germany’s master plan – by joseph borkin and charles a welsh p2

8/7/2019 Germanys Master Plan by Joseph Borkin and Charles A Welsh P2

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11. S A M U R A I - O R I E N T A L J U N K E R S

GERMANY'S blueprint for conquest was truly global.I t included the vast reaches of Asia and the riches ofthe Indies. T o deprive its enemies of this wealth and toencircle Russia were the ends of Germany's easternstrategy.

In the ancient rivalry of peoples, no quarrel hasburned more steadily or bitterly than the antagonismbetween the Teuton and the Slav. From Adolf of Hol-stein, the leader of the Teutonic Knights in the twelfthcentury, to Adolf Hitler, the concept recurring over andover again in German dreams is the Drang Nach Osten-the Drive to the East.

The land ocean of Russia has surged across the pathto German world dominion. T o the West lay Britain-the gateway to the seas. T o the North were the silentwastes of ice. The Russian land bridge to the East was,therefore, the path across which German armies wereto trod. The fertile valley of the Ukraine would sup-ply the food for the German nation on the march.. Wh atwas more important, beyond the bridge of Russia wasthe fabulous wealth of Asia. All the ersatz materials

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S A M U R A I O R I E N T A J U N K E R S 159which Germany so painfully contrived in its laboratoriesexisted in natural abundance beyond the Caucasus.There were whole forests of rubber and quinine, moun-tains of tungsten and tin. F rom the Caucasus to theIndies were endless deposits of oil. T he virgin resourcesof Asia beckoned. Only the Russian Bear stood guard.

Along this road to Asia the invincible hosts of theWehrmacht could storm their way. The ramparts whichguarded Asia could thus be scaled and British sea powerfrustrated.

I n the Wor ld War Germany's campaign in the Eastcould not batter down the door to Asia. The schedule;of Berlin to Bagdad did not run on time. I n makingglobal plans, the scope of Germany's ambitions in theEast increased. Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan were sta-tions on the time table of German conquest. T he ter-minus was India-the battleground of East and West.

German militarists had studied Japanese ambitions inthe same minute detail with which they analyzed Alliedstrategy. Japan was the perfect foil for German aims,and could be used to stab the democracies from the rear,and give Russia a two-front war.

Japan nursed its own vainglorious schemes. TheTanaka Memorial propounded the limitless hopes ofJapanese imperialism. Germany fostered these views fortheir immediate value. T he strength of Japan could beutilized now, and its weaknesses noted for future refer-


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160 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANence. T he westward flow of Kultur would in time en-gulf Japan.

In Japan, as in Germany, the development of modernindustry occurred primarily during the latter half ofthe nineteenth century. In each country there was amilitary caste-the Samurai in Japan, corresponding tothe German Junkers-who saw in the machine tech-nique an instrument of national aggrandizement. Thereare, both industrially and in military affairs, almostidentical characteristics in the last century of Japaneseand German history, differentiated more by geographicconditions than by any other consideration. This paral-lelism illustrates the importance of the form of socialinstitutions in the modern world, because in both ofthese aggressor nations the existence and promotion ofmilitary ambitions and the assumption of superiorityto other peoples have produced corresponding modesof conduct.

1t is enough to turn attention to the outstanding in-dustrial group in the Japanese Empire, the MitsuiGomei Kaisha (Mitsui Partnership Company), whichranks first among the four largest monopolist combinesin Japan. The Mitsubishi, the Sumitomo, and theYasuda, in approximately the order named, are allsmaller than the Mitsui combine. I t has been estimatedthat these four groups control over 70% of Japaneseindustry, and are the principal beneficiaries of Japaneseaggression throughout the East. Indeed, these power-

SA MU R A I O R I E N TA JU N K E R S 161'fu l companies have been the vanguard of Japanesearmies, for in every area in which they have succeededin establishing a commercial foothold, an excuse haslater arisen for military action.

The Mitsui group has perhaps the longest history ofany large modern corporation, tracing its family treeto the seventh century.

The Mitsui were among the first Japanese business-men to carry on trade with foreign merchants. Even be-fore the treaties of 1854, by which Japan establisheduneasy relations with western civilization, the Mitsuihad carried on some trade with Dutch commercial agen-cies. Following the removal of the barriers to trade,Mitsui became the most important trading concern inJapan, accounting for nearly one-half of the total im-ports and exports. This branch of its business alonemakes Mitsui the greatest single trading company inthe world.

After the restoration and the fal l of the Shogunate,the Mitsui banking house became for a time the unoffi-cial treasury for the Emperor Meiji Tenno, and is stillthe most important "private" bank anywhere in theEast. Since that time the number and scale of Mitsuienterprises have grown until they are, collectively,among the world's largest business groups. The centralholding company and general headquarters administer-ing all the Mitsui interests is the Mitsui Partnership


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162 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANCompany, membership in which is restricted to theheads of the eleven Mitsui families.

Feudal succession determines the selection of thepresident of the concern, and the lesser offices are al-lot ted to representat ives of each family group. Theentire assemblage of Mitsui enterprises is operated ac-cording to a fam ily const itution original ly d raw n u p bythe son of Hachirobei, the founder of Mitsui 's dynasty.This constitution, in the main, consists of Orientalmaxims intended to assure prosperi ty and the retentionof control within the mem bership of the eleven families.T h e consti tut ion was redrafted in 1900, and now re-quires every member of the family at the t ime of ma-jority to swear an oath of allegiance to the House ofMitsui . I t is interest ing to note that am ong i ts clausesis the command to serve the Emperor before al l else,and, as the Mitsui have stated themselves, this precept"has never been forgotten."

Th e branches of the Ho use of Mitsui are divided intodomestic and foreign enterprises. The Mitsui Partner-ship Company i tself does not often deal directly withth e representatives of indu stry outside Japan. Th isfunction is performed by the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha(M i t su i & Company, Limited), which has branches inall of the p-incipal countries of the world.

T h e majo r fields of operat ion in which Mitsui is en-gaged are banking, mining, insurance, engineering,steel, coal, silk and cotton textiles, electrical machinery,

SAMURAZ-ORIENTAL JUNKERS 163aviation, chemicals, cement, transportation (rail, ma-rine, automobile, and airplane transport and manufac-ture), and armament production. For many years i thas been virtually impossible for any foreign concernto operate in the Japanese market without the consentof Mitsui. As a consequence, commercial and contrac-tual relat ionships existed up to the t ime of the warbetween M itsui companies and nearly a l l of the m ajorindustrial enterprises carrying on business in Japan orChina.

I n some ins tances Bri ti sh, American, and ~ e r m a ncompanies conduct joint enterprises with Mitsui. Forexample, the Shibauri Engineering Works is a jointenterprise of Mitsui and Internat ional General Elec-tric; th e Japan Stee l W ork s is a joint enterprise of th eMitsui and the Bri t ish companies of Armstrong andVickers. Many of the Mitsui fi rms operate under li-cense from American, British, and German companies.Mitsui has relationships with duPont, General Electric,I. G. Farben, Imperial Chemical Industries, Sperry,P r a t t & Whitney, the Mond Nickel Company, Alumin-ium Limited, to m ention only a few.

M itsui is itself a cartel, an d is a mem ber of th e prin-cipal dyestuffs an d chemical cartels of th e world. I t maybe noted, however, that in none of its connections withforeign industry, even in the case of German industry,has Mitsui exhibited the slightest compunction at anytime in forcin g acceptance of its own terms, and in estab-


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164 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANl ishing a bargaining position intended eventually toeliminate al l foreign control o r participation in Japaneseindustry. As stated by an American cartel member experton the ways of M itsui, th e Japanese p lan was to accom-plish "the exclusion . . . of foreign manufacturerswith t he possible exception of wha t may be a cooperativeplan with the German I.G."

T h is in itself is only nationalistic; Mitsui's aims,however, are international. I n the chemical industryJapanese ambitions, executed primarily by Mitsui, ap-proximate those of Germany. Th eir object is the con-trol of world marke ts in chemicals, and t he suppo rt ofthe m ilitary regime to obtain those markets by conquest.Asia constitutes today the greatest market on theearth. No subtle insight is required to deduce the eco-nomic incentives which have m otivated Japanese foreignpolicy s ince the f i rs t Wo rld W ar . I t should be pointedout that, contrary to a commonly held opinion, there isno conflict between Japanese industry and Japanesemilitarism. T h e "co-prosperity sphere" of grea ter Asia,which is the aim of the warlords, is also the goal ofMitsui and its lesser companions in monopoly in theJapanese economy.

T h e relationship of M itsui to American, English, andGerman financial and industrial groups has significance,not only because of the technical knowledge and capi-tal introduced into Japan by these channels, but alsobecause of their cartel character. The car te l form in

SAMURAI-ORIENTAL JUNKERS 165Japan, as in Germany, is admirably suited to industrialorganization under a totalitarian regime.

I n its intercourse with the w estern powers, Japaneseindustry has found cartel agreements most useful ingaining freedom f rom competition, and a t the same timeacquiring through patent agreements , l icenses, andjointly owned concerns, the scientific know ledge neces-sary to the erection of a military state. Because of cheaplabor an d the im itative ability of- heir race, Japanese in-dustry even before the war had become a serious threatto America's in ternational tr ad e position; indeed, tothe very same firms with whom agreements had beenestablished either by Mitsui or by the other membersof Japanese industrial oligarchy, Japanese competitionwas a nuisance.

I n I 93 7 th e Japanese were included in the Axis . T h eelements of German strategy were complete.

When war began, Japan hung back, awaiting the testof Ger ma n ability to execute the p lan successfully. O neby one, such doubts were dispelled. E ver y G erman vic-tory was an argument with cogent force. Japan deter-mined to come in and take its share.

T h e las t weeks before Pe ar l Ha rbo r d isclose the pat-tern. German armies battered their way to Moscow'sgates. Despite the approach of winter, the Wehrmachtdid not retire when tactical principles indicated strategicretreat. Political reasons held th em there. Retre at mig hthave discouraged Japan. T h e momen t had come when


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166 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANJapan must act to divert the energies of the UnitedStates, and lock the "Open door."

O n the v ery day tha t Japan had lashed out a t Brit ish,Dutch, and American possessions, the German armywithdrew to i ts winter l ines. T h e Un ited States was nolong er th e isolator, but the isolated.

Pea rl Ha rbor, Singapore, and Java smashed the com-placency with which the Japanese peril had been re-garded. Those who had be l ieved in the myths tha tJapanese cou ld not fly, that their navy w as inferior, an dthat they would not dar e to cross our path had deceivedthemselves.

W ha t was even more appall ing, the strategy of block-ade ha d been tu rned against i ts makers.

12. M O S Q U I T O E S , M A L A R I A , A N DM O N O P O L Y

THE Global W ar i s measured around th e gi rdle ofthe Equator. Africa has its effect on the Russian front,and S ingapore was the key to th e whole Pacific. I n al lthe wars of history, disease has been the invisible foeof armies. But the Equ ator is the fever l ine of the earth.W he n soldiers f rom tempera te zones a re sent to junglesand deserts, their bodies must be conditioned, and am plesupplies of medicine must trav el with the men.

Am ong th e scourges of mankind through out recordedhistory, no ne has been m ore w idespread in its incidence,and o nly the "black death" has been m ore devastat ingin its immediate effects, than the disease known as ma-laria. I n any Germ an plan of war, this problem h ad tobe resolved. As early as the W or ld W ar, I .G.a substance called Optochin, which h ad some prop ertiesof the quinine which Germ any could not get . Optochinwas not successful in its action, an d I.G. continued itssearch.

Spu rred by Germany's desire fo r colonies, I.G. at lastsucceeded. Atabrine, a synthe tic specific which p rod uced

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168 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANamazing cures in malarial patients, resulted, for I.G.knows no fatigue. Thereby hangs a tale of equatorialwar.

As Dr. W illiam Osier said, "No infection except per-haps tuberculosis compares with it in the extent of itsdistribution or its importance as a killing and disablingdisease." T h e frequency and persistence of malaria haveprobably exacted a greater cumulative toll of humanhealth in the span of history than al l the wars everfoug ht. T he re is a close connection between malaria an dwar. L ike o ther diseases to which m an is subject, malariaincreases its inroads whenever the sanitary barriers ofpeace are overthrow n by war. I t is recorded that E gy ptwas saved from the Assyrian armies of Sennacherib in712 B.C. by an outbreak of malaria which debilitatedthat tyrant 's hosts. Du ring the Civil W ar in our owncountry, malaria was the leading cause of death on theSouthern side.

I n the present war, with our t roops spread around th eworld, especially in tropical regions, the threat of ma-laria to soldier and civilian alike is enormously in-creased. Dr. John E. Baker, former director-general ofthe Bu rma R oad, stated recently that i f some meanswere not found to check the spread of malaria in China,the Japanese would soon be able to let the mosquitoesdo their fighting.

Ev en in peacetime, however, larg e areas of the worldare constantly subject to t he disease. I t is est imated that

MOSQUITOES, MALARIA, AND MONOPOLY 169there a re some ~OO,OOO,OOO sufferers from malaria inthe world today, more than IOO,OOO,OOO of whom arein India alone, accounting for I,OOO,OOO of the 3,000,-000 deaths annually. In the United States, it was esti-mated in 1937 that there were more than 4,000,000cases, the ma jority of w hich were in th e south ern states.

M or e than a thousand years ago i t was suggested thatmosquitoes carried the disease, but it was not until thediscoveries made by Sir Ron ald Ross, C. L. A. Laveran,and others, definitely proved the guilt of the anophelesand similar mosquitoes, th at it was possible to institutethe preventive measures developed in sanitary engineer-ing. When the French first at tempted to construct thePanama Canal under the direct ion of Ferdinand deLesseps, they were forced to abandon the project be-cause of the malaria and yellow fever which struckdown the laborers. Sir Richard Gregory, in his book"Discovery," says-"It has been state d tha t befo re th ework was final ly abandoned by the French, a humanlife had been sacrificed for every cubic yard of earthexcavated." No t un ti l Colonel Gorgas was able to de-stroy the principal breeding places of the carrier mos-quitoes could the canal be completed.

N o real relief from malaria was found unti l the earlypart of the I 7th century. Nevertheless, long years wereto pass before th e kno wledge of th e specific cause and- care of the disease were to be known or used widely inEurope. When Tort i gave name to malaria, in bel ief


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170 GERMANY'S MASTE R PLANtha t it was caused by "bad air," ther e was as yet no realunderstanding of the m ode of t ransmission o r th e physi-ological effects of th e quinine used as a remedy. SpanishJesui ts in Peru had used the bark of the quina t ree intreat ing fevers. I t is bel ieved tha t they obtained theirknowledge of this bark from the nat ive Incas. Even atthat early date, the sale of quinine was a monopoly ofthe Jesui t order. Dr. Victor Heiser, in "An AmericanDoctor's Odyssey," says, "T he priests received its weig htin gol d from those who could afford to pay; to the poori t was free. T h e supply was never equal to the demand,and in th e effort to ad just the balance, the t rees of SouthAmerica were stripped of their bark and largely de-stroyed." T h e later monopoly in quinine was to provenot so philanthropic in dispensation of the drug.

T h e haphazard a nd reckless methods which depletedth e sup ply of cinchona bark in South Am erica led toattemp ts to cultivate the tre e in other countries. As wasthe case with rubber, th e seeds of th e cinchona tree weretaken to the East Indies, where by careful botanicalstudy i t was found th at the t ree could be improved an dwould grow readily in the rich earth of Java. Just asthe English at tempted to protect the rubber plants, sothe Dutch sought to guard their knowledge of theme thod s of cultivation and extraction. I t may be re-marked, however, that whereas the English fai led tokeep the ir secret, the D utch were e ntirely successful, somuch so that even up to the present t ime no one has

MOSQUITOES,MALARIA, AND MONOPOLY 171succeeded in determining exact ly what methods theyused in caring fo r the t re e o r what are th e actual costsof production of quinine. Since I 86 5 the Dutch havemaintained one of the tightest of all monopolies by theusual meth ods of mar ket control, but with consequencesmore immed iately and dramatical ly tangible in the cas-ualty lists of those stricken by malaria.

Dr . Heiser graphical ly describes the care used by th eDu tch Quinine Syndicate to keep i ts knowledge hidden,stating, "Not many m iles from th e Botanical Gardenslies a mysterious plantation, encircled by a high stonewall. W ith in this enclosure, which no visitor ever enters,grow th e cinchona trees of Java. T h e secret of cultiva-t ion and extract ion thus jealously guarded have madethe Dutch supreme in the production of quinine."T h e 37?500 acres of trees supplied over 95% of theworld's quinine. As with t he Jesuits, th e supply hasnever been equal to the d emand , not because more couldnot be made available, but because the government-sponsored syndicate of planters and manufacturers, theKina Bureau of Amsterdam, maintained a high-price,low-output policy. Regardless of actual need or effec-t ive demand, only a limited amo unt of quinine was soldto each country. The annual harvests of cinchona bark,no longer necessitating the killing of the tree, wereoften larger than the quotas. In such cases, the excessbark was stored, or mo re often, burned. I t has been esti-


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172 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANmated th at about 50% of the bark produced was burnedin som e years.

T h e l i t t le quinine produced 'outs ide the Nether landsIndies was, through international agreements , subjectto the same price-fixing arrangements. Since the uncon-scionable hig h price precluded its purchase by th e peopleof the areas where m alaria occurs most frequently, thecartel's mon opoly was criticized by social an d m edicalworkers in the Eas t . Th e He al th Sect ion of the L eagueof Nations, at Dr . Heiser's suggestion, periodically pub-lished th e production a nd price record of quinine and itsderivatives, which so clearly bespoke the unrelentingcontrol, which had, with mo re efficient methods, mad egreater output possible, but increased prices and with-he ld "surplus." I t is not too much to say tha t these prac-tices were directly to blame for the continuance of amuch higher death ra te than that which would haveobtained if maximum production and competitive priceleve ls existed.

The international cartel in natural quinine was in-dic ted by the United S tates Government in March,I 928. Twenty-five manufacturers , Dutch, German,Fren ch, En glish, Japanese, an d American, of quinineand o the r derivatives of cinchona, and a num ber of in-dividuals were charged with violation of th e antitrustlaws. T h e indictment summ arizes the activities by whichthe cartel was accused of enforcing its artificial controlover the wo r ld market .

MOSQUITOES, MALARIA, AND MONOPOLY 17 3First, th e indictment charged tha t imports of cinchona

bark and quinine derivatives into the Un ited States wererestricted as to quantity, and shared by various Amer-ican manufacturers , such as the Merck Company andMallinckrodt Chemical Company, on an allotmentbasis. Prices of a ll cinchona products were fixed at bothwholesale and retail levels. Any firms failing to ob-serve the prices f ixed by th e cartel were threatened withboycott, an d shuttin g off of f ur the r supplies of th edrugs, an d this "policing" of th e mark et was rigidl yenforced. All the manufacturers of quinine derivativesin the world were compelled to pool their profits underan arrange me nt known as th e "Aussgleich," or equaliz-ing agreement, which apportioned quotas of bark andquotas of profit, among the members of the cartel.Man ufacturers who sold less than their quota, an d whodid not reach their fixed profit level, received contribu-tions, presumably on a pro-rata basis, from those sellingin excess of quota.

T h e indictment was f iled in March, 1928, and inSeptember of the same year a consent decree was en-tered which enjoined further operation of the cartelwithin the United States. But the jurisdiction of onegovernment was limited, and the cartel continued tofunction in the world market. Obviously, the isolated"competitive area" of this country could not escape theeffects of an entirely monopolistic market outside itsborders . And to make the decree effective, i t would


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174 G E R M A N Y 9 S M A S T E R P LA Nhave been necessary to break the grip of the cartel onthe source of supply. Thi s could not be done, and nomeasures short of an international decree could makethis "natural" monopoly, as it was euphemisticallytermed by its beneficiaries, a competitive industry.

Th at the cartel's continued functioning in the inter-national market remained unimpaired is borne out byconsidering the long-term price record of quinine, andby the situation which existed when war began in 1939,and again when Japan attacked and conquered Java. I n1914, quinine sulphate, the principal form in whichcinchona is given to malarial sufferers, cost about twen-ty-five cents per ounce. In the middle twenties theprice had risen to nearly fifty cents an ounce, reachedsixty-seven cents in 1939, and is now over eighty-fivecents per ounce. Only control by the Federal Govern-ment of the available stocks of natural quinine has helddown the lid on prices.

The Dutch monopoly on cinchona, and the manufac-turers' cartel which held so long to a competition-proofmarket were not free from the ever-present threat toall cartels: market rivalry based on technologicalchange. I t will be recalled that it was during an effortto produce quinine synthetically that Perkin discoveredaniline dyes. I.G.'s continued search developed atabrine,a coal-tar derivative. I t is taken in tablet form, andoccasionally causes the skin to become yellowish, becauseit is made from a yellow coal-tar dye, known as acridine.

MOSQUZTOES,M A L A R I A , A N D MONOP OLY 175Atabrine is in some respects more efficient than nat-

ural quinine. A ton of atabrine can be used in treatingabout 600,000 cases of malaria, while a ton of quinineis sufficient for only 30,000 cases. Since I932, becauseof its higher price, and especially because of the re-strictive production policy of I.G. and its licensees,atabrine did not displace any substantial part of thequinine market during peace time. I n the United Statesthe Winthrop Chemical Company, a subsidiary of Ster-ling Products, with whom I.G. had other dealings, ob-tained an exclusive license under I.G.'s atabrine patents.By limiting access to technical knowledge of a vitalproduct, I.G. had added a link in the German counter-blockade.

As the Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnoldstated in the Oct. 1942 Atlantic Monthly:

A single patent, controlled by I. G. Farben, dic-tated the terms by which this essential drug could bemanufactured in the United States. Sterling Productshad an interest in this patent, but even during ourlend-Iease program officers of Sterling Products gaveassurance to Germany that their interests would beprotected during and after the war. Sterling Productsis now rid of German domination. Today the situa-tion is further safeguarded by the seizure of the Ger-man rights by the Alien Property Custodian. But the

-.spectacle of the production of this essential drug, leftso long to the secret manipulation of a German-American combination during a period when Ger-


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1 7 6 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANmany was preparing for war against us, is too shock-ingto need elaboration.The Dutch, with short-sighted stubbornness, clung to

their cinchona plantations in Java and their rigid com-mercial practices in marketing. These policies haveboomeranged not only on themselves but on all theUnited Nations. When the Japanese overran Java, theycame into possession of more than nine-tenths of theworld's supply, since the only other source of naturalquinine is the scattered and relatively undeveloped in-dustry in South America.

Present evidence indicates that this hurdle is beingsurmounted. Bataan was lost in part because of a short-age of quinine and atabrine. Wi th the forces of thiscountry and its allies engaging the enemy or guardingsalients in tropical regions, which have been among themost active theaters of this war, every precaution shouldbe taken to insure an adequate supply of these syntheticsat prices sufficiently low to be within the reach not onlyof the fighting services but of the civilian populations.Malaria has not yet been defeated. I t has only beenchecked in a relatively narrow segment of the world'spopulace, and that by strenuous efforts with little helpfrom either the quinine syndicate or the I.G. controlledcartel.

Germany cracked the Dutch cartel, and permittedthe United Nations to be "hoist on their own petard/

13. COAL, O I L , A N D F I R E POWER

OIL is the blood of mechanized armies-the richestprize of battle. No sacrifice in lives or money has beenjudged too great to pay for its possession. Denied oil bythe Allies for four years, the Imperial German Armyhad finally gasped and halted.

Like a phoenix rising from the ashes of its defeat,Germany emerged from the postwar years clutching thesecret by which its basic need could be fulfilled. In 1926I.G. belligerently announced to an unperceiving worldthat in due course "it would make all the oil the worldrequired" from coal.' From that day forward there wasno chance for peace.

The core of Germany's greatest military problem hadbeen pierced. The oil which her ancient foes withheldcould now be synthesized.

'What did this mean in specific terms of global strat-egy? T he oilbearing lands of the world were almostwithout exception located in countries which had beenGermany's enemies. Consider where the oil deposits ofthe world are found. T he United States has the largestfields; South America, China, the Dutch Eas t Indies,

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178 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANthe Middle East, all of these were far away-their oilwas owned by enemy interests. Every well was pro-tected by a hostile navy. The deposits of Roumania were'British-owned, and Roumania itself was a member ofthe ring of buffer states which France would use asshock absorbers when war should come again. Any effortto reach Russian oil would mean the expenditure ofcountless German lives with no guarantee of success.

What did Germany have? I t had I.G. and coal. Butcoal was of no use in planes. If I.G.'s magic could con-jure oil from coal, then Germany could begin to calcu-late, free from the torment of knowing that the nooseof Allied strategy could garrote her war machine.

Coal became the denominator of Germany's future.The sandbox of German earth would yield the vitalelixir to fuel her mechanized might.

There is a profound message for all nations in Ger-many's escape from her prison. Surrounded, and lack-ing the most essential material of motorized war,Germany once more placed all her hopes on her tech-nological skill. She was not disappointed.

This technological cataclysm was not recorded on theseismograph of politics, yet its tremors were to rendthe fate of nations.

Not in the ledgers of government, but in t he balancesheets of finance were tallied the first accounts of thisdiscovery. In 1927 the largest industrial corporation in

COAL, OIL, AND FIREPOWER 179the world, Standard Oil (N . J.) felt the shock to itsfoundations. It was as though all their wells had ex-ploded a t the same time. Every coal mine became a~ot ent ial usher.

Like the legendary giant which it resembles, Stand-ard's strength is drawn from the earth, each renewedcontact adding to its vitality. Standard's geologistsripped up a continent in their search for the preciousfluid. I n time they traversed the earth, seeking in re-mote corners of Asia, Africa, and South America, anytrace of oil. Control of oil resources, oil refineries, andmarkets spread around the globe, has been Standard'ssustenance. As late as 1941 Standard owned some 14%of the tanker shipping tonnage of the world.

Because modern civilization flows on a river of oil,Standard's every act is reflected in some manner in theebb and flow of economic affairs. An outstanding au-thori ty on international industry has said of Standard:

[It] has extended its influence over the wholeworld. I n China it has made large advances to thegovernment in return for valuable concessions. InMexico . . . it has been engaged in a struggle withBritish capitalists for the control of oilbearing lands[and] it has been at times one of the principal insti-gators of civil disturbances there.2

This agitation is attributed to Standard in other coun-tries, and was undoubtedly one cause for the expropria-tion of British and American oil properties by the


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184 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R PLANStandard-I.G . Co rporation (S-I.G.), any rights uponpatents affect ing the oi l industry. Standard in turnwould transfer to this offspring i ts present and futurerights und er the hydrogenation process.

With regard to the exchange of experience betweenStandard and I.G., i t was stated that :. . . he part ies agree to work together o n th e tech-nical development of the hydrocarbon field, to com-municate to each other du ring th e l i fe and within thescope of this agreement all technical knowledge andexperience, past, present an d future, pa tented a nd un-patented, of which the parties are now possessed orwhich hereafter be possessed in the sense of having

the power to dispose of them, and also to help eachother in their efforts to obtain adequate patent pro-tectiona4T h e merger of petroleum and chemical technology

thus brought about could be held in check, "regulated"in business terms, only by a condominium of such sizeas the Standard-I.G. combine. Within th e hydrocarbonan d al l ied fields, th e Standard-I.G. agreements must beconsidered as the radial h ub from which other ancil laryaccords sweep out to a ll sectors of th e oil and chemicalindustries.

T h e architecture of Standard's relationships withI.G. is constructed on foundations which, when uncov-ered, advertise the true purposes of the edifice and ex-plain its use. Onc e past the facade of "cooperation," the

C O A L , O I L , A N D F I R E P O W E R 1 8 5structu re is seen to be a fortress to withstand an y assaultby th e forces of competition on the territory of Sta ndar dor I.G., and a salient base from which both m igh t con-duct sorties into adjacent industries.

Th is stronghold was buil t , to adapt a phrase used byStand ard, by "piling paten t upon patent," and th e anal-ogy is therefore not too remote. In the judgment ofthe Senate Committee invest igat ing the National De-fense Pro gram , "to obtain such a patent structure Stand-ard paid a heavy price which, as in the case of othercompanies creating such patent structures, had to beborne by the en tire nation."

T h e Standard-I.G. cartel was in its scope an d impli-cations larger, more powerful, and in some respects, atleast, of greater significance, than any other economic"junto" with which we have deal t or shal l deal . Butth e characteristics of I.G.'s ma rriage with Stan dar d areso similar to i ts agreements with other American andEuropean industrial interests that no doubts can beente rtain ed of I.G.'s purpo ses.

T h e primacy of oi l in internat ional affairs and th einfluences which oil's dev elopm ent has exerted on t hehistory of th e twentieth century a re traceable in Britishimperial strategy since 191 . In tha t year WinstonChurchil l, at the request of L or d Asquith, entered th eBritish Admiralty. Germany was increasing the size ofher fleet and th e firepower of her n aval rifles. Chu rchillgrappled with the enormous task of modern izing Bri t-b -


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186 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANain's seapower in ord er to meet the new G erman navalthreat. Churchill's problem was clear. H e must buildnew ships with firepower beyond any thin g contemplatedby Germany. Churchill knew that a second-best navywas like a second-best poker h and, and th at th e securityof Britain's emp ire rested on the fleet. Ev er y change inthe structure of battleships was a gamble with thefuture.

Churchill himself relates a parable which shows hisgrasp of th e basic nature of technological change. H esays:

I n one of those nightmare novels that used to ap-pear from t ime to t ime before the war, I read in I 9 I 3of a great bat t le inwhich, to the amazement of thedefeated Bri t ish Fleet , the German new vesselsopened fire with a terrible, unheard-of 15-inch g u a 5Chu rchill knew that wa r was th e "art of calculated

risk" and th at there a re other ways for a soldier to diefor his country tha n on the battlefield.

I n determining to equip the Bri tish fleet with I 5-inchguns, he would encounter not only the opposition ofParliament but the natural conservatism of the BritishGovernment . Nevertheless, he made up his mind toproceed.

T o put 15-inch guns on a bat tlefleet m eant the re-design of all the ships on the ways, but in redraftingthem, other problems arose. "The gun dominated the

COAL, OIL , AND FIREPOWER 18 7ship,^ and in order to reduce weight elsewhere withoutsacrificing armor, it was necessary to change the fuelenergy from coal to oi l . By el iminat ing coal bunkers andintroducing oil, th e fleet would ga in at every point. O ilmeant greater speed; oi l gave ships a greater range ofaction; oil permitted the refueling of fleets at sea; butmost of all, oil eliminated the de ad weight of coal.

In moving forward Churchil l encountered anotherobstacle, this time an oil cartel. H e says:

T o change the foundation of th e Navy from Brit -ish coal to foreign oil was a formidable decision initself. . . . Firs t there must be accumulated in Gre atBri tain an enormou s oi l reserve larg e enough to en-able us to fight fo r man y mo nths if necessary withoutbringing in a single cargo of oil. . . . Fleets oftankers had to be bui l t to convey the oi l from the dis-tant oilfields across the oceans to the British Isles,and others of a different pat tern to take i t from ournava l harbo urs to the fleets at sea.. . . And beyond these difficulties loomed up themo re intangible problems of mark ets and monopolies.The oil supplies of the world, were in the hands ofvast oil trusts un der fore& control . T o c ommi t t heNa vy irrevocably to oil was indee d "to take armsagainst a sea of troubles'? . . . If we overcame thedifficulties and surmounted the risks, we should beable to raise the whole power and efficiency of theNavy to a definitely higher level; better ships, bet-ter crews, higher economies, more intense forms ofwar power-in a word , mastery itself was th e prize


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188 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R PLANof the venture. A year gained over a rival might makethe difference. Forw ard, then!Churchill 's und erstand ing of th e relationship be-

tween mil i tary strength and technology gave the Bri t-ish N avy i ts saving edge. T h e new IS-inch gun s werea success. When the Battle of Jutland was fought yearslater, Churchill 's actions were more than justified. Ift he Ge rman High Seas Fle et h ad m et ships less power-ful than the new Bri t ish Fleet , the whole war mighthave been lo st in the space of hours.

Churchill 's decision precipitated a s trug gle fo r oil inwhich the Bri t ish Empire became a ma jor contestant .England entered into the oi l market i tself and ul t i -mately formed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com pany which,in turn, entered the wo rld cartel .

If Churchil l had held high office in the post-waryears, who can say, when Germany declared its inten-tions, that Churchill 'would not have awakened Britain.After al l , i t was dur ing the years between the w ars thathe wrote "While England Slept ."

14. RUBBER-A LESSON IN L O G I S T I C S

PA N ZE RS and armored cars a re the cavalry of m odernwar. T he ir wheels and tread s are rubber-shod-withoutrubber they m ust hal t.

W ith every increase in the use of oil in engines of de-struct ion, the need for rubber grew. For Germany theproblem of rubber was, therefore, another hurdle to beleaped.

Rubber g rew in far-off Malaya, and Bri tain rat ionedit to the w orld in w ar and peace.

Germ any endeavored to achieve in the synthet ic rub-ber industry the same success she attained in the manu-facture of synthet ic ni trates. T h e Bayer Dyeworks atElberfe ld, an arm of I.G., took up the problem of syn-thet ic rubber, intending to make Germ any indepen dentof Bri tain's monopoly in the coming World War. Ata dramatic meeting of the International Congress ofAppl ied Chemistry in New York in the year 1912, Dr.Carl Duisberg of I. G. Farben del ivered an address inGerman on the subject of synthetic rubber, which heillustrated graphically by displaying tires produced inI.G. laboratories. Although Germany was not com-

189


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192 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANproposed between the Goodrich Rubber Company andStandard which I.G. refused to ratify. Standard's ownattitude was intended to discourage the fabricators fromentering into production of any synthetic goods. As theGoodrich Company stated:

Certain it is that little enthusiasm will be arousedin a development where the question of terms onwhich it can be placed in commercial production isleft to future negotiations, where there is a possibil-ity that these terms may be of onerous character as topreclude its employment or where there is even a re-mote chance that the result of our development willbe passed on to another to the exclusion of o~r sel ve s .~For the entire decade after 1932 Standard en-

deavored to keep its control untouched. T he re were twochief difficulties. First, the rubber manufacturers mightseek to develop their own synthetics, which would makevoid Standard's control. That Standard was aware ofthis possibility is shown in a statement made in 1936:. . . following our refusal to deal with Goodyear

on synthetic rubber several years ago, Goodyear wentto work rather vigorously on its own behalf in thisfield and recently has succeeded in making some veryinteresting looking products.'The second burden under which Standard pursued its

policy of averting independent research in syntheticrubber came from I.G. I.G. prevented Standard fromcommitting itself to a positive program of synthetic rub-

RUBBER-A LESSON IN LOGZSTZCS 193her development, and withheld the necessary know-how. As early as 1935 Standard knew that I.G. was notliving up to its agreement to exchange full and com-plete information on Buna rubber because, in Standard'sown words:

. . . The Hitler Government does not look withfavor upon turning the invention over to foreigncountries.'I.G.'s attitude was motivated by military expediency;

war was coming and the German Government wouldnot arm its enemies.

Despite I.G.'s refusal to adhere to its own side of thebargain, Standard, as a "loyal partner in marriage,'' de-cided to give its own knowledge of butyl rubber, aStandard Oil development, to Germany. Evidence indi-cates that Standard's butyl rubber can be made moreeasily, using less critical materials, than Buna. Butylrubber, in the opinion of some experts, is substantiallycheaper than Buna or natural rubber. T he quality ofbutyl as it has been improved is almost the equal ofBuna. Standard conveyed this information because ofcommercial considerations: it had too much at stake.. . . Certain difficulties still exist which prevent

our I. G. friends from giving us full technical infor-mation and proceeding in the normal manner withthe commercial development in the United States.


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194 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R P L A NIn view of the very genuine spirit of cooperation

which [I. G.] displayed, I am convinced that i t is notonly the right thing to do, but the very best thingfrom every standpoint to pass on to them full infor-mation on the copolymer [butyl] at this time. I donot believe we have anything to lose by this which iscomparable with the possible benefit to al l of our in-t e res t~ .~

I n Standard's own words, it was felt that:Until we have this permission [f rom Germany],

however, there is absolutely nothing we can do, andwe must be especially careful not to make any movewhatever, even on a purely informal, personal orfriendly basis, without the consent of our friends. Weknow some of the difficulties they have, both frombusiness complications and inter-relation with therubber and chemical trades in the United States, andfrom a national standpoint in Germany, but we donot know the whole situation, and since under theagreement they have full control over the exploita-tion of this process, the only thing we can do is tocontinue to press for authority to act, but in the mean-time loyally preserve the restrictions they have 'put onus. [Italics added]Axis plans were reaching a culmination; Pearl Har-

bor was drawing closer. No synthetic rubber was beingproduced in this country on any commercial scale. Thereason again was I.G.'s persistence in denying to Stand-ard either permission or information necessary to begin

RUBBER-A LESSON I N LOGISTICS 195large-scale development in the United States. As Stand-ard stated at the time:

The thing that is really holding us up, however,is not the lack of a plan either from Goodyear or our-selves, but the inability of our partners to obtain per-mission of their government to proceed with the de-velopment in the United state^.^Came September 1939 and war. In the following

month, October, a vice-president of Standard Oi l wentto Europe and wrote back to Standard's president whatis now the classic statement of "business as usual":

Pursuant to these arrangements I was able to keepmy appointments in Holland, where I had three daysof discussion with the representatives of the I.G.They delivered to me assignments of some 2,000 for-eign patents and we did our best to work out completeplans for a modw vivendf which would operatethrough the term of the war, hether or not the U. S.came h. All of the arrangements could not be com-pleted, but it is hoped that enough has been done topermit closing the most important uncompletedpoints by cable. I t is difficult to visualize as yet justhow successful we shall be in maintaining our rela-tions through this period without personal contacts.[Italics added]As a consequence of these arrangements, the strictures

which I.G. had placed on Standard were slightly re-laxed. Standard was now free if it chose to license the


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19 6 G E R M A N Y ' S MASTER PL ANrubber companies under the I.G. patents to make Buna.On its own behalf, Standard retarded the pace of thesenegotiations because of its instinctive desire to protectand perpetuate its monopoly in the United States. Thatthese were its purposes is substantiated by two docu-ments. The first is a memorandum by a Standard officialdescribing the type of license to be offered to the rubbercompanies:

The most important terms of the licensing agree-ment are:

I. The rubber company takes a license to producefor consumption in its own products but not for saleotherwise. I t gives us an option to buy one-fourth ofits plant capacity for distribution to the trade gen-erally.

2, A high royalty rate (7.i;f lb.) is fixed so as tomake the operation practical for the rubber companyonly so long as the product is used as a relatively highcost specialty.3. The rubber company agrees to license back to usits improvements.

The effect of these terms is to limit rather drasti-cally what the rubber companies may do under theirlicense and to leave Jersey free to itself manufactureand sell, or participate along with rubber companiesin a manufacturing organization, or confine its activ-ities to licensing and supplying raw materials. There-fore, the licenses offered may be considered as a stop-gap arrangement to permit the rubber companies toget into quick production of Perbunan for specialty

RUBBER-A LESSON I N L O G I S T I C S 197use if they so desire. Beyond this, there has been nodecision as to how the development will be advanced.'

In analyzing the effect of these proposals, Standard'spatent attorney stated:

The agreement as it is now drafted will lead to thecentering of all patent rights of licensees in the handsof licensor, with no outflow of these rights except tocustomers of licensor (and on two minor phases ofpatents to licensors' licensees).

All manufacturing patent license of licensees willhelp to build up licensors' dominating position, but nolicensee will get the benefit of any other licenseesJmanufacturing patent rights. I n other words, this isnot a cross-licensing agreement, but one in which pat-ents are piled on patents in the hands of one central-izing company.'How perfectly Standard's desire to look out for its

own commercial future coincided with Axis plans!The Pacific relations of the United States were be-

coming tense. Standard remained f irm in its determina-tion that no rubber company should make synthetic rub-ber tires until such time as Standard felt that its owncontrol was secure. Two companies had the temerity totry. Goodrich started to fabricate Buna. Three monthsprior to Pearl Harbor Standard started suit againstGoodrich for infringement of the I.G. patents. At thesame time, a notice of similar action to follow was sentto the Goodyear Rubber Company.


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198 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANT he ensuing months a fte r Pear l H arbo r were to teach

th e American public the real mean ing of "too littl e an dtoo late."A Lesson k lockade

Synthetic rubber has become a military a nd economickeystone of American strategy. There would be no syn-thet ic rubber problem if we could grow enou gh rubberor i f the natural rubber industry, over the last twenty .years, had not used a geographical monopoly as anopportunity to create one of the most important of rawmaterial cartels. W e have seen that patents can be in-struments of power politics and warfare. Natural mo-nopolies based upon the concentration of raw materialsin favored areas of the world have played an equ al partin international relations. I n the case of n atural ru bber,the consequences of monopoly and cartellization haveaffected t he course of th e greatest wa r in history.

T h e colorful story of the natural rubber industry hasbeen told and retold. Original ly, natural rubber wasfound o nly in Brazi l. As the uses of rubber in industryincreased, this source became unable to supply theworld's demands. Seeds and plants of the Hevea Bra-zil iensis were smugg led to E nglan d, a nd even tual ly cul-tivation of rub ber was begun in British M alaya, Ceylon,and the D utch E ast Indies .

In a few years the monopoly which Brazi l had en-joyed passed into th e hands of the rubber plan tations of

RUBBER-A LESSON IN LOGISTIC S 199the Fa r East . In t ime more than 90% of th e cul tivatedrubber output was produced in British and Dutch col-onies and plantations.

This si tuat ion was always a problem to the UnitedStates, because this country consumed more than three-fourths of a l l the rubber grown in the world. T h e la rgeAmerican rubber manufacturing companies in some in-stances were able to invest in F ar Eastern rubber plan-tations, and eve ntually th eir shar e of ow nership becamesubstant ia l . During the f i rs t World War, before ourown entry, we were cut off from our supply, but wefa i led to grasp the mora l a t the t ime.

At t he end of t he W or l d War , t he Dut ch and Br it ishplanters had accumulated large stocks of crude rubber.As output continued to increase in I 9 I 9 and I 920, therubber market broke sharply. During 1920 and 1921the British Rubber Growers' Association made strenu-ous efforts to obtain the intervention of their govern-me nt on behalf of th e industry. A special Parliamen tarycommittee was appointed, and in 1922 a program ofcompulsory restriction, known as the Stevenson Plan,was put into operation.

T h e Stevenson Plan, act ing in l ight of w hat i t deemedto be imperial policy, undertook to ru le ou t competitionwithin the industry, to regulate the export policies ofall the planters, an d to set up a qu ota system of produc-tion. Negotiations were undertaken with the Dutch


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20 0 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R P L ANGovernment, but the lat ter stubbornly held out andwould no t consent to the terms of the plan.

Des pite this refusal of Du tch cooperation, th e BritishGovernment enacted the plan into law late in 1922.The outcry in the consuming countries, principally theUnited States, was loud and long, and to moll ify thisagitation some concessions were made, witho ut abandon-ing the principal provisions of the plan. As Great Brit-ain's share in th e world ru bber market began to decl ineand that of th e Dutch to rise, the first Stevenson Planult imately defeated i ts own ends. In 1928 i t was sup-posedly shelved.

T h e cessation of t he measures intende d to maintainartificially the price structure of the rubber market co-incided with th e onset of the Gre at Depression. E ffortswere made to declare a "tapping holiday" in 1930, butthese were futile. Crude rubber stocks rose. Prices andexports fell . T h e entire industry suffered severely.

I n 193 3 conferences were begun to re-inst itute th ecartel. I n I 934 an intergovernmental agreement wasdrawn u p between Great Britain, India, H ollan d,France, and Siam, gov erning world rubber production.An adm inistrative body, the Internat ional Rubb er Reg-ulation Comm ittee (I.R.R.C.), was set up to allocateproduction and export quotas. Accumulation of excessstocks of rubber was prohibited, as were new plantingsof rubber t rees. No thing was overlooked. T h e export of"leaves, flowers, seeds, buds, twigs, branches, roots, or

RUBBER-A LESSON IN LOGISTICS 20 1any l iving port ion of t he rubb er plant that m ay be usedto propagate i t" was forbidden. Here indeed was theultimate in cartel regulation of nature's processes.

The intergovernmenta l agreement was renewed inI 93 8 fo r a period of five years. O stensibly its aims wereth e establishment of "equilibrium" an d "fair an d equita-ble" relationships between the plan ters and consumers.Such .apparently lofty principles, however, could notconceal the fact that, like all such artificial restrictionschemes, the agreement was based on the canons ofmonopoly. Thus, for example, when Germany sharplyreduced i ts imports of natural rubber in the years im-mediately preceding 1 939, the I.R.R.C. cut productionand export quotas correspondingly, lest the re should beany "surplus" on the world market .

I t was, of course, typical of the p urblin d statecraft ofthose years that the governments support ing the cartelcould not read the handw rit ing on the w all which, whentranslated, meant that Germany had overcome one ofher wors t problems in the World War, and was nowprepared to t ry again. Furiously st i rring i ts cauldronson the Rhine, I .G. had learned to brew synthetic rubber,and, as with so many other materials, Germany couldnow discount in advance the blockade w hich war w ouldbring.

Ev en afte r the bl i tzkrieg started, the I.R.R.C. con-t inued th e smooth tenor of i ts way. T h e Rising Sun ofJapan glared ever more fiercely on the plantat ions of


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202 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANthe East, but the cartel saw nothing beyond its own im-mediate shadow. The pettifogging behavior of the cartelaroused no alarm in any of the governments dependenton Malaya and the Indies for rubber.

From the military point of view, as well as from theeconomic, it is almost incredible that great states shouldpermit themselves to be placed at such obviously geo-graphical disadvantage. Pearl Harbor, Singapore, andthe Dutch East Indies were a large fee to pay for alesson in elementary logistics. The cardinal principlesof military and economic warfare, the provision of am-ple supplies, had been violated.

15 . THE BATTLE OF ALUMINUM

FHE battle of aluminum is one of the major cam-paigns affecting the outcome of this war. Aluminum isthe basic source of airpower. Because of its importance,Germany's aluminum industry was expanded to un-precedented size in the years of nervous "peace" beforethe war.

The industrial war is a series of campaigns. Measuredby the yardstick of aluminum production, the Uni tedStates and the United Nations are fighting desperatelyto match the output of the Axis. W e lost the first roundin this struggle, for the disparity remained in Germany'sfavor in 1942.

Since the outbreak of war, our pitiful capacity, stuntedby high price, low-output policies, brought cries of angerfrom a public taken by surprise. The realization thataluminum production was now a fighting front precipi-tated a crisis. Men were toppled from high positions inour government because they had underestimated theneed for this strategic metal. Charges of waste, inef-ficiency, and monopoly were freely hurled because ofthe shortage. Senate Committees held harrowing ses-

203


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2 04 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANsions, delving for the truth. Recrimination was the orderof the day.

Once more monopoly was our undoing. The Alumi-num Company of America, sole ~ro duc er f aluminumin the United States, was harshly criticized.

Other ages have used iron, bronze, copper, steel andtin, but aluminum metal is entirely a product of moderntimes. I t is the forerunner of the "Age of Light Metals."There is some slight evidence that "alumen" was knownin the Roman Era, but it was not until I 825 that HansOersted, the Danish chemist, successfully isolated smallquantities of aluminum in the laboratory. Hi s feat waslater duplicated by Woehler, the German chemist, whowas able to determine more accurately the properties ofthe "silver found in clay."

Interest in the new metal, and realization of its pos-sible applications, was immediate. Napoleon 111, sens-ing that aluminum might be used for military equip-ment, subsidized Henri Deville, the brilliant Frenchchemist, to discover economical methods by whichaluminum could be produced on a commercial scale.Devil le had exhibited a bar of aluminum at the Fair inParis in I 855, and is credited with the major pioneer-ing which ultimately led to the establishment of theindustry. At the time Deville started his productiveexperiments in I 856, aluminum cost about $500 perpound, and ranked as a precious metal. Napoleon didnot live to see his own augury vindicated, but the cor-

T H E BAT T L E OF ALUMINUM 20 5rectness of his premonition has long since been proved.

Aluminum is one of the most plentiful substances innature, exceeded in its frequency of occurrence only byoxygen and silicon. I t forms the metallic base of avariety of compounds, such as bauxite, alunite, leucite,feldspars, and common clays. In commercial production,the ore used is bauxite, which is richer than the othersin its aluminum content. Characteristically, bauxite oc-curs in "pockets," or localized deposits, and this fact hasbeen of extreme importance in the monopolistic devel-opment of the industry. Bauxite beds are found on everycontinent, and most of the higher-grade deposits arenow worked.

The properties of aluminum which account for itsuses are its light weight, its resistance to corrosion, itselectrical conductivity, and its malleability. Aluminumcan be forged, cast, and machined with precision, andwhen properly alloyed has a tensile strength equal tolight steel. Because of these properties, aluminum hascome to the fore as an ideal material for the manufac-ture of aircraft, ships, and other military and civilianvehicles. Aluminum cooking utensils and food recep-tacles are standard supplies of the home. The WorldWar enormously enhanced the consumption of alumi-num for military and transport uses and the interimbetween I 919 and 1939 saw its increasing applicationthroughout industry.

The 'Initial discovery which transformed the industry


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206 GERMANY 'S MASTER PLANwas made by Charles S. Bradley, who filed an applica-t ion for a Un ited S tates patent in I 883. Bradley's appli-cation set forth a process for manufacturing aluminumby conducting an electric current throug h an aluminousore, such as cryolite.* H is paten t was not gra nte d until1892, a circumstance which changed th e later course ofthe industry.'

I n I 886, Charles M. Hal l , an American, and PaulH ero ult , of France, filed claims almost at the same time,in their respective countries, describing the method ofmaking aluminum by the electrolysis of alumina (alu-minum oxide) in cryolite. Hall 's patent was issued in1889, and in the same year the Pi t tsburgh ReductionCompany, which had been formed to exploit his proc-ess, began production of aluminu m.

In 1907 he nam e of the Pi t tsburgh Reduction Corn-pany was changed to the Aluminum Company of Am er-ica, and as a corporate entity Alcoa has been alteredonly once since then, when it merged with a Canadianpower company in 1925. T h e durat ion of the corporatename is the only static feature of t he company. I n al loth er respects it has enl arg ed upon its original holdings.T h e ownership of Alcoa, however, has always beenclosely he ld by its directors, their families, and descend-ants, including the D avis group, th e Me llon group , andt h e H u n t g ro u p.

Cryolite is sodium-alum inum fluoride, occurring in large deposits only inGreenland.

THE BATTLE OF ALUMINUM 207The Hal l pa tent expi red in 1906, and the Bradley

patent in 1909, and theoret ical ly the aluminum indus-t ry was thrown open to a l l who would enter . W h y othersdid not, and in fact could not do so, is explained by thepolicies which had governed the company's develop-ment from the outset . The patents were the fi rst andthe crucial factor which inflected th e curve of th e indus-try tow ard monopoly. B ut between th e date of i ts estab-lishm ent and the expiration of the patents, Alcoa tooksteps to nullify the loss of its patent protection. As arule, patents and control of raw materials are the twostrongest pillars of monopoly. Therefore, Alcoa, antici-pat ing the removal of the fi rst , sought to acquire thenext best prop by engrossing the bauxite supplies in th eUnited States, and later, in South America.

Having preempted the field, Alcoa grew to becomeone of the industrial giants of our economy. It s organicintegration was carried forward by buying up the mostfavorably located water power sites tha t could be fou nd.Alcoa was a member of every world aluminum carteluntil 1915. Thereafter, while Alcoa did not directlyparticipate in cartel agreements w ith foreign produ cers,no alum inum cartel could have existed had Alcoa chosento compete.

W he the r or no t there w ere any tacit or "gentlemen's"agreements, the price, output, and sales records suggestthat th e European s have not sought to invade Alcoa'sAmerican stronghold, and Alcoa has abstained fro m an y


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20 8 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R PLANextensive effort to en ter the European's sphere of in-fluence. There is, however, indication that Alcoa's ac-quisition of European water power sites, bauxite hold-ings, and reduction facilities has had the purpose, andth e beneficial effect ( for Alcoa), of keepin g th e Eur o-pean producers "in line."Alcoa was, unt i l the war prog ram of th e governmentresul ted in br inging the Reynolds Company and thegovernment-bui l t plants into the field, the sing le sourceof virgin aluminum in this country. Moreover, in thefabrication of aluminum products, such as aluminumsheet, autom otive p arts such as pistons, cooking utensils,and aluminum cable, to mention some of the largeritems, A lcoa and its subsidiaries have m aintained a n un-broken "leadership."

By 1928 Alcoa had a corporate st ructure which couldbe used in any stud y of integ rated "big business." Fol-lowing the 1925 merger wi th the Duke inte res t s inCanada, Alcoa ha d an au thor ized capital stock of 1,500,-000 shares, par $100 per share, and the same numberof shares with no par or nom inal value. It s whollyown ed subsidiaries included thirty-tw o companies, rang-ing from railroads, bauxite mining companies, fabricat-ing companies, sales companies, and power companiesin the United States, Canada, South America, and Eu-rope. I n addit ion, i t control led a score or mo re ofaffiliated companies in partnership with others. Theseaffiliated concerns included several European fabricat-

THE B A T T L E OF ALUM iNUM 20 9in g companies, Norwegian, Jugoslavian, Italian, Frenc h,and other fi rms producing bauxite , power, aluminum,and finished goods. W ha t th e total value of Alcoa 'sassets was by 1928 must to some extent be conjecture,but they were conservatively between one billion andone and one-half billions of dollars. At one time themarket value of its stock alone was over one billiondollars. During its early period, Alcoa's profits per-mitted stock dividends on several occasions, and esti-mates have been made tha t for ev ery dol lar invested inAlcoa the annual profit to its stockholders has been inthe neighborhood of 100%. Since much of this hasbeen put back into the business, a fifty-year averagereturn on the total equi ty would be about 1~.5%,a rhigher than in comparable industries not completelymonopolized.

I n 1928, Alcoa executed what can be regarded as oneof th e shrewdest strokes any similarly situated companyever attempted, or one of the most unbusiness-like,depending upon the perspective from which i t is viewed.Quite del iberately, Alcoa created th e Alum inum Com-pany, Ltd ., in Canada, and "sold" to its own offspringall foreig n prop erties which it possessed, with t he excep-tion of its Du tch G uiana bauxite mines and a few minorholdings. The consideration for this sale consisted of490,875 shares of Alted's stock, which were distributedproportionately to the principal stockholders of Alcoa.Formally, and as Alcoa insisted, actually, Alted and


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2 10 GERM ANY'S MASTER PLANAlcoa were completely independent entities. As late as1940 the owners of 81.53% of Alcoa's stock also held83.93% of Alted's stock. W e are faced, therefore, witha unique example of corporate development which eco-nomically reproduces the biological phenomenon of fis-sion, by which bacteria reach a given size, and auto-matically divide into two. But analogy ceases with theact.

What was Alcoa's motive in forming Alted? It s ownreasoning, at least as stated publicly, was to conductbusiness more efficiently in the British Empire and otherforeign countries. Is this acceptable or plausible from aneconomic standpoint? I t is not, because there is no eco-nomic or technical advantage in business operationswhich could not have been served by simply creatinga subsidiary. As long as Alcoa retained Alted's stock inits own treasury, the latter was a subsidiary. By issuingthe stock to Alcoa's own shareholders, did Alcoa freeAlted completely? The questions which arise immedi-ately are first, could it be contended that Alcoa delib-erately created a competitor? Secondly, despite the tech-nical independence of Alted, was the re any change ininterests which it served? To the first, it may be repliedthat not even the most altruistic corporation would setabout consciously to destroy its own foundation and mar-ket. T o the second query, the record answers that thecontrolling interests in Alcoa and Alted remained iden-

T H E BATTLE OF A L U M I N U M 21 1tical, with the exception of minor changes in proportion-ate holdings of stock by individuals. E. K. Davis, thebrother of Arthur V. Davis, became President of Alted.The principal officers of Alted were all former Alcoaemployees. The controlling shares, as has been stated,were held by the same groups in both companies.

Why, then, was Alted formed? I t will be recalled thatunder the 1912 decree Alcoa was enjoined from enter-ing into further cartel agreements with European pro-ducers by means of a Canadian subsidiary. Whi le i t maybe legally moot, it is clear that Alted as an "independ-ent" company could do what a subsidiary could not.Within three years after its formation, Alted enteredinto a world cartel agreement, to which only Alcoa,among all the major producers, was not a signatory.

Since Alted's formation, Alcoa has been able to enjoyto the fu ll its monopolistic position in the United Statesmarket. Acting as a monopoly must, it has done fourthings: Restricted production, administered its priceschedules, parried all threats of competition, and, as willbe demonstrated hereafter, successfully checked a tech-nological rival. T he results of these policies becamestarkly and fearfully apparent when our national de-fense program began. Th e United States was no longerthe world's largest producer of aluminum; this title hadpassed to Germany.

Through the cartel device Germany achieved a vic-tory which a thousand bombers could not have won.


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2 1 2 GERM ANY'S M AS TER PLAN

Force MajeureT h e formation of Aluminum Company, Ltd., by

Alcoa, as a n "independent" corporation, eve n if it werecredi ted completely, does not al ter ths aftermath ofA l te r s associat ion with the alum inum cartel . After theWorld War, the European producers had joined in aseries of cartel agreemen ts, with the G erm an producers,who had been completely united in a war-cartel, againcoming to terms with t he oth er aluminum manufactur-ers. Both the Vereinigte A luminium W erk e (V.A.W.),the government-sponsored cartel , and the AluminumWerke , a subsidiary of I.G. (and of Metallgesellschaft,which I.G. controls), acted as one in their foreign rela-tions afte r the war. Th er e are close connections betweenth e I.G. and V.A.W., th roug h the Metallgesellschaft.

In 1928, the year in which Alted came into being, th eEuropean producers were joined in an Association.Alted did not enter immediately the Associat ion, butdid not in any way transgress its rules.

In July, 1930, Alted was a party to the "ZurichAgreement," by which the Japanese mark et was divided.Alted received 52% of this territory, the other 48%being divided between th e Brit ish, French, Germ an an dSwiss producers. A lted w as made exclusive sales agen tin the Japanese m arket for t he o ther signatories, there-with receiving the rig ht to fix the price of a ll sales. Th isagreement prevai led unti l Pearl Harbor, al though the

T H E B A T T LE OF AL UM INUM 21 3g o w t h of nat ive Japanese production lessened Altedy sgrasp. Du ring th e years I928-1 93 I, there w ere also sep-arate agreements concerning sales to Russia an d India,in which Alted received proportionate quotas.

T h e y e ar I 9 3 r marked the e nd of t he "Associat ionnand the form ation of a ful l -fledged cartel between Altedand the European producers . I n October, 1930, M r.A. V. Davis, of Alcoa, took a t r ip to Europe . Th e Euro-pean s kne w of it, and "anxiously" awaited his arriva l.T h e cha irman of the European cartel , M. Marlio, con-ferr ed with Davis, spoke of "harmony," and pointedout tha t "i t was difficult to have harm ony in th e indus-try i f the European producers were in a cartel andAluminum were not ." And the European producers, asE. K. Davis stated, regarded participation in a cartel"the acid test of good will." W he th er M. Marlio suc-ceeded o r no t in enlisting- A. V. Davis' influence to per-suade Alted to join in a formal cartel , short ly there-a f te r E. K. Davis, President of Alted, began work on aplan for a cartel, the principal features of which wereknown, a t least in a gene ral way, by his brother. A t thelatter's suggestion, Alcoa's own attorneys acted on be-half of Alted in th e conferences in M ontrea l which wereheld in Apri l, r 9 3 r, etween A lted and the representa-tives of the Europ eans.

Th ese conversat ions were continued later in London ,and on July 3, I 9 3 I , th e so-called "Foun dation Agree-


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2 1 4 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R P L ANrnent" was signed in Paris. In performance of this agree-ment, the Alliance Aluminum Compagnie was incor-porated in Basle, Switzerland. T he Alliance issued1,400 shares of "A" stock, subscribed by the membersin the ratio of one share of stock for each IOO metrictons of their respective annual capacities. These propor-tions also governed the relative votes of each membercompany in defining Alliance's policies, and determinedthe quota of total production which each member wouldreceive. Th e total annual production was to be fixed byAlliance. Th e entire executive staff of Alliance consistedof Ludwig Braasch and George Hodson, who had beenfor many years in Alcoa's employ. As E. K. Davisstated, Alted obtained the r ight which it asked for, i.e.,". . . o exercise a predominant influence over the ad-ministrative set-up of the Alliance . . " I t was at therequest of Alted that the cartel placed Swiss bankerswho were "friendly to Alcoa" on the directors' boardof Alliance. (Swiss law required tha t some nationals beon boards of Swiss corporations.)

The ratios of ownership, and therefore of whatevermaximum output might be fixed by the Alliance, wereas follows:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .luminum Ltd. 28.58%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .rench 2 .36%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ermans 19.64%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .wiss 15.42%. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ritish 15.00%

T H E B A T T L E O F A L U M I N U M 21 5The Alliance also had the du ty of fixing prices peri-

odically, by setting minimums on aluminum ingot andfabricated products, below which the cartel memberswere not to sell. To enforce these decrees, Alliance wasempowered to deal in aluminum metal, so that it couldbuy and sell excess stocks or surplus production of thecartel members. The "buying price," set by Alliance,allowed the members of the cartel to dispose of anyunsold aluminum at a price which was high enough todeter them from any "dumping" at lower levels.

One feature of this cartel departed from the standardpattern, and from the provisions of the former agree-ments in the industry. Instead of reserving particularmarkets to each member, the quota system applied uni-versally. By restricting total production and fixing pricesin all markets, there was no need to distinguish betweendomestic and foreign outlets. Th e resultant supervisioncovered the world market, with the conspicuous excep-tion of the United States.

The Aluminum Company, since it was not a directmember of the cartel, was not lega lly bound by its pro-visions. Th e cartel, on the other hand, could never havefunctioned unless by design or accident Alcoa did notdisturb their markets.

One pertinent question stands out concerning theFoundation Agreement and the Alliance. How couldany such contract or cartel hope to operate effectivelyif Alcoa, not being a member, could at any time it chose


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21 6 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R P L A Nrip assunder the whole careful ly planned program oft he ~ l l i a n c e ? he a nswer i s t ha t A lc oa d i d no t do so ,and that the m embers of the cartel acted as if i t wouldnot. As E. K. Davis s ta ted (or unders ta ted?) , "I amnot conscious of ev er having felt any app rehension abo utthe se lling of Alcoa metal on m arket conditions as theyhave been the past several years."

The All iance, l ike al l internat ional cartels , thoughtand acted as a sovereign body. This presumption is ex-plicit in a letter from E. K. Davis to M. Marl io , inDecember, I 935, concerning Russia, whose possible ex-ports perturbed th e cartel . Mr . Davis said, "The otherthou ght th at occurred to me was that the A lliance m ightbe well advised to seize this opportunity presented bythe Russians . . . part icularly their desire for aluminaconcerning which you have already written me-toenter into a t reaty with them whereby, for supplyingthem with the desired quanti ty of alumina and a con-siderable tonnage of alum inum, they w il l join the A ll i-ance under some special understanding or agreementrelative to their exports, thus safeguarding the Alliancefro m possible futu re annoyance from t hat source."

One year after the formation of the Alliance, that is,in 1932, the Board of Directors of the cartel decreedthat the unit of production per share was to be reducedfrom 100 metric tons to 53 m etric tons. T h e productionrecords for the years 1930-1932 present an interesting

T H E B A T T L E OF A L U M I N U M 217comm entary on th e coincidence of ou tpu t policy betweenAlcoa and th e cartel:

1030 1 9 3 1 1 9 3 2Canada . . . . . . . . 34,900 * 31,000 I 8,000France . . . . . . . . . 24,640 18,152 14,360Germany . . . . . . . 30,700 27,100 19,200Switzerland . . . . . 20,500 I 2,200 8,500Engl a nd . . . . . . . 14,000 14,200 10,300Uni ted Sta tes . . . 103,891 80,534 47,577

* Figures in metric tons.

Alcoa "happened to be" the only producer in the Un itedStates, and its figures of reduced production followedthe cartel line. Th ese years were, to be sure, a depressedperiod, b ut th e reductions in output by th e All iance wereonly incidental ly made with such adjustment in mind.T h e Alliance was interested in "maximizing" revenue,by m aintaining price and lowering ou tput , an d in "sta-bi lizing" the wo rld market .

Tha t Alcoa was a factor was recognized by I. G.Farben in a memorandum concerning I.G. contractswhich "extend to the Un ited States." I.G. s ta ted:

T h e firms joint ly agree to avail themselves of thecancellation possibility of the Alliance Alu min ium Co.,within five years, calculated fro m Jan. I , 1932, onlyin the event that Aluminum Co. of America, whichhi ther to has not exported any a luminum fromU.S.A., shou ld commence to export aluminu m or dis-turb in any other way the st ipulat ions of the agree-ment with All iance Aluminium Co.


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21 8 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R P L A NT o be sure, the cartel never was disturbed by Alcoa's

expansion, and therefore no members withdrew.I n I934 the German government harnessed the in-

dustry to its armament Juggernaut, and correctly sawthe outstanding value of aluminum in the war theymeant to loose on Europe. The policy of the Allianceas it was then formulated ran directly counter to thewar program, so far as Germany was concerned. Ger-many would need aluminum and still more aluminumto fit its plans of conquest. Vereinigte Aluminium Werkeand I.G.'s Aluminum Werke at once sought to be re-leased from the quota restrictions placed on them by thecartel. Continued restrictions on the production of thedemocracies would not be hard to induce. Therefore,the German members could afford to show their hand.

The non-German members, including Alted, at firstbalked at the proposals made by the Germans. But thespirit of appeasement soon led the cartel to capitulate.At first, the members tr ied to satisfy the demand of theGermans by supplying them with extra metal, withoutlifting the bars the cartel had set up. These half-waymeasures did not find approval in Germany. V.A.W.was adamant in its attitude: not only must they beallowed to produce to capacity, but to expand theircapacity without stint. As in political and military affairs,so in industrial agreements the Germans were ready toregard treaties as "scraps of paper" binding on others,but not on themselves. As E. K. Davis expressed it:

T H E B A T TL E O F A L U M I N U M 2 19The German producers stated that they were going

to produce in excess of their production rightswhether the Alliance authorized them or not. TheGermans stated in effect that they considered them-selves to be subjected to force majewe in the matter,and asked to have their situation recognized.

This was done.The Germans agreed not to export, and this sop

proved sufficient to keep the cartel in operation as itapplied to other countries, for a time. This stipulationalso removed Alted's objection, since the Germanspromised to buy a ton of aluminum from the cartel forevery ton exported, so as not to affect the world market.As a further mollifying move, the Germans agreed toadvance the price of aluminum sold for non-governmentpurposes in Germany. This was no more than a gratui-tous gesture. Germany restricted civilian consumption,which should have served warning on the other mem-bers of the cartel, had they not been so obtusely bent onpreserving the market arrangements which their com-mercial instincts inclined them to place foremost.

E. K. Davis, in opposing the original demands of theGermans, portrayed accurately the nature of the schemeand the "business-like" basis of the objection. In a let terto M. Louis Marlio, chairman of the Alliance, Davisstated:

W e and th e others who are about to be sacrificedt o this cold-blooded scheme have carried In silence


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2 2 0 GERMANY'S MASTER PLANour respective burdens under the Alliance, await&zgthe time whenwe can enjoy some of the benefits of astrict application of the association's rules. [Italicssupplied]

MorIturI te salutamus!The action of V.A.W. and Aluminum Werke so dis-

turbed the program of the Alliance that the FoundationAgreement was abandoned. On January I , 1936, theFoundation Agreement was superseded by a new cartelagreement. Alliance and its Board continued to regulateoutput, but instead of fixing a "buying-price" at whichsurplus products would be bought by the Alliance, aroyalty was placed on production above quota.The demand for aluminum expanded generally after1936 to such a degree that output-restrictions (but, onthe whole, not price levels) could no longer be enforced.Hence, the Alliance has been dormant since about I 938.But it is still in legal existence, ready to resume its"burdens" as the fu ture permits.

The "cold-blooded scheme" engineered by the Ger-mans worked, and effectively hampered the armamentof the democracies. Germany became the world's prin-cipal producer of aluminum, and created an "aluminumeconomy." The statistical record of output tells t he storyin the barest terms:

1933 I934 1935 1936 I937 1 9 3 8 ~Canada . . . . . 16 ,20o* 15 ,500 20 ,556 26 ,900 42 ,550 50 ,000France . . . . . 14,300 15,10 0 22,000 28,300 34,500 40,000

THE BATTLE OF AL UM INUM 2 2 1I933 I934 I935 1936 I937 19 38

Germany . . . 18,900 37,200 70,800 97,500 127,500 175,000Switzerland . 7 ,500 8,200 11,700 13,700 25,000 28,000England . . . . 11 ,ooo 13,000 I $ , I O O 16,400 19,400 24,000U. S. . . . . . . 38 ,614 33 ,647 54,112 102,027 132,759 130,129* Metric tons.

Since I 938 the ascendancy of Germany in aluminumhas been unimpaired and the disparity made greater byGerman conquest. It is reliably estimated that in 1941Germany produced more aluminum than the combinedUnited Nations. The collection of kitchen utensils inthis country, occasioned by the shortage of aluminumfor bombers, excited public question of such a scarcely-credible lack. The slow-down of aircraft production linesbecause of insufficient aluminum continued, in I 942,to hinder our "all-out" effort. Th e reasons for thescarcity of aluminum in this country are part ly attrib-utable to domestic monopoly, partly to the cartelliza-tion of the world market, and the concurrence, consciousor not, of the production policies of both monopoly andcartel.

Again, Germany took advantage of the "natural pro-pensities" of cartel-makers, so as to weaken other coun-tries, while leaving German industry free from externalrestraint, but completely "gearedn to a war economy.In the case of France, the world's leading producer ofbauxite for many years, the adherence of her aluminumproducers to the cartel until the last hour before war isone direct cause of her downfall. When the Luftwaffe


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2 2 2 G E R M A N Y ' S M A S T E R PLANdebouched from its hangars across the Rhine, to triumphswiftly over the comparatively miniscule French AirForce, the outcome was foregone. France could notremedy her aluminum shortage in the time allowed suf-ficiently to muster more than a token assemblage ofplanes. T he moral needs no pointing.

TO Germany, magnesium was a discovery of greatmilitary importance. It s sources are virtually unlimited.I t is found in seawater and in widely distributed ores.No blockade can cut off its supply, and only productionfacilities limit its output.

T o a monopolistic aluminum industry, magnesiummeant a technological rival of formidable properties. Itsmere existence was a nuisance.

In these two sets of conditions magnesium developedto take its place among the lightest of l ight metals.Germany, since I 9 I 5 , has constantly pushed onwardin magnesium production. T he democracies not onlylagged behind, but sought to throttle magnesium, be-cause it threatened to make obsolete the interests vestedin aluminum. Once more monopoly must guard againstboth competition and technological change.

With Mephistophelean guile, Germany's minister ofindustrial war, I. G. Farben, lulled Alcoa into dreamsof security, while Germany made magnesium in ever-increasing amounts.

Both I.G. and Alcoa "knew what they wanted." I.G.


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224 GERMANY'S M AS TER PLANdesired magnesium. Alcoa wanted to erect a "cordonsamtaire" around the industry. I.G. lent willing aid.

Aluminum, as has been noted, is considered almostindispensable for some purposes which copper, steel, andother metals cannot economically fulfill, and is com-petitive with these metals in common use. Within itsown special niche, aluminum is not, however, free fromthe threat of substitution by a competitive, and in manyrespects, a superior ~ ro du ct , he metallic element mag-nesium. Although it has been known scientifically forsome time, magnesium was first produced commerciallyin Germany in the early part of the Worl d War. TheGeneral Electric Company, in I9 I 5, produced mag-nesium in the United States, and during the periodI 9I 5-1 9 I 9 some eight American companies entered thefield. The initial impetus to the industry was both eco-nomic and military, since magnesium was used in mak-ing flares, tracer bullets, and incendiary bombs, and soldat a price of about $5 per pound.

Technologically, magnesium is in all important re-spects the greatest rival to aluminum. Magnesium can,when properly alloyed, fulfill any of the functions ofaluminum with greater efficiency, since it is one-thirdlighter in weight, it is more easily shaped in the machin-ing process, and has greater tensile strength. Chemicallypure magnesium is extremely inflammable because ofits affinity for oxygen. This characteristic impeded some-

MAGNESIUM-ME TAL OF MARS 225what its introduction into commercial use, but accountedfor its inauguration as a military essential, since mag-nesium generates extreme heat when it burns. Mag-nesium alloys, consisting of varying proportions of mag-nesium and aluminum or magnesium and other suitablealloy metals, possess great advantages as material forthe construction of aircraft, the manufacturers of whichare engaged in a never-ceasing search for lighter weight.The Minerals Year Book for 1940 reported:

The highly destructive German-made aerial bombused in Spanish Civil War raids on Barcelona con-sisted of ammonium nitrate, powdered charcoal, andaluminum, enclosed in a magnesium-alloy shell.

The use of magnesium red

germany’s master plan – by joseph borkin and charles a welsh p2

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