Ghazali's Unique Unknowable God by Fadlou Shehadi; GhazaliReview by: Michael E. MarmuraJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1967), pp. 621-622Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/597618 .

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Reviews of Books 621

al-HAfiz and Ibn Hallikan were intimate friends of rather long standing, from before the time al-Hiafiz became generally known as Jalal ad-Din al-Yagmfuri, and that Sams ad-Din was his laqab before this point in his career. The change must have come about either during the lifetime of Mfisd b. Yakm-dr (d. Satbdn 663, see Yinini, II, 330) or shortly after his death, at which time al-Hafiz could have adopted the new laqab and nisbah as a mark of respect to his recently departed friend and patron. Ibn Hallikan thus used his new titles, by which he was known to the literary world, in the Wafayat, which was destined for publication, but in the MS, which he doubtless intended to retain in his own library, he reverted, perhaps inadvertently, to the form used by al- HIfiz when they first became acquainted.

A few further remarks on the Marzubdn! biog- raphy in the Fihrist, p. 132 f., discussed by the editor, p. 21 f., should not be out of place here. Prof. Sellheim notes that the expression hawdla t-tamdnina waraqah, which cannot possibly refer to the size of the Muqtabas, is also found in Ydqfit, though his citations from the Fihrist do not always agree with the Fligel edition, and though he evidently had access to a copy in Ibn an- Nadim's own hand. This fact is of great im- portance to the textual criticism of the Fihrist. It indicates that the corruption in the text is very old, going back at least before the time of Ydqfit, and perhaps even to the author himself. I would suggest that the author may have omitted a line in making his clean copy, and that the expression refers to a title originally found in the omitted portion. (I do not understand Fliigel's note on this passage: Die Worte hawdla t-tamdnina waraqah gehbren sicher an das Ende des Artikels, since to move the words to that position would only create another problem. It may be that he intended to say that they should

go at the end of the description of the K. al-AnwWr wat-Timar, p. 134, where no indication of the number of the leaves is given.)

Another possibility is that the words were a marginal note intended to modify or replace the words diina l-mi'ati waraqah, p. 133.25, in the description of the K. al-Murs'id, which was later inserted in the text at the wrong point. This is unlikely if the error originated with Ibn an- Nadim, but quite possible if a later copyist is responsible.

Another dislocation is apparent in the descrip- tion of the K. al-Aw&'il, p. 133.20. A work with this title would quite likely contain stories of the ancient Persians as indicated, but hardly accounts of the Muttazilites and their majalis. This last portion of the description may originally have formed part of the notice on the K. al- Murs'id, mentioned above. Ibn Hallikan quotes several passages from this work in his biography of Ibn Ab! Duwdd, a famous Muttazilite (Wafaydt, I, 63 if.). Given Marzubdn!'s own Multazilitism and these citations, we can be sure that in the K. al-Murfid he dealt extensively with theologians of that sect.

All the foregoing observations are, of course, quite peripheral to the main consideration, that is, that Prof. Sellheim has provided us with an excellent edition of a very important work. All students of Arabic philology are much in his debt for having taken the time and made the effort necessary to accomplish this. It is to be hoped that either he himself, or someone else following his example, will produce an edition of the other abridgment of the Muqtabas, which though it contains less substance than the Niir al-Qabas, has preserved many of the isndds, which are im- portant to the study of the history of Arabic philology.

JAMES A. BELLAMY UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Ghazali's Unique Unknowable God. By FADLOU SHEHADI. Pp. 132. Leiden: E. J. BRILL,

1964. GId. 28.

This is a closely argued philosophical analysis, concerned with the language of theistic attribu- tion. Professor Shehadi tries to show, in effect, that if the view that God is totally other than His creation is strictly taken, then the function of the

language of attribution as positively applied to God cannot be descriptive. ile develops the argu- ment that this function is laudatory and practical, not descriptive, through a consideration of the thought of Ghazali, dwelling for the most part on some of his later writings. This involves the author in an interpretation of Ghazali that con- ditions the argument of the book.

The argument hinges on the interpretation of

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622 Journal of the American Oriental Society 87.4 (1967)

the Islamic concept of al-mulkhdlafa, the differ- ence between God and uis creation: Is this in Ghazali a difference in degree only, or is it total difference, a difference in kind? The author main- tains that Ghazali's real view is that it is a differ- ence in kind: God, for Ghazali, is utterly unique and hence unknowable. In a discussion of Ghazali's mystical doctrine, the author argues that Ghazali denies, not only the possibility of any form of mys- tical identification with God, but also any form of mystical experiencing of the divine essence. But how can Ghazali reconcile this agnostic stand with his claim that to know God is part of man's highest attainment? Shehadi maintains that Ghazali, well aware of this difficulty, attempts to solve it through his distinction between the divine essence and the divine attributes. According to this solution, while the divine essence remains utterly unknowable, the divine attributes represent a knowable aspect. Hence to know God is to know His attributes.

The author, however, does not find this a satis- factory solution, arguing that for Ghazali the divine attributes are utterly other than their human counterparts, resembling them only in verbal expression, and hence are unknowable. In the final analysis, the author maintains, to know God, for Ghazali, "amounts to understanding the authoritative language about God which is ex- pressed in human terms." (p. 75; author's italics). He observes that since this scriptural language speaks about God in human terms, if taken as descriptive of God, it cannot be true. Drawing on Ghazali's statements that bring out the laudatory and practical aspects of the language of attribu- tion, Shehadi argues that these aspects in reality represent the only function of this language, namely, praising God and directing the lives of the believers. In the concluding chapter, which is perhaps the most interesting philosophically, the author raises and tries to answer the question of how a unique and unknowable God can be said to reveal. Since this only becomes a problem if we agree with Shehadi that for Ghazali it is not only the divine essence, but also the divine at- tributes which are utterly unique, we will confine our attention to this latter point-the uniqueness of the attributes.

Shehadi has certainly drawn attention to the importance of the laudatory and practical function of the language of attribution in Ghazali. His argument that this is its sole function, however,

is unconvincing. To support the interpretation that in Ghazali the divine attributes are " utterly " different from their human counterparts, the author uses isolated quotations from disparate works without sufficient discussion of the context. One notes in connection with the author's treat- ment of his sources that he lists Madtrij al-Quds as a work of Ghazali and quotes it in one instance, without regard to the question of its authenticity. But what appears to us to be the fundamental weakness of his interpretation is that it does not give proper attention to the Ashtarite base that underlies much of what Ghazali has to say in his later works. The Tahufut, whose debates revolve around two conflicting theories of theistic attribu- tion, is largely ignored. Here Ghazali is com- bating a necessitarian metaphysics based on the premise that divine essence and attributes are identical; hence Ghazali's insistence on the Ashtarite distinction between divine essence and attributes. When Ghazali holds that the eternal will is additional to essence, defining it as an attribute that differentiates and chooses between similar possible alternatives, he is making meta- physical assertions and is not simply urging de- votion to God. The qualified theologian, as distinct from the untutored masses, can at least know this much about such an attribute.

The Ashtarites certainly stress the vast differ- ence between the divine and the human attributes. But they do not negate all analogy. Their view of the ontological relation of the divine eternal attributes to one another, where they argue, for example, that the attribute of knowledge pre- supposes that of life, is taken quite unabashedly from human example. Again, in defending the dogma that God is seen in the hereafter, some Ash'arites argue that inasmuch as God is an existing essence, whatever can be correctly affirmed of any existing essence can be affirmed of God, provided that such affirmation does not imply temporal origination (al-hudith); visibility, like knowability, being a characteristic God can share with other existents. This argument, which Ghazali fully endorses in his Iqtfisad (pp. 61-62 of the 1962 Ankara edition and p. 30 of the undated Cairo edition) should, in our view, be a starting point of any investigation of what the doctrine of al-mukh~lafa in Ghazali means.

MICHAEL E. MARMURA UNIVBRSITY OF TORONTO

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