank Project inThailand where villagers and NGOs were actively involvedin the construction of a rainwater capture basin, also moti-vating other people to participate. Often people fromsmaller ethnic groups or from rural regions are very dis-trustful at first when approached by outsiders; in somecases, showing respect for their religion can be a major fac-tor in obtaining access to particular population groups. Ide-ally, development workers should live alongside them intheir village and become familiar with the village routine inthe place where innovations are to be implemented, asdemonstrated by a water project in Deccan Trap, India.Here the inhabitants of three villages were presented withnew irrigation techniques by assistants who had basedthemselves in the village and shared the usual hardships ofeveryday life with the village population, which stronglyraised the efficacy of the project (UN-ECOSOC, 1998). Keyfactors in successful projects are also public informationcampaigns and close cooperation among different institu-tions (such as cooperation between the local administra-

tion, health authority and citizens in the successful imple-mentation of water and sanitation projects). Where newtechnologies are being implemented in a developing coun-try (for example a solar cooking system in Kenya and theHonduras) it is important that future users from differentcultural contexts, with particular habits and socio-culturalnorms, are given targeted instructions and that plans aremade for education or training accordingly. moreover, themaintenance and care of these items of equipment must beensured, for example by a voluntary helper, in order tomaintain successful developments in the long term.This wasmade clear by a water pipe project in Nepal in which a vil-lage was equipped with new sanitation pipes. Particularly inprojects on freshwater management, it is seen time andagain that water is not only an economic but also a socialresource (WBGU, 1998a): Joint activities on water manage-ment can lead to better relations between neighbours andshared experiences of success, as was the case in the abovecited Water Bank Project in Thailand. In tandem with areward system, maintenance projects in which inhabitantsof different neighbourhoods work side by side can take ona folk festival character, as a municipal sanitation project inGhana showed. There, a monthly prize awarded to thecleanest region led to community campaigns which broughttogether members of several neighbouring districts andwhich were very positively evaluated by the population(UN-ECOSOC, 1998).


cisely here that the ‘spirit of Rio’ is being put intopractice (Box C 5.3-1).

Support for German LA-21 processes is expectedto come from three landmark steps taken by the Ger-man federal government in accordance with its reso-lution of 26.07.2000: A ‘Green Cabinet’ (Staatssekre-tärsausschuss für Nachhaltige Entwicklung) was con-vened, a ‘Council for Sustainable Development’ (Ratfür Nachhaltige Entwicklung) was founded and a new‘Sustainability Strategy’ was passed as a maxim forpolitical action. These three elements should con-tribute to implementation of the resolutions adoptedin 1992 at the Conference on Environment andDevelopment in Rio de Janeiro.

Findings from awareness-raising projectsExperience from projects with young people indi-cates that when dealing with sustainable develop-ment themes, it is important to ‘speak the students’language’ because otherwise there is a danger thatthey will sideline the activities as ‘green issues’ andshow no further interest. A successful approach toenthusing young people about environmental andhealth education was an interactive radio show inKenya, for example, in which information and enter-tainment were combined in a highly effective way(UN-ECOSOC, 1998).

In local education work, the experiences andknowledge of older people should also be utilized,since they can often call on skills that external devel-opment workers do not possess. When indigenousknowledge comes into play, however, it is often thecase that different people suggest different practices.If curriculum development draws on the knowledgeof indigenous people or long-time local residents forideas, examples from different regions should begathered (UN-ECOSOC, 1998).

EvaluationIn so far as it is possible at all to gain a reliableoverview of the activities, methods and outcomes, it isevident that to date there has been no scientific basisand, more pertinently, no systematic evaluation ofoutcomes or effects. The link with a sustainabilitystrategy as a global mission for solving global prob-lems is often undiscernible. Moreover, there is awidespread lack of integration between the differentprojects and also between different countries, so thatthere is little opportunity for learning from oneanother, for raising the motivation to take part and tocontinue to play a part, but most of all, for systemat-ically pooling and further developing the insightsgained. Better coordination of programmes and theirsponsoring or initiating institutions could and shouldbring about more rapid and effective progress inmunicipal activities focusing on sustainable develop-

ment throughout the world. Even if the diversity ofresponsibilities and institutions among individualcountries and cross-border cooperation initiativesapparently represent insuperable barriers, the Coun-cil makes the case that learning for sustainable devel-opment deserves ‘sustained’ support as a key policyarea, and that international organizations such asUNESCO, above all, should be put in a position towork more effectively on the global level.


Recommendations for action• Learning for sustainable development (in the

sense of formal education measures and local gov-ernment sustainability processes) must be con-ceived of as a key component of environmentalpolicy and systematically linked with other strate-gies (e.g. legal, economic, technological).

• The tendency to mount disparate programmesand projects without follow-up must be counteredby integration, coordination and, most impor-tantly, evaluation of actions. To this end, nationaland international conferences and transnationalnetworks should be supported.

• In all the follow-up conferences to the conven-tions on environment and development problems,the themes of awareness-raising, education andmunicipal Agenda 21 processes should be stand-ing items on the agenda, so that recognition isgiven to the long-term nature of these processes.

• Measures in the educational sphere which pursuethe concept of sustainable development and sat-isfy verifiable criteria of meeting educationalobjectives successfully must be prioritized for sup-port. All national governments should present areport on this every two years, as is already thepractice in Germany.

• There must be better networking within govern-mental and non-governmental projects andbetween the two realms; education measures mustbe more strongly integrated into the (wider-rang-ing) local government learning processes.

• There should be increased support for coopera-tion between institutional educational establish-ments (schools, universities) and Local Agenda 21initiatives.

• Internal organizational and structural reform ofeducational establishments on the principle of sus-tainable development (e.g. in the form of environ-mental audits, resource conservation, etc.) must besupported.


Recommendations for research• National and international evaluation studies that

go further than the previous practice of collecting‘success stories’ must be given more intensive sup-port.

• Investigations of promising educational strategiesfor sustainable development must be carried outtaking greater account of different contexts (eco-nomic, technological, socio-cultural frameworkconditions), different target groups and differen-tials between educational settings.

• Increased support must be given to interdiscipli-nary research on new learning concepts, new orga-nizational structures for learning, and innovativeawareness-raising strategies on issues and strate-gic aspects of sustainable development.

Institutional interplay D

D 1International trade regimes and the environment

D 1.1Globalization processes – the millenniumchallenge for international environmental policy

Images of street violence during the WTO Confer-ence and the shattered window panes which markedthe World Economic Forum in Davos are not theonly clear signs that the terms ‘free trade’ and ‘glob-alization’ have gradually become embattled con-cepts, symbolic of an erosion of social standards, anincrease in global differentials between ‘rich andpoor’, a problematic readjustment of consumerlifestyles and for many, not least, contributory causesof worldwide environmental destruction. The twophenomena are also closely connected. Thus, alongwith the absolute and relative fall in the significanceof transportation costs, the removal of trade barriershas been the other principal factor which has accel-erated globalization, made it easier to gain access tonatural resources worldwide and, by creating addi-tional growth impulses, increased resource consump-tion and hence also raised emissions. So the processesof globalization also encroach into the field of ten-sion between growth and the environment.

The Council is aware of the contentious nature ofthe issue, and would like to take a critical look at thefield of tension between trade, globalization, eco-nomic growth and global environmental problems ina future report, should the occasion arise.The follow-ing sections serve primarily to make initial distinc-tions in the often ideologically-loaded debate on thepossibility of disciplining global market forces and,more particularly, to consider the political options foraction from the viewpoint of international environ-mental policy (on controversial assessments Dalyand Goodland, 1994; Klemmer, 1999). In view of thetheme of this report, the latter is of particular impor-tance.

The globalization of capital, sales and procure-ment markets, the internationalization of decisionson company locations and the migration of skilledemployees rank among the basic characteristics ofeconomic and social development in the past decade

which have had simultaneous repercussions on theconditions and options for international environ-mental policy action (on these developments, seeamong others Bender, 1998; UNCTAD, 1999; WTO,1999). There is argument over the ambivalent conse-quences this has for environmental policy:• On the one hand, a rise in global environmental

problems due to the increase in transportation,growth-induced consumption of resources,increasing incursions into the natural world,expansion of the worldwide volume of productionusing materials and processes with the potential toharm the environment, along with diminishedoptions for national controls and protective provi-sions against multinational enterprises and cross-border value-creation chains;

• On the other hand, an expansion of worldwideknowledge transfer, improved developmentopportunities for countries which are economi-cally weak and therefore dependent on naturalresource extraction, together with an export ofstandards for conservation of the natural environ-ment in response to increasing global public atten-tion.

Hence the Council warns against a blanket demo-nization of free trade, the globalization processes ithas initiated, and its other consequences.With regardto research it advocates a differentiated investigationof the interplay between trade, globalization and theenvironment, while under the environmental policyaspect it favours the introduction of supplementaryinstitutional incentives for identification and reduc-tion of global environmental damage. The Councilseeks an institutional incentive system which lessensthe problematic consequences for the global envi-ronment, since these can not be prevented alto-gether. Beside the question of how such incentivesare to be triggered, the principal subject of manydebates is the question of who should be responsiblefor their administration. In particular the role of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) and its relation-ship to worldwide environmental standards is a con-tentious political issue. Many believe that the inter-ests of the environment would be better served by

108 D Institutional interplay

selectively influencing world trade first and fore-most.

D 1.2The WTO and international environmentalstandards

The WTO came into being as part of the UruguayRound of the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT). Its aim is a global liberalization oftrade by means of principles such as most-favourednation and national treatment, banning import quo-tas and generally preventing discrimination againsttrading partners (on the structure and developmentof the trade regime see Helm, 1995; WBGU, 1996;Leirer, 1998; Moncayo von Hase, 1999). From theenvironmental policy perspective, this function canhave critical significance. Protectionist subsidies ofenvironmentally harmful products can be restricted,capital-poor nations are given better access to inter-national markets and foreign investments, povertyand enduring dependency are lessened in this wayand possible poverty-induced environmental degra-dation is alleviated. Competition also creates incen-tives by encouraging innovation processes so as tomake more efficient use of available resources. Insustainability terms this is generally to be welcomed.It is certainly true that – due to growth – other envi-ronmental risks may arise, but the causes will have tobe sought more in the tensions between growth and

the environment rather than in the web of linkagesbetween trade and the environment.

It is worth highlighting the successes of theGATT/WTO regime in reducing protectionist regu-lations, and the increasing acceptance of interna-tional dispute settlement over the former preferencefor imposing unilateral sanctions (O’Neal Taylor,1997; Knorr, 1997). As outlined below, such progressperhaps also constitutes an opportunity to enhanceenvironmental protection. However, the continuingdisadvantages of the developing countries in theagrarian and textiles markets are noted, and theseare inevitably associated with negative impacts onthe global environment (such as more intensive landuse in the European Union (EU) and discourage-ment of multifunctional land-use in developing coun-tries). The Council has already commented on this inpast reports (WBGU, 1996).

Since the WTO, among its many tasks, must alsoinspect national regulations for compatibility withnon-discriminatory world trade, it can come into con-flict with national regulations on environmental pro-tection. It must be said, though, that even though noexhaustive legal clarification of the relationship ofthe WTO regime with national and internationalenvironmental standards is in place, it is already pos-sible to take environmental factors into account bymeans of various general exceptions in GATT. Themain one of these is Article XX of GATT (Box D 1.2-1) where, admittedly, the environment is not explic-itly cited as an exceptional case permitting traderestrictions, but measures are declared permissible ifthey are required to protect human, animal or plantlife or health (Art. XX lit. b) and if they relate to theconservation of exhaustible natural resources ifmade effective in conjunction with restrictions ondomestic production or consumption (Art. XX lit. g).However this only applies when trade restrictionsbased on environmental policy represent neithercovert trade barriers nor arbitrary or unjustifiablediscrimination between countries where the sameconditions prevail.

This article is supplemented by regulations in theancillary agreements to GATT:• In particular the Agreements on Application of

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and onTechnical Barriers to Trade within the WTO re-gime likewise allow exceptions to protect human,animal or plant life and health. Moreover, theAgreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ex-pressly mentions the environment as a legitimatepurpose.

• In the Agreement on Agriculture, state partiesreceive a specific exemption from their commit-ments to reduce national agricultural subsidies for

Box D 1.2-1

Article XX of GATT

General Exceptions

Subject to the requirement that such measures are notapplied in a manner which would constitute a means ofarbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguisedrestriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption orenforcement by any contracting party of measures:...(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life orhealth;...(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible naturalresources if such measures are made effective in con-junction with restrictions on domestic production orconsumption. ...

Source: WTO

109The WTO and international environmental standards D 1.2

direct payments made on specific conditionsunder environmental programmes.

• Finally it is worth mentioning that the 1994 Agree-ment Establishing the World Trade Organization,in contrast to GATT 1947, expressly mentions andthus recognizes the necessity for environmentalprotection and the goal of sustainable develop-ment.

At least since the failed Millennium Round in Seattle(Box D 1.2-2) the call to embed environmental pol-icy standards more firmly in WTO law attractedmany supporters in the industrialized nations andtheir environmental organizations. The EU also sup-ports proposals of this kind. These demands are con-troversial in that they potentially signal an intentionto evaluate production and manufacturing processesin other countries, in which case the other countries,especially developing countries, regard them asunjustified interference in their internal affairs, oreven as ‘environmental colonialism’ on the part ofthe North.

Cases that have become more widely known arethe tuna fish-dolphin conflict between Canada, Mex-ico and the USA, and the shrimp-turtle case betweenthe USA and several Asian countries. So according tothe American law on endangered animal species,American shrimp catchers must use particular netswhich prevent or at least reduce the by-catch of seaturtles. Since 1989 the USA has banned the import ofshrimps caught by foreign fishers using other types ofnets, which led some of the countries affected, such asIndia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, to proceedwith a case before the Appellate Body of the WTO(WTO, 1998; Altemöller, 1998), in order to defendthemselves against the costly impact of the externallyimposed process standards.

The challenged US legislation was criticized to theeffect that it was not concerned with preventing envi-ronmental damage in the country of import, but withenforcing production standards and hence specificenvironmental protection measures in relation to thecountry of production or export, which was seen asproblematic. Whilst the USA lost this case due toinconsistencies in its legislation – in a step which isfundamental, and important in terms of trade and theenvironment, restrictive trade practices aimed atexcluding products where the production processeswere problematic from an environmental point ofview were recognized as permissible environmental-policy exemptions under Article XX of GATT. Thisshows that it would be perfectly possible to use deci-sions of the WTO court in the course of dispute set-tlement procedures to give higher status to particularenvironmental aspects. Thus the Appellate Body ofthe WTO could set useful precedents for environ-mental policy.

Should this most recent decision of the WTOcourt mark a U-turn in environmental policy, apotential for conflict could emerge because manydeveloping countries resolutely resist the unilateralimposition of production standards – and here wefind an Appellate Court (a kind of expert panel)engaged in a dispute settlement procedure which issetting out an environmental policy that applies to allcountries. It remains to be seen how the developingcountries would react to such a change of course inenvironmental policy. The panel in this case under-took a very cautious interpretation of GATT ArticleXX. The turtles concerned have already been classi-fied as under immediate threat of extinction underthe Convention on International Trade in Endan-gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) butthe provisions of CITES are not directly applicablebecause it only bans direct trade in endangered tur-tles (Art. I-X CITES), but not unintentional killing ofturtles in the course of fishing or other human actionssuch as polluting the oceans via rivers, etc. On theother hand, the parties to CITES expressly acknowl-edge in their preamble that ‘peoples and States areand should be the best protectors of their own wildfauna and flora’, which again contains a certain oblig-ation to take account of aspects of endangeredspecies conservation.

On the one hand, the USA could not resort to theargument that it was using its trade laws to proceedagainst developing countries’ breaches of CITES,because – as long as there was no international trad-ing in the unintentional by-catch of turtles – the stan-dard shrimp-catching methods did not constitute abreach. On the other hand, the CITES preamble con-tains ‘voluntary commitments’ and the turtles’ migra-tions cover both the high seas and territorial waterswithin the exclusive economic zone, so that here theUSA was able to assert a particular conservationinterest, which was also acknowledged by the court.In the judgement of the WTO Appellate Court, how-ever, there was no possible justification of the USA’simport ban according to GATT Art. XX, one reasonbeing that the USA had failed to enter into negotia-tions with the governments concerned over protec-tion of the sea turtles. In the final analysis it is whollyjustifiable to take account of environmental aspectsin the course of dispute settlement procedures. How-ever, representatives of the developing countriesretort that instead of unilateral import bans, the pro-tection of turtles in the Indian Ocean should be sup-ported in the form of direct technology transfer, forinstance by way of the Global Environment Facility(GEF).

These two types of measures must not be seen asstark alternatives, but instead an environmentalapproach must be found which involves a balanced


Box D 1.2-2

The World Trade Organization (WTO) MinisterialConference in Seattle – An environmentalevaluation

The third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle inDecember 1999 failed in its attempt to launch a new multi-lateral liberalization round. The reasons for this failure arevaried and reflect the extremely heterogeneous interests ofthe individual states and groups of states. The intention ofthe European Union (EU) was to introduce a comprehen-sive new liberalization round in the WTO framework (theso-called ‘Millennium Round’). The foremost aim of such around would have been the further advancement of effortsto liberalize international trade. Furthermore, almost all ofthe themes currently under discussion as part of the processof international trade regime formation would havebecome the object of WTO negotiations, for exampleextending regulations in the sectors of agriculture and ser-vices, dismantling duties for non-agricultural products, cre-ating a multilateral framework of regulations coveringinternational investments, international competition policyand the treatment of environmental and social policyaspects.

The comprehensive agenda requested by the EU was atodds with the substantially more restrained interests of theUSA and the developing countries. In particular in the clar-ification of many unresolved questions in relation to inter-national trade and environmental protection, the EU founditself on the defensive and virtually without allies on suchissues. Whereas the USA showed little interest in environ-mental policy questions and concentrated more onimproved market access – e.g. in information technologyand services – the developing countries vehementlyopposed any increased consideration of environmental andsocial standards in the WTO regime because they see lowstandards as a key competitive advantage in the global mar-ket. They reject the demands of industrialized nations forharmonization of environmental and social standards withthe accusation that their only interest is to use environmen-tal protection as a subterfuge for sealing off their domesticmarkets against products from developing countries (‘eco-protectionism’). The developing countries emphasize theirneed to catch up in economic development terms beforethey are in a position to introduce the same standards as theindustrialized nations.

These conflicts of interest make it clear that the disman-tling of trade barriers collides in many cases with the goal ofavoiding negative environmental impacts from trade activ-ities. The relationship between trade and the environmentincludes numerous points of intersection, which so far havenot been satisfactorily regulated under international tradeand environment law. Only a small number of aspects werearticulated in Seattle. From the environmental policy per-spective, clarification would have been desirable particu-larly of the following questions:1. How can the relationship of the WTO to multilateral

environmental agreements be regulated? 2. What criteria and procedures should be applied in deter-

mining the permissibility of trade restrictions based onproduction standards and environmental labelling?

3. How can the precautionary principle be anchored in theWTO agreements?

These essential aspects of environmental policy were notgiven systematic treatment in Seattle. Accordingly, thereremains a great need for action. Along with agriculture,which has fundamentally close links with the environment,centre stage from the environmental policy perspective wasgiven to biotechnology. The USA and Canada pressed toachieve better market access for genetically modified prod-ucts. For this purpose, they wanted a working group to bedeployed within the WTO framework to investigate thelinkages between biosafety issues and trade aspects. TheEU took a fundamentally different line on genetically mod-ified organisms (GMOs). Emphasis was placed on the pre-cautionary principle, which is intended to give states theright to impose import restrictions where there is insuffi-cient scientific knowledge of the potential risks of GMOs.At the same time, treatment of the issues within the scopeof the WTO agreements was rejected, reference being madeinstead to negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol which hadnot yet been concluded at that time.

During the course of negotiations the EU retreatedfrom its original viewpoint and thereafter supported thetreatment of biosafety questions by a WTO working group.Ultimately the Ministerial Conference could not reachagreement on a joint statement, and therefore no WTOworking group on biosafety issues could be convened. Thisis a positive outcome from the environmental policy per-spective. The treatment of biosafety questions shouldremain the brief of the Biodiversity Convention process.Thus, the agreement achieved in Montreal at the end of Jan-uary 2000 on a Biosafety Protocol to the Biodiversity Con-vention is to be viewed as a major success. If the decisionhad been taken in Seattle to establish a WTO workinggroup on biosafety, then this could have been interpreted asaccording higher value to WTO rules.This would have set aworrying precedent that could have critically weakenedother multilateral environmental agreements.

The discussions in Seattle on the right forum for dealingwith questions of biosafety highlight the great need thatexists for clarification of the relationship between multilat-eral environmental agreements and trade aspects. Since theWTO Ministerial Conference failed in this respect, theseaspects will be dealt with as before in the WTO Committeeon Trade and Environment. Legally binding decisions, how-ever, can only be taken at the next Ministerial Conference.

Nonetheless, the events of Seattle should have an endur-ing influence both on the further institutional design of theinternational trade regime as well as on international envi-ronmental policy. More than ever, the Ministerial Confer-ence has aroused an extraordinary level of public attention.The violent protests on the streets of Seattle, which ulti-mately led the city to declare a state of emergency, summonthe National Guard and impose a curfew, will not be for-gotten quickly and should have a considerable influence onthe process of future WTO negotiations.The protests are anexpression of how the political responsibility for the nega-tive consequences of globalization processes is increasinglyattributed to the WTO. In future, discussions and negotia-tions on the relationship between trade and the environ-ment will have to be conducted under the watchful eye of ahighly alert civil society.


combination of both.The Council believes that undercertain circumstances the dispute settlement proce-dure could become an useful option for the inclusionof environmental concerns in the world trade regime,although it remains to be seen how much use theAppellate Body will make of the powers available toit for environmental purposes.This applies most of allin relation to so-called unilateral standards.

Unilateral standards, as the protests in Seattleshowed, are what numerous environmental pressuregroups want. They are calling for general environ-mental standards which embrace production pro-cesses in order to protect global environmentalresources. The consider the sanction mechanism ofthe WTO, which permits unilateral trade sanctions,an effective lever for the implementation of other-wise ‘toothless’ environmental agreements (WBGU,1996; Chittka, 1996). In contrast, developing coun-tries continue to fear the use of such environmentalprotection standards as a method of protectionismfor undermining their competitive advantages, whichare often based on comparatively cheap labour costsand the plentiful availability of natural resources.This constellation leads to a coalition between envi-ronmentalists, trade unions and enterprises in struc-turally weak economic sectors in the industrializedcountries against representatives of the developingcountries and ‘new’, trade-dependent economic sec-tors.

The latent danger is that accusations of ‘environ-mental dumping’ in this context, due to a lack of ade-quate definitions and terminological clarity, pay toolittle heed to different values attached to environ-mental use around the world (WBGU, 1996; Karl andRanné, 1997; Klemmer and Wink, 1998; Klemmer,1999). Hence the Council observes with concern thata potential for conflict is developing between thecountries of the North and the South. The Councilsees a risk that rather than giving effective impulsesfor environmental conservation, countries mayrevert to periods of protectionism in which both thedeveloping countries and the environment may bethe losers (Klemmer, 1999; Biermann, 2000b; Lang-hammer, 2000b). The Council also notes the objec-tion that unilateral standards are at odds with theunderlying principle of the Rio Declaration, whichrequires that international policy should be shapedprincipally by means of consensus. Precisely becauseof the resistance that may be expected, the Council isafraid that using the dispute settlement procedure asa route for including environmental aspects in theworld trade regime is not appropriate under all cir-cumstances as the sole way forward.The most impor-tant challenge is to encourage countries to join forceson environmental policy.

The only possible solution to this problem –appropriate enforcement of environmental stan-dards versus environmental colonialism or covertprotectionism dressed up as environmental concern– is to confine acceptance of standards to those whichare the outcome of a multilateral consultationprocess. The critical question is thus: how can legiti-mate trade restrictions be distinguished from non-legitimate restrictions under the WTO dispute settle-ment mechanism? The answer is that, normally,restrictions with multilateral backing could beallowed whereas unilateral restrictions could be pro-hibited. Because of the wide range of multilaterallyagreed environmental standards, this would make itpossible to link environmental policy with trade pol-icy, which could ultimately lead to a comprehensiveand joint international ‘greening’ of the WTO.

Therefore the prime concern for the future is totoughen up the many multilateral environmentalagreements with standards for dealing with interna-tional environmental resources together with theWTO regime (Baker, 1993; Leirer, 1998). Agree-ments such as the Montreal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layer already contain theoption of trade restrictions for non-signatory statesand – as part of a comprehensive non-complianceprocedure – for parties to the treaty who violate theregime (Section C 3.2).

What fundamental possibilities exist, then, forintegrating environmental aspects into the worldtrade regime, or for enforcing more global environ-mental protection by means of sanction mechanisms,as has recently been attempted? As this report hasalready shown, there are two options which bothappear relevant. The first way is essentially to under-take no concrete reforms to the WTO regime, thusleaving the interpretation of trade law to the WTOdispute settlement mechanism and to some extenttransferring decisions away from the political andinto the judicial sphere. This option is supported byWTO reforms already accomplished and the judicial-izing of the dispute settlement mechanism. Moreoverthe GATT regulations as interpreted under generalinternational law leave considerable scope for bring-ing free trade and environmental conservation intoconcordance while observing the proportionalityprinciple. This way fundamentally allows for morerapid action and creates greater flexibility. Whetherthe Appellate Body can become a setter of prece-dents is questionable, however. It will not be capableof decoupling itself fully from the sentiments of itsmembers. For that reason, as regards its environmen-tal policy precedent-setting function, may well fallshort of expectations. Another problematic areacould be the lack of political control over the deci-sions, and it seems doubtful that the aims of environ-


mental protection, free trade and an inclusive worldorder can be served when fundamental decisions onthe relationship of trade and the environment aretaken by legal experts rather than at the negotiatingtable. In the long term, this could undermine thepolitical acceptance of the WTO, especially in devel-oping countries.

The second way, which should at least be com-bined with the first, consists of explicitly clarifyingthe relationship of multilateral environmental agree-ments to trade law by means of negotiation, and ofsetting clearer standards for the states’ dispute set-tlement mechanism in the shape of politically deter-mined, highly binding ‘guard rails’. Suggestions forthis are found in the literature (Biermann, 2000b)and the Council views them as worthy of attentionand would like to see this option at least debated. Inthis way it would be possible to:1. Negotiate and resolve restrictive trade practices

motivated by environmental policy directly withinthe world trade regime (WTO Environment Code/ Agreement on Environment);

2. Grant a waiver to individual parties to the treatyfor trade restrictions motivated by multilateralenvironmental agreements according to Art. IXparas 3–4 WTO Agreement;

3. Clarify the relationship of international environ-mental treaties to obligations based on the worldtrade regime, giving greater definition to Art. XXlit. b and lit. g GATT by means of an amendment;

4. Or to work towards a decision on interpretation ofthe Ministerial Conference according to Art. IXpara 2 WTO Agreement, giving a binding inter-pretation of the environmental exceptions men-tioned in Art. XX GATT and explicitly recogniz-ing certain multilateral environmental agreementsas exceptions to the core WTO regulations.

The negotiation and ratification of a WTO Environ-ment Code or an amendment to the treaty (possiblymodelled on Art. 104 NAFTA) involve great politicaleffort and bearing in mind the current resistance ofmany governments to environmental clauses, it isunclear whether ratification by a two-thirds majorityof the 136 WTO members would succeed. The possi-bility of a waiver for trade restrictions motivated byenvironmental treaties, in contrast, does not seemcommensurate with the significance of the environ-ment theme, because ‘waivers’ under the WTOAgreement are intended for temporary special casesand must regularly be reviewed by the MinisterialConference. This contradicts the intended purposesof restrictions on trade (such as those of the CITESregime) which are specifically not time-limited butare intended as part of the overall normative frame-work of a global governance structure which alsoembraces ecological principles. Thus a decision on

interpretation by the Ministerial Conference seemsthe most promising route to take.

Were the community of nations to agree on suchan interpretation resolution, whereby unilaterallyimposed restrictions on trade with extraterritorialeffects would be clearly distinguished from broadlyaccepted restrictions on trade based on internationalenvironmental treaties, then clear criteria must bedetermined for making this distinction. Firstly aquantitative criterion could be defined wherebytrade-restrictive provisions of an international envi-ronmental treaty should take priority over WTO lawif, for instance, x per cent of WTO parties were alsoparty to the international environmental treaty inquestion. A rigid rule of this nature might be inade-quate in individual cases, however, so that the Minis-terial Conference also needs to define some scope forestablishing case-by-case justice. Secondly, a qualita-tive provision could determine that an internationalenvironmental treaty must have certain characteris-tics, irrespective of the number of parties, to claimpriority over GATT. For example, it would be possi-ble to insist that the international environmentaltreaty has been negotiated under the auspices of theUnited Nations or its specialized agencies; has beenapproved ex ante by the United Nations Environ-ment Programme; has been negotiated by a range ofcountries from different global regions and of differ-ent degrees of economic and social development;that it only deals with cross-border or global prob-lems, and precisely defines the extent of permissiblerestrictions on trade or guarantees finance and tech-nology transfer to developing countries.

A qualitative definition ex ante would need to beso broad that all current and comparable futureinternational environmental treaties are acceptable,but also tight enough to avoid abuse by a minority ofnations. However the completion of negotiations onthis might require considerable political resources.Since the requirements imposed by future environ-mental problems cannot be predicted, the MinisterialConference would in any case have to retain theoption of giving future international environmentaltreaties priority over GATT if they fail the qualita-tive test but are otherwise widely viewed as legiti-mate. Overall a quantitative ex-ante provision wouldnot always do justice to individual cases, while a qual-itative ex-ante provision would require substantialpolitical resources, if it were to succeed at all.

If on this basis the international communitywished to agree on a decision on interpretation bythe Ministerial Conference, it would be advisablethat the specific treaties to be included are spelt outin the ministers’ resolution. With a certain quorum,the Ministerial Conference could determine a list ofinternational environmental treaties that fulfil the


exceptional conditions of Art. XX GATT. This mayinclude regional and global agreements. The listcould also be supplemented whenever new environ-mental treaties are agreed.A first draft of this annex,i.e. a list of specific environmental treaties, would bean integral element of the Ministerial Conference’sdecision-making process.

The detailed structure of such an interpretationresolution may conceivably take a variety of forms.As an example, a draft from the specialist literature isreproduced in Box D 1.2-3. This contribution to the

discussion would effectively halt unilateral environ-mentally-motivated import bans directed at produc-tion processes abroad, and thus enact a ‘greening’ ofthe WTO in a strictly multilateral way.

Even if such a procedure currently appears to bethe only option with any prospect of success, thereare lingering doubts about an environmentally bene-ficial modification of the status quo. In the context ofthis option, it is above all important to examinewhether unilateral measures should be permitted inspecific, exceptional cases governed by strict precon-

Box D 1.2-3

Example from the specialist literature of onepossible formulation of a decision by the WTOMinisterial Conference on Trade and theEnvironment

Draft Decision on the Interpretation of Certain ProvisionsRelating to the Protection of Human, Animal or Plant Lifeor Health, or the Environment

The Ministerial Conference,Recalling Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Envi-

ronment and Development that trade policy measures forenvironmental purposes should not constitute a means ofarbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguisedrestriction on international trade, that unilateral actions todeal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdictionof the importing country should be avoided and that envi-ronmental measures addressing transboundary or globalenvironmental problems should, as far as possible, be basedon an international consensus,

Reaffirming that the relations of Parties in the field oftrade and economic endeavour should be conducted with aview to raising standards of living, ensuring full employ-ment and a large and steadily growing volume of real in-come and effective demand, and expanding the productionof and trade in goods and services, while allowing for theoptimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with theobjective of sustainable development, seeking both to pro-tect and preserve the environment and to enhance themeans for doing so in a manner consistent with their respec-tive needs and concerns at different levels of economic de-velopment,

Concerned that disputes about the interpretation ofArticle XX lit. b and lit. g of the General Agreement on Tar-iffs and Trade have given rise to conflicts which maythreaten both effective environmental policy and the ex-pansion of world trade,

Hereby decides as follows:1. Article XX lit. g of the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade may allow any Member of the WTO to enacttrade policy measures that address transboundary orglobal environmental problems, including such mea-sures that may provide for standards related toprocesses and the production of goods, provided thatthese measures are prescribed by any one of the multi-lateral environmental agreements listed in Annex I tothis decision.

2. Trade policy measures that aim at protecting human,animal or plant life or health, or the environment, andthat are prescribed by any one of the multilateral envi-ronmental agreements listed in Annex I to this decisionshall be deemed to be necessary in the context of ArticleXX lit. b of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tra-de.

3. The provisions of any one of the multilateral environ-mental agreements listed in Annex I to this decisionshall be deemed, to the extent that they prescribe tech-nical regulations or standards, to be international stan-dards in the context of Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 5, ofthe Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994).

4. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which are pre-scribed by any one of the multilateral environmental ag-reements listed in Annex I to this decision shall bedeemed to be international standards in the context ofArticle 3, paragraphs 1 to 3, and presumed to be in ac-cordance with Article 2, paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Agree-ment on the Application of Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasures (1994).

5. Any Member of the WTO may initiate a proposal toamend Annex I to this decision by submitting such pro-posal to the Ministerial Conference. The MinisterialConference shall decide, at its next session, whether theAnnex shall be amended accordingly. Such decisionsshall be taken by a three-fourth majority.In its considerations, the Ministerial Conference shalltake into account that lack of full scientific certaintyshall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effecti-ve measures to prevent environmental degradationwhere there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-age.

ANNEX I

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Speciesof Wild Fauna and Flora, done Washington, 3 March 1973.

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movementsof Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done Basel, 22March 1989.

Protocol (to the Convention on the Protection of the OzoneLayer of 22 March 1985) on Substances that Deplete theOzone Layer, done Montreal, 16 September 1987, as modi-fied by the Amendment adopted in London, 29 June 1990,and the Amendment adopted in Copenhagen, 25 Novem-ber 1992, according to the rules laid down in the MontrealProtocol.“

Source: Biermann, 2000b


ditions. To this end the decision on interpretationcould also be appended with an open-ended clausegiving the dispute settlement mechanism latitude toallow further unilateral import bans (e.g. ‘The fore-going does not affect in any way the competences ofthe Dispute Settlement Mechanism to decide on fur-ther exceptions’).Whatever the case, the Council rec-ognizes a substantial need for research in this area.

In view of the deficits in enforcement and the slowprogress in the negotiations of numerous interna-tional environmental treaties, as well as the compar-atively marginal significance of relevant UN organi-zations, the call is often heard for the establishmentof an additional parallel organization to the WTOwith responsibility for protecting the environment(Esty, 1994a; Biermann and Simonis, 2000). TheCouncil will discuss the possibilities of a World Envi-ronment Organization in greater detail in Chapter E2. At this juncture, though, the Council points outthat corporate decisions on international locationspresent a lesson in how environmental and socialstandards can be cost factors which detract from theattractiveness of a location for investment, or thecompetitiveness of a national economy. Even so, theCouncil still perceives deficits in the area of rawmaterials extraction. For the agreement and imple-mentation of international environmental standardsit is thus important to emphasize the advantages ofappropriate investment in environmental protectionand its preconditions (human and social capital).Under the precondition that the institutional condi-tions in particular countries take appropriateaccount of environmental protection, the Councilsees the mobilization of private incentives for thedevelopment and implementation of environmentalstandards as a critical lever in obtaining these advan-tages.These include private agreements on conserva-tion labels and environmental quality standards, thereinforcement of cross-border liability for environ-mental damage and the promotion of internationalinvestment in environmental protection by modify-ing charitable trust and taxation law (Chang, 1997;WBGU, 2001; OECD, 2000). The Council will deal inmore detail with these institutional approaches in itsprospective future report on the relationshipbetween trade and the environment.

Contrary to various media reports and statementsfrom certain environmental groups, the GATT/WTOregime also represents an opportunity for worldwideenvironmental protection, with its approaches forpreventing discrimination against foreign tradingpartners in combination with the exemptions men-tioned above which make provision for taking envi-ronmental concerns into account. Only access onequal terms to international markets and the cre-ation of legal stability for international investments

offer the prospect of overcoming the widely censuredthreats to the environment from poverty, protection-ism and counter-productive subsidies, in particular inthe areas of agriculture and fisheries. However, theWTO should not be mistakenly viewed as an envi-ronmental organization with an explicit mission todevelop international standards for environmentalprotection. This view is made inappropriate by theinterests and (lack of) capacities within the WTO,together with the limited options for enforcement ofinternational standards in a globalising world. On thecontrary, the Council identifies as a major opportu-nity the activation of the forces of the globalizationprocess to benefit private initiatives towards interna-tional environmental standards, and makes the fol-lowing recommendations to the German govern-ment:• To work on speeding up the abolition of subsidies,

in particular in the agriculture and fisheries sector.• In the EU, to work towards ensuring that trade-

restrictive measures within the GATT/WTOregime are based on multilateral consultationprocesses or multilateral environmental agree-ments.

• To improve the conditions for strengthening pri-vate initiatives (labels, standards and charitablefoundations).

D 2Interplay with financial institutions

D 2.1The World Bank Group and global environmentalpolicy

The structure of the World Bank GroupThe World Bank Group (Section B 4.5) consists ofthe International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (IBRD) and the International Devel-opment Organization (IDA) (Hoering, 1999). TheIBRD owns two subsidiaries: The InternationalFinance Corporation (IFC), which invests in privatecompanies in developing countries and the Multilat-eral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), whichsecures foreign investors in developing countriesagainst non-market risks. Officially the World Bankis a specialized agency of the UN, but it is not subjectto UN control. The World Bank Group’s principalrole is to support its borrowers in reducing poverty.Its loans are to improve the preconditions for eco-nomic development in the recipient countries andthus to improve living conditions.

IBRD and IDA differ in their roles and provisionof funding: the IBRD belongs to the governments of181 nations (1999), which have subscribed to capitalshares according to their economic and political sig-nificance. The number of subscribed capital sharesdetermines the weighting of a country’s vote in deci-sion-making (weighted voting rights). To finance itsloans, the IBRD predominantly borrows on the inter-national capital markets. Loans are issued on interestterms in line with the international capital markets.Hence the IBRD – unlike the IDA – is also catego-rized as a ‘hard credit’ lender. Loans are principallygranted for projects and structural adjustment pro-grammes.

The IDA focuses support on poorer developingcountries with an annual gross national product perhead of population of under US$925 (1997).This cur-rently applies to 70 countries.The loan terms are sub-stantially more favourable than those of IBRD loanssince the IDA draws its financial resources primarilyfrom contributions from the more industrialized ordeveloped member countries, either from the pro-

ceeds of taxation or transfers of IBRD profits. Atthree-year intervals, replenishment negotiations areheld.

‘Greening’ the World BankFrom an environmental policy perspective in partic-ular, the World Bank’s lending policy has been criti-cized for not requiring any investigation of the envi-ronmental impacts of funded projects (Mikesell andWilliams, 1992; Rich, 1994; Hoering, 1999). Well-known examples of the World Bank’s poor perfor-mance in this respect are for instance the Polono-roeste regional development programme (North-eastern Brazil Integration Development Program) orthe coal-fired power project in Singrauli, India, whichis currently the world’s largest single source of CO2

emissions (Sharma, 1996). Furthermore the WorldBank’s financing of dams and other major projectshas attracted widespread criticism. Here, large-scale,comprehensive reshaping of natural landscapes hasbeen undertaken without sufficient impact assess-ment, and has often included forced resettlement ofaffected population groups in large numbers.

As a result of mounting criticism, in the 1990s theWorld Bank made an astonishing breakthrough inconsidering the environmental and socio-economicimpacts of its financing policy, so much so that thepast criticism can no longer be upheld across theboard. A particular impetus for integration of envi-ronmental and socio-economic issues into the WorldBank’s business management came from theUNCED resolutions in Rio. The new environmentand development policy model of sustainable devel-opment was adopted into the World Bank’s canon ofaims. This process was widely termed the ‘greening’of the World Bank and can be traced on two levels(World Bank, 1999):1. Developing environmental assessment procedures

for projects financed. To avoid potential negativeeffects from World Bank projects on the environ-ment and vulnerable population groups, specialenvironmental assessments and safety measureswere introduced for planning and implementa-tion. Because not all projects have the same envi-


ronmental relevance, meaning that case-by-caseenvironmental assessment is required, the WorldBank divides the projects into three categories:• Category A: Full assessment of environmental

impacts (for the fiscal year 1999, 10 per cent ofprojects were placed in this category).

• Category B: Limited assessment of environ-mental impacts (35 per cent).

• Category C: No assessment of environmentalimpacts (55 per cent).

2. Targeted support for environmental protection. Inaddition to introducing the environmental assess-ments and safety measures, a targeted supportprogramme was developed for environmentalprotection. This programme covers not only mea-sures to finance investments in environmentalprotection, but is planned more comprehensivelyas an approach to support sustainable develop-ment processes. In order to achieve this goal, theWorld Bank is increasingly concentrating on rein-forcing environmental policy capacities, particu-larly in developing countries. In trying to integrateenvironmental aspects into the economic policystrategies of the countries concerned, the WorldBank is going far beyond the first step, the avoid-ance of negative environmental impacts.

As the lead institution of the Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF) the World Bank is also increasinglycommitted to the area of global environmentalfinancing. Usually in collaboration with the GEF, itsupports projects in five key areas:1. Conserving biodiversity;2. Phasing out the production of ozone-depleting

substances;3. Protecting the global climate;4. Protecting international waters;5. Indirectly, conserving soils in arid zones, if climate

protection or biodiversity conservation areaffected.

In its function as an implementing institution of theMontreal Protocol, the World Bank is supportingprogrammes in 20 countries to help avoid the use ofozone-depleting substances. Due to the importanceof China to the successful implementation of theMontreal Protocol, the support of the Chinese pro-gramme for phasing out CFC production should berated a particular success (World Bank, 1999).Along-side the activities with the GEF and the MontrealProtocol, the World Bank is also involved in otherinitiatives relating to global environmental protec-tion. In 1999, the prototype of a CO2 fund was intro-duced (PCF – Prototype Carbon Fund).The functionof this new fund is to inform and support technicalCO2 reduction measures within the context of the‘flexibility mechanisms’ established by the KyotoProtocol (World Bank, 1999).

Despite this progress, the World Bank still comesunder criticism from many environmental groups. Inparticular its forestry policy and the effects of itsstructural adjustment policy on environmental policyare central focuses for criticism. On this matter, theWorld Resources Institute (WRI) presented a studyin which the effects of World Bank structural adjust-ment programmes on forest conservation were inves-tigated (Seymour and Dubash, 2000). According tothis, in highly forested countries, the conditionsattached to loans, aimed at supporting structural pol-icy with a macro-economic focus, actually producedmany unexpected shifts in the structure of incentivesfor the utilization of wood resources. In particular,logging in tropical rainforests was strongly encour-aged.The World Bank had varying success in alteringits forestry policy (e.g. in Papua New Guinea,Cameroon and Indonesia). In order to support thenecessary reforms in national forestry policy, theWorld Bank – according to the study’s recommenda-tions – should take greater account of the conditionsin the respective developing country. For example,the chances of successful reform are substantiallygreater when the main national actors are involved inthe planning and implementation of the financedprojects (stakeholder engagement). Overall, thetrend for more active integration of environmentalaspects by the World Bank is unmistakable andprogress in this direction should continue. Neverthe-less it is still necessary to keep a critical eye on theWorld Bank’s attention to environmental standards.

Notes on institutional reformThe World Bank has become the largest source offinance supporting environmental protection pro-jects. The total portfolio of investments in environ-mental protection rose from US$2,000 million (1990)to US$11,500 million (1996) (Umana, 1997). For thisreason, calls for a wholesale reform of the WorldBank should be given a very balanced discussion andevaluation. The following points must be considered:• It must be borne in mind that the significance of

environmental aspects in the organization andstrategy of the World Bank has continually grown.For projects in which major environmentalimpacts are feared, comprehensive environmentalassessments are conducted. Additionally, supportfor environmental protection measures, increas-ingly also addressing global environmental prob-lems, has become a fixed element of World Bankpolicy. Even if environmental strategy could stillbe integrated more consistently into World Bankactivities, the overall progress made by the WorldBank in recent years must be rated very positively.All the more so, given that its primary role is tosupport productive international investment pro-

117Interdependencies between the IMF and global environmental policy D 2.2

jects to combat poverty. Pursuing this aim, theWorld Bank’s contribution to (global) environ-mental protection might even be greater than if itdevoted disproportionate attention to environ-mental concerns. Given that the World Bank ful-fils these important functions, calls for a moreextensive ‘greening’ of the World Bank are to beassessed critically. These demands may ultimatelyoverburden the World Bank, which could jeopar-dize its primary purpose.

• The developing countries and many non-govern-mental organizations (NGOs) repeatedly criticizethe dominant influence of the industrializednations over the World Bank. This influence isundeniable, but it should not be forgotten thatmost of the World Bank’s funding, especially forthe IDA, is made available by the industrializednations.The their wish for co-determination of theuses of funds (or granting of loans, or appointmentof management personnel) is not only under-standable, but could even be beneficial in respectof attracting additional funding (Section E 3).

In view of these parameters, proposals for institu-tional reform should only be directed at selected divi-sions of the World Bank Group. Above all, thechanges already initiated by the World Bank itselfshould be advanced further. The reasons necessitat-ing (partial) reform of the World Bank are:• The World Bank Group’s role in financing global

environmental policy (Section E 3) is permeatedby a pronounced cross-sectoral character. Thismeans that in exercising its functions, the WorldBank touches on many different fields of environ-mental policy. One example is the conflict whicharises between the existing (supply-oriented) pri-orities of the World Bank in the area of energysupply and efforts to achieve an effective(demand-oriented) climate policy (WBGU,1995b).

• The World Bank should endeavour to increase thetransparency of its policy even still further. Thiswould substantially improve its public acceptance.

In order to give adequate consideration to these twoaspects, and to raise its efficiency and effectiveness infulfilling its role, the Council recommends the fol-lowing measures:• Cooperation with major UN programmes (UNDP,

UNEP) and major international environmentaltreaties should be extended (Chapter F).The ben-efits of increased cooperation would be, forinstance, utilization of the expertise contained inthe respective environmental conventions inorder to set standards for environmental assess-ments, and making use of the advisory function ofUNDP and UNEP in selecting projects to befinanced.

• In order to raise the transparency and acceptanceof World Bank activities, cooperation with NGOsshould be further extended. The main idea here isto increase the exchange of information ratherthan to increase NGO involvement in bank deci-sions.

• The greater involvement of the private sector inplanning and implementing projects promises inmany cases to deliver effectiveness and efficiencygains. Hence public-private partnerships of thiskind should be promoted.

• Structural adjustment programmes should bemore thoroughly assessed for environmentalimpacts.The results of such studies should be usedfor operational and strategic changes in the plan-ning and implementation of these programmes.

D 2.2Interdependencies between the IMF and globalenvironmental policy

Like the World Bank, the International MonetaryFund (IMF) is a target for criticism on the part of var-ious international researchers and environmentalgroups. Just ahead of the annual IMF conference in2000, worldwide public interest was attracted notonly by the question of the future membership of theIMF Directorate, but also by a report from the Inter-national Financial Institution Advisory Commission(IFIAC; also known as the Meltzer Commission) forthe US Congress which called for reform of theIBRD in the direction of a World DevelopmentAgency with an exclusive mission to assist withdevelopment in the least developed nations and pro-vide global public goods, and in tandem, radical cutsin the IMF’s duties, competences and funding(IFIAC, 2000).At the same time, demonstrations andprotests during the IMF annual conference testifiedthe dissatisfaction of the opponents of advancingglobalization with the IMF’s function and fulfilmentof its duties. For the area relevant to this report, thatof international environmental policy, criticism fromthese groups is concentrated directly on two aspects(French, 1995; Cornia et al., 1989; Oxfam PolicyDepartment, 1995; Chossudovsky, 1998):– The direct environmental impacts of national

structural adjustment measures coupled to IMFsupport in the countries concerned, and

– one-sided concentration of IMF policy on main-taining or achieving a positive balance of pay-ments without consideration of the consequencesfor establishing and adhering to internationalenvironmental treaties.

Over and above the direct global environmental con-sequences, the IMF stands as an important example


of the emergence and functionality of internationalcooperation in a segment which rates as one of thecritical weak points of numerous environmentaltreaties: the financing of international tasks. Henceits experiences are worth considering when develop-ing new financing mechanisms for global environ-ment and development policy (Section E 3.2).Accordingly, the following discussions set out to givedetailed answers to three questions in the cause-effect web interlinking the IMF and global environ-mental policy:1. What role can and should the IMF adopt in the

context of international environmental policy?2. To what extent are the existing institutional struc-

tures suitable to fulfil these roles?3. What recommendations for IMF reform can be

derived from the international environmental pol-icy perspective?

The departure point for answering these three ques-tions is an analysis of the fundamental roles of theIMF (on the IMF’s structure and function see Hoer-ing, 1999; Khan, 1999; Siebert, 1998).The IMF was setup following the Bretton Woods Agreement to makefunds available to secure the functioning of the stableexchange rate system, which was itself supersededalmost three decades ago.The governments, as mem-bers of the IMF, pay a contribution in the form ofSpecial Drawing Rights (SDR), which can be usedfor low-interest, sometimes only partially repayableloans and bonds to overcome short-term liquiditycrises or to support structural financial reforms. Therecent financial crises in Southeast Asia are an aptdemonstration of the importance of this kind ofinternational crisis intervention (Kho and Stulz,1999; IMF, 1999). At the same time they also clearlyindicate the limitations of leaving early detection andfinancial discipline to individual nations. Theacknowledgement of these limitations was amongthe factors that unleashed controversies over thefuture profile of the IMF’s tasks and correspondinginstitutional arrangements (IFIAC, 2000; Frenkel,1999; Vasquez, 1999; Frenkel and Menkhoff, 2000).

Given the IMF’s objective, its view of itself isexpressly not that of a direct environmental policyactor. Regardless of this, any IMF intervention doeshave environmental policy consequences. These typ-ically include the side effects of national structuraladjustment programmes.The IMF insists on these, incombination with lending, to guarantee that balanceof payments deficits which have arisen can be per-manently reduced (Killick, 1995). Important compo-nents of the structural adjustment programmes arethe reduction of subsidies and social services, and thepromotion of exports. In this way, public expenditureshould be reduced, competitiveness and attractive-ness to international investors and capital inflows are

raised, and the confidence of the international capitalmarkets in the country’s economic strength and itscurrency is reinforced. To understand these mea-sures, it is important to keep the short-term andmedium-term consequences apart. In the short-term,the reduction of social provision and subsidiesheightens the pressure for adjustment in the nationaleconomies concerned (Abed, 1998). The conse-quences are evident signs of structural unemploy-ment and increasing burdens on economicallyweaker groups within the population. For the envi-ronment, these short-term effects are linked withincreased utilization pressure, due to– the affected country’s lack of financial means to

comply with national and international commit-ments to environmental protection,

– the dependence of economically weaker groupson provision with natural resources,

– the increasing concentration of population groupsin slums with negative consequences for humanhealth as well as soil and water quality,

– the transfer of agricultural resource use toexportable crops and livestock, with productionsometimes resorting to environmentally harmfulpractices and substances.

In the medium-term, on the other hand, financial andsocial reforms create the conditions to raise the effi-ciency of resource use and make economicallyweaker groups less dependent on short-term use ofnatural resources. Experiences following the South-east Asian financial crisis show that it triggeredurgently needed adjustments of economic structures,sealed-off markets and inefficient concentrations ofenterprises (Kho and Stulz, 1999; Siebert, 1998;Frenkel 1999; IFIAC, 2000). Such an adjustment isaccompanied by opportunities to build new educa-tion systems, to create decentralized local institutionsand to reorganize production structures and productranges. Enhancing international processes of compe-tition fundamentally sharpens the pressure to makeuse of more up-to-date technologies, and thus raisesincentives to reduce the resource-intensiveness ofproduction practices and products. At the same timethe compulsion to open up markets and to reducepublic expenditure can weaken the attractiveness ofpolitical measures targeting shortsighted use of nat-ural resources. Often, well-organized groups repre-senting minority interests exert appropriate pressure,such as in the case of tropical forest use in SoutheastAsia (Ariyoshi et al., 2000).The prerequisite for suchreforms is the implementation of longer-term struc-tural adjustments and the establishment of new insti-tutional systems on the local level which are inte-grated into an international context.

The Council sees this initiation of long-termreform impulses as a decisive role of the IMF in the

119Interdependencies between the IMF and global environmental policy D 2.2

context of international environmental policy. It can-not be the task of the IMF to define environmentalpolicy standards itself and to integrate them intostructural adjustment programmes, since neither thenecessary capacities are available, nor is there anyneed for another international body to carry out sucha task.Also the political prospects for obtaining IMFfunding for environmental purposes are meagre(Jakobeit, 2000). However it is important to use theIMF to– prevent short-term fluctuations in the interna-

tional capital markets by means of an effectiveearly warning system and incentives for structuraladjustment, since such fluctuations raise the uti-lization pressure on natural resources,

– to support private financial and capital markets bymeans of international rules and standards(Frenkel and Menkhoff, 2000), also making it eas-ier, for example, to attract private finance forinternational environmental protection projectsand structures (Section E 3),

– to promote transparency of the impacts ofnational institutions through commitments to doc-ument economic, social and – where relevant –also ecological consequences, resulting in greaterpressure from world public opinion (Siebert,1998).

The Council recommends that the German govern-ment should more intensively pursue appropriateinitiatives to strengthen the core competences of theIMF, with particular regard to short-term decisionmaking. This also entails a clear delimitation ofresponsibilities from those of the World Bank, whichthe Meltzer Commission has advocated this publiclyto great effect and it is already being discussed withinthe IMF as a strategic aim (IFIAC, 2000; Fischer,2000; Langhammer, 2000a). Moreover, the Councilurges examining the extent to which, within struc-tural adjustment programmes, commitments arisingfrom national and international environmentalagreements can be spared from cuts in public spend-ing. However it cannot be the IMF’s aim to supportprojects in the sphere of global environment anddevelopment policy itself, although coordinationwith longer-term and structurally-focused activitiesof other organizations eases the acceptance andeffectiveness of the structural adjustment pro-grammes.

The future of the interplay between the IMF andglobal environmental policy involves more than pol-icy content alone. Organizationally, the IMF comesunder criticism for two reasons:– Firstly, due to one-sided dominance of the capital

donor countries over its decision making, and– secondly, due to the limited effectiveness of IMF

measures.

Dominance of decision-making power is based onthe allocation of voting rights (Chossudovsky, 1998;French, 1995). The voting rights relate exclusively tothe contributions paid in, which at the same timeensures that the capital donors have the certainty ofbeing able to steer the spending of funds. Since lend-ing is coupled to sometimes-drastic interventionsinto national sovereign rights over fiscal policy, thecapital borrowers’ sense the need to resist this ‘mod-ern form of colonialism’. However, it can be shownby analyses based on game theory, for example, thatwithout such certainty on the part of capital donors,there is an increased incentive for borrowers to drawon the fund as a ‘cheap’ source of finance withoutinherent discipline (Section E 3). The capital donorswould thereupon refuse to provide funds. Preciselyfrom the environmental policy perspective, whatemerges in this connection is the opportunity todevelop ‘packaged solutions’, i.e. by linking interna-tional environmental treaty agreements with IMFfunding allocation agreements. To achieve this pur-pose, there needs to be a clear separation of the roleand organization of the IMF from international envi-ronmental agreements, so that the individual ‘pack-age elements’ can properly be distinguished, andcompliance made subject to separate and transpar-ent control.

The emergence of the financial crisis in SoutheastAsia and crises that have occurred in Mexico andLatin America in recent years have supported theconclusion that the IMF’s main aim of stabilizing theworld financial markets is not one that it can fulfilsatisfactorily. A particularly problematic feature isthe IMF’s function as a ‘lender of the last resort’which entails certain incentives (Siebert, 1998; Fis-cher, 1999). This defines the function of the IMF tointervene as a lender when, due to a liquidity crisis,no other capital lender can be found. This procedurecauses problems, both removing incentives for gov-ernment decision-makers to maintain fiscal disci-pline, and affecting the private banks’ judgement ofrisks. The safety net of the IMF encourages privateinvestors to enter into higher-risk lending in finan-cially weak countries than is economically justifiable(IFIAC, 2000; Frenkel, 1999). The associated dangerof growing financial crises in economically weakcountries indirectly affects the availability of envi-ronmental resources, since grave economic crisestend to raise the utilization pressure. Hence theCouncil underscores the need for action, as recom-mended also by the Meltzer Commission, with regardto the formulation of and adherence to IMF criteriafor intervention and lending. The Meltzer Commis-sion’s proposed criteria are so restrictive, however,that they would limit the activities of the IMF to aminimum. The Council thus argues for continuation


along the route embarked upon by the Financial Sta-bility Forum in Basel towards a regulatory frame-work for the financial markets along with clear andtimely notice of the IMF’s course of action in cases ofcrisis, the development of early detection systemsand, in the worst case, introduction of penalty pay-ments for countries and actors where blame for cau-sation of an economic crisis can be clearly appor-tioned (Siebert, 1998). In summary, the Council viewsa steadfast development of the IMF’s stabilizationfunction, the removal of false incentives, the over-coming of internal organizational coordination prob-lems and better alignment with national and interna-tional environmental agreements as decisive contri-butions to improving the effectiveness of global envi-ronmental policy. The opportunities lie not so muchin ‘greening the IMF’ as in ‘enabling for green activi-ties by the IMF’.

D 3Interplay with development institutions: UNDP and the environment

D 3.1UNDP activities for environmental protection

The United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) is the central financing, coordinating andsteering body for the UN’s operative developmentpolicy functions. UNDP is represented by regionaloffices in 132 countries.Thematically the Programmeemphasizes the areas of poverty reduction, genderissues, good governance and environmental protec-tion.

Between 1994 and 1997, a total of 24 per cent offunding was dedicated to environmental projects,although the UNDP’s contribution to sustainabledevelopment is very much wider ranging becauseexpenditure on good governance or poverty reduc-tion also supports this aim. Most projects are carriedout by executing agencies (from within the UN andits subsidiary entities, or more recently also NGOsand private consultancy firms), with selection andcoordination of projects arranged by UNDP’s localstaff. The Programme’s policy is determined by anExecutive Board comprising members from 36 coun-tries.

In the area of environmental protection, UNDPcarries out a range of projects. Thus since 1994 theSustainable Energy and Environment Division(SEED) has been assisting developing countries inthe implementation of programmes which integrateenvironmental protection and the use of naturalresources to reduce poverty. SEED is also responsi-ble for the further programmatic development ofUNDP environmental strategies, and consists of aseries of subsidiary programmes such as the Capacity21 programme, which supports developing countriesin integrating the principles and aims of Agenda 21into national policy, or the Energy and AtmosphereProgramme, which promotes sustainable energy pol-icy in the developing countries. There are also pro-jects on forestry, freshwater conservation and marineenvironmental protection.

UNDP is one of the implementing agencies of theGEF and one of the four bodies that administer the

Multilateral Ozone Fund, which is engaged in imple-menting the aims of the Montreal Protocol and insupporting numerous developing countries in con-verting to non-ozone-depleting substances. UNDPalso hosts the Office to Combat Desertification andDrought (UNSO, previously the UN SahelianOffice), which supports affected countries in imple-menting the aims of the Desertification Convention.

D 3.2Moves for UNDP reform

In past years, UNDP has been criticized for its lack ofsuccess in fulfilling its allotted tasks adequately.Instead it tends to be seen as a weak developmentpolicy institution, partly due to its low and diminish-ing funding (1991: annual budget US$1,022 million,1997: US$778 million). Nevertheless UNDP stillranks as one of the largest donors in the UN system.Financing operates by means of voluntary contribu-tions, which makes for uncertainties in planning dueto the considerable fluctuations from one year toanother.Above all the donor countries complain thatfrom their perspective the fulfilment of purpose ispoor, the standards of performance are too low andstructure of accountability is weak. This criticismfrom the donor countries is one of the reasons for thedeclining willingness to contribute (Section E 3).Theend of the Cold War has also worked to the detrimentof UNDP because since that era ended there hasbeen less obvious interest in United Nations devel-opment cooperation. A significant structural flaw isthe transfer of various tasks to UNDP without equip-ping the programme with appropriate enforcementinstruments and reinforcing its political strength. YetUNDP possesses important potentials for pro-gramme design and operative work, such as the coor-dination mechanism for round tables, a high degreeof identification of programme countries withUNDP measures, and longstanding experience(Klingebiel, 1999). Governments in developing coun-tries appreciate UNDP for attaching few conditions


to funding and giving relatively comprehensive polit-ical rights of co-determination.

Clear evidence of the drive for UNDP reform isseen in the major changes to the programme over thepast ten years. During this time a significant part ofthe responsibility for implementation has beenpassed to the countries, so that UNDP has given upits own operative unity. Instead there is a self-con-tained UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS).Between 1992 and 1997 the administrative costs fellby 19 per cent, the number of staff by 15 per cent (andeven as much as 31 per cent at headquarters). Out ofa staff of around 5,300, over 80 per cent are employedin regional offices. Also the balance of the financingstructure has been shifted away from its ownresources (core sources) to new sources of funding(non-core sources). Finally, UNDP has fostered anew public image for itself with the publication since1990, to worldwide acclaim, of the annual HumanDevelopment Report.

Lately the World Bank has begun to compete withUNDP in the area of technical cooperation (Rudis-chhauser, 1997). There seems to be a trend on thepart of the USA, Japan and Germany to shift politi-cal priorities in favour of the financially betterresourced World Bank Group, with the result thatdirect grants have been stopped in favour of increas-ing numbers of (to a greater or lesser extent subsi-dized) loans (Hüfner, 1997). Another problem is thestagnation of contributions and grants to UNDP. Ifthis trend persists, UNDP’s role as coordinator of alltechnical cooperation in the UN system will be jeop-ardized, especially as the World Bank’s annual bud-get even now amounts to around ten times that ofUNDP (1996).The developing countries in particularfear any further magnification of the imbalancebetween the United Nations (‘one country, one vote’system) and the Bretton Woods institutions (‘onedollar, one vote’ system) (Agarwal et al. 1999). Thusthe Council urges for a clear and well-considereddivision of responsibilities, and coordinated coopera-tion between UNDP – which should be betterresourced – and the World Bank Group.

According to Klingebiel (1999), UNDP could takeon a central role in the creation of favourable frame-work conditions in the developing countries, withoutwhich successful implementation of the aims ofglobal environmental regimes is impossible. Firstlythe remit of good governance, crisis prevention andpeace consolidation could be extended. Here UNDPhas a special legitimacy because from the GeneralDeclaration of Human Rights to the Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the mostimportant agreements in this sphere have beenreached by the United Nations. Secondly, by devel-oping a systematic follow-through process, UNDP

could contribute to the effective and efficient imple-mentation of all the agreements reached at the ‘worldconferences’ of the 1990s; in particular through tar-geted support and involvement of local institutions.Thirdly, according to Klingebiel (1999), by buildingsuitable capacities in the developing countries,UNDP should help them to coordinate the greaterpart of their development cooperation themselves.Such proposals are along the right lines, in the Coun-cil’s view, but to strengthen UNDP as a financing andcoordination body for the operative activities of theUnited Nations, a more broadly drawn set of objec-tives is required which, in the spirit of Agenda 21,gives equal consideration to development and envi-ronment issues.

D 3.3Strengthening UNDP as a financing andcoordinating body

UNDP is steadily losing ground as a financing andcoordinating body for the operative activities of theUN in favour of the very much better resourcedWorld Bank Group. To bolster the confidence ofdonors in the Development Programme, the Councilrecommends more effective monitoring of the effi-cient use of UNDP resources (Section E 3). Further-more UNDP should be reinforced in its responsibil-ity for development issues within the UN system. Inparticular, the possible options should be examinedfor equipping UNDP with an exclusive mandate andwith decision-making authority outside of its ownprogrammes.

UNDP’s acceptance is founded primarily on itscompetence in its field and its provision withresources (which has suffered greatly in recentyears). The Council emphasizes that the funding ofUNDP is far from adequate to ensure action com-mensurate with the global problems that are nowimminent. A further reason why strengtheningUNDP is highly desirable is that the programmeenjoys the special confidence of the developing coun-tries. This reserve of goodwill is especially importantfor projects promoting good governance, crisis pre-vention and peace consolidation.

Besides numerous development projects, UNDPalso coordinates projects on the conservation of nat-ural resources. The Council recommends investiga-tion of the extent to which environment and devel-opment goals could be better combined withinUNDP project work. One initiative along these linesis the Poverty and Environment Initiative of UNDPand the European Commission (the first Forum ofMinisters on this took place in September 1999),which refuses to treat environmental protection and

123Strengthening UNDP as a financing and coordinating body D 3.3

poverty reduction as mutually exclusive and seekspossibilities for achieving both goals.

Reinforced in its cooperation and coordinationfunctions, the United Nations Environment Pro-gramme (UNEP) (Section E 2) should have theoption of exercising an environmental policy influ-ence on UNDP, and could develop environmentalstandards for UNDP in the light of existing multilat-eral agreements. In future, the annual Human Devel-opment Report published by UNDP could also takeenvironmental aspects into account, especially in thedevelopment of new indices. Here, in the Council’sview, UNDP could also play a significant role inbringing about integrated reporting on global envi-ronment and development problems. The Councilfurther emphasizes how important it is that knowl-edge gained in the operative activity of UNDP is alsotransmitted to UNEP, to ensure that the experiencefrom these projects is fed back into the continuedstrategic development of the programme.

Without dependable financing combined with bet-ter efficiency controls, UNDP will be unable toachieve the outlined aims. To motivate donors, it isthus important not only to advance the proposedconceptual innovations and to strengthen the Pro-gramme’s decision-making authority, but also toensure efficient controls over the uses of funding.Ultimately it will be crucial to hold intensive dia-logue between donors and programme countriesregarding the continued pursuit of the reformprocess.

Global environmental policy:Assessment, organization and funding

E

E 1Assessing environmental problems

E 1.1Introduction

In this chapter, the Council concentrates upon therole of scientific policy advice in the assessment ofglobal environmental changes, proposing, in particu-lar, the establishment of an independent body that iscapable of drawing the attention of the internationalcommunity to particularly risk-laden developments.This discussion includes the Commission on Sustain-able Development (CSD). In addition, the Councilproposes the establishment of independent scientificpanels modelled on the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC). In its previous reports, theCouncil has already provided an in-depth discussionof the role of international science and has examinedglobal monitoring and early warning systems(WBGU, 1997, 2000a).

E 1.2An independent body for assessment and earlywarning

As a part of its vision for recasting the structures ofglobal environment and development policy, theCouncil considers it essential to establish an inde-pendent body endowed with universally acceptedethical and intellectual authority, and charged withidentifying and assessing the risks of global change.The Council recommends to the German govern-ment that it examines the options for establishing an‘Earth Commission’ and that it submits a corre-sponding proposal to the United Nations (Fig. F 1.1).This commission, comprising 10–15 eminent individ-uals, would provide the long-term perspectiveneeded to protect environmental resources and safe-guard the rights and interests of future generations,and would provide impulses for research activitiesand political action. A particular function of theEarth Commission could be to place on the interna-tional agenda, in a manner that catches the world’s

attention, issues which would otherwise be neglecteddespite their vital importance.

The members of the Earth Commission,appointed by the UN General Assembly, should beleading figures of highest moral authority who cancommand the attention of a global audience, as theBrandt and Brundtland Commissions did. Such acommission might be viewed as a globalized form ofthe German Council for Sustainable Development(Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung). Where the needarises, the Earth Commission could be supported byinputs provided by scientific panels (Section E 1.3);however, the main task of the panels would be toadvise the Conferences of the Parties to the Rio con-ventions.

The Earth Commission could receive a right topropose scientific issues to be treated by the panels.These environmental analyses would then beprocessed by the Earth Commission and evaluated interms of whether a ‘warning’ needs to be issued to theglobal public and the United Nations about impend-ing and potentially irreversible environmentalchanges. Neither the scientific panels nor the EarthCommission should engage in research themselves,but should initiate such research, review its outcomesin terms of policy relevance and inform political deci-sion makers about emerging global change issues ofparticular concern.

For the early warning function to have sufficientweight and political mandate, the Earth Commissionshould have the right to be heard by the UN GeneralAssembly or to launch initiatives to address prob-lems or misguided developments relating to globalchange. It should deliver regular reports to the UNSecretary-General providing assessments of theglobal environmental situation. The CSD could pro-vide a forum for debating these reports. In conjunc-tion with the scientific panels, the Earth Commissionwould have four focal tasks:• Synopsis: It should reap maximum benefit from

the existing monitoring systems in order to char-acterize the state of the Earth System. Further-more, additional monitoring activities should beestablished where needed.

128 E Global environmental policy: Assessment, organization and funding

• Early recognition and early warning: Based uponscientific data and findings, the Earth Commissionshould warn the public and particularly the UnitedNations of impending and potentially irreversibleglobal environmental damage.

• Identification of guard rails: The Commissionshould identify ‘guard rails’ for international envi-ronmental policy in order to demarcate stillacceptable transitional areas from unacceptablestates.

• Reporting: The Commission should submit to theUN Secretary-General an annual report evaluat-ing, on the basis of the latest scientific information,the main environmental problems and develop-ments.

E 1.3The role of scientific policy advice

In its previous reports, the Council has repeatedlystressed the importance of independent scientificpolicy advice in processes relating to problem identi-fication and resolution (WBGU, 1997, 2000a, 2001).In view of the complexity of global problems, sys-tematic dissemination of scientific findings and earlyrecognition strategies to the political regulatory bod-ies is crucial. Scientific bodies operating within spe-cific regimes frequently only address concrete tasksassigned to them by the respective Conferences ofthe Parties (COPs). To support such regime-specificbodies, a need remains in global environment anddevelopment policy for institutions that provide sci-entific advice in the manner of the Intergovernmen-tal Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), making theirrecommendations accessible to the internationalcommunity, the Parties and all stakeholders. For this,it is necessary to achieve improved coordination andconcentration of existing scientific networks and torender them utilizable to international policyendeavours by setting up thematic panels.These pan-els should bring together the leading scientists fromacross the world.

As the Council has already set out in previousreports, knowledge is the key to coping with the chal-lenges of global change, and has been utilized inade-quately in the past (WBGU, 2000a).This has had var-ious causes, ranging from inadequate integration ofsectoral knowledge, over asymmetrical access toknowledge, through to ineffective knowledge dis-semination structures. To bring together this knowl-edge more effectively, the Council has already rec-ommended the establishment of various scientificpanels (WBGU, 2000a, 2001). In the present report,the Council takes up these individual recommenda-tions and develops them further to an integrated set

of scientific panels within the context of an institu-tionalized Earth Assessment, one of the three pillarsof an overarching Earth Alliance structure forstrengthening international environmental policy(Chapter F).

E 1.3.1The IPCC experience

Experience gained in negotiating processes withinthe international environment and development pol-icy arena underscores a growing need for well-founded and independent scientific advice (ChaptersB and C). Here it needs to be kept in mind that theimpact of science upon politics depends cruciallyupon how these findings were generated and whopresents them. This was one of the motives for theestablishment of the IPCC by WMO and UNEP in1988. In the meantime, the assessments delivered bythe IPCC, which is not bound by the decisions of theConference of the Parties, have become the widelyrecognized scientific basis of international climatepolicy. The IPCC’s work rests upon a broad, interna-tional participation of scientists and a differentiated,multistage peer review procedure. However, thesummaries for decision makers contained in IPCCreports are copy edited line for line by governmentrepresentatives – while the main parts of the reportsand the three working groups are not subject to suchpolitical influence (Agrawala, 1997). Furthermore –with the goal of making its work more relevant to thepolicy process – special-interest actors have beengiven opportunities to influence the process. Fearshave been voiced that, at least in specific areas, this isjeopardizing the scientific character of the IPCC(Jung, 1999b). However, the experience of the Coun-cil does not currently support such fears.

Because developing countries lack sufficientresearch capacities, they are frequently underrepre-sented in the IPCC (Enquete Commission, 1990;Agrawala, 1997). Nonetheless, owing to financial sup-port provided by the IPCC, the number of partici-pants from developing countries has risen steadilysince 1988. The Council takes the view that the aimcannot be to demand too-rigid fulfilment of regionalrepresentation quotas as this would compromise thescientific credibility of the IPCC. The aim shouldrather be to promote scientific capacities in develop-ing countries in order to create a more balanced situ-ation over the long term.

129The role of scientific policy advice E 1.3

E 1.3.2Supporting global environmental policy byscientific panels

The indeterminacy of the scientific fundamentals,terms and concepts used in international environ-mental policy negotiations has become increasinglyclear in recent years and forms an impediment toelaborating or implementing the decisions taken bythe Parties. With regard to the UNCED follow-upprocess, there is a need for action in the followingspheres:• There is a lack of coordinated contributions by the

scientific community to the problems of globalchange. In some environmental spheres, knowl-edge on states, degradation dynamics and poten-tial consequences is still very patchy or entirelyabsent (Chapter B). This applies, for instance, tothe loss of biological diversity and the degradationof soils. Regular scientific stock-taking exercisesare an essential prerequisite for concretizingtreaty commitments, using, for instance, a base linecatalogue of global indicators – which yet needs tobe developed (Chapter C).

• There is a need for a body engaging in cross-cut-ting analysis of the key themes of global changeand identifying ‘safety margins’ or ‘guard rails’ inorder to inform the international community, in astimely a manner as possible, about hazardousdevelopments in the environmental realm. Guardrails indicating the limits of absolute non-sustain-ability would provide a scientifically underpinnedbasis upon which to determine abatement or con-servation goals within the various environmentalregimes. In its report on global environmentalrisks, the Council proposed a Risk AssessmentPanel, one function of which would be to initiatean international risk evaluation process (WBGU,2000a).

• To transpose scientific findings into politically rel-evant options for action, there is frequently a lackof integration among the approaches and perspec-tives of the various disciplines.

• To inform the wider public, a need remains for astructure that channels and renders accessible theavailable ‘risk knowledge’.

The present structure, in which only the ClimateChange Convention has an independent scientificadvisory body at its command, does not suffice tocope with the tasks outlined above. The biodiversityand desertification regimes do in fact have two bod-ies charged with providing scientific-technologicaladvice: the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technicaland Technological Advice (SBSTTA) within the bio-diversity regime and the Committee on Science and

Technology (CST) within the desertification regime.The function of these bodies is to stimulate and eval-uate scientific reports at the specific request of therespective COPs. The results of these expert reportsthen need to be processed into draft resolutions forthe COPs. In their capacity as subsidiary, instruction-bound bodies of the COPs, both the SBSTTA and theCST are closely linked to the programmes of work oftheir respective COPs. Under the Climate ChangeConvention, there is the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change (IPCC), whose reports areprocessed for the COP by the Subsidiary Body forScientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Thebiodiversity and desertification conventions lacksuch an advisory structure – here the necessary inde-pendent scientific work cannot be conducted withinthe force field of political interests. In manyinstances, SBSTTA and CST meetings are attendedby government representatives rather than indepen-dent scientists. These representatives engage in con-sultation processes from a more political perspective.

Building upon the IPCC experience, the Councilrecommends the establishment of comparable scien-tific bodies or panels to provide advice and support,for instance to international soil and biodiversity pol-icy. In an Intergovernmental Panel on BiologicalDiversity (IPBD) (WBGU, 2001) or an Intergovern-mental Panel on Land and Soils (IPLS), eminent sci-entists could be brought together who could work onan ongoing and independent basis and provide scien-tific policy advice. The need for advice is extensive:Within the desertification regime, for instance, inorder to provide more effective implementation ofdecisions, there is a need for a ‘core set’ of global indi-cators (for monitoring and reporting) and guard rails(for conservation and abatement targets). In thisregard, there are already promising moves towardscreating a database on soils, soil use and soil degra-dation over the next 10–15 years. Over the long term,however, a need remains for a structure that moni-tors and evaluates soil-related changes continuously(Section C 4.3).

It is similarly essential to focus international bios-phere research within an expert scientific committee,as biosphere policy also suffers a lack of well-founded and independent scientific policy advice.The Council has already discussed this issue in detailelsewhere (WBGU, 2001). Furthermore, a RiskAssessment Panel could form a network node, sys-tematically collating the various national-level riskcharacterization and evaluation efforts. This panelshould be concerned not so much with analysingenvironmental problems that have already beenidentified, but rather with identifying, early on, newtypes of global change risk whose first outlines are

only just emerging. The Council has set out the tasksof this panel in detail elsewhere (WBGU, 2000a).

The contributions provided by these panels couldgive greater weight to the debate on internationalenvironmental protection. A further aspect is thatthe panels, set up as independent bodies as recom-mended, could provide the Parties and all stakehold-ers with scientific policy advice on current issues andproblems in the political process and, moreover,highlight topics neglected in the policy arena.The sci-entific findings of these panels would also be utilizedby the Earth Commission proposed by the Council. Itwould need to be considered whether the panelsshould be termed ‘International’ instead of ‘Inter-governmental’, in order to underscore their politicalindependence.

However, it needs to be kept in mind that, by shift-ing scientific tasks to independent bodies, the existingsubsidiary scientific bodies increasingly gain apreparatory role for the Conferences of the Parties.Such a development can already be observed todayin the biodiversity and climate regimes, where thesessions of these subsidiary bodies (SBSTTA and,respectively, SBSTA and SBI) have now become‘mini-COPs’ which prepare numerous COP deci-sions. Such a development is not currently under waywithin the desertification regime, because the ses-sions of the CST take place at the same time as theCOP meetings. This effectively prevents the formerfrom preparing the latter. The Council is of the opin-ion that further development of the existing scientificsubsidiary bodies or committees in the direction out-lined above is highly expedient, as this would makescientific inputs possible which could be processed ina manner utilizable for the Conferences of the Par-ties. The scientific subsidiary bodies or committeeswould thus have an important interface functionbetween the scientific and policy arenas, as is alreadythe case within the climate regime.

At the European Union (EU) level, too, there is alack of coordinated scientific policy advice. It wouldtherefore be useful to give the existing national-levelenvironmental and sustainability councils the oppor-tunity to provide consultative support, by means ofjoint reports, to EU environment and developmentpolicy. In the view of the Council, the run-up toWSSD would lend itself particularly to such anapproach. In the negotiations within the UNCEDfollow-up process, the European Union has beenspeaking with one voice for long now. The time istherefore ripe to establish a structure permitting EU-wide cooperation among national-level scientific pol-icy advice bodies or to set up a scientific council atEU level in which members of national-level advi-sory bodies are represented. The regular meetings ofEuropean environmental and sustainability councils,

which have joined forces to form the group of Euro-pean Environmental Advisory Councils (EEAC) andjointly finance a focal point, are a first step in thisdirection.

E 1.4The role of the CSD

Within the Earth Assessment structure proposed bythe Council, the Commission on Sustainable Devel-opment (CSD) would assume an important functionin promoting interlinkage and dialogue in the delib-erative process among the Earth Commission andgovernments, science, non-governmental organiza-tions and the proposed International EnvironmentOrganization. In the view of the Council, such a repo-sitioning could provide one of the future fields ofwork of the CSD, which will have fulfilled in the year2001 its mandate as stipulated by UNCED to addressthe individual topics of AGENDA 21. As a functionalcommission of ECOSOC, the CSD was establishedwithout a fixed term. Consequently, the topics to beaddressed will be decided anew at the WSSD. TheEarth Commission could be given a right to proposethe issues to be addressed by the CSD, thus raisingthe profile of topics which are particularly importantfrom a scientific perspective but have not yet gainedsufficient political attention. Moreover, the CSDcould be the forum in which the reports of the EarthCommission are debated.

The CSD is particularly suited to this role, as it isthe specific intergovernmental forum within theUnited Nations system in which cross-cutting sus-tainability issues are addressed. The CSD is the cen-tral forum for issues relating to environment anddevelopment. Besides this integrative role, the CSDhas an important supportive function within interna-tional environment and development policy, as it ini-tiates the consensus-building and standard-develop-ing deliberative process within the internationalcommunity of states that is crucial to the politicaldecision-making process. This exceedingly importantfunction needs to be retained in the future, and inte-grated within the system for global change riskassessment proposed by the Council. Science hasbeen somewhat underrepresented in the CSD untilnow. The Council therefore urges that it be consid-ered whether science can gain a more prominent rolewithin the CSD process. One way of doing this couldbe by having representatives of the scientific panelsreport on latest findings at the two-day multi-stake-holder dialogues with which each CSD sessionbegins.


131Assessing global environmental problems E 1.5

E 1.5Assessing global environmental problems:Recommendations for action

Overall, the assessment process should seek to inte-grate the Earth Commission, the scientific policyadvice community and the CSD. In the view of theCouncil, such an interplay of ethical authority, cut-ting-edge scientific expertise and open debate withina UN institution is crucial to the enterprise of assess-ing the complex problems of global change in a man-ner that is both appropriate to the issues at hand anddoes justice to the precautionary principle. It is aboveall important that this assessment process has adynamic structure and adapts continuously to chang-ing conditions and findings. The Earth Commissionshould not only sound the environmental ‘warningtrumpet’, but should also be able, if developments arefavourable, to give the ‘all clear’.

Reforming the organizational structure of global environmental policyE 2

E 2.1Introduction

While we have concentrated in Chapter C uponexperience gained in specific environmental regimes,in Chapter D upon policy interplay and in Section E1 upon scientific assessment processes, we now turnto the issue of the appropriate organizational archi-tecture for global environmental policy. Section E 3will then address the cross-cutting issue of funding.These elaborations are intended to provide anaction-oriented contribution in the run-up to theWSSD due in 2002, where the institutional issue willbe one of the focal themes.

As set out in the previous sections, the Councilsees a number of advances in the present state ofglobal environmental policy. Nonetheless, successfulinternational negotiations are troublesome and time-consuming. Due to the structurally dominant princi-ple of sovereignty, decision-making in internationalenvironmental negotiations continues essentially tobe based upon the principle of consensus, although insome regimes the states have agreed upon majoritydecision-making for certain issues. As shown inChapter C, majority decision-making has been intro-duced under, for instance, the 1987 Montreal Proto-col on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, andwithin the Global Environment Facility (WBGU,1997). Nonetheless, these breakthroughs remainedexceptions to the rule, and in other spheres of globalenvironmental policy the principle of consensus hasin fact experienced a renaissance. A consequence ofthe fundamental orientation to consensus, particu-larly when concluding treaties, is that often environ-mental policy ‘laggards’ can only be moved to partic-ipate by giving them concessions. In many instances,they even prevent effective measures completely(Sand, 1990). Similarly, deficits continue to prevail inbroad areas of international environmental policyimplementation and enforcement.

Consequently, in view of the frequently noted lackof coordination and efficacy of global environmentalpolicy, repeated calls have been made in recent years

for a comprehensive redesign of the internationalinstitutional and organizational architecture. No con-sensus on the necessary steps has yet been found inthe scientific debate (Esty, 1994a, b, 1996; Runge,1994; Biermann and Simonis, 2000). The most recentmove in this direction comes from French PrimeMinister Lionel Jospin and French EnvironmentMinister Dominique Voynet, who announced in June2000 their intention to use the French EU presidencyto advance the debate on an international environ-mental organization. Former WTO Director-GeneralRenato Ruggiero already spoke out in favour of a‘Global Environmental Organization’ in 1999 as acounterbalance to the WTO, but without specifyingthis proposal. French President Jacques Chirac hadalready advocated the establishment of an interna-tional environmental organization a year before.

In the international arena, Germany, too, is viewedas a proponent of the establishment of a UN special-ized agency for environmental issues following theofficial statement by then Chancellor Helmut Kohl in1997 at the UN General Assembly special session onenvironment and development that “[...] global envi-ronmental protection and sustainable developmentneed a clearly-audible voice at the United Nations.Therefore, in the short term, I think it is importantthat cooperation among the various environmentalorganisations be significantly improved. In themedium term this should lead to the creation of aglobal umbrella organization for environmentalissues, with the United Nations Environment Pro-gramme as a major pillar” (Kohl, 1997). This wasidentical in essence to the Joint Declaration byBrazil, Germany, Singapore and South Africa issuedin June 1997 at the same UN General Assembly spe-cial session. The design details of this ‘globalumbrella organization for environmental issues’ pro-posed by Germany were not specified.

The new German administration which came intooffice in 1998 continues to back this initiative. Forinstance, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) envi-ronmental policy spokesperson declared on 25 Janu-ary 1999: “We need […] a concentration of theunwieldy and fragmented international institutions

133The functions of restructuring E 2.2

and programmes. UNEP, CSD and UNDP should beamalgamated in an organization for sustainabledevelopment. Close connections to the World Bank,the International Monetary Fund, the World TradeOrganization and UNCTAD [UN Conference onTrade and Development] are desirable in order toprevent environmental dumping and to achieveoverall a sustainable, environmentally sound devel-opment in accordance with AGENDA 21” (quotedafter: epd-Entwicklungspolitik 5/99).

The Council has already spoken out in favour ofthe establishment of an International EnvironmentalOrganization in previous reports (WBGU, 1996,2000a). The present report takes up this proposalonce again and substantiates it comprehensively.First Section E 2.2 discusses what an organizationalreform of global environmental policy should yieldand should not yield. Section E 2.3 goes on to presenta three-step model for redesigning the internationalorganizational architecture. The Council does notrecommend a priori that all steps should be imple-mented over the long term, nor that Step 3 should bethe necessary ultimate goal. The Council ratheradvises the German government to aim initially toimplement the first step, to examine its efficacy andonly then to consider further steps if the previousstep did not yield the desired outcome.

E 2.2The functions of restructuring

Coordination needsWhat are the problems that have made the calls forthe establishment of an International EnvironmentalOrganization so strident? First of all, the swift rise inthe number of international environmental agree-ments over the past three decades has considerablyincreased the need to coordinate environmental poli-cies.There is a real risk of duplication of efforts, over-lap of competency and conflict among goals, not onlyamong the various Conferences of the Parties, butalso among the convention secretariats and the UNprogrammes and departments. Such problems ariseboth among various environmental agreements andbetween institutions located within and outside ofthe environmental sphere. For instance, internationalforest conservation rules are currently being debatedby five different institutions: The International Trop-ical Timber Agreement, the Food and AgriculturalOrganization of the United Nations (FAO), the Cli-mate Change Convention, the Biodiversity Conven-tion and the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests.

In practically all fields of international environ-mental policy these problems are becoming increas-ingly apparent. For instance, there is little coordina-

tion between climate policy on the one hand and bio-diversity and soil policy on the other. For each ofthese, independent secretariats have been set upwhich have effectively become small specializedorganizations with their own agenda. Accounting forgreenhouse gas sinks under the Kyoto Protocol to theClimate Change Convention could now create incen-tives in forest policy that run counter to the goals ofbiodiversity policy, because the Protocol will rewardas a climate policy measure the logging of (species-rich) primary forests followed by reafforestationwith (species-poor, but rapidly growing) plantations(WBGU, 1998b; for general discussions of theseproblems see Chambers, 1998; Oberthür, 1997; Ober-thür and Ott, 1999; Young, 1997; Young et al., 1999).

A primary purpose of establishing the UN Envi-ronment Programme (UNEP) in 1972 was to coordi-nate the emergent field of international environmen-tal policy. UNEP was initially a comparatively inde-pendent actor with clearly focussed tasks. The grow-ing number of international environmentalagreements subsequently led to considerable frag-mentation of the system, as newly created conventionsecretariats were not or only loosely attached toUNEP, partly for political reasons. As a result, stronginterests of individual entities developed, which hasnot on the whole promoted coordinated and efficientglobal environmental policy. In addition, various UNspecialized agencies have developed environmentalactivities without UNEP, a relatively small organiza-tion, having been able to exert a normative and pro-gramme-determining influence. Moreover, thefinancing of the central environmental agreements ofNorth-South relevance was partly institutionalized atthe World Bank in the form of the Global Environ-ment Facility (GEF), and partly entrusted to inde-pendent sectoral funds (Section E 3; Ehrmann, 1997;Biermann, 1997).

The problem of fragmentation has been wellknown for some time. Attempts to network individ-ual organizations, programmes and offices have beenunder way since 1972. However, efforts to bridge thespecific interests of individual departments, pro-grammes and convention secretariats havefoundered, so that the comparatively ineffective andinefficient fragmentation of the institutional andorganizational architecture of international environ-mental policy has not subsided, but rather grown.Thedebate on institutional reform at the 1992 Rio con-ference only led to the formation of a further sub-sidiary commission of the Economic and SocialCouncil of the United Nations (ECOSOC), the Com-mission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (Sec-tion B 4.3). Due to its specific institutional locus,which accords it little more than the right to forwardrecommendations to ECOSOC, the CSD has albeit


established itself in addition to UNEP, the conven-tion secretariats and the UN specialized agencies as aforum for debate, but not for decisions.

Capacity buildingConcerning the urgently required capacity buildingin developing countries, the international systemagain suffers under an ad-hoc approach that alreadyfails to do justice to the requirements of trans-parency, effectiveness and participation of thoseaffected – and the need for financial and technologytransfer from North to South will continue to grow.For instance, in climate policy, as in ozone policybefore, the industrialized countries have promised toreimburse the incremental costs incurred by devel-oping countries if the latter commit themselves toquantified greenhouse gas emissions reductionobjectives in the next decades. Much the sameapplies to the future costs of soil conservation andbiodiversity conservation policy in the South. Thiswill presumably soon be joined by transfer commit-ments for limiting the release of persistent organicpollutants. Moreover, future international emissionstrading under the climate regime, for instance in theform of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)decided in Kyoto in 1997, will require substantialinstitutional underpinning.

Supporters of the establishment of a UN special-ized agency for environmental issues argue that suchan organization – modelled on, for instance, theWorld Health Organization – could make a greatercontribution to raising awareness of the issues andcould improve worldwide information as a decision-making basis. The latter point concerns both infor-mation on the Earth System and present environ-ment and development issues on the one hand, andinformation on the status of implementation of inter-national and national policies to control globalchange on the other. Of course there is no need toreinvent the wheel: All environmental agreementsalready commit their parties to regular reporting.Specialized agencies such as the World Meteorologi-cal Organization (WMO), the International Mar-itime Organization (IMO) or the WHO gather anddisseminate valuable knowledge and promote fur-ther research; the CSD provides important contribu-tions to the elaboration of indicators for sustainabledevelopment. UNEP, not least, is active in many ofthese fields.

Nonetheless, a need remains to coordinate andconcentrate this knowledge in a comprehensiveapproach, and to process and channel it in a mannersuited for decision-making (Section E 1). The contri-butions currently elaborated by the various interna-tional actors need a central locus in the internationalinstitutional system. UNEP could be this locus, but

the resources and current competencies of this pro-gramme attached to the UN General Assembly donot suffice. Here one alternative might be to upgradeUNEP, transforming it into a treaty-based, institu-tionally independent International EnvironmentalOrganization underpinned with sufficient additionalfunding. A comparison of staff numbers illustrateshow poorly UNEP is presently endowed: UNEP, anentity with worldwide activities, only commands oversome 530 staff (2000), while the German FederalEnvironmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA)has 1,032 (1999) and the US Environmental Protec-tion Agency (EPA) even commands over 18,807 staffmembers (1999).

Upgrading UNEP would also have the benefit ofimproved support for regime formation processes,for instance through initiating and preparing treaties.Here the ILO could provide a model, which has elab-orated, following a defined procedure, a comprehen-sive body of ‘ILO Conventions’ which represent aform of global labour relations code. Compared tothe ILO, regime formation in global environmentalpolicy is far more disparate and suffers more from‘turf battles’ among various UN specialized agencies,in which small UNEP has been unable to defendenvironmental interests adequately.

The case for and against a UN specializedagency for environmental issuesNow that Germany, too, has joined the debate onestablishing a UN specialized agency for environ-mental issues, it needs to be stressed that this can beno panacea. Many of the problems plaguing the pre-sent small entities, notably UNEP and CSD, will notdisappear from one day to the next. In a broader per-spective, it further needs to be kept in mind thatinternational organizations are rarely exemplars ofefficiency. Institutional incrustation occurs all tooeasily in them, leading to inadequate adaptability andconsequent bureaucratism. Thus some observersview the United Nations as a whole as an example ofinefficiency. However, this does not necessarily speakin favour of maintaining the status quo either, fortoday the secretariats of international regimes arealready often attached to global institutions andaccordingly have to cope with bureaucratization ten-dencies. Each secretariat, each small environmentalprogramme requires its own administrative appara-tus, from payroll accounting to EDP services. Thefoundation of a new International EnvironmentalOrganization into which the convention secretariatsand UNEP would merge would indeed create a newbureaucracy – but it would simultaneously renderseveral smaller ones superfluous.

There is nonetheless a need to state clearly what anew International Environmental Organization

135Towards a new architecture E 2.3

should not yield, or what must at all events beavoided. For one thing, it needs to be ensured thatsuch an organization does not carry out projectsitself. On-site project coordination should continueto be provided, according to the specific technicalexpertise required, by UNDP (Section D 3.3), theWorld Bank (Section D 2), FAO or UNIDO,whereby the new International Environmental Orga-nization would operate exclusively as client andprovider of substantive support. It would greatlyexacerbate the inefficiency of the overall system if afurther project-executing organization were createdin addition to the existing project-focussed entities inthe UN system.

Similarly, organizational restructuring should notlead to the creation of a new funding organization inaddition to UNDP (Section D 3.3), the World Bankor the Global Environment Facility (Section B 4.5).However, a International Environmental Organiza-tion would need to be equipped with sufficient fund-ing to pay its staff appropriately and carry out its sub-stantive work – in some instances the present finan-cial bottlenecks in the UN system have reached ascale detrimental to that system’s effective opera-tion.

Past debates have made it clear that reservationsagainst the establishment of a International Environ-mental Organization prevail particularly in develop-ing countries.The experience made with the Germangovernment initiative in 1997 shows that such politi-cal advances enter treacherous terrain if Germany isnot backed by the consensus and support of its Euro-pean partner countries. It is consequently recom-mendable to initially elaborate a common positionon reforming the UN in the environmental spherewithin the European Union, particularly as Franceevidently aims to lobby more strongly for an Interna-tional Environmental Organization.

In a further step, it is essential to ensure that indus-trialized and developing countries support all initia-tives in this area jointly. The Council therefore urgesthe German government to seek targeted coalitionswith important developing countries in order toensure acceptance of a political initiative from theoutset. The Council accordingly welcomes the 1997four-country initiative of the German government,taken together with Brazil, Singapore and SouthAfrica, and recommends taking further politicalsteps in this direction.

Furthermore, in order to enhance the acceptanceby developing countries of proposals for reform, theCouncil recommends considering decision-makingprocedures in which North and South have an equalposition – for instance modelled on the equal North-South representation in the decision-making proce-dures of the Montreal Protocol, the Ozone Fund or

the GEF (Section B 4.5). This could ensure that thestrategic and programming decisions of the neworganization run counter to neither the interests ofthe developing countries nor those of the industrial-ized countries. Without the approval of a majority ofthe developing countries and without the consent ofa majority of the industrialized countries, global envi-ronment and development policy is impossible. Deci-sion-making procedures with equal North-South rep-resentation are effectively a ‘third path’ between theprocedures of the UN General Assembly, whichfavour the South (one country, one vote), and thoseof the Bretton Woods institutions, which favour theNorth (one dollar, one vote), and may build the foun-dation for an International Environmental Organiza-tion (Biermann and Simonis, 2000).

E 2.3Towards a new architecture

In the following, the Council develops three stages oforganizational reform of the UN system as it relatesto the environmental sector, building upon the statusquo. Each step should be considered separately. TheCouncil stresses that this model is by no meansintended as a necessary sequence of steps leadinginexorably to the last step. It is rather to be expectedthat the transition from one step to the next willalready yield considerable improvements in globalenvironmental policy. Only if this is not found to bethe case should the transition to the next higher stepbe considered.

E 2.3.1Step 1: Improving cooperation

The previous sections have discussed in detail theexisting organizational structure and have high-lighted its deficits. Against this backdrop, it appearsnecessary to the Council to take further stepstowards improved cooperation among the variousorganizations and programmes. In Step 1, this coop-eration would continue to be in the form of collabo-ration among equal partners. Nor would it touchupon the functions of the CSD, the GEF, the variousconvention secretariats and Conferences of the Par-ties, or the environmental policy departments andprogrammes of the individual specialized agencies.This corresponds to the basic principle of a ‘segmen-tation strategy’ of global environmental policy, inwhich the core competence for addressing individualenvironmental issues lies with the specialized con-ventions.This promotes unequivocal sectoral respon-sibilities.


In this phase, a key element in the opinion of theCouncil is to first establish a high-level Environmen-tal Management Group. This would be drawn fromthe executive personnel of the environmentally rele-vant UN specialized agencies and programmes, asrecommended by the Töpfer Task Force (Box E 2.3-1). Within this group, environmental concerns couldbe promoted by upgrading UNEP accordingly. Thisupgrading could be provided by strengtheningUNEP financially and administratively, in order for itto be able to carry out its tasks more effectively in thefields of scientific coordination, public awareness-raising, technology transfer and advisory services forstate and non-state actors in developing countries.

If appropriate, UNEP could also be strengthenedby upgrading it to the status of an agency within theUnited Nations system. Such an elevated statuswould not compromise the rights of the conventionsecretariats, Conferences of the Parties or the otherUN specialized agencies. It would rather mean,besides improved financial and staffing resources,above all an upgrading of environmental concernswithin the ‘family’ of UN specialized agencies.

There are two models for such institutionalupgrading: First that of the World Health Organiza-tion, i.e. a UN specialized agency with its own budgetand own membership, or, second, that of the UnitedNations Conference on Trade and Development

Box E 2.3-1

The Töpfer Task Force

In 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established theUnited Nations Task Force on Environment and HumanSettlements in order to elaborate proposals for strengthen-ing UNEP and Habitat (United Nations Centre on HumanSettlements). Klaus Töpfer, UNEP Executive Director, wasappointed chair. The motivation behind establishing theTask Force was the generally shared conviction that institu-tional fragmentation in numerous separate environmen-tally related processes has led to a loss of effectiveness. Thebrief of the Task Force was to review the structures of envi-ronmentally related activities within the UN, to evaluatetheir efficiency and effectiveness and to submit proposalsfor improving the environmental work of the UN at theglobal level and the role of UNEP as leading environmen-tal organization. In addition, recommendations were to bemade for strengthening the role of UNEP as the mainsource of environmentally related information for the CSD.

The Task Force comprised 21 eminent experts, met fourtimes and submitted its report to the Secretary-General in1998. It summarized its findings in 24 recommendations.Their implementation would serve to strengthen coordina-tion among the various organizations, programmes andconventions, and enhance general political coherence inorder to reinvigorate the work of the UN in the sphere ofthe environment and human settlements.The recommanda-tions call for decisions and measures at both the intergov-ernmental and secretariat levels.

Establishment of an Environmental ManagementGroupThe key proposal of the Task Force was to establish anEnvironmental Management Group headed by the UNEPDirector, in order to better coordinate the exchange ofinformation, new initiatives and the planning framework,and thus to ensure an efficient and effective use ofresources.The purpose of this group is to create a forum forexchange among the analytical and normative activities ofUNEP and the operative functions of UNDP.

Regular consultations between UNEP and the repre-sentatives of the conventions (presidents of Conferences ofthe Parties, heads of secretariats) are proposed in order toaddress cross-cutting issues. Consultation among the vari-ous programmes of the conventions and those of UNEP is

to be improved and synergies exploited. The Secretary-General, governments and Conferences of the Parties arecalled upon to seek solutions to the inefficiency and exag-gerated costs caused by the geographical dispersal of secre-tariats.The Task Force stresses the importance of stabilizingand strengthening Nairobi as a UN location. Issues thatshould be addressed include security, exploitation of syner-gies between UNEP and Habitat, developing a commonfinancing strategy and, finally, merging administrations.

Early warning functionIn the opinion of the Task Force, UNEP and Habitat shouldadopt information and early warning functions.They shouldbe placed in a position to provide governments with timelyinformation about negative developments that require pre-ventive or relief measures on the part of the internationalcommunity. This calls for a strengthening of their informa-tion provider function in order to facilitate an improvedexchange of information for best practice in dealings withthe global environment by the international community.Consequently, the Earthwatch system should be reviewedand further developed to an effective, scientifically basedsystem. In the same vein, indicators for sustainable devel-opment should be developed and data and informationexchange capacities expanded. The Task Force statesexpressly that these should include information providedby non-governmental organizations.

The Task Force further stresses the necessity of using theGEF efficiently. To this end, collaboration between UNEP,UNDP and the World Bank should be intensified.

The Task Force also provided a series of suggestions forstrengthening the involvement in the work of the UN of pri-vate industry, non-governmental organizations (particu-larly those in the South) and other civil society groups.

To enhance coordination and coherence among inter-governmental institutions in the environmental sphere, theTask Force proposes, among other things, a global environ-mental forum at minister level that should meet annually inconnection with the sessions of the UNEP GoverningCouncil and should review the environmental agenda of theUN and its implementation.The meetings should take placeat different locations, should tackle regional issues andshould attract media attention through debates of topicalinterest. With the aim of improving consultation with theCSD and with the Conferences of the Parties, this forumshould also elaborate contributions to the CSD sessions.The first global forum of environment ministers took placein May 2000 in Malmö.


(UNCTAD), a UN programme established by theUN General Assembly to promote cooperation ininternational trade policy.

The group of UN specialized agencies is the out-come of functional specialization within the UN sys-tem, with the United Nations Organization (UNO) atthe centre, surrounded by a group of independentUN specialized agencies for special policy fields, suchas for food and agriculture (FAO, since 1945), educa-tion, science and culture (UNESCO, since 1945),health (WHO, 1946), aviation (ICAO, 1944) or mete-orology (WMO, 1947). Some of the specialized agen-cies are much older than the UNO itself, such as theUniversal Postal Union (UPU), going back to theyear 1874. Most, however, were established almostsimultaneously with the UNO because national gov-ernments feared at the time that the vast range oftasks would overburden the UNO. All UN special-ized agencies are linked intimately with the UN, inparticular with ECOSOC.

In 1945, environmental problems were not yet anissue, so that the term ‘environment’ is not men-tioned once in the UN Charter. It was not until 1972that a UN environment programme was establishedwithin the UNO, without legal personality and with-out its own budget; its founding document stipulatesit should have only a small secretariat. This UNEP isnot comparable with the UN specialized agencies forthe other policy fields. If, now, the International Envi-ronmental Organization were to be established as afurther UN specialized agency, this would build upona founding treaty that would need to be ratified by acertain number of states in order to enter into force.Such an organization could have its own budget, pos-sibly replenished by member state contributions, andcould also administer in trust the funds of innovativefinancial institutions (Section E 3).

A UN specialized agency for environmental issuescould adopt certain standards binding upon all mem-bers, where appropriate with majority decisions. Fur-thermore, the general assembly of the InternationalEnvironmental Organization could negotiate andadopt treaties which would then be opened for signa-ture within the organization. ILO, for instance,demands of its member states that, within one yearafter adoption of an ILO convention, they forwardthis to the appropriate governmental institutions fordeliberation and ratification. This goes far beyondthe powers of the present UNEP Governing Council.On the other hand, a new organization would notnecessarily lead immediately to the dissolution ofUNEP, particularly if not all UN members wish tojoin the new organization. Insofar, during a transi-tional period and possibly for longer, a new UN spe-cialized agency could exacerbate rather than allevi-ate the problem of duplication of efforts and ineffi-

ciency. Over the long term, however, following theestablishment and implementation of an Interna-tional Environmental Organization, the existing UNenvironmental programme should expire.

The UNCTAD model, i.e. a subsidiary body withinthe UN, currently appears the most realistic solution.UNCTAD was established in 1964 by a resolution ofthe UN General Assembly. Its status as a semi-autonomous specialized entity within the UN hasremained largely unique. To a certain degree, UNC-TAD has a higher status than UNEP at present.Nonetheless, upgrading UNEP to a semi-autonomous entity subsidiary to the UN does notappear a sufficiently ambitious step.

The act of creating a Type I International Envi-ronmental Organization, be it on the WHO/ILOmodel or on the UNCTAD model, would not in itselfaffect the status of the various environmental con-ventions. It is however probable that a stronger envi-ronmental policy actor within the UN system wouldultimately lead to a certain shift in the balance ofpower among the organizations, notably to a transferof competencies to the new organization at the costof FAO, UNESCO and UNIDO.

Approval by the developing countries would beenhanced if this Type I International EnvironmentalOrganization implies a strengthening of the UNEPfunctions that are central to developing countryinterests, such as information procurement and dis-semination, and technology transfer. It further needsto be ensured with a view to developing countryapproval that the Type I International Environmen-tal Organization does not remain restricted to inher-ently global environmental problems such as climatechange or ozone layer depletion; it must also coverthe management of environmental problems whoseglobal impact rests on cumulative effects, such as soiland land degradation, biodiversity loss, forest deci-mation or freshwater scarcity. In developing coun-tries, such environmental problems currently endan-ger far more human lives than the inherently globalenvironmental problems (WBGU, 2000a).The Type IInternational Environmental Organization shouldtherefore concentrate on the conservation of fresh-water resources, soils, biodiversity and forests, on thesafe management of chemicals and on air pollutioncontrol (also indoors). Inherently global environ-mental problems, such as ozone depletion or climatechange, must also be addressed by this organization,but should not be the central issues. One reason forthis is that – at least in the eyes of the developingcountries – the principal responsibility for theseinherently global issues continues to rest with theindustrialized countries and therefore other organi-zations such as the OECD could carry out the corre-sponding tasks.


Such a International Environmental Organizationneed not have any ‘sharp teeth’, but could quite wellbe successful by means of ‘soft’ enforcement mecha-nisms. For instance, the organization should beempowered to gather information on the state of theenvironment and of environmental policy in the indi-vidual countries and to evaluate and publish this in asuitable form. This could in particular make compar-isons with the international commitments into whichthe states in question have entered. As Levy (1993)has shown for the example of the European air pol-lution control regime, purely comparative informa-tion on different states can trigger important politicalinitiatives in countries where environmental aware-ness is low.

E 2.3.2Step 2: Coordinating umbrella organization withindependent committees

If improved cooperation among international orga-nizations and programmes, possibly including theestablishment of a new organization modelled on theWHO or on UNCTAD, should not suffice to remedythe deficits identified, strengthening environmentalprotection through improved coordination of actorswould need to be considered. Such coordinationwould to a certain extent necessitate a limited intro-duction of hierarchies within the organizationalarchitecture. Should such a step become necessaryover the medium term, the model of the World TradeOrganization (WTO) suggests itself. Here the secre-tariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) was upgraded to an independent interna-tional organization; at the same time, various multi-lateral and plurilateral trade agreements werebrought under the umbrella of the framework treatyestablishing the WTO. As a result, all trade agree-ments have the same secretariat, namely the WTO,which prevents inefficient fragmentation amongnumerous administrative units. Furthermore, alltrade agreements are subject to the same dispute set-tlement mechanism. Nonetheless, a certain degree ofdecentralism in the decision-making system isretained because the specific decisions for the keytrade agreements are taken at special conferencesattached as ‘committees’ to the WTO MinisterialConference. In analogy, it might be possible over themedium term to integrate the various Conferences ofthe Parties in the environmental arena under theumbrella of a common framework treaty establishingan International Environmental Organization andthen to let them continue to operate, as in the WTOsystem, as special committees of the ministerial con-ference with a high degree of autonomy. The estab-

lishment of such a Type II organization will surelyonly be accepted by developing and industrializedcountries alike if both sides have effective veto rightsover the further development of the organization.Here adoption of the decision-making procedure ofthe Montreal Protocol, with its equal North-Southrepresentation, makes particular sense.

For developing countries, the establishment of aType II International Environmental Organizationwould have the particular advantage of geographiccentralization of negotiations. Until now, very manyof the smaller developing countries are overbur-dened in terms of human resources by the great num-ber of international negotiating committees, Confer-ences of the Parties, sub-committees and expert pan-els meeting worldwide.They are scarcely able to keeptrack of the scientific, political and economic impli-cations of the complex issues under negotiation, forinstance global emissions trading under the climatechange regime, or safe international management ofgenetically modified organisms. As a consequence,many developing countries orient themselves politi-cally to the major actors of the South. Even the lead-ing G-77 countries, such as India or China, often donot command over a sufficient number of experts tokeep up with the ‘global negotiating caravan’. Thus,for instance, Indian interests have often been repre-sented at international negotiations by local embassystaff, so that India’s ambassador in Finland had toplay a substantial role in negotiations on a global banon the diverse ozone-depleting substances (Rajan,1997). It is therefore often considered an advantageof an International Environmental Organization thatenvironmental policy negotiations could be orga-nized centrally at the seat of this organization. Thiswould put almost all developing countries in a posi-tion to build a professional team of expert environ-mental diplomats at this organizational seat. Thesame applies to representatives of environmentalassociations and other non-governmental organiza-tions from the South, who are scarcely able to affordthe present negotiating system of shifting confer-ences moving through almost all capital cities of theworld. They would be able to establish a permanentrepresentation in a single ‘global environmental cap-ital’. Industrialized countries, too, could save consid-erable travel and staff costs through such centraliza-tion.

A need for clarification would remain in Step 2with regard to the development aspects of the globalproject of sustainable development. Globally, envi-ronmental protection cannot be viewed in isolationfrom the other policy arenas. Political agreementsand programmes, for instance on tropical forest con-servation or on regulating the consumption of fossilfuels, inevitably affect core areas of economic and


development policy. A Type II International Envi-ronmental Organization needs to take this intoaccount. In the view of the Council, it should notpromote development as such, such as the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP) or the WorldBank strive to do (Sections D 2 and D 3). However,the new organization should strive to ensure in itspolicies that poverty alleviation and economic devel-opment in the South are not jeopardized and thatglobal environmental policy meets the criterion ofglobally equitable burden-sharing. It is thereforeimportant to enshrine these aspects in the statutes ofthe organization – possibly in analogy to the 1992 RioDeclaration on Environment and Development.Biermann and Simonis (2000) make the further pro-posal of expressing this focus in the title of the neworganization, too, terming it the ‘World Environmentand Development Organization’ (WEDO).

Some envisage a far greater degree of integration,arguing for a merger of UNEP and UNDP (thus, forinstance, the German Social Democratic Party’senvironmental policy spokesperson in a declarationon 25 January 1999). Considering the UNDP corebudget of some US$700 million, this would be a ‘jug-gernaut marriage’ in the family of international insti-tutions. Industrialized countries have long resisted aninternational organization for development issues, sothat it appears scarcely possible to implement theupgrading of UNDP and UNEP to a ‘World Organi-zation for Sustainable Development’. On the otherhand, the UNDP-UNEP synthesis might find favouramong some industrialized countries if this couldreduce the overall development policy budget of theUN through merger-related savings. The formerUNDP head Gustave Speth has spoken out funda-mentally in favour of an International Environmen-tal Organization, but against its merger with his owninstitution (Speth, 1998). Similar resistance is to beexpected from his successor; given the weight ofUNDP, this is not to be underestimated. A mainproblem is the project character of UNDP’s work,which UNEP does not have and would not be expe-dient for the International Environmental Organiza-tion under debate here; a further problem is the con-siderable difference in size between UNEP andUNDP. Both aspects could be highly detrimental tothe envisaged policy-stimulating and cooperation-enhancing effects of an International EnvironmentalOrganization – these new effects could be submergedby UNDP’s operative activities.

E 2.3.3Step 3: Centralization and concentration withinone organization?

It is too early to judge whether steps 1 or 2 will suf-fice to respond adequately to the mounting globalenvironment and development crisis. Nonetheless,with a view to longer-term developments, the Coun-cil wishes to provide indications for possible furtherinstitutionalization steps as a response to any failureof steps 1 and 2.

Step 3 would involve fundamental restructuring ofthe institutional architecture of global environmentalpolicy, notably by establishing a new, superordinateorganization. One purpose of this would be to cen-tralize and hierarchize international environmentalpolicy more strongly. A second would be to acceler-ate decision-making processes by overcoming theprinciple of consensus or setting up smaller decision-making bodies with representative membership, suchas an ‘Environmental Security Council’, by whichminorities would lose their power of blockade. Build-ing on such hierarchization, compliance with interna-tional environmental standards could be ensured bymeans of coercive measures, but also through inten-sified financial and technical assistance. The presentgreat array of decentralized institutions developingin isolation from each other, whose interrelationshipshave as yet scarcely been designed in any deliberatemanner, could thus be channelled to solve coordina-tion problems more readily. Daniel Esty’s proposalto establish a ‘Global Environmental Organization’(1994b), for instance, amounts to such centralizationand hierarchization.

Such proposals give preference to the aspect ofglobal ‘government’ over horizontal, non-hierarchi-cal patterns of organization – ‘governance’. In mostschools of thought there has been general agreementthat this is unrealistic or undesirable. This view isshared both by neorealism, which considers all formsof institutionalizing the international system unreal-istic and improbable (Waltz, 1959, 1979), and neolib-eral institutionalism, which stresses the prospects ofbuilding international governance upon a foundationof interconnected issue-specific regimes and notthrough organizations that restrict sovereignty (Haaset al., 1993; Victor et al., 1998; Young, 1997; Zürn,1997).

Over the medium term, forms of hierarchizationthat restrict sovereignty will doubtlessly encounterconsiderable resistance, in North and South alike.This applies, for instance, to proposals for the estab-lishment of an Environmental Security Council(Palmer, 1992) or an International EnvironmentalCourt with binding adjudication (Zaelke and


Cameron, 1990; Fues, 1997). The first of these twowould certainly need an amendment to the UN Char-ter, which requires ratification by two-thirds of UNmembers and by China, France, Russia, the UnitedKingdom and the United States. Far-reaching restric-tions of national sovereignty appear out of the ques-tion at present with such a quorum.

Furthermore, rigorous enforcement mechanismsof an International Environmental Organizationwould ultimately only be practicable against thosestates that already see themselves threatened todayby ‘ecoimperialism’:The developing countries (Agar-wal and Narain, 1991; Agarwal et al., 1999). Particu-larly in relations with these states, an InternationalEnvironmental Organization equipped with ‘sharpteeth’ may therefore in fact be counterproductive(Biermann and Simonis, 2000): In order not to exposethemselves to the environmental dictates of richindustrialized countries, they may either stay awayfrom the organization, or demand weaker standardsin international environmental law and refusestricter ones.

A centralization in which several issue areas aredrawn together would offer special opportunities tomake package deals across the boundaries of previ-ously separate sectors. However, when the scope ofnegotiations is expanded in this fashion there is thedanger of increased negotiating blockades, as toomany technical aspects may be mingled (Sebenius,1983). Furthermore, centralization harbours the riskof hampering institutional innovations that wouldotherwise emerge in niche areas and subsequentlybecome the norm. In a centralized structure, eveninnovations in peripheral areas will always tend tohave very much broader implications because thedirectly regulated area is interlinked institutionallywith many others. For instance, it is quite conceivablethat the possibility of majority decisions provided forby the Montreal Protocol would not have beenenforceable in a centralized structure because manyactors would have feared the precedent that thiswould have set.

Institutional centralization in the shape of a worldorganization restricting national sovereignty has aclear potential to solve the problems associated withcoordination among different environmental organi-zations. However, the necessary coordination ser-vices could in principle also be provided within thecontext of existing structures and a more modestorganizational solution, such as establishing an Inter-national Environmental Organization with a limitedmandate that does not restrict national sovereignty(Type I or II).

E 2.4Recommendations for action and researchconcerning the organization of globalenvironmental policy

The institutional and organizational architecture ofinternational environmental policy currently has adistinctly decentralized structure: In most issue-spe-cific institutions a variety of institutional elementsare combined. This has hampered, given the prevail-ing principle of consensus, both the adoption of bind-ing decisions for environmental protection and theeffective implementation of decisions taken. More-over, the system of international institutions in theenvironmental sphere (and beyond) is strugglingincreasingly with coordination deficits.

To remedy this situation is now the challenge forefforts to reform the institutional structure of inter-national environmental policy. Proposals range fromestablishing an all-powerful world organizationresponsible for all environmental issues, through tosimply introducing new procedural elements withinthe context of certain environmental agreements(incremental change) (Oberthür, 1999b). In the opin-ion of the Council a hierarchical restructuring ofinternational environmental policy is currently out ofthe question as it will not be compatible with theprinciple of sovereignty that conditions structures ininternational relations.

Overall, however, the Council takes the view thatit would be a promising path to upgrade UNEP to anInternational Environmental Organization in such away that this does not restrict national sovereignty.This would provide an additional element of a hori-zontally organized global governance structure ininternational environmental policy. In the typologyset out above, the Council has termed this ‘Step I’. Itappears essential to have an organizational locus fora decentralized international sustainability strategy,in a form that does justice to the interests of moststates. Just as the environmental protection policyarena was strengthened institutionally in the nation-states in the 1970s and 1980s through the establish-ment of independent environment ministries, so nowshould the global environmental policy arena bestrengthened by an independent specialized organi-zation. This is important to minimize the tendenciesof individual programmes and organizations to pur-sue their own agendas, and in order to limit duplica-tion, overlap and inconsistency.

The main functions of the new organization wouldbe to bring international environmental policies backtogether, to build capacity in developing countriesthrough the transfer of knowledge and technology, tocontribute to improved implementation and to cre-

141Recommendations for action and research E 2.4

ate a setting for negotiating new institutions that ismore conducive to cooperation. It can at presentscarcely be assessed whether further moves – steps 2and 3 – may become necessary over the mediumterm.The Council urges adherence to the principle ofsubsidiarity; initially Step 1 should be the aim, before,proceeding from a painstaking analysis of effective-ness, further steps are considered. It is only throughsuch an approach that the confidence of the develop-ing world can be gained for a reform of the UN sys-tem in the environmental sphere.

The debate on the establishment of an Interna-tional Environmental Organization should notobscure the fact that the global environmental crisisis more than a problem of environmental protection– it is a global environment and development crisisthat calls for efforts and new global policyapproaches in the sphere of ‘traditional’ develop-ment cooperation too. Revocation of the Germangovernment’s drastic cuts in official developmentassistance funding would be a key contribution topromoting effective and globally acceptable environ-mental policies.

Raising and allocating funds for global environmental policy E 3

E 3.1The significance of funding

Solving the problem of how global environmentalprotection is to be financed plays a crucial role in vir-tually all stages of global environmental policy(Chapter C). While national environmental policy isimplemented principally through sovereign jurisdic-tion, global environmental policy is characterized bythe principle of consensus, in other words, the imple-mentation of global environmental policy depends toa large extent on agreement being reached by allcountries. Because many measures to protect globalenvironmental resources are more efficient in devel-oping countries (e.g., lower costs associated withimproving energy efficiency to avoid greenhouse gasemissions), or indeed are only possible in developingcountries (e.g., conservation of the tropical rainfor-est), getting developing countries to agree to interna-tional conventions on the environment is frequentlydependent on wealthier industrial nations assumingat least some of the costs of implementing these con-ventions. The developing countries are thus gainingincreasing negotiating power, and this manifestsitself especially in the say that they have regardingthe use of funds (Biermann, 1998b).

AGENDA 21 takes this as a starting point whenanalysing the design of global environmental policy.According to that programme of action, the financingof global environmental protection is to proceed inaccordance with the principle of ‘common but differ-entiated responsibilities’. In the conventions for theprotection of the ozone layer, the climate and biolog-ical diversity, the industrialized countries committedthemselves to take on the ‘agreed full incrementalcosts’ incurred by developing countries in imple-menting the conventions. The concept of ‘agreed fullincremental costs’ is a rather loose term that requiresinterpretation, and one on which the views of partiesto the conventions are opposed. In AGENDA 21 theannual funding required for implementation of theconventions is estimated at US$600 thousand millionfor the 1993–2000 period, of which the international

community is expected to raise US$125 thousandmillion. The Council has already indicated in an ear-lier report that at that time, based on Germany’s con-tribution of 8.93 per cent to the United Nations for1993, the amount expected from Germany would bein the region of US$11.16 thousand million. In termsof Germany’s gross national product for 1993 – thefirst year of the AGENDA 21 planning period – thiswould have been equivalent to 0.59 per cent of Ger-many’s gross national product (GNP). Such a com-mitment would have come very close to the interna-tionally agreed target, reiterated at the internationalconferences in the UNCED follow-up process, ofearmarking a 0.7 per cent share of GNP for develop-ment cooperation. As economic cooperation withdeveloping countries encompasses more than the‘pure costs of Rio follow-up’, the commitment wouldeffectively go far beyond the stated 0.7 per cent(WBGU, 1998a). It is against this background thatone should view the recommendation of the Council,once again reaffirmed here, to increase the target inthe long term to one per cent of GNP. First of all,however, we should focus our attention once againon the goal of spending 0.7 per cent of GNP on globalenvironment and development policy. Despite thedifficult budget situation, the German governmentshould seek – at least in the medium term – to imple-ment this goal.

This demand must appear all the more ambitiousgiven that public spending on development coopera-tion in Germany has dwindled continuously overrecent years. In most of the other industrialized coun-tries too – especially in those countries that make thelargest financial contributions to development coop-eration in absolute terms – the willingness to providemore funds out of public budgets has diminished sub-stantially (Table E 3.1-1).

The foregoing remarks show clearly that anyexamination of the question of financing global envi-ronmental policy must take into account the two fol-lowing background conditions:• The funding requirement for global environmen-

tal protection seems to be enormous. This hasbeen shown clearly both in the various reports of

143The significance of funding E 3.1

the Council (WBGU, 1994–2001) and in theremarks made in Chapter B concerning the sixmajor global environmental problems.

• Because of the consolidation path being pursuedby the majority of donor countries, due to thedecreasing level of priority being given to globalenvironmental protection against the backgroundof national economic problems (e.g., unemploy-ment), but also due to diminishing confidence thatfunds are being used efficiently, the amount offunding being made available by the industrializedcountries is declining constantly.

Within the UN system these fundamental problemsrelated to financing have been the subject of discus-sion for some time under the heading ‘global part-nership for development’. In 1997 the UN GeneralAssembly passed a resolution to stage a high-levelintergovernmental event in the year 2001 on the sub-ject of financing for development. Key themes at thisconference will be international development coop-eration, including debt relief, but also aspects of theinternational monetary, financial and trade systemthat could help to support economic development.The Council welcomes the efforts of the UN to tacklethis important subject in the context of a high-levelinternational conference. Accordingly, this section isdevoted to examining key questions pertaining to thefinancing of global environment and developmentpolicy.

The Council has demonstrated the considerableneed for action that exists in terms of global environ-mental policy.There is significant scope for action foran environmental policy without money. This kind ofpolicy focuses above all on measures aimed at for-mulating global regimes, improving the organizationof existing institutions, harmonizing policies or elim-inating shortcomings regarding enforcement. Suchsteps are important, but they are not enough. Thusthe question of how to raise funds is indeed vitallyimportant. Regrettably, this question is oftenanswered only very superficially and money isrequested for all sorts of purposes. Sometimes onecannot avoid the impression that obtaining funding isthe be-all and end-all in itself.

More recent discussion surrounding the reform ofinternational organizations shows that demands ofthis sort for more money are being viewed withincreasing scepticism. In particular more recent pub-lic choice analyses of politics and bureaucracy havedrawn attention to the fact that national, and espe-cially international, authorities and institutions havea tendency to expand and to be inefficient and arecharacterized by a high degree of irreversibility(Roppel, 1979; Jackson, 1982; Frey and Kirchgässner,1994; Kolan, 1996; Richter and Furubotn, 1996;Kuhlmann, 1998). Important insights have beengained by examining bureaucracy in terms of princi-pal-agent relationships. Such a relationship is presentwhere a person or a body (such as a community of

Table E 3.1-1Official DevelopmentAssistance (ODA) transfersof OECD countries in 1993and 1998 (debt repaymentsdeducted; sorted in theorder of absolute volumes ofdevelopment assistancetransfers in 1998).Source: World Bank (2000c)

ODA ODA mean annual[millions of [% GNP] changeUS-$] [%]

1993 1998 1993 1998 1992-93to1997-98

Japan 11,259 10,640 0.27 0.28 -0.8USA 10,123 8,786 0.15 0.10 -8.3France 7,915 5,742 0.63 0.40 -5.7Germany 6,954 5,581 0.35 0.26 -4.7UK 2,920 3,864 0.31 0.27 0.6Netherlands 2,525 3,042 0.82 0.80 2.3Italy 3,043 2,278 0.31 0.20 -12.7Denmark 1,340 1,704 1.03 0.99 3.8Canada 2,400 1,691 0.45 0.29 -3.9Sweden 1,769 1,573 0.99 0.72 -3.7Spain 1,304 1,376 0.28 0.24 0.3Norway 1,014 1,321 1.01 0.91 2.7Australia 953 960 0.35 0.27 -0.3Switzerland 793 898 0.33 0.32 -2.1Belgium 810 883 0.39 0.35 -0.8Austria 544 456 0.30 0.22 -2.6Finland 355 396 0.45 0.32 -5.6Portugal 235 259 0.28 0.24 -1.2Ireland 81 199 0.20 0.30 19.8New Zealand 98 130 0.25 0.27 3.9Luxembourg 50 112 0.35 0.65 18.2

Total 56,486 51,888 0.30 0.24 -3.6


states) – the so-called principal – within the frame-work of a contractual agreement instructs an agent –administrative authority – to perform a service thatbenefits the principal. There is always a risk that theagent will use the scope for action assigned to it tofurther its own interests. The easier it is for theauthority (agent) to elude regular (democratic) mon-itoring the greater the risk becomes. Such authoritiescan also achieve considerable autonomy as regardsparticular apportionments of funds. This is the casewhen the funds are raised by means of dedicatedlevies whose basis of assessment expands (such asmovements of traffic or mass flows).Then authoritiesor bureaucracies can develop ‘idiosyncrasies’, whichare particularly prevalent in international bureaucra-cies (Kuhlmann, 1998). Administrative officials hereare much better able to pursue their own personalinterests than within national bureaucracies. Thisexplains why requests for more money are met withincreasing caution and ways are sought to improveefficiency or find other, more sophisticated solutions.

Parallel to serious efforts first of all to achieve the0.7 per cent target, innovative financing mechanisms must also be developed. Where one is dealing withpublic funds (Section E 3.2), solutions must first befound that do not consist – whether openly or dis-guised – of a new form of taxation, but rather take theshape of, for instance, charges for actual use of envi-ronmental resources. Other new proposals are con-stantly being put forward for introducing so-called‘innovative financing mechanisms’ in order to enablesteady funding for global environmental policy andat the same time to create a degree of independencefrom the willingness of the industrialized countries toprovide funds. Section E 3.2 provides an overview ofsuch sources of finance. In its own recommendationsand in the research that it commissions, the Councilfocuses on developing systems that provide incen-tives with beneficial environmental impacts. SectionE 3.3 discusses the advantages that can be achievedthrough greater involvement of the private sector infinancing global environmental protection and iden-tifies the possibilities that exist for obtaining addi-tional financial resources as a result of involving pri-vate sector players. The subject of Section E 3.4 ishow efficiently financial resources are spent. Thelevel of efficiency with which funding institutionsallocate public funds is an important topic of analysisbecause efficiency improvements can increase whatcan be achieved with a given volume of resources.This in turn can increase willingness to provide addi-tional funds. The discussion concludes with recom-mendations for action and research in the field offinancing global environmental policy (Section E3.5).

E 3.2Innovative approaches to financing

E 3.2.1Introduction

Section E 3.1 underscored that considerable financialresources are required to deal with the global envi-ronmental crisis. This need will increase as the exist-ing problems grow in significance (Chapter B), butalso as new areas for action emerge. Despite effortsto use the money already flowing into the systemmore efficiently (Section E 3.4), in the comingdecades the international community will not be ableto circumvent having to develop new, innovativeapproaches aimed at raising money to reorient thepath of global development towards greater sustain-ability and viability.It its report entitled ‘Our Common Future’, theBrundtland Commission put forward proposals forinnovative, ‘automatic’ sources of finance. In the fol-lowing section the Council assesses some of the pro-posals for financing global environmental protectionand adds some ideas of its own. Many people mayfind the proposals discussed here far-reaching.Indeed it is true that international politics, which stillhas to work within the parameters of a system ofdecentralized state agencies, will need a great deal ofstaying power in order to make these proposals con-crete and implement them. The Council neverthelessconsiders it to be its duty to march on with elaborat-ing the ideas and to provide policy-makers with ini-tial concepts and stimuli for developing innovativefinancing tools.

Direct allocation of funds out of national tax rev-enues is the predominant mechanism for financingglobal environmental policy (Section E 3.2.2). In dis-cussing these issues and making its recommenda-tions, the concept of user charges has a key role forthe Council. Section E 3.2.3 therefore discusses pro-posals for levying user charges for using global com-mon goods. The following section goes on to presentand assess the possibility of introducing compensa-tion for abstaining from resource use (Section E3.2.4), and insurance and compensation options forregional damage resulting from global environmen-tal change (Section E 3.2.5). The section concludeswith an analysis of some additional, much debatedproposals for levy schemes (Section E 3.2.6). It isimportant to emphasize with regard to the whole ofthe following discussion that considerable furtherresearch and debate are needed. The Council there-fore recommends that the German government

145Innovative approaches to financing E 3.2

should continue to foster and promote scientificexchange and political debate on these issues.

E 3.2.2Direct contributions of funds from national taxrevenues

The status quo as regards financing internationalenvironment and development policy has beendescribed in depth in the academic literature and hasalso been evaluated in the Council’s earlier reports.From these it is clear that as a rule global environ-mental policy is financed by means of direct alloca-tions of funds from national tax revenues, whichmeans that governments meet the costs of their ownenvironmental policy primarily directly from theirown budgets. This is basically true of both industrial-ized and developing countries. In addition, mostdeveloping countries also receive financial supportfor their environmental policy from the internationalcommunity, either in the form of bilateral assistanceor through multilateral donors such as the WorldBank or the UN Development Programme (SectionsD 2 and D 3.3).

Protection of the climate, the ozone layer and bio-logical diversity are three special cases; here theindustrialized countries and (with regard to ozonepolicy) some emerging economies have committedthemselves to take on the ‘agreed full incrementalcosts’ of the developing countries in these areas ofpolicy.This means that the costs incurred by develop-ing countries for planning and implementing envi-ronmental protection measures in these areas will bereimbursed by the international community, less anycosts related to other, purely national interests ofbenefit to the developing countries (for example, lessthe income from tourism in nature conservationareas). Defining ‘incremental costs’ in a specific envi-ronmental project is no simple matter, however, andis often the subject of protracted political negotia-tions. Moreover, by setting out in a contract provi-sions for the implementation of contribution-basedfinancing of ‘incremental costs’ that are difficult todefine there is a risk of encouraging ‘increases incosts’, and thereby creating inefficiency, which is notthe intention of the donor.

In institutional terms, in these three areas of globalenvironmental concern funds are transferredthrough the Multilateral Fund for the Implementa-tion of the Montreal Protocol (Biermann, 1997) andthe Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the WorldBank. The Bank operates the GEF in conjunctionwith UNEP and UNDP. The GEF finances environ-mental protection projects to protect internationalwater resources, the ozone layer (where eastern

European countries and Russia are concerned) andthe soil in arid regions (insofar as there is a connec-tion with climate and biodiversity) (Ehrmann, 1997;Fairman and Ross, 1996). In all these cases fundingcomes directly from the government budgets of theindustrialized countries which have committed them-selves to this programme, either in accordance with aspecially adapted UN contributions scheme (in otherwords, depending primarily on the financial capacityof each country), or on the basis of voluntary contri-butions (as is mainly the case with the GEF).

Direct financing of this nature via the state budgethas a whole range of important advantages. Itensures, for example, that such funding remains aregular subject of parliamentary debate and does notbecome rigidified in an inefficient manner. Constantreview of the funding mechanism by the national par-liaments of the OECD countries also has the effect ofmaking the money-distributing authority constantlyseek reaffirmation of these parliaments’ support.This undoubtedly has considerable influence on howefficiently financial resources are allocated.

On the other hand, however, there are also obvi-ous disadvantages: donor countries that are particu-larly strong in financial terms gain significant influ-ence as regards the allocation of funds and the gen-eral policy of the money-distributing authority, whichmay be reflected not only in staffing policy but also incertain fundamental decisions. The United Nationsitself for example suffers from the failure of some ofits largest member countries to adhere to their con-tribution commitments and as a result is dependenton these countries in a very particular way. This inturn is hardly beneficial for the organization’s consti-tution and especially for its internal voting mecha-nisms. A further problem arising from the more orless voluntary financing of global environmental pol-icy is that it creates incentives for donor states toengage in freerider behaviour, perhaps withholdingor cutting back on their contributions at times whenthere are budget bottlenecks, relying on the contri-butions of other states being sufficient to financeglobal tasks. The theory of collective action (Olson,1965) shows that this behaviour, which is rational onan individual basis, can lead to a policy outcome thatis collectively suboptimal in a decentralized system.Yet another disadvantage related to raising financialresources via national budgets and taxes is that it hasno impact whatsoever in terms of changing behav-iour towards making more efficient and resource-conserving use of the natural environment.

Direct financing of global tasks via transfers fromstate budgets nevertheless remains the preferredmethod at the present time and its advantages – espe-cially the regular checks by national parliaments andthe pressure on the money-distributing body to legit-


imize its actions – should not be underrated. TheCouncil therefore recommends adhering in principleto this method. In parallel, however – for particularglobal environmental policy tasks where such a pro-cedure is appropriate – progress must be made indeveloping and introducing new types of financingmechanism. It must be stressed again, however, thatconsiderable research and testing still needs to beundertaken in this regard. The proposals presentedbelow likewise require such in-depth analysis.

E 3.2.3Levying charges on the use of the global commons

E 3.2.3.1The basic idea of user charges

The Council has repeatedly emphasized the positivecontribution to environmental protection that trans-ferring property rights relating to environmentalresources – in conjunction with liability – can have(WBGU, 2000a). In some cases, however, this optionis not feasible at all or only to a limited extent. Thisapplies especially to the oceans and the Earth’satmosphere – the global commons. These are whatare known as open-access resources, and they areconstantly exposed to the danger of overexploitationunless common rules of ‘good practice’ are estab-lished for their management. Assigning propertyrights over these for environmental purposes is gen-erally ruled out simply because of diffusionprocesses. These resources must be managed by theinternational community in a kind of trusteeship.There is a need to clarify the implications of theseglobal commons in terms of property rights.

In the case of goods where property rights areclearly defined, the situation is straightforward. Here,as a rule, a user charge must be paid for using theresource. If the owners are thinking in the long term,this has advantages from the environmental point ofview. Above all it arouses the owner’s interest inmaintaining the viability of the resources he owns.This leads the owner to engage in protection andremediation activities with a view to maintaining orrestoring the viability of a given resource and alsosimultaneously makes users aware of the scarcity of agood or resource. It is most important that the linkbetween the charges and the use of the environmen-tal resource should be direct and clear and that theyraise awareness of the harmful impact resulting fromusing the resource. If the harmful effects diminish orthe viability of the resource is secured by othermeans, then the charges must also be reduced. Thepoint therefore is not to raise revenue in a ‘purpose-

less’ way or defined merely in terms of general envi-ronmental concerns, but rather that the chargesshould serve a clear purpose and provide specificincentives.

In the view of the Council it would make sense toexplore to what extent user charges could be used asa tool in the case of the oceans and the Earth’s atmos-phere, including the geostationary orbit. Here we aredealing with open-access resources which, despiteprotective regulations, are being damaged increas-ingly. Substances (such as greenhouse gases) arebeing emitted into the Earth’s atmosphere, theEarth’s orbit is being used for satellites or space sta-tions, or as a dumping ground, fish stocks are beingoverfished and the water and air are being contami-nated by shipping and air traffic. In this connectionthe Council would also point to recent developmentsin the field of infrastructure financing. In these casestoo we are dealing with resources – e.g., roads – thatare utilized by the community as a whole. Here thereis an increasing tendency to exclude the maintenanceand expansion of capital goods that are importantfrom the point of view of sustainability from the day-to-day political agenda and instead provide themwith funding that is linked to interesting sources ofrevenue and incentives, and to more long-term think-ing. A typical example of this is the German feder-ally-run trunk road network. An increasing numberof academics recommend going down the road oflegal autonomy – for example in the form of a federalmotorway company – with the new owners levyinguser charges at the same time. User charges couldvary according to intensity of use and environmentalimpact, and also according to time and place. Theintention of such proposals is to provide a strongerfocus on utilization and on the longer term.

Technically it is possible to cover all movements oftraffic and apportion the costs of use (road pricing).In this way a connection can be made between induc-ing behavioural change and financing. By directlylinking user charges to specific purposes – in otherwords, maintaining the viability of these communityresources – the problems of monitoring are alsoreduced, since instead of an international authoritythat might have a rather diffuse operating remit, aninstitution is created whose tasks are clearly definedand which can be monitored by means of regularreporting. Such an institution can also be made sub-ject to competitive controls, for example throughregionalization. There is no reason why the idea oflevying user charges cannot be applied to global com-mon resources too.

The Council would like to emphasize stronglyhere that such charges are not merely one of manyvariants in the upwardly spiralling number of pro-posals for new forms of environmental levy. Rather it


is about a concept that contains elements of assigning‘property rights’, but which centres on the principleof equivalence as regards setting the charges. Byassigning property rights, open-access resourcesbecome common property resources. Overexploita-tion and degradation (pollution), which also occurfrequently in the case of the latter, are to be pre-vented. At the same time the beneficiaries becomethe bearers of the costs, and the efficiency of resourceallocation can thereby be increased greatly. The rev-enues thus obtained should be used primarily tomaintain or perhaps even improve the viability andproductivity of resources belonging to the globalcommunity – ‘global common resources’. Revenuesmust not be used for cross-subsidizing other tasksand must not be diverted into the general budget.The charges must highlight instances of scarcity andshould serve to maintain the functional capacity of aspecific global environmental resource. It must bepossible to reduce the charges again where this taskhas been fulfilled. Below we shall discuss some pro-posals aiming in this direction concerning air space,the oceans and the Earth’s orbit.

E 3.2.3.2Use of air space

Although under international law air space comesunder the sovereign jurisdiction of the country inquestion, it can certainly also be regarded as a com-mon resource in terms of impact and for considera-tions that are to some extent political.Above the highsea – which covers a large share of the Earth’s surface– air space is not subject to national sovereignty. Tothis extent it is justifiable to speak of this medium pri-marily as a global common resource.As global warm-ing shows, the global community is jointly affected atleast by specific impacts upon the Earth’s atmos-phere. Air space and the Earth’s atmosphere areopenly available to be used for waste disposal or as amedium for transportation purposes, and theirincreasing scarcity raises questions concerning howto manage this scarce resource efficiently and how tofinance the necessary measures to reduce emissions.

A starting point for efficient management of thesescarce resources is to define rights of use with regardto the Earth’s atmosphere. The Earth’s atmospheremay be understood as a global common resource thatmust be managed in trusteeship. Such a trusteeshipmay sell rights of use to interested parties. The best-known example of this is the hotly debated grantingof emissions rights in climate policy. Here, emissionsrights are acquired for private use and are treatedlike property titles. In principle these rights, the over-all scope of which has been laid down politically

beforehand, could be acquired through auction. Insuch an event, given the large number of interestedusers, the trusteeship could expect to take in a highvolume of revenue. Moreover, from an economicpoint of view an auction of this kind also provides aguarantee that the distribution of available utiliza-tion rights is determined exclusively by efficiency cri-teria, since only the highest bidders would receive therights.The Council would therefore welcome an auc-tion mechanism of this sort in principle.

However, since one has to work on the basis ofwidespread existing use, such a course would causehuge adjustment problems for existing users. In addi-tion, in view of the economic disparities that exist, itwould trigger serious distribution effects worldwide.The Council therefore considers auctioning rights ofuse to the Earth’s atmosphere to be politically infea-sible. Instead, it is assumed that each country must begranted a certain amount of emissions disposal rightsin a first round, and each country is then free eitherto sell its superfluous emissions rights or to buy upextra emissions rights that it needs. This procedurehas the ecological advantage that the desired quanti-tative reductions are achieved immediately and thescarcity of space for emissions disposal in the Earth’satmosphere immediately acquires a price tag.The useof the atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gas emis-sions, which has so far been virtually ‘free of charge’,is thus included more comprehensively in the costcalculation of individual economic units, triggeringthe desired adjustment responses (including innova-tion effects). In addition, in view of the differencesthat exist worldwide in terms of the way producers ofgreenhouse gas emissions are organized and in termsof the potential for reducing emissions, considerablefinancial resources may be expected to flow into cap-ital-poor regions that generally have low per capitaemissions.

Consequently, the key political problem withemissions rights trading of this sort – alongside thetechnical questions of verification and implementa-tion, which are relevant for other instruments too – isthe initial allocation of emissions rights. If allocationwere based on a country’s emissions per head ofpopulation, then all developing countries wouldremain sellers in this market in the long term, withthe result that there would be a significant north-south transfer of funds. If, on the other hand, emis-sions rights were allocated on the basis of existingemissions (‘grandfathering’), industrialized countrieswould be able to profit from their already consider-able emissions level. Allocation of rights purely onthe basis of the per capita criterion is probably notfeasible in most industrialized countries on accountof the major financial and economic implications thatit would likely entail. Such a method of allocation


would furthermore have major consequences forworld trade and would create resistance to climatepolicy.

It should be borne in mind that no additionalfunds flow into the system of international organiza-tions in the event of a decision not to auction utiliza-tion rights when they are initially allocated. Financialflows in this case are transferred exclusively betweenthe generators of greenhouse gas emissions engagingin this trade and are stimulated by the economicprofitability of measures to reduce emissions. Forgo-ing additional funds has no deleterious effect on theway the trade in emissions rights operates, as all thatis required is a ‘clearing house’ to implement andsupervise the transactions, and these are tasks that inprinciple could be carried out by a private institutionin the banking or stock market system. The fundsrequired for this are negligible, judging from theexperience of the USA with certification schemes aspart of their clean air policy (Hansjürgens, 1998). Insuch a system, a Conference of the Parties (COP)would define and allocate emissions rights in the firstinstance.

It is also possible in principle to achieve thedesired reduction in emissions via taxation. Here thehope is that rising prices will act as an incentive.Experience has shown, however, that this route isfraught with considerable problems. Faced withuncertain and constantly changing price elasticities,the reductions are difficult to predict; integration intoexisting tax systems presents problems; in the shortterm interest in the fiscal effects prevails and individ-ual governments tend to allow exceptions that areecologically counterproductive. In line with the posi-tion it has taken previously, the Council thereforeadvocates the introduction of a system of tradeableemissions rights. Research has already advanced sofar in this area that it would be appropriate to launcha pilot phase.

Disagreement reigns among academics and politi-cians as to what extent it is appropriate or possible tolevy a user charge for access to the Earth’s atmos-phere as a transportation route. Although air trafficat present contributes only around three to four percent to global warming, the huge growth potential ofthis sector could mean a quadrupling of this percent-age by the year 2050. Moreover, the emissions arefour times more harmful at an altitude of 10,000mthan on the ground. Yet another problem is thatemissions caused by international air traffic do not atpresent figure in countries’ emissions inventoryreports. For all these reasons, consideration shouldcertainly be given to imposing a charge for the use ofthe atmosphere and air space.

According to current data from the InternationalAir Transport Association (IATA), whose members

account for around 90 per cent of all passenger flightsand 95 per cent of all cargo flights, approximately 20thousand million kilometres were flown in 1998. Aglobal utilization charge of DM0.10 per kilometreflown would therefore raise revenues of aroundDM2 thousand million. Similar calculations may befound in the Agenda for Peace by the former UN Sec-retary-General Boutros-Ghali.

This already demonstrates clearly, however, that inmany cases attention focuses on taxation proposalsconcerned primarily with revenue-raising and lesswith bringing about a change in behaviour. TheCouncil therefore emphasizes that charges for theuse of air space must fulfil three conditions in orderto avoid the situation where an international organi-zation orients itself exclusively towards maximizingthe funds at its disposal:• The basis of assessment must be oriented strictly

towards the global environmental consequencesof air traffic and a direct link must be establishedwith prevention and reduction of this environ-mental damage.

• The levying and use of such a charge must be coor-dinated internationally in order to limit evasionstrategies.

• Attention must be paid to ensuring that it is polit-ically feasible to implement such a charge in viewof the social and economic importance of air traf-fic.

These requirements would be best fulfilled under asystem of tradeable emissions rights. It is thus con-ceivable that airlines, depending on the specific emis-sions of their aircraft and the number of kilometrescovered, might have to purchase emissions rights orbargain for these rights among themselves on thebasis of an initial allocation system.

Another proposal goes down the road of a special,internationally agreed levy on kerosene consump-tion, which presupposes that the existing subsidiza-tion of aviation fuel would first of all be abolished.Against the background of the urgent need for actionon the environment, raising funds in this way seemsespecially attractive, especially as it is possible tolimit the effect on flight prices. A user charge basedon aviation fuel and thus on the level of CO2 emis-sions would not necessarily result in higher air faresas the share of fuel in an airline’s operating costs isonly 10–25 per cent. Accelerated technology devel-opment in the field of fuel-saving aircraft enginesmight also be expected, but not necessarily a reduc-tion in the amount of kilometres flown. The interna-tional success of the Airbus industry was foundedprecisely on lower-consumption aircraft, so consider-able competitive importance is attached to this seg-ment of technological development. However, heretoo, care must be taken to prevent the increase in the


cost of fuel taking on a momentum of its own. Thebasis of assessment for such a tool would have to berelated to the dynamics of CO2 emissions of air traf-fic.At the same time the whole system would need tobe integrated into an international arrangement forflexible implementation of the global goal of climateprotection. The special levy should be collected forthis specific purpose and used (for purchasing emis-sions rights and financing measures to reduce emis-sions) in the individual countries in order to preventan international organization from using such a levyas a (constantly increasing) source of income.

International coordination of this sort has so farrun aground chiefly due to resistance from individualcountries to a user charge related to fuel consump-tion. Within IATA this resistance comes first andforemost from developing countries, which are afraidof losing their revenues from tourism and point totheir relatively old aircraft, which would be ‘penal-ized’ disproportionately due to their higher keroseneconsumption. But the USA, Japan, Canada and otherindustrialized countries too (although not Norwayand Switzerland) spoke out in 1997 at the ‘Rio+5’UN General Assembly Special Session against theworldwide introduction of user charges for air trafficthat had been proposed by the EU.

The Council also strongly advises Germanyagainst trying to ‘go it alone’ on this issue because,given Germany’s central location and the resultingadditional financial burden, it is likely that this wouldlead to flights being diverted to airports in neigh-bouring countries (Section C 3.6).The limits of actiontaken at national level are confirmed by the experi-ences of Norway. In January 1999 Norway introduceda kerosene tax of 26 per cent that was close to neutralin revenue terms for international and nationalflights, in order to curb increasing air traffic emis-sions. As a countermove, the existing environmentallevy for all airline passengers was reduced. BritishAirways thereupon refused to pay the new tax, refer-ring to existing bilateral and multilateral treaties thatpermit airlines worldwide to procure kerosene dutyand tax-free. Other airlines too announced theirintention to take legal action. In March 1999 thekerosene tax was abolished with retrospective effect,the money levied up to that date was repaid – withinterest – to the airlines, and the levy payable for allpassengers was raised again. Only domestic flightswere excluded from this reversal. This exampleshows that, although it is possible for a country to acton its own, efforts to introduce user charges must beintensified simultaneously at both European andinternational level. An agreement at European levelis thus more promising in terms of avoiding interna-tional deflections of traffic while at the same timetesting the economic and environmental feasibility of

a user charge that is linked to a verifiable basis ofassessment.

The Council therefore recommends to the Ger-man government as a first step to review existing taxpreferences granted to air traffic at national level. Inthe medium term the German government shouldlend its support to an EU-wide levy of user chargesfor use of the air space, with these consisting ulti-mately of nothing other than the purchase of emis-sions rights, and it should push for such levies to beintroduced within the framework of the UnitedNations. The Council considers linking this closely totrade in emissions rights to be an indispensable con-dition for safeguarding against political incentives tointroduce an (especially lucrative) environmentallevy.

E 3.2.3.3Use of the oceans

The oceans of the world are a common resource parexcellence, even if the recent regime of ExclusiveEconomic Zones has in some ways led to propertyrights to resources being allocated or appropriatedsince the 1970s. There is still a need for action. Thefollowing forms of utilization require regulation(Section B 2.6):– Use of resources on or in the seabed,– use of fish stocks,– use of the sea for transportation and for installa-

tions (such as drilling rigs),– use of the sea for waste disposal.In all these cases there is a problem of financing.Thisis particularly relevant with regard to combating thepollution problem that is largely the result of river-borne substances entering the oceans of the world.This problem can only be combated by buildingpurification plants in the catchment areas of majorrivers and by modifying production processes andproduct systems. In places where industrial nationsare responsible for river effluent one can assume thatthe riparian states have the necessary technicalknow-how and are also in a position to finance solu-tions to the problems themselves. The situation indeveloping countries, on the other hand, is quite dif-ferent.There, both technology and financial transfersare needed. In these cases the first question thatarises is how to raise the necessary funds for financ-ing measures to reduce effluent in the developingcountries. At the same time, there is the question ofhow funds can be used most efficiently in the coun-tries concerned.

With regard to financing such measures the Coun-cil advocates reviewing which uses of the marineenvironment might best contribute to underscoring


the increasing scarcity of marine resources throughthe introduction of user charges. This particularlyconcerns deep-sea mining, whose importance is con-sidered minimal at present, but will increase in thefuture (Section B 2.3). Deep-sea mining is carried outmainly in the high sea, which is not covered bynational property rights (Box E 3.2-1). In the contextof the negotiations on the United Nations Conven-tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the possibil-ity of mobilizing funds for international objectivesfrom user charges for deep-sea mining had comeunder consideration since the 1970s (Wolf, 1991), andit was thought of also as a means of raising funds forthe UN. UNCLOS, which came into force in 1994,created a new institution for supervising deep-seamining, the International Seabed Authority. How-ever, little came of initial hopes of a new source offunding for the UN. The International SeabedAuthority coordinates the activities of private con-sortia of firms and levies only very small utilizationcharges. As there is currently very little activity tak-ing place in this field due to the relative, and in somecases the absolute, decline in price of many mineralresources and unresolved technical problems relat-ing to deep-sea mining, hopes of tapping into new,additional financial resources from this sphere havebeen dashed for the time being. A major problem asregards these considerations is that they wereplanned as a tax or duty for financing the UN. Thusthe principle of focusing on the benefits and costs ofmaintaining a global environmental resource, asemphasized by the Council, is relegated to the back-ground.

If ownership of the seabed existed, then it wouldbe conceivable to buy and sell, or lease it subject topublic welfare considerations. An institution that isresponsible for managing the seas – and thereforealso its mineral resources – in trusteeship could leaseout areas subject to environmental considerations. Inview of the lack of appropriate property rights todate, it would be quite legitimate here – contrary toutilization of the Earth’s atmosphere – to charge arent and thereby secure an income for the trusteebody. To ensure that the rent charged is appropriateit would make sense to establish a regulatory bodyresponsible for authorizing the pricing proposals ofthe Seabed Authority while at the same time takinginto account environmental issues.The income couldbe used to provide financial support for measuresthat reduce effluent (discharge of substances intorivers) by developing countries, other marine protec-tion measures and support for marine research. It iscrucial to ensure that there is a clear connection at alltimes between the amount of the charge and the pro-tection of the oceans and marine resources, and that

regular reports are produced giving cost-to-perfor-mance analysis.

A worsening problem of scarcity may be seen inthe field of fishing (Section B 2.3). At issue here is aspecific use of the sea that affects a renewableresource. Given the already overstrained regenera-tion capacity of fish stocks in many places, and inview of continuing population pressure and intensifi-cation of food production based on marine products,pressure on the use of this resource may be expectedto increase further in future. In addition, subsidiza-tion of the fishing industry is widespread, which pre-vents fishing fleets from adjusting.

In order to counteract this danger of overexploita-tion and destruction, the Council suggests definingrights of use with regard to fish stocks.These rights ofuse – defined for individual fish species and adaptedto suit the conditions of different ecosystems – wouldbe auctioned annually, with the highest bidder win-ning. In this way the scarcity of fish stocks would alsobe manifest in the prices. The price increase likely toresult from this would have the effect of reducingdemand. A market for rights of use would alsodemonstrate that the current subsidization ofnational fishing industries is a form of interventionthat distorts competition; this ultimately affects tradeand should be banned by the WTO as discriminatory.Defining rights of use and conducting the auctionrequires the setting up of an institution operating asa trusteeship with specific responsibility for conserv-ing fish stocks. It should operate separately from theother marine protection bodies. The Council recom-mends that the German government should lobbyvia the EU for the implementation of such a scheme.

The revenues could be used for measures to sup-port the process of structural adjustment of nationalfishing capacities to the new price and quantityregimes, to establish the systems of control requiredto monitor compliance with the fishing rightsacquired, and to fund research into accelerating therestoration of endangered stocks. In order to assistdeveloping countries with the process of adjustmentit is also conceivable that the trust organization mightitself purchase stocks (fishing rights) using theincome it receives and, subject to special conditions,pass these on to selected countries. Efforts must how-ever be made to ensure that total allowable catchesare not exceeded and that the dynamics of the auc-tion prices are not manipulated. Revenues mustremain earmarked for their designated purpose andmay not be used to provide financial support to otherinstitutions. Options involving taxation are ruled outas they allow too much scope for manipulation, andlack of information concerning price elasticitiesmeans that the intended conservation effect can onlybe achieved to a limited degree or with considerable


Box E 3.2-1

Use of the genetic resources of the high seas

Access to genetic resources is regulated internationally inthe Convention on Biological Diversity. Under the Con-vention genetic resources do not constitute a global com-mon resource, but are basically subject to state sovereignty,which also extends to the 12-nautical-mile zone. Scientificmarine research in the 200-nautical-mile zone (also calledthe Exclusive Economic Zone) is regulated internationallyby the Convention on the Law of the Sea. In practice thecoastal state has sovereign rights to conduct research andexploit the natural resources in this zone, and this includesaccess to genetic resources. Countries’ national legislation,however, is generally limited to terrestrial ecosystems anddoes not often deal with the legal peculiarities relating toaccess to coastal waters.

Genetic resources accordingly only take on the charac-ter of a global common resource outside the 200-nautical-mile zone. Here a distinction should be made between thewater column and the seabed.The regulations pertaining tothe water column are principally concerned with preventingoverexploitation and pollution. They thus have no rele-vance in terms of access to genetic resources as this regu-larly does not involve pollution of the environment, nordoes it involve any form of consumption, and therefore can-not result in overexploitation.The rules relating to exploita-tion of the seabed beyond the boundaries of national juris-diction apply only to mineral resources that could be of sig-nificance for deep-sea mining. Living resources do notbelong in this category and neither, therefore, does their useas genetic resources.

The genetic resources of the high seas are thus a ‘globalcommon resource’ that is not covered by any legal regula-tion.They are therefore freely accessible and may be appro-priated by anyone. This gap in the regulatory system is aninadvertent omission, however, as the potential value ofmarine genetic resources was not yet apparent in the 1970s.In principle, therefore, there is nothing that stands in theway of levying a user charge for access to the geneticresources of the high seas.The argument used in the case ofthe other global common resources is also valid here: Any-one deriving benefit from the use of these resources, in thiscase in the form of intellectual property rights, should con-tribute to conservation of the resources, or the ecosystem.According to its preamble, the Convention on the Law ofthe Sea is intended to contribute to a just and equitableinternational economic order that takes into account aboveall the particular interests and needs of developing coun-tries. In addition, it stipulates that marine scientific researchshould be carried out for the “benefit of mankind as awhole” (Article 143[1]), although it does not go any furtherin defining this. Article 5 of the Convention on BiologicalDiversity also specifically stipulates that there should becooperation among the Contracting Parties “in respect ofareas beyond national jurisdiction”.

A set of rules for access to marine genetic resourcescould therefore be agreed by the United Nations as anamendment to the Convention on the Law of the Sea or asa protocol under the Biodiversity Convention. Amendingthe Convention on the Law of the Sea would have theadvantage that an institution already exists in the shape ofthe International Seabed Authority, which has responsibil-ity for organizing the use of resources and levying usercharges. The Biodiversity Convention, on the other hand,has greater specialized powers as it regulates access to

genetic resources within the areas of national jurisdictionand a recognized legal framework for this already exists.

The Council warns against having excessively highexpectations in this regard, however. Utilization of marinegenetic resources requires a vast amount of technology andknow-how, and this is currently available only in a fewindustrialized countries and multinational companies.There are also considerable problems involved in terms ofproving the origin of the resources, among other things.Theeffort required for tapping the genetic resources on land orin coastal regions is considerably smaller and at the sametime the biological diversity of these areas is immeasurablygreater. The deep sea is nevertheless a habitat of extremeliving conditions and the ways in which its organisms haveadapted, their biochemistry and their genetic attributes areunusual and rare (extremophile organisms, e.g., in ‘blacksmokers’ or in marine ice). Thus, for example, enzymes thathave adapted to the extreme temperatures, pressures orchemical conditions typical of the ocean depths can be ofgreat significance for research and industry. A lucky strikein this sphere – such as a patent with broad industrial appli-cations – can certainly be of considerable economic value.Whether the specific search for extremophile marineorganisms leads to commercial success is by no means cer-tain. For this reason, the economic significance of this mar-ket is still speculative in nature and is ultimately impossibleto gauge, especially given that extremophile organisms canof course also be found in more easily accessible places(e.g., thermal volcanic springs).

The potential revenues from user charges, which at thepresent time are purely visionary in character, must beweighed up against the administrative and financial costsassociated with negotiating an international legal instru-ment for marine genetic resources and the incalculableproblems of monitoring its implementation. This fieldshould not, however, be consigned to oblivion as the frame-work conditions in science and technology are wont tochange rapidly. Problems that still seem impossible to solvetoday may be manageable tomorrow, so that the aboveprocess of weighing up advantages and disadvantages mightwell produce a different conclusion. For this reason, thetimely creation of an internationally recognized legal statusfor these resources, laying down provisions relating to theconservation, sustainable use and sharing of this commoninheritance of mankind for the benefit of the global envi-ronment could be a great advantage in the event – at pre-sent purely speculative – of a ‘genetic gold rush’. To con-tinue with the present unregulated state of affairs wouldmean in practice that the utilization of these resourceswould be the exclusive preserve of the industrialized coun-tries endowed with financial and technological resources,and this would not be in keeping with the spirit of either theBiodiversity Convention or the Convention on the Law ofthe Sea. ‘Curative’ regulation of this area after the event,when concrete economic interests have already made them-selves manifest, would certainly be considerably more diffi-cult than ‘preventive’ regulation.The Council therefore rec-ommends investigating the various options regarding legalregulation of access to the genetic resources of the high seasand, based on this, taking the initiative in the internationalarena. Scientific knowledge about marine genetic resourcesand how to assess their value is currently inadequate, so theCouncil at the same time advises intensifying researchefforts in this sphere.

Sources: Glowka, 1995; CBD, 1996; Henne, 1998; ten Kateand Laird, 2000


delay. The political resistance that is to be expectedfrom countries with large ‘distant water fleets’(Japan, Russia, Spain) should not be underestimatedin terms of the obstacle it will present to levying anyform of user charge.

The sea not only separates, it also connects.Human history shows that the sea above all facili-tates inter-state trade and thereby benefits the eco-nomic development of coastal states and ports. Thismaritime transport, however, is largely free of charge,at least as regards use of the transport route. As arule, the use of other transport or transmission routes(roads, electricity lines) is tied to a toll charge, andattention is increasingly being given to the idea oflevying a user charge based on the section of a routetravelled (e.g., road pricing) as a solution to the prob-lems of maintenance, reconstruction, expansion andcongestion. However, it is rarely suggested that thisidea be applied to the use of the oceans as a transportroute. As there is a connection between utilizationand pollution (Section B 2.3), the Council considersthe idea of charges that reflect the demands on andpollution of the seas to be an idea worth pursuing.However, the link between utilization and pollutionor remediation must be maintained at all times. Therevenue from such charges should not be used forpurposes that are unrelated to pollution.

Technically it would be relatively straightforwardto implement a user charge of this sort because satel-lite technology nowadays makes it possible to iden-tify vehicles or vessels and record the distances cov-ered by them. The charge could be levied in a decen-tralized way via port dues. It would also be possibleto differentiate on the basis of the potential riskposed by individual ships or stationary installationsor their potential to cause pollution.At the same timethis would create incentives to limit the use of anti-quated engines and particularly hazardous heavyoils. Overall, this would mean that funds would comefrom rental charges relating to seabed lease, from theannual auction of rights of use relating to fish stocks,and from a toll charge for marine transport based onroute and risk. In terms of institutional arrange-ments, the revenues from the auction of rights of userelating to fish stocks should be levied separately viaa trust administration, and this income should beused with an eye to fostering structural change in thefisheries sector and monitoring compliance withrights of use in order to keep the scheme focused onits primary purpose.

In contrast, the rest of the revenue should be putto a specific use related to improving marine waterquality, namely to finance measures to reduce land-based discharge of effluent into the sea in thosecountries that are not in a position to do so eithereconomically or institutionally. In view of the fact

that deep-sea mining is not very economically attrac-tive at present, this principally concerns the proposeduser charges for maritime transport. The charges areto be paid strictly as an earmarked special levy andcollected in a fund to which a time limit is attached.This fund could be administered by the World Bank.The time limit relates exclusively to implementationof effluent-reducing projects in economically weakcountries. In order to prevent freerider effects indeveloping countries, which might reduce their owninvestment to eliminate land-based emissions in theexpectation of receiving financial support, here too –as is the case with protection of the climate, the ozonelayer and biodiversity – support should be restrictedto the ‘agreed full incremental costs’ incurredthrough the common goal of marine protection. Inview of the fact that investment in remediation in thecountries eligible for subsidization can take placeannually at best and in view of the large number ofship movements annually, we can assume that theaverage amount of distance-related charges will besmall. This means that the economic burden on thisbranch of the transport sector will be kept within lim-its. As regards the use of the funds, the Council con-siders it vital that – a time-limit should be fixed from the outset on the

levying of user charges for maritime transport andon the financing of effluent-reducing measures,

– the user charges should be used solely for the spe-cific purpose of supporting the effluent-reducingmeasures,

– the administration of the fund should be institu-tionally separate from the levying of the chargesand that the funds should be used efficiently inaccordance with the conditions set out in SectionE 3.4.

Protection of the seabed and marine water qualityare to be understood as joint tasks that could beundertaken by a trust-type body. In contrast, deci-sions relating to calculating the charges and termi-nating the redistribution of funds from user chargesto effluent-reducing projects should be made exclu-sively by the community of nations in order to ensuredemocratic monitoring of the process.

E 3.2.3.4Use of the geostationary orbit

In recent times there has been great interest in theuse of the geostationary orbit. Its use is increasingrapidly and the number of satellites is growing, butthe debris dumped there is also becoming all tooobvious. From an economic point of view, therefore,a scarcity phenomenon is becoming apparent. Con-sequently, it comes as no surprise that this should


trigger a debate on user charges for stationingtelecommunications satellites in the geostationaryorbit, which constitutes a common access spaceunder international law. The Council takes the viewthat there is a need for global action emerging herewhich could certainly be tackled by means of raisinga utilization charge.

The Earth’s orbit is used primarily as a path orlocation, or as a parking place, for satellites and spacestations. It is increasingly also becoming a dumpingground where the debris of rockets, satellites or spacestations mills about, and into which other substancesare also discharged. Initial signs of congestion arebecoming apparent, and the dumping of ‘scrap’ of allsorts is proving especially troublesome. If the Earth’sorbit were in private ownership the (fictitious) ownerwould demand (increasing) user charges for the usesoutlined above, and these charges would show clearlythe increasing scarcity of this resource and the costsof combating the problem of orbital debris. As theseeconomic signals are lacking, there is a danger ofoverexploitation.

We must either agree rules for appropriate com-munal use, as is often the case with the classic com-mon resources, or we must consider the idea of usercharges. With the first of these two suggestions thereis the problem that setting rules like these that areaccepted by the community of nations will be diffi-cult and very time-consuming. The concept of usercharges, on the other hand, allows the individualplayers more scope for action, and makes it possibleto adjust the charges more quickly to any new prob-lems that emerge. In this case an orbit authoritywould have to be established under the auspices ofthe United Nations, and this authority would set thecharges – under the supervision of a regulatory body.Critical values such as maximum permissible levelsof ambient pollution or defining the maximum‘orbital parking space’ would have to be prescribedby the United Nations (Section E 1). The incomecould be used to finance these institutions, for theremoval of orbital debris or for orbital research. Inany case, it is essential to prevent a process of auto-matically increasing revenues from developing andprevent the revenues from being diverted to otheruses.The Council therefore urges that the charge-set-ting process should be reviewed continuously by theindividual countries.

Thinking of ways to raise money is not somethingnew.The discussion surrounding the launch tax envis-aged by the European company Arianespace in 1996is a typical example. At that time it was assumed thatby the year 2003 around 20–25 sizeable civilianobservation and telecommunications satellites wouldbe transported into space each year (The Economist,1 June 1996). Given costs per launch ranging between

US$50 million for a Chinese spacecraft and US$150million for Ariane 5, a launch tax of one per centwould have yielded annual revenues of aroundUS$20 million. Vague references were also made toimprovements in environmental performancebrought about by such a scheme. What precisely wasmeant by this, however, was open to interpretation.Was the intention to reduce the number of launches,or to use the money to remove space debris? There ismuch to suggest that the proposal was aimed primar-ily at creating a fiscal charge with the main objectiveof raising revenue, although the revenue thusobtained would have been much too meagre totackle even the most important issues.

This shows clearly the problems there are with thisproposal. Although technically it would be relativelyeasy to implement this levy, questions remain unan-swered, such as how to raise a substantial volume offunds, but most especially what is the connectionbetween the levy and actual use of space.There wereand are no adequate research data on possible pollu-tion of the stratosphere resulting from spacecraftemissions. Added to this is the fact that some satel-lites are used specifically for observing the Earth andgathering environmental information. In these casesa tax of this sort would be counterproductive in termsof modifying behaviour. Moreover, political compli-ance on the part of the countries operating spacecraftlaunching systems is not guaranteed, as space trans-portation technology is considered to be an ‘industryof the future’ that is of great economic, technologicaland security importance.

These reservations could be mitigated by estab-lishing a clear link between the user charges and spe-cific levels of ambient pollution or the availablespace for waste disposal in the Earth’s orbit. In thesecases a system of tradeable certificates could be setup, which would have three important advantages.First, it would have a clearer impact on behaviourdue to its strong connection to scarcity of space in theEarth’s orbit. Second, auctioning utilization rightswould be likely to raise considerable funds. Such anauction is unlikely to be feasible, however, withoutthe acceptance of those countries that operate space-craft launching systems. Third, by deciding not toplace such a financial burden on these countries,while at the same time ensuring efficient distributionof the existing space in the Earth’s orbit, politicalresistance could be reduced.The Council is thereforein favour of investigating the possibilities of settingup such a system in the medium term.


E 3.2.4Compensation for abstaining from using aresource

In contrast to the oceans, the Earth’s orbit and airspace, in terms of ownership rights, most land andfreshwater resources are in the hands of privateactors or countries. Owners are able to use theseresources freely for a variety of purposes, and as arule they have several options open to them. Theproblem for environmental policy resides in the factthat ecological functions are not valued highlyenough, and those who benefit from protective mea-sures and those who pay for them are far apart bothin time and in place.

In order to conserve biological diversity it is oftennecessary to abstain from using certain areas of theEarth’s surface, and this is an issue to which theCouncil has devoted considerable attention (WBGU,2001). What is problematic here, however, is thatsome of the countries harbouring a particularly largeshare of biodiversity of worldwide conservationinterest face disadvantages as a result of effectiveglobal environmental policy. Moreover, the most bio-diversity-rich countries are often also the poorestand are therefore unable to contribute to conservingbiological diversity without support.The BiodiversityConvention attempts to deal with this problem byguaranteeing to developing countries that the‘agreed full incremental costs’ of any measuresimplemented to conserve biological diversity will becovered, in other words the costs remaining afterdeduction of the overall utility for the country itself.The Council already mentioned the problems andrisks associated with this agreement earlier in thepresent report. The idea behind this cost-sharingapproach is nevertheless economically justifiable if itis understood as international compensation for theloss of prospective profit from the use of theseresources, which is in the interests of the global com-munity.

This idea may be extended further, taking up theprinciple underlying pollution certificates. In the lat-ter case a specific right of use is bought, and a non-utilization commitment may be purchased in muchthe same way. The problem concerning conservationof renewable resources is that because of the longtime needed for regeneration, e.g., of a forest stand,owners are often unable to ‘reap the fruits’ of it andas a result use existing stocks more intensively thanthey can replenish. The costs and the benefits ofmaintaining stocks of a resource diverge in time. Theconflict becomes even more serious where the costsand the benefits of conserving a resource diverge interms of place too. Here the obvious thing would be

for those who benefit in terms of time and place topay the owner of the resource compensation for notusing the resource (today). They purchase commit-ment certificates, with which the owners committhemselves not to use the resource. Basically this is aform of non-utilization payment with correspondingincentive effects.

The funds could be raised in either the private sec-tor or the public sector. Here, however, furtherresearch is needed. There is a need to clarify, forexample, how compliance with commitments can beensured, to what extent extortion can be prevented inconnection with commitment payments, in whichareas commitment certificate ‘swaps’ might be possi-ble, and to what extent fragmentation can be pre-vented. What is important in any case is that the per-son or institution ‘bearing the cost’ – which we willdefine here as a person or institution not exercisingan ownership right – receives the payments. Only inthis way can a genuine incentive effect be achieved.If the payments, or the ‘incremental costs’ mentionedabove, are paid to governments, there is a danger thatthey will be used to pay for other matters of concern.

In the long term, consideration should be given toextending this concept to create a worldwide systemof commitments not to use particular resources (suchas rainforests) signed by countries or regional stake-holders and with corresponding financial compensa-tion provided by the international community.

E 3.2.5 Options for insurance and compensation forregional damage resulting from globalenvironmental change

Many environmental problems are a legacy of thepast. They came about at a time when the legal pro-visions still permitted inappropriate emissions oruses of resources, or there was a lack of informationabout the risks associated with particular emissionsor uses. Furthermore, it is not always possible to iden-tify or eliminate all environmental problems in time,and in the global context too it is to be feared thatsome environmental changes can no longer behalted, only mitigated or slowed by decisive action.The onset of climate change is the best-known exam-ple illustrating that in future there will be costs relat-ing not only to prevention but also adaptation.At thenational level this issue is generally approached, withan eye to future risks, using the instrument of liability(accompanied by the insurance schemes that liabilityregularly entails). Such a form of regulation not onlyallows compensation for damage, it also gives rise topreventive effects and innovation. In order to avoid


paying high premiums, substitution processes are ini-tiated and production may even be halted.

If an effective liability system is in place, then theplayers have an incentive to limit the risk of environ-mental damage as far as possible. As a rule this isboth efficient and highly effective, due to the fact thatthe players know more about the hazards in a givensituation. Insurance premiums that are graduatedaccording to risk induce a corresponding behaviouralchange in decentralized actors. In addition, theseinsurance schemes package together knowledgeabout potential risks, preventive measures andstrategies for adapting to unavoidable environmentalchanges (WBGU, 2000a).

But how does one deal with problems that aregenuine legacies? It is often impossible to identifythose who are to blame for these inherited burdensor hold them to account legally. At the internationallevel, moreover, there are no clearly defined legalregulations to date pertaining to liability. If we followthe classical principles of environmental policy, thepolluter pays principle would have to be replacedhere by the principle of public responsibility, or thelatter principle applied in subsidiary fashion. In cer-tain respects an international solidarity principlewould come into its own here. The costs of remedia-tion and adaptation (such as resettling people at riskdue to sea-level rise) would need to be financed outof a fund replenished by state contributions. As it ismainly the industrial nations that have benefited, interms of prosperity, from misguided use of naturalresources in the past, payments into the fund couldbe based on prosperity indicators, on internationaltrade volume, or on the specific volume of trade withthe countries concerned. In some cases the responsi-bility of specific branches of industry should also beinvestigated. However, here too the funds mustremain dedicated to a specified purpose.

In the medium term it might also be worth exam-ining the possibility of setting up a general fund fordamage.The idea behind this is that we will probablynever manage to avoid the adaptation costs thatglobal activities entail. In theory it might therefore bepossible to envisage some form of global obligatoryinsurance for residual damage compensation in theevent of globally induced environmental problems.Consideration should be given to setting up a soli-darity-based model analogous to that of the Germansocial insurance system. An integral part of such amodel is a commitment on the part of all members ofthe collective (in the present instance the communityof nations) to pay contributions into a fund that willbe used to cover the costs of certain types of damage– for example as a result of climate change and mea-sures needed to adapt to it (e.g., dyke building orclean-up operations). There are a number of indica-

tors that could be used to graduate the level of con-tributions – emissions, productive capacity of theeconomy, etc. In contrast to an exclusively pay-as-you-go system of financing, which is the approachmost European social insurance systems are basedon, in view of the uncertainty and incalculability ofthe risks relating to climate change impacts it wouldbe conceivable for the fund to be placed under pri-vate-sector risk management, with funds invested inlong-term real and human capital investments thatfoster climate protection. Modern reinsurance strate-gies using hedging portfolios could also be employedhere (Hommel, 1998).

In this context catastrophe bonds, or cat bonds, arean instrument that is of special interest. Damageresulting from natural disasters has increased consid-erably in recent decades. The Kobe earthquake in1995, for example, caused damage amounting toUS$100 thousand million to the economy as a whole.Only around two to three per cent of the damage wascovered by insurance. Damage on this scale can nolonger really be covered by traditional insurance andreinsurance business. The capital resources of theglobal insurance market are estimated at US$500thousand million. The capitalization of the interna-tional financial markets, meanwhile, amounts toapproximately US$40 million million. The basic ideaof catastrophe bonds is to distribute the risks associ-ated with natural disasters beyond the classical insur-ance sphere, over the financial markets and the par-ticipants in those markets (Adler, 1999; Kunreutherand Linnerooth-Bayer, 1999).

Catastrophe bonds are issued on the capital mar-kets by insurance and reinsurance companies or bygovernments and they relate to a precisely definedenvironmental occurrence. For example, the cata-strophe bond of the Swiss insurance company Win-terthur covers damage arising in the event that morethan 6,000 insured motor vehicles are damaged byhail, storm and tempest. Buyers of catastrophe bondsreceive interest above the market rate. In return theyhave to forgo interest, and in some cases capital too,in the event of damage occurring. In this way they aretaking on a part of the overall risk. Thus, by bringingan inflow of new risk capital, catastrophe bonds havea positive effect on the liquidity of the insurance sec-tor, which in turn expands capacity to provide cover.There have already been academic studies looking atadopting this tool for reducing risk related to floods.As well as its effects on liquidity, it is also possible touse catastrophe bonds, if they are designed appropri-ately, in conjunction with other decentralized incen-tive-creating instruments to finance, for example,preventive and adaptation measures (Kunreutherand Linnerooth-Bayer, 1999).


The Council sees this as an important area forfuture research and recommends that the Germangovernment explore ways of developing similar mod-els for the prevention and short-term control of risksassociated with other disasters (e.g., the flood disas-ter in Mozambique).

E 3.2.6Other financing mechanisms

In the international debate on this issue a wholerange of other proposals are also under discussion.The Council can mention some of these only brieflyhere, such as the proposal to tax data transfers via theInternet (the ‘bit tax’), to allow the UN to take outloans or to assign new special payment rights via theIMF for purposes relating to environment and devel-opment policy in developing countries (Jakobeit,1999; see also Section E 2). Other proposals, how-ever, merit more in-depth analysis.

E 3.2.6.1Foreign currency turnover tax (‘Tobin tax’)

A great deal of space in the debate is given over tothe proposal for taxing currency transactions that hasbecome known as the ‘Tobin tax’, after the US Nobel-Prize Laureate economist James Tobin (Tobin, 1974,1978). For advocates of this tax it represents a way ofmaking speculative, cross-border capital transactionsless attractive, of enhancing national capacity to actin the economic policy sphere, and a way of mobiliz-ing additional financial instruments to balance outthe global North-South divergence and for fundingglobal environmental tasks (Ul Haq et al., 1996;Michalos, 1997; Felix, 1995, 1996; Kulessa, 1996;Menkhoff and Michaelis, 1995; Spahn, 1996; Stotsky,1996; Tanzi, 1997; Jakobeit, 1997; Bündnis 90/DieGrünen, 1998; Huffschmid, 1999).

Due to the explosion in the volume of currencytransactions in recent years – it now stands at aroundUS$1.5 million million per day of trading worldwide(as of April 1998) – according to cautious estimateseven a minimal tax of a mere 0.1 per cent would yieldmore than US$170 thousand million per year fornational and/or global purposes. As the Tobin taxwould be levied nationally, it would be left tonational parliaments to decide what share of this rev-enue should be earmarked for international goals.Attaining the 0.7 per cent target would no longer bea utopia for the industrialized countries.

If it were only a question of its function as afinancing mechanism, then the verdict on the Tobintax would be positive. The revenues that could be

expected from it would suffice – assuming that therewas the necessary political will in the industrializedcountries – to cover the new and additional fundingrequirements of AGENDA 21. However, this tax hasscarcely any ecological behaviour-modifying func-tion and little chance of being politically feasible, andthere is still controversy as to whether it would betechnically possible to implement it. Consequently,over the next few years discussion concerning intro-duction of the Tobin tax is likely to continue, butthere is little likelihood of it being realized.

Politically the tax cannot be implemented if thereis resistance from major industrialized countries,because if it were introduced in some countries only,then currency transactions would shift to stockexchanges where no Tobin tax was levied (free rid-ers).The USA especially rejects any new form of tax-ation of this sort as an inadmissible regulatory inter-vention in the free play of market forces. Even theadvocates of the tax admit that there is no chance ofit succeeding unless the world’s eight most importantstock exchanges are involved. And yet the technicalfeasibility of the tax would still be questionable evenif the Tobin tax were levied at the eight major stockexchanges. In the international financial markets inrecent years the pace of innovation has beenextremely rapid, and has also benefited from the newglobal information and communications possibilities.Stock market trading can now take place 24 hours aday, worldwide, on the Internet. Capital markettransactions that became more expensive as a resultof the Tobin tax would move to financial oases or off-shore financial markets. Even if a new tax were leviedglobally on particular types of currency trading trans-actions (and the type of transaction would have to belaid down precisely in law in all countries), the finan-cial sector has shown in recent years that it would becapable of developing new instruments very quicklythat would not come under the Tobin tax but thatwould nevertheless take on the hedging and specula-tive functions of currency trading. The legislatorswould presumably have difficulty in keeping up withsuch a pace of innovation.

In addition, the Tobin tax offers no direct link tospecific, environmentally harmful actions; rather,with its across-the-board taxation of all currencytransactions, it places the emphasis on maximizingbudgetary revenue. For the reasons given above, theCouncil opposes this course of action in the area offinancing. Moreover, the Council considers that nar-rowing the debate to such financial instruments jeop-ardizes the objective of reaching agreements basedon international consensus.

157Involving private players in financing E 3.3

E 3.2.6.2Environmental lotteries

Since environmental lotteries have already beenintroduced both regionally and nationally (Nether-lands), there might be an opportunity for the Ger-man government, in addition to other financingmechanisms, to launch a political initiative for theintroduction of a European environmental lottery.The focus here would not be on the lottery’sfundraising function. Rather, such an environmentallottery could help to raise public awareness of envi-ronmental issues in developing countries.

Experiences with environmental lotteries inLower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg(‘bingo lottery’) prove that additional, dedicatedfinancial resources can be mobilized in this way atleast for environmental problems that are specific tothe region. In the national context (in Germany,ARGE-Lotterie-Arbeitsgemeinschaft Neue Bun-deslotterie für Umwelt und Entwicklung – workinggroup for a new federal lottery for the environmentand development) or in the European context (Euro-vision, or modelled on the Dutch ‘Nationale Post-code Loterij’) additional funds could be raised by alottery of this kind held in conjunction with a televi-sion programme geared specifically towards inform-ing the public about serious environmental problemsin developing countries. As an innovative mediumfor political education, and one that is gearedtowards a mass audience, there is undoubtedly scopehere for ministerial or federal government initiatives.Even though it is difficult to estimate the revenuefrom such lotteries (especially given that the new lot-tery would have to compete with numerous estab-lished regional lotteries), the principal effect wouldprobably be to increase awareness of and interest inthese issues.This, meanwhile, would provide links forwork at local and municipal level to implementAGENDA 21 if these local initiatives worked in stablecooperation partnerships with municipalities indeveloping countries. Establishing competing lotter-ies with different environmental and developmentprojects and private and local partners would alsoopen the way for institutional competition todevelop, which would mean that the success of a lot-tery could also be an indicator of the project’s likeli-hood of success (Section E 3.4).

However, the problem remains that the fundsraised for tackling global environmental problemswill be meagre, the environmental incentive effectsare very general in nature and, most importantly, theever-crucial link to a specific purpose is omitted.Ultimately it does little more than open up a sourceof finance for environmental goals that are defined invery general terms.

E 3.3Involving private players in financing

In principle it makes sense to involve private-sectorplayers.There is much to suggest that these organiza-tions are more efficient, as can be seen in the com-ments made in Section E 3.4 regarding efficient useof financial resources. Privatization holds the poten-tial for the following advantages:– Greater capacity for processing knowledge as a

result of being more decentralized, with the addedeffect that a transfer of know-how of relevance tosmall areas is facilitated (WBGU, 1997),

– greater diversity of globally relevant solutions toproblems, as competing approaches can be testedin the competitive environment first and assessedin terms of what they contribute to solving theproblem,

– improved control over how funds are usedthrough competitive structures and increasedinterest on the part of those concerned,

– positive motivating effects, as the anonymity andlimited direct control of government funding pro-grammes can be reduced.

By galvanizing private initiatives the Council sees achance to use the process of globalization and theefficiency effects it has brought with it for the benefitof the global environment. New technical possibili-ties provided by modern information and communi-cations technologies, and also the fusion of globalmarkets, open up new ways to move beyond govern-ment action and include ‘civil society’ as a relevantplayer in global environmental policy worldwide.There are two principal ways in which this can hap-pen. First, through the creation of property rights andliability rights, private players can become more inte-grated into global environmental policy both as pay-ers of user charges and as implementers of worldwideenvironmental protection and development tasks.Approaches relating to this were discussed in detailin Section E 3.2. Second, it is also a question of mobi-lizing private players’ existing readiness to pay and toact even where no unilateral or multilateral agree-ments are in place. In this connection the Council isparticularly opposed to two popular misconceptionsthat are often used as arguments against strengthen-ing private initiatives:– There is neither the willingness nor the financial

resources,– it is infeasible in the face of a process of globaliza-

tion that is leading to erosion of social and ecolog-ical standards.

The Council has already devoted special attention toprivate initiatives in its earlier report on biodiversity,where it emphasized the importance of private foun-


dations for fundraising (WBGU, 2001). Private initia-tives such as these involve a kind of ‘governancewithout government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).This approach can be supported by means of a con-tractual environment that fosters cooperation and byconcern building. In its earlier reports the Councilalso made reference to a motivational approach(WBGU, 2000a).

This motivational approach is based on the obser-vation that for many issues of concern to global envi-ronmental policy there is definitely a willingness topay on the part of individuals, and that this can bemobilized and put to use. It should, however, bepointed out that with this approach we do not meana policy of selective setting of economic incentives –such as by establishing state funding bodies fromwhich subsidies, guarantees or grants of some kindare made. Rather, it is geared towards creating thebasic conditions for establishing a variety of solutionson a private basis, including ‘spontaneous’ ones.Whatwe want is a wide variety of institutions that is notmerely the expression of deliberate state interven-tion in pursuit of an internationally agreed model ofglobal environmental policy, but rather the productof individual, local or regional ideas concerning envi-ronmental protection.

Ultimately we are talking about a kind of club orpatronage scheme that would be able to mobilize pri-vate players’ inherent willingness to pay for environ-mental concerns. Similar activities are to be found inthe sphere of development cooperation (such as Mis-ereor or Bread for the World).They are important, asmoney is often combined here with personal com-mitment and it can generally be guaranteed thatresources will be spent frugally. Moreover, they alsoserve to raise awareness, as they arouse interest inglobal environmental protection in the donor coun-tries.

A special incentive is created for private initiativesof this sort if financing of environment and develop-ment policy measures can come from private con-sumers’ willingness to pay. Guidance with regard toassessing products can be provided in the form oflabelling and auditing information. Consumers thenuse their consumption decisions to vote on alterna-tive institutional systems of environmental protec-tion in the different countries. Environmental pro-tection is part and parcel of competition betweeninstitutional systems in different countries (Streit,1995; Karl, 1998; Becker-Soest, 1998).Thus it is totallyconceivable that a competitive ‘race to the top’ could,under certain conditions, contribute to solving globalenvironmental problems. The basic idea underlyingthis line of argument is the fact that for producerscompliance with protection requirements or certain(not necessarily politically set) standards in environ-

mental protection are not just a cost factor, but mayalso be seen from an offensive point of view as extrautility (Section E 2.2). This extra utility can be mar-keted profitably and is therefore capable of develop-ing environmentally innovative processes. Thesestandards compete as product or location attributeswith other products or locations that have differentstandards. Competition thus takes place not onlybetween products but also between standards. Thisby no means has to be laid down by government, butcan evolve ‘spontaneously’ in the manner of many ofthe ISO standards. When they make a purchase,therefore, consumers or location seekers are at thesame time making a decision about accepting certainstandards (Wegner, 1998; on the potential of labellingstrategies for environmental protection, see alsoIWÖ and IFÖK, 1998; Karl and Orwat, 1999). Pro-ducers who fail to submit to these standards run therisk of being sanctioned by worldwide competitionand of incurring economic losses. Furthermore, if therisk of being exposed to problematic pressure toadjust as a result of decisions by a global regulatorybody is then removed, then there is an increasedincentive constantly to bring new standards into playat global level as new competitive elements, or for anecological dynamics of the free market to evolve(Knill, 1998). Thus the question is not primarily oneof using regulatory measures to prevent poor coun-tries from dragging down prosperous and environ-mentally aware countries, but quite the opposite:mechanisms should be brought into play to encour-age other countries to adjust to the more rigorousstandards (Vogel, 1997).

In its previous report, the Council indicated thereforms that would be needed in order to foster thisprocess of galvanizing private players (WBGU,2001). Included among these measures are reforms –over and above the reform passed in Germany thisyear – of the law pertaining to foundations, publicrelations work to promote environmental labellingand auditing systems, critical appraisal of the com-petitive impact of established labels and the impacton demand exerted by large trading companies, andinformation and public awareness-raising work tosupport the development of international networksof companies and agreements for private-sectorcapacity building and knowledge transfer.

Experience shows, however, that private commit-ment of this sort often merely functions as an impe-tus or only has a complementary role. Given the scaleof the problems to be tackled, a much greater inflowof funds is needed and these funds need to be used ina more focussed way.This inevitably means that moreabundant sources of funding need to be found, as wasdiscussed in Section E 3.2 above.

159Efficient spending of funds E 3.4

E 3.4Efficient spending of funds

E 3.4.1The issues

The international system for financing global envi-ronmental protection is characterized by a multitudeof institutions and organizations (Table E 3.4-1). Interms of their primary function, the individual insti-tutions have different relationships to global envi-ronmental policy. The Global Environment Facility(GEF) provides funds exclusively for global environ-mental protection. In the case of the UNDP and theWorld Bank the connection with global environmen-tal issues is much more indirect, since the focus is pri-marily on financing development projects and pro-grammes and only a portion of the funds goesdirectly to environmental protection. On the otherhand, expenditure that serves to reduce poverty alsomakes an important contribution to global environ-mental protection. In the case of multifunctionalfunding organizations of this sort, the exact amountof funding allocated to global environmental protec-tion can only be determined by analysing the individ-ual projects and programmes. Such analysis, how-ever, is highly resource-consuming. For this reason,

only estimates are given here. It is even more difficultto establish the volume of funding provided by pri-vate foundations for global environmental issues. Forthe sake of comparison only, therefore, Table E 3.4-1presents the volume of donations of the Turner Fund(United Nations Foundation, UNF), which providesfunds for the areas of ‘Environment’, ‘Women andPopulation’, and ‘Children’s Health’, and that of anational environmental fund in Colombia (‘Corpora-cion Ecofondo’). Taken all together, these fundinginstitutions represent the spectrum of institutionsthat must be examined in order to gauge how effi-ciently funds are spent.

In AGENDA 21 the principles of ‘Universality,Democracy and Transparency’ were formulated forthe institutional design of global environmental pol-icy. From the point of view of efficiency, transferringthese principles in a uniform way to matters relatingto financing global environmental policy is not to berecommended. As the experience of many UN bod-ies demonstrates, the universal participation of allcountries makes decision-making difficult. For rea-sons of efficiency it is advantageous in many cases tostrive for smaller decision-making bodies (Ehrmann,1997). Furthermore, it is desirable to place the man-agement of funding allocation in professional handsto avoid unnecessary and inefficient battles over howmoney is spent. At the same time, however, due con-sideration must be given to the justified demands of

Personal staff Budget Funds[number / administeredreference year] [mio. US-$ year-1 / reference year]

Institutions with a funding functionWorld Bank 11,310 ‘00 719 ‘99 29,000 ‘99GEF 65 ‘00 22.2 ‘00 500-700 ‘99UNDP 5,300 ‘98 58.6 ‘00 2,000 ‘98FAO 3,500 ‘00 367 ‘00 615 ‘00UNESCO 1,076 ‘96 272.2 ‘00 405 ‘00Ozone Fund 8 ‘00 3.9 ‘00 147 ‘00UNCTAD 394 ‘00 50 ‘00 24 ‘00UNEP 529 ‘00 4.7 ‘00 96.1 ‘00

Institutions without a funding functionIMO 300 ‘00 29.5 ‘00WMO 246 ‘00 39.4 ‘00CSD approx. 40 ‘00 n. d.CBD 47 ‘99 8.3 ‘99CITES 27 ‘00 5.15 ‘00UNCCD 39 ‘00 8.6 ‘00UNFCCC 79 ‘00 11.04 ‘00

By way of comparisonTurner Fund 1,000 1)

(United Nations Foundation)Corporación Ecofondo 58.5(national environment and development fund, Columbia)

1) For various global policy objectives (environment, women and population, children’shealth).

Table E 3.4-1Overview of internationalfunding institutions of rele-vance to global environ-mental policy. n.d. = no data.Source: WBGU


developing countries to have a say in the raising andallocation of funds.

In developing a system for financing global envi-ronmental policy there is thus a fundamental conflictbetween equity and efficiency goals.This conflict can-not be eliminated entirely by means of institutionalreforms. Compromises must always be sought thattake adequate account of both goals. Examination ofthe conflict between distributional equity and effi-ciency certainly has a firm place in the academic lit-erature (e.g., Okun, 1975; Zimmermann, 1996). Onthe other hand, however, systematic application oftheories of justice (Rawls, 1975) to global environ-mental policy in conjunction with an examination ofefficiency effects is largely lacking to date (oneexception, for example, is Helm and Simonis, 2000).However, it is beyond the scope of the present reportto discuss these extremely complex problems indetail. Our intention is to highlight the significantshortage of research in this area. For this reason wesingle out two aspects here that are crucial for devel-oping a system for financing global environmentalpolicy that takes into account both equity and effi-ciency-related objectives:1. What sort of voting and decision-making pro-

cesses operate within international funding insti-tutions, and what effects do these have in terms ofefficiency and distribution? This will be discussedusing the GEF as an example (Section E 3.4.2).

2. What is the institutional form that distributes athousand million DM best in terms of contributingto achieving a goal (relating to a global environ-mental problem)? Put in a different way: how, if itwere solely a case of ensuring efficient allocation,should the German government distribute theavailable funds among the various institutionsinvolved in financing global environmental pro-tection? In connection with this, a system of deter-minants is presented that provides pointers fordeveloping an efficient system of financing that isalso equitable in distributive terms (Section E3.4.3).

E 3.4.2 The role of voting and decision-makingprocedures in the case of the GEF

In terms of designing an efficient and distributivelyjust system for financing global environmental policyit is particularly instructive to examine the develop-ment of the GEF, which was founded in 1991 andmay be considered to be the key funding institutionfor global environmental protection (WBGU,1995a). Ever since it was founded, the GEF has beenthe subject of many disputes between industrialized

and developing countries. The central issues in theseconflicts have been the design of the organization’svoting rules and decision-making processes. Becausethe GEF operates under the joint auspices of theWorld Bank, UNEP and UNDP, a major reason forthis conflict is inherent in the institutional design ofthe GEF itself. Should its decisions be made in accor-dance with the rules of UN organizations (‘one coun-try, one vote’) or should they follow the proceduresof the World Bank Group, in which a country’s voteis weighted according to its financial contribution(‘one dollar, one vote’)?

The advantages of both procedures are plain:whereas the decision-making rules of the UN organi-zations guarantee member states equal standing, anddistributive considerations play a more significantrole, in the World Bank Group’s decision-makingprocedures it is the influence of the wealthy indus-trial nations that predominates. Because of the dom-inating influence of the donor countries, one canassume a high degree of efficiency in the case of theWorld Bank Group. Demands on the part of devel-oping countries for greater consideration to be givento distributive goals, which in many cases could meana loss of efficiency, are fended off or weakened by thevoting majority of the industrialized countries.

Naturally, such a brief characterization of the twodifferent decision-making processes is simplistic. Notall UN decisions are automatically inefficient and notall World Bank decisions are distributively unjust.Rather, we are talking here about tendencies. Theeffects of the two decision-making processes may beexpected broadly to take this form.

In the course of the founding and restructuringphases of the GEF, this fundamental conflict waslargely resolved by means of an innovative solution.The voting mechanism of the GEF is based on a ‘dou-ble weighted majority’ system. Basically, decisions inthe Council of the GEF must be based on consensus.In the event that all efforts to reach a consensus havebeen exhausted, each member of the Council has theright to demand a formal vote. However, the subse-quent voting takes place in two stages: in the firstround each member has one vote (‘one country, onevote’), and in the second round the vote is weightedaccording to financial contribution (‘one dollar, onevote’). A decision is reached if 60 per cent of thecountries vote in favour and this majority at the sametime represents 60 per cent of the contributions tothe GEF fund. Industrialized countries and develop-ing countries are thus not able to outvote each other(WBGU, 1996; Ehrmann, 1997). In the UN institu-tions, in contrast, as was mentioned above, decisionsare made on the basis of a majority of member states,so that donor countries can easily be outvoted. Forthis reason, if the GEF had not been set up outside


the narrower confines of the UN system, financialresources would probably not have flowed to theextent they have.

Similar, flexible voting rules were also introducedin the context of decisions relating to the allocationof funds from the Multilateral Ozone Fund. TheOzone Fund has been given the task of compensatingdeveloping countries for the incremental costs ofconverting their industries to substances andprocesses that are non-damaging to the ozone layerin accordance with the provisions of the MontrealProtocol. A group composed of an equal number ofdonor and recipient countries is responsible for themanagement of this fund. Outvoting of one group ofcountries by another is not possible because, in theevent of failure to reach consensus, a decision isarrived at by two-thirds majority, which must alsocomprise the majority of representatives of bothgroups of countries (Gehring 1990; Biermann, 1997).

The voting mechanisms of both the GEF and theMultilateral Ozone Fund are the product of a prag-matic compromise. Experience to date suggests thatthese are successful institutional innovations in thesphere of global environmental policy that could actas models for other international environmentalagreements. Their success is demonstrated not leastby the fact that actual voting – in the case of the GEFat any rate – is the exception and that the existence ofthis voting procedure in itself fosters the desired con-sensus.

In the case of some of the conventions it has so farnot been possible to approve a full set of operationalrules because of conflicts relating to voting rules ondecisions concerning financial matters. For example,in the case of the United Nations Convention toCombat Desertification (UNCCD) (Rule 47) andthe Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)(Rule 40) voting rules concerning financial mattershave not been settled to date. Whereas developingcountries argue for a two-thirds majority rule, theOECD countries demand unanimous decisions onfinancial matters. In order to end this dispute, whichhas already lasted several years, as soon as possible,the Council recommends introducing decision-mak-ing procedures based on the voting rules of the GEFand the Ozone Fund.

The GEF, as the most important funding institu-tion in global environmental policy, is rated posi-tively. The reasons for this evaluation are on the onehand its proximity to the World Bank, which makes itprobable that funds will be allocated in a professionalmanner, and on the other its innovative decision-making procedure. It is not recommended, however,that all the funds earmarked for global environmen-tal protection in the German federal budget shouldbe handed over to the GEF.A number of reasons can

be given for this. Especially important is the fact thatthe concentration of large sums of money in oneplace always tends to arouse a desire for moremoney, even though these additional funds may notbe necessary to fulfil the task in hand. The principaldanger here is that large institutions are particularlysusceptible to becoming excessively bureaucratic.Moreover, where competition among different insti-tutions for public funds is reduced, efforts to useresources efficiently may also be expected to slacken.Preference should therefore be given, for example, toNGOs in developing countries because they have theadvantage of being close to the problems due to theirfamiliarity with the particular local conditions. Such anetwork of NGOs could be funded for example viaGermany’s development cooperation institutions(BMZ, GTZ, KfW), or alternatively via a newly cre-ated national trust fund for the environment anddevelopment (Section E 3.4.5).

Against this background it is vital to give carefulconsideration to how the available volume of fundscan be divided up so as to ensure the maximum pos-sible contribution to the goal of global environmen-tal protection. The system of determinants presentedbelow is intended to provide starting points both fordividing up the funds and for possible institutionalchanges with regard to the international system offinancing.

E 3.4.3 A system of determinants for assessing howefficiently funds are spent

E 3.4.3.1 The importance of analysing efficiency in theallocation of public funds

If an organization is highly efficient in the way itspends funds, this means that it makes a large contri-bution to achieving the goal of global environmentalprotection with the resources available to it.What weare concerned with here is not so much planning indi-vidual environmental protection projects in the mostefficient way possible. Rather, the focus is on thefunding institutions, and the analysis examines theextent to which an institution is able to select fromamong the projects requiring funding those propos-als that will contribute the most to achieving thedesired goals. This is the primary goal of any fundinginstitution, and in order to achieve it the fundsrequired for the project selection process must them-selves be spent as efficiently as possible. For a startthis means that the budget of an organization mustallow the minimum possible for financing adminis-


trative costs and the maximum possible for projectsfunding. If an institution is successful in achieving ahigh degree of efficiency, then this will have two maineffects:1. The contribution it makes to the goal of global

environmental protection is greater.This will hap-pen by definition as a result of greater efficiency,which implies that a goal is achieved at the lowestpossible cost. The additional funds available as aresult of the increased efficiency can then be spenton other projects. By being able to finance theseadditional projects, the overall contribution toglobal environmental protection is increased.

2. Alongside this direct connection, greater effi-ciency in the use of funds also has an importantindirect effect on the donor countries. The knowl-edge that the funds allocated will be used effi-ciently can significantly increase the inclination ofthese countries to provide more funds. In view ofthe fact that the industrialized countries’ inclina-tion to provide funds for global environment anddevelopment policy is on the wane, this aspectbecomes all the more important.

The further idea of effectiveness is also closely boundup with efficiency. An institution is effective if itachieves the environmental goal set for it. Cost-related considerations are not taken into accountwhen measuring effectiveness in the stricter sense. Inthe following reflections the focus is on efficiency asregards the use of funds, even though reference isoccasionally made to effectiveness. Systematic exam-ination of how efficiently funds are spent by interna-tional funding institutions is virtually completelymissing in the literature.As the question being raisedis new, it is not possible to make assertions that arebacked by empirical evidence. Rather, the goal is toset out a rough preliminary pattern of determinantsthat can serve as a basis from which we can derivehypotheses concerning how efficiently funding bod-ies spend financial resources in the field of globalenvironmental protection. Empirical examinationwould have to be the subject of future research (Zim-mermann and Pahl, 2000).

E 3.4.3.2The individual determinants

The basic idea underlying a system of determinantsto assess how efficiently international funding insti-tutions spend funds is that the efficiency of a givenfunding institution is influenced by a great number ofvery different factors. Under the term ‘efficiency’,two approaches are examined in parallel:• The narrow concept of efficiency, as used for

example in cost-benefit analysis, where the estab-

lished costs are set against the measured or esti-mated benefits (advantages, contribution toachieving a goal, etc.), is only used to a limitedextent as a basis here.This approach is very limitedbecause although costs are usually relatively easyto ascertain, measuring the magnitude of benefitson the utility or performance side is bound by tightconstraints.

• The second approach is procedural in nature. Wewant to identify an organization that is designed insuch a way – with incentives, clear performancetargets, scope for decision-making, etc. – that effi-cient results may be expected.This approach is thefocus of the discussion below.

The possible determinants that might be expected toaffect efficiency as outlined above are very numer-ous. They are condensed here into a limited number.Some of these may be applied to all types of financialinstitution and should therefore be examined first.These are particularly suited to comparing fundinginstitutions with one another.

Another group is specific to a particular area ofresponsibility and the problems that need to beresolved within it; consequently, global environmen-tal problems are focused upon here. Lastly, the kindsof measures that institutions plan and take decisionson also appear to influence efficiency.

The determinants that we have formulated areexplained here in brief. In doing so the argumenta-tion is not taken to the point of carrying out effi-ciency tests. Rather, examples are subsequently givenof hypotheses concerning how these determinantsrelate to efficiency (Section E 3.4.4). Further reflec-tions aimed especially at extending this list and fur-ther subdividing the determinants presented, as wellas empirical examination, would be a subject forfuture research.The years of experience gained in thefield of efficiency and effectiveness analysis relatingto development assistance payments could be partic-ularly useful in terms of analysing financial supportpayments for global environmental policy (Fairmanand Ross, 1996).

Attributes of financial institutions asdeterminantsDeterminant One: Public versus private institutions.In global environmental policy a distinction can bemade between public and private institutions as play-ers. Large public organizations such as those withinthe UN system are often said to be relatively ineffi-cient. National trust funds for environment anddevelopment can provide a counterbalance to this(Section E 3.4.5). These trust funds provide supportespecially to private groups, NGOs, etc. – mostlyoperating at local level – that often operate more


efficiently and effectively than projects initiated bygovernment organizations.

Determinant Two: Multifunctional versus mono-functional institutions. Funding institutions may bedesigned specifically to deal with a single environ-mental problem (e.g., the Multilateral Ozone Fund),or they may be responsible for several environmen-tal issues (GEF). Concentrating on a narrowlydefined environmental problem (e.g., ozone deple-tion in the stratosphere; see also Determinant Six)permits a fund that is related to a specific conventionrapidly to build up a body of knowledge relating tothe environmental problem concerned. One of thespecial features of multifunctional funding institu-tions such as the GEF, meanwhile, is their goodoverview of the spectrum of global environmentalproblems and this enables them to make internallinkages that cut across the boundaries between dif-ferent conventions (see also Determinant Six). Afunding institution for climate problems has to spendmore interdisciplinary knowledge and policy than anozone fund. An institution that is inappropriatelydesigned for the environmental issue in question, forexample if it is inadequately connected to the rele-vant environmental conventions, is highly detrimen-tal to efficiency.It is usually not possible to draw any direct conclu-sion as regards efficiency from either of these twodeterminants, which relate to the type of fundinginstitution. Rather, each institution must be exam-ined on a case-by-case basis for specific examples offunding allocation. In any case, cross-checking mustbe carried out with the determinants describedbelow.

Determinant Three: Internal organization. Withregard to internal organization, we can draw a dis-tinction between a professional approach to respon-sibilities, which fulfils the requirements of the‘clients’ and develops an ethos geared towardsaccomplishing tasks correctly on the one hand, and abureaucratic organization characterized by lengthyand awkward decision-making processes on theother (Mayntz, 1997). Older institutions, ceterisparibus, are often more bureaucratic and may there-fore have to undergo reorganization. Referencepoints for testing the efficiency of funding institu-tions may be obtained by examining the internalstructures of the organization. For example one canexamine whether there are internal review proce-dures to check whether tasks are carried out effi-ciently. The existence of an internal review mecha-nism should greatly increase the likelihood of thesort of procedural efficiency under discussion here.Furthermore the type of budgeting procedure exertsconsiderable influence on how efficiently funds areused. The UN organizations have already largely

replaced ‘object-of-expenditure budgeting’ with‘programme budgeting’. However, a results-orientedbudgeting process, focussing attention more onachieving results and setting performance indicatorsfor this purpose, would provide better internal andexternal efficiency controls (see also DeterminantFour). Efforts to introduce such ‘results-based bud-geting’, which is also an important element of thereform plans of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan,should therefore be pursued for reasons of efficiency(Mizutani et al., 2000).

Determinant Four: External regulation of institu-tions. This determinant covers many individual con-siderations that can affect efficient use of resources.Of particular importance is institutionalized moni-toring of efficiency. Provision should be made eitherfor internal auditing (see also Determinant Three) orthis should be carried out externally. Internal audit-ing should be carried out along the lines of the rigor-ous internal reviews that are carried out in privateenterprises. For external auditing an organizationcould be established along the lines of the Office ofInspector General in the USA, which would inspectthe funding bodies concerned. Furthermore, thenature of the voting process (e.g., unanimity rule, ordouble weighted majority decision-making such as inthe GEF and the Multilateral Ozone Fund; Section E3.4.3) and the terms of reference for allocating fundsare also important.As regards the terms of reference,another important question is whether these are laiddown in the convention or are largely open to inter-pretation on the part of the funding bodies. Theextent to which the funds available to an institutionare dedicated to specific purposes should also bechecked, or whether the distribution of funding islargely at the discretion of the institution. Both typeshave advantages and disadvantages that have to beascertained on a case-by-case basis.

Determinant Five: Possibilities for influencing gov-ernance structures in the recipient country. It is a well-know fact in the field of development cooperationthat, due to poor governance structures in the recipi-ent country (e.g., corruption, or construction of pres-tige objects), a great deal of funding has made only ameagre contribution or none at all to achieving itsintended objectives (World Bank, 1998). Institutionssuch as the IMF and the World Bank have a good rat-ing with regard to this determinant, because they canexert an influence on the creation of a good institu-tional infrastructure. Recent studies have shown,however, that being able to influence governancestructures successfully depends on the institutionalsetting in each case (Seymour and Dubash, 2000). Forthis reason assessment should be made on a case-by-case basis. In many instances decentralizedapproaches with direct involvement of local agents


offer an alternative to the World Bank and the IMFin order to build appropriate governance structuresand, as an important prerequisite for institutionalreforms, strengthening the interest of the local popu-lation in (global) environmental protection (Keo-hane, 1996).

Attributes of global environmentalproblems as determinantsDeterminant Six: Whether a global environmentalproblem cuts across issues. By cutting across issueswe mean whether a global environmental problemimpinges only on a single, narrowly defined area ofthe environment or whether it affects several areas.The first applies for example to the problem ofstratospheric ozone depletion or protection of thesea from tanker accidents. The problems of globalwarming and biodiversity conservation on the otherhand affect several areas of the environment simul-taneously; in a special report (WBGU, 1998b), theCouncil has discussed in detail the problems associ-ated with crediting carbon sinks in climate policy andhow they relate to biodiversity conservation.

Determinant Seven: Numbers of people affected byprevention measures. For global environmental prob-lems, the groups of actors that are affected and thatbenefit are by definition global. However, a distinc-tion can be made between global environmentalproblems where prevention activities affect only asmall group of actors, and those where the circleaffected by prevention measures is very broadindeed. A soil protection policy, for example, has adecisive effect on land-use options and thus has a sig-nificant impact on the local population, while the cir-cle of people affected by protection measures relat-ing to the stratospheric ozone layer, in other words,CFC-producing companies, is considerably nar-rower. Here too, appropriate design of the institutionis a prerequisite for fulfilling tasks efficiently. Theprojects financed by the GEF for example are some-times criticized in this regard for failing to cooperateadequately with the institutions and stakeholdergroups on site, in other words with those affected bythe environmental policy measure (Horta, 1998).

Type of environmental protection measureDeterminant Eight: Type of environmental protectionmeasure. The eighth determinant, finally, is the typeof measure that is envisaged or required, as this playsan important role in determining which institution isbetter suited than others to carrying out the job inhand efficiently. There is a significant difference, forexample, whether it is a question of financing con-crete projects, developing a long-term environmentalprotection strategy (e.g., altering the energy mix of anational economy) or disseminating information.

E 3.4.4 Hypotheses and recommendations relating to thedeterminants

Due to the large number of determinants listed andall the possible combinations of influences resultingfrom this, it is not within the scope of this report toassess the individual determinants exhaustively.These represent a first attempt to make some conjec-tures regarding how efficiently funding institutionsspend funds and to draw up hypotheses that can betested empirically. It is only possible to give someexamples here of politically significant conclusionsthat can be drawn from such a broad concept.

An important reference point for assessing theefficiency of a funding institution is its internal orga-nization (Determinant Three).The existence of inter-nal review mechanisms and the budgeting processstrongly influence the efficiency of an institution’sactivities. In addition, transparency with regard to theuse of funds should also be mentioned here.A lack oftransparency regarding the use of funds by the secre-tariats of the individual conventions is a problem thatis increasingly a cause of displeasure on the part ofthe donor countries. The secretaries-general of theCBD and the UNCCD have been asked repeatedlyto provide the Parties with more detailed and preciseinformation on how funds are allocated, instead ofsubmitting an overall balance-sheet that consists ofonly a few pages or is difficult to understand. TheCouncil therefore believes that the reform efforts ofthe UN should include improving the financialreporting system of the secretariats. These reformscould be supported by the Office of Internal Over-sight Services (OIOS) set up in 1995, which assists theUN Secretary-General in carrying out internalinspections.

When considering the determinant relating to themultifunctionality of an institution (DeterminantTwo) one may initially assume that an institution thathas been assigned many tasks will display a low levelof efficiency.There are many different environmentalprotection measures to be financed. The knowledgerequired for this may be developed through relevantspecialist departments, but this can result in verylarge institutions. Such large institutions are oftenconsidered to be less efficient than smaller institu-tions due to their tendency to become bureaucratic(Determinant One). The opposite of such multifunc-tional institutions are convention-specific funds suchas the Multilateral Ozone Fund (Determinant Two).In the case of funds relating to a specific conventionone may assume that the focus on a precisely definedenvironmental problem permits a large body ofexpertise to be developed more rapidly and more


effectively (determinants Two and Six). The proxim-ity of such a convention-specific fund to the problemshould prove to be highly advantageous in terms ofachieving the greatest possible efficiency.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to give preferenceto convention-specific solutions on principle. On theone hand, all of the determinants must be taken intoaccount, while on the other, most importantly, refer-ence must be made to the environmental problem inquestion.This will be illustrated in a few points, usingthe example of the GEF:1. The work of the GEF as a multifunctional institu-

tion is certainly to be judged efficient overall. Acrucial reason for this is its linkage to the WorldBank, which has at its disposal a well-honed eval-uation and monitoring system (determinantsThree and Four). The professionalism that thisgives it is in turn an important precondition for thedonor countries to provide funds, as their influ-ence means that they have a say regarding thespending of funds, at least to a certain extent(Sharma, 1996).

2. In addition, the GEF also provides the right set-ting for developing strategies for global environ-mental problems which require internationalcooperation (Determinant Eight), such as climatechange. This is also true of biodiversity conserva-tion. Many measures in biodiversity policy must,however, be developed and implemented on sitein cooperation with the sections of the populationaffected. Accordingly, smaller, locally operatinginstitutions, including NGOs, should be givengreater involvement in planning – and in financ-ing, which is the focus of our attention here.

3. The GEF is responsible especially for climate pro-tection and biodiversity. These global environ-mental problems cover a wide cross-section offields and the circle of those affected by preven-tive action is very broad (determinants Six andSeven). It is therefore necessary to have a generaloverview of the linkages among the underlyingenvironmental problems. This points in favour ofgiving the GEF responsibility for funding mattersrelating to both conventions.

Despite its very positive assessment, the GEF shouldnot be the only institution for distributing funds.Some studies for example (Keohane, 1996) show thatso far neither the GEF, nor indeed the MultilateralOzone Fund, have entirely managed to arouse inter-est in (global) environmental protection at local level(Determinant Five).

Experience in development policy in this regardshows that innovative forms of service provision,such as participation by the local population anddecentralization of decision-making, can greatlyincrease the efficiency of development assistance

payments (OECD/DAC, 1997; Umana, 1997; WorldBank, 1998). Such approaches should be adoptedmore frequently in financing global environmentalpolicy. National trust funds for environment anddevelopment, among others, could serve this pur-pose. In the next chapter these funds are presentedbriefly and we examine – also using the system ofdeterminants presented above – to what extent thesefunds might be suitable to take on the role of a sec-ond important pillar in the financing of (global) envi-ronmental protection alongside the GEF.

E 3.4.5Efficiency analysis of non-commercial nationaltrust funds for environment and development

National trust funds for environment and develop-ment emerged from the debt-for-nature swaps thattook place in the early 1990s (Resor and Spergel,1992; Sand, 1994; Rubin et al., 1994; Danish, 1995a,1996; CSD, 1996; Meyer, 1997). These trust funds areadministered in the developing country concernedand take on the function of an on-site source of fund-ing. They provide funding for organizations or indi-viduals planning to carry out environmental or devel-opment projects. One of their special characteristicsis the integration of the structures of civil society inthe developing countries in question into the deci-sion-making mechanisms of the fund.

To date this innovative financial tool is being usedin more than 30 countries. Just under US$1,000 mil-lion have flowed into these funds. Trust funds forenvironment and development came about not leastbecause the experience gathered in developmentcooperation over the past five decades suggested thatit was not necessarily a good idea to continue usingthe tools hitherto used. If financial resources can beusurped and diverted to other purposes (e.g., to buyarms) by the political power elites in the countries ofthe South where democracy has not yet been ade-quately consolidated or where dictatorial regimesare still in power, then new, additional funds wouldnot only fail to solve the fundamental problems, butindeed exacerbate them further.

As the first fixed-interest securities issued in theframework of debt-for-nature swaps with nationalgovernments were approaching their final maturitydate in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the questionarose as to what would be the most sensible thing todo with the nominal capital of these securities.Instead of going to a single NGO, which could easilyfind itself overwhelmed by the sudden windfall, thesolution that presented itself was to create a newnational institution or foundation that would managethe funds independently of the government and


involve the broadest possible range of stakeholdersfrom civil society. It would also allow the donors to beinvolved in the process of decision-making regardingallocation of the funds. As far as international envi-ronmental NGOs were concerned the most impor-tant thing was the goal of achieving independent,long-term, secure funding for nature conservationmeasures in order to minimize the problems of meet-ing on-going costs that had been experienced in pastprojects. Precisely in the field of projects relating tobiodiversity conservation, the constant need forfunds often exceeds the limited duration of projectcycles in traditional development cooperation.

In addition, these trust funds contributed tostrengthening the structures of civil society in therecipient country if the rights of disposition over thenew financial resources were designed appropriately(Determinant Five). The trust funds in many casesproved to be much less susceptible to corruption andthus spent the funds more efficiently and in a moretargeted way than the state bodies in the recipientcountries in traditional project work. In order toguarantee that the national environmental trustfunds were representative, the environmental NGOsadvocated that if possible all representative local andnational environmental NGOs, national govern-ments and representatives of the donor countries’governments and international NGOs should have aseat and a vote in the trust’s decision-making bodies.

Meanwhile the World Bank, UNDP and the gov-ernments of the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Norwayand The Netherlands all lend their support to the set-ting up of national trust funds for environment anddevelopment by providing technical assistance or on-going funds from the public budget (Wahl, 1997).

Depending on the chosen legal form of the funds,which go by the name of ‘Trust Funds’ under Anglo-Saxon law or ‘Stiftungen’ (foundations) under Ger-man law, the money from donors or from nationalenvironmental taxes and levies goes into a centralinvestment fund, where it can either remain tied inthe long term, with projects being financed out of thecurrent income (revolving fund), or it can be investedimmediately or over a period of time for particularmeasures relating to environmental protection(depleting fund). Trust funds for conserving speciesdiversity are generally managed as revolving fundswhere the endowments are invested on the interna-tional capital market by professional managers inaccordance with criteria prescribed in advance. Theobjective is to make current income available forproject work that is planned on a long-term basis.Thehigh opportunity costs associated with a revolvingfund might cause some surprise at first sight. Sincethere are numerous examples of absorption capacityfor new project funding being too low in other areas

too, however, this legal structure for the funds cer-tainly carries conviction. Wherever more damagethan progress in terms of consolidation and develop-ment is caused by a heavy influx of funds, a revolvingfund is probably the most appropriate solution. Thisflexibility, which is geared to the on-site conditions, iswithout doubt one of the strongest points of this tool.

Existing national trust funds for environment anddevelopment are not uniform in design. A vast rangeof legal forms, ways of raising and allocating funds,decision-making structures, ways of assigning tasksand ways of working can be identified. At the sametime, however, there are three key points that they allhave in common (Danish, 1996). First, funds arepooled together from a large number of national andinternational sources of finance, both public and pri-vate. Second, in their decision-making bodies as arule a broad swathe of stakeholders from civil societyin the recipient country are represented and third,they have the distinguishing feature of also beingable to allocate very small-scale grants to many localrecipients.

There have so far been no comprehensive com-parative studies of the work of national trust fundsfor environment and development to date. It isnonetheless possible to evaluate the potential ofthese funds. They often display a higher level of eco-nomic efficiency because they cut down on transac-tion costs and avoid the opportunistic structures thatare often to be found where environment-relatedNorth-South transfers are concerned (Meyer, 1997).In addition, trust funds for environment can be tai-lored to suit the environmental problem concerned,thereby enhancing their effectiveness in terms ofenvironmental policy (determinants Six and Seven).Such funds allow forms of ‘good governance’ to belearned and can strengthen the structures of civilsociety (Determinant Five; Jakobeit, 2000). As aresult of the capacity building that goes hand in handwith this, the efficiency with which funds are spent islikely be enhanced in the long term.

Funds and NGOs are not miracle cures, however.They too must be assessed in the light of the deter-minants presented above. For example the trans-parency of an environmental trust fund’s decision-making structures and its integration into an externalmonitoring system must be examined (determinantsThree and Four; Meyer, 1997). It should not be over-looked that, as non-profit organizations, such trustfunds are not subject to either of the two major con-trol mechanisms of the ‘market’ (with bankruptcy asa sanction) or the ‘state’ (with being voted out ofoffice as a sanction), and that they therefore needparticularly good internal and external control mech-anisms, not least in order to remain innovative (Zim-mermann, 1999).

167Conclusion E 3.5

Studies have shown, moreover, that dependencyon a single source of finance can reduce the efficiencyof a fund considerably (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).One must also examine to what extent participationrights for local NGOs affect traditional bilateraldevelopment cooperation, which is based on cooper-ation between governments. Greater flexibility, lessbureaucratization, fostering smaller projects at locallevel and participation of civil society stakeholdersare nevertheless significant advantages that environ-ment trust funds offer. A further positive point thatshould be emphasized is that the fund’s capital can bemade up of money from a wide variety of sources. Forexample, the fund’s capital can comprise internation-ally agreed contributions from member countries, asin the case of the GEF, direct bilateral developmentcooperation, debt-for-nature swaps, private endow-ments (Section E 3.3) or the revenue from specificenvironmental property rights (WBGU, 2001).

Because of the advantages outlined here, theCouncil recommends assessing the efficiency andeffectiveness of national trust funds for environmentand development on the basis of the system of deter-minants presented above. In the event of the assess-ment being positive, one option that presents itselfwould be to allocate at least part of the money thatwould be freed up as a result of a comprehensive ini-tiative to release the poorest developing countriesfrom their debt, as was discussed at the world eco-nomic summit in Cologne in June 1999, to selectedtrust funds for environment and development. In thecase of a partial waiver of debt repayments, for exam-ple, this could take the form of paying the remainingdebt commitment into such a fund. This would havethe advantage that on the one hand debt repaymentcould take place in the currency of the country con-cerned and, on the other, that the impact that can beachieved in terms of environmental policy is greaterthan in the case of an unconditional remission ofdebt.

E 3.5Conclusion

The creation of an efficient and effective system forfinancing global environment and development pol-icy is one of the most vital and at the same time oneof the most difficult tasks in reforming the interna-tional institutional framework. In this chapter theCouncil presented and discussed a large number ofproposals for institutional reform on the revenueside and the expenditure side. If one looks in isola-tion at the recommendations of the Council forfinancing global environmental policy, many of theproposals appear utopian at first sight. It is therefore

imperative that the recommendations should beviewed in the context of a comprehensive reform ofthe institutional framework of global environmentalpolicy. The institutional and organizational short-comings of the existing structures raise doubts forexample as to whether, even if funding wereincreased to one per cent of GNP, the desiredincrease in the effectiveness of global environmentalpolicy could be achieved. It could certainly beachieved if the institutional structures were opti-mized. In Chapter F the Council develops a compre-hensive vision for reorganizing the institutional andorganizational structure of global environmental pol-icy in the form of an Earth Alliance. Incorporatedinto the presentation of the Council’s vision concern-ing structures, the crucial recommendations foraction with regard to financing are reiterated in Sec-tion F 4.3.

Earth Alliance: Approaches and a visionfor restructuring

F

F 1Contributing to the World Summit on Sustainable Develepment

Shortly before the World Summit on SustainableDevelepment the Council submits its proposals forrestructuring the institutional architecture of globalenvironmental policy. These proposals concentrateon concrete action. The analysis of the most urgentglobal environmental problems has shown that,despite the great number of some 900 bi- or multilat-eral environmental agreements, a considerable needfor action remains (Chapter B). At the heart of therecommendations is the structural vision of theCouncil for global environmental policy, taking theshape of an Earth Alliance.This does not appear fea-sible over the short term; nonetheless, it is recom-mended to use this structural vision over the longterm as a guiding model for the reform of global envi-ronmental policy. First steps towards this visionshould be taken and subjected to continuous reviewof their efficiency and effectiveness.

The Council’s vision of an Earth Alliance toreform the architecture of international environmen-tal institutions and organizations (Fig. F 1-1) buildson existing structures and develops them further asneeded. The Earth Alliance comprises three cross-cutting areas interlinked in terms of information,communication, coordination and finances. First, toenhance the assessment of environmental problems,the Council proposes the establishment of an inde-pendent entity with the task of issuing (early) warn-ings of development trajectories that harbour partic-ularly high risks.This entity should be kept small (10-15 members plus secretariat), should have a right ofproposal vis-à-vis the scientific advisory bodies of theConferences of the Parties – some of which are yet tobe established – and should be entitled to address thepublic as needed (Earth Assessment). This recom-mendation is explained in detail in Section E 1.

Second, the Council recommends changes in theorganizational hub of international environmentalpolicy (Earth Organization).This centres on the step-wise establishment of an International Environmen-tal Organization – a prime issue of debate in the run-up to WSSD. This would involve the coordinationand cooperation function of a strengthened UNEP,with closer networking among the secretariats of the

international environmental conventions and their(in some instances yet to be established) scientificadvisory bodies.The possible structure of this organi-zation is discussed in detail in Section E 2.

In addition to legal certainty and good gover-nance, sufficient financial resources are necessary tocounter growing global challenges successfully. How-ever, the reluctance of the industrialized countries toprovide adequate funding – which has becomeincreasingly entrenched over the years – poses anobstacle to the raising of sufficient funds to protectglobal environmental resources. For instance, overthe period from 1990 to 1998, the official develop-ment assistance transfers of Germany have droppedfrom 0.42 to 0.26 per cent of gross national product.This trend needs to be reversed. In addition, theCouncil recommends that innovative avenues forfunding global environmental policy be pursuedincreasingly. The third and last part of this chaptertherefore makes recommendations for funding thepolicies previously outlined. Such new prospects forEarth Funding are discussed in depth in Section E 3.

172 F Earth Alliance: Approaches and a vision for restructuring

EARTH ALLIANCE

EARTH FUNDINGEARTH ORGANIZATION

Project implementationthrough UN agencies

International

ex-UNEP

EARTH ASSESSMENT

Earth Commission E

nvironmental Organizatio

n

Informationneed

Informationneed

Monitoring,Early warning,

Information

Financing,Debt relief

Financing,Debtrelief

Usercharges


RAP(risks)

IPS(soils)

IPBD(biodiversity)

Scientificpanels

Scientificpanel

Scientific advice

Scientificadvice CSD

Agreements

Agreements

Furtheragreements

Trustee-ship

UNFCCC

UNCCD

CBD

World Bank

GEF

UNDP

Trusts

Sponsors

Donors

High seas

Air space

Outer space

Trusteeship for the global commons

Publicfunds

Public funds

Private funds

Private funds

Project implementation through UN agencies

UNEP


CSD

UNFCCC

UNCCD

CBD

World Bank

GEF

UNDP

Trusts

Sponsors

Donors

Deep-sea floor(UNCLOS)

Informationneed

Scientificadvice

a

b

Environment anddevelopment fund

Figure F 1-1 Reform of the United Nations in the field of environment: (a) today’s status and (b) vision of a reform.Source: WBGU

F 2Earth Assessment: Ethical authority and scientific competence to

assess environmental issues

F 2.1Establishing an Earth Commission

As a part of its vision for recasting the structures ofglobal environment and development policy, theCouncil considers it essential to establish an inde-pendent body endowed with universally acceptedethical and intellectual authority, and charged withidentifying and assessing the risks of global change.The Council recommends to the German govern-ment that it examines the options for establishing an‘Earth Commission’ and that it submits a corre-sponding proposal to the United Nations. This com-mission would provide the long-term perspectiveneeded to protect environmental resources and safe-guard the rights and interests of future generations,and would provide impulses for research activitiesand political action. A particular function of theEarth Commission could be to place on the interna-tional agenda, in a manner that catches the world’sattention, issues which would otherwise be neglecteddespite their vital importance.

The members of the Earth Commission,appointed by the UN General Assembly, shouldnumber 10 to 15, and be leading figures of highestmoral authority who can command the attention of aglobal audience, as the Brandt and Brundtland Com-missions did. Such a commission might be viewed asa globalized form of the German Council for Sus-tainable Development (Rat für Nachhaltige Entwick-lung). Where the need arises, the Earth Commissioncould be supported by inputs provided by scientificpanels (Section E 1.3). The Earth Commission couldreceive a right to propose scientific issues to betreated by the panels. These environmental analyseswould then be processed by the Earth Commissionand evaluated in terms of whether a ‘warning’ needsto be issued to the global public and the UnitedNations about impending and potentially irreversibleenvironmental changes.

For the early warning function to have sufficientweight and political mandate, the Earth Commissionshould have the right to be heard by the UN General

Assembly or to launch initiatives to address prob-lems or misguided developments relating to globalchange. It should deliver regular reports to the UNSecretary-General providing assessments of theglobal environmental situation.

F 2.2Strengthening scientific policy advice

In conjunction with the scientific panels, the EarthCommission would have four focal tasks:• Synopsis: It should reap maximum benefit from

the existing monitoring systems in order to char-acterize the state of the Earth System. Further-more, additional monitoring activities should beestablished where needed.

• Early recognition and early warning: Based uponscientific data and findings, the Earth Commissionshould warn the public and particularly the UnitedNations of impending and potentially irreversibleglobal environmental damage.

• Identification of guard rails: The Commissionshould identify ‘guard rails’ for international envi-ronmental policy in order to demarcate stillacceptable transitional areas from unacceptablestates.

• Reporting: The Commission should submit to theUN Secretary-General an annual report evaluat-ing, on the basis of the latest scientific information,the main environmental problems and develop-ments.

With regard to the UNCED and future WSSD fol-low-up process, there is a need for action in the fol-lowing spheres:• There is a lack of coordinated contributions by the

scientific community to the problems of globalchange. In some environmental spheres (e.g. bio-diversity and soils), knowledge on states, degrada-tion dynamics and potential consequences is stillvery patchy or entirely absent (Chapter B).

• There is a need for a body engaging in cross-cut-ting analysis of the key themes of global changeand identifying ‘safety margins’ or ‘guard rails’ in


order to inform the international community, in astimely a manner as possible, about hazardousdevelopments in the environmental realm. Guardrails indicating the limits of absolute non-sustain-ability would provide a scientifically underpinnedbasis upon which to determine abatement or con-servation goals within the various environmentalregimes.

• To transpose scientific findings into politically rel-evant options for action, there is frequently a lackof integration among the approaches and perspec-tives of the various disciplines.

• To inform the wider public, a need remains for astructure that channels and renders accessible theavailable ‘risk knowledge’.

The present structure, in which only the ClimateChange Convention has an independent scientificadvisory body at its command, does not suffice tocope with the tasks outlined above. Building uponthe IPCC experience, the Council recommends theestablishment of comparable scientific bodies orpanels to provide advice and support, for instance tointernational soil and biodiversity policy. In an Inter-governmental Panel on Biological Diversity (IPBD)(WBGU, 2001) or an Intergovernmental Panel onLand and Soils (IPLS), eminent scientists could bebrought together who could work on an ongoing andindependent basis and provide scientific policyadvice. Furthermore, a Risk Assessment Panel couldform a network node, systematically collating thevarious national-level risk characterization and eval-uation efforts and identifying global risks. This panelshould be concerned not so much with analysingenvironmental problems that have already beenidentified, but rather with identifying, early on, newtypes of global change risk whose first outlines areonly just emerging (WBGU, 2000a). The contribu-tions provided by these panels would provide theParties and all stakeholders with scientific policyadvice on current issues and problems in the politicalprocess. The scientific findings of these panels wouldalso be utilized by the Earth Commission proposedby the Council.

At the European Union (EU) level, too, there is alack of coordinated scientific policy advice. It wouldtherefore be useful to give the existing national-levelenvironmental and sustainability councils the oppor-tunity to provide consultative support, by means ofjoint reports, to EU environment and developmentpolicy. In the view of the Council, the run-up toWSSD would lend itself particularly to such anapproach. In the negotiations within the UNCEDfollow-up process, the European Union has beenspeaking with one voice for long now. The time istherefore ripe to establish a structure permitting EU-wide cooperation among national-level scientific pol-

icy advice bodies or to set up a scientific council atEU level in which members of national-level advi-sory bodies are represented.

F 2.3The CSD as the forum for debate

Within the Earth Assessment structure, the Commis-sion on Sustainable Development (CSD) wouldassume an important function in promoting inter-linkage and dialogue in the deliberative processamong the Earth Commission and governments, UNagencies, the scientific community and non-govern-mental organizations. In the view of the Council, sucha repositioning could provide one of the future fieldsof work of the CSD. The Earth Commission couldhave a right to propose the issues to be addressed bythe CSD, thus raising the profile of topics which areparticularly precarious from a scientific perspectivebut have not yet gained sufficient political attention.Moreover, the CSD could be the forum in which thereports of the Earth Commission are debated. TheCSD is particularly suited to this role, as it is the spe-cific intergovernmental forum within the UnitedNations system in which cross-cutting sustainabilityissues are addressed. The CSD is the central forumfor issues relating to environment and development.Besides this integrative role, the CSD has an impor-tant supportive function within international envi-ronment and development policy, as it initiates theconsensus-building and standard-developing delib-erative process within the international communityof states that is crucial to the political decision-mak-ing process. This exceedingly important functionneeds to be retained in the future, and integratedwithin the system for global change risk assessmentproposed by the Council.

F 3Earth Organization: Integrating global environmental policy

F 3.1Towards an International EnvironmentalOrganization

F 3.1.1Introduction

As a result of the frequently stated lack of coordina-tion and efficacy in global environmental policy, callsfor comprehensive reconfiguration of the interna-tional institutional and organizational structure havebecome increasingly strident in recent years. Thisdebate received a new impetus from the proposal ofthe heads of government of Brazil, Germany, Singa-pore and South Africa in 1997 to establish an inter-national environmental organization to be devel-oped as a UN entity from UNEP. In 2000, France’sPrime Minister Lionel Jospin and Environment Min-ister Dominique Voynet also spoke out in favour ofsuch a proposal. The 1st international forum of envi-ronment ministers in Malmö reiterated the need fororganizational reform.

The issue will therefore doubtlessly play a key roleat the WSSD in 2002 (Section E 2). A look at staffmembers underscores the urgency not only ofreform, but also of strengthening UNEP: UNEP hasonly 530 employees to carry out its global mandate.The German Federal Environmental Agency(Umweltbundesamt, UBA) has almost twice as many(1999: 1,032) and the US Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) even 35 times more (1999: 18,807). Inthe view of the Council, the need for action is plain.

However, it is essential to take a number of pointsinto consideration when embarking upon a restruc-turing of global environmental institutions:• The concerns of the developing world must be

taken into account. Past debates have shown thatthese countries in particular have reservationsagainst the establishment of an InternationalEnvironmental Organization. It needs to beensured that all initiatives in this area are sup-ported multilaterally, in a concerted effort of

industrialized and developing countries. TheCouncil therefore urges the German governmentto engage in targeted efforts to form coalitionswith key developing countries in order to ensureacceptance of a political initiative right from thestart.

• In order to enhance the acceptance of reform pro-posals in the developing world, decision-makingprocedures need to be considered that give Northand South equal representation. This could bemodelled on the systems of developed-developingworld parity in decision-making established by theMontreal Protocol, the Ozone Fund or the GEF(Chapter C). It could thus be ensured that strate-gic and programming decisions do justice to allinterests as far as possible.

• The reform should not lead to the establishmentof a new authority with a mandate to implementprojects on its own. Operational work in the fieldshould continue to be carried out by UNDP (Sec-tion D 3.3), the World Bank (Section D 2), FAO,UNIDO and similar actors.

• Organizational restructuring should not createany further financing organization in addition toUNDP, the World Bank or the GEF.

These are fundamental aspects that need to be con-sidered in the debate on reforming the internationalsystem of organizations in global environmental pol-icy in the run-up to WSSD. For this, the 1997 initiativeof the German government and the 1999 declarationby the environmental policy spokesperson of theSocial Democratic Party group in the German par-liament provide a good basis.

F 3.1.2Three steps for reform

Building upon the previous analysis, the Council rec-ommends three steps for organizational reform ofthe UN system (Section E 2). Each step needs to beexamined separately. This model is not intended as anecessary sequence of steps that must strive inex-orably towards the final outcome. It is rather to be


expected that the transition from one step to the nextalready yields considerable improvements in globalenvironmental policy. Only if this is not found to bethe case should the transition to the next higher stepbe considered.

Step 1: Improving cooperationThe first step involves improved cooperation amongthe various organizations and programmes, whichwould continue to cooperate as equal partners. Inthis process, the several functions of the CSD, theGEF, the various convention secretariats and Con-ferences of the Parties and the environmental policydepartments and programmes of the individual spe-cialized agencies would not be touched. If appropri-ate, improved cooperation could be brought about byupgrading UNEP to the status of an internationalorganization within the UN system. At this stage,such upgrading would imply, besides the associatedfinancial and human resource strengthening, aboveall an upgrading of environmental issues in generalwithin the ‘family’ of UN specialized agencies. Suchupgrading of UNEP to an International Environ-mental Organization could be modelled on theWorld Health Organization – that is, on a UN spe-cialized agency with its own budget and membership– or on the UN Conference on Trade and Develop-ment (UNCTAD), an internal UN entity set up bythe UN General Assembly to promote cooperationin international trade policy.

A UN specialized agency for environmental issuescould be empowered to adopt certain standards bymajority decision which would then be binding uponall members. The general assembly of such an Inter-national Environmental Organization could further-more negotiate and adopt treaties which would thenbe opened for signature within its headquarters. Thiswould go far beyond the present powers of theUNEP Governing Council.

Step 2: Setting up an umbrella organizationwith independent committeesIf improved cooperation among international orga-nizations and programmes, as set out above, shouldnot suffice to remedy the deficits identified, strength-ening environmental protection through improvedcoordination of actors would need to be aimed at.Such coordination would necessitate a limited intro-duction of hierarchies within the organizationalarchitecture. Should such a step become necessaryover the medium term, the model of the World TradeOrganization (WTO) suggests itself. Here the secre-tariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) was upgraded to an independent interna-tional organization; at the same time, numerous mul-tilateral and plurilateral trade agreements were

brought under the umbrella of the framework treatyestablishing the WTO. As a result, all trade agree-ments have the same secretariat, namely the WTO,which prevents inefficient fragmentation amongnumerous administrative units. Furthermore, alltrade agreements are subject to the same dispute set-tlement mechanism. Nonetheless, a certain degree ofdecentralism in the decision-making system isretained because the specific decisions for the keytrade agreements are taken at special conferencesattached as ‘committees’ to the WTO MinisterialConference. In analogy, it might be possible over themedium term to integrate the various Conferences ofthe Parties in the environmental arena under theumbrella of a common framework treaty establishingan International Environmental Organization andthen to let them continue to operate, as in the WTOsystem, as special committees of the ministerial con-ference with a high degree of autonomy. The estab-lishment of such an organization will surely only beaccepted by developing and industrialized countriesalike if both sides have effective rights to determinethe further development of the organization. Hereadoption of the decision-making procedure of theMontreal Protocol, with its equal North-South repre-sentation, would be expedient.

Step 3: Centralization and subordination toa single organization?It is too early to judge whether steps 1 or 2 will suf-fice to respond adequately to the mounting globalenvironment and development crisis. Nonetheless,with a view to longer-term developments, the Coun-cil wishes to provide indications for further institu-tionalization steps as a response to any failure ofsteps 1 and 2. The proposals made in the debate allseek to centralize and hierarchize international envi-ronmental policy more strongly. Decision-makingprocesses are to be accelerated by overcoming theprinciple of consensus or setting up smaller decision-making bodies with representative membership, suchas an ‘Environmental Security Council’, by whichminorities would lose their power of blockade. Build-ing on such hierarchization, compliance with interna-tional environmental standards could be ensured bymeans of coercive measures, but possibly alsothrough intensified financial and technical assistance.

Over the medium term, forms of hierarchizationthat restrict sovereignty will doubtlessly encounterconsiderable resistance, in North and South alike.This applies, for instance, to proposals for the estab-lishment of an Environmental Security Council or anInternational Environmental Court with bindingadjudication. Moreover, the first of these two pro-posals would need an amendment to the UN Char-ter, which requires ratification by two-thirds of UN

177Specific actions relating to sectoral environmental regimes F 3.2

members and by China, France, Russia, the UnitedKingdom and the United States. Far-reaching restric-tions of national sovereignty appear out of the ques-tion at present with such a quorum.

Beyond these steps, the Council recommends forthe restructuring of the Earth Organization the long-term creation of trusteeship authorities for the globalcommons – atmosphere, oceans, geostationary orbitand Antarctic (Section E 3) – and strengtheningexisting project-implementing organizations such asUNDP (Section D 3.3).

F 3.1.3Concrete implementation of structural reform

Overall, the Council takes the view that it would be apromising path to upgrade UNEP to an InternationalEnvironmental Organization in such a way that thisdoes not restrict national sovereignty. This wouldprovide an additional element of a horizontally orga-nized global governance structure. It appears essen-tial to have an organizational locus for a decentral-ized international sustainability strategy, in a formthat does justice to the interests of most states. Just asthe environmental protection policy arena wasstrengthened institutionally in the nation-states inthe 1970s and 1980s through the establishment ofindependent environment ministries, so now shouldthe global environmental policy arena be strength-ened by an entity within the UN or, alternatively, anindependent specialized agency. This is important tominimize the tendencies of individual programmesand organizations to pursue their own agendas, andin order to limit duplication, overlap and inconsis-tency. The main functions of the new organizationwould be to bring international environmental poli-cies back together, to build capacity in developingcountries through the transfer of knowledge andtechnology, to contribute to improved implementa-tion of international agreements and to create a set-ting for negotiating new institutions that is more con-ducive to cooperation. The latter function is particu-larly important given the current loss of confidenceamong developing countries in the willingness ofindustrialized countries to take action.

It is scarcely possible to assess at present whetherfurther steps will become necessary over the mediumterm. If improved cooperation among internationalorganizations and programmes – including the estab-lishment of a new UN specialized agency for envi-ronmental issues modelled on the WHO or UNC-TAD – does not suffice to remedy the deficits identi-fied, a strengthened representation of environmentalconcerns modelled on the World Trade Organization(WTO) could be considered.This would involve inte-

grating the specific environmental agreements andtheir Conferences of the Parties within a commonFramework Convention Establishing an Interna-tional Environmental Organization. Within such astructure, the environmental conventions and theirConferences of the Parties would then continue tooperate as in the WTO system as separate commit-tees of the ministerial conference with a considerabledegree of autonomy.

The Council urges adherence to the principle ofsubsidiarity; initially only the first step should betaken, before, proceeding from a painstaking analysisof effectiveness, further steps are considered. It isonly through such an approach that the confidence ofthe developing world can be gained with regard toreforming the UN system in the environmentalsphere. The debate on the establishment of an Inter-national Environmental Organization should notobscure the fact that the global environmental crisisis more than a problem of environmental protection– it is a global environment and development crisisthat calls for efforts and new global policyapproaches in the sphere of ‘traditional’ develop-ment cooperation too (Chapter D). Revocation ofthe German government’s drastic cuts in officialdevelopment assistance funding would be a key con-tribution to promoting effective and globally accept-able environmental policies.

F 3.2Specific actions relating to sectoral environmentalregimes

The analysis of institutional responses to the mostpressing global environmental problems has shownthat the individual sectoral regimes also present aconsiderable need for action by the community ofstates (Chapter C). To meet this need, the Councilhas identified a number of principles for good regimedesign that can also be transferred to other regimesand new arenas of conflict (Chapter C).

Using protocols to advance the purposes offramework agreementsToday, the strategy that for the most part prevails isto initially only draw up general framework agree-ments and to leave the concrete terms to furtherrounds of negotiation, whose results then take theform of protocols that supplement the convention,making it more precise and more strict (Section C 3).The Council rates this approach as positive, becausein this way it is possible to draw into the negotiationprocess a large part of the community of states, eventhose that tend to hold back. In view of the steadyintensification of global environmental problems,


however, it must be urgently pointed out that a verylengthy period of time will elapse between enteringinto a convention and actually overcoming the prob-lem on the local level. The protocol negotiations fol-lowing adoption of a framework agreement musttherefore proceed swiftly.

Making voting procedures more flexiblewhere neededVoting procedures are a crucial determinant in theflexible evolution of regimes. Urgently necessaryagreements are repeatedly delayed because amend-ments or supplements to protocols or annexes needto be approved explicitly by all participating states.However, the examples of the ozone and MARPOLregimes also show that it is indeed possible to put inplace more flexible voting procedures (Section C 3).The Council therefore urges that an effort be made inthe direction of softening the consensus principle ininternational negotiations, especially where it is amatter of conserving irretrievable environmentalassets or warding off imminent hazards. A particu-larly useful procedure in this context is that of ‘tacitacceptance’ (Section C 3). In modifying protocols orannexes that do not involve negotiating completelynew fields, North-South parity decisions based onqualified majority votes should be promoted as ageneral principle, since, owing to the small loss ofnational sovereignty that this entails, this is the formthat is most likely to gain consensus.

Furthermore, in decisions that impact the humanheritage as a whole, a modification of the formal ‘onestate, one vote’ principle should be reconsidered infavour of a ‘one person, one vote’ distribution.Schemes in which population size is considered in theallocation of voting rights already exist for instancein European Community law and in the parliamen-tary assemblies of international organizations, albeitonly assemblies that have no decision-making pow-ers. Consideration of population size as a further ele-ment in the voting systems of international organiza-tions or conferences – in addition to the conventional‘one state, one vote’ principle and financial weightingof vote allocation (such as in the Bretton Woods insti-tutions: ‘one dollar, one vote’) – would take intoaccount the increasing integration of the individualsubject within the body of international law, and theincreasing circumscription of the bounds of state sov-ereignty.

Strengthening information procurementrights and linking these to reportingproceduresIn addition to introducing more flexible voting pro-cedures, the institutional design of international com-pliance monitoring is a major criterion for a regime’s

success and should therefore be organized rigorously.Experience shows that the obligation of memberstates to report on the fulfilment of their commit-ments is an indispensable tool for monitoring inter-national compliance (Section C 4).The Council urgesthat the numerous and voluminous reports are col-lated from factual and legal perspectives, assessed indetail and summarized by the secretariats, in order tomaximize their usefulness at sessions of the Confer-ences of the Parties. Where the need arises, furtherrights to procure information should be created, suchas the queries and ad-hoc on-site inspections byinternational bodies provided for in the ozone andCITES regimes.

Options for responding flexibly toimplementational difficultiesThe findings of case studies show that cooperativesolutions in the event of implementational difficul-ties can be highly effective in specific environmentalregimes, since the spirit of partnership that thisengenders strengthens both international relationsand transparency (Section C 4). Guaranteed instru-ments to assist compliance that are not attached toany kind of conditions can, however, blunt the moti-vation of parties to meet obligations out of their ownmeans. Moreover, in some cases concerted sanctionshave helped to swiftly eliminate implementationshortcomings (for instance in the CITES regime;WBGU, 2001). For these reasons, the Council rejectsany dogged adherence to either confrontational ornon-confrontational approaches. It recommends,instead, providing for flexible options for respondingto implementational difficulties and non-compliancein order to allow for decisions appropriate to eachspecific case.

Involving non-governmental organizationsas partners in environmental protectionNon-governmental organizations (NGOs) providevaluable links on all levels – from local to interna-tional – and ensure that social concerns are takeninto consideration. The participation of environmen-tal associations has proven particularly effective forgathering information and implementing agreements(Section C 4). The Council therefore supportsapproaches that integrate NGOs into the decision-making and implementational processes of environ-mental regimes by granting them consultation andparticipation rights. Participation rights of civil soci-ety actors, such as are in place under the Desertifica-tion Convention, can initiate learning processes fordemocratic actions that have an important functionin promoting ‘good governance’ (Section C 4.3).When negotiating future environmental regimes,such participatory elements that generate societal

179Specific actions relating to sectoral environmental regimes F 3.2

leverage should be integrated and existing regimesamended accordingly. However, due to their lack ofdemocratic legitimation, direct co-determinationrights and decision-making competencies for NGOsneed to be examined critically. In most cases, theirparticipation needs to be restricted to consultativeand implementational functions.

Non-state cooperation: Ensuring thatenvironmental certification systems are fairWorldwide product certification is another activitythat is well suited to international non-state coopera-tion for environmental protection. Whether or notinternational cooperation among enterprises or cer-tification initiatives can make a contribution to thelong-term, sustainable use of global resources cannotbe determined at present. Be this as it may, the Coun-cil definitely perceives in these an incentive systemthat – as a supplement to international governmentalcooperation – must not be neglected. One possibilityfor regulating environmental certification or labell-ing would be accreditation by the Earth Commission(Section E 1), which could develop appropriate crite-ria.

Earth Funding: Financing global environmental policyF 4

To reform the international institutional architec-ture, funding global environmental policy is one ofthe most difficult tasks, both because of the volumeof the funds required and in view of the associatedglobal distributional conflicts between net providersand net recipients of funds. It is also one of the mostnecessary tasks.The potential for conflict is apparentin the present situation, in which OECD countriesare steadily reducing their share of gross nationalproduct (GNP) allocated to development coopera-tion transfers, while financial requirements rise andthese countries persistently criticize the inefficientand ineffective structures by which interntional orga-nizations spend the funds. The present report hasillustrated repeatedly that, in view of the intercon-nections among economic and social developmentand changes in the global environment, the financialrequirements of global environment and develop-ment policy go well beyond the internationallyagreed target, confirmed in the UNCED follow-upprocess, of a GNP share for development coopera-tion of 0.7 per cent. The Council therefore reaffirmsits recommendation that efforts be made to increasethis share over the long term to 1 per cent of GNP.

However, the Council warns against viewing thisrecommendation in isolation from the question ofthe sources and spending of funds. Recent debates onthe reform of international organizations haveshown that responses to such demands for moremoney are increasingly sceptical. Economic analysesof political and bureaucratic procedures have shownthat international institutions can be characterizedby inefficiency, a tendency towards continuousexpansion of budgets and substantial institutionalinertia despite the loss of original tasks. For the fund-ing of global environment and development policy,this means that– donor countries have little incentive to increase

their disbursements for global environment anddevelopment projects, and

– even if available funding were increased, it is ques-tionable whether the additional funds wouldreally trigger the desired impulses benefitingglobal environment and development policy.

The structural vision for financing global environ-mental policy set out in the following comprises threeapproaches for reform which – in addition to poten-tially increasing available funds – would above alllead to a more efficient spending of these funds (Sec-tion E 3). These three approaches are: To reorganizeboth internal and external controlling structures inmultilateral institutions, to levy charges for the use ofglobal common resources, and to intensify the inte-gration of both state and private-sector financingmechanisms within the overall context of the fundingof global tasks.

F 4.1Making multilateral organizations more efficient

The Council assumes that in future, the primaryinstrument for global environment and developmentpolicy will continue to be direct financing of globaltasks through contributions from national budgets.This system offers, significantly, the advantages ofdirect and regular control by national democraticinstitutions and constant pressure on money-distrib-uting bodies to demonstrate accountability vis-à-vissuch institutions. Numerous international organiza-tions have come under the scrutiny of the nationalparliaments of OECD countries for non-transparentor less than efficient handling of funds; willingness toprovide financial support for UN organizations iswaning. On the other hand, the UN organizationsenjoy high acceptance in most developing countriesas a result of positive experiences with UN capacity-building inputs and because UN voting proceduresgive each country a voice regardless of its economicstrength.

Section E 3 discusses in detail the determinantsand preconditions of efficient spending of funds inmultilateral organizations (Section E 3.4.3). Thisshows that there is no prototypical institutionaldesign for efficient spending that could be appliedacross the board to all environmental problems.However, the need for reform identified among mul-

181Promoting interlinkage with governmental and private-sector financing tools F 4.3

tilateral organizations certainly calls for case-by-casereview of the extent to which– the use of funds can be concentrated on a single,

narrowly defined environmental problem orwhether diverse interplay with other environmen-tal problems must be taken into account as well,

– auditing procedures within the organization areproducing incentives for increased operationalefficiency,

– external control might be improved by additionalmonitoring bodies and modified voting proce-dures,

– lack of efficiency in recipient countries can beovercome by capacity-building measures thatintegrate local initiatives,

– the temporal, structural and spatial aspects of theprocess of adjustment needed to cope with globalenvironmental problems are being taken intoaccount, and

– the organization of fund spending is geared to thetype of environmental protection measuresneeded (from individual projects on up to com-prehensive economic structural reforms).

The Earth Funding vision thus includes continuingthe financing of global environmental protection anddevelopment projects through the existing diversityof multilateral organizations. In particular, this canbuild upon the positive experience gained withreforms within the World Bank and the GEF. None-theless, the Council recommends tackling the reformneeds identified in the individual organizations inorder to both enhance willingness to increasenational contributions and enhance the impact offunds spent.

F 4.2Levying user charges for the global commons

Linking price mechanisms on private-sector marketsto the use of natural resources is in many instancesthe decisive factor for their prudent management.Prices indicate scarcity, which enhances willingnessto manage prudently these resources to which a valuehas thus been attached.This mechanism has its limits,however, where property rights are non-existent.Numerous environmental assets – such as interna-tional air space, the high seas, or outer space – areopen access resources. Since it is impossible to put aprice on such resources, only placing them within acommon global trusteeship can prevent their overex-ploitation for exclusive use.

For the funding of global environment and devel-opment policy, such a trusteeship provides an oppor-tunity to make clear, through a user charge system,that available environmental resources are limited

and thus to create incentives to improve the effi-ciency of environmental use, and, second, to raisefunds dedicated to the conservation of global com-mon resources (Section E 3.2.3). In the Earth Fund-ing system, the levying of user charges for the tappingof such global community resources provides animportant alternative to contributions from govern-ment budgets for financing global environment anddevelopment policy. The Council wishes to drawattention in this context to three aspects that areindispensable for the understanding of and termsgoverning such charges:• The charges must serve a clear purpose which is

directly linked to the availability of the globalcommon resource in question. They are not a gen-eral environmental levy.

• Decisions as to the type, amount and uses of usercharges are to be geared to the unique nature ofeach global common property resource. In manycases, systems can build upon existing (multilat-eral or private) organizations. It may prove impos-sible to derive additional revenue from someglobal common resources; however, even in thesecases incentives for greater efficiency can be pro-duced through the granting of and trade in indi-vidual use rights or emission rights.

• The trusteeship entity is to be subjected to con-stant monitoring and approval by individual gov-ernments or their designated regulatory bodies.

Consequently the Council views user charges as anexpedient means by which to supplement the existingrange of multilateral financing tools. The direct link-ing of charges to environmental uses and the linkingof funds raised to specific purposes have the particu-lar benefit of preventing the intransparency of pastways in which funds have been raised and spent.

F 4.3Promoting interlinkage with governmental andprivate-sector financing tools

The Council has already pointed out repeatedly inthe present report the growing significance of the pri-vate sector and innovative financing tools on localand national levels. The preconditions to greaterinvolvement of private actors and to expanding non-commercial national environment and developmentfunds have also been discussed (Section E 3.4.5). Inthe Council’s Earth Funding vision (Section E 3) thisdecentralized element is an important factor for– taking advantage in individual cases of the famil-

iarity of actors with on-site conditions and the cor-responding requirements and options for action,

– using the efficiency gains provided by a moredecentralized and thus more manageable struc-


ture and by greater competitive pressure in theprivate sector and among different sites, to thegood of global environment and development pol-icy,

– increasing intrinsic motivation by means of moredirect access to global environment and develop-ment projects.

The Council recommends creating suitable institu-tional framework conditions that can galvanize theprivate sector and strengthen national, non-commer-cial funds – e.g., in combination with the worldwidedebt relief initiative discussed at the world economicsummit in 1999 (Sections E 3.2 and E 3.4.5). In con-trast to the first two areas of reform – reorganizingmultilateral institutions and introducing user chargesfor global common resources – these elements arenot measures that need to be taken worldwide in aconcerted manner, but rather emerge as the outcomeof changed institutional framework conditions on thenational (and in some cases bilateral) level. Indeed,in this area of reform the Earth Funding system pos-itively needs competition among a variety of individ-ual, innovative financing schemes, whose respectiveefficiency will determine how widely they are takenup in other countries, sectors or problem areas. Withthis in mind, the Council recommends examining towhat extent – above and beyond the recommenda-tions for action made here – institutional incentivesmight be developed to intensify on the internationallevel, too, the competitive element in efforts to makeinnovative contributions to financing global environ-ment and development projects.

To summarize: The Earth Funding vision com-prises further development of existing organizationalforms and development of innovative financing tools(especially user charges for global commonresources). In the combination of these two types ofaction lies a distinct opportunity: The first successfulsteps toward reform could inspire an openness tofinancial agreements on specific global communityresources – agreements that appear almost utopiantoday. At the same time, a firm focus must be main-tained not only on gaining revenue but above all onthe efficient spending of available financialresources.

F 4.4Making the most of the World Summit onSustainable Develepment

In the opinion of the Council, this vision should serveas a model for the urgently required reform of globalenvironmental policy. In particular, the WSSD due totake place in 2002 should serve as an opportunity toget some elements of this structural reform under

way.As early as 1997, the German government spokeout in favour of setting up an International Environ-mental Organization. French President JacquesChirac reiterated this proposal a year later. In June2000, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospinannounced the intention to revive debate on anInternational Environmental Organization duringFrance’s presidency of the EU.The first internationalconference of environment ministers in Malmö alsohighlighted the need for organizational reform ofglobal environmental policy. This auspicious politicalmoment should, in the view of the Council, be seized,and an initiative launched, possibly by the EU. Thepresent report seeks to inform and stimulate suchaction.

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Glossary H

199Glossary H

Agenda 21 is the legally non-binding programme ofaction for sustainable development that wasadopted in 1992 at the ➥ United Nations Confer-ence on Environment and Development(UNCED). Agenda 21 comprises 40 chapters.

Agenda setting means to position an issue in the pub-lic or political debate.

Biodiversity Convention (or Convention on Biologi-cal Diversity, CBD) is the key international regu-latory instrument pertaining to the biosphere. Itwas signed in 1992 at the ➥ United Nations Con-ference on Environment and Development andentered into force in 1993.The parties to the CBDundertake to conserve biological diversity, to useits components sustainably and to share the bene-fits arising from the utilization of geneticresources fairly and equitably.The Cartagena Pro-tocol on Biosafety was adopted in January 2000.

Brundtland Report was published in 1987 by theWorld Commission on Environment and Devel-opment, chaired by Norwegian Prime MinisterGro Harlem Brundtland. The report, titled ‘OurCommon Future’, underscored the interdepen-dence of environment and development and intro-duced the concept of ➥ sustainable development.

Climate Change Convention (United NationsFramework Convention on Climate Change,UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 and entered intoforce in March 1994. The ultimate objective of theConvention is to stabilize greenhouse gas concen-trations in the atmosphere at a level that wouldprevent dangerous anthropogenic interferencewith the climate system. Such a level should beachieved within a time frame sufficient to allowecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,to ensure that food production is not threatenedand to enable economic development to proceedin a sustainable manner. The Kyoto Protocol,adopted in 1997, sets out binding commitments toreduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) is acommission of ➥ ECOSOC and was set up in 1992as the central forum for the Rio follow-up process.It monitors and supports the implementation of ➥Agenda 21. The annual meetings of the CSD areattended by governments and international orga-nizations, but also by more than 1,000 non-govern-mental organizations.

Convention often refers in non-legal usage to a treatyunder international law that has particular impor-tance or scope. However, the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties does not distinguishbetween different forms of treaties, and gives ‘con-ventions’ no special status. (In German legal lan-guage the English term ‘Convention’ is generallytranslated as ‘Übereinkommen’.)

Core problems of global change are, in the ➥ syn-drome concept, the central phenomena of ➥global change. They manifest themselves either asparticularly significant trends of global change,such as human-induced climate change, or theycomprise several interrelated trends. One such‘megatrend’ is the core problem of ‘soil degrada-tion’, which comprises several trends includingerosion, salinization, contamination, etc.

Debt swaps refer to the ‘exchange’ of debt titles (usu-ally in developing countries) for certain actions,such as a certain environmental policy (debt-for-nature swaps) or a certain food security policy(debt-for-food-security swaps). The form thatthese transactions take depends on the type ofdebts. In the case of debts to foreign banks, forexample, the debt-for-nature swaps open upopportunities to simultaneously score successesagainst the debt crisis and for environmental pro-tection.

Desertification Convention (or United Nations Con-vention to Combat Desertification in Those Coun-tries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Deser-tification, Particularly in Africa, UNCCD) aims toconserve soils in arid regions and to mitigate theeffects of drought. The UNCCD was adopted in1992 at the ➥ United Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development and entered intoforce in 1996.As it is limited to arid, semi-arid andsub-humid zones, the UNCCD only covers a partof global soil degradation. It was negotiated underthe impression of the severe drought in the Saheland the failed 1977 Plan of Action to CombatDesertification. As a result, the UNCCD hasexplicit links with poverty and is distinct in thisrespect from the other two Rio conventions on cli-mate change and biodiversity.

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations(ECOSOC) is one of the six principal organs ofthe UN. Its task is to coordinate UN activities inthe sphere of economic and social policy and toreport on the social state of the world.

ECOSOC ➥ Economic and Social Council of theUnited Nations

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)was adopted in 1947. Its purpose is to promotefree world trade exploiting comparative costadvantages. GATT rules require most-favourednation treatment for all parties to the agreement,legal non-discrimination of domestic and foreigngoods, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions,dumping and export barriers and the principle ofreciprocity in removing barriers to trade. The ➥World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged fromGATT in 1986.

200 H Glossary

Global change refers to the interlinkages amongglobal environmental changes, economic global-ization, cultural transformation and a growingNorth-South gradient.

Global common resources are environmentalresources such as the high seas, the Earth’s atmos-phere or orbits, which are accessible to all andover which there are no property rights or specificsovereignty rights.

Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a multilateralfinancing mechanism established in 1991. TheGEF is implemented jointly by ➥ UNDP, ➥UNEP and the ➥ World Bank. It provides grantsand low-interest loans to developing countries andeastern European transformation countries tohelp them carry out projects and measures torelieve pressures on global ecosystems. The focalareas are climate protection, biodiversity conser-vation, ozone layer protection and the protectionof international waters. Soil conservation mea-sures in arid zones and forest conservation mea-sures also receive support if they have links to oneof the four focal areas.

Global governance is a term that is gaining currencyin both political practice and political science.Nonetheless, there is no final and universallyagreed definition of the term; it is used norma-tively by some, and analytically by others. Oftenglobal governance refers to the proposition thatthe strong growth in international institutionsover recent decades has created a new quality thattranscends the traditional understanding of inter-governmental policy. It is important to note thatglobal governance is not the same as global gov-ernment. (There are, with varying connotations,several German counterparts to the term. Theseinclude ‘Weltordnungspolitik’ and ‘globale Struk-turpolitik’.)

Global network of interrelations means, in the ➥ syn-drome concept, a qualitative network embracingall ➥ trends of global change, as well as their inter-actions. The global network of interrelations pro-vides a highly aggregated characterization of ➥global change in terms of specific phenomena.

Group of 77 and China (G-77 and China), formed in1964, is a loose grouping of developing countriesnow numbering 132 (1999).At international nego-tiations, the G-77 and China often act as a com-mon interest group.

Guard rails demarcate, in the ➥ syndrome concept,the domain of free action for the people-environ-ment system from those domains which representundesirable or even catastrophic developmentsand which therefore must be avoided. Pathwaysfor sustainable development run within the corri-dor defined by these guard rails.

Incremental costs are costs incurred by states in addi-tion to their regular expenditure when imple-menting environmental measures that are entirelyin the global interest (such as climate protection).In the conventions on ozone, climate change andbiodiversity, the industrialized countries havecommitted themselves to reimburse the agreedfull incremental costs incurred by developingcountries in implementing these treaties. TheMontreal Ozone Fund and the ➥ Global Environ-ment Facility serve the fulfilment of this commit-ment.

Institutions are common arrangements establishedby actors in society to regulate their relations.They range from the United Nations prohibitionof the use of force to the institution of marriage. Ininternational politics, the key institutions aretermed ‘international regimes’, the term referringto a body of common principles, norms, rules anddecision-making procedures among internationalactors (usually states). The climate regime, forinstance, is an institution that regulates the behav-iour of its parties in the interests of climate pro-tection and imposes certain obligations uponthem.

Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) wasestablished in 1997 by a special session of the UNGeneral Assembly in order to elaborate the ele-ments of a forest conservation instrument bindingunder international law.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)was established in 1988 and is one of the mostinfluential international scientific institutions forclimate policy. In 1990, the IPCC presented a draftconvention providing the basis for climate negoti-ations. It publishes at regular intervals assessmentreports on global climate change.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up fol-lowing the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) tomake funds available to secure the functioning ofthe stable exchange rate system; that system wassuperseded almost three decades ago. Govern-ments, as members of the IMF, pay a contributionin the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDR),which can be used for low-interest, sometimesonly partially repayable loans and bonds to over-come short-term liquidity crises or to supportstructural financial reforms.

International regimes are bodies of implicit orexplicit principles, norms and decision-makingprocedures within which the expectations ofactors – usually states – converge in a specificarena of international relations. The ➥ ClimateChange Convention, for instance, is such a regime.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprisesall financial transfers from government agencies

201Glossary H

to developing countries and multilateral organiza-tions for the improvement of living conditions.

Organizations are administrative units with theirown budget, personnel and letterhead. The Cli-mate Secretariat in Bonn is a small internationalorganization, while the climate regime is an ➥institution.

Scientific committees and subsidiary bodies of theConferences of the Parties (COPs) have the taskof stimulating and evaluating scientific reports atthe specific request of the respective COPs. Theresults of these expert reports then need to beprocessed into draft resolutions for the COPs. Forthe ➥ Climate Change Convention, there is theSubsidiary Body for Scientific and TechnologicalAdvice (SBSTA), for the ➥ Desertification Con-vention the Committee on Science and Technol-ogy (CST) and for the ➥ Biodiversity Conventionthe Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical andTechnological Advice (SBSTTA). In their capacityas subsidiary, instruction-bound bodies of theCOPs, they are closely linked to the programmesof work of the latter.

Sustainable development is mostly understood as aconcept of environmental and development policythat was formulated by the ➥ Brundtland Reportand further developed at the ➥ United NationsConference on Environment and Development inRio de Janeiro in 1992. In the process, democraticdecision-making and implementation processesshould promote development that is ecologically,economically and socially sustainable, and shouldtake into account the needs of future generations.

Syndrome concept is a scientific concept developedby the WBGU for the interdisciplinary character-ization and analysis of ➥ global change. Key ele-ments of the syndrome concept, in addition to thesyndromes, are the ➥ global network of interrela-tions, comprising ➥ trends and their interactions,and the ➥ guard rails.

Syndromes of global change refer to patterns of crit-ical relationships between humankind and theenvironment that manifest themselves spatially.These are characteristic, globally relevant constel-lations of natural and anthropogenic trends ofglobal change as well as the interactions betweenthem. In analogy to medicine, every syndrome is a‘global symptom’; it represents an anthropogeniccause-effect complex with specific environmentalstresses and thus forms a discrete pattern of envi-ronmental degradation. Syndromes reach beyondindividual sectors such as industry, biosphere orpopulation, as well as across individual environ-mental media such as the soil, water or air. Syn-dromes always have a direct or indirect spatial ref-erence to natural resources. A syndrome can usu-

ally be identified in several regions of the worldwith differing degrees of intensity. Several syn-dromes may occur simultaneously in one region.

Tacit acceptance is a voting procedure applied under,for instance, the Montreal Protocol for annexes tothe Protocol or their adjustment.They are bindingthrough a two-thirds majority decision, even uponstates that did not vote in favour. Such states havethe opportunity to reject the decision expresslyand in writing within a certain deadline. Amend-ments to the overall Protocol continue to requireratification in each instance to be binding.

Trends of global change are in the syndrome conceptphenomena in society and nature that are relevantto ➥ global change and characterize it. These arechangeable or processual factors that can bedetermined qualitatively, such as the trends of‘population growth’, ‘intensified greenhouseeffect’, ‘growing environmental awareness’ or‘medical progress’.

UN specialized agencies are the outcome of func-tional specialization within the UN system, withthe United Nations Organization (UNO) at thecentre, surrounded by a group of independent UNspecialized agencies for special policy fields, suchas for food and agriculture (FAO, since 1945), edu-cation, science and culture (UNESCO, since1945), health (WHO, 1946), aviation (ICAO, 1944)or meteorology (WMO, 1947). Most were estab-lished almost simultaneously with the UNObecause national governments feared at the timethat the vast range of tasks would overburden theUNO. All UN specialized agencies are linked inti-mately with the UN, in particular with ➥ECOSOC.

United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED, the Earth Summit) tookplace in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. It was the secondworld environment conference; the first tookplace in 1972 in Stockholm. At UNCED, ➥Agenda 21 was adopted.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-ment (UNCTAD) is since 1964 a permanent bodyof the UN General Assembly, to which it reportsdirectly. The goals and tasks of UNCTAD are topromote international trade, define principles forinternational trade relations and conclude legallybinding trade agreements. Its work centres onrelations between trade, economic developmentand international economic assistance. UNCTADplayed a major role in the debate on a new worldeconomic order in the 1970s.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)was established in 1965 and is the central financ-ing, coordinating and steering body for the UnitedNation’s operative development policy functions.

202 H Glossary

UNDP is represented by regional offices in 132countries. Thematically the Programme empha-sizes the areas of poverty reduction, gender issues,good governance and environmental protection.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)was established in 1972 by the UN Conference onthe Human Environment in Stockholm. Its objec-tives are to support national activities and regionalcooperation in environmental protection andnature conservation, and to develop, assess andmonitor international environmental and conser-vation law.The activities of UNEP include hostingand coordinating various convention secretariats,creating databanks and preparing environmentalstatus reports (Global Environment Outlook –GEO), advising governments and financingadvanced training and regional programmes.

World Bank Group is an international organizationconnected loosely with the United Nations by spe-cial agreements. Founded in 1944, it is today thelargest source of development assistance finance.The objective of the Bank is to reduce poverty indeveloping countries. The Bank grants loans andprovides political advice, technical assistance and,increasingly, services for knowledge exchange.TheWorld Bank Group comprises five closely linkedinstitutions. The priorities in granting loans are:Health and education, environmental protection,supporting private-sector economic development,strengthening the capability of governments toprovide services efficiently and transparently, sup-porting reforms to attain stable economic condi-tions, and social development and poverty reduc-tion.

World Summit on Sustainable Development(WSSD) is the follow-up conference ten yearsafter the ➥ United Nations Conference on Envi-ronment and Development, to take place in 2002at Johannesburg. This will involve a first assess-ment of the impacts of the Rio agreements. Theinstitutional reform of global environment anddevelopment policy will also be on the agenda.

World Trade Organization (WTO) came into beingin 1995 within the context of the Uruguay Roundof the ➥ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT). Its aim is the global liberalization oftrade by means of principles such as most-favoured nation and national treatment, banningimport quotas and generally preventing discrimi-nation against trading partners. Since the failedattempt by the European Union in Seattle in 1999to launch a ‘Millennium Round’, calls for theWTO to observe environmental policy standardshave become louder.

The German Advisory Council on GlobalChange

I

205The German Advisory Council on Global ChangeI

The CouncilProf Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber, Potsdam (Chairperson)Prof Juliane Kokott, St. Gallen(Vice Chairperson)Prof Friedrich O. Beese, GöttingenProf Klaus Fraedrich, HamburgProf Paul Klemmer, EssenProf Lenelis Kruse-Graumann, HagenProf Christine Neumann, GöttingenProf Ortwin Renn, StuttgartProf Ernst-Detlef Schulze, JenaProf Max Tilzer, KonstanzProf Paul Velsinger, DortmundProf Horst Zimmermann, Marburg

Staff to the Council MembersDr Arthur Block, PotsdamDr Astrid Bracher, Bremerhaven (from 1.4.99)Dipl.-Geogr. Gerald Busch, GöttingenReferendar-jur. Cosima Erben, HeidelbergDipl.-Ing. Mark Fleischhauer, DortmundDr Dirk Hilmes, GöttingenAndreas Klinke, M.A., StuttgartDipl.-Psych. Dörthe Krömker, HagenDipl.-Geogr. Jacques Léonardi, HamburgReferendar-jur. Markus Böckenförde, Heidelberg(until 31.8.99)Dr Heike Mumm, Konstanz (until 31.3.99)Dipl.-Biol. Martina Mund, Jena (until 30.4.99)Dipl.-Volksw. Thilo Pahl, MarburgDipl.-Geoökol. Christiane Plötz, Bayreuth (from1.5.99)Dr Rüdiger Wink, Bochum

The Secretariat of the Council, Bremerhaven*and from 1.6.01 BerlinProf Dr Meinhard Schulz-Baldes (Secretary-General)Dr Carsten Loose (Deputy Secretary-General)Dr Frank Biermann, LL.M.Dr Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (until 18.4.99)Dr Georg Heiss (from 15.6.99)Vesna Karic-FazlicUrsula LiebertDr Benno PilardeauxMartina Schneider-Kremer, M.A.Dipl.-Pol. Jessica Suplie

Joint Decree on the Establishment of the GermanAdvisory Council on Global Change (April 8, 1992)

Article 1In order to periodically assess global environ-

mental change and its consequences and to help allinstitutions responsible for environmental policy aswell as the public to form an opinion on these issues,an Advisory Council on ‘Global EnvironmentalChange’ reporting to the Federal Government shallbe established.

Article 2(1)The Council shall submit a report to the Federal

Government by the first of June each year, giving anupdated description of the state of global environ-mental change and its consequences, specifying qual-ity, size and range of possible changes and giving ananalysis of the latest research findings. In addition,the report should contain indications on how to avoidor correct maldevelopments.The report shall be pub-lished by the Council.

(2)While preparing the reports, the Council shall pro-

vide the Federal Government with the opportunityto state its position on central issues.

(3)The Federal Government may ask the Council to

prepare special reports and opinions on specifiedtopics.

Article 3(1)The Council shall consist of up to twelve members

with special knowledge and experience regarding thetasks assigned to the Council.

(2)The members of the Council shall be jointly

appointed for a period of four years by the two min-istries in charge, the Federal Ministry for Researchand Technology and the Federal Ministry for theEnvironment, Nature Conservation and ReactorSafety, in agreement with the departments con-cerned. Reappointment is possible.

(3)Members may declare their resignation from the

Council in writing at any time.(4)If a member resigns before the end of his or her

term of office, a new member shall be appointed forthe retired member’s term of office.

* Secretariat WBGU Reichpietschufer 60–6210785 Berlin, GermanyTel. ++49 30 263948 0Fax: ++49 30 263948 50Email: [email protected]: http://www.wbgu.de/

206 I The German Advisory Council on Global Change

Article 4(1)The Council is bound only to the brief defined by

this Decree and is otherwise independent to deter-mine its own activities.

(2)Members of the Council may not be members

either of the Government or a legislative body of theFederal Republic or of a Land or of the public serviceof the Federal Republic, of a Land or of any otherjuristic person under public law unless he or she is auniversity professor or a staff member of a scientificinstitute. Furthermore, they may not be representa-tives of an economic association or an employer’s oremployee’s organization, or be permanently attachedto these through the performance of services andbusiness acquisition. They must not have held anysuch position during the year preceding theirappointment as member of the Council.

Article 5(1)The Council shall elect a Chairperson and a Vice-

Chairperson from its midst for a term of four years bysecret ballot.

(2)The Council shall set up its own rules of proce-

dure. These must be approved by the two ministriesin charge.

(3)If there is a differing minority with regard to indi-

vidual topics of the report then this minority opinioncan be expressed in the report.

Article 6In the execution of its work the Council shall be

supported by a Secretariat which shall initially belocated at the Alfred Wegener Institut (AWI) in Bre-merhaven.

Article 7Members of the Council as well as the staff of the

Secretariat are bound to secrecy with regard to meet-ing and conference papers considered confidentialby the Council.This obligation to secrecy is also validwith regard to information given to the Council andconsidered confidential.

Article 8(1)Members of the Council shall receive all-inclusive

compensation as well as reimbursement of theirtravel expenses. The amount of compensation shallbe fixed by the two ministries in charge in agreementwith the Federal Ministry of Finance.

(2)The costs of the Council and its Secretariat shall

be shared equally by the two ministries in charge.

Dr Heinz RiesenhuberFederal Minister for Research and TechnologyProf Klaus TöpferFederal Minister for Environment, Nature Con-servation and Reactor SafetyMay 1992

— Appendix to the Council Mandate —

Tasks to be Performed by the AdvisoryCouncil Pursuant to Article 2, para 1

The tasks of the Council include:(1)Summarising and continuous reporting on current

and acute problems in the field of global environ-mental change and its consequences, eg with regardto climate change, ozone depletion, tropical forestsand fragile terrestrial ecosystems, aquatic ecosystemsand the cryosphere, biological diversity and thesocioeconomic consequences of global environ-mental change. Natural and anthropogenic causes(industrialisation, agriculture, overpopulation,urbanisation, etc) should be considered, and specialattention should be given to possible feedbackeffects (in order to avoid undesired reactions to mea-sures taken).

(2)Observation and evaluation of national and inter-

national research activities in the field of globalenvironmental change (with special reference tomonitoring programmes, the use and management ofdata, etc).

(3)Identification of deficiencies in research and coor-

dination.

(4)Recommendations regarding the avoidance and

correction of maldevelopments.

In its reporting the Council should also considerethical aspects of global environmental change.

J

A

accountability; see also compliance 90, 93, 95, 121, 180actors 38, 47, 59, 69, 74, 78, 83, 116, 138, 164, 178, 181advice; cf policy adviceAfrica 23, 41, 52, 56, 75-76, 79AGENDA 21 62, 75, 98, 100-101, 142, 159

– LOCAL AGENDA 21 69, 101agenda setting 69-70, 72, 74agreed full incremental costs; cf financingagriculture 23, 31, 36, 41, 44, 48, 110air space 147-148, 181air traffic 146, 148Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 73ARGE-Lotterie-Arbeitsgemeinschaft Neue Bun-

deslotterie für Umwelt und Entwicklung; cf Work-ing Group for a New Federal Lottery for the Envi-ronment and Development

Asia 40-41, 52, 118-119Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

7

B

Biodiversity Convention; cf Convention on Biologi-cal Diversity (CBD)

biodiversity loss 35-36, 41, 48, 55, 81, 87biodiversity; cf biological diversitybiological diversity 38-39, 41, 56, 81, 129, 154biosphere conservation policy 69, 81, 129Brundtland Commission 72, 127, 144, 173Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und

Reaktorsicherheit (BMU); cf German FederalEnvironment Ministry

Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammen-arbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ); cf German Fed-eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment

C

capacity building 134, 158, 166catastrophe bonds; see also insurance 26, 155Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

47certificates 83, 87, 153-154chemicals 28, 36, 137

chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs); see also greenhousegases 28, 48, 70-71, 116

civil society 63, 83, 88, 90, 157, 165-166Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 73, 91, 134Clearing House Mechanism (CHM) 62climate change 23-24, 27, 41, 44, 55-57, 137Climate Change Convention; cf United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)

climate policy 24, 72-74, 87, 92, 128co-determination 117, 122, 179Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer

(CCOL) 71Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) 62,

98, 127, 130, 134, 174commitment period 92-93, 97Committee on Science and Technology (CST) 63, 91,

129common property resources 81, 146community of states 77, 130, 143, 174, 177compensatory payments 39compliance 40, 58, 79, 83, 86-89, 92-97, 119, 139, 176,

178– implementation 43, 58, 69, 81-82, 86, 89-91, 95, 98,

134, 142, 145, 177Conference of the Parties (COP) 63, 81-82, 91, 96,

129-130, 148conferences of the parties 77, 128, 130, 138, 176-177consensus principle; see also voting procedures 132,

139, 142, 176, 178Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 38-39, 56,

62, 81-82, 88, 154Convention on International Trade in Endangered

Species (CITES) 39, 62, 95, 109, 178convention secretariats 62, 133, 136, 176conventions; cf international agreementscriticality analysis 56

D

debt 47, 167– debt relief 143– debt relief initiative 182– debt-for-nature swaps 165, 167

deep-sea mining 150-152

Index

208 J Index

deforestation 35, 41, 52, 55desertification 23, 40, 56, 63Desertification Convention; cf United Nations Con-

vention to Combat Desertification in CountriesExperiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertifica-tion, Particularly in Africa (UNCCD)

determinants, system of 162-165, 180developing countries 23, 39, 41, 58, 66, 70, 72, 76, 82,

84, 88, 108-109, 117, 121-122, 128, 135, 137, 142, 145,149

development cooperation 26, 43, 47, 91, 96, 141-142,161, 165, 167, 180

development policy 115, 128, 130, 142, 145, 158, 165,180

disparities 44, 48, 147dispute settlement 108-109, 111, 138drought; see also desertification 40, 56, 75-76

E

early recognition 128, 173early warning 47, 127, 173Earth Alliance 17, 128, 167, 171

– Earth Assessment 17, 128, 130, 174– Earth Funding 17, 171, 181– Earth Organization 17, 171, 177

Earth Commission 127-128, 130, 173Earth Politics 16Earth Summit; cf United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development (UNCED)Earth System analysis 56Earth System management 17, 60ecoimperialism 140Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

(ECOSOC) 60, 130, 133Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) 28economic incentives 26, 38, 59, 85, 114, 119, 144, 158education 38, 40, 47, 98-100, 102

– awareness-raising 98, 101-102, 158education policy 69, 98emissions 23-24, 56, 81, 148

– CO2 emissions 72-73, 115, 149– emissions reduction 24-25, 72, 85– emissions rights; cf utilization rights

enforcement; see also compliance 45, 58, 93, 111, 114,121, 138

environmental assessment 115-116environmental associations 78, 82, 84, 93, 138, 178environmental education; cf educationEnvironmental Law Centre 75environmental levy 146, 149, 181environmental lotteries 157environmental policy 48, 69, 79, 81-82, 90, 107, 109,

117, 119, 129, 132, 139-140, 145, 175, 177– coordination needs 133

environmental problems 21-22, 40, 48, 50, 53, 58, 70,76, 84, 137, 154, 157, 164-165, 171

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 90, 134,175

environmental quality standards 114environmental regimes; cf regimesEnvironmental Security Council 139, 176environmental standards 28, 47, 107, 108, 111, 114, 176Europe 23, 40, 74, 100-101European Environmental Advisory Councils

(EEAC) 130European Society for Soil Conservation (ESSC) 74European Union (EU) 73, 98, 109, 130, 174Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 80, 109, 149, 151experts; see also panels 22, 62, 78, 91-93, 96, 138

F

famines; see also food 76financial provision; cf financingfinancing; see also Earth Alliance - Earth Funding 26,

39, 48, 80, 90, 115, 133, 142, 144-145, 149, 158-159,165-166, 180-181– agreed full incremental costs 78, 81, 92, 134, 142,

152, 154– efficient use of financial resources 122, 157, 159,

160-163, 167, 180– financing bodies 61, 64, 115-116, 121-122, 158,

161-163– financing mechanisms 66, 74, 88, 144, 156– financing policy 115– transparency 97, 164, 166

fishing 15, 31, 33, 150food; see also famines 31, 34, 38, 41, 55, 60forest policy 116, 133

– forest protocol 26, 39, 81Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 83forests 23-24, 35-36, 39, 55, 133forum of environment ministers 136, 175foundations 157-158, 166freeriding 84-85, 97, 145, 152, 156freshwater 44-45, 51, 101freshwater scarcity 54, 137funding; cf financing

– funding provision 119, 142, 144, 146, 162, 165, 171funds 39, 91, 119, 144, 148, 157-159, 161, 163-166

– CO2 funds; cf Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF)– Compliance Fund 93– development funds 162, 167, 181– environmental funds 159, 165– funds for damage 155– insurance funds 26– investment funds 166– multilateral funds 28, 66, 78, 145– Ozone Fund 121, 161, 163– Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) 116– Turner Fund 159– Water Fund 47

209Index J

G

G-77; see also developing countries 25, 138game theory 69, 84, 87General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

108, 111, 114, 138General Assembly special session; cf United Nations

(UN)General Assembly; cf United Nationsgenetic resources; see also resources 35, 38, 81, 151genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 110geostationary orbit 146, 152-153German Council for Sustainable Development 102,

127, 173German Federal Environment Ministry 74German Federal Environmental Agency 74, 134, 175German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and

Development 161German Society on Development Cooperation

(GTZ) 161Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit und

Entwicklung (GTZ); cf German Society onDevelopment Cooperation

Global and National Soil and Terrain Digital Data-base Program (SOTER) 43, 92

Global Environment Facility (GEF) 62, 65, 74, 91,116, 145, 159-160, 165

global environmental policy; cf environmental policy global governance 16, 112, 140, 177Global Mechanism 91Global Soil Degradation Database (GLASOD) 43,

74, 92global strategy 45globalization; see also particularization 14, 21, 83, 107,

114, 157good governance 95, 122, 166goods 71, 117, 144, 146, 153

– common access 50, 58, 82, 86, 153, 181– common property resources 52, 80, 147, 181– commons; cf common property resources

greenhouse gases 24, 27-28, 41, 50, 57, 84, 146gross domestic product (GDP) 13gross national product (GNP) 91, 96, 115, 142, 180guard rails 43, 82, 92, 95, 112, 128-129

I

implementation; cf complianceimproving environmental performance 33, 153incentive systems; cf economic incentivesincremental costs; cf agreed full incremental costs

– indicators 40, 43, 82, 98, 100, 129, 155industrialized countries 24, 28, 58, 66, 70, 72, 75, 90-91,

134, 139, 142, 145, 147, 156, 160-161, 171, 180institutional arrangements 24, 28, 33, 36, 38, 43, 45, 77,

79, 152– infringement of rules 35, 97, 111– non-compliance 35, 91, 93, 97

– regulatory needs 33, 82, 149institutional design 48, 54, 58, 71, 76, 79-80, 87, 89, 180institutions 17, 69-70, 77, 89, 98, 100, 137, 140, 159, 162,

164– centralization 138-139, 176– hierarchization 139, 176– reform 17, 69, 140, 167, 175, 180

insurance 26, 144, 154-155intergovernmental organization (IGO) 62, 92Intergovernmental Panel on Biological Diversity

(IPBD) 40, 56, 82, 174Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

56, 72, 74, 96, 127-129Intergovernmental Panel on Land and Soils (IPLS)

43, 76, 91, 129, 174international agreements 33, 40, 58, 62, 79, 82, 86, 98,

112, 113, 117, 142, 176-177International Air Transport Association (IATA) 148-

149International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-

ment (IBRD) 64, 115International Centre for Settlement of Investment

Disputes (ICSID) 64International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-

lution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) 79International Convention for the Prevention of Pol-

lution from Ships (MARPOL) 34, 79-80international cooperation; cf international relationsInternational Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)

60, 74International Development Association (IDA) 64,

115international environmental law 70-71, 140International Environmental Organization; see also

Earth Organization 133-134, 139, 182International Finance Corporation (IFC) 64, 115International Financial Institution Advisory Com-

mission (IFIAC) 117, 119International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD) 91International Joint Commission (IJC) 89-90International Labour Organisation (ILO) 92, 134,

137International Maritime Organization (IMO) 60, 80International Monetary Fund (IMF) 117-119international relations 60, 62, 84, 97, 118, 140, 165, 178International Soil Conservation Organization

(ISCO) 74International Soil Reference and Information Cen-

tre (ISRIC) 43, 74International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

(ISDR) 26International Undertaking on Plant Genetic

Resources for Food and Agriculture (IUPGR) 38International Union on Soil Sciences (IUSS) 75

210 J Index

K

knowledge dissemination; cf knowledge transferknowledge transfer; see also technology transfer 34,

48, 107, 128, 158

L

labelling 35, 38, 86, 158land use 26, 36, 38, 52land-use change 23, 56liability 87, 114, 154-155lifestyles 24, 28, 36, 45, 53, 98

M

majority decisions; see also voting procedures 78, 80,88, 137, 140

‘Man and the Biosphere’ (MAB); cf UNESCO Pro-gramme ‘Man and the Biosphere‘

marine environmental policy 79-80Meltzer Commission; cf International Financial Insti-

tution Advisory Commission (IFIAC)models 23, 57, 85-86, 92-93, 136monitoring 39, 50, 86-87, 89-92monitoring mechanisms; cf complianceMontreal Protocol 28, 62, 66, 70, 72, 77-78, 88, 116Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

64, 115multinational corporations 83

N

National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) 27, 70

national reports; see also compliance 40, 82, 91, 96nature conservation 39, 62, 82, 100, 166negotiations 26, 56, 72, 74, 85-86, 92, 132, 138, 178networking; see also networks 56, 96, 101-102, 171networks 47, 60, 83, 100, 128, 158non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 62, 75, 82,

90, 95, 117, 161, 166, 178North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

112North-South problem 71nutrition; cf food

O

oceans 23, 30, 33, 65, 79, 109, 146, 149– degradation 31

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Devel-opment (OECD) 44, 101, 137

– OECD countries; cf industrialized countriesOffice of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) 164Official Development Assistance (ODA) 141, 143,

171Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) 73organizations 60, 69, 71-72, 76, 80, 83, 88, 101, 134, 143,

159, 162, 176

ozone hole; cf climate change

P

panels; see also experts 88, 127-129, 173-174particularization; see also globalization 16parties 25, 50, 72, 78, 80, 85, 88, 90-93, 109, 112, 178persistent organic pollutants (POPs) 28, 36, 79, 134

– ‘dirty dozen’ 28, 30– POPs convention 29

plan of action; cf programmes of actionpolicy advice 40, 51, 56, 64, 127-130, 174

– need for advice 43, 92, 129population growth 41, 58poverty 41, 43, 52, 58, 75, 108poverty reduction 95, 121, 139principle of sovereignty 132, 140programmes 60, 71, 88, 90, 98-99, 102, 116, 121programmes of action 40, 43, 63, 71, 75-76, 79, 90, 96,

98programmes of the United Nations; cf United

Nations (UN)protected areas 33, 35, 39-40protocols; see also international agreements 59, 85,

87, 177

R

Rat für Nachhaltige Entwicklung; cf German Coun-cil for Sustainable Development

regimes; see also international agreements 16, 43, 48,50, 54, 58, 81, 87, 95-96, 129-130, 174, 177– acid rain regime 34– GATT/WTO regime 108, 114– MARPOL regime 80, 87– OILPOL regime 79-80

Regional Seas Programme 33, 79reporting procedures; see also compliance 35research 29, 44, 50, 59, 71, 87, 127-128, 150, 160Rio conference; cf United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development (UNCED)– Rio+10 conference 96, 130, 132, 171, 175

Risk Assessment Panel (RAP) 129, 174risks of global change 26, 36, 44, 47-48, 87, 108, 127,

173

S

sanctions; see also compliance 35, 84, 86, 93, 97, 108,178

sea-level rise 55, 73, 155self-help capabilities; see also development coopera-

tion 26, 34, 47social standards 107, 110, 114soil conservation 57, 74-75, 95soil conservation policy 75, 92, 134soil convention; cf United Nations Convention to

Combat Desertification in Countries Experienc-

211Index J

ing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Par-ticularly in Africa (UNCCD)

soils 30, 40-42, 75, 92– degradation 44, 52, 75, 129

Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 118structural adjustment programmes; see also develop-

ment cooperation 115, 118-119Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological

Advice (SBSTA) 129Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) 130Subsidiary Body on Scientific,Technical and Techno-

logical Advice (SBSTTA) 62, 82, 129subsidies; see also economic incentives 39, 108, 114,

118sustainability policy 98, 100sustainability strategy 102, 140, 177sustainable development 58, 62, 76, 83, 98-102, 121syndrome methodology of the WBGU 21syndromes of global change 21, 24, 31, 52

T

taxes 145, 166technology transfer; see also knowledge transfer 34,

62, 73, 93, 109The World Conservation Union (IUCN) 75Tobin tax; see also taxes 156Töpfer Task Force 136tourism 22, 39, 145, 149trade 39, 61, 86, 109, 111, 138

– free trade 107, 112– liberalization of trade 108– trade barriers 108– trade restrictions 108, 109, 111-112

treaties; cf international agreementstrends of global change 21, 58

U

Umweltbundesamt (UBA); cf German Federal Envi-ronmental Agency

UNESCO Programme ‘Man and the Biosphere‘ 38,60

United Nations (UN) 60-61, 132– General Assembly 127– General Assembly special session 149– specialized agencies 60, 133, 136-137– UN programmes 61, 117

United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED) 21, 62, 72, 75-76, 129, 133,171

United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-ment (UNCTAD) 61, 133, 137

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) 150-151

United Nations Convention to Combat Desertifica-tion in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought

and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa(UNCCD) 43, 63, 75-76, 79, 90-91, 96

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)62, 121-122, 139, 159

United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO) 60, 98, 101

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)62, 71, 75, 79-80, 123, 133-137, 175

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) 33, 60, 81

United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) 63, 72, 92-95, 129, 174

United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-tion (UNIDO) 66, 135, 137, 175

United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Forests(IPF) 75

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)122

United Nations Office to Combat Desertificationand Drought (UNSO) 121

USA 47, 70, 72, 89, 109, 156user charges; see also financing 50, 86, 144, 146, 149,

150-153, 181utilization rights 93, 147-148, 153

V

veto right; see also voting procedures 40, 82, 138voting procedures 78, 82, 119, 160-161, 178, 180

W

Washington Convention; cf Convention on Interna-tional Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

Working Group for a New Federal Lottery for theEnvironment and Development 157

World Bank 63, 64, 115-116, 122, 160– greening 115, 117

World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-ment (WBCSD) 83

World Commission on Environment and Develop-ment (WCED); cf Brundtland Commission

World Health Organization (WHO) 45, 47, 137World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 60, 72,

74World Soil Charter 75World Trade Organization (WTO) 107-109, 111, 114,

138, 176World Water Charter 47World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 75

german advisory council on global change (wbgu) new

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