global agenda council on institutional governance …...6 effective leadership in international...

Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems

Effective Leadership in International Organizations

April 2015

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No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system.

The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of the World Economic Forum.

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3Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership

Contents

5 Executive Summary

6 1. The Effective Leadership Project

6 a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

6 b. Why Focus on Leadership?

7 c. Constrained Leadership

7 d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?

8 e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

8 f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?

8 g. The Objectives of the Study

10 2. Emerging Good Practices

11 a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

11 b. Managing Performance

11 c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

12 d. Developing and Retaining Talent

12 e. Setting Strategic Priorities

13 f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

13 g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

14 3. Appendix: Leadership Practices

14 a. African Development Bank Group

19 b. Asian Development Bank

24 c. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

28 d. Inter-American Development Bank

32 e. International Monetary Fund

38 f. International Organization for Migration

42 g. United Nations Development Programme

45 h. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

50 i. World Bank Group

58 j. World Health Organization

60 k. World Trade Organization

66 References

4 Effective Leadership in International Organizations

Project Team

Ngaire Woods, Project Leader; Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Shubhra Saxena Kabra, Council Manager, Global Agenda Councils, World Economic Forum, [email protected] Hall, Fellow in Global Governance, Hertie School of Governance, Germany, [email protected] Taranova, Researcher, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Kellerman, Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, [email protected] Hugo Batten, Associate, McKinsey & Company, Australia, [email protected]

Members of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems

Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Chair; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University, USARobert C. Orr, Vice-Chair; Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, United Nations, New YorkCyrus Ardalan, Vice-Chairman and Head, UK and EU Public Policy and Government Relations, Barclays, United KingdomAnn M. Florini, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, SingaporeDavid Kennedy, Director, Institute for Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School, USAPascal Lamy, Chair (2012-2013); Honorary President, Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute, FranceJeffrey D. Lewis, Director, Economic Policy, Debt and Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, Washington DCLin Jianhai, Secretary, International Monetary Fund, Washington DCEmmanuel E. Mbi, First Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, African Development Bank, TunisiaRiyad Abdulrahman Al Mubarak, Chairman, Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority, United Arab EmiratesArunma Oteh, Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission, NigeriaKatharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, USAQu Bo, Associate Professor and Deputy Director, China Foreign Affairs University, People’s Republic of ChinaGabriela I. Ramos Patiño, Chief-of-Staff and OECD G20 Sherpa, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ParisNasser Saidi, President, Saidi & Associates, United Arab EmiratesJan Sturesson, Global Leader, Government and Public Services and Partner, PwC, SwedenNgaire Woods, Vice-Chair (2012-2013); Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Xue Lan, Dean, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, People’s Republic of ChinaYu Keping, Director and Professor, China Center for Global Governance and Development, People’s Republic of ChinaZhang Haibin, Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University, People’s Republic of China

Acknowledgements

The authors are particularly grateful to the World Economic Forum for providing inspiration and supporting this project, and the academic advisers, current and former officials who have helped along the way. Conversations with several leaders, who provided insights into the challenges faced by leaders of international organizations, were particularly inspiring, including those with Pascal Lamy, Gus Speth, Takehiko Nakao, Helen Clark, Suma Chakrabati and Donald Kaberuka.

Sincere thanks go to the many officials from the following organizations who answered questions: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). The authors would like to thank the following current and former officials from these organizations: Bjorn Gillsater, Brian Gleeson, Kazu Sakai, Margret Thalwitz, Inge Kaul and Max Watson.

A number of academic experts generously offered their insights and feedback, which made this study possible: Michael Barnett (George Washington University), Sam Daws (University of Oxford), Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (University of Oxford), Michael Doyle (Columbia University), Tana Johnson (Duke University), Jérôme Elie (Graduate Institute), Martha Finnemore (George Washington University), Guy Goodwin-Gill (University of Oxford), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales), Craig Murphy (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Catherine Weavers (University of Texas, Austin), and James Vreeland (Georgetown University).

Finally, the authors thank the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, and the Hertie School of Governance, Germany, for providing research support for this report.


Executive Summary

Good leadership in international organizations is necessary, but not sufficient, for their success. Structures supporting leadership vary enormously across global agencies. This report highlights some of the best practices across 11 organizations that facilitate good leadership. It also underscores that international institutions could learn from each other’s practices across seven domains: (1) selecting and re-electing leadership on merit, (2) managing performance, (3) setting and evaluating ethical standards, (4) developing and retaining talent, (5) setting strategic priorities, (6) engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, and (7) evaluating independently and effectively.


1. The Effective Leadership Project

a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

Over the last two decades, the world has suffered from a global governance deficit. This deficit comprises a lack of the following:

– Adequate mechanisms to deal with issues of international peace and security

– Satisfactory mechanisms to anticipate and counter global economic shocks

– Effective instruments to ensure important global public goods, not least in critical areas such as climate change and public health

In the early 2000s, it was expected that the international community would embark on a comprehensive effort to overhaul the multilateral system, with renewed rules and institutions to address the challenges posed by evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances. These ambitions included reform of World Bank and IMF governance; creation of a new world environmental institution; and ongoing attempts at United Nations (UN) Security Council reform. Recent history suggests, however, that such a comprehensive overhaul will not take place anytime soon.

Almost every effort to significantly transform the mechanisms for international cooperation and coordination has failed. The floundering of the 2005 UN World Summit, the collapse of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round, the disappointing progress on climate change, and the non-fulfilment of early and indispensable G20 commitments all suggest that governments are not ready, or not willing, to close the growing governance gap, at least within the next few years.

In other words, no transformative overhaul of international institutions should be expected in the foreseeable future. In no way should the pertinent players give up on existing institutions; rather, the only realistic alternative seems to be incremental reform.1 Scarce political capital should be applied to improving the performance of multilateral institutions, as radical transformations of the existing overall framework cannot be counted on. Based on this notion, this project addresses one aspect where incremental reform seems not only necessary, but feasible: in the leadership of international organizations (IOs).

b. Why Focus on Leadership?

Effective leadership in international agencies is crucial: the world relies on these organizations to ease cooperation – whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained, mail is delivered to foreign countries, or citizens can fly safely to other countries.

To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identify and deliver on organizational goals without the constraint of undue influence, by individual members or other stakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined the leader’s role, let alone recruited or managed that person on the basis of particular knowledge, competence and experience required to effectively lead the organization. In addition, democratic election processes and strong accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that the interests of executive management are aligned with the organization.

While good leadership is not enough for successful international cooperation, it is necessary for effective governance. However, leadership performance in organizations is often buried behind arguments about which country should get “the top job”. The presumption is that, once appointed, leaders have their hands tied by member states, and will predominantly serve their patrons’ interests. Indeed, leaders’ performance is seldom rigorously tested or measured. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the institutional features needed to promote effective and accountable governance.

This project of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems has taken up the challenge. First, the project has identified ways in which leadership makes a positive difference in the performance of international agencies. Second, the research team has investigated a sample of IOs, drawing out best (and other) practices that either illustrate or indicate a lack of high-performing leadership.

The report’s seven sections cover the positive practices emerging in IOs that support good leadership. This introduction sets out the conception of leadership, as well as the study’s rationale, method and strategy.


c. Constrained Leadership

Leaders influence their agencies’ operational and strategic direction. They work with member states to identify priorities and set strategy, and translate this into operational goals, which in turn are monitored and evaluated as progress is made towards them. Leaders direct a bureaucracy and see that it has sufficient staffing, expertise and financing to carry out mandated tasks. They also must consult and work with other stakeholders. While their room for manoeuvring is limited (see Figure), their actions and behaviour are vital to their organizations’ success. Finally, organizations that depend on ad-hoc funding also constrain their leaders.

In addition, the Council and team sought to capture innovations in leadership across the organizational cases.

Not all of the important elements could be measured. In fact, it was difficult to find a metric to measure the degree to which leadership structures permit resistance against “capture” by a powerful state, private companies or vested interests; and this despite that many instances exist of undue influences undermining an organization’s performance (an organization’s leadership can play a key role in ensuring this does not happen, or at least that it is brought to the public’s attention). Some of this dimension of leadership is covered in the report’s reflections on ethical standards, setting strategic priorities (e.g. the proportion of core vs earmarked funds) and procedures for electing an administrator, director-general (DG) or managing director (MD). Future research could investigate other measures of organizational independence and impartiality, such as whether heads of organizations should chair council or governing body meetings, and how effectively they can shape decision-making in these meetings to guard against special interests. Studies could also examine if an organization’s leader is able to publish reports, policy positions or advice in the organization’s name, without prior approval of member states.2

Another important element of leadership is the “speed of renewal” and the capacity to adapt to changing external environments. This was very difficult to measure or compare across the 11 different organizations, given the variety of environments and issue areas. In the future, studies could look at the extent to which IO heads can (and do) initiate projects, pilots or discussions to address emerging issues, and the leeway they have to shape these. Finally, the authors believe leaders play an essential role in ensuring their organizations collaborate with others to deliver cooperation and other public goods. Future research, it is hoped, will identify ways to track governance in this area.

The report reflects on practices from a pilot group of international organizations. In some cases, good practice seems relatively straightforward. For example, for the selection of an organization’s head: do clear and publicly available terms of reference (TOR) exist for both the position and a high-quality, exhaustive search process? As for ethical leadership, are leaders required to sign and adhere to the organization’s ethical codes, and publicly declare any conflicts of interest and their financial assets? In some cases, good practices may vary enormously – for instance, in how leaders attract and retain a diverse staff.This study benchmarks current practices and does not rank organizations against each other, as significant differences in the structure, size, nature and scope of IOs make ranking problematic. However, some common principles and structures could strengthen leadership possibilities in all organizations.

Political

Leader

Governments members of IOs

Bureauc

ratic

IOs seni

or

managem

ent

Social andeconomic

forces

External

stakeholders

High performance in a leadership role has a major impact on an organization’s ability to deliver on tasks requested by its member states. An IO with weak operational planning, high staff turnover and vulnerability to special interests is unlikely to perform effectively. Not only do leadership governance and effectiveness need more attention in international organizations; a striking need also exists for more practice-focused comparisons across organizations so they can learn from each other.

An important caveat should be emphasized: improving leadership in IOs is just one part of improving their overall performance. Leaders are heavily constrained, relying on financing from the member states that select them. Some IO boards “monitor” their leadership and organizations’ architectures very closely, meeting weekly to discuss and provide regular input to operational business, while others may only convene several times a year. The enormous differences in the broader governance structures of IOs, which greatly influence their operations, are noted in this report.

d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?

Through extensive deliberations, the Council and project team have identified seven indicators of effective leadership structures:

1. Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit2. Managing performance 3. Setting and evaluating ethical standards4. Developing and retaining talent5. Setting strategic priorities6. Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders7. Evaluating independently and effectively

Figure: Types of Forces that Constrain Leadership


e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

The Council identified seven indicators contributing to effective leadership. The research team then determined questions for assessing IOs on each of the indicators and for using as the basis for studies of leadership practices in 11 organizations (see appendix): African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations were selected because they cover a broad range of issue areas (from health to migration and development), vary in size, and include regional and international bodies. However, the selection was not intended to be representative of all intergovernmental organizations, but rather to provide a basis for the pilot study of best practice in governance. Inclusion of other organizations in future studies is encouraged.

A research team initially conducted a desk-based study, looking for publicly available evidence of each indicator. Follow-up interviews with former and current senior officials of the organization, as well as key stakeholders and academic experts, were conducted. Their inputs were used to identify additional documentation of formal processes, and to identify relevant informal practices. Although the report is focused on the presence of formal processes (documented officially, wherever possible, when sufficient evidence is available), the differences between formal and informal processes have also been captured. The evidence included in the appendix is separated into two columns: “published rules”, based on official organizational documents; and “other factors”, which draw on a range of sources – including interviews with experts on the organization and staff – to gain more subjective insights into informal practice. Where possible, “decoupling” (when formal rules are in place but are not to be implemented in practice) is noted. While attempts were made to gather the most recent information for each organization, the study may not capture all organizational practices, as many of the organizations were undergoing significant reforms. A summary of good, formal leadership practices is shown in the Table.

The data for each question across the 11 organizations was analysed to identify variations in practice. The objective was not to derive an “ideal” best practice, although management and public administration studies were also consulted. The report is limited to practices in IOs from which other organizations could learn. Readers and organizations are invited to contribute input3 from practices and examples not discussed in this report.

f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?

An organization’s membership (represented on its board) and its senior management are collectively responsible for ensuring effective processes are in place. The membership or the board have responsibility for some criteria (election and re-election procedures for heads); other indicators fall under the scope of senior leadership (ethical codes, conflicts of interest), and some are shared (setting strategic priorities). In some organizations, a “grey zone” may exist, where it is not always clear who is responsible – the leader, senior management team, membership or board. By identifying these priority areas, organizations should be able to focus attention and clarify who will take the lead.

g. The Objectives of the Study

This study aims to inspire greater attention to leadership in international organizations, instigate learning across them and draw attention to good practice. Many organizations in this study are already engaged in reforming their governance mechanisms, strategic frameworks or other organizational processes. This study highlights leadership structures as one element that should be taken into account.It is planned to share results with relevant forums, bringing together boards and committees in the UN system, and across international financial institutions and development banks. Apparently, a number of these organizations are already sharing practices. It is hoped that the study will foster a more systematic comparison and identification of good practice, thus enabling more direct learning.


Table: Good Leadership Practices among the 11 Selected Organizations

Indicators Examples of Formal Practice

ÎSelecting and re-electing leadership on merit

1. Organizations should search for candidates with specific, relevant competencies, and test these against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.

Criteria/TOR for leadership are published online Selection process updates are available onlinePassport blind selection of candidates is doneOther candidates are always considered in re-elections

Performance is given formal consideration in re-elections

ÎManaging performance

2. Organizations should have clear expectations of performance, which are transparent and consistent with their goals, and facilitate leadership accountability.

Leaders are expected to set performance expectations in inaugural speechBoards conduct regular individual performance appraisals

ÎSetting and evaluating ethical standards

3. Leadership should comply with clearly defined ethical standards.

Leaders are obliged to disclose financial assets and conflicts of interestLeaders are obliged to adhere to a published code of ethicsCompliance with the code of ethics is enforced

ÎDeveloping and retaining talent

4. Leadership should attract, retain and develop talent throughout the organization.

Leaders carry out regular global staff surveys Leaders ensure survey results are monitored and utilized

Leaders are obliged to participate in formal training programmes for their own professional development

ÎSetting strategic priorities

5. Leadership should have the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities due to changing circumstances.

Strategic documents include measurable objectives

ÎEngaging with a wide range of stakeholders

6. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with a wide range of stakeholders.

Meetings between stakeholder organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors occur on a regular, established basis

ÎEvaluating independently and effectively

7. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with internal and external evaluations.

Evaluation office reports directly to the board Management must respond to evaluations

Source: Authors


2. Emerging Good Practices

a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

Many international organizations have no selection process that clearly searches for and tests candidates on relevant (and much-needed) leadership competencies in their domain. Often, leaders are selected in a political bargaining process. However, some changes are under way.

The review of leadership selection revealed four important practices, each of which is being used in at least one international agency: (1) the leadership role is clearly defined, (2) the competencies and experience needed to take up the role are clearly stated, (3) the role and competencies are openly advertised, and (4) the selection process is transparent and clear.

WHO, for example, set out a code of conduct in 2011 to ensure ethical and transparent nomination and election of leadership. It specifically notes that every candidate is expected to provide supporting evidence to match each of the published criteria for the Director General position. The executive board shortlists those candidates matching the criteria.4

In its selection process, the WTO actively seeks to reflect its membership’s diversity. An official WTO document (WT/L/509, published in 2002 and available online) invites nominations from across all regions and stipulates that, in the case of equally meritorious candidates for DG appointments, the diversity of WTO membership shall be taken into account.5 The document also gives the clear time frame for the process to start nine months before, and be completed 3 months prior to, the end of the incumbent’s term. The recent election of the WTO DG was a role model of transparency: all stages were well documented and exposed through a special page on the WTO website.

Although selecting its president remains non-exhaustive and without a clear formal process, the EBRD is introducing greater rigour at the vice-president (VP) level. For example, EBRD conducted an exhaustive review from over 850 applicants for the position of VP of banking operations (a post traditionally held by an American). The search was passport-blind, and included psychometric testing and multiple interviews.6

The IMF has been opening up its processes. In 2011, it published its first comprehensive terms of appointment for its Managing Director.7 In addition to its Articles of Agreement and By-Laws, which contain a standardized job description for executive directors, the IMF published complete terms of reference in the same year for the ethics advisor,8 ombudsperson9 and director of the Independent Evaluation Office.10 The IMF already instituted a rigorous process of candidate profiling in 2007, making available full job descriptions, and the desired qualities and experience of candidates. The executive board set out a timetable and invited nominations from executive directors for the post of MD, interviewing those that did apply.11 However, the IMF’s good formal practice is undermined by the informal convention that the organization’s European members, in consultation with the other members, ultimately select a European as MD.

In the WTO, all decisions, including selection of the DG, are made by consensus of all members. If a consensus cannot be reached in the appointed time, a provision allows for a vote by the General Council.12 In the 2012 DG selection process, WTO members officially nominated nine candidates, each of whom presented their vision for the WTO at a council meeting in January 2013. In the final two months of the process, the council chair consulted with members to build a consensus. The selection process concluded with a council meeting in May, where the decision to appoint the new DG was taken. Practices for re-election or reappointment are not particularly strong across organizations. Performance can be difficult to assess, as few international organizations have objectives for their leadership on this measure. WHO stands out in this regard. During the re-election of its DG in May 2012, the incumbent wrote a self-assessment that evaluated her first-term performance on the priorities she had set out; this was captured in a document and taken into account through the re-nomination process. The AfDB now considers a range of candidates alongside the incumbent for re-election, as does the EBRD, where Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected over the incumbent president in 2012.The more exhaustive, inclusive and meritocratic the process, the better the chance of not only the best candidate being chosen or reappointed, but also of full membership being engaged to hold that candidate accountable for performance.


b. Managing Performance

Governments expect that heads of international organizations, once appointed, will deliver on their mandated goals. However, individual states often have divergent views on organizational priorities and the role of leaders, and some states have greater influence over leadership selection and subsequent decision-making. It is thus critical that the membership and the leader agree together on performance expectations, particularly at the start of a new tenure. Furthermore, the leader’s responsibilities with respect to vision, goals and implementation need to be carefully differentiated from those of the board. Otherwise, lines of accountability and responsibility are blurred, and the board can no longer evaluate the leader’s performance without evaluating its own.13 Setting performance expectations can help prevent organizational capture (when the leader becomes the instrument of a few states) and enable performance management.

Despite the proliferation of results-based management, no organization in this study had an openly published formal procedure for setting performance expectations for the leader. However, all leaders were expected to report regularly to member states on overall organizational performance at board, council and other equivalent meetings.14

In some international organizations, incoming presidents or directors are expected to deliver a statement to the board or general council, setting out a vision and objectives for the organization during their tenure. Such a procedure, for example, took place at the WTO in 2009.15 In recent years, the president-elect of the AfDB also delivered a working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.16

If performance objectives are set, boards can conduct regular performance appraisals to give feedback on a leader’s successes and failures. Regular management of leaders’ performance is standard across the private and public sectors. A formal, annual process to evaluate chief executive officer performance exists in 80% of US non-profit boards and 96% of Standard and Poor’s 500 companies.17 However, very few international organizations have institutionalized annual performance appraisals of their leaders. One study found that none of the major international financial institutions conducted individual performance appraisals in 2008.18

More recently, some organizations have sought to address this deficit. Since 2009, the MD of the IMF has been evaluated annually by the board, based on agreed performance objectives. As part of the feedback, the MD also assesses the executive board’s performance. The framework is tailored by job position and based on the IMF’s annual performance review template. Annual salary adjustments for IMF management are linked to the consumer price index, and allow for performance-based merit increases.

In 2008, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, established Senior Managers’ Compacts for many senior UN officials. These compacts outline the roles of UN department heads, although they do not cover UNHCR or UNDP. Heads must report if they are spending their budgets according to programme objectives.19 In addition, they are reviewed on how well they promote gender diversity and follow geographic distribution requirements. The UN Secretariat’s Management Performance Board uses the compacts to assess senior UN leaders annually.20

c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

In recent years, a number of heads of major international organizations have resigned because of questions about their ethical conduct. 21 Three sets of practices are associated with upholding ethical standards: (1) an ethics code; (2) a clear authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing it, and dealing with non-compliance; and (3) formal declarations of any conflicts of interest and financial assets of senior leaders.

Every international organization examined in this study obliges all staff and heads to adhere to a code of ethics. However, not all codes are public, and not all are formally enforced. The EBRD has a defined formal code of conduct (updated in 2012), which is overseen by a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the president. The World Bank Group has its Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, an ethics helpline, a code of conduct for staff (2003) and the Code of Conduct for Board Officials, which focuses on disclosure policies.22 With women’s accession at the Group, the documents have recently been refined to include sexual harassment. Meanwhile, the WTO’s code of core values is only circulated internally. All UN staff are obliged to follow its code of conduct, and many UN agencies, such as UNHCR, have set their own codes of conduct.23

Some organizations require disclosures of conflicts of interest and financial assets. Declarations are filed annually at the AfDB, which also has an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an office to investigate disclosures. This was a product of a joint anti-corruption task force (2006) of international financial institutions.24 In the UN system, all senior officers must file an annual financial disclosure statement with the UN ethics office.25 Those who do not are charged and may be penalized by the UN’s Department for Administration and Management.26 The UNDP administrator and the UNHCR high commissioner have voluntarily disclosed their financial assets publicly, and made them available online.27 However, these organizations are exceptions: most leaders do not publicly disclose their financial assets.


d. Developing and Retaining Talent

A core responsibility of leaders at IOs is to attract, develop and retain outstanding staff. Leaders can thus help to ensure their workforces have the capacity and diversity to deliver on the organization’s vision and strategy, while proactively addressing gaps in capability.28 This is a challenge for international organizations, where it is understood that particular countries should hold certain positions, and staff selection is seen as requiring a balance of national diversity and merit. At worst, leaders may face pressure from states to hire particular individuals for high-level posts.

IOs can attract, develop and retain talent in many ways – for example, through policies for fair and transparent staff selection, and by ensuring diversity of staff at all levels. However, when trying to study staff diversity in gender and nationality across the 11 organizations, it was difficult to get accurate, comparable data for all organizations. For this reason, the use of staff surveys, while a limited measure, was seen as evidence of senior managements’ interest in staff welfare. Such surveys, as well as staff liaison organizations, are used by some organizations to monitor staff progression and ensure that it is, and is perceived to be, based on merit. UNHCR conducts staff surveys every three years, and has done so since 2006. The agency has a committee dedicated to carrying out survey recommendations and developing action plans.29 The High Commissioner has tasked the Deputy High Commissioner with following up recommendations from this committee’s deliberations. Responses to UNHCR’s staff survey have guided human resources reform and resulted in changes to the agency’s postings and promotions procedures.30 UNDP’s annual global staff surveys are conducted by an external independent organization. The EBRD has recently reprioritized staff surveys, conducting them annually rather than every three years.31 As yet, none of the international organizations examined makes staff survey results available online.

Heads of organizations mentor, support and coach their staff. While few formal processes exist for this, evidence does show widespread informal practices in many organizations. For example, IOM’s director-general makes it a priority to open the training of new chiefs of mission, outlines the organization’s vision and invites open dialogue with staff. 32

Finally, leadership training that ensures the strengthening of necessary senior management skills is occurring in a few agencies. The IMF has recently progressed with leadership training programmes. Most leaders are supported with and trained in organizational rules by their executive office staff and/or their chief of staff when they arrive. For instance, UNHCR’s chief of staff provides informal on-the-job training in UN rules and protocols to new high commissioners. UNHCR’s Global Learning Centre in Budapest has consolidated the agency’s learning activities and programmes, and has a position dedicated to developing and delivering training programmes for senior management. Many organizations are prioritizing senior staff development. The EBRD, for example, has a learning and development

team that works closely with the evaluation department to design measures addressing current weaknesses in programme delivery.

e. Setting Strategic Priorities

Most organizations have a mission statement and strategic goals that identify the raison d’être and ultimate objectives. To deliver on these, the organizations’ heads must translate the overarching organizational mission into a clear, detailed and measurable operational plan, and evaluate progress on a regular basis. International organizations vary greatly in their ability to do this. Some organizations have very broad strategic documents, with weak strategic direction, no measurable objectives and no mechanism to evaluate progress. Others have developed more detailed and measurable strategies, with timelines and budgets. Board members most often work with executive leadership to set strategic frameworks and evaluate progress towards them. Yet, their input varies greatly – in some cases, member states may lead on formulating strategic goals (e.g. IOM’s 12-point plan), and in others, the executive director will take the lead (for instance, the UNDP).

UNHCR and UNDP are committed to producing well-developed strategic documents. UNHCR details objectives in its Global Strategic Priorities, and evaluates progress towards them in global annual reports and strategic reviews. The priorities set out operational, support and management goals, and include specific “impact indicators” to evaluate progress.33 The agency has also established the Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF), which “comprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the organization and relates them to the corresponding management policies and guidance”.34 It works at country, regional and global levels to clarify the lines of accountability, responsibilities and functions. In addition, UNHCR has Focus, a software that integrates its results-based management at country and international levels. UNDP has a series of regular strategic plans covering about four years, and reports in depth on how it will implement, finance, measure and review progress towards these goals.35

In recent years, the IMF produced the Global Policy Agenda, the MD’s vision of the institution’s strategic priorities and actions. It serves as the basis for the biannual International Monetary and Financial Committee ministerial meetings that review and set the IMF’s broad goals, which the executive board‘s work programme subsequently operationalizes. This helps the IMF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances. Similarly, with its president setting priorities, the EBRD has rapidly expanded lending to North African clients in need of greater assistance in their transition to democracy and free markets. The ADB’s 2008 report, Strategy2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020, provided a 12-year framework, with measurable organizational objectives, to guide the organization. A midterm review of the bank’s performance, presented at the board of governors’ annual meeting in 2013, found that 80% of ADB’s operations in 2008-2012 were conducted in the five core areas outlined in the original strategic agenda: infrastructure, environment, regional cooperation, financial sector development and education.


An international organization’s flexibility is also influenced by its funding model. Providing discretionary, or “earmarked”, funding can rapidly spur specific activities and innovations. Discretionary and other tied funds – from private institutions, other multilaterals or trust funds – may enable leaders to expand into new areas and adapt to changing circumstances when they are explicitly sought for this purpose. However, because discretionary funds are tied to specific tasks, leaders may have little flexibility to redeploy these funds with changing external circumstances. Organizations with a small core budget, and highly reliant on discretionary financing, would be expected to respond more directly to donor demands to ensure their survival.

Most organizations studied had a high percentage of funds earmarked for specific issues or projects, implying that leadership has less flexibility and discretion in setting priorities. Over 97% of IOM’s financing is from non-core contributions.36 However, the organization’s director-general has actively lobbied states for an increase in IOM’s core funding, and has also established an audit and oversight committee.37 Similar numbers are seen in other organizations: in 2012, only 2% of UNHCR’s financing came from the UN regular budget, and 98% percent was voluntary; for WHO, 76% of financing was voluntary.38

WHO, as part of its extensive programme reform, has launched the “Financing Dialogue” initiative, spearheaded by Director-General Margaret Chan. Among other things, it aims to ensure that member states and other funders commit to fully aligning fund allocation to the approved programme budget. Funders should make their contributions public to increase transparency, and ensure the predictability and flexibility of their funds.39

f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

Every multilateral organization engages in some way with its members and a wider group of stakeholders, including beneficiaries, private-sector organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups. Some do this more effectively than others. The benefits from positive, well-structured engagement include better information, better-quality collaboration, heightened responsiveness, sharing responsibility, and better public understanding and cooperation with the agency. Most organizations have formal and informal mechanisms to engage with stakeholders – joint projects with NGOs and other multilateral organizations, discussions and dialogues at conferences, and structured forums to interact with leaders of academia and civil society. But as no established “most effective way” exists to conduct these engagements, the challenge is in measuring or attempting to report best practice. Evidence, however, points to the importance of regular, formal meetings between organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors. It becomes more difficult for civil society to have an impact when meetings are informal or irregular.

g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

In recent years, most international organizations have recognized that independent evaluations can provide timely, useful and robust information on their work.40 The World Bank created the Operations Evaluation Unit in the 1970s under its president, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), and renamed it as the Independent Evaluation Group in 2001. The same year, the IMF created an evaluation group, which it has subsequently and independently audited on two occasions.41

Besides serving as external appraisals, evaluations are also another way to ensure that members are aware of the governance, effectiveness, impact and use of their funds. The independence of these evaluations is critical and important to maintain, as are the channels through which evaluators’ findings are considered.

At the IMF, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is independent from management and reports to the board. As indicated in the IEO’s terms of reference, the office engages with executive management, the board and staff when they “respond to relevant parts of the evaluation”.42

At the World Bank and EBRD, independent evaluation teams report directly to the board of directors. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bank conducted a client survey in 2012 to determine both whether the bank was meeting clients’ needs and how clients perceived its impact, as one of the ways of engaging with the organization. At EBRD, engagement is done through links with key people, i.e. the chief compliance officer reports directly to the president, as does the internal audit team. The vice-president for risk also sits on the executive committee.

The AfDB has recently tried to strengthen independent internal and external evaluations. The Quality Assurance and Results department has established a round-table review mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.

The ADB has internal and external reviews. The internal compliance review panel investigates alleged non-compliance by the bank in its operational policies and procedures. It does not, however, investigate borrowing countries, the executing agency or private-sector clients, unless they are relevant to non-compliance. Externally, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) regularly evaluates the institution and individual members, especially large donors such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and conducts regular assessments to ensure their money is being spent safely and effectively.

Some organizations have recently taken steps to make sure they follow best practice. The UNDP, for example, revised its evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the Evaluation Office’s independence and ensure that all evaluations have a response from management. The office’s head reports directly and independently to the executive board. The administrator, however, is briefed before an evaluation is presented to the board, and the administrator’s office prepares a management response to evaluations. The administrator has the right to reply to evaluations, and discusses follow-up actions with the board.

14Effective Leadership in International O

rganizations

3. Appendix: Leadership Pratices

a. African Development Bank (AfDB)

OrganizationThe AfDB is a regional development bank founded in 1963 to foster economic growth and regional integration on the continent. The group also consists of the African Development Fund and Nigerian Trust Fund.43 Governance Owned and financed by 79 member countries (54 African and 25 non-African),44 the bank is currently headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia, having temporarily moved there from its official headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. It has 37 field offices, 6 customized liaison offices, 2 regional resource centres, 56 departments, and an external representation office in Tokyo.

At the top of the AfDB’s organizational structure is the board of governors, which comprises ministers and high-level officials of economic, financial and development institutions from shareholder countries. The board of governors meets once a year and delegates day-to-day decision-making to a 20-member board of directors. The president, who is always an African and who is elected by the board of governors, chairs the board of directors.

Length of leadership mandateA renewable five-year term.

IncomeAs of December 2012, the AfDB’s cumulative authorized capital was $103 billion, while the subscribed capital stood at $100.2 billion (60% subscribed by regional members and 40% by non-regional members).

Number of staff2,068 regular staff, as of December 2012.

History of leadershipIn the early to mid 1990s, AfDB faced severe financial crises, compounded by major management problems. Distrust among shareholders, board, management and staff had weakened executive functions, procedures and controls, as well as policy and oversight functions. By the early 2000s, the AfDB fixed its balance sheet and regained its AAA credit rating via mechanisms for institutional reform. This strategic initiative has been reinvigorated under the current president.

Previous presidents were: Mamoun Beheiry (from Sudan, 1964-1970); Abdelwahab Labidi (Tunisia, 1970-1976); Kwame Donkor Fordwor (Ghana, 1976-1979); Godwin Gondwe (Malawi; caretaker capacity, 1979-1980); Willa Mung’Omba (Zambia, 1980-1985); Babacar N’diaye (Senegal, 1985-1995) and Omar Kabbaj (Morocco, 1995-2005).

The current president is Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda, 2005-to date).

Current trajectoryKaberuka, Rwanda’s finance minister in the decade following the genocide, has given the AfDB international prominence, and exponentially increased lending to the private sector, since taking over as president. Under his leadership, the bank has received more confidence from its shareholders, as evidenced by recent votes to increase its capital base and to replenish its resources. A growing number of African countries now see the bank as a lender and adviser of first choice, although it has fewer resources than the World Bank. The AfDB’s strategy, covered in At the Center of Africa’s Transformation: Strategy for 2013-2022,45 proposes a variety of reforms of leadership mechanisms. The next board session will take place in Abidjan in September 2014.

15Evaluation of O

rganizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership

Indicator Published rules Other factors I. The leadership selection process searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.

1 Does the Multi-lateral Organization/International Organization (MO/IO) publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?

Neither terms of reference nor criteria for the president’s position are found openly published.

2 What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?

Full membership, but with different voting power. The founding Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank (1963) states that the board of governors elects the president “by a majority of the total voting power of the members, including a majority of the total voting power of the regional members”.46 Each AfDB member country, however, has an equal number of basic votes (625) in addition to the/a number of votes proportionate to its paid-in shares. The bank lists voting powers of each state in its annual reports in a transparent table based on subscriptions and contributions.47

3 Is there a time-bound, published and exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?

No. The establishing Agreement only states that it should be “a person of the highest competence in matters pertaining to the activities, management and administration of the Bank and shall be a national of a regional member state”.48

II. The leader has clear performance expectations, which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO’s overarching goals and which facilitate leadership accountability.

1 Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?

There is no official procedure for setting performance expectations. In practice, candidates outline the issues or themes they consider important, and the president-elect is expected to outline their working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.49

2 Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?

The current president has taken things further along with concrete steps in this direction: (a) the elaboration of the Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2012 (MTS) with the advice of a high-level panel of eminent people; and (b) the AfDB Ten-Year Strategy (TYS) for 2013-2022.50 In addition, the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 proposes to “transform the leadership statement into tangible actions that managers can enact with staff on an ongoing basis”, and that “each leader and manager will have clear people management goals in their annual objectives that link to these standards and goals”.51


rganizations

3 Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?

Yes. The establishing Agreement states “the Bank, its President, Vice-Presidents, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned”.52 This principle of impartiality is enforced through the Staff Integrity and Ethics Office (SIEO) and the Anti-Corruption Department that investigates allegations of prohibited practices and related staff misconduct.

4 Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?

Yes, equal for each staff member of the bank. There is an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an investigation office to look into the above. This was a product of a joint IFI anti-corruption task force (2006). The Bank also has a 1999 code of conduct for staff, as well as a 2007 code of conduct for executive directors.

III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance1 Is the leadership subjected to annual

performance appraisal?Not formally, but the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 proposes that in the near future the “leadership behaviours will be translated into specific behavioural requirements, and progress will be measured through management effectiveness and employee engagement indices and 360 feedback, and supported by development interventions.”53 Each VP now has to sign a “Performance Contract” annually with the president.

2 Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?

No evidence.

3 Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?

No official mechanisms established, but supplying “managers with coaches or mentors to provide confidential help to become more effective” is one of the initiatives of the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 (implementation began in the 3rd quarter of 2013).54

IV. Leadership re-election is based on transparent processes and metrics1 Are performance management criteria

considered by the full membership in the re-election process?

No evidence.

2 Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?

No evidence.

V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances1 Does the leader have the authority

to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?

Yes. Mainly through structural changes in the Bank. Due to the establishing Agreement the AfDB President determines the organizational structure, functions and responsibilities as well as the regional and country representation offices.55

17Evaluation of O

rganizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership

2 Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?

Yes. For example, the Results Management Framework will monitor implementation of the new Strategy for 2013-2022 over the 3-year planning horizon reflected in the rolling plan and assess the development effectiveness of the institution.

3 What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?

The Fund has available resources entrusted to it under Article 8 of the founding Agreement (1963), which empowers the Fund to receive other resources including grants from State Participants, non-participating countries, and from any public or private body or bodies.56 There has been an increase in trust funds capital in 2010 – 73% compared to 2009 – that triggered a trust funds reform.57

As of 2012, the Bank mobilized a total of $127.7 million from donors to replenish the existing thematic ($130 million) and bilateral ($22.6 million) Trust Funds. By the end of 2012, the African Development Bank had made substantial progress under its Trust Fund Reform policy by moving away from tied bilateral funds to multi-donor Trust Funds most of which are thematic in nature (for example, South-South Cooperation Trust Fund with Brazil ($6 million) approved by the Board in March 2011).

VI. The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent through-out the organization1 Does the organization take staff

surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?

Yes. The first staff survey was conducted in 2007. In 2010 President Kaberuka committed to a regular corporate accountability exercise, involving both client survey and a staff survey.58 The most recent staff survey was completed in December 2013 with results expected to be published in February 2014.

There have been a number of staff surveys in the past and we are planning to institutionalize the process and include results (staff engagement survey) as part of our Results Measurement Framework – the fundamental benchmark against which we assess our own performance. One of the 2013-2022 Strategy59 goals is: to put focus on “performance priorities, talent management and succession planning”.60

2 Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?

No evidence.


rganizations

VII. MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholdersNo. According to the Framework for Enhanced Engagement with Civil Society Organizations (2012), the Bank has no mechanisms to ensure systematic CSOs engagement, but aims at strengthening and institutionalizing it.61 The document encourages the staff (management included) to engage with stakeholders.62 Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) administers Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) through which people adversely affected by a project financed by the AfDB can request the Bank to comply with its own policies and procedures.

VIII. MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluationsThe Bank has structures to deal with both internal/independent and external evaluations.63

For independent evaluations there is a Management Response and a Management Action Record (MAR) that is published and discussed with the Board. The MAR sets out time-bound actions the Bank will (or will not) take in response to Recommendations made by Independent Evaluators. Management and Evaluators then jointly track implementation of these Management Commitments. For external Evaluations (e.g. UK Multilateral Aid Review, Australian Multilateral Aid Review or MOPAN) the Bank prepares Management Responses (though not usually an MAR).Quality Assurance and Results Department has established a Roundtable Review Mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review the evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.


b. A

sian

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

k (A

DB

)

Org

aniz

atio

nFo

unde

d in

196

6 by

31

coun

tries

to s

uppo

rt ec

onom

ic g

row

th a

nd re

gion

al

inte

grat

ion

in A

sia,

the

AD

B n

ow h

as 6

7 m

embe

rs. I

t pro

vide

s lo

ans,

gra

nts,

te

chni

cal a

ssis

tanc

e an

d eq

uity

inve

stm

ents

to s

over

eign

s, c

entra

l ban

ks, n

on-

profi

t org

aniz

atio

ns a

nd p

rivat

e-se

ctor

clie

nts.

The

AD

B d

raw

s fro

m o

rdin

ary

capi

tal r

esou

rces

(OC

R) a

nd e

ight

spe

cial

fund

s, in

clud

ing

the

Asi

an D

evel

opm

ent

Fund

(AD

F).64

The

ban

k is

hea

dqua

rtere

d in

Man

ila, P

hilip

pine

s.

Gov

erna

nce

The

AD

B g

rant

s al

l pow

ers

to th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

, com

pose

d of

one

re

pres

enta

tive

of e

ach

mem

ber.

The

boar

d m

ay d

eleg

ate

any

or a

ll po

wer

s to

the

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s, e

xcep

t tho

se p

ower

s ex

clus

ivel

y re

serv

ed fo

r the

gov

erno

rs.65

Th

e bo

ard

of d

irect

ors

hand

les

day-

to-d

ay m

anag

emen

t in

prac

tice,

and

is

com

pose

d of

12

mem

bers

ele

cted

by

the

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs (e

ight

by

regi

onal

m

embe

rs a

nd fo

ur b

y no

n-re

gion

al m

embe

rs) f

or re

new

able

two-

year

term

s.66

Th

e ba

nk’s

pre

side

nt c

hairs

the

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s bu

t has

no

vote

, exc

ept i

n th

e ev

ent o

f an

equa

l div

isio

n, in

whi

ch c

ase

the

pres

iden

t has

the

deci

ding

vot

e.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Five

yea

rs; r

e-el

ecta

ble.

Inco

me

$9.4

billi

on in

app

rove

d O

CR

loan

s in

201

2. T

otal

sub

scrib

ed c

apita

l in

the

sam

e ye

ar w

as $

163.

129

billio

n, w

ith a

n op

erat

ing

inco

me

of $

464.

7 m

illion

.67

Num

ber

of s

taff

3,04

5.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pEv

ery

pres

iden

t has

bee

n Ja

pane

se. T

he p

ast p

resi

dent

s w

ere:

Tak

eshi

Wat

anab

e (1

966-

1972

), S

hiro

Inou

e (1

972-

1976

), Ta

roic

hi Y

oshi

da (1

976-

1981

), M

asau

Fu

jioka

(198

1-19

89),

Kim

imas

a Ta

rum

izu

(198

9-19

93),

Mits

uo S

ato

(199

3-19

99),

Tada

o C

hino

(199

9-20

05) a

nd H

aruh

iko

Kur

oda

(200

5-20

13).

The

curre

nt p

resi

dent

is T

akeh

iko

Nak

ao (2

013-

pres

ent).

The

elec

tion

of N

akao

, the

nin

th-c

onse

cutiv

e un

cont

este

d Ja

pane

se c

andi

date

in a

ro

w, h

as le

d m

any

to q

uest

ion

the

info

rmal

con

vent

ion

of J

apan

sel

ectin

g th

e A

DB

pr

esid

ent.68

For

exa

mpl

e, E

swar

Pra

sad,

Tol

ani S

enio

r Pro

fess

or o

f Tra

de P

olic

y,

Cor

nell

Uni

vers

ity, a

nd c

ontri

buto

r to

the

Asi

an D

evel

opm

ent B

ank

Inst

itute

69, t

old

the

Fina

ncia

l Tim

es: “

The

Chi

nese

hav

e lo

ng w

ante

d [c

ontro

l of]

the

AD

B.”

70 C

hina

ha

s no

t pub

licly

con

firm

ed th

is d

esire

. How

ever

, dur

ing

an a

ddre

ss a

t the

AD

B’s

20

14 A

stan

a co

nfer

ence

, Chi

nese

repr

esen

tativ

e Ji

wei

Lou

not

ed: “

Emer

ging

ec

onom

ies

in th

e re

gion

are

in a

pos

ition

to b

e A

DB

’s fi

nanc

ing

partn

ers,

but

th

eir v

oice

and

repr

esen

tatio

n ne

ed to

be

incr

ease

d th

roug

h th

e re

form

of A

DB

’s

gove

rnan

ce s

truct

ure

so a

s to

ena

ble

them

to u

nder

take

mor

e re

spon

sibi

litie

s fo

r A

DB

’s d

evel

opm

ent.”

71

Furth

er, m

any

see

Chi

na’s

pro

posa

l for

an

Asi

an In

frast

ruct

ure

Inve

stm

ent

Ban

k (A

IIB) a

s a

chal

leng

e to

wha

t is

perc

eive

d to

be

a Ja

pane

se-d

omin

ated

A

DB

.72 N

akao

has

pub

licly

wel

com

ed th

e ne

w b

ank.

73 H

owev

er, R

ober

t Orr,

US

A

mba

ssad

or to

the

AD

B, h

as n

oted

that

Chi

na m

ay b

e cr

eatin

g th

e A

IIB o

ut o

f fru

stra

tion,

due

to it

s in

abilit

y to

incr

ease

its

capi

tal c

ontri

butio

n (a

nd th

us v

otin

g po

wer

) in

the

exis

ting

inst

itutio

n.74

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryN

akao

rece

ntly

ple

dged

to a

ctiv

ely

expl

ore

optio

ns to

add

ress

the

bank

’s “

reso

urce

ch

alle

nge”

and

take

adv

anta

ge o

f opp

ortu

nitie

s to

co-

finan

ce w

ith b

ilate

ral a

nd

priv

ate-

sect

or s

ourc

es.75

Fur

ther

, at t

he 4

7th

Ann

ual M

eetin

g of

the

Boa

rd o

f G

over

nors

in 2

014,

Nak

ao a

nnou

nced

pla

ns to

com

bine

the

conc

essi

onal

AD

F an

d LI

BO

R-b

ased

OC

R. T

he m

erge

r of t

he fu

nds

aim

s to

incr

ease

AD

B’s

equ

ity b

ase

with

out i

ts h

avin

g to

requ

est a

dditi

onal

fund

s fro

m m

embe

rs.76

Ulti

mat

ely,

this

wou

ld

enha

nce

the

bank

’s c

apac

ity to

pro

vide

con

cess

iona

l fina

ncin

g fo

r dev

elop

men

t pr

ojec

ts.


Indi

cato

rP

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

No

evid

ence

.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Form

ally

, ful

l mem

bers

hip.

(a) E

ach

Gov

erno

r can

nom

inat

e a

cand

idat

e. (b

) Eac

h m

embe

r cou

ntry

has

one

vot

e. T

he P

resi

dent

is

elec

ted

by a

sim

ple

maj

ority

of G

over

nors

repr

esen

ting

no le

ss th

an a

m

ajor

ity o

f tot

al v

otin

g po

wer

of a

ll m

embe

rs.77

Fur

ther

, the

Pre

side

nt

mus

t be

a na

tiona

l of a

regi

onal

mem

ber c

ount

ry (e

.g.,

ther

e ca

nnot

be

an A

mer

ican

Pre

side

nt).78

Muc

h lik

e th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

tradi

tion

of s

elec

ting

an A

mer

ican

Pre

side

nt, t

he A

DB

is c

omm

only

un

ders

tood

to o

pera

te u

nder

the

info

rmal

co

nven

tion

that

the

Pre

side

nt is

sel

ecte

d by

Jap

an

(Yas

utom

o 19

93, 1

995;

Wan

199

5; K

ilby

2006

, 20

11; L

im &

Vre

elan

d 20

13).

Ever

y P

resi

dent

has

be

en J

apan

ese,

and

mos

t hav

e co

me

dire

ctly

from

th

e Fi

nanc

e M

inis

try o

f Jap

an.79

Lim

& V

reel

and

(201

3) w

rite

that

in a

dditi

on to

its

larg

e fo

rmal

vot

ing

pow

er, J

apan

“ex

erts

info

rmal

influ

ence

thro

ugh

its

de fa

cto

appo

intm

ent o

f the

AD

B p

resi

dent

.”80

AD

B

Dire

ctor

of S

trate

gy K

azu

Sak

ai s

trong

ly d

isag

reed

w

ith th

e no

tion

that

Jap

an ‘d

e fa

cto’

app

oint

s th

e P

resi

dent

. He

rem

inde

d vi

a in

terv

iew

that

eve

ry

regi

onal

mem

ber c

an p

ut fo

rwar

d a

cand

idat

e, a

nd

that

“no

oth

er c

andi

date

doe

s no

t mea

n th

ere

was

no

ele

ctio

n; th

ere

was

[stil

l] an

ele

ctio

n an

d vo

ting.

” N

umer

ous

acad

emic

s an

d ob

serv

ers

mai

ntai

n,

how

ever

, tha

t the

stro

ng in

form

al in

fluen

ce a

nd la

rge

mon

etar

y co

ntrib

utio

n of

Jap

an a

llow

s it

to p

ick

the

Pre

side

nt u

ncon

test

ed.81

But

as

Sak

ai c

orre

ctly

no

tes,

ther

e is

no

form

al e

vide

nce

that

wou

ld

confi

rm s

uch

an in

form

al a

rran

gem

ent,

asid

e fro

m

the

fact

that

ther

e ha

s ne

ver b

een

a no

n-Ja

pane

se

cand

idat

e pr

opos

ed b

y an

y m

embe

r.3

Is th

ere

a tim

e-bo

und,

pub

lishe

d,

exha

ustiv

e pr

oces

s fo

r lea

ders

hip

sele

ctio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

No

evid

ence

.


II.

The

lead

er h

as c

lear p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

Yes.

The

AD

B is

larg

ely

guid

ed b

y go

als

stat

ed in

its

‘Stra

tegy

2020

’82

repo

rt. T

o m

easu

re th

e B

ank’

s pe

rform

ance

, a ‘R

esul

ts F

ram

ewor

k’

appr

oved

by

the

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

is a

lso

publ

ishe

d.83

The

Ban

k al

so

feat

ures

a ‘D

evel

opm

ent E

ffect

iven

ess

Rev

iew

,’84 a

n In

depe

nden

t Ev

alua

tion

Dep

artm

ent (

IED

)85, a

Com

plia

nce

Rev

iew

Pan

el (C

RP

)86, a

tra

nspa

renc

y po

licy87

, and

a n

ew V

ice-

Pre

side

nt fo

r Adm

inis

tratio

n an

d C

orpo

rate

Man

agem

ent.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

Yes.

In O

ctob

er th

e cu

rrent

Pre

side

nt a

ddre

ssed

how

the

AD

B c

an

fulfi

l the

goa

ls o

f Stra

tegy

2020

in a

writ

ten

stat

emen

t sub

mitt

ed

to th

e 88

th m

eetin

g of

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Dev

elop

men

t Com

mitt

ee in

W

ashi

ngto

n D

.C.88

At t

he A

DB

’s 2

014

Ann

ual G

ener

al M

eetin

g of

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs in

Ast

ana,

Nak

ao o

utlin

ed te

n pr

iorit

y ac

tion

area

s to

fulfi

l the

goa

ls o

f Stra

tegy

2020

in li

ght o

f its

mid

-ter

m re

view

.89

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. T

he 2

011

Cod

e of

Con

duct

requ

ires

the

Pre

side

nt a

nd D

irect

ors

to d

iscl

ose

any

such

con

flict

s to

the

AD

B E

thic

s C

omm

ittee

.90

Ther

e ar

e al

so g

uide

lines

for t

he a

void

ance

of c

onfli

cts

of in

tere

st in

in

depe

nden

t eva

luat

ions

91, a

nd a

ll st

aff i

nvol

ved

in le

ndin

g ac

tiviti

es a

re

requ

ired

to d

iscl

ose

such

inte

rest

s.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. T

here

is a

n Et

hics

com

mitt

ee th

at h

as p

ublis

hed

rule

s on

gift

s an

d en

terta

inm

ent92

, acc

ess

durin

g in

vest

igat

ions

93, g

uide

lines

for

alle

gatio

ns o

f mis

cond

uct94

and

gen

eral

cod

e of

con

duct

for a

ll em

ploy

ees.

95

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

No

evid

ence

.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

Sal

ary

incr

ease

s fo

r mos

t em

ploy

ees

are

tied

to p

erfo

rman

ce b

ut it

is

unc

lear

if th

is a

pplie

s to

the

Pre

side

nt. T

he P

resi

dent

’s e

xact

sal

ary

is n

ot a

vaila

ble

but t

he h

ighe

st s

alar

y ca

tego

ry (I

S10

) ran

ged

from

$2

57,8

00 –

$32

2,30

0 ac

cord

ing

to a

201

4 pr

opos

al.96

Exe

cutiv

e sa

larie

s re

mai

n an

exc

lusi

ve ri

ght o

f the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs.

The

Com

mitt

ee o

n R

emun

erat

ion,

est

ablis

hed

via

Res

olut

ion

No.

66

(and

am

ende

d by

Res

olut

ions

15

5 an

d 17

5) u

nder

take

s an

ann

ual r

evie

w o

f the

P

resi

dent

and

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s’ s

alar

ies.

It m

ay

subm

it a

prop

osal

to th

e B

oard

of G

over

nors

for

adju

stm

ents

to th

e B

oard

of D

irect

ors

ever

y ye

ar

and

the

Pre

side

nt e

very

oth

er y

ear.97

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

No

evid

ence

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent c

riter

ia

cons

ider

ed b

y th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

No

evid

ence

.


2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e ha

s ne

ver b

een

anot

her c

andi

date

put

forw

ard

in th

e ev

ent o

f an

elec

tion

or re

-ele

ctio

n.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt is

ent

rust

ed w

ith th

e au

thor

ity to

con

duct

the

‘bus

ines

s of

the

bank

.’98 H

owev

er, m

ajor

cha

nges

to s

trate

gic

prio

ritie

s (o

r con

tinua

tions

of e

xist

ing

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies)

requ

ire a

ppro

val b

y th

e B

oard

of D

irect

ors.

The

Pre

side

nt o

f the

AD

B is

wid

ely

unde

rsto

od

to e

xerc

ise

sign

ifica

nt p

erso

nal p

ower

with

in

the

orga

niza

tion.

99 O

ne fo

rmer

dire

ctor

-gen

eral

, sp

eaki

ng u

nder

con

ditio

n of

ano

nym

ity in

201

0, to

ld

Lim

and

Vre

elan

d (2

013)

: “th

e A

DB

is li

ke a

sta

te,

and

the

AD

B P

resi

dent

is li

ke it

s em

pero

r.”10

0 Thi

s in

terp

reta

tion

was

stro

ngly

con

test

ed, h

owev

er, b

y A

DB

Dire

ctor

of S

trate

gy K

azu

Sak

ai in

an

inte

rvie

w

cond

ucte

d fo

r thi

s re

port.

Sak

ai s

tress

ed th

at th

e A

DB

’s 1

2-m

embe

r Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s (e

lect

ed b

y th

e G

over

nors

) mus

t app

rove

all

maj

or d

ecis

ions

pr

opos

ed b

y th

e P

resi

dent

, and

that

the

abov

e qu

ote

is a

“co

mpl

ete

mis

repr

esen

tatio

n of

the

AD

B.”

101

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt c

an p

ut fo

rwar

d a

stra

tegi

c ag

enda

and

take

ste

ps

to fu

lfil i

ts g

oals

, as

exem

plifi

ed b

y S

trate

gy20

20. F

urth

er, t

he A

DB

pu

blis

hes

a W

ork

Pro

gram

me

and

Bud

get F

ram

ewor

k th

at d

escr

ibes

ho

w th

e A

DB

will

impl

emen

t its

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies.

102

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

App

roxi

mat

ely

$4 b

illion

(28.

6%) o

f AD

B fu

ndin

g is

Spe

cial

Fun

d R

esou

rces

fund

ed b

y a

subs

et o

f ful

l mem

bers

hip.

103

The

larg

est s

peci

al in

itiat

ive

is th

e A

sian

D

evel

opm

ent F

und

(AD

F). T

he c

umul

ativ

e to

tal o

f th

e A

DF

is a

ppro

xim

atel

y $3

3 bi

llion.

The

Fun

d is

con

trolle

d to

a la

rge

exte

nt b

y a

subs

et o

f ful

l m

embe

rshi

p. B

ut a

t the

end

of e

ach

repl

enis

hmen

t ne

gotia

tion

proc

ess,

und

erta

ken

once

eve

ry fo

ur

year

s, th

e ag

reem

ent b

etw

een

AD

B m

anag

emen

t an

d A

DF

dono

rs is

put

into

a re

port

calle

d th

e ‘D

onor

s’ R

epor

t.’ T

his

‘Don

ors’

Rep

ort’

is th

en

subm

itted

to th

e B

oard

mem

bers

for a

ppro

val.

Thus

maj

or d

ecis

ions

rega

rdin

g th

e A

DF

(e.g

., re

plen

ishm

ents

) and

indi

vidu

al A

DF

proj

ects

are

ul

timat

ely

appr

oved

by

the

full

set o

f AD

B m

embe

rs

via

thei

r Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s re

pres

enta

tives

.104

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

The

AD

B c

ondu

cts

‘Sta

ff En

gage

men

t Sur

veys

’ eve

ry tw

o ye

ars.

105 I

n re

spon

se to

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys, A

DB

Man

agem

ent

take

ste

ps to

add

ress

sta

ff di

ssat

isfa

ctio

n at

bot

h th

e in

stitu

tiona

l and

de

partm

ent l

evel

.


2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

Evid

ence

.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

In 2

006

the

AD

B re

leas

ed a

gui

de o

n st

reng

then

ing

stak

ehol

der e

ngag

emen

t, fo

cusi

ng o

n th

e pa

rtici

patio

n of

a d

iver

se ra

nge

of s

take

hold

ers

in th

e si

x st

ages

of t

he A

DB

Pro

ject

Cyc

le: 1

. Cou

ntry

Pro

gram

min

g; 2

. P

roje

ct P

roce

ssin

g; 3

. Ope

ratio

nal P

lann

ing;

4. I

mpl

emen

tatio

n, M

onito

ring

and

Rep

ortin

g; 5

. Sel

f-Ev

alua

tion;

an

d 6.

Pos

t-Ev

alua

tion.

Whe

n re

view

ing

a po

licy,

stra

tegy

or c

ount

ry p

rogr

amm

e, th

e A

DB

aim

s to

con

sult

with

sta

keho

lder

s to

iden

tify

who

has

inte

rest

s in

a g

iven

act

ivity

; det

erm

ine

stak

ehol

der g

roup

inte

rest

s;

capi

taliz

e on

sta

keho

lder

’s e

xper

ienc

e an

d ex

perti

se; g

ain

stak

ehol

der c

onse

nsus

on

proj

ects

; and

max

imiz

e tra

nspa

renc

y.10

6

In th

e m

ost r

ecen

t sur

vey,

thre

e-qu

arte

rs o

f sta

keho

lder

s ag

ree

that

the

AD

B is

doi

ng e

noug

h to

reac

h ou

t and

bu

ild p

artn

ersh

ips

with

the

priv

ate

sect

or, b

ut o

f priv

ate

sect

or re

spon

dent

s, th

at n

umbe

r is

only

one

-thi

rd.10

7

VIII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

erna

l eva

luat

ions

Inte

rnal

: The

Com

plia

nce

Rev

iew

Pan

el (C

RP

), an

inte

rnal

wat

chdo

g of

the

AD

B, i

nves

tigat

es a

llege

d no

ncom

plia

nce

by th

e ba

nk in

its

oper

atio

n po

licie

s an

d pr

oced

ures

that

has

cau

sed,

or i

s lik

ely

to c

ause

, di

rect

mat

eria

l har

m to

pro

ject

-affe

cted

peo

ple.

It d

oes

not,

how

ever

, inv

estig

ate

borro

win

g co

untri

es, t

he

exec

utin

g ag

ency

or p

rivat

e se

ctor

clie

nts

unle

ss re

leva

nt to

acc

usat

ions

of n

onco

mpl

ianc

e. C

ompl

aint

s ca

n be

file

d vi

a th

e ‘A

ccou

ntab

ility

Mec

hani

sm’ b

ut m

ust b

e ex

pres

sed

in w

ritin

g an

d se

nt to

the

Com

plai

nts

Rec

eivi

ng O

ffice

r (C

RO

). Th

ere

are

two

addi

tiona

l lev

els

of in

tern

al e

valu

atio

n in

the

orga

niza

tion.

The

firs

t is

self-

eval

uatio

n, c

ondu

cted

by

thos

e re

spon

sibl

e fo

r ind

ivid

ual c

ount

ry s

trate

gies

, pro

gram

mes

or p

roje

cts.

The

se

cond

is in

depe

nden

t eva

luat

ion

cond

ucte

d by

the

Inde

pend

ent E

valu

atio

n D

epar

tmen

t (IE

D),

a m

embe

r of

the

Eval

uatio

n C

oope

ratio

n G

roup

of t

he M

ultil

ater

al D

evel

opm

ent B

anks

(EC

G).

The

IED

ope

rate

s ac

cord

ing

to s

tand

ards

of i

nsul

atio

n fro

m e

xter

nal i

nflue

nce

and

the

avoi

danc

e of

con

flict

s of

inte

rest

. IED

man

ager

s an

d ev

alua

tors

exc

lude

them

selv

es, f

or e

xam

ple,

from

eva

luat

ing

any

proj

ect/

prog

ram

me/

activ

ity/e

ntity

that

they

w

orke

d on

.108

Exte

rnal

: Don

ors

eval

uate

per

form

ance

dur

ing

the

regu

lar r

ound

s of

cap

ital r

eple

nish

men

t. Fu

rther

, a s

ubse

t of

don

ors

crea

ted

the

Mul

tilat

eral

Org

anis

atio

n P

erfo

rman

ce A

sses

smen

t Net

wor

k (M

OPA

N),

whi

ch re

gula

rly

cond

ucts

eva

luat

ion

revi

ews

of in

stitu

tions

(suc

h as

the

AD

B) t

o w

hich

sai

d do

nors

con

tribu

te fu

nds.

109 A

m

embe

r of t

he A

DB

’s to

p m

anag

emen

t not

ed v

ia in

terv

iew

that

som

e in

divi

dual

don

or c

ount

ries

have

beg

un

to c

ondu

ct re

gula

r ass

essm

ents

, citi

ng th

e U

nite

d K

ingd

om a

nd A

ustra

lia a

s th

e m

ost n

otab

le c

ases

. “Th

ey

wan

t to

incr

ease

the

volu

me

of th

eir d

evel

opm

ent a

ssis

tanc

e bu

t wan

t to

cont

ain

thei

r [ow

n] a

dmin

istra

tive

budg

et. T

he s

olut

ion

is to

cha

nnel

thei

r fun

ds th

roug

h in

tern

atio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

like

us

[AD

B].

But

in o

rder

to

do th

at th

ey w

ant t

o ev

alua

te th

e pe

rform

ance

of i

nter

natio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

, and

they

wan

t to

put t

heir

mon

ey

in o

rgan

izat

ions

they

thin

k ar

e do

ing

a go

od jo

b… W

e ar

e re

gula

rly s

ubje

ct to

suc

h as

sess

men

ts.”

The

re is

al

so th

e In

tern

atio

nal A

id T

rans

pare

ncy

Initi

ativ

e (IA

TI),

of w

hich

the

AD

B b

ecom

e a

mem

ber i

n 20

13.11

0


c. E

urop

ean

Ban

k fo

r R

econ

stru

ctio

n an

d D

evel

opm

ent (

EB

RD

)

Org

aniz

atio

nA

mul

tilat

eral

dev

elop

men

t ban

k, th

e EB

RD

use

s in

vest

men

t as

a to

ol to

hel

p bu

ild m

arke

t eco

nom

ies

in th

e re

gion

of o

pera

tions

stre

tchi

ng fr

om c

entra

l Eur

ope

to c

entra

l Asi

a, a

nd th

e so

uthe

rn a

nd e

aste

rn M

edite

rran

ean.

Gov

erna

nce

The

EBR

D’s

pre

side

nt re

ports

to a

boa

rd o

f gov

erno

rs a

nd d

irect

s an

exe

cutiv

e co

mm

ittee

that

ove

rsee

s th

e im

porta

nt a

spec

ts o

f stra

tegy

, per

form

ance

and

fin

anci

al a

naly

sis.

Whi

le th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

repr

esen

ts d

onor

nat

ions

, it

dele

gate

s m

ost o

f its

aut

horit

y to

the

boar

d of

dire

ctor

s. T

he b

ank

is o

rgan

ized

in

to s

even

ope

ratio

nal g

roup

s in

clud

ing

bank

ing,

fina

nce,

risk

and

pol

icy,

am

ong

othe

rs.

The

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs a

lso

appo

ints

or r

eapp

oint

s th

e pr

esid

ent.

Mos

t oth

er

pow

ers

are

devo

lved

to th

e bo

ard

of d

irect

ors,

whi

ch o

vers

ees

the

oper

atio

ns o

f th

e pr

esid

ent a

nd th

e ex

ecut

ive

com

mitt

ee (m

ade

up o

f the

hea

ds o

f the

maj

or

inte

rnal

ope

ratio

nal g

roup

s).

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Four

yea

rs a

nd re

new

able

, with

no

limit

on th

e nu

mbe

r of t

erm

s a

pres

iden

t can

ho

ld. T

he v

ice-

pres

iden

t has

a fi

ve-y

ear t

erm

.

Inco

me

€9.1

billi

on in

inve

stm

ents

wer

e m

ade

in 2

011.

Num

ber

of s

taff

App

roxi

mat

ely

1,70

0 on

per

man

ent c

ontra

cts,

with

1,2

50 a

t the

Lon

don

head

quar

ters

and

400

in c

ount

ry o

ffice

s. A

sig

nific

ant n

umbe

r of a

dditi

onal

em

ploy

ees

are

on te

mpo

rary

con

tract

s.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pEB

RD

pre

side

nts

have

typi

cally

ser

ved

four

-yea

r ter

ms;

onl

y Je

an L

emie

rre h

as s

erve

d th

e fu

ll ei

ght-

year

dou

ble

term

. Pas

t pre

side

nts

incl

ude

Jacq

ues

Atta

li (1

991-

1993

), Ja

cque

s de

Lar

osiè

re (1

993-

1998

), H

orst

Köh

ler (

1998

-200

0), J

ean

Lem

ierre

(200

0-20

08) a

nd T

hom

as M

irow

(200

8-20

12).

The

curre

nt p

resi

dent

, Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti, w

as e

lect

ed in

201

2.

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryA

ll le

ader

s pr

ior t

o S

ir S

uma

wer

e ei

ther

Fre

nch

or G

erm

an, a

nd h

ad b

anki

ng

back

grou

nds.

Sir

Sum

a re

pres

ents

a c

hang

e in

em

phas

is, g

iven

his

ext

ensi

ve

expe

rienc

e in

man

agin

g la

rge

publ

ic-s

ecto

r org

aniz

atio

ns. H

e ha

s in

trodu

ced

a w

ide-

rang

ing

refo

rm p

rogr

amm

e to

impr

ove

orga

niza

tiona

l effi

cien

cy a

nd d

eliv

ery,

incl

udin

g a

shift

to g

reat

er tr

ansp

aren

cy in

hiri

ng e

xecu

tive

man

agem

ent,

and

grea

ter e

mph

asis

on

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent o

f sen

ior l

eade

rshi

p.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

Ther

e ar

e no

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r the

Pre

side

nt’s

role

. Em

ploy

men

t co

ntra

ct is

pub

lishe

d on

line

incl

udin

g sa

lary

, ter

ms

of d

ism

issa

l. Th

ere

are

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r the

Vic

e P

resi

dent

s.B

oard

of G

over

nors

, Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s an

d P

resi

dent

’s ro

le is

laid

out

‘B

asic

Doc

umen

ts o

f EB

RD

’ in

som

e de

tail,

but

ther

e is

no

deta

iled

disc

ussi

on o

f any

oth

er ro

les.

111

They

are

con

side

ring

writ

ing

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r the

Pre

side

nt’s

role

in fu

ture

. Thi

s m

ost l

ikel

y w

ould

be

draf

ted

by s

enio

r EB

RD

sta

ff m

embe

r. Th

e P

rinci

pals

wou

ld d

eleg

ate

this

role

to th

e B

oard

of

Dire

ctor

s w

hom

pre

dom

inan

tly s

erve

nat

iona

l in

tere

sts.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Form

ally

, the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs h

as ro

unds

of m

ajor

ity v

otin

g to

el

imin

ate

cand

idat

es a

nd d

eter

min

e th

e P

resi

dent

for 4

-yea

r ter

ms

(and

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent t

erm

s).11

2

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti is

the

first

non

-Fre

nch

or

Ger

man

Pre

side

nt o

f the

Ban

k. T

radi

tiona

lly F

ranc

e an

d G

erm

any

agre

ed o

n th

e ca

ndid

ate.

How

ever

, in

the

mos

t las

t ele

ctio

n th

ere

was

a c

ompe

titiv

e pr

oces

s as

the

‘gen

tlem

en’s

agr

eem

ent’

brok

e do

wn.

113

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Pre

side

nt s

elec

tion

rem

ains

non

-exh

aust

ive

and

with

out a

cle

ar fo

rmal

pr

oces

s.A

t the

Vic

e P

resi

dent

ial l

evel

gre

ater

rigo

r has

bee

n in

trodu

ced

to th

e le

ader

ship

pro

cess

. The

re is

a c

lear

form

al p

roce

ss fo

r VP

leve

l lea

ders

th

at w

as e

ffect

ivel

y te

sted

for V

P C

FO, V

P C

AO

, VP

Ris

k, a

nd V

P

Pol

icy

as w

ell a

s th

e G

ener

al C

ouns

el. F

or e

xam

ple,

an

exha

ustiv

e,

pass

port-

blin

d in

terv

iew

sea

rch

of o

ver 8

50 a

pplic

ants

was

con

duct

ed

for V

P o

f ban

king

ope

ratio

ns (a

role

trad

ition

ally

hel

d by

an

Am

eric

an)

in 2

012.

.114

In th

e la

st e

lect

ion

the

role

was

adv

ertis

ed to

sh

areh

olde

rs, s

ever

al c

andi

date

s w

rote

man

ifest

os

to v

oter

s ou

tlini

ng th

eir v

isio

n fo

r the

Ban

k, a

nd fo

ur

of th

e fiv

e ga

ve in

terv

iew

s to

the

Cen

tre fo

r Glo

bal

Dev

elop

men

t, fo

llow

ed b

y he

arin

gs w

ith th

e EB

RD

B

oard

115 T

his

was

the

mos

t pub

licly

tran

spar

ent

elec

tion

proc

ess.

How

ever

it is

not

a c

odifi

ed

proc

ess.

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

No

publ

icly

ava

ilabl

e ev

iden

ce.

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abat

i mad

e hi

s go

als

clea

r thr

ough

hi

s el

ectio

n M

anife

sto

to s

hare

hold

ers.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

trans

late

s ov

erar

chin

g go

als

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

No

evid

ence

. Th

e pe

rform

ance

obj

ectiv

es fo

r the

Exe

cutiv

e M

anag

emen

t are

pub

lishe

d on

the

intra

net a

nd

effe

ctiv

ely

refle

ct th

e P

resi

dent

’s g

oals

(tak

en a

s a

sum

). Th

ese

perfo

rman

ce o

bjec

tives

are

then

ca

scad

ed d

own

to th

e re

st o

f the

org

aniz

atio

n.Th

e st

rate

gic

plan

ning

cyc

le d

oes

not l

ink

to th

e pr

esid

entia

l ele

ctio

n cy

cle.

The

Ban

k ha

s a

five

year

“C

apita

l, R

esou

rces

, Rev

iew

”, w

hich

it m

ust d

eliv

er

on. H

owev

er, a

n in

com

ing

Pre

side

nt h

as li

mite

d fle

xibi

lity

to re

set t

hese

goa

ls a

nd a

dapt

to c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s.

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?D

iscl

osur

es o

f con

flict

of i

nter

est a

re m

anda

ted

unde

r the

form

al C

ode

of C

ondu

ct.

The

EBR

D h

as a

n an

nual

dis

clos

ure,

whi

ch is

sc

rutin

ized

by

the

chie

f com

plia

nce

offic

er, a

nd

ther

e is

a p

roce

dure

for f

ollo

w-u

p an

d en

forc

emen

t.


4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?EB

RD

has

a d

efine

d fo

rmal

Cod

e of

Con

duct

(whi

ch w

as u

pdat

ed in

20

12) o

vers

een

by a

Chi

ef C

ompl

ianc

e O

ffice

r who

repo

rts d

irect

ly to

th

e P

resi

dent

. Res

pons

ible

for r

eput

atio

nal r

isks

and

sta

ff m

isbe

havi

our

and

over

seei

ng th

e P

roje

ct C

ompl

ianc

e M

echa

nism

.116

EBR

D p

ract

ices

are

som

etim

es s

trict

er th

an th

e fo

rmal

Cod

e of

Con

duct

as

it ca

n be

pol

itica

lly

sens

itive

for s

enio

r sta

ff to

be

non-

exec

utiv

e m

embe

rs o

f Boa

rds

in th

e pr

ivat

e or

cha

rity

sect

or

(eve

n if

offic

ially

they

may

be

able

to d

o so

). III

.Th

e le

ader

has

a d

efine

d pe

rfor

man

ce m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce1

Is th

e le

ader

ship

sub

ject

ed to

ann

ual

perfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

?D

etai

ls a

bout

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent a

re n

ot o

utlin

ed o

nlin

e or

pu

blic

ly.

Ther

e is

no

form

al a

ppra

isal

of t

he P

resi

dent

. Thi

s w

ould

be

diffi

cult

for t

he B

oard

of D

irect

ors

or

Prin

cipa

ls’ t

o ca

rry

out a

s th

ey d

o no

t hav

e su

ffici

ent

info

rmat

ion

on th

e P

resi

dent

’s ro

le.11

7 2

Is re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

Ann

ual r

epor

t dis

cuss

es ‘r

ewar

ds a

nd b

enefi

ts’ d

esig

ned

to e

ncou

rage

su

perio

r per

form

ance

, but

it is

not

cle

ar w

heth

er th

e po

licy

incl

udes

le

ader

ship

.118

The

Pre

side

nt m

ust h

ave

Boa

rd a

ppro

val f

or a

n in

crea

se in

sal

ary.

119

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

EBR

D h

as a

lear

ning

and

dev

elop

men

t tea

m w

ho w

ork

clos

ely

with

th

e Ev

alua

tion

Dep

artm

ent (

EvD

) tea

m to

des

ign

prog

ram

mes

that

ad

dres

s ex

istin

g w

eakn

esse

s in

pro

gram

me

deliv

ery.

The

y do

not

fo

cus

on th

e P

resi

dent

.

The

Pre

side

nt a

nd o

ther

sen

ior m

anag

emen

t hav

e co

achi

ng a

vaila

ble

on re

ques

t. M

any

seni

or s

taff

have

per

sona

l coa

ches

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent c

riter

ia

cons

ider

ed b

y th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

The

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent p

roce

ss is

sim

ilar t

o th

e ap

poin

tmen

t pro

cess

in

that

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs re

quire

a m

ajor

ity v

ote,

but

freq

uent

ly

info

rmal

neg

otia

tions

prio

r to

the

form

al v

ote

are

deci

sive

.

No

as th

ere

is n

ot a

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

of

the

Pre

side

nt.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

The

EBR

D c

onsi

dere

d a

full

rang

e of

can

dida

tes

for r

e-ap

poin

tmen

t in

the

last

ele

ctio

n. F

or e

xam

ple,

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abar

ti w

as s

elec

ted

over

th

e in

cum

bent

Pre

side

nt in

201

2, T

hom

as M

irow

.

How

ever

, the

re is

no

codi

fied

rule

that

oth

er

cand

idat

es m

ust b

e co

nsid

ered

in th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s. It

is li

kely

that

the

next

ele

ctio

n w

ill al

so b

e op

en a

nd c

onte

sted

. 120

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

The

Pre

side

nt h

as a

utho

rity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies.

For

exa

mpl

e,

in c

onju

nctio

n w

ith B

oard

of G

over

nors

/ Dire

ctor

s, P

resi

dent

has

ex

pand

ed le

ndin

g to

Nor

th A

frica

n cl

ient

s as

the

need

to a

ssis

t the

m in

tra

nsiti

onin

g to

dem

ocra

cy a

nd fr

ee-m

arke

ts h

as e

mer

ged.

Due

to th

e m

ism

atch

bet

wee

n st

rate

gic

plan

ning

an

d th

e el

ectio

n cy

cle

it is

ext

rem

ely

diffi

cult

for t

he

Pre

side

nt to

ada

pt th

e EB

RD

’s s

trate

gic

prio

ritie

s. It

ca

n oc

cur i

n re

actio

n to

a m

ajor

cris

is s

uch

as th

e A

rab

Spr

ing.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes.

The

Pre

side

nt c

arrie

s ou

t stru

ctur

al re

form

s to

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew s

trate

gic

prio

ritie

s an

d ev

olve

afte

r the

glo

bal

finan

cial

cris

is a

nd th

e co

ntin

uing

gre

at re

cess

ion.

For i

nsta

nce,

the

Pre

side

nt h

as d

evel

oped

a n

ew p

olic

y ro

le th

at th

e B

oard

app

rove

d as

wel

l as

a ne

w C

orpo

rate

Lea

ders

hip

Gro

up. I

n ad

ditio

n, th

e P

resi

dent

has

dev

elop

ed 1

2 in

tern

al ta

skfo

rces

to re

view

in

tern

al p

roce

sses

and

stru

ctur

es. A

new

pol

icy

oper

atio

nal g

roup

has

al

so b

een

crea

ted

to b

ette

r con

vey

the

EBR

D’s

pol

icy

expe

rtise

to

clie

nt c

ount

ries.

Ther

e is

no

budg

et fo

r spe

cial

initi

ativ

es.

Furth

erm

ore

the

Boa

rd c

ontro

l the

bud

get,

sala

ry

of s

taff

and

tota

l num

ber o

f fixe

d em

ploy

ees.

Thi

s m

akes

it e

xtre

mel

y di

fficu

lt fo

r the

Pre

side

nt to

mak

e st

rate

gic

chan

ges

with

exi

stin

g st

aff a

s th

e EB

RD

is

only

abl

e to

hire

sta

ff on

sho

rt-te

rm c

ontra

cts.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

The

EBR

D fe

atur

es 1

7 S

peci

al F

unds

ear

mar

ked

by s

peci

fic p

roje

ct

type

and

/or g

eogr

aphi

c ar

ea a

nd fu

nded

by

subs

ets

of d

onor

s (to

tallin

g €8

27 m

illion

in 2

011,

equ

ival

ent t

o 9%

of t

he €

9.1

billio

n in

tota

l com

mitm

ents

). In

add

ition

to th

ese

fund

s, th

e EB

RD

runs

a

num

ber o

f bila

tera

l and

mul

tilat

eral

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

fund

s in

the

Sou

ther

n an

d M

edite

rran

ean

(SEM

ED) r

egio

n, to

tallin

g €2

.574

billi

on in

20

11.12

1

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

The

EB

RD

has

shi

fted

from

sur

veys

eve

ry 3

yea

rs to

ann

ually

.122

Thes

e su

rvey

s ha

ve b

een

used

.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

. Th

e P

resi

dent

is n

ot fo

rmal

ly a

sses

sed

on th

is (o

r an

ythi

ng e

lse)

, how

ever

Sir

Sum

a C

hakr

abat

i has

de

dica

ted

time

to m

ento

ring

seni

or s

taff.

VI

I.M

O/IO

has

stru

ctur

es th

at e

ncou

rage

lead

ersh

ip to

eng

age

with

div

erse

ran

ge o

f sta

keho

lder

sTh

e EB

RD

has

a C

ivil

Soc

iety

Pro

gram

me

whe

re e

xecu

tive

man

ager

s sp

end

two

days

with

civ

il so

ciet

y gr

oups

to g

arne

r fee

dbac

k on

EB

RD

per

form

ance

. It a

lso

cond

ucts

a b

usin

ess

foru

m w

here

the

Pre

side

nt

and

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s in

tera

ct w

ith b

usin

ess

lead

ers.

In 2

012

the

EBR

D s

igni

fican

tly e

nhan

ced

its c

ivil

soci

ety

initi

ativ

es. T

he E

BR

D M

inin

g O

pera

tions

Pol

icy

was

impl

emen

ted

that

yea

r in

cons

ulta

tion

with

mor

e th

an 1

,500

org

aniz

atio

ns in

clud

ing

min

ing

com

pani

es, c

ivil

soci

ety

grou

ps a

nd a

cade

mic

s. F

urth

er, P

hase

3

of th

e S

usta

inab

le E

nerg

y In

itiat

ive

(SEI

) was

laun

ched

, with

con

sulta

tive

mee

tings

in G

eorg

ia, K

azak

hsta

n,

Rus

sia,

Tur

key

and

Ukr

aine

. The

EB

RD

als

o re

view

ed it

s po

litic

al m

etho

dolo

gy in

201

2, h

oldi

ng w

orks

hops

in

Lond

on, S

tanf

ord,

Bel

grad

e, M

osco

w a

nd C

airo

. Acc

ordi

ng to

its

2013

pro

spec

tus,

the

EBR

D a

lso

plan

ned

on re

view

ing

thre

e po

licie

s la

st y

ear i

n co

nsul

tatio

n w

ith c

ivil

soci

ety

grou

ps a

nd a

wid

e va

riety

of o

ther

st

akeh

olde

rs: t

he 2

009

Pro

ject

Com

plai

nt M

echa

nism

Rul

es o

f Pro

cedu

re, t

he 2

008

Envi

ronm

enta

l and

Soc

ial

Pol

icy,

and

the

2011

Pub

lic In

form

atio

n P

olic

y.12

3 VI

II.M

O/IO

has

stru

ctur

es th

at e

ngag

e le

ader

ship

thor

ough

ly w

ith in

tern

al/e

xter

nal e

valu

atio

nsEB

RD

has

a d

efine

d Ev

alua

tion

Pol

icy

that

has

regu

larly

bee

n up

date

d si

nce

1992

(EB

RD

Eva

luat

ion

Pol

icy,

20

13).

EBR

D h

as a

n Ev

alua

tion

Dep

artm

ent (

EvD

) whi

ch re

ports

to a

Chi

ef E

valu

ator

whi

ch is

par

t of a

co

mpl

emen

tary

web

of i

nstru

men

ts –

e.g

. wor

k pr

ogra

mm

es a

nd b

udge

ts, r

esul

ts fr

amew

orks

, per

form

ance

sc

orec

ards

, etc

. The

eva

luat

ion

team

repo

rts d

irect

ly to

the

Boa

rd o

f Dire

ctor

s. In

add

ition

, the

Chi

ef

Com

plia

nce

Offi

cer r

epor

ts d

irect

ly to

the

Pre

side

nt, a

s do

es th

e in

tern

al a

udit

team

. The

Vic

e-P

resi

dent

for

Ris

k al

so s

its o

n th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Com

mitt

ee.

EBR

D a

lso

feat

ured

in th

e 20

06 M

ultil

ater

al D

evel

opm

ent B

ank

(MD

B) C

omm

on P

erfo

rman

ce A

sses

smen

t (C

OM

PAS

) rep

ort,

whe

re M

DB

s jo

intly

pub

lish

info

rmat

ion

on h

ow th

ey c

ondu

ct b

usin

ess

and

orga

nize

th

emse

lves

to e

nsur

e th

at th

eir o

pera

tions

are

gea

red

tow

ards

resu

lts.12

4


d. In

ter-

Am

eric

an D

evel

opm

ent B

ank

(IDB

)

Org

aniz

atio

n Fo

unde

d in

195

9 as

a p

artn

ersh

ip b

etw

een

Latin

Am

eric

an c

ount

ries

and

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

the

IDB

sup

ports

clie

nt g

over

nmen

ts, p

rivat

e en

titie

s an

d no

n-pr

ofit s

ecto

rs w

ith c

apita

l for

dev

elop

men

t ope

ratio

ns. T

he In

ter-

Am

eric

an

Dev

elop

men

t Ban

k G

roup

(IA

DB

) is

com

pose

d of

the

IDB

, the

Inte

r-A

mer

ican

In

vest

men

t Cor

pora

tion

(IIC

) and

the

Mul

tilat

eral

Inve

stm

ent F

und

(MIF

), th

e la

tter

bein

g ad

min

iste

red

by th

e ID

B. T

he g

roup

is h

eadq

uarte

red

in th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s (W

ashi

ngto

n D

C).

Gov

erna

nce

The

IAD

B is

hea

ded

by a

boa

rd o

f gov

erno

rs, w

hich

del

egat

es o

vers

ight

of b

ank

oper

atio

ns to

a b

oard

of e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s (re

pres

enta

tives

from

48

coun

tries

). Th

e m

anag

emen

t tea

m ru

ns d

ay-t

o-da

y op

erat

ions

. Ele

cted

by

the

boar

d of

go

vern

ors,

the

pres

iden

t cha

irs th

e m

eetin

gs o

f the

boa

rd o

f exe

cutiv

e di

rect

ors,

bu

t has

no

vote

.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Five

yea

rs; c

an b

e re

-ele

cted

.

Inco

me

$11.

4 bi

llion

in le

ndin

g w

as a

ppro

ved

in 2

012.

The

sub

scrib

ed c

apita

l to

the

IDB

, af

ter t

he n

inth

gen

eral

cap

ital i

ncre

ase,

will

amou

nt to

$17

0.9

billio

n.

Num

ber

of s

taff

Abo

ut 2

,000

.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

p Th

e th

ree

prio

r pre

side

nts

serv

ed s

ever

al te

rms:

Fel

ipe

Her

rera

(fro

m C

hile

, 196

0-19

71);

Ant

onio

Orti

z M

ena

(Mex

ico,

197

1-19

88) a

nd E

nriq

ue V

. Igl

esia

s (U

rugu

ay,

1988

-200

5).

The

curre

nt p

resi

dent

, Lui

s A

lber

to M

oren

o (C

olom

bia;

200

5-pr

esen

t), h

as a

lso

serv

ed m

ore

than

one

term

.

In th

e 19

70 e

lect

ions

, bot

h A

rgen

tina

and

Vene

zuel

a no

min

ated

diff

eren

t ca

ndid

ates

, but

on

27 N

ovem

ber,

Orti

z re

ceiv

ed th

e m

ajor

ity o

f vot

es. D

avid

M.

Ken

nedy

, US

sec

reta

ry o

f the

trea

sury

, rep

orte

d to

Pre

side

nt R

icha

rd N

ixon

that

the

elec

tion

had

been

“co

nten

tious

”.12

5

The

And

ean

Dev

elop

men

t Cor

pora

tion

(CA

F) fu

nded

mor

e La

tin A

mer

ican

in

frast

ruct

ure

proj

ects

in 2

012

than

the

IAD

B a

nd W

orld

Ban

k co

mbi

ned.

126

Acc

ordi

ng to

Hum

phre

y an

d M

icha

elow

a (2

013)

, the

attr

activ

enes

s of

CA

F vi

s-à-

vis

the

IAD

B is

its

fast

pro

cess

ing

times

and

low

soc

ieta

l and

env

ironm

enta

l sta

ndar

ds.

Suc

h ad

vant

ages

, the

aut

hors

arg

ue, a

re p

erha

ps m

ade

poss

ible

by

CA

F’s

lack

of

non-

regi

onal

mem

bers

.127

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryS

ince

Mor

eno

assu

med

the

pres

iden

cy in

Oct

ober

200

5, th

e ba

nk h

as u

nder

gone

a

maj

or re

shap

ing

of it

s or

gani

zatio

nal s

truct

ure,

and

has

est

ablis

hed

a re

form

age

nda

linke

d to

the

nint

h ge

nera

l inc

reas

e in

reso

urce

s m

anda

te.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I. Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

No.

The

Cha

irman

sub

mits

the

term

s of

the

cont

ract

for e

mpl

oym

ent

for t

he P

resi

dent

to th

e B

oard

of G

over

nors

in a

con

fiden

tial m

anne

r.128

Som

e ob

serv

ers

cele

brat

e th

e IA

DB

’s g

over

nanc

e st

ruct

ure,

arg

uing

that

it b

ette

r pre

serv

es th

e in

tere

sts

of re

gion

al m

embe

rs th

an o

ther

mul

tilat

eral

in

stitu

tions

. Nan

cy B

irdsa

ll (2

014)

, for

exa

mpl

e,

note

s th

at in

the

IAD

B re

gion

al m

embe

rs h

old

a m

ajor

ity o

f the

vot

ing

pow

er, w

here

as n

on-

borro

win

g m

embe

rs c

olle

ctiv

ely

hold

a m

ajor

ity in

th

e W

orld

Ban

k.12

9 Num

erou

s au

thor

s ha

ve w

arne

d,

how

ever

, tha

t vot

ing

wei

ght i

s an

insu

ffici

ent

mea

sure

of p

ower

and

influ

ence

with

in a

n or

gani

zatio

n (S

chot

ter 1

981;

Hos

li 19

96).13

0 Stra

nd

(200

3), e

mpl

oyin

g th

e Jo

hnst

on v

otin

g po

wer

inde

x,

calc

ulat

es th

e ac

tual

dis

tribu

tion

of v

otin

g po

wer

in

the

IAD

B b

ased

on

indi

vidu

al c

ount

ries’

vot

ing

pow

er w

ithin

coa

litio

n gr

oups

and

the

pow

er o

f the

co

aliti

on g

roup

itse

lf. A

ccor

ding

to th

is c

alcu

latio

n,

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

hold

s 80

% o

f vot

ing

pow

er w

ithin

th

e IA

DB

.131 F

urth

er, a

s B

irdsa

ll (2

014)

not

es h

erse

lf,

the

US

, via

its

de fa

cto

veto

pow

er, c

ontro

ls th

e se

lect

ion

of th

e IA

DB

’s E

xecu

tive

Vice

-Pre

side

nt

(EVP

). Th

is is

sig

nific

ant g

iven

that

the

EVP

cha

irs

the

Loan

Com

mitt

ee th

at m

ust a

ppro

ve a

ny p

roje

ct

befo

re it

reac

hes

the

Boa

rd o

f Gov

erno

rs fo

r fina

l ap

prov

al.13

2

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip e

lect

ion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

Full

mem

bers

hip.

(a) E

ach

Gov

erno

r can

nom

inat

e a

cand

idat

e. (b

) Ea

ch m

embe

r cou

ntry

has

equ

al a

mou

nt o

f vot

es (1

35) p

lus

one

vote

fo

r eac

h sh

are

of o

rdin

ary

capi

tal (

OC

) sto

ck o

f the

Ban

k. T

he m

ajor

ity

of to

tal v

otin

g po

wer

of m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s el

ects

the

Pre

side

nt,

incl

udin

g an

abs

olut

e m

ajor

ity o

f gov

erno

rs o

f reg

iona

l mem

bers

.133

Votin

g po

wer

am

ong

mem

ber c

ount

ries

of th

e ID

B is

as

follo

ws:

Lat

in

Am

eric

an a

nd th

e C

arib

bean

hav

e 50

.015

%, U

nite

d S

tate

s 30

.006

%,

Can

ada

4.00

1% a

nd th

e no

n-re

gion

al m

embe

rs 1

5.97

9%.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p el

ectio

n th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Yes.

The

com

preh

ensi

ve s

et o

f reg

ulat

ions

134 t

oget

her w

ith th

e ag

reem

ent e

stab

lishi

ng th

e B

ank13

5 is

publ

ishe

d on

line.


II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

The

IDB

has

a s

erie

s of

stra

tegi

es to

ach

ieve

its

inst

itutio

nal

man

date

s.13

6

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

It is

unc

lear

if th

ere

is a

spe

cific

, for

mal

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

Pre

side

nt

do s

o. H

owev

er, P

resi

dent

Lui

s M

oren

o di

d re

leas

e a

five-

year

pla

n tit

led

Bui

ldin

g O

ppor

tuni

ty fo

r the

Maj

ority

in 2

006

that

list

s a

num

ber

of s

peci

fic s

trate

gies

and

goa

ls fo

r the

200

7-20

12 p

erio

d.13

7

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. A

ll ID

B e

mpl

oyee

s m

ust d

iscl

ose

confl

ict o

f int

eres

ts to

pre

vent

th

e si

tuat

ion

from

esc

alat

ing

into

an

alle

gatio

n of

Mis

cond

uct.13

8

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. A

ll ID

B e

mpl

oyee

s ad

here

to s

trict

eth

ical

sta

ndar

ds la

id o

ut in

th

e 20

12 C

ode

of E

thic

s an

d P

rofe

ssio

nal C

ondu

ct.13

9 The

Boa

rd o

f Ex

ecut

ive

Dire

ctor

s is

sub

ject

to it

s ow

n C

ode.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

No

evid

ence

.

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No.

As

of D

ecem

ber 2

012,

the

Pre

side

nt h

as a

fixe

d sa

lary

of

$440

,798

(doe

s no

t inc

lude

Exe

cutiv

e A

llow

ance

of $

78,8

89).1 4

0

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

No

evid

ence

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

crite

ria c

onsi

dere

d by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in th

e re

-app

oint

men

t pr

oces

s?

No

evid

ence

.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.


V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

The

Pre

side

nt m

akes

pro

posa

ls o

n th

e ge

nera

l pol

icy

of th

e B

ank

for

cons

ider

atio

n by

the

Boa

rd.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

No

evid

ence

.

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Of t

he 2

012

tota

l app

rova

ls, $

10.8

billi

on w

as fr

om th

e O

rdin

ary

Cap

ital (

OC

), $3

20 m

illion

from

the

Fund

for S

peci

al O

pera

tions

(FS

O)

(bef

ore

1965

was

cal

led

Soc

ial P

rogr

ess

Trus

t Fun

d).14

1 Con

tribu

tions

to

the

FSO

are

mad

e in

the

form

of n

on-n

egot

iabl

e, n

on-in

tere

st

bear

ing

dem

and

oblig

atio

ns in

lieu

of t

he im

med

iate

pay

men

t of a

ll or

an

y pa

rt of

a m

embe

r’s c

ontri

butio

ns q

uota

s.

The

Boa

rd a

lloca

tes

the

reso

urce

s.14

2 (S

teph

en D

. Kra

sner

writ

es th

at

for t

he F

SO

act

iviti

es v

otin

g, th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s ha

ve a

blo

ckin

g ve

to.)14

3

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

Wor

king

on

the

Hum

an C

apita

l Stra

tegy

(201

1),14

4 a b

road

con

sulta

tion

proc

ess

was

und

erta

ken

by M

anag

emen

t to

iden

tify

the

key

chal

leng

es

perc

eive

d by

sta

ff th

roug

h an

ele

ctro

nic

surv

ey s

ent o

ut to

500

em

ploy

ees.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge m

anag

emen

t to

enga

ge w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

Mos

t im

porta

ntly

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns (C

SO

s) m

ay a

lso

be e

ligib

le to

rece

ive

finan

cing

from

the

Ban

k.A

lso,

acc

ordi

ng to

the

Stra

tegy

for P

rom

otin

g C

itize

n P

artic

ipat

ion

in B

ank

Act

iviti

es (2

004)

,145 T

here

are

four

ar

eas

of B

ank

activ

ity in

whi

ch c

itize

n pa

rtici

patio

n ca

n be

sys

tem

atic

ally

inco

rpor

ated

: (i)

Ban

k in

put i

nto

the

shap

ing

of c

ount

ry d

evel

opm

ent p

olic

ies,

pla

ns a

nd a

gend

as; (

ii) se

ctor

stra

tegy

and

cou

ntry

stra

tegy

fo

rmul

atio

n, (i

ii) pr

ojec

t pre

para

tion

and

impl

emen

tatio

n, a

nd (i

v) e

valu

atio

n of

Ban

k ac

tiviti

es. T

here

are

ann

ual

CS

O m

eetin

gs a

nd C

SO

Con

sulti

ng G

roup

s fu

nctio

ning

thro

ugh

the

year

. VI

II.M

O/IO

has

stru

ctur

es th

at e

ngag

e ex

ecut

ive

man

agem

ent t

horo

ughl

y w

ith in

tern

al/e

xter

nal e

valu

atio

nsEv

alua

tion

at th

e ID

B is

a s

hare

d re

spon

sibi

lity

betw

een

man

agem

ent a

nd th

e O

ffice

of E

valu

atio

n an

d O

vers

ight

(OVE

). M

anag

emen

t foc

uses

on

proj

ect e

valu

atio

ns a

nd m

onito

ring

portf

olio

per

form

ance

. OVE

is in

depe

nden

t of

man

agem

ent a

nd a

nsw

ers

to th

e B

oard

of E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s. It

s ac

tiviti

es in

clud

e en

surin

g th

at s

trate

gies

, po

licie

s an

d pr

ogra

mm

es c

ompl

y w

ith th

e ID

B’s

obj

ectiv

es a

nd m

anda

tes.

OVE

ove

rsee

s th

e B

ank’

s in

tern

al

mon

itorin

g m

echa

nism

s an

d co

nduc

ts e

x-po

st p

roje

ct e

valu

atio

ns.

OVE

has

org

aniz

atio

nal a

nd b

ehav

iour

al in

depe

nden

ce, a

nd is

free

from

ext

erna

l pre

ssur

e an

d co

nflic

ts

of in

tere

st a

ccor

ding

to th

e cr

iteria

est

ablis

hed

by th

e Ev

alua

tion

Coo

pera

tion

Gro

up o

f the

Mul

tilat

eral

D

evel

opm

ent B

anks

(EC

G),

of w

hich

the

IDB

is a

foun

ding

mem

ber.


e. In

tern

atio

nal M

onet

ary

Fund

(IM

F)

Org

aniz

atio

n Es

tabl

ishe

d af

ter t

he S

econ

d W

orld

War

as

part

of th

e in

tern

atio

nal e

cono

mic

in

frast

ruct

ure

agre

ed a

t Bre

tton

Woo

ds (U

nite

d S

tate

s), t

he IM

F is

com

mitt

ed to

pr

omot

ing

inte

rnat

iona

l mon

etar

y co

oper

atio

n an

d hi

gh le

vels

of e

mpl

oym

ent a

nd

inco

me,

as

wel

l as

faci

litat

ing

inte

rnat

iona

l tra

de.14

6

Gov

erna

nce

The

boar

d of

gov

erno

rs is

the

IMF’

s hi

ghes

t dec

isio

n-m

akin

g bo

dy. I

t con

sist

s of

one

gov

erno

r and

one

alte

rnat

e go

vern

or fo

r eac

h of

the

188

mem

ber

coun

tries

. The

gov

erno

rs, a

ppoi

nted

by

thei

r res

pect

ive

mem

ber c

ount

ries,

ar

e us

ually

min

iste

rs o

f fina

nce

or th

e he

ads

of th

eir c

ount

ries’

cen

tral b

ank.

Th

e bo

ard

reta

ins

the

right

to a

ppro

ve q

uota

incr

ease

s, th

e ad

mitt

ance

of n

ew

mem

bers

, com

puls

ory

with

draw

al o

f mem

bers

, and

am

endm

ents

to th

e A

rticl

es

of A

gree

men

t and

By-

Law

s. T

he b

oard

is a

dvis

ed b

y tw

o m

inis

teria

l com

mitt

ees:

th

e In

tern

atio

nal M

onet

ary

and

Fina

ncia

l Com

mitt

ee (I

MFC

) and

the

Dev

elop

men

t C

omm

ittee

.

The

exec

utiv

e bo

ard

cons

ists

of 2

4 ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

s re

pres

entin

g al

l 188

m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s, a

nd c

ondu

cts

the

IMF’

s bu

sine

ss. C

urre

ntly

, the

five

larg

est

quot

a co

ntrib

utor

s ap

poin

t the

ir ow

n ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

, and

the

othe

r cou

ntrie

s el

ect a

n ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

bas

ed o

n co

nstit

uenc

ies.

Und

er th

e qu

ota

and

gove

rnan

ce re

form

s, a

dopt

ed in

201

0 bu

t not

yet

in fo

rce,

all

24 e

xecu

tive

dire

ctor

s w

ould

be

elec

ted

by m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s, m

akin

g th

e IM

F th

e on

ly

inte

rnat

iona

l ins

titut

ion

with

an

all-e

lect

ed b

oard

.147

The

IMF

is le

d by

the

man

agin

g di

rect

or (M

D),

who

is th

e he

ad o

f sta

ff an

d ch

airm

an o

f the

exe

cutiv

e bo

ard.

The

MD

is a

ssis

ted

by a

firs

t dep

uty

man

agin

g di

rect

or a

nd th

ree

depu

ty m

anag

ing

dire

ctor

s. T

he m

anag

emen

t tea

m o

vers

ees

the

staf

f and

mai

ntai

ns h

igh-

leve

l con

tact

with

mem

ber c

ount

ries,

priv

ate-

sect

or

orga

niza

tions

, the

med

ia, c

ivil

soci

ety

orga

niza

tions

, thi

nk ta

nks,

aca

dem

ia a

nd

othe

r ins

titut

ions

.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

A re

new

able

five

-yea

r ter

m.

Tota

l quo

tas

$360

billi

on, a

s of

Mar

ch 2

013.

Num

ber

of s

taff

App

roxi

mat

ely

2,70

0.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pLe

ader

ship

recr

uitm

ent a

t the

IMF

and

Wor

ld B

ank

has

deal

t with

the

natio

nalit

y pr

inci

ple

– a

long

stan

ding

con

vent

ion

by w

hich

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

and

Euro

pe

divi

de m

anag

emen

t of t

he re

spec

tive

orga

niza

tions

. The

IMF’

s M

D is

sel

ecte

d by

its

exe

cutiv

e bo

ard,

whi

ch a

lso

appr

oves

the

MD

’s c

ontra

ct. A

gov

erno

r or a

n ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

may

nom

inat

e ca

ndid

ates

with

out r

egar

d to

thei

r nat

iona

lity,

al

thou

gh a

ll M

Ds

have

bee

n Eu

rope

an: C

amille

Gut

t (fro

m B

elgi

um, 1

946-

1951

); Iv

ar R

ooth

(Sw

eden

, 195

1-19

56);

Per

Jac

obss

on (S

wed

en, 1

956-

1963

); P

ierre

-Pau

l S

chw

eitz

er (F

ranc

e, 1

963-

1973

); H

. Joh

anne

s W

ittev

een

(Net

herla

nds,

197

3-19

78);

Jacq

ues

de L

aros

ière

(Fra

nce,

197

8-19

87);

Mic

hel C

amde

ssus

(Fra

nce,

198

7-20

00);

Hor

st K

öhle

r (G

erm

any,

200

0-20

04);

Rod

rigo

de R

ato

(Spa

in, 2

004-

2007

) an

d D

omin

ique

Stra

uss-

Kah

n (F

ranc

e, 2

007-

2011

).

The

IMF’

s cu

rrent

lead

er, C

hris

tine

Laga

rde

(Fra

nce,

201

1-pr

esen

t), is

als

o its

firs

t fe

mal

e M

D.

The

MD

pos

ition

has

bee

n ac

com

pani

ed b

y its

sha

re o

f con

trove

rsy.

In 2

000,

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

chal

leng

ed th

e G

erm

an n

omin

atio

n of

Cai

o K

och-

Wes

er, t

here

by

trigg

erin

g co

nflic

t: Ja

pan

and

deve

lopi

ng c

ount

ries

sign

alle

d th

at th

e co

nven

tion

was

to b

e ca

lled

into

que

stio

n (la

ck o

f tra

nspa

renc

y an

d de

lays

in a

ppoi

ntm

ent

have

bee

n cl

osel

y re

late

d to

the

conv

entio

n). L

ater

, in

2007

, Rod

rigo

de R

ato’

s re

sign

atio

n ha

lfway

thro

ugh

his

term

due

to p

erso

nal r

easo

ns s

hock

ed th

e or

gani

zatio

n. A

nd h

is s

ucce

ssor

, Dom

inqu

e S

traus

s-K

ahn,

resi

gned

in M

ay 2

011

afte

r bei

ng a

rrest

ed.

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryIt

is w

idel

y re

cogn

ized

tha

t, to

be

effe

ctiv

e, t

he I

MF

gove

rnan

ce s

truct

ure

mus

t re

pres

ent

the

inte

rest

s of

all

its m

embe

rs a

nd r

eflec

t th

e cu

rrent

wor

ld e

cono

my.

Th

is w

as s

een

in th

e 20

06 re

form

s, w

hich

incl

uded

wid

e-ra

ngin

g qu

ota

real

ignm

ents

(in

crea

sing

the

votin

g po

wer

of d

ynam

ic e

mer

ging

-mar

ket c

ount

ries,

con

sist

ent w

ith

thei

r gro

win

g re

lativ

e im

porta

nce

in th

e w

orld

eco

nom

y), a

sig

nific

ant i

ncre

ase

in b

asic

vo

tes

and

a ch

ange

in h

ow th

ey a

re d

eter

min

ed, t

o pr

otec

t the

vot

ing

pow

er o

f sm

all

and

low

-inco

me

coun

tries

.


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

Yes.

Ter

ms

of A

ppoi

ntm

ent f

or C

hris

tine

Laga

rde

wer

e pu

blis

hed

on

July

5, 2

011

in fo

rm o

f a p

ress

rele

ase.

148

The

Fund

’s A

rticl

es o

f Agr

eem

ent a

nd B

y-La

ws

offe

r sta

ndar

dize

d jo

b de

scrip

tion

for E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s.14

9 The

re a

re a

lso

com

plet

e TO

Rs

for t

he e

thic

s ad

vise

r,150 t

he o

mbu

dspe

rson

,151 a

nd th

e In

depe

nden

t Ev

alua

tion

Offi

ce.15

2

Bef

ore

2007

ther

e w

as n

o st

atem

ent o

f the

qu

aliti

es, e

xper

tise

and

expe

rienc

e th

at c

andi

date

s sh

ould

hav

e. T

he p

roce

ss im

prov

emen

ts s

tarte

d w

ith th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd s

ettin

g ou

t a ti

met

able

and

in

vitin

g no

min

atio

ns fr

om E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s fo

r the

po

st o

f MD

, and

inte

rvie

win

g th

ose

who

app

lied.

153

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

The

entir

e m

embe

rshi

p. A

ny IM

F m

embe

r, th

roug

h its

Gov

erno

r or

Exec

utiv

e D

irect

or, c

an n

omin

ate

a ca

ndid

ate

for t

he p

ost o

f Man

agin

g D

irect

or. A

ccor

ding

to th

e qu

ota

form

ula,

“th

e to

tal v

otes

of e

ach

mem

ber s

hall

be e

qual

to th

e su

m o

f its

bas

ic v

otes

and

its

quot

a-ba

sed

vote

s”.15

4 In

Dec

embe

r 201

0, th

e B

oard

of G

over

nors

app

rove

d a

quot

a an

d go

vern

ance

refo

rm th

at is

to s

hift

mor

e th

an 6

% o

f quo

ta

shar

es to

em

ergi

ng m

arke

t and

pro

tect

the

quot

a sh

ares

and

vot

ing

pow

er o

f the

poo

rest

mem

bers

.155

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes.

The

pro

cess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

is p

art o

f the

foun

ding

A

rticl

es o

f Agr

eem

ent o

f the

Inte

rnat

iona

l Mon

etar

y Fu

nd a

nd is

pu

blic

ally

ava

ilabl

e.15

6 The

pro

cedu

res

and

timet

able

for 2

011

sele

ctio

n of

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or w

ere

publ

ishe

d th

roug

h a

serie

s of

pre

ss

rele

ases

.157

Ther

e is

a n

omin

atio

n pe

riod,

follo

wed

by

shor

tlist

ing

of c

andi

date

s (in

cas

e th

ere

are

mor

e th

an th

ree)

by

a m

ajor

ity o

f vot

es c

ast b

y th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd. O

nce

the

shor

tlist

is p

ublis

hed

24 E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s in

terv

iew

eac

h ca

ndid

ate.

Th

e ca

ndid

ates

then

mak

e st

atem

ents

to th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd (w

hich

are

pub

lishe

d), f

ollo

win

g by

a Q

&A s

essi

on. T

he B

oard

then

mak

es th

e fin

al

sele

ctio

n tra

ditio

nally

bas

ed o

n co

nsen

sus

(alth

ough

a

maj

ority

of v

otes

cas

t is

form

ally

requ

ired)

. The

se

lect

ed c

andi

date

is n

otifi

ed a

nd a

nnou

nced

pu

blic

ly, i

nclu

ding

the

hirin

g co

ntra

ct.

II.

The

lead

er h

as c

lear p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

Yes.

The

resp

onsi

bilit

ies

of m

anag

emen

t of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion

are

divi

ded

betw

een

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or a

nd fo

ur D

eput

y M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

s (D

MD

s). E

ach

DM

D h

as a

pur

view

of c

ount

ries

and

subj

ect m

atte

rs fo

r w

hich

he/

she

is re

spon

sibl

e an

d ty

pica

lly o

vers

ees

the

inte

rnal

revi

ew

proc

ess

for e

ach

Boa

rd p

aper

and

cha

irs re

late

d B

oard

mee

tings

. In

addi

tion

to th

e co

untri

es a

nd s

ubje

cts

unde

r his

/her

pur

view

, the

Firs

t D

eput

y M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

is re

spon

sibl

e fo

r all

issu

es th

at a

re n

ot in

th

e pu

rvie

w o

f the

oth

er D

MD

s an

d as

sist

s th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

in

the

com

preh

ensi

ve o

vers

ight

of t

he in

stitu

tion.

The

Boa

rd a

lso

sets

ob

ject

ives

for a

sses

sing

the

perfo

rman

ce o

f the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or

(and

DM

Ds)

, and

suc

h as

sess

men

t tak

es p

lace

ann

ually

.

Com

mitm

ents

are

som

etim

es m

ade

unof

ficia

lly a

nd

befo

re th

e se

lect

ion

is m

ade.

For

exa

mpl

e, J

acqu

es

de L

aros

ière

com

mitt

ed to

cha

ir th

e B

oard

mee

tings

pe

rson

ally

, and

he

kept

the

prom

ise.

158


2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

Yes.

Alth

ough

it is

n’t i

n th

e te

rms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ent.

Man

agin

g D

irect

or

pres

ents

thei

r goa

ls a

nd v

isio

n to

the

inst

itutio

n’s

min

iste

rial p

olic

y ad

viso

ry c

omm

ittee

, the

IMFC

, tw

ice

a ye

ar in

the

Glo

bal P

olic

y A

gend

a.15

9 IM

FC d

iscu

sses

and

pro

vide

s its

vie

ws,

whi

ch a

re th

en

trans

late

d by

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or in

to a

n op

erat

iona

lly p

oint

ed s

et

of p

ropo

sals

as

the

Sta

tem

ent o

n th

e W

ork

Pro

gram

of t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd, w

hich

is d

iscu

ssed

and

end

orse

d by

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

.160

The

Wor

k P

rogr

am (t

wic

e a

year

) is

then

con

tinuo

usly

mon

itore

d by

the

MD

and

the

Boa

rd, a

nd re

vise

d in

ligh

t of d

evel

opm

ents

to e

nsur

e its

ef

fect

ive

impl

emen

tatio

n. T

he M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

and

the

man

agem

ent

team

ove

rsee

the

inst

itutio

n’s

Acc

ount

abilit

y Fr

amew

ork

to e

nsur

e th

at

seni

or m

anag

ers

(Dep

artm

ent H

eads

) mee

t the

stra

tegi

c go

als

set b

y th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

.

The

regu

lar s

truct

ured

dis

cuss

ions

bet

wee

n de

partm

ent d

irect

ors

and

man

agem

ent f

ocus

on

key

depa

rtmen

tal o

bjec

tives

, inc

ludi

ng o

n bu

dget

an

d hu

man

reso

urce

prio

ritie

s. D

epar

tmen

tal

obje

ctiv

es fl

ow fr

om th

e an

nual

sta

tem

ent o

f M

anag

emen

t’s K

ey G

oals

, whi

ch is

der

ived

from

th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

’s G

loba

l Pol

icy

Age

nda.

M

anag

emen

t hol

ds s

emi-a

nnua

l dis

cuss

ions

with

ea

ch D

irect

or to

dis

cuss

pro

gres

s m

ade

with

cur

rent

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s an

d to

revi

ew p

erfo

rman

ce

agai

nst b

udge

t and

peo

ple

man

agem

ent i

ndic

ator

s.

New

goa

ls a

nd ta

rget

s ar

e al

so d

iscu

ssed

for

the

perio

d ah

ead.

Thi

s pr

oces

s he

lps

impr

ove

depa

rtmen

tal a

lignm

ent t

o in

stitu

tiona

l prio

ritie

s an

d en

hanc

es c

olla

bora

tion

betw

een

depa

rtmen

ts b

y sp

ecify

ing

join

t obj

ectiv

es, w

hile

pro

mot

ing

mor

e ef

fect

ive

man

agem

ent o

f bud

gets

and

peo

ple.

161

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. P

arag

raph

27

of th

e C

ode

of C

ondu

ct16

2 est

ablis

hed

the

prin

cipl

e th

at “

any

staf

f mem

ber w

ho c

onsi

ders

that

he

or s

he m

ight

be

in

a po

sitio

n of

act

ual o

r app

aren

t con

flict

of i

nter

est s

houl

d di

sclo

se

the

mat

ter”

to h

is o

r her

sup

ervi

sor o

r to

the

Com

plia

nce

Offi

cer.

Sub

mis

sion

of a

nnua

l fina

ncia

l cer

tifica

tion

form

is a

lso

part

of M

D’s

co

ntra

ct. T

he C

ode

of C

ondu

ct is

als

o co

nsid

ered

in th

e as

sign

men

t of

staf

f tas

ks, i

nclu

ding

that

a m

issi

on c

hief

/rev

iew

ed c

anno

t be

assi

gned

to

a c

ount

ry o

f whi

ch h

e/sh

e is

a n

atio

nal.

In a

dditi

on, t

he E

thic

s C

omm

ittee

of t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd d

eals

with

any

pos

sibl

e co

nflic

ts o

f in

tere

st a

mon

g Ex

ecut

ive

Dire

ctor

s.

Acc

ordi

ng to

the

IEO

, the

Fun

d’s

gove

rnan

ce

fram

ewor

k is

not

wel

l des

igne

d to

iden

tify

actu

al

and

pote

ntia

l con

flict

s of

inte

rest

or e

thic

al p

robl

ems

of th

e M

D.16

3 Nam

ely,

ther

e is

no

“whi

stle

-blo

wer

” pr

otec

tion

for p

erso

ns w

ho re

port

mis

cond

uct,

and,

in

par

ticul

ar, t

here

is n

o m

echa

nism

for c

ompl

aint

s an

d co

ncer

ns a

bout

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors,

the

MD

, and

oth

er s

enio

r offi

cers

that

gua

rant

ees

the

confi

dent

ialit

y of

the

sour

ce.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. T

he c

urre

nt M

D is

sub

ject

to th

e st

aff C

ode

of C

ondu

ct u

nder

the

term

s of

the

lette

r of a

ppoi

ntm

ent.

Ther

e is

a B

oard

Eth

ics

Com

mitt

ee,

whi

ch is

sep

arat

e fro

m E

thic

s O

ffice

r.164

As

the

IEO

not

es, i

t is

not c

lear

who

wou

ld b

e in

a

posi

tion

to a

pply

this

Cod

e to

the

MD

, giv

en th

at

thos

e re

spon

sibl

e fo

r its

app

licat

ion

repo

rt to

the

MD

.165


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Yes.

The

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

con

duct

s a

dire

ct A

nnua

l Per

form

ance

R

evie

w o

f the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or (a

nd D

MD

s), d

urin

g w

hich

MD

pr

ovid

es fe

edba

ck o

n he

r ow

n as

sess

men

t and

that

of t

he B

oard

in

the

sam

e co

ntex

t.166

This

ann

ual e

xerc

ise,

intro

duce

d in

200

9, is

bas

ed o

n a

defin

ed

fram

ewor

k. E

ach

year

, bot

h th

e B

oard

and

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or

spec

ify p

erfo

rman

ce o

bjec

tives

for e

ach

othe

r, ag

ains

t whi

ch a

n as

sess

men

t is

cond

ucte

d in

the

follo

win

g ye

ar. I

n co

nduc

ting

this

ex

erci

se, t

he B

oard

eac

h ye

ar a

ppoi

nts

a w

orki

ng g

roup

of fi

ve

Exec

utiv

e D

irect

ors

(with

geo

grap

hica

l rep

rese

ntat

ion)

to o

vers

ee th

e pr

oces

s. T

he p

roce

ss c

ompr

ises

sev

eral

iter

atio

ns a

nd in

volv

es a

ll Ex

ecut

ive

Dire

ctor

s.2

Is re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

Chr

istin

e La

gard

e’s

term

s of

app

oint

men

t ide

ntify

a fi

xed

sala

ry o

f $4

67,9

40 p

er a

nnum

, whi

ch is

adj

uste

d by

the

incr

ease

in c

onsu

mer

pr

ice

inde

x in

the

grea

ter W

ashi

ngto

n ar

ea.16

7

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Yes.

IMF

orga

nize

s m

anag

eria

l cou

rses

; the

man

agem

ent t

eam

has

ac

cess

to th

em.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent c

riter

ia

cons

ider

ed b

y th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

Yes.

The

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

, in

cons

ulta

tion

with

the

entir

e m

embe

rshi

p,

dete

rmin

es w

heth

er to

re-a

ppoi

nt th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

. In

doin

g so

, it

take

s an

acc

ount

of M

D’s

per

form

ance

.

Acc

ordi

ng to

IEO

, the

Boa

rd h

as th

us fa

r pla

yed

only

a p

ro fo

rma

role

in s

elec

ting

MD

s an

d re

new

ing

thei

r app

oint

men

ts, w

ith th

e ac

tual

dec

isio

n be

ing

mad

e by

a s

ubse

t of m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s’ a

utho

ritie

s th

roug

h an

opa

que

proc

ess.

168

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

In c

onsi

derin

g an

y re

-app

oint

men

t of t

he M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

, the

Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd, r

epre

sent

ing

the

mem

bers

hip,

con

side

rs a

ll op

tions

.A

ccor

ding

to IE

O, t

here

is n

o fo

rmal

pro

cess

for

sear

chin

g fo

r can

dida

tes.

The

con

vent

ion

that

the

gove

rnm

ents

of t

heir

coun

tries

of o

rigin

pro

pose

ca

ndid

ates

has

in th

e pa

st re

sulte

d in

som

e co

mpe

tent

pos

sibl

e ca

ndid

ates

not

bei

ng p

ut

forw

ard

for a

var

iety

of r

easo

ns in

clud

ing

dom

estic

po

litic

al fa

ctor

s or

lack

of e

nthu

sias

m b

y th

e na

tiona

l au

thor

ities

.169


V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

Yes.

The

Man

agin

g D

irect

or p

rese

nts

her G

loba

l Pol

icy

Age

nda,

ou

tlini

ng th

e st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s of

the

inst

itutio

n, tw

ice

per y

ear t

o th

e m

inis

teria

l pol

icy

advi

sory

com

mitt

ee, t

he IM

FC, a

fter c

lose

co

nsul

tatio

n w

ith th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd. S

houl

d ci

rcum

stan

ces

war

rant

, th

e M

anag

ing

Dire

ctor

can

act

qui

ckly

to c

onsu

lt w

ith th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd o

n re

finin

g th

e st

rate

gy in

the

inte

rim p

erio

d.2

Doe

s th

e M

O/IO

hav

e pr

oces

ses

that

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

Yes.

The

Man

agin

g D

irect

or ro

utin

ely

cons

ults

with

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

on

all s

trate

gic

mat

ters

. In

addi

tion,

the

Man

agin

g D

irect

or o

ften

mee

ts w

ith s

enio

r pol

icy

mak

ers

durin

g he

r tra

vel t

o m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s an

d di

scus

ses

the

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

of th

e in

stitu

tion,

incl

udin

g em

ergi

ng is

sues

.170

The

EIO

sta

tes

that

ther

e ar

e al

so in

form

al p

ract

ices

th

at fa

cilit

ate

nego

tiatio

ns. E

.g.:

disc

ussi

ons

and

deci

sion

mak

ing

shift

out

of t

he B

oard

and

into

a

smal

ler g

roup

of p

olic

y m

aker

s w

ho a

re n

ot b

ound

by

vot

ing

arra

ngem

ents

or f

orm

al p

roce

dure

s; th

eir

dial

ogue

take

s pl

ace

thro

ugh

conf

eren

ce c

alls

and

pr

ivat

e m

eetin

gs w

here

offi

cial

min

utes

are

rare

ly

kept

.171

3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Sup

plem

enta

ry fi

nanc

ing

arra

ngem

ents

exi

st b

etw

een

the

IMF

and

a su

bset

of m

embe

rs. P

rimar

y am

ong

thes

e ar

e th

e N

ew A

rran

gem

ents

to

Bor

row

bet

wee

n th

e IM

F an

d 38

mem

ber c

ount

ries.

The

re is

som

e di

scre

tiona

ry b

udge

t on

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce:

40%

($10

7 m

illion

, 46%

of

ext

erna

l fina

ncin

g ov

er 1

990-

2012

per

iod

is J

apan

ese)

of I

MF’

s bu

dget

dev

elop

men

t and

mor

e th

an 7

0% o

f fiel

d de

liver

y. S

ome

fund

s ar

e co

ntro

lled

by a

ll m

embe

rshi

p, fo

r exa

mpl

e th

e P

over

ty R

educ

tion

and

Gro

wth

Fac

ility

(PR

GF)

.

The

finan

cing

mad

e av

aila

ble

to th

e IM

F un

der s

uch

cred

it ar

rang

emen

ts a

re in

tend

ed to

be

avai

labl

e to

an

y m

embe

r cou

ntry

if n

eede

d.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

The

re a

re p

erio

dic

IMF-

wid

e st

aff s

urve

ys o

n a

wid

e ra

nge

of

issu

es, w

ith th

e m

ost r

ecen

t con

duct

ed in

201

3. T

he m

anag

emen

t te

am s

hare

s its

resu

lts d

irect

ly w

ith a

ll th

e st

aff (

but d

oes

not p

ublic

ly

publ

ish

them

).

Ther

e is

an

inte

nse

follo

w-u

p w

ith s

taff,

incl

udin

g to

wn

hall

mee

tings

with

all

staf

f, an

d ac

tion

plan

s on

a w

ide

varie

ty o

f spe

cific

issu

es a

re d

evel

oped

, im

plem

ente

d, a

nd m

onito

red

clos

ely.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

The

man

agem

ent t

eam

is a

sses

sed

on a

ll is

sues

. In

the

MD

’s s

elf-

asse

ssm

ent m

anag

emen

t of s

taff

is a

n im

porta

nt e

lem

ent.17

2


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

The

annu

al re

port

men

tions

IMF

coop

erat

ion

with

labo

ur g

roup

s (m

ostly

, tho

ugh

disc

ussi

ons)

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns (t

hrou

gh c

onfe

renc

es, m

eetin

gs, s

emin

ars

and

fello

wsh

ip p

rogr

amm

e th

at c

ould

cou

nt a

s lim

ited

inst

itutio

naliz

atio

n), a

cade

mia

(aca

dem

ic fe

llow

ship

pro

gram

me)

, as

wel

l as

legi

slat

ors.

The

IMF

Man

agin

g D

irect

or a

nd th

e W

orld

Ban

k P

resi

dent

als

o ho

ld a

civ

il so

ciet

y or

gani

zatio

ns to

wn

hall

mee

ting

durin

g th

e A

nnua

l Mee

tings

.

Mor

e re

cent

ly, t

he IM

F ha

s in

crea

sed

its

enga

gem

ent w

ith la

bour

gro

ups.

Sin

ce 2

010,

co

llabo

ratio

n be

twee

n th

e IM

F an

d th

e In

tern

atio

nal

Labo

ur O

rgan

izat

ion

(ILO

) has

not

icea

bly

incr

ease

d,

with

gre

ater

focu

s on

soc

ial p

rote

ctio

n flo

ors,

na

tiona

l soc

ial d

ialo

gue,

and

rese

arch

on

jobs

an

d gr

owth

. The

IMF

enga

ges

with

the

ITU

C o

n a

regu

lar b

asis

, and

the

two

orga

niza

tions

hol

d an

nual

di

scus

sion

s w

ith re

pres

enta

tives

of n

atio

nal l

abou

r un

ions

. The

IMF

also

regu

larly

eng

ages

with

glo

bal

med

ia a

nd h

olds

regu

lar p

ress

brie

fings

on

coun

try

and

polic

y m

atte

rs.17

3

VIII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

eng

age

the

lead

er th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

erna

l eva

luat

ions

The

Inde

pend

ent E

valu

atio

n O

ffice

(IEO

) was

est

ablis

hed

in 2

001

to c

ondu

ct o

bjec

tive

eval

uatio

ns o

f Fun

d po

licie

s an

d ac

tiviti

es. U

nder

its

Term

s of

Ref

eren

ce, i

t is

fully

inde

pend

ent f

rom

the

Man

agem

ent o

f the

IMF

and

oper

ates

at a

rm’s

leng

th fr

om th

e B

oard

of E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

s. It

pub

lishe

s on

e re

port

a ye

ar o

n a

spec

ific

IMF

polic

y (ro

le o

f IM

F as

trus

ted

advi

ser,

inte

rnat

iona

l res

erve

s, re

sear

ch a

t the

IMF)

. As

indi

cate

d in

the

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r IEO

,174 i

t eng

ages

with

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t, th

e bo

ard

and

the

staf

f whe

n th

ey “

resp

ond

to

rele

vant

par

ts o

f the

eva

luat

ion”

.175

From

a m

ore

oper

atio

nal a

ngle

, the

Offi

ce o

f Int

erna

l Aud

it an

d In

spec

tion

inde

pend

ently

exa

min

es th

e ef

fect

iven

ess

of th

e ris

k m

anag

emen

t, co

ntro

l, an

d go

vern

ance

pro

cess

es o

f the

org

aniz

atio

n. E

ach

year

, OIA

co

nduc

ts a

udits

and

revi

ews,

whi

ch in

clud

e fin

anci

al a

udits

, inf

orm

atio

n te

chno

logy

aud

its, a

nd o

pera

tiona

l an

d ef

fect

iven

ess

audi

ts. O

IA m

ay a

lso

prov

ide

cons

ultin

g se

rvic

es, e

.g.,

help

iden

tify

cont

rols

for n

ew

proc

esse

s. T

he o

vera

ll pu

rpos

e is

to e

nsur

e th

at th

e IM

F op

erat

es in

line

with

bes

t int

erna

tiona

l pra

ctic

es.

The

IMF

also

con

duct

s re

gula

r and

ext

ensi

ve in

tern

al s

elf-

asse

ssm

ents

of i

ts w

ork.

The

re is

a c

ompr

ehen

sive

in

tern

al re

view

pro

cess

for a

ll IM

F do

cum

ents

, pol

icy

anal

ysis

, and

lend

ing

oper

atio

ns, w

hich

beg

ins

with

an

inte

rdep

artm

enta

l sta

ff re

view

. Man

agem

ent i

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r the

fina

l cle

aran

ce o

f all

offic

ial d

ocum

ents

be

fore

issu

ance

to, a

nd c

onsi

dera

tion

by, t

he E

xecu

tive

Boa

rd. T

here

afte

r, m

ost d

ocum

ents

are

pub

lishe

d.

Exam

ples

of i

nter

nal s

elf-

asse

ssm

ent i

nclu

de e

x po

st a

sses

smen

ts/e

valu

atio

ns o

f fina

ncia

l pro

gram

mes

(for

ex

ampl

e, a

rece

nt a

sses

smen

t of t

he G

reec

e pr

ogra

mm

e).17

6


f. In

tern

atio

nal O

rgan

izat

ion

for

Mig

ratio

n (IO

M)

Org

aniz

atio

n IO

M w

orks

with

par

tner

s to

sup

port

stat

es in

mee

ting

the

grow

ing

oper

atio

nal

chal

leng

es o

f mig

ratio

n go

vern

ance

; adv

ance

und

erst

andi

ng o

f mig

ratio

n is

sues

; en

cour

age

soci

al a

nd e

cono

mic

dev

elop

men

t thr

ough

mig

ratio

n; a

nd u

phol

d th

e w

ell-b

eing

and

hum

an ri

ghts

of m

igra

nts.

IOM

has

a lo

ng-s

tand

ing,

ext

ensi

ve a

nd c

lose

ly c

oord

inat

ed w

orki

ng re

latio

nshi

p w

ith th

e U

N, a

t pol

icy

and

oper

atio

nal l

evel

s. A

t the

ope

ratio

nal l

evel

, IO

M c

hief

s of

mis

sion

par

ticip

ate

in h

uman

itaria

n co

untry

team

s an

d in

virt

ually

all

UN

cou

ntry

te

ams.

IOM

con

tribu

tes

to s

yste

m-w

ide

oper

atio

ns th

roug

h its

par

ticip

atio

n in

the

Inte

r-A

genc

y S

tand

ing

Com

mitt

ee (I

AS

C),

and

is a

n ac

tive

partn

er, l

ead

and

co-

lead

in s

ever

al c

lust

ers

in m

any

coun

tries

aro

und

the

wor

ld.

At t

he g

loba

l lev

el, t

he U

nite

d N

atio

ns H

igh

Com

mis

sion

er fo

r Ref

ugee

s an

d IO

M

are

the

cam

p co

ordi

natio

n an

d ca

mp

man

agem

ent c

o-cl

uste

r lea

d ag

enci

es.

At t

he p

olic

y le

vel,

IOM

was

cha

ir of

the

Glo

bal M

igra

tion

Gro

up in

the

seco

nd

sem

este

r of 2

013,

lead

ing

the

grou

p’s

prep

arat

ions

for t

he s

econ

d U

N H

igh-

Leve

l D

ialo

gue

on M

igra

tion

and

Dev

elop

men

t. Fr

om 2

011

to 2

013,

the

IOM

dire

ctor

-ge

nera

l (D

G) l

ed s

yste

m-w

ide

effo

rts to

sup

port

prev

entio

n of

sex

ual e

xplo

itatio

n an

d ab

use

(PS

EA) a

s th

e P

SEA

cha

mpi

on. I

nter

-inst

itutio

nal c

oope

ratio

n is

m

aint

aine

d by

IOM

’s h

eadq

uarte

rs; t

he p

erm

anen

t obs

erve

r in

New

Yor

k, th

roug

h on

goin

g lia

ison

with

the

UN

sec

reta

riat;

and

spec

ial l

iais

on m

issi

ons

in th

e fie

ld.

Twen

ty-s

ix U

N a

genc

ies

are

repr

esen

ted

in IO

M a

s O

bser

vers

.

Gov

erna

nce

The

IOM

Cou

ncil,

com

pris

ing

repr

esen

tativ

es o

f 157

mem

ber s

tate

s, d

eter

min

es,

exam

ines

and

revi

ews

polic

ies,

pro

gram

mes

and

act

iviti

es, a

nd re

view

s an

d ap

prov

es th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

budg

et, e

xpen

ditu

res

and

acco

unts

. As

the

high

est

auth

ority

, the

cou

ncil

revi

ews

the

repo

rts, a

nd a

ppro

ves

and

dire

cts

the

activ

ities

, of

its

subs

idia

ry b

odie

s. M

eetin

g re

gula

rly a

t its

ann

ual s

essi

on a

nd in

spe

cial

se

ssio

ns, t

he c

ounc

il m

ay a

dmit

non-

mem

ber s

tate

s up

on th

eir a

pplic

atio

n. It

may

al

so a

dmit

inte

rnat

iona

l org

aniz

atio

ns a

nd c

ivil

soci

ety

orga

niza

tions

to p

artic

ipat

e in

its

sess

ions

as

non-

votin

g ob

serv

ers.

Pre

para

tions

for c

ounc

il se

ssio

ns a

re

mad

e th

roug

h ot

her g

over

ning

bod

y st

ruct

ures

, inc

ludi

ng th

e st

andi

ng c

omm

ittee

on

pro

gram

mes

and

fina

nce

(SC

PF)

, inf

orm

al c

onsu

ltatio

ns a

nd w

orki

ng g

roup

s.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Five

yea

rs; r

enew

able

onc

e.

Inco

me

Refl

ectin

g IO

M’s

exp

ansi

on, t

he o

rgan

izat

ion’

s bu

dget

reac

hed

$1.3

billi

on in

201

3,

the

fifth

-con

secu

tive

year

of g

row

th.17

7

Num

ber

of s

taff

App

roxi

mat

ely

8,50

0 gl

obal

ly, w

ith m

ore

than

480

fiel

d lo

catio

ns.17

8

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pW

hen

sele

ctin

g th

e D

G, m

embe

r sta

tes

have

trad

ition

ally

ele

cted

the

cand

idat

e no

min

ated

by

IOM

’s la

rges

t don

or c

ount

ry, w

ith o

ne e

xcep

tion:

Bas

tiaan

Hav

eman

, N

ethe

rland

s (1

961-

1969

). IO

M’s

lead

ersh

ip c

ompr

ises

a d

eput

y di

rect

or-g

ener

al

(DD

G),

who

is a

lso

an e

lect

ed o

ffici

al.

Pas

t lea

ders

of I

OM

and

its

pred

eces

sor o

rgan

izat

ions

wer

e: H

ugh

Gib

son

(from

the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

195

2-19

54);

Har

old

Tittm

an (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

955-

1958

); M

arcu

s D

aly

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

195

8-19

61);

Bas

tiaan

Hav

eman

(Net

herla

nds,

196

1-19

69);

John

Th

omas

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

196

9-19

79);

Jam

es C

arlin

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

197

9-19

88) a

nd

Bru

nson

McK

inle

y (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

998-

2008

).

The

curre

nt le

ader

is W

illiam

Sw

ing

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

200

8-pr

esen

t).17

9

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryA

fter

taki

ng o

ffice

, S

win

g em

bark

ed o

n a

stru

ctur

al r

evie

w t

hat

cons

olid

ated

IOM

’s

field

stru

ctur

es a

nd e

nsur

ed g

reat

er c

oher

ence

at h

eadq

uarte

rs;18

0 inc

reas

ed th

e co

re

fund

ing;

181

and

stre

ngth

ened

inte

rnal

con

trols

by

esta

blis

hing

an

audi

t and

ove

rsig

ht

com

mitt

ee.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/ter

ms

of re

fere

nce

for t

he le

ader

onl

ine?

Yes.

The

IOM

Con

stitu

tion,

whi

ch is

ava

ilabl

e on

line,

out

lines

the

DG

’s

func

tions

. Acc

ount

able

to th

e C

ounc

il, th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al fo

rmul

ates

pr

opos

als

rela

ted

to th

e ad

min

istra

tive

and

exec

utiv

e fu

nctio

ns o

f IO

M, i

n ac

cord

ance

with

the

Con

stitu

tion

and

Cou

ncil

polic

ies

and

deci

sion

s.

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

of th

e le

ader

?

Spe

cial

Cou

ncil

Ses

sion

s in

vite

all

votin

g M

embe

r Sta

tes

to p

artic

ipat

e in

the

elec

tion

proc

ess.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

and

the

Dep

uty

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al (D

DG

) are

ele

cted

by

a tw

o-th

irds

maj

ority

of a

ll pa

rtici

patin

g vo

ting

Mem

ber S

tate

s of

the

Cou

ncil.

182 T

he C

onst

itutio

n ou

tline

s th

e cr

iteria

for M

embe

r Sta

tes’

loss

of v

otin

g rig

hts.

A M

embe

r Sta

te

whi

ch is

in a

rrear

s in

the

paym

ent o

f its

fina

ncia

l con

tribu

tions

to th

e O

rgan

izat

ion

lose

s its

vot

ing

right

if th

e am

ount

of i

ts a

rrear

s eq

uals

or

exc

eeds

the

amou

nt o

f the

con

tribu

tions

due

in th

e pr

eced

ing

two

year

s.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

ncie

s ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Yes.

The

pro

cess

of D

G a

nd D

DG

sel

ectio

n is

det

aile

d in

the

Con

stitu

tion,

whi

ch is

ava

ilabl

e on

line.

Add

ition

al e

lem

ents

for t

he

elec

tion

of th

e le

ader

ship

, ado

pted

by

the

Cou

ncil

on 3

0 N

ovem

ber

2007

, stip

ulat

e th

e re

quire

men

t tha

t the

nom

inat

ion

of c

andi

date

s be

pr

esen

ted

by M

embe

r Sta

tes

to th

e C

ounc

il C

hairp

erso

n no

late

r tha

n tw

o m

onth

s pr

ior t

o th

e el

ectio

ns.

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

the

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

acc

ount

abilit

y1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

set

cle

ar

perfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns fo

r th

emse

lves

, whi

ch a

re tr

ansp

aren

t an

d co

nsis

tent

?

Yes.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

’s a

ccep

tanc

e sp

eech

to th

e C

ounc

il up

on

elec

tion

outli

nes

the

over

arch

ing

prio

ritie

s fo

r the

man

date

ahe

ad. T

he

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

repo

rts b

iann

ually

--

to th

e C

ounc

il an

d to

the

SC

PF

-- o

n th

e pe

rform

ance

of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion

unde

r his

lead

ersh

ip. T

he

repo

rt sp

ecifi

es h

ow th

e w

ork

of th

e O

rgan

izat

ion

rela

tes

to e

ach

of

the

poin

ts o

f the

IOM

Stra

tegy

est

ablis

hed

by th

e C

ounc

il.

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

trans

late

s ov

erar

chin

g go

als

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

Yes

– m

anda

ted

by th

e C

ounc

il, IO

M h

as p

roce

sses

that

est

ablis

h ac

tion

plan

s of

the

Org

aniz

atio

n’s

Stra

tegy

. The

Reg

iona

l Stra

tegi

es

are

oper

atio

nal t

ools

that

illu

stra

te h

ow th

e gl

obal

IOM

Stra

tegy

(1

2-P

oint

Stra

tegy

) is

impl

emen

ted

at th

e re

gion

al le

vel.

Two

coor

dina

ting

com

mitt

ees

for m

anag

emen

t coo

rdin

atio

n (M

CC

) and

po

licy

form

ulat

ion

(PFC

C) f

acilit

ate

cohe

renc

e, c

omm

unic

atio

n an

d co

oper

atio

n be

twee

n H

eadq

uarte

rs a

nd th

e Fi

eld

and

enha

nce

the

qual

ity o

f dec

isio

n-m

akin

g an

d co

mpl

ianc

e th

roug

hout

the

Org

aniz

atio

n. T

he S

enio

r Man

agem

ent T

eam

join

s fo

r a b

ienn

ial r

etre

at

to re

view

and

ope

ratio

naliz

e m

ulti-

annu

al o

rgan

izat

iona

l goa

ls w

ith

targ

ets.

In a

ltern

atin

g ye

ars,

the

DG

con

vene

s a

Glo

bal C

hief

s of

M

issi

on m

eetin

g, w

here

Fie

ld a

nd H

Q c

omm

unic

ate

and

cons

ult o

n ke

y in

stitu

tiona

l prio

ritie

s an

d ch

alle

nges

.


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s, th

e D

G, t

he D

DG

and

all

IOM

sta

ff ar

e re

quire

d to

dec

lare

any

co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t. Th

e C

onst

itutio

n st

ipul

ates

that

in th

e pe

rform

ance

of

thei

r dut

ies,

thes

e sh

all n

eith

er s

eek

nor r

ecei

ve in

stru

ctio

ns fr

om

an e

xter

nal a

utho

rity.

All

empl

oym

ent b

y IO

M is

sub

ject

to s

igna

ture

of

a d

ecla

ratio

n to

this

effe

ct. T

he E

thic

s an

d C

ondu

ct O

ffice

pro

vide

s ad

vice

on

requ

est f

or in

volv

emen

t in

any

activ

ity o

utsi

de IO

M th

at m

ay

invo

lve

a co

nflic

t of i

nter

est.

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?A

ll em

ploy

men

t in

IOM

is s

ubje

ct to

a s

igne

d co

mm

itmen

t to

adhe

re

to th

e IO

M S

tand

ard

of C

ondu

ct. A

ll IO

M s

taff

mem

bers

hav

e an

ob

ligat

ion

to re

port

any

alle

ged

viol

atio

ns to

the

Ethi

cs a

nd C

ondu

ct

Offi

ce, w

ho m

anag

es re

ferr

als

conc

erni

ng a

llega

tions

of m

isco

nduc

t an

d un

ethi

cal b

ehav

iour

. III

.Th

e le

ader

has

a d

efine

d pe

rfor

man

ce m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me

and

rece

ives

ann

ual f

eedb

ack

on p

erfo

rman

ce1

Is th

e le

ader

sub

ject

ed to

ann

ual

perfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

?Th

e D

G re

ports

regu

larly

to M

embe

r Sta

tes

and

give

s a

full

acco

unt

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

prog

ram

mat

ic a

nd fi

nanc

ial p

erfo

rman

ces

in

mee

tings

of t

he G

over

ning

Bod

ies.

2A

re re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

The

DG

’s re

mun

erat

ion

is d

eter

min

ed b

y th

e C

ounc

il, b

ased

on

the

UN

pa

y sc

ale

and

fixed

for t

he e

ntire

dur

atio

n of

his

man

date

. 183

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Yes.

IOM

has

a s

taff

and

deve

lopm

ent p

rogr

amm

e w

hich

pro

vide

s co

achi

ng a

nd d

evel

opm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to th

e D

G, D

DG

and

oth

er

staf

f mem

bers

.

IV.

Re-

elec

tion

of th

e le

ader

is b

ased

on

trans

pare

nt p

roce

sses

and

met

rics

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

The

perfo

rman

ce is

sub

ject

to th

e cr

iteria

est

ablis

hed

by e

ach

of th

e vo

ting

coun

tries

indi

vidu

ally

. Re-

elec

tion,

like

the

initi

al e

lect

ion,

is

dete

rmin

ed b

y M

embe

r Sta

tes

thro

ugh

an e

lect

ion

proc

ess.

2

Are

oth

er q

ualifi

ed c

andi

date

s co

nsid

ered

in th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

Yes.

Fol

low

ing

the

proc

ess,

all

nom

inat

ed c

andi

date

s ar

e co

nsid

ered

.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

Yes.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

put

s in

to a

ctio

n, v

aryi

ng th

e em

phas

is

as a

ppro

pria

te to

circ

umst

ance

s, th

e IO

M S

trate

gy e

stab

lishe

d by

M

embe

r Sta

tes.

Mor

eove

r, th

e IO

M C

onst

itutio

n re

ques

ts th

e D

G to

‘fo

rmul

ate

prop

osal

s fo

r app

ropr

iate

act

ion

by th

e C

ounc

il’, p

ropo

sals

th

at h

ave

incl

uded

new

stra

tegi

c im

pera

tives

. 184

2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

Yes,

the

DG

impl

emen

ts n

ew s

trate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

con

sulta

tion

with

in

IOM

, the

Org

aniz

atio

n’s

Mem

ber S

tate

s as

wel

l as

rele

vant

par

tner

s.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

an

d co

ntro

lled

by a

sub

set o

f the

full

mem

bers

hip?

3% o

f IO

M’s

ann

ual b

udge

t com

es fr

om a

sses

sed

cont

ribut

ions

and

is

use

d to

cov

er th

e co

re s

truct

ure.

The

ope

ratio

nal p

art o

f the

bud

get

(97%

) is

prov

ided

by

Mem

ber S

tate

s an

d ot

her d

onor

s fo

r spe

cific

pr

ojec

ts th

at fa

ll un

der I

OM

’s m

anda

te a

nd s

trate

gy –

bot

h of

whi

ch

are

esta

blis

hed

thou

gh a

una

nim

ous

deci

sion

of t

he M

embe

r Sta

tes.

185

IOM

als

o m

anag

es s

peci

al fu

nds

who

se c

riter

ia a

nd p

roce

dure

s ar

e es

tabl

ishe

d by

the

full

mem

bers

hip.

The

se fu

nds

allo

w s

wift

resp

onse

s to

em

erge

ncie

s w

hile

wai

ting

for f

undi

ng to

be

clea

red

(Mig

ratio

n Em

erge

ncy

Fund

ing

Mec

hani

sm) o

r to

assi

st v

ulne

rabl

e m

igra

nts

who

wou

ld n

ot b

e el

igib

le u

nder

oth

er fu

ndin

g m

echa

nism

s (G

loba

l A

ssis

tanc

e Fu

nd fo

r Vic

tims

of T

raffi

ckin

g). I

n ad

ditio

n, th

e IO

M

Dev

elop

men

t Fun

d se

eds

inno

vativ

e pi

lot p

roje

cts.

Som

e re

spon

dent

s ha

ve n

oted

that

this

fund

ing

stru

ctur

e in

fluen

ces

IOM

’s a

ctiv

ities

. 186

For

inst

ance

on

e U

K D

FID

repo

rt, n

oted

that

as

IOM

is a

‘p

roje

ctis

ed o

rgan

isat

ion’

the

UK

‘onl

y se

ek[s

] to

influ

ence

[it]

on a

pro

ject

bas

is’.18

7

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

IOM

has

car

ried

out a

num

ber o

f sur

veys

, mos

t not

ably

the

“Glo

bal S

taff

Sat

isfa

ctio

n S

urve

y”. I

t is

also

car

ryin

g ou

t a re

view

of i

ts

orga

niza

tiona

l res

truct

urin

g w

hich

incl

udes

sur

veys

to s

taff

mem

bers

. IO

M a

lso

uses

org

aniz

atio

n-w

ide

an o

nlin

e st

aff e

valu

atio

n su

rvey

, as

one

of D

G’s

prio

ritie

s w

ill co

ntin

ue to

be

“sta

ff pr

ofes

sion

alis

m”.

In

addi

tion,

IOM

has

a s

mal

l tea

m fo

cusi

ng o

n ta

lent

man

agem

ent i

n th

e or

gani

zatio

n. T

he le

ader

ship

hol

ds re

gula

r con

sulta

tions

with

the

Sta

ff A

ssoc

iatio

n C

omm

ittee

. 2

Is th

e le

ader

ass

esse

d on

men

torin

g an

d co

achi

ng o

f sub

ordi

nate

sta

ff?Th

e D

G s

ets

prio

ritie

s fo

r coa

chin

g of

sta

ff. H

e ha

s be

en in

volv

ed w

ith

the

train

ing

of n

ew C

hief

s of

Mis

sion

by

artic

ulat

ing

IOM

’s v

isio

n an

d ho

lds

regu

lar o

pen

dial

ogue

s w

ith s

taff.

188

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

Yes.

One

of D

G S

win

g’s

prio

ritie

s re

volv

es a

roun

d th

e th

eme

of “

partn

ersh

ips”

. IO

M is

a p

erm

anen

t obs

erve

r to

the

UN

and

a s

tand

ing

invi

tee

to IA

SC

mee

tings

. The

Org

aniz

atio

n is

a m

embe

r of t

he G

loba

l Mig

ratio

n G

roup

, th

e pr

inci

pal i

nter

-age

ncy

coor

dina

tion

mec

hani

sm o

n m

igra

tion,

and

wor

ks c

lose

ly w

ith th

e G

loba

l For

um fo

r M

igra

tion

and

Dev

elop

men

t (G

FMD

), in

clud

ing

thro

ugh

supp

ort t

o th

e G

roup

’s S

ecre

taria

t and

the

Foru

m’s

S

uppo

rt U

nit.

IOM

hol

ds re

gula

r con

sulta

tions

with

par

tner

NG

Os

and

host

s an

ann

ual g

loba

l civ

il so

ciet

y co

nsul

tatio

n in

HQ

. The

Org

aniz

atio

n pr

ovid

es s

ubst

antiv

e an

d lo

gist

ical

sup

port

to re

gion

al c

oope

ratio

n m

echa

nism

s on

mig

ratio

n in

volv

ing

a br

oad

rang

e of

sta

te a

nd n

on-s

tate

sta

keho

lder

s. In

rece

nt y

ears

, the

O

rgan

izat

ion

has

plac

ed g

reat

er e

mph

asis

on

outre

ach

to th

e pr

ivat

e se

ctor

. VI

II.Th

e IO

has

stru

ctur

es th

at e

ngag

e th

e le

ader

ship

thor

ough

ly w

ith in

tern

al/e

xter

nal e

valu

atio

nsYe

s, b

oth

exte

rnal

and

inte

rnal

. IO

M’s

Offi

ce o

f the

Insp

ecto

r Gen

eral

con

tribu

tes

to th

e ov

ersi

ght o

f the

O

rgan

izat

ion,

thro

ugh

its fu

nctio

ns o

f int

erna

l aud

it, e

valu

atio

n, ra

pid

asse

ssm

ent a

nd in

vest

igat

ion.

An

exte

rnal

aud

itor,

repo

rting

to th

e m

embe

rshi

p, c

arrie

s ou

t per

form

ance

aud

its a

nd e

xam

ines

the

annu

al

finan

cial

sta

tem

ents

of I

OM

, in

rela

tion

to a

ccep

ted

inte

rnat

iona

l aud

iting

sta

ndar

d. In

add

ition

to th

at, a

n A

udit

and

Ove

rsig

ht A

dvis

ory

Com

mitt

ee (A

OA

C),

esta

blis

hed

to in

crea

se th

e tra

nspa

renc

y an

d ac

coun

tabi

lity

of IO

M, i

s co

mpo

sed

of fi

ve m

embe

rs s

elec

ted

by M

embe

r Sta

tes

that

repo

rt an

nual

ly to

the

SC

PF.

Fin

ally

, ex

tern

al e

valu

atio

ns c

ondu

cted

on

the

requ

est o

f don

ors

are

liste

d on

the

web

site

and

ava

ilabl

e up

on

requ

est.18

9


e. U

nite

d N

atio

ns D

evel

opm

ent P

rogr

amm

e (U

ND

P)

Org

aniz

atio

nA

s th

e U

N’s

larg

est a

nd le

ad d

evel

opm

ent a

ctor

, the

UN

DP

’s m

issi

on is

to

assi

st c

ount

ries

to “

achi

eve

sust

aina

ble

hum

an d

evel

opm

ent”

. Its

four

cor

e ar

eas

are:

the

mille

nniu

m d

evel

opm

ent g

oals

and

pov

erty

redu

ctio

n; d

emoc

ratic

go

vern

ance

; env

ironm

ent a

nd e

nerg

y; a

nd c

risis

pre

vent

ion

and

reco

very

.190

Gov

erna

nce

The

UN

DP

has

an

exec

utiv

e bo

ard

of 3

6 st

ates

, whi

ch s

erve

on

a ro

tatin

g ba

sis

unde

r the

aut

horit

y of

the

Econ

omic

and

Soc

ial C

ounc

il (E

CO

SO

C).19

1 The

bo

ard

is re

spon

sibl

e fo

r pro

vidi

ng p

olic

y gu

idan

ce, m

onito

ring

perfo

rman

ce a

nd

deci

ding

on

adm

inis

trativ

e an

d fin

anci

al p

lans

.192 S

ince

200

1, th

e bo

ard

has

held

tw

o re

gula

r ses

sion

s an

d an

ann

ual s

essi

on e

ach

year

.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Four

yea

rs; c

an b

e re

new

ed tw

ice.

Inco

me

The

UN

DP

’s in

com

e fro

m a

ll co

ntrib

utio

ns w

as $

4.64

billi

on in

201

2.19

3

Num

ber

of s

taff

8,00

0.19

4

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pTh

e U

ND

P a

dmin

istra

tor w

as tr

aditi

onal

ly a

n A

mer

ican

, nom

inat

ed b

y th

e U

S

gove

rnm

ent a

nd re

com

men

ded

by th

e U

N s

ecre

tary

-gen

eral

(SG

) to

the

Gen

eral

A

ssem

bly.

Thi

s ch

ange

d in

199

9, w

hen

Mar

k M

allo

ch B

row

n (U

nite

d K

ingd

om)

beca

me

adm

inis

trato

r. Th

e su

bseq

uent

adm

inis

trato

r was

from

Tur

key,

and

the

curre

nt o

ne is

from

New

Zea

land

.

Pas

t lea

ders

of t

he U

ND

P w

ere:

Pau

l Hof

fman

(fro

m th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

966-

1972

); R

udol

ph P

eter

son

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

197

2-19

76);

Fran

k M

orse

(Uni

ted

Sta

tes,

197

6-19

86);

Willi

am D

rape

r (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

986-

1993

; Jam

es G

us

Spe

th (U

nite

d S

tate

s, 1

993-

1999

); G

eorg

e M

allo

ch B

row

n (U

nite

d K

ingd

om,

1999

-200

5) a

nd K

emal

Der

vis

(Tur

key,

200

5-20

09).

The

curre

nt le

ader

is H

elen

Cla

rk (N

ew Z

eala

nd, 2

009-

pres

ent).

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryIn

Apr

il 20

11, C

lark

laun

ched

an

“age

nda

for o

rgan

izat

iona

l cha

nge”

,195 s

eeki

ng to

en

hanc

e or

gani

zatio

nal e

ffect

iven

ess

by im

prov

ing

UN

DP

’s s

trate

gic

plan

ning

and

or

gani

zatio

nal p

erfo

rman

ce. C

lark

intro

duce

d th

e an

nual

bus

ines

s pl

an in

201

2,

whe

re o

rgan

izat

iona

l goa

ls “

casc

aded

” to

uni

t wor

k pl

ans

in o

rder

to s

treng

then

al

ignm

ent o

f act

ions

and

reso

urce

s.19

6 The

UN

DP

was

rank

ed in

the

top

10 o

f 72

orga

niza

tions

in th

e 20

12 A

id T

rans

pare

ncy

Inde

x.19

7

Cla

rk w

as re

-ele

cted

in A

pril

2013

for a

sec

ond

four

-yea

r ter

m, a

nd in

201

4 sh

e la

unch

ed a

ser

ies

of h

uman

reso

urce

refo

rms.

The

se in

clud

ed re

duci

ng s

taff

at

head

quar

ters

and

regi

onal

leve

ls b

y 10

%; r

ever

sing

the

staf

f dis

tribu

tion

ratio

so

that

60

% o

f em

ploy

ees

wou

ld b

e ba

sed

at re

gion

al a

nd c

ount

ry o

ffice

s, a

nd 4

0% a

t the

N

ew Y

ork

head

quar

ters

; and

inte

grat

ing

polic

y an

d su

ppor

t-pr

ogra

mm

e ef

forts

into

a

sing

le b

urea

u to

redu

ce s

taffi

ng c

osts

.198


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/ter

ms

of re

fere

nce

for t

he le

ader

onl

ine?

Ther

e ar

e no

pub

lical

ly a

cces

sibl

e te

rms

of re

fere

nce

onlin

e fo

r the

le

ader

ship

.199 U

ND

P’s

foun

ding

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y re

solu

tions

do

not

outli

ne th

e A

dmin

istra

tor’s

func

tions

. 2

Wha

t per

cent

age

of th

e m

embe

rshi

p is

invo

lved

in le

ader

ship

ele

ctio

n an

d re

-ele

ctio

n in

pra

ctic

e?

The

Adm

inis

trato

r is

offic

ially

app

oint

ed b

y th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

(S

G),

in c

olla

bora

tion

with

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

, and

then

con

firm

ed b

y th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

for a

term

of f

our y

ears

.200 O

ffici

ally

all

mem

ber

stat

es o

f the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y ha

ve a

say

.

How

ever

, unt

il 19

99 th

e U

S P

resi

dent

pro

pose

d th

e U

ND

P A

dmin

istra

tor,

who

m th

e S

G th

en

reco

mm

ende

d to

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y fo

r co

nfirm

atio

n.20

1 Kofi

Ann

an in

trodu

ced

a ne

w, m

ore

mer

it-ba

sed

and

open

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s. 2

02 T

he

larg

est d

onor

sta

tes

have

tend

ed to

hav

e th

e m

ost

influ

ence

on

the

SG

’s d

ecis

ion.

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for e

lect

ion

of

the

lead

er th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

Ther

e is

no

form

aliz

ed p

roce

ss o

ffici

ally

doc

umen

ted.

Ann

an’s

new

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s in

trodu

ced:

fo

rmat

ion

of s

peci

alis

t sea

rch

sele

ctio

n co

mm

ittee

s w

ho c

ondu

cted

rese

arch

and

inte

rvie

ws

and

reco

mm

ende

d a

cand

idat

e to

the

SG

. 203

Thi

s ca

ndid

ate

coul

d be

vet

oed

by th

e S

G a

nd h

ad

to g

ain

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y ap

prov

al. H

owev

er th

e S

G’s

sel

ectio

n co

mm

ittee

s w

ere

not f

orm

aliz

ed

and

ther

e ar

e no

form

al d

ocum

ents

out

linin

g th

is

proc

ess.

204 F

urth

erm

ore

the

sele

ctio

n pr

oces

s is

st

ill po

litic

ized

: can

dida

tes

mus

t be

reco

mm

ende

d by

a g

over

nmen

t and

gov

ernm

ents

can

vet

o th

e de

cisi

on.

IITh

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

acc

ount

abilit

y1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

set

cle

ar

perfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns fo

r th

emse

lves

, whi

ch a

re tr

ansp

aren

t an

d co

nsis

tent

?

UN

DP

pub

lishe

s th

e A

dmin

istra

tor’s

Ann

ual R

epor

t whi

ch o

utlin

es th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

perfo

rman

ce to

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

. How

ever

ther

e ar

e no

sep

arat

e, in

divi

dual

per

form

ance

sta

ndar

ds fo

r the

Adm

inis

trato

r.205

The

Ann

ual R

epor

t is

repo

rtedl

y w

idel

y re

ad b

y al

l st

aff t

o kn

ow th

e A

dmin

istra

tor’s

prio

ritie

s. 2

06

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er

trans

late

s ov

erar

chin

g go

als

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

UN

DP

has

set

spe

cific

, mea

sura

ble

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in S

trate

gic

Pla

ns s

uch

as th

e cu

rrent

201

4 –

2017

Stra

tegi

c P

lan.

207 U

ND

P h

as

also

exp

lain

ed h

ow th

eir s

trate

gic

goal

s w

ill be

impl

emen

ted

and

mea

sure

d in

det

ail.20

8


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?A

ll se

nior

offi

cers

in th

e U

N s

yste

m m

ust fi

le a

fina

ncia

l dis

clos

ure

stat

emen

t ann

ually

with

the

UN

eth

ics

offic

e.20

9 Cur

rent

Adm

inis

trato

r H

elen

Cla

rk h

as d

iscl

osed

her

fina

ncia

l ass

ets

publ

ical

ly.21

0 4

Is th

e le

ader

obl

iged

to a

dher

e to

a

publ

ishe

d co

de o

f eth

ics?

All

UN

sta

ff, in

clud

ing

the

Adm

inis

trato

r, ar

e ob

liged

to fo

llow

the

UN

C

ode

of C

ondu

ct.21

1

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

n an

nual

pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

UN

DP

’s A

dmin

istra

tor i

s ac

coun

tabl

e to

the

UN

DP

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

.W

e fo

und

no e

vide

nce

(form

al o

r inf

orm

al) o

f an

indi

vidu

al p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me

or

appr

aisa

l for

the

Adm

inis

trato

r.2

Is re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

The

UN

Hum

an R

esou

rces

rule

s an

d re

gula

tions

on

rem

uner

atio

n se

ts a

cle

ar, fi

xed

pay

scal

e fo

r all

staf

f dep

endi

ng o

n th

eir r

ank.

The

A

dmin

istra

tor i

s pa

id a

t the

Und

er S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

pay

gra

de.21

2

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

UN

DP

has

an

exte

nsiv

e pr

ogra

mm

e fo

r lea

ders

hip

deve

lopm

ent a

nd

man

agem

ent s

kills

whi

ch o

ver 6

00 s

taff

parti

cipa

ted

in 2

012.

213

Sen

ior

lead

ersh

ip c

an a

ttend

Exe

cutiv

e Ed

ucat

ion

Pro

gram

mes

. IV

.Le

ader

ship

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess

is b

ased

on

trans

pare

nt p

roce

sses

and

met

rics

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e is

no

docu

men

tatio

n of

a fo

rmal

per

form

ance

app

rais

al o

f the

ca

ndid

ate.

All

Adm

inis

trato

rs w

ho h

ave

soug

ht a

sec

ond

term

hav

e be

en re

appo

inte

d by

the

UN

SG

, with

th

e B

oard

’s a

ppro

val.

Inte

rvie

wee

s cl

aim

ed th

at

ther

e ar

e in

form

al d

iscu

ssio

ns b

etw

een

the

SG

, ke

y do

nors

, oth

er p

oliti

cal g

roup

s su

ch a

s th

e G

7 an

d re

gion

al g

roup

s ov

er th

e A

dmin

istra

tor’s

pe

rform

ance

but

no

form

aliz

ed a

ppra

isal

pro

cess

. 214

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess?

No

offic

ial e

vide

nce

of th

is.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

The

Adm

inis

trato

r ope

rate

s un

der t

he p

olic

y gu

idan

ce o

f the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

. 215

The

Adm

inis

trato

r can

pur

sue

new

initi

ativ

es b

ut m

ust g

et

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

’s a

ppro

val.21

6

The

Adm

inis

trato

r may

influ

ence

Boa

rd d

ecis

ions

an

d do

es n

ot a

lway

s ha

ve g

ain

form

al a

ppro

val

thro

ugh

a m

ajor

ity v

ote

to b

egin

wor

k in

new

are

as. 2

17

2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

UN

DP

has

a s

enio

r man

agem

ent c

omm

ittee

whi

ch d

iscu

sses

new

pr

iorit

ies

and

will

eval

uate

all

docu

men

ts b

efor

e th

ey g

o to

the

Exec

utiv

e C

omm

ittee

with

requ

este

d ac

tions

. 218


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

In 2

012,

ear

mar

ked

cont

ribut

ions

from

bila

tera

l ($1

.33

billio

n) a

nd

mul

tilat

eral

par

tner

s ($

1.53

billi

on) a

ccou

nted

for 2

2% o

f the

ove

rall

inco

me.

219 U

ND

P’s

cor

e re

sour

ces

are

disb

urse

d by

the

Gen

eral

A

ssem

bly

and

have

sta

gnat

ed in

rece

nt y

ears

: in

2012

they

wer

e 20

%

of it

s ov

eral

l fina

ncin

g.22

0

UN

DP

is re

porte

d to

‘act

ivel

y’ p

ursu

e ‘n

on-c

ore

finan

cing

by

pres

entin

g do

nors

with

pro

gram

mes

th

at a

ppea

l to

them

’.221 U

ND

P h

as a

lso

dive

rsifi

ed

its s

ourc

es o

f fina

ncin

g in

rece

nt y

ears

with

fin

anci

ng fr

om: o

ther

mul

tilat

eral

sou

rces

(suc

h as

the

Euro

pean

Com

mis

sion

and

the

Glo

bal

Envi

ronm

ent F

und)

and

priv

ate

finan

cing

(whi

ch

cons

titut

es a

lmos

t a th

ird o

f the

bud

get).

It h

as

gain

ed fi

nanc

ing

from

em

ergi

ng c

ount

ries

who

pay

di

rect

ly fo

r ser

vice

s pr

ovid

ed b

y U

ND

P.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

UN

DP

con

duct

s an

nual

Glo

bal S

taff

Sur

veys

whi

ch a

re c

arrie

d ou

t by

an

exte

rnal

, ind

epen

dent

org

aniz

atio

n. In

add

ition

, UN

DP

has

pr

iorit

ized

sup

porti

ng s

taff

in it

s 20

14 –

201

7 S

trate

gic

Pla

n w

hich

st

ates

that

“U

ND

P w

ill lif

t its

peo

ple

man

agem

ent c

apab

ilitie

s w

ith

spee

dier

recr

uitm

ent a

nd in

itiat

ion

prog

ram

mes

that

sup

port

staf

f to

beco

me

effe

ctiv

e m

ore

quic

kly,

ens

ure

dive

rsity

, man

age

tale

nt a

nd

deliv

er b

ette

r suc

cess

ion

plan

ning

for k

ey p

osts

.” 22

2

2Is

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t ass

esse

d on

men

torin

g an

d co

achi

ng o

f su

bord

inat

e st

aff?

They

are

not

form

ally

exp

ecte

d to

do

this

.

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

UN

DP

is m

anag

er o

f the

UN

Res

iden

t Coo

rdin

ator

Sys

tem

. In

this

role

it h

as to

coo

rdin

ate

and

faci

litat

e pr

ogra

mm

ing

and

com

mon

‘bus

ines

s op

erat

ions

’ of o

ther

UN

age

ncie

s at

cou

ntry

leve

l. Th

ey h

ave

prop

osed

ev

alua

ting

thei

r par

tner

ship

s w

ith p

artn

ers’

sat

isfa

ctio

n su

rvey

s w

ith U

ND

P.22

3

VIII.

The

IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

erna

l eva

luat

ions

UN

DP

revi

sed

its e

valu

atio

n po

licy

in 2

011

to e

stab

lish

the

Eval

uatio

n O

ffice

’s in

depe

nden

ce a

nd e

nsur

e th

at

all e

valu

atio

ns h

ave

a m

anag

emen

t res

pons

e.22

4 Th

e he

ad o

f the

UN

DP

Eva

luat

ion

Offi

ce re

ports

dire

ctly

to

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

. The

Adm

inis

trato

r is

brie

fed

befo

re a

nd th

eir o

ffice

pre

pare

s a

man

agem

ent r

espo

nse

to

eval

uatio

ns. T

he A

dmin

istra

tor h

as th

e rig

ht o

f rep

ly to

eva

luat

ions

and

dis

cuss

es fo

llow

-up

actio

ns w

ith th

e B

oard

.


h. U

nite

d N

atio

ns H

igh

Com

mis

sion

er fo

r R

efug

ees

(UN

HC

R)

Org

aniz

atio

nU

NH

CR

’s c

ore

man

date

is th

e pr

otec

tion

of re

fuge

es. I

n re

cent

yea

rs, t

he a

genc

y ha

s al

so ta

ken

a ro

le in

hum

anita

rian

cris

es a

nd s

ituat

ions

invo

lvin

g in

tern

ally

di

spla

ced

pers

ons

(IDP

s).22

5

Gov

erna

nce

UN

HC

R is

a s

ubsi

diar

y bo

dy o

f the

UN

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y, e

stab

lishe

d un

der

Arti

cle

22 o

f the

UN

cha

rter.

The

high

com

mis

sion

er (H

C) a

cts

unde

r the

aut

horit

y of

and

repo

rts a

nnua

lly to

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y. T

he U

NH

CR

sta

tute

aut

horiz

es

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y an

d th

e Ec

onom

ic a

nd S

ocia

l Cou

ncil

(EC

OS

CO

) to

give

the

offic

e po

licy

guid

ance

.226 H

owev

er, U

NH

CR

’s p

rinci

pal e

xecu

tive

and

advi

sory

bod

y is

the

Exec

utiv

e C

omm

ittee

of t

he P

rogr

amm

e of

the

UN

HC

R (E

xCom

), co

mpr

ised

of

87

mem

ber s

tate

s as

of J

uly

2013

.227 E

xCom

is re

spon

sibl

e fo

r app

rovi

ng

UN

HC

R’s

bud

get a

nd p

rogr

amm

e, a

nd p

rovi

ding

gui

danc

e on

the

agen

cy’s

m

anag

emen

t and

prio

ritie

s.22

8

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

No

time

limit

has

been

sta

ted;

in th

e pa

st, H

Cs

have

ser

ved

up to

thre

e te

rms.

A

term

is c

omm

only

five

yea

rs (e

.g. S

adru

ddin

Aga

Kha

n w

as H

C fo

r 12

year

s).

Inco

me

UN

HC

R’s

ann

ual b

udge

t is

need

s-ba

sed,

and

in 2

012

was

$4.

3 bi

llion

(incl

udin

g su

pple

men

tary

pro

gram

mes

).229 H

owev

er, i

ts in

com

e is

typi

cally

far b

elow

the

budg

et: i

n 20

12, i

t rec

eive

d on

ly a

bout

$2.

3 bi

llion

in v

olun

tary

fund

ing.

230

Num

ber

of s

taff

Ove

r 6,8

00, w

ith m

ore

than

150

nat

iona

litie

s w

orki

ng a

t 259

offi

ces

in 1

18

coun

tries

.231

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pTh

e pa

st le

ader

s of

UN

HC

R w

ere:

Ger

rit J

an v

an H

euve

n G

oedh

art (

from

the

Net

herla

nds,

195

1-19

56);

Aug

uste

Lin

dt (S

witz

erla

nd, 1

956-

1960

); Fé

lix S

chny

der

(Sw

itzer

land

, 196

0-19

65);

Sad

rudd

in A

ga K

han

(Iran

, 196

5-19

77);

Pou

l Har

tling

(D

enm

ark,

197

8-19

85);

Jean

-Pie

rre H

ocké

(Sw

itzer

land

, 198

6-19

89);

Thor

vald

S

tolte

nber

g (N

orw

ay, 1

990-

1990

); S

adak

o O

gata

(Jap

an, 1

990-

2000

) and

Ruu

d Lu

bber

s (N

ethe

rland

s, 2

001-

2005

)

The

curre

nt H

C is

Ant

ónio

Gut

erre

s (P

ortu

gal,

2005

-pre

sent

).

UN

HC

R h

as h

ad s

ever

al h

igh-

profi

le le

ader

ship

sca

ndal

s. J

ean-

Pie

rre H

ocké

(1

986-

1989

) had

to re

sign

as

HC

afte

r he

and

his

wife

flew

firs

t cla

ss w

hile

don

ors

wer

e de

man

ding

gre

ater

bud

get r

estri

ctio

ns fo

r the

age

ncy.

232 H

C R

udd

Lubb

ers

(200

1-20

05) a

lso

dam

aged

UN

HC

R’s

repu

tatio

n w

hen

he w

as fo

rced

to re

sign

in

200

5 du

e to

alle

gatio

ns o

f sex

ual a

buse

.233 U

nite

d N

atio

ns S

G J

avie

r Per

ez d

e C

uélla

r nom

inat

ed V

irend

ra D

ayal

, the

chi

ef o

f his

ow

n ex

ecut

ive

offic

e an

d w

ho h

ad

prev

ious

ly w

orke

d at

UN

HC

R. T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s an

d ot

her m

ajor

don

ors

expr

esse

d co

ncer

n, a

rgui

ng th

ere

was

insu

ffici

ent c

onsu

ltatio

n, a

nd th

e S

G w

ithdr

ew D

ayal

’s

nom

inat

ion.

234

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryU

nder

Gut

erre

s’ le

ader

ship

, UN

HC

R h

as m

ade

prog

ress

on

inte

rnal

refo

rms.

235

The

HC

offi

ce h

as in

trodu

ced

resu

lts-b

ased

man

agem

ent,

a ne

w IT

sys

tem

and

an

eth

ics

offic

e. In

201

2, th

e H

C a

ppoi

nted

an

inde

pend

ent a

udit

and

over

sigh

t co

mm

ittee

to re

view

and

stre

ngth

en th

ese

func

tions

.236 U

NH

CR

has

als

o re

stru

ctur

ed a

nd re

duce

d st

aff c

osts

from

41%

of t

otal

exp

endi

ture

in 2

006

to 2

6%

at th

e be

ginn

ing

of 2

013.

237 G

uter

res

has

soug

ht a

gre

ater

role

in p

rote

ctin

g ID

Ps

and

peop

le d

ispl

aced

by

natu

ral d

isas

ters

. How

ever

, som

e do

nors

are

con

cern

ed

that

UN

HC

R is

exp

andi

ng b

eyon

d its

man

date

and

not

prio

ritiz

ing

prot

ectio

n of

re

fuge

es.23

8

Tow

ards

the

end

of 2

012,

UN

HC

R e

stab

lishe

d an

org

aniz

atio

n-w

ide

risk

man

agem

ent f

ram

ewor

k. In

this

pha

se, t

he w

ork

on e

nter

pris

e ris

k m

anag

emen

t (E

RM

) con

cent

rate

d on

dev

elop

ing

a dr

aft p

olic

y fra

mew

ork

and

impl

emen

tatio

n to

ols,

whi

ch h

ave

been

test

ed a

t hea

dqua

rters

and

in fo

ur fi

eld

oper

atio

ns

thro

ugho

ut 2

013.

A c

hief

risk

offi

cer r

epor

ts d

irect

ly to

the

depu

ty H

C. G

loba

l im

plem

enta

tion

of E

RM

will

cont

inue

thro

ugho

ut 2

014.

239


Indi

cato

rsP

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors24

0 I.

The

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

proc

ess

sear

ches

and

test

s fo

r spe

cific

, rel

evan

t com

pete

ncie

s ag

ains

t cle

arly

defi

ned

crite

ria th

roug

h an

incl

usiv

e, e

xhau

stiv

e pr

oces

s1

Doe

s th

e IO

pub

lish

the

crite

ria/t

erm

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r the

lead

er o

nlin

e?Th

e co

re fu

nctio

ns o

f the

HC

(HC

) are

out

lined

in U

NH

CR

’s S

tatu

te, a

s ef

fect

ivel

y re

vise

d an

d ex

tend

ed th

roug

h su

cces

sive

GA

reso

lutio

ns.24

1 Th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

pro

pose

s th

e te

rms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ent w

hich

ar

e th

en b

y ap

prov

ed b

y th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly.

242 T

he H

C’s

func

tions

ar

e al

so d

escr

ibed

in U

NH

CR

’s m

anua

l (ch

apte

r II)

whi

ch is

ava

ilabl

e on

the

Intra

net a

nd a

cces

sibl

e to

per

man

ent m

issi

ons

and

UN

HC

R’s

pa

rtner

s.24

3

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

ele

ctio

n an

d re

-ele

ctio

n of

the

lead

er in

pra

ctic

e?

Acc

ordi

ng to

UN

HC

R’s

Sta

tute

, the

HC

is e

lect

ed b

y th

e U

N G

ener

al

Ass

embl

y on

the

reco

mm

enda

tion

of th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

.244 T

he

Sec

reta

ry G

ener

al c

onsu

lts th

e fiv

e ge

ogra

phic

al g

roup

s of

the

Gen

eral

A

ssem

bly

and

mem

bers

of t

he S

ecur

ity C

ounc

il. 2

45

The

HC

has

ofte

n co

me

from

a s

igni

fican

t don

or

stat

e (th

e cu

rrent

HC

is a

n ex

cept

ion

to th

is).

Mea

nwhi

le, t

he p

ost o

f Dep

uty

HC

has

alm

ost

alw

ays

been

a U

S N

atio

nal.24

6 P

ower

ful d

onor

sta

tes

have

a s

trong

influ

ence

on

the

deci

sion

and

hav

e fre

quen

tly v

etoe

d po

tent

ial

cand

idat

es.24

7 The

re h

as o

nly

been

one

con

test

ed

elec

tion

for t

he H

C, w

hich

was

in 1

950

for t

he fi

rst

HC

.248

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for s

elec

tion

of

the

lead

er th

at w

eigh

s co

mpe

tenc

e ag

ains

t the

pub

lishe

d cr

iteria

?

No.

The

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s is

larg

ely

a pr

oces

s of

con

sulta

tions

be

twee

n th

e U

N S

G a

nd k

ey d

onor

sta

tes.

Th

e G

uter

res

elec

tion

was

repo

rtedl

y m

ore

trans

pare

nt th

an p

revi

ous

as it

‘inv

olve

d so

me

prio

r pu

blic

scr

utin

y of

the

cand

idat

es’ 24

9, d

onor

s st

ill ha

d a

larg

e in

put. 2

50

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

the

IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

oes

the

lead

er s

et c

lear

pe

rform

ance

exp

ecta

tions

for

them

selv

es, w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent

and

cons

iste

nt?

The

HC

set

s ou

t his

/her

obj

ectiv

es in

a n

umbe

r of U

NH

CR

repo

rts,

incl

udin

g th

e an

nual

Glo

bal R

epor

ts a

nd th

e G

loba

l Stra

tegi

c P

riorit

ies.

25

1

Thes

e ar

e or

gani

zatio

n-w

ide

goal

s, n

ot s

peci

fic to

the

HC

.2

Is th

ere

an e

xpec

tatio

n th

at th

e le

ader

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear s

trate

gy?

In a

dditi

on to

the

Glo

bal S

trate

gic

Prio

ritie

s, U

NH

CR

has

est

ablis

hed

a G

loba

l Man

agem

ent A

ccou

ntab

ility

Fram

ewor

k (G

MA

F). T

he G

MA

F re

porte

dly

‘com

preh

ensi

vely

map

s ac

coun

tabi

litie

s, re

spon

sibi

litie

s an

d au

thor

ities

acr

oss

the

orga

niza

tion

and

rela

tes

them

to th

e co

rresp

ondi

ng m

anag

emen

t pol

icie

s an

d gu

idan

ce’.25

2

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?A

ll se

nior

offi

cers

in th

e U

N s

yste

m m

ust fi

le a

fina

ncia

l dis

clos

ure

stat

emen

t ann

ually

with

the

UN

eth

ics

offic

e.25

3 Gut

erre

s ha

s vo

lunt

arily

di

sclo

sed

this

pub

lical

ly.25

4

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?A

ll U

NH

CR

sta

ff in

clud

ing

the

seni

or m

anag

emen

t are

ask

ed to

sig

n th

e U

NH

CR

Cod

e of

Con

duct

.255

Sta

ff m

ay d

ecid

e no

t to

sign

the

code

of c

ondu

ct, i

n w

hich

cas

e th

ey a

re o

blig

ed to

exp

lain

thei

r dec

isio

n in

writ

ing.

256


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Ther

e is

no

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t app

rais

al fo

r the

HC

. H

owev

er, t

he H

C re

ports

ann

ually

to th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Com

mitt

ee a

nd to

th

e Th

ird C

omm

ittee

of t

he G

ener

al A

ssem

bly,

and

in U

NH

CR

’s a

nnua

l re

ports

.257

The

Dep

uty

HC

and

the

Ass

ista

nt H

Cs

have

per

form

ance

ap

prai

sals

.258

The

offic

e w

as c

reat

ed w

ith a

hig

h de

gree

of

auto

nom

y an

d al

thou

gh th

e U

NS

G s

igns

the

cont

ract

app

oint

ing

the

HC

, the

UN

SG

doe

s no

t ha

ve a

role

in p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t. 25

9

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

The

HC

has

a fi

xed

sala

ry a

nd s

tand

ard

entit

lem

ents

like

any

oth

er

UN

sta

ff m

embe

r. W

hen

on m

issi

on, h

e re

ceiv

es a

sta

ndar

d tra

vel

allo

wan

ce li

ke a

ll ot

her U

N s

taff.

260

The

UN

Hum

an R

esou

rces

rule

s an

d re

gula

tions

on

rem

uner

atio

n go

vern

the

HC

’s s

alar

y. 26

1

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng a

nd

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ty to

add

ress

w

eakn

esse

s ov

er ti

me?

Ther

e is

no

form

al o

r sta

ndar

d tra

inin

g pr

ogra

mm

e or

coa

chin

g fo

r the

H

C. T

he C

hef d

u C

abin

et p

rovi

des

info

rmal

on

the

job

train

ing

in U

N

rule

s an

d pr

otoc

ols

to n

ew H

Cs.

262 U

NH

CR

has

est

ablis

hed

a G

loba

l Le

arni

ng C

entre

(GLC

) in

Bud

apes

t to

cons

olid

ate

its le

arni

ng a

ctiv

ities

an

d pr

ogra

mm

es. I

t has

a p

ositi

on d

edic

ated

to d

evel

opin

g an

d de

liver

ing

train

ing

prog

ram

mes

for s

enio

r man

agem

ent b

ut th

is d

oes

not i

nclu

de th

e H

C, D

eput

y or

Ass

ista

nt H

Cs.

263

How

ever

, the

y ca

n as

k fo

r thi

s ad

ditio

nal t

rain

ing

if ne

eded

.

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent c

riter

ia

cons

ider

ed b

y th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

If m

embe

r sta

tes

are

cont

ent w

ith th

e w

ork

of th

e H

C, t

he S

G w

ill no

min

ate

him

/her

for r

e-el

ectio

n by

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y.26

4 The

re is

no

form

al a

ppra

isal

pro

cess

.2

Are

oth

er q

ualifi

ed c

andi

date

s co

nsid

ered

in th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

Trad

ition

ally

the

HC

is re

-ele

cted

by

the

GA

if s

/he

stan

ds. T

here

is n

o st

ated

tim

e lim

it; th

e H

C c

an s

tand

for a

third

man

date

.Th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

rare

ly g

oes

to a

full

vote

as

the

HC

is n

orm

ally

reap

poin

ted

by c

onse

nsus

.265

Oth

er n

omin

ees

will

be p

ut fo

rwar

d on

ly if

ther

e is

no

t a c

onse

nsus

.V.

The

lead

er h

as th

e au

thor

ity a

nd m

echa

nism

s to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

The

UN

HC

R S

tatu

te s

tate

s th

at th

e H

C s

hall

follo

w ‘p

olic

y di

rect

ives

’ fro

m th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

or E

CO

SO

C, a

nd th

at th

e of

fice

may

en

gage

in ‘s

uch

addi

tiona

l act

iviti

es’ a

s th

e G

ener

al A

ssem

bly

may

de

term

ine.

266

The

HC

can

acc

ept,

influ

ence

and

gen

erat

e po

licy

dire

ctiv

es in

the

Gen

eral

Ass

embl

y, E

CO

SO

C

and

ExC

om.26

7 The

HC

set

s U

NH

CR

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith s

enio

r man

agem

ent,

field

ope

ratio

ns, p

erso

ns o

f con

cern

, par

tner

s an

d m

embe

r sta

tes.

The

se p

riorit

ies

have

evo

lved

, as

refle

cted

in th

e S

trate

gic

Rev

iew

, for

inst

ance

U

NH

CR

has

dev

elop

ed a

n ‘a

ge, g

ende

r and

di

vers

ity’ a

ppro

ach

and

focu

sed

incr

ease

d at

tent

ion

on s

exua

l and

gen

der b

ased

vio

lenc

e in

ope

ratio

ns

and

on L

GB

TI p

erso

ns o

f con

cern

.268


2D

oes

the

IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies?

UN

HC

R h

as a

num

ber o

f mec

hani

sms,

incl

udin

g: it

s gl

obal

nee

ds

asse

ssm

ent (

whi

ch id

entifi

es it

s ne

eds-

base

d an

nual

bud

get,

base

d up

on c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith p

erso

ns o

f con

cern

and

par

tner

s), t

he G

loba

l S

trate

gic

Prio

ritie

s, E

XCO

M c

oncl

usio

ns, t

he a

nnua

l HC

’s D

ialo

gues

on

Pro

tect

ion

Cha

lleng

es.26

9 3

Wha

t per

cent

age

of re

sour

ces

are

set

asid

e fo

r spe

cial

initi

ativ

es d

ecid

ed b

y an

d co

ntro

lled

by a

sub

set o

f the

full

mem

bers

hip?

UN

HC

R is

alm

ost c

ompl

etel

y vo

lunt

arily

fund

ed a

nd h

as a

ver

y sm

all

UN

regu

lar b

udge

t. 27

0 In

2012

, 98%

of f

undi

ng w

as v

olun

tary

and

onl

y 2%

cam

e fro

m U

N R

egul

ar B

udge

t (as

sess

ed c

ontri

butio

ns) t

o co

ver

adm

inis

trativ

e co

sts.

271 E

xCom

mus

t app

rove

UN

HC

R’s

bud

get,

and

even

sup

plem

enta

ry a

ppea

ls w

hich

are

issu

ed d

urin

g th

e ye

ar.

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

UN

HC

R c

ondu

cts

Glo

bal S

taff

Sur

veys

regu

larly

. Th

ese

wer

e fir

st a

dmin

iste

red

in 2

006

and

have

bec

ome

a re

gula

r bi

annu

al e

xerc

ise.

The

HC

has

task

ed th

e D

eput

y H

C w

ith fo

llow

ing-

up o

n re

com

men

datio

ns th

at c

ome

out o

f the

sta

ff su

rvey

. 272 A

ccor

ding

to T

urk

and

Eyst

er (2

010)

, re

spon

ses

from

the

surv

ey h

ave

guid

ed H

uman

R

esou

rces

refo

rm a

nd re

sulte

d in

cha

nges

to

UN

HC

R’s

pos

tings

and

pro

mot

ions

pro

cedu

res.

273

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

The

HC

is n

ot a

sses

sed

form

ally

on

the

men

torin

g or

coa

chin

g of

su

bord

inat

es.

How

ever

, the

role

mea

ns s

/he

info

rmal

ly m

ento

rs h

is/h

er te

am o

f se

nior

man

ager

s (2

0 bu

reau

hea

ds a

nd d

irect

ors

who

mee

t wee

kly

as

wel

l as

the

‘troi

ka’ o

f the

Dep

uty

HC

and

the

Ass

ista

nt H

Cs)

. 274

VII.

The

IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

The

HC

mee

ts re

gula

rly w

ith th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Com

mitt

ee. S

/he

has

also

est

ablis

hed

info

rmal

dia

logu

es w

ith

dono

rs w

ho g

ive

mor

e th

an $

20m

illion

, Reg

iona

l Gro

ups

and

refu

gee

host

ing

coun

tries

.In

add

ition

, the

HC

hol

ds: a

n an

nual

mee

ting

with

NG

Os,

regu

lar h

igh-

leve

l bila

tera

l mee

tings

with

key

hu

man

itaria

n ag

enci

es, a

nd a

dia

logu

e on

Pro

tect

ion

Cha

lleng

es. U

NH

CR

incl

udes

per

sons

of c

once

rn a

nd

partn

ers

in th

eir p

lann

ing

and

prio

rity

setti

ng.

VIII.

The

IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

erna

l eva

luat

ions

The

Pol

icy

Dev

elop

men

t and

Eva

luat

ion

Sec

tion

is p

art o

f UN

HC

R’s

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ion

and

Man

agem

ent

Div

isio

n an

d re

ports

dire

ctly

to th

e H

C. T

here

are

a n

umbe

r of o

ther

ove

rsig

ht fu

nctio

ns w

hich

eng

age

seni

or

man

agem

ent w

ith e

valu

atio

ns a

nd fi

ndin

gs o

f oth

er o

vers

ight

mec

hani

sm.


i. W

orld

Ban

k G

roup

(WB

G)

Org

aniz

atio

nTh

e W

BG

con

sist

s of

five

inst

itutio

ns: I

nter

natio

nal B

ank

for R

econ

stru

ctio

n an

d D

evel

opm

ent (

IBR

D),27

5 Int

erna

tiona

l Dev

elop

men

t Ass

ocia

tion

(IDA

),276

Inte

rnat

iona

l Fin

ance

Cor

pora

tion

(IFC

),277 M

ultil

ater

al In

vest

men

t Gua

rant

ee

Age

ncy

(MIG

A),27

8 and

Inte

rnat

iona

l Cen

tre fo

r Set

tlem

ent o

f Inv

estm

ent D

ispu

tes

(ICS

ID).27

9 The

WB

G is

hea

dqua

rtere

d in

Was

hing

ton

DC

and

has

mor

e th

an 1

24

coun

try o

ffice

s.

Gov

erna

nce

Man

y of

the

bank

’s in

stitu

tiona

l fea

ture

s re

sem

ble

thos

e of

the

IMF.

Mem

ber

coun

tries

(188

) gov

ern

the

WB

G th

roug

h th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

and

boa

rd o

f ex

ecut

ive

dire

ctor

s.28

0 The

25

resi

dent

exe

cutiv

e di

rect

ors

(ED

s) a

re re

spon

sibl

e fo

r the

con

duct

of t

he b

ank’

s ge

nera

l ope

ratio

ns u

nder

del

egat

ed p

ower

s fro

m th

e bo

ard

of g

over

nors

.

Five

ED

s ar

e ap

poin

ted

by th

ose

mem

ber s

tate

s w

ith th

e la

rges

t sha

res

(Fra

nce,

G

erm

any,

Jap

an, U

nite

d K

ingd

om a

nd U

nite

d S

tate

s). T

he re

mai

ning

25

EDs

are

elec

ted

ever

y 2

year

s by

con

stitu

enci

es m

ade

up o

f the

rem

aini

ng m

embe

rs.

Sau

di A

rabi

a, C

hina

and

the

Rus

sian

Fed

erat

ion,

how

ever

, are

sin

gle-

mem

ber

chai

rs, m

eani

ng th

at th

ey e

xerc

ise

thei

r vot

es a

lone

rath

er th

an d

oing

so

in

cons

titue

ncie

s of

mul

tiple

mem

ber s

tate

s. T

he E

Ds

sele

ct th

e pr

esid

ent.

Jim

Yon

g K

im is

the

WB

G’s

12t

h pr

esid

ent a

nd is

cha

irman

of t

he b

oard

of E

Ds

(ele

cted

in

2012

).

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Five

yea

rs; c

an b

e re

new

ed tw

ice.

Inco

me

The

boar

d of

ED

s ap

prov

ed a

ppro

xim

atel

y $3

1.55

billi

on in

fina

ncia

l ass

ista

nce

in fi

scal

yea

r 201

3, w

ith $

40.8

4 bi

llion

pred

icte

d fo

r 201

4.28

1 The

201

3 to

tal

com

pris

ed $

15.2

billi

on in

IBR

D le

ndin

g an

d $1

6.3

billio

n in

IDA

sup

port,

with

an

adm

inis

trativ

e bu

dget

of a

ppro

xim

atel

y $1

.9 b

illion

for fi

scal

yea

r 201

4.28

2 In

2012

, Ji

m Y

ong

Kim

, the

new

pre

side

nt, a

nnou

nced

a th

ree-

year

pla

n to

dec

reas

e th

e ba

nk’s

bud

get b

y 8%

, or $

400

milli

on.28

3

Num

ber

of s

taff

Ove

r 9,0

00 e

mpl

oyee

s fro

m m

ore

than

168

cou

ntrie

s.28

4

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pA

n un

writ

ten

rule

exi

sts

that

the

US

pre

side

nt s

elec

ts th

e W

BG

pre

side

nt.28

5 Up

until

201

1, th

e ch

oice

of a

n A

mer

ican

as

pres

iden

t of t

he W

BG

was

not

ope

nly

chal

leng

ed b

y th

e pr

opos

al o

f a c

ompe

ting

cand

idat

e. In

that

yea

r, ho

wev

er, t

wo

non-

US

can

dida

tes

– Jo

se A

nton

io O

cam

po (C

olom

bia)

and

Ngo

zi O

konj

o-Iw

eala

(N

iger

ia) –

wer

e pu

t for

war

d.28

6 Jim

Yon

g K

im, a

n A

mer

ican

, won

the

nom

inat

ion.

The

follo

win

g w

ere

past

pre

side

nts

of th

e ba

nk: E

ugen

e M

eyer

(194

6-19

46),

John

J.

McC

loy

(194

7-19

49),

Euge

ne R

. Bla

ck, S

r. (1

949-

1963

), G

eorg

e W

oods

(196

3-19

68),

Rob

ert M

cNam

ara

(196

8-19

81),

Ald

en W

. Cla

usen

(198

1-19

86),

Bar

ber

Con

able

(198

6-19

91),

Lew

is T

. Pre

ston

(199

1-19

95),

Jam

es W

olfe

nsoh

n (1

995-

2005

), P

aul W

olfo

witz

(200

5-20

07) a

nd R

ober

t Zoe

llick

(200

7-20

12).

App

oint

ed p

resi

dent

in 2

012,

Kim

pro

pose

d a

num

ber o

f ins

titut

iona

l cha

nges

in

2013

afte

r a s

urve

y of

app

roxi

mat

ely

10,0

00 e

mpl

oyee

s re

veal

ed a

“cu

lture

of f

ear”

, “f

ear o

f ris

k” a

nd a

“te

rrib

le”

envi

ronm

ent f

or c

olla

bora

tion.

287 K

im’s

cha

nges

hav

e,

how

ever

, bee

n m

et w

ith c

ritic

ism

. The

dec

isio

n to

alte

r the

ban

k’s

orga

niza

tion,

for

exam

ple,

has

bee

n de

emed

unn

eces

sary

.288 H

iring

the

man

agem

ent c

onsu

lting

firm

M

cKin

sey

& C

ompa

ny fo

r the

rest

ruct

urin

g w

as a

lso

cont

rove

rsia

l, gi

ven

that

the

firm

had

des

igne

d th

e ex

istin

g st

ruct

ure

(and

all

prev

ious

stru

ctur

es s

ince

the

bank

’s

1972

reor

gani

zatio

n un

der P

resi

dent

McN

amar

a)28

9 , an

d ha

d co

mpe

ted

dire

ctly

with

th

e W

orld

Ban

k in

adv

isin

g go

vern

men

ts.29

0

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryTh

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

orga

niza

tiona

l ref

orm

s co

me

at a

tim

e of

incr

easi

ng c

ompe

titio

n fro

m o

ther

mul

tilat

eral

dev

elop

men

t ins

titut

ions

. A s

tudy

by

Hum

phre

y an

d M

icha

elow

a (2

013)

, for

exa

mpl

e, fo

und

that

, und

er c

erta

in m

acro

econ

omic

ci

rcum

stan

ces,

indi

vidu

al b

orro

wer

s in

Lat

in A

mer

ica

ofte

n pr

efer

to w

ork

with

the

IAD

B a

nd C

AF

due

to th

eir f

aste

r pro

cess

ing

times

and

less

bur

eauc

ratic

soc

ial a

nd

econ

omic

lend

ing

requ

irem

ents

.291 F

urth

erm

ore,

num

erou

s ob

serv

ers

see

the

New

D

evel

opm

ent B

ank,

com

pose

d of

Bra

zil,

the

Rus

sia

Fede

ratio

n, In

dia,

Chi

na a

nd

Sou

th A

frica

(BR

ICS

), as

a p

oten

tial c

ompe

titor

to th

e W

orld

Ban

k an

d th

e IM

F.29

2


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

sO

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

Yes.

Ter

ms

of a

ppoi

ntm

ents

wer

e re

cent

ly m

ade

publ

icly

ava

ilabl

e,

alth

ough

Bob

Zoe

llick’

s co

ntra

ct is

eas

ier t

o fin

d th

an D

r Kim

’s.29

3 Th

e fo

rced

resi

gnat

ion

of W

orld

Ban

k P

resi

dent

Pau

l W

olfo

witz

in 2

007

for v

iola

ting

cont

ract

ual c

laus

es

rela

ting

to e

thic

al a

nd g

over

ning

prin

cipl

es in

dica

tes

that

the

term

s of

refe

renc

e fo

r lea

ders

hip

sele

ctio

n ar

e ta

ken

serio

usly

and

are

enf

orce

able

.294

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip s

elec

tion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

All

mem

ber s

tate

s vo

te d

urin

g el

ectio

ns a

nd re

-ele

ctio

ns e

ither

al

one

(as

in th

e ca

se o

f Sau

di A

rabi

a, R

ussi

a an

d C

hina

) or v

ia th

eir

cons

titue

ncy

repr

esen

tativ

e.

In p

ract

ice,

mem

bers

app

rove

the

cand

idat

e pu

t fo

rth b

y th

e U

nite

d S

tate

s.29

5

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes.

Eac

h of

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up o

rgan

izat

ions

ope

rate

s ac

cord

ing

to p

roce

dure

s es

tabl

ishe

d by

its

Arti

cles

of A

gree

men

t, w

hich

incl

ude

term

s of

ser

vice

s fo

r the

Pre

side

nt.29

6

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

Ther

e is

no

proc

edur

e fo

r tha

t. S

ome

set p

erso

nal s

tand

ards

dur

ing

inau

gura

l spe

eche

s or

pro

noun

cem

ents

at t

he B

oard

mee

tings

(see

th

e m

inut

es).29

7

Lead

ers

focu

s on

bro

ad s

trate

gic

poin

ts, b

ut th

ere

is n

o se

t of c

omm

itmen

ts.29

8 Rob

ert M

cNam

ara

and

Geo

rge

Woo

ds a

re th

ough

t to

be m

ost c

lear

on

thei

r per

form

ance

obj

ectiv

es.29

9 2

Is th

ere

an e

xpec

tatio

n th

at th

e le

ader

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear s

trate

gy?

Onl

y th

roug

h su

bsec

tion

and

stra

tegi

c re

ports

. Im

porta

nt to

not

e th

at

expe

ctat

ions

com

e fro

m a

ver

y di

vers

e gr

oup

of s

take

hold

ers

(see

W

BG

Stra

tegy

for 2

030

appr

oved

in A

pril

2013

).300

The

deba

te is

als

o ab

out d

efini

ng e

xpec

tatio

ns

(diff

eren

t at d

iffer

ent t

imes

) and

wha

t lea

ders

hip

does

to u

nder

stan

d w

hy re

sults

don

’t m

eet t

hem

.301

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Ye

s. A

ll th

e m

id-le

vel e

mpl

oyee

s ha

ve to

dis

clos

e fin

anci

al in

vest

men

ts,

incl

udin

g th

e P

resi

dent

. A s

epar

ate

Cod

e of

Con

duct

for B

oard

O

ffici

als

sets

the

sam

e st

anda

rd.30

2

In p

ract

ice,

the

Ban

k’s

com

plia

nce

with

the

disc

losu

re p

rinci

ple

was

pro

ven

on th

e W

olfo

witz

’s

case

in 2

007.

The

Wor

ld B

ank

Boa

rd lo

st

confi

denc

e in

the

Pre

side

nt W

olfo

witz

afte

r a s

peci

al

inve

stig

ativ

e co

mm

ittee

foun

d he

had

vio

late

d hi

s co

ntra

ct b

y br

eaki

ng e

thic

al a

nd g

over

ning

rule

s in

arr

angi

ng a

pro

mot

ion

pack

age

for h

is p

artn

er

Sha

ha A

li R

aza.

Wol

fow

itz re

sign

ed b

efor

e hi

s te

rm

had

ende

d.30

3 4

Is th

e le

ader

obl

iged

to a

dher

e to

a

publ

ishe

d co

de o

f eth

ics?

Yes.

Cod

e of

eth

ics

equa

lly a

pplie

s to

eve

ry s

taff

mem

ber.

Ther

e is

an

Offi

ce o

f Eth

ics

and

Bus

ines

s C

ondu

ct, a

n et

hics

hel

plin

e, a

Cod

e of

C

ondu

ct fo

r Sta

ff (c

reat

ed in

200

3), a

s w

ell a

s a

Cod

e of

Con

duct

for

Boa

rd O

ffici

als.

It h

as b

een

rece

ntly

refin

ed to

incl

ude,

for e

xam

ple,

se

xual

har

assm

ent (

due

to a

cces

sion

of w

omen

at t

he W

BG

).304


III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Yes,

but

not

to th

e sa

me

exte

nt a

s th

e re

gula

r sta

ff. T

he e

valu

atio

n of

the

orga

niza

tion

and

the

Pre

side

nt a

re o

ne a

nd th

e sa

me

if th

e P

resi

dent

is h

eld

resp

onsi

ble

for i

ts p

erfo

rman

ce. I

nter

nal E

valu

atio

n G

roup

(IEG

) “Ev

alua

tion

of th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

Org

aniz

atio

nal

Effe

ctiv

enes

s”30

5 rep

ort p

ublis

hed

in A

pril

2012

incl

uded

asp

ects

of

lead

ersh

ip.

Ther

e ar

e in

form

al p

roce

sses

that

info

rm th

e m

anag

emen

t.306

2Is

rem

uner

atio

n or

ben

efits

tied

to

the

outc

omes

of t

he p

erfo

rman

ce

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e?

No,

var

iatio

n is

ver

y lim

ited.

Sal

arie

s fo

r top

man

agem

ent a

re d

iscl

osed

in

ann

ual r

epor

ts.30

7

3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

Onl

y on

an

ad-h

oc b

asis

. D

r Kim

has

a p

erso

nal c

oach

nam

ed M

arsh

all

Gol

dsm

ith.30

8

IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent c

riter

ia

cons

ider

ed b

y th

e fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p in

th

e re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s?

No

evid

ence

.Th

e tw

o B

retto

n W

oods

org

aniz

atio

ns –

IMF

and

Wor

ld B

ank

– sh

ow th

at re

-app

oint

men

t is

base

d on

two

crite

ria: (

1) w

heth

er th

e in

cum

bent

wis

hes

to

stay

; and

(2) t

he d

omin

ant p

oliti

cs.30

9

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes.

In

pra

ctic

e, c

ompe

ting

non-

Am

eric

an c

andi

date

s ha

ve n

ot b

een

cons

ider

ed u

ntil

the

2011

ele

ctio

n in

whi

ch tw

o no

n-U

S c

andi

date

s w

ere

put f

orth

for

elec

tion.

310

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

Yes,

the

Pre

side

nt c

an re

com

men

d sh

ifts

of s

trate

gy th

orou

gh

deliv

erin

g re

ports

for t

he D

evel

opm

ent C

omm

ittee

.311 T

he g

over

nors

ap

prov

e th

e pr

opos

als.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Unc

lear

. Am

ong

mec

hani

sms

that

par

tly fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

stra

tegi

es: r

epor

ts o

f the

Dev

elop

men

t Com

mitt

ee; a

gend

a an

d su

mm

arie

s of

mee

tings

; App

rais

al re

ports

(Int

erna

l Com

plet

ion

Rep

orts

(IC

R);

Pro

ject

Com

plet

ion

Rep

orts

(PC

R) e

tc.);

Inte

rnal

Ev

alua

tion

Gro

up (I

EG) r

epor

ts (t

he u

nit r

epor

ts to

the

Boa

rd o

f G

over

nors

, not

man

agem

ent o

f the

Ban

k); I

nter

natio

nal D

evel

opm

ent

Ass

ocia

tion

(IDA

) rep

orts

.

The

only

con

stra

ints

are

the

Arti

cles

of

Agr

eem

ent.31

2


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

Ther

e is

a ra

pid

grow

th in

“tru

st fu

nds”

, non

-dis

cret

iona

ry b

udge

t th

at is

bei

ng e

arm

arke

d.31

3 Ide

ally

, tru

st fu

nds

wou

ld b

e cl

osel

y lin

ked

to th

e W

orld

Ban

k’s

stra

tegy

, pro

cess

es a

nd o

vers

ight

. How

ever

, si

nce

trust

fund

s ad

d 25

% to

the

Ban

k’s

adm

inis

trativ

e bu

dget

, the

in

cent

ives

to a

lign

are

wea

k.

In a

dditi

on, t

he b

igge

st c

ontri

buto

rs in

201

2 ar

e U

S a

nd U

K ($

4,5b

n,

mor

e th

an o

ne th

ird o

f tot

al),

whi

ch in

crea

ses

risk

of c

aptu

re b

y th

ese

two

coun

tries

.

Trus

t fun

ds in

fluen

ce b

ehav

iour

s an

d pr

iorit

ies;

do

nors

wan

t thi

s. It

als

o di

stra

cts

othe

r res

ourc

es

(not

onl

y fin

anci

al, b

ut a

lso

hum

an re

sour

ces,

for

exam

ple)

. Als

o co

nsid

er R

eim

burs

able

Adv

isor

y S

ervi

ces

– w

hen

coun

tries

ask

for e

xtra

ser

vice

s (m

anag

emen

t, fo

r exa

mpl

e, R

AM

P p

rogr

amm

e w

here

for a

fee

the

Wor

ld B

ank

unde

rtake

s m

anag

emen

t of a

sset

s).31

4

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes.

The

re a

re: (

1) b

road

sta

ff su

rvey

s co

nduc

ted

ever

y 18

mon

ths

to re

veal

sta

ff sa

tisfa

ctio

n w

ith m

anag

ers,

(2) “

360

degr

ees”

exe

rcis

e w

here

one

sol

icits

inpu

ts o

f sub

ordi

nate

s an

d (3

) a m

echa

nism

of p

eer

revi

ew in

pla

ce to

mak

e re

com

men

datio

ns fo

r cor

rect

ion.

Jim

Yon

g K

im re

cent

ly c

ondu

cted

a s

urve

y of

its

10,0

00 e

mpl

oyee

s. It

reve

aled

a

“cul

ture

of f

ear,”

per

vasi

ve “

fear

of r

isk”

and

a “

terr

ible

” en

viro

nmen

t for

co

llabo

ratio

n.31

5

Sta

ff su

rvey

s ha

ve b

een

play

ing

a su

rpris

ingl

y la

rge

role

sin

ce K

im c

ame.

316

2Is

exe

cutiv

e m

anag

emen

t ass

esse

d on

men

torin

g an

d co

achi

ng o

f su

bord

inat

e st

aff?

No

evid

ence

. It

is “

not a

prio

rity

ques

tion”

.317


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

With

in it

s S

ocia

l Dev

elop

men

t Dep

artm

ent,

the

Par

ticip

atio

n an

d C

ivic

Eng

agem

ent G

roup

pro

mot

es th

e pa

rtici

patio

n of

peo

ple

and

thei

r org

aniz

atio

ns to

influ

ence

inst

itutio

ns, p

olic

ies

and

proc

esse

s fo

r equ

itabl

e an

d su

stai

nabl

e de

velo

pmen

t. Th

e gr

oup

assi

sts

Wor

ld B

ank

units

, clie

nt g

over

nmen

ts a

nd c

ivil

soci

ety

orga

niza

tions

. A C

ivil

Soc

iety

Pol

icy

Foru

m, o

rgan

ized

join

tly w

ith th

e W

orld

Ban

k, in

par

alle

l with

the

Ann

ual

and

Spr

ing

Mee

tings

of t

he IM

F an

d W

orld

Ban

k th

at c

over

s a

wid

e ra

nge

of to

pics

, inc

ludi

ng m

any

sugg

este

d by

CS

Os

them

selv

es. C

SO

con

sulta

tions

are

now

com

mon

pra

ctic

e (if

not

requ

ired)

as

part

of p

roje

ct

appr

aisa

l pro

cess

es, n

otifi

catio

n of

pro

cure

men

t bid

s, a

nd p

art o

f the

WD

R p

roce

ss (p

ublis

hing

ear

ly c

once

pt

note

s an

d in

itial

dra

fts fo

r pub

lic c

omm

ents

).Th

ere

are

also

stru

ctur

es in

pla

ce:

Glo

bal P

artn

ersh

ip fo

r Soc

ial A

ccou

ntab

ility,

a m

ulti-

dono

r tru

st fu

nd to

sup

port

CS

Os

that

wor

k in

soc

ial

acco

unta

bilit

yS

eats

in c

omm

ittee

s an

d W

B a

dvis

ory

boar

ds a

nd g

over

ning

bod

ies

(non

-vot

ing

seat

) for

WB

trus

t fun

ds

(ofte

n do

nor-

spec

ific)

Par

ticip

atio

n at

WB

Ann

ual m

eetin

gIn

volv

emen

ts o

n pr

ojec

ts, c

onsu

ltatio

ns

Dev

elop

men

t Gra

nt F

acilit

y (fi

nanc

e an

d P

artn

ersh

ips)

Exte

rnal

Indu

stry

Initi

ativ

e (E

II) w

hen

WB

act

s as

a tr

uste

e an

d ad

min

iste

rs m

oney

Thro

ugh

coun

try o

ffice

s –

dono

r mee

tings

and

cou

ntry

rela

tions

Th

roug

h pr

ojec

ts –

rela

tions

on

the

grou

nd

Sta

keho

lder

s su

rvey

ed b

y M

OPA

N in

201

2 ra

ted

the

Ban

k ad

equa

te in

coo

rdin

atin

g w

ith c

lient

s in

the

desi

gn o

f pro

ject

s, fo

r the

cla

rity

of it

s pr

oced

ures

, flex

ibilit

y, a

nd re

spon

sive

ness

to c

hang

es in

the

proj

ect

impl

emen

tatio

n co

ntex

t. In

thei

r writ

ten

com

men

ts, t

hey

note

d th

at th

e B

ank’

s pr

oced

ures

are

rigi

d an

d th

at

bure

aucr

atic

pro

cess

es o

ften

dela

y im

plem

enta

tion.

318

The

new

stra

tegy

pro

pose

s th

at th

e B

ank

will

focu

s on

cus

tom

ized

dev

elop

men

t sol

utio

ns a

nd a

lign

all i

ts a

ctiv

ities

with

the

two

goal

s: w

ork

mor

e in

pa

rtner

ship

with

oth

ers,

incl

udin

g th

e pr

ivat

e se

ctor

; an

d si

gnifi

cant

ly in

crea

se c

olla

bora

tion

acro

ss it

s ag

enci

es.31

9

VIII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

eng

age

lead

ersh

ip th

orou

ghly

with

inte

rnal

/ext

erna

l eva

luat

ions

Inde

pend

ent E

valu

atio

n G

roup

’s (I

EG) s

trate

gic

goal

is to

influ

ence

the

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up’s

abi

lity

to a

chie

ve

deve

lopm

ent o

utco

mes

glo

bally

and

with

its

partn

er c

ount

ries.

It re

ports

dire

ctly

to th

e B

oard

s of

Exe

cutiv

e D

irect

ors,

whi

ch o

vers

ee IE

G’s

wor

k th

roug

h th

e C

omm

ittee

on

Dev

elop

men

t Effe

ctiv

enes

s. T

he IE

G

cond

ucte

d a

clie

nt s

urve

y in

201

2 to

det

erm

ine

whe

ther

the

Ban

k w

as m

eetin

g cl

ient

s’ n

eeds

and

how

they

pe

rcei

ve it

s im

pact

. The

sur

vey

findi

ngs

are

base

d on

iden

tical

sur

veys

car

ried

out a

mon

g th

ree

audi

ence

s:

Wor

ld B

ank

Gro

up B

oard

mem

bers

and

adv

iser

s, W

orld

Ban

k G

roup

sta

ff, a

nd e

xter

nal s

take

hold

ers

(aca

dem

ia, p

rivat

e co

mpa

nies

, non

gove

rnm

enta

l org

aniz

atio

ns, g

over

nmen

ts, i

nter

natio

nal o

rgan

izat

ions

, do

nor o

rgan

izat

ions

, and

med

ia).

The

Ban

k al

so fe

atur

es th

e D

evel

opm

ent I

mpa

ct E

valu

atio

n In

itiat

ive

(DIM

E),

whi

ch s

eeks

to in

crea

se th

e us

e of

impa

ct e

valu

atio

n (IE

) in

the

desi

gn a

nd im

plem

enta

tion

of b

ank

proj

ects

. D

IME

eval

uate

s pr

ogra

mm

es b

ased

on

IE s

tand

ards

, thu

s en

tailin

g an

add

ition

al in

tern

al e

valu

atio

n of

pe

rform

ance

.320

It is

goo

d th

at IE

G a

nd th

e B

ank

carr

y ou

t suc

h su

rvey

s, b

ut th

e B

ank

as a

glo

bal p

laye

r has

to

wei

gh c

ount

ry p

riorit

ies

with

glo

bal p

riorit

ies

and

natu

rally

they

don

’t m

atch

.321


j. W

orld

Hea

lth O

rgan

izat

ion

(WH

O)

Org

aniz

atio

nW

HO

, the

dire

ctin

g an

d co

ordi

natin

g au

thor

ity fo

r hea

lth w

ithin

the

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

sy

stem

, is

resp

onsi

ble

for p

rovi

ding

lead

ersh

ip o

n gl

obal

hea

lth m

atte

rs, s

hapi

ng

the

heal

th re

sear

ch a

gend

a an

d se

tting

nor

ms

and

stan

dard

s. H

eadq

uarte

red

in G

enev

a, S

witz

erla

nd, i

t has

six

regi

onal

offi

ces

(Bra

zzav

ille, t

he R

epub

lic o

f C

ongo

; Was

hing

ton

DC

, US

A; N

ew D

elhi

, Ind

ia; C

open

hage

n, D

enm

ark;

Cai

ro,

Egyp

t; an

d M

anila

, Phi

lippi

nes)

and

150

cou

ntry

offi

ces.

Gov

erna

nce

The

194

mem

ber c

ount

ries

gove

rn W

HO

, mee

ting

annu

ally

at t

he W

orld

Hea

lth

Ass

embl

y (W

HA

). Th

e as

sem

bly

appo

ints

the

dire

ctor

-gen

eral

(DG

), su

perv

ises

th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

finan

cial

pol

icie

s, a

nd re

view

s an

d ap

prov

es th

e pr

opos

ed

prog

ram

me

budg

et. T

he W

HA

is a

dvis

ed b

y th

e ex

ecut

ive

boar

d (3

4 m

embe

rs),

who

are

tech

nica

lly q

ualifi

ed in

the

heal

th fi

eld

and

are

elec

ted

for a

thre

e-ye

ar

term

.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Five

yea

rs.

Inco

me

The

prop

osed

bud

get f

or 2

014-

2015

is $

3.98

billi

on.

Num

ber

of s

taff

8,00

0, s

prea

d ov

er h

eadq

uarte

rs, r

egio

nal o

ffice

s an

d co

untri

es.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pP

ast d

irect

or-g

ener

als

wer

e: B

. Chi

shol

m (f

rom

Can

ada,

194

8-19

53);

M.G

. C

anda

u (B

razi

l, 19

53-1

973)

; H. M

ahle

r (D

enm

ark,

197

3-19

88);

H. N

akaj

ima

(Jap

an, 1

988-

1998

); G

.H. B

rund

tland

(Nor

way

, 199

8-20

03);

Lee

Jong

-woo

k (R

epub

lic o

f Kor

ea, 2

003-

2006

[die

d in

offi

ce])

and

And

ers

Nor

dströ

m (S

wed

en,

2006

-200

7 [a

ctin

g D

G, r

epla

cing

Lee

]).

Mar

gare

t Cha

n, th

e cu

rrent

DG

, was

app

oint

ed o

n 9

Nov

embe

r 200

6.

Ther

e ha

ve b

een

no o

utw

ard

scan

dals

rega

rdin

g an

y of

the

lead

ers.

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryU

nder

Cha

n’s

lead

ersh

ip, W

HO

has

und

erta

ken

maj

or fi

nanc

ial,

man

ager

ial a

nd

gove

rnan

ce-r

elat

ed re

form

, lay

ing

out i

ts p

roje

cted

tim

elin

e, in

term

edia

te c

heck

-in

poin

ts a

nd g

uide

lines

. Thi

s re

form

has

bee

n bo

th in

tern

al a

nd e

xter

nal-f

acin

g, th

e la

tter c

over

ing

WH

O’s

act

iviti

es w

ith e

xter

nal s

take

hold

ers,

incl

udin

g co

untri

es a

nd

non-

stat

e en

titie

s.


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

The

re is

no

evid

ence

of a

“te

rms

of re

fere

nce”

onl

ine

or in

any

pub

lic

reco

rd. H

owev

er, t

he W

orld

Hea

lth O

rgan

izat

ion

has

a de

taile

d,

thor

ough

pro

cess

of n

omin

atin

g an

d el

ectin

g th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al,

the

deta

ils o

f whi

ch a

re o

n th

e w

ebsi

te, a

nd p

art o

f the

pub

lic re

cord

s.

This

pro

cess

incl

udes

the

step

s ne

cess

ary

for m

embe

r sta

tes

to

nom

inat

e an

app

ropr

iate

can

dida

te, d

etai

ls o

f the

qua

lifica

tions

nee

ded

to b

e a

cand

idat

e, s

peci

fic d

eadl

ines

and

inte

rvie

w g

uide

lines

.322

Ther

e is

a la

rge,

ong

oing

dis

cuss

ion

on th

e el

ectio

n of

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

, and

it h

as b

een

high

-leve

l ag

enda

item

in th

e 13

2nd

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

mee

ting

in 2

013.

The

cur

rent

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

has

bee

n a

stro

ng p

ropo

nent

of b

ringi

ng c

larit

y to

the

proc

ess

of s

elec

tion,

and

has

suc

ceed

ing

in m

akin

g ke

y ch

ange

s to

ens

ure

grea

ter t

rans

pare

ncy.

Th

e un

ique

asp

ect o

f WH

O is

that

all

the

Reg

iona

l D

irect

ors

(RD

s) a

re a

lso

elec

ted

by th

e m

embe

r st

ates

of t

he re

spec

tive

regi

on, a

s op

pose

d to

nom

inat

ed th

roug

h ot

her U

nite

d N

atio

ns

orga

niza

tions

2W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

the

mem

bers

hip

is in

volv

ed in

lead

ersh

ip e

lect

ion

and

re-e

lect

ion

in p

ract

ice?

The

Wor

ld H

ealth

Ass

embl

y (c

ompo

sed

of a

ll 19

4 co

untri

es) e

lect

s th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al, o

n th

e re

com

men

datio

n of

the

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

(c

ompo

sed

of 3

4 m

embe

rs).

The

mem

bers

hip

of th

e Ex

ecut

ive

Boa

rd is

ske

wed

be

caus

e th

e w

eigh

ting

give

n to

diff

eren

t reg

ions

is

not

bas

ed o

n po

pula

tion,

but

rath

er o

n th

e nu

mbe

r of m

embe

r sta

tes

in th

at re

gion

. The

re

is a

lso

cons

ider

able

var

iabi

lity

in th

e co

nsul

tativ

e pr

oced

ures

by

regi

on. T

here

has

bee

n so

me

frust

ratio

n by

Lat

in A

mer

ica,

Afri

ca a

nd S

outh

Asi

a du

e to

a la

ck o

f Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

repr

esen

ting

thes

e re

gion

s, b

ut it

was

bec

ause

mos

t cou

ntrie

s no

t su

ppor

ting

thei

r bid

s.3

Is th

ere

a tim

e-bo

und,

pub

lishe

d,

exha

ustiv

e pr

oces

s fo

r lea

ders

hip

elec

tion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

Yes,

the

abov

e-m

entio

ned

docu

men

ts li

st o

ut th

e ex

act p

roce

dure

s,

incl

udin

g a

time-

line

and

othe

r det

ails

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion.

It

lays

out

inst

ruct

ions

for c

andi

date

s to

pro

vide

sup

porti

ng e

vide

nce

to m

atch

eac

h of

the

publ

ishe

d cr

iteria

for t

he p

ost o

f the

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al. T

here

are

als

o se

t gui

delin

es to

sub

mit

a cu

rric

ulum

vita

e an

d ot

her i

nstit

utio

naliz

ed p

roce

sses

.

Ther

e is

als

o an

exh

aust

ive

docu

men

t whi

ch la

ys

out a

cod

e of

con

duct

to p

rom

ote

ethi

cal p

ract

ices

an

d tra

nspa

renc

y th

roug

hout

the

nom

inat

ion/

elec

tion

proc

ess.

323

II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es a

ccou

ntab

ility

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

The

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

put

forth

a c

lear

list

of p

erso

nal e

xpec

tatio

ns fr

om

her t

enur

e w

hich

she

sha

red

publ

icly

at t

he s

tart

of h

er te

rm

2Is

ther

e an

exp

ecta

tion

that

the

lead

er tr

ansl

ates

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls o

f or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

man

agea

ble

and

clea

r stra

tegy

?

No

avai

labl

e in

form

atio

n


3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?N

o in

form

atio

n av

aila

ble

publ

icly

Ever

y st

aff,

P5

and

abov

e (in

clud

ing

the

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al) h

as to

dec

lare

con

flict

s of

inte

rest

ann

ually

. Th

is p

roce

ss is

con

duct

ed b

y th

e le

gal t

eam

in

tern

ally

, and

is v

ery

stric

t hav

ing

been

upd

ated

re

cent

ly. T

hese

dec

lara

tions

are

con

fiden

tial

in n

atur

e, b

ut th

e or

gani

zatio

n is

look

ing

into

pu

blis

hing

them

in th

e fu

ture

, bas

ed o

n th

e U

nite

d N

atio

ns m

odel

.4

Is th

e le

ader

obl

iged

to a

dher

e to

a

publ

ishe

d co

de o

f eth

ics?

Ther

e is

a c

ode

of c

ondu

ct a

nd e

xten

sive

rule

s an

d re

gula

tions

go

vern

ing

WH

O s

taff,

324 h

owev

er, t

here

is n

othi

ng s

peci

fical

ly d

etai

led

for s

enio

r lea

ders

hip.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

er s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Ther

e is

no

men

tion

of a

form

al p

erfo

rman

ce a

ppra

isal

on

the

publ

ic p

orta

l. H

owev

er, t

he c

urre

nt D

irect

or-G

ener

al p

ublis

hed

a se

lf-as

sess

men

t of h

er o

wn

perfo

rman

ce a

t the

cul

min

atio

n of

her

fir

st te

rm, w

here

all

her m

anda

tes

at th

e tim

e of

her

ele

ctio

n w

ere

com

pare

d to

her

ach

ieve

men

ts. A

lthou

gh, t

his

appr

aisa

l was

n’t

cond

ucte

d ob

ject

ivel

y, it

stil

l lay

s ou

t som

e pe

rform

ance

met

rics.

Ther

e is

a v

ery

robu

st p

erfo

rman

ce p

rogr

amm

e th

roug

hout

the

orga

niza

tion

at e

very

leve

l. M

OPA

N re

view

has

hig

hlig

hted

big

cha

nges

bei

ng

unde

rtake

n by

HR

to im

prov

e th

e pr

oces

s; h

owev

er,

ther

e is

no

form

al s

yste

m o

f app

rais

al o

f the

D

irect

or-G

ener

al. S

he h

as p

revi

ousl

y co

nduc

ted

her

pers

onal

per

form

ance

app

rais

al p

ublic

ly b

ut a

s it

is

a se

lf-ev

alua

tion,

it is

not

inhe

rent

ly u

n-bi

ased

.2

Is re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

A g

uide

for m

anag

ers

in a

pply

ing

WH

O p

erfo

rman

ce c

ompe

tenc

ies

has

been

issu

ed. A

pol

icy

on re

war

ds a

nd re

cogn

ition

will

be is

sued

sh

ortly

. Fur

ther

mor

e, a

gui

de to

hel

p su

perv

isor

s m

anag

e pe

rform

ance

is

in th

e fin

al s

tage

s of

dev

elop

men

t.325

WH

O o

pera

tes

at th

e sa

me

pay

scal

e as

the

rest

of

the

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

sys

tem

, par

ticul

arly

in li

ne

with

the

UN

DP.

In p

ract

ice,

WH

O p

artia

lly fo

llow

s a

mod

el o

f rem

uner

atio

n tie

d to

out

com

es o

f the

pe

rform

ance

man

agem

ent a

nd th

ere

are

som

e w

ithin

-gra

de p

ay in

crea

ses

for h

igh

perfo

rman

ce3

Is th

e le

ader

offe

red

coac

hing

and

de

velo

pmen

t opp

ortu

nity

to a

ddre

ss

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

A g

loba

l eLe

arni

ng p

latfo

rm w

ill be

laun

ched

in S

epte

mbe

r thi

s ye

ar.

Pro

posa

ls fo

r the

dev

elop

men

t of a

man

agem

ent d

evel

opm

ent

prog

ram

me

are

curre

ntly

bei

ng e

valu

ated

.326

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

sel

ecte

d th

e G

loba

l Lea

ders

hip

Com

mitt

ee h

erse

lf an

d th

ere

is m

uch

mor

e fo

cus

on le

ader

ship

ski

lls a

nd m

anag

emen

t (e-

lear

ning

, gr

oup

lear

ning

and

men

tors

hip

prog

ram

mes

). Th

ere

is a

two

year

pro

gram

me

for s

enio

r man

agem

ent

incl

udin

g co

achi

ng, t

rain

ing

and

man

agem

ent s

kills

bu

t thi

s is

not

the

case

for t

he D

irect

or-G

ener

al.


IV.

Lead

ersh

ip re

-ele

ctio

n is

bas

ed o

n tra

nspa

rent

pro

cess

es a

nd m

etric

s1

Are

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent

crite

ria c

onsi

dere

d by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in th

e re

-app

oint

men

t pr

oces

s?

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

pre

sent

ed h

er o

rigin

al p

riorit

ies

and

man

date

w

hen

she

was

sta

ndin

g up

for e

lect

ion

for h

er fi

rst t

erm

. At t

he re

-ap

poin

tmen

t for

her

sec

ond

term

, she

pre

sent

ed a

doc

umen

t with

a

self-

asse

ssm

ent o

f how

wel

l she

per

form

ed o

n th

ose

prio

ritie

s. T

his

was

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt th

roug

h th

e re

-nom

inat

ion

proc

ess.

327 Th

ese

wer

e no

t spe

cific

ally

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent,

but h

ow w

ell t

he

orga

niza

tion,

und

er h

er le

ader

ship

, tac

kled

the

maj

or c

halle

nges

.

It w

as g

ener

ally

laud

ed th

at th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al

star

ted

the

proc

ess

of s

elf-

eval

uatio

n, b

ut th

is

shou

ld b

e ex

pand

ed to

the

regi

onal

-dire

ctor

s as

w

ell.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

wan

ts to

cre

ate

an

inde

pend

ent e

valu

atio

n sy

stem

for h

er p

ositi

on a

t a

late

r sta

ge a

s w

ell.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Ther

e is

opp

ortu

nity

to s

tand

up

agai

nst t

he in

cum

bent

Dire

ctor

-G

ener

al in

a re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s an

d ea

ch c

andi

date

is e

valu

ated

on

the

sam

e ob

ject

ive

scal

e as

is u

sed

for a

new

ele

ctio

n. T

here

hav

e be

en c

ases

of s

ittin

g R

egio

nal D

irect

ors

bein

g ch

alle

nged

by

othe

r qu

alifi

ed c

andi

date

s.

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

was

not

cha

lleng

ed a

t the

pr

evio

us re

-ele

ctio

n pr

oces

s si

nce

she

had

prov

ed

hers

elf t

o be

a s

trong

can

dida

te, t

he o

ppor

tuni

ty to

pu

t for

war

d ot

her c

andi

date

s ex

iste

d.

V.Th

e le

ader

has

the

auth

ority

and

mec

hani

sms

to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s1

Doe

s th

e le

ader

hav

e th

e au

thor

ity

to s

hift

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

ies

in li

ght o

f ex

tern

al c

hang

es?

Ther

e ar

e so

me

“cor

e fu

nctio

ns”

that

are

spe

cifie

d in

the

orga

niza

tion,

th

at h

ave

been

set

out

in th

e G

ener

al P

rogr

amm

e of

Wor

k an

d th

at

cove

r a 1

0 ye

ar p

erio

d (2

006–

2015

).328 T

hese

are

rela

tivel

y un

-ch

ange

able

sin

ce th

is h

as b

een

deci

ded

as lo

ng-t

erm

‘rai

son

d’êt

re’

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n. H

owev

er, t

he c

urre

nt D

G h

as s

peci

fied

her o

wn

prio

ritie

s st

emm

ing

from

thes

e co

re fu

nctio

ns, a

nd h

as a

sked

to b

e ev

alua

ted

on th

ese

spec

ific

prio

ritie

s. “

I wan

t my

lead

ersh

ip to

be

judg

ed b

y th

e im

pact

of o

ur w

ork

on th

e he

alth

of t

wo

popu

latio

ns:

wom

en a

nd th

e pe

ople

of A

frica

.” –

Mar

gare

t Cha

n329 T

here

is a

lso

a W

HO

refo

rm p

roce

ss b

eing

und

erta

ken,

of w

hich

a m

ajor

com

pone

nt

is im

prov

ed h

ealth

out

com

es, i

n lin

e w

ith th

e ag

reed

glo

bal h

ealth

pr

iorit

ies.

As

a st

rand

in th

e re

form

pro

cess

, WH

O is

wor

king

with

its

mem

ber s

tate

s to

set

prio

ritie

s fo

r its

wor

k in

ord

er to

focu

s its

ac

tiviti

es a

nd d

eliv

er m

ore

effe

ctiv

ely.

330 T

here

fore

, it c

an b

e sa

id

that

bot

h th

e le

ader

ship

and

the

mem

ber s

tate

s do

hav

e a

certa

in

disc

retio

n to

tailo

r the

cor

e fu

nctio

ns in

to s

trate

gic

prio

ritie

s ac

cord

ing

to c

urre

nt re

aliti

es a

nd n

atio

nal/i

nter

natio

nal p

riorit

ies.

Ther

e is

no

auth

ority

to c

hang

e th

e m

anda

te a

way

fro

m h

ealth

, for

exa

mpl

e to

topi

cs s

uch

as tr

ade

or

agric

ultu

re.

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

Yes,

ther

e is

a p

roce

ss to

faci

litat

e im

plem

enta

tion

of n

ew p

riorit

ies

as

disc

usse

d ab

ove.

Eve

ry D

G c

an p

riorit

ize

certa

in s

peci

fic s

trate

gies

/di

seas

es o

r asp

ects

dur

ing

thei

r ten

ure,

and

ther

e is

a p

roce

ss d

urin

g th

e W

orld

Hea

lth A

ssem

bly

whe

re m

embe

r-st

ates

can

hav

e in

put i

nto

the

stra

tegi

c pr

iorit

y se

tting

.331

Extra

-Ord

inar

y m

eetin

gs o

f the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

ha

ve b

een

calle

d in

the

past

for c

hang

ing

stra

tegi

es.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

76%

of W

HO

’s fu

nds

are

‘vol

unta

ry c

ontri

butio

ns’ w

ith m

ost o

f the

m

bein

g hi

ghly

spe

cifie

d as

to w

hich

dep

artm

ent o

r hea

lth in

terv

entio

n th

ey s

houl

d be

use

d fo

r. (h

ttp://

whq

libdo

c.w

ho.in

t/pb

/201

2-20

13/

PB

_201

2%E2

%80

%93

2013

_eng

.pdf

)

The

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

is tr

ying

to e

nsur

e a

fully

-fin

ance

d bu

dget

, thr

ough

the

Fina

ncin

g D

ialo

gue

Initi

ativ

e. C

urre

ntly

, som

e pa

rts o

f the

bud

get a

re

over

-fun

ded

and

som

e ar

e un

der-

fund

ed. A

ccor

ding

to

Ian

Sm

ith, E

xecu

tive

Dire

ctor

, Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

’s

Offi

ce, t

he c

ritic

al e

lem

ents

to a

fina

nced

bud

get i

s pr

edic

tabi

lity

and

alig

nmen

t. It

is e

ssen

tial t

hat w

e kn

ow h

ow m

uch

mon

ey w

e ha

ve, a

nd w

hen

we

will

rece

ive

it. A

dditi

onal

ly, i

t is

impo

rtant

that

the

reso

urce

s ar

e al

igne

d w

ith th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

wor

k,

with

the

regi

ons,

sta

ffing

and

act

iviti

es. T

he W

HO

is

dev

elop

ing

a po

rtal w

hich

will

be tr

ansp

aren

t, sh

owin

g al

l the

reso

urce

s, w

here

they

hav

e be

en

spen

t and

to w

hat t

hey

have

bee

n de

dica

ted

to.

This

is n

ot a

uni

que

idea

(UN

DP

has

a m

ulti-

dono

r tru

st fu

nd w

ebsi

te a

s an

exa

mpl

e), b

ut w

ill be

so

met

hing

new

for W

HO

.VI

.Th

e le

ader

is e

xpec

ted

to a

ttra

ct, r

etai

n an

d de

velo

p ta

lent th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes,

the

orga

niza

tion

cond

ucts

and

pub

lishe

s a

“sta

keho

lder

sur

vey”

w

hich

incl

udes

bot

h ex

tern

al s

take

hold

ers

and

inte

rnal

sta

ff. T

he

resu

lts a

re p

ublis

hed

in a

repo

rt, a

vaila

ble

on th

e w

ebsi

te. I

t see

ms

that

from

the

2012

sur

vey,

one

of t

he k

ey fi

ndin

gs w

as th

at “

21%

of

ext

erna

l and

25%

of i

nter

nal r

espo

nden

ts h

ave

doub

ts re

gard

ing

WH

O’s

abi

lity

to ta

ke th

e ne

cess

ary

mea

sure

s to

ens

ure

the

inde

pend

ence

of i

ts p

ublic

hea

lth e

xper

ts, s

imila

r pro

porti

ons

voic

ed

conc

erns

abo

ut W

HO

’s in

depe

nden

ce fr

om in

appr

opria

te in

dust

ry

influ

ence

.” T

he fu

ll re

port

with

the

surv

ey fi

ndin

gs is

als

o on

the

web

site

. (ht

tp://

ww

w.w

ho.in

t/ab

out/

who

_per

cept

ion_

surv

ey_2

012.

pdf)

Ther

e is

ano

ther

sur

vey

calle

d th

e “P

erce

ptio

n S

urve

y” th

at is

led

by th

e D

epar

tmen

t of

Com

mun

icat

ions

, led

by

an e

xter

nal a

genc

y. It

is

shar

ed w

idel

y in

tern

ally

and

wid

ely

disc

usse

d by

th

e A

ssis

tant

Dire

ctor

Gen

eral

s an

d th

e R

egio

nal

Dire

ctor

s.

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

This

is p

art o

f the

per

form

ance

man

agem

ent s

yste

m

(PM

DS

) and

is ta

ken

into

acc

ount

info

rmal

ly.


VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge m

anag

emen

t to

enga

ge w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

WH

O is

fairl

y co

nser

vativ

e in

this

mat

ter.

Ther

e is

an

ong

oing

pro

cess

of r

efor

m fo

r eng

agin

g in

non

-st

ate

acto

rs. T

he c

ateg

orie

s of

eng

agem

ent a

re

the

follo

win

g: 1

) Gov

erna

nce

(whe

re s

take

hold

ers

can

enga

ge in

gov

erna

nce

mat

ters

of W

HO

), 2)

C

olla

bora

tion

(join

t wor

k-pl

an, p

roje

cts,

offi

cial

re

latio

ns w

ith N

GO

s et

c.),

3) C

onsu

ltatio

n (m

ore

ad-

hoc,

due

-dilig

ence

, con

flict

of i

nter

est,

deve

lopm

ent

of s

tand

ards

, sha

ring

of in

form

atio

n, e

xper

tise

and

know

-how

), 4)

Fin

ance

(non

-sta

te a

ctor

s ca

n m

ake

a co

ntrib

utio

n to

WH

O),

5) C

ontra

cts

give

n to

the

priv

ate

sect

or fo

r car

ryin

g ou

t spe

cific

pie

ces

of

wor

k.VI

II.M

O/IO

has

stru

ctur

es th

at e

ngag

e ex

ecut

ive

man

agem

ent t

horo

ughl

y w

ith in

tern

al/e

xter

nal e

valu

atio

nsW

HO

is c

omm

itted

to a

pro

gram

of r

egul

ar

eval

uatio

ns, m

aint

aini

ng in

depe

nden

ce, a

nd

enga

ging

in in

depe

nden

t eva

luat

ions

. the

Exe

cutiv

e B

oard

will

cond

uct a

nd e

valu

ate

thes

e fo

r the

WH

O.


k. W

orld

Tra

de O

rgan

izat

ion

(WTO

)

Org

aniz

atio

nR

epla

cing

the

Gen

eral

Agr

eem

ent o

n Ta

riffs

and

Tra

de, t

he W

TO is

the

mul

tilat

eral

fo

rum

for n

egot

iatin

g gl

obal

trad

e ag

reem

ents

and

ens

urin

g th

at th

e ru

les

of

inte

rnat

iona

l tra

de a

re c

orre

ctly

app

lied

and

enfo

rced

.332

Gov

erna

nce

The

WTO

des

crib

es it

self

as “

a ru

les-

base

d, m

embe

r-dr

iven

org

aniz

atio

n –

all

deci

sion

s ar

e m

ade

by M

embe

rs, a

nd th

e ru

les

are

the

outc

ome

of n

egot

iatio

ns

amon

g M

embe

rs”.

333 A

ll 16

0 m

embe

r cou

ntrie

s m

ay p

artic

ipat

e in

all

coun

cils

an

d co

mm

ittee

s, e

xcep

t the

dis

pute

set

tlem

ent p

roce

dure

s an

d th

e co

mm

ittee

s re

spon

sibl

e fo

r plu

rilat

eral

agr

eem

ents

. Whi

le W

TO a

gree

men

t for

esee

s th

e us

e of

vot

es w

hen

cons

ensu

s ca

nnot

be

reac

hed

in s

ever

al s

peci

fic s

ituat

ions

, co

nsen

sus

dom

inat

es th

e de

cisi

on-m

akin

g pr

oces

s. M

embe

rs m

ake

deci

sion

s re

late

d to

new

rule

s an

d th

eir i

mpl

emen

tatio

n, a

s w

ell a

s to

org

aniz

atio

nal m

atte

rs

such

as

the

budg

et a

nd a

ctiv

ities

of t

he s

ecre

taria

t, an

d on

the

appo

intm

ent o

f th

e di

rect

or-g

ener

al (D

G).33

4

The

Min

iste

rial C

onfe

renc

e, w

hich

mus

t mee

t at l

east

onc

e ev

ery

two

year

s, is

m

ost i

mpo

rtant

. The

con

fere

nce

can

take

dec

isio

ns o

n al

l mat

ters

und

er a

ny o

f th

e m

ultil

ater

al tr

ade

agre

emen

ts. T

he G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eets

regu

larly

in G

enev

a to

car

ry o

ut W

TO fu

nctio

ns; i

t has

repr

esen

tativ

es fr

om a

ll m

embe

r gov

ernm

ents

, an

d ha

s th

e au

thor

ity to

act

on

beha

lf of

the

min

iste

rial c

onfe

renc

e. T

he W

TO

has

thre

e fu

rther

cou

ncils

and

ove

r 20

com

mitt

ees

rele

vant

to th

e va

rious

WTO

ag

reem

ents

and

the

secr

etar

iat’s

act

iviti

es; t

hrou

gh th

ese

grou

ps, m

embe

rs m

ake

deci

sion

s, m

onito

r pro

gres

s an

d ca

rry

out t

he o

rgan

izat

ion’

s da

y-to

-day

wor

k.

Alth

ough

not

a fo

rmal

par

t of t

he W

TO s

truct

ure,

a tr

ade

nego

tiatio

ns c

omm

ittee

, ch

aire

d by

the

DG

, was

est

ablis

hed

by m

embe

rs in

the

cont

ext o

f the

Doh

a R

ound

of t

rade

neg

otia

tions

. In

the

proc

ess

of n

egot

iatio

ns, W

TO m

embe

rs,

vario

us c

omm

ittee

cha

irs a

nd th

e D

G c

onve

ne a

rang

e of

diff

eren

t inf

orm

al

grou

ps a

nd p

roce

sses

, suc

h as

“G

reen

Roo

ms”

, whi

ch a

re c

ompr

ised

of

vario

us c

onfig

urat

ions

of m

embe

rs w

ith th

e ai

m o

f infl

uenc

ing

nego

tiatio

ns a

nd

build

ing

cons

ensu

s. T

his

can

then

faci

litat

e de

cisi

on-m

akin

g in

the

form

al W

TO

com

mitt

ees.

The

secr

etar

iat i

s he

aded

by

the

DG

and

pro

vide

s su

ppor

t to

WTO

mem

bers

on

all

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n’s

activ

ities

. As

only

mem

bers

mak

e de

cisi

ons,

the

secr

etar

iat h

as n

o de

cisi

on-m

akin

g po

wer

s w

ith re

gard

to th

e co

nten

t, co

mpl

etio

n

or im

plem

enta

tion

of W

TO a

gree

men

ts. T

he s

ecre

taria

t doe

s, h

owev

er, m

ake

inte

rnal

man

agem

ent d

ecis

ions

rele

vant

to im

plem

entin

g th

e w

ork

prog

ram

me

and

budg

et a

ppro

ved

by m

embe

rs.

Leng

th o

f lea

ders

hip

man

date

Four

yea

rs; c

an b

e re

new

ed o

nce.

Inco

me

Tota

l bud

get f

or 2

013

was

CH

F 19

7.2

milli

on.

Num

ber

of s

taff

In th

e se

cret

aria

t: 63

9, fr

om 7

7 co

untri

es (a

s of

Mar

ch 2

013)

.

His

tory

of l

eade

rshi

pTh

e W

TO le

ader

ship

app

oint

men

t pro

cess

is o

pen

and

com

petit

ive,

in th

at a

ny

mem

ber c

ount

ry c

an p

ut fo

rwar

d a

cand

idat

e. A

n un

ders

tand

ing

exis

ts a

mon

g co

untri

es th

at th

e po

sitio

n sh

ould

alte

rnat

e be

twee

n de

velo

ped

and

deve

lopi

ng

coun

try m

embe

rs.33

5

WTO

’s fi

rst D

G w

as P

eter

Sut

herla

nd (f

rom

Irel

and,

199

3-19

95).

Div

isio

n an

d de

adlo

ck a

risin

g fro

m th

e fa

ilure

of m

embe

rs to

reac

h co

nsen

sus

on a

new

D

G re

sulte

d in

the

shor

tene

d te

rm o

f Ren

ato

Rug

gier

o (It

aly,

199

5-19

98) a

nd a

te

rm-s

harin

g ag

reem

ent b

etw

een

Mik

e M

oore

(New

Zea

land

, 199

8/9-

2002

) and

S

upac

hai P

anitc

hpak

di (T

haila

nd, 2

002-

2005

). Th

e su

bseq

uent

two

DG

s w

ere

Pas

cal L

amy

(Fra

nce,

200

5-20

13; r

eapp

oint

ed in

200

9) a

nd R

ober

to A

zevê

do

(Bra

zil,

2013

-pre

sent

).

In 1

994-

1995

, the

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

resi

sted

Rug

gier

o’s

sele

ctio

n on

the

grou

nds

that

th

e ap

poin

tmen

t of a

n Ita

lian

wou

ld v

iola

te a

n in

form

al u

nder

stan

ding

that

Eur

opea

n D

Gs

shou

ld n

ot b

e fro

m o

ne o

f the

larg

e Eu

rope

an e

cono

mie

s. In

the

late

199

0s,

disc

ord

amon

g m

embe

rs re

sulte

d in

a d

ecis

ion

to s

plit

the

term

bet

wee

n tw

o D

Gs

– on

e fro

m a

dev

elop

ed a

nd th

e ot

her f

rom

a d

evel

opin

g co

untry

.

Cur

rent

traj

ecto

ryA

zevê

do’s

pos

ition

as

DG

sta

rted

on 1

Sep

tem

ber 2

013.

In 2

014,

he

inte

nds

to

unde

rtake

a c

ompr

ehen

sive

org

aniz

atio

nal r

evie

w, i

nclu

ding

on

gove

rnan

ce a

nd

stra

tegy

(but

ess

entia

lly o

n st

affin

g).


Indi

cato

r P

ublis

hed

rule

s O

ther

fact

ors

I.Th

e le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n pr

oces

s se

arch

es a

nd te

sts

for s

peci

fic, r

elev

ant c

ompe

tenc

ies

agai

nst c

lear

ly d

efine

d cr

iteria

thro

ugh

an in

clus

ive,

exh

aust

ive

proc

ess

1D

oes

the

MO

/IO p

ublis

h th

e cr

iteria

/te

rms

of re

fere

nce

for l

eade

rshi

p on

line?

Term

s of

refe

renc

e ar

e no

t ava

ilabl

e on

line.

How

ever

, the

role

of t

he

DG

is d

efine

d in

bro

ad te

rms

in W

TO le

gal t

exts

, whi

ch a

re a

vaila

ble

on th

e w

ebsi

te.33

6 A

200

2 G

ener

al C

ounc

il de

cisi

on in

200

2 (d

ocum

ent W

T/L/

509)

de

fines

requ

ired

qual

ifica

tions

for t

he jo

b.33

7

Term

s of

refe

renc

e ar

e pu

blis

hed

with

the

notic

e in

vitin

g ca

ndid

atur

es fo

r DG

, i.e

. with

“Va

canc

y N

otic

e”; t

his

is p

oste

d on

-line

.338

Inte

rest

ingl

y, th

e En

hanc

ed In

tegr

ated

Fra

mew

ork

(a W

TO-r

elat

ed o

rgan

izat

ion

for t

he d

eliv

ery

of

tech

nica

l ass

ista

nce

and

capa

city

bui

ldin

g to

de

velo

ping

cou

ntrie

s) h

as s

ever

al p

ublic

ly a

vaila

ble

TOR

s.2

Wha

t per

cent

age

of th

e m

embe

rshi

p is

invo

lved

in le

ader

ship

sel

ectio

n an

d re

-ele

ctio

n in

pra

ctic

e?

Dec

isio

ns –

incl

udin

g D

G s

elec

tion

– ar

e m

ade

by c

onse

nsus

of a

ll m

embe

rs. T

here

fore

, all

Mem

bers

can

be

invo

lved

in th

e le

ader

ship

ap

poin

tmen

t and

reap

poin

tmen

t pro

cess

.

The

degr

ee o

f inv

olve

men

t by

Mem

bers

var

ies

wid

ely

depe

ndin

g on

thei

r cap

aciti

es in

term

s of

hu

man

reso

urce

s an

d th

eir e

cono

mic

/pol

itica

l si

gnifi

canc

e in

the

syst

em. A

lthou

gh m

any

info

rmal

an

d fo

rmal

opp

ortu

nitie

s ex

ist,

the

degr

ee o

f en

gage

men

t and

influ

ence

var

ies.

Som

e gr

oups

, su

ch a

s th

e A

frica

n G

roup

, col

lect

ivel

y w

eigh

in fo

r pa

rticu

lar c

andi

date

s as

the

proc

ess

adva

nces

.339

3Is

ther

e a

time-

boun

d, p

ublis

hed,

ex

haus

tive

proc

ess

for l

eade

rshi

p se

lect

ion

that

wei

ghs

com

pete

nce

agai

nst t

he p

ublis

hed

crite

ria?

The

“200

2 de

cisi

on”

desc

ribes

in d

etai

l the

lead

ersh

ip a

ppoi

ntm

ent

proc

ess.

It la

ys o

ut a

cle

ar ti

mef

ram

e fo

r a p

roce

ss to

com

men

ce 9

m

onth

s be

fore

and

be

com

plet

ed 3

mon

ths

befo

re th

e ex

piry

of a

n in

cum

bent

’s te

rm. O

nly

mem

ber c

ount

ries

can

nom

inat

e ca

ndid

ates

, w

ho m

ust b

e th

eir o

wn

natio

nals

, and

nom

inat

ions

mus

t be

mad

e w

ithin

one

mon

th o

f the

sta

rt of

the

proc

ess.

Th

ere

is a

n ag

reed

des

crip

tion

of th

e re

quire

d qu

alifi

catio

ns fo

r the

po

st, w

ith “

the

desi

rabi

lity

of re

flect

ing

the

dive

rsity

of t

he W

TO’s

m

embe

rshi

p in

suc

cess

ive

appo

intm

ents

to th

e po

st”

also

list

ed a

s an

exp

licit

fact

or to

be

take

n in

to a

ccou

nt. C

andi

date

s pr

ovid

e C

Vs,

and

mee

t with

and

mak

e pr

esen

tatio

ns to

the

WTO

Gen

eral

Cou

ncil.

Th

en in

the

final

two

mon

ths

of th

e pr

oces

s th

e C

hair

of th

e C

ounc

il,

assi

sted

by

the

Cha

ir of

the

Dis

pute

Set

tlem

ent B

ody

and

Cha

ir of

the

Trad

e P

olic

y R

evie

w B

ody

as F

acilit

ator

s, c

onsu

lt w

ith m

embe

rs a

nd

seek

s to

bui

ld a

con

sens

us. T

here

is a

pro

visi

on fo

r the

Cou

ncil

to v

ote

if a

cons

ensu

s ca

nnot

be

reac

hed

in th

e ap

poin

ted

time.

340

In th

e re

cent

app

oint

men

t pro

cess

, WTO

mem

bers

offi

cial

ly n

omin

ated

9

cand

idat

es fo

r the

pos

t of t

he n

ew D

irect

or-G

ener

al fr

om 1

to 3

1 D

ecem

ber 2

012.

All

the

cand

idat

es m

ade

a pr

esen

tatio

n on

thei

r vi

sion

for t

he W

TO a

t a G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

g in

Jan

uary

201

3. T

he

appo

intm

ent p

roce

ss c

oncl

uded

with

a G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

g on

14

May

201

3, a

t whi

ch th

e re

com

men

datio

n to

app

oint

Rob

erto

Aze

vêdo

as

the

new

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

was

app

rove

d.

Dur

ing

the

two

mon

ths

of c

onse

nsus

bui

ldin

g un

derta

ken

by th

e C

hair

of th

e G

ener

al C

ounc

il,

the

trans

pare

ncy

and

oppo

rtuni

ties

for p

artic

ipat

ion

depe

nd o

n th

e sp

ecifi

c pr

oces

ses

purs

ued

by th

e C

hair.

The

pro

cess

and

crit

eria

by

whi

ch C

hairs

co

nclu

de th

at c

andi

date

s ar

e re

mov

ed fr

om th

e sh

ort-

list i

s no

t alw

ays

trans

pare

nt.34

1


II.Th

e le

ader

has

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns w

hich

are

tran

spar

ent a

nd c

onsi

sten

t with

MO

/IO’s

ove

rarc

hing

goa

ls a

nd w

hich

faci

litat

es le

ader

ship

ac

coun

tabi

lity

1D

o th

e le

ader

s se

t cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce

expe

ctat

ions

for t

hem

selv

es, w

hich

ar

e tra

nspa

rent

and

con

sist

ent?

No

offic

ial p

roce

dure

in p

lace

. Alth

ough

the

new

DG

gen

eral

ly d

eliv

ers

a st

atem

ent t

o ou

tline

his

vis

ion

and

goal

s, a

s w

ell a

s hi

s fo

rmal

ob

ligat

ions

, in

front

of t

he G

ener

al C

ounc

il, th

ere

is n

o pr

oces

s fo

r se

tting

cle

ar p

erfo

rman

ce e

xpec

tatio

ns o

r rev

iew

.

The

deba

tes

over

the

role

of t

he D

G a

nd th

e ap

poin

tees

’ sco

pe fo

r tak

ing

lead

ersh

ip c

ompl

icat

e th

e ab

ility

of th

e le

ader

to s

et c

lear

exp

ecta

tions

of

them

selv

es a

nd g

oals

. Man

y m

embe

rs a

re re

luct

ant

to s

ee th

e D

G ta

ke a

n ac

tion

or in

itiat

ive

that

is n

ot

sim

ply

the

impl

emen

tatio

n of

dec

isio

ns ta

ken

by th

e M

embe

rshi

p. G

iven

deb

ates

on

the

broa

der m

issi

on

and

purp

ose

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n lim

it th

e po

litic

al

scop

e fo

r the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

to e

xplic

itly

lay

out a

cl

ear a

gend

a fo

r act

ion

or c

hang

e.34

2 2

Is th

ere

an e

xpec

tatio

n th

at th

e le

ader

tran

slat

es o

vera

rchi

ng g

oals

of

orga

niza

tion

into

a m

anag

eabl

e an

d cl

ear s

trate

gy?

Yes.

As

part

of th

e se

lect

ion

proc

ess,

all

cand

idat

es n

omin

ated

for

the

posi

tion

of D

irect

or-G

ener

al m

ake

a pr

esen

tatio

n of

thei

r vis

ion

for t

he W

TO a

t a G

ener

al C

ounc

il, a

nd a

gain

upo

n th

eir a

ppoi

ntm

ent.

For e

xam

ple,

Rob

erto

Aze

vêdo

gav

e hi

s vi

sion

spe

ech

to th

e G

ener

al

Cou

ncil

on 9

Sep

tem

ber.34

3 Thi

s is

als

o do

ne th

roug

h th

e an

nual

bu

dget

pro

posa

l to

mem

bers

.344

The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

is e

xpec

ted

to re

port

to

Mem

ber S

tate

s at

the

regu

lar G

ener

al C

ounc

il m

eetin

gs o

n pr

ogre

ss a

nd a

ctiv

ities

of t

he

Sec

reta

riat.

A fu

rther

inst

rum

ent i

s th

e el

abor

atio

n of

W

TO A

nnua

l Rep

ort,

supe

rvis

ed b

y th

e D

G, w

hich

su

mm

ariz

es th

e pr

ogra

mm

es a

nd a

ctiv

ities

of t

he

orga

niza

tion.

345

3Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

dis

clos

e co

nflic

ts o

f int

eres

t?Th

e di

sclo

sure

pol

icy

only

ava

ilabl

e in

tern

ally

. Ex

ecut

ive

man

agem

ent,

like

all s

taff

mem

bers

, are

ex

pect

ed to

abi

de b

y th

e co

de o

f cor

e va

lues

. The

S

taff

Rul

es a

lso

requ

ire th

at s

taff

seek

aut

horiz

atio

n fo

r out

side

act

iviti

es a

nd d

iscl

ose

any

pote

ntia

l fin

anci

al in

tere

sts.

346

4Is

the

lead

er o

blig

ed to

adh

ere

to a

pu

blis

hed

code

of e

thic

s?Ye

s. H

owev

er, t

he c

ode

of c

ore

ethi

cs is

onl

y ci

rcul

ated

inte

rnal

ly.

The

code

of c

ore

valu

es o

f the

WTO

Sec

reta

riat

exis

ts in

tern

ally

and

all

staf

f are

requ

ired

to s

ign

the

oath

of o

ffice

upo

n en

try in

to th

e or

gani

zatio

n.34

7 Th

e ne

wly

app

oint

ed D

G h

as s

igne

d th

e O

ath

of

Offi

ce. A

trai

ning

man

ual o

n W

TO c

ore

valu

es is

av

aila

ble

to a

ll st

aff.

III.

The

lead

er h

as a

defi

ned

perf

orm

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d re

ceiv

es a

nnua

l fee

dbac

k on

per

form

ance

1Is

the

lead

ersh

ip s

ubje

cted

to a

nnua

l pe

rform

ance

app

rais

al?

Not

at t

he le

vel o

f DG

. Dire

ctor

s, h

owev

er, a

re s

ubje

cted

.D

irect

ors’

per

form

ance

s ar

e as

sess

ed b

y th

e D

G

or re

spec

tive

DD

G th

roug

h th

e an

nual

per

form

ance

ev

alua

tion

repo

rt.34

8 The

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

pla

ns to

un

derta

ke a

n ob

ject

ive

casc

adin

g ex

erci

se s

tarti

ng

next

yea

r. 2

Is re

mun

erat

ion

or b

enefi

ts ti

ed to

th

e ou

tcom

es o

f the

per

form

ance

m

anag

emen

t pro

gram

me?

No

evid

ence

.W

hile

ther

e is

a P

erfo

rman

ce R

ewar

ds s

chem

e fo

r st

aff m

embe

rs, t

his

is n

ot a

pplic

able

to D

irect

ors,

D

eput

y D

irect

ors

Gen

eral

and

the

DG

.349


3Is

the

lead

er o

ffere

d co

achi

ng

and

deve

lopm

ent o

ppor

tuni

ties

to

addr

ess

wea

knes

ses

over

tim

e?

Yes,

upo

n re

ques

t.350

Coa

chin

g an

d ex

ecut

ive

man

agem

ent s

essi

ons

by

exte

rnal

coa

ches

are

offe

red

to s

enio

r man

agem

ent

upon

requ

est.

Sen

ior E

xecu

tive

Ret

reat

s (fo

r D

G; D

DG

s an

d D

irect

ors)

hav

e be

en in

trodu

ced

to d

iscu

ss o

penl

y an

d co

llect

ivel

y th

e W

TO’s

pe

rform

ance

man

agem

ent p

rogr

amm

e an

d de

velo

pmen

t fee

dbac

k.35

1 IV

.Le

ader

ship

re-e

lect

ion

is b

ased

on

trans

pare

nt p

roce

sses

and

met

rics

1A

re p

erfo

rman

ce m

anag

emen

t crit

eria

co

nsid

ered

by

the

full

mem

bers

hip

in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

No

evid

ence

.

2A

re o

ther

qua

lified

can

dida

tes

cons

ider

ed in

the

re-e

lect

ion

proc

ess?

Yes,

if n

ew c

andi

date

s ar

e no

min

ated

. In

pra

ctic

e, a

t the

end

of t

he n

omin

atio

n pe

riod

in

2009

, Pas

cal L

amy

was

the

only

can

dida

te a

nd w

as

re-a

ppoi

nted

. V.

The

lead

er h

as th

e au

thor

ity a

nd m

echa

nism

s to s

hift

str

ateg

ic p

riorit

ies

to m

eet c

hang

ing

circ

umst

ance

s


1D

oes

the

lead

er h

ave

the

auth

ority

to

shi

ft st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s in

ligh

t of

exte

rnal

cha

nges

?

The

orga

niza

tion

is m

embe

r-dr

iven

. Hen

ce, i

t is

the

mem

bers

who

set

th

e st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s fo

r WTO

. Yet

the

DG

can

hav

e an

indi

rect

impa

ct

on M

embe

rs’ c

onsi

dera

tion

of th

e O

rgan

izat

ion’

s st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s.

For e

xam

ple,

form

er D

irect

or-G

ener

al, P

asca

l Lam

y, c

onve

ned

a pa

nel

on d

efini

ng th

e fu

ture

of t

rade

in A

pril

2012

. The

pan

el re

port

“The

Fu

ture

of T

rade

: The

Cha

lleng

es o

f Con

verg

ence

” w

as re

leas

ed in

Apr

il 20

13.35

2 At t

he s

tart

of th

e 20

08 c

risis

Lam

y in

itiat

ed a

mon

itorin

g of

pr

otec

tioni

sm, w

hich

was

sub

sequ

ently

val

idat

ed b

y th

e M

embe

rs;

he a

lso

conv

ened

an

expe

rt gr

oup

on tr

ade

finan

ce to

ass

ess

need

s in

the

mar

ket a

nd in

form

pot

entia

l act

ions

to e

ase

acce

ss to

trad

e fin

ance

.353

View

s on

the

desi

rabl

e sc

ope

for l

eade

rshi

p an

d in

depe

nden

t act

ion

by th

e D

irect

or-G

ener

al v

ary

amon

g M

embe

r Sta

tes

and

depe

ndin

g on

the

issu

e. G

iven

the

lega

lly-b

indi

ng n

atur

e of

WTO

ag

reem

ents

, and

thei

r eco

nom

ic s

igni

fican

ce, m

ost

Mem

bers

reso

lute

ly o

bjec

t to

the

notio

n th

at th

e D

G s

houl

d ha

ve a

ny d

ecis

ion-

mak

ing

auth

ority

with

re

spec

t to

nego

tiatio

n, fo

rmat

ion

or im

plem

enta

tion

of W

TO ru

les.

How

ever

, som

e ha

ve a

rgue

d th

at th

e W

TO D

G ‘s

role

sho

uld

be m

ore

clea

rly s

peci

fied

with

rega

rd to

the

nego

tiatio

n pr

oces

s –

enab

ling

for

inst

ance

the

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

to fo

rmal

ly p

ropo

se

and

push

for p

oliti

cal s

olut

ions

to p

robl

ems

or

brok

er d

eals

to b

ring

nego

tiatio

ns to

a c

lose

. In

prac

tice,

the

DG

is in

volv

ed a

ctiv

ely

in th

e pr

oces

s of

con

sens

us-b

uild

ing

thro

ugh

the

proc

ess

of

chai

ring

info

rmal

Gre

en R

oom

mee

tings

, min

i-m

inis

teria

l and

the

trade

neg

otia

tions

Com

mitt

ee.

Thes

e in

form

al p

ract

ices

mee

t with

var

ying

deg

rees

of

sat

isfa

ctio

n an

d ap

prov

al b

y M

embe

rs g

iven

the

subs

tant

ive

diffe

renc

es a

mon

g M

embe

rs o

n w

hat

kind

s of

agr

eem

ents

and

pro

visi

ons

shou

ld b

e pu

rsue

d, a

nd o

ver t

he o

bjec

tives

of t

he o

rgan

izat

ion

as a

who

le.

Dur

ing

his

tenu

re a

s D

irect

or-G

ener

al, P

asca

l La

my

prov

ided

stra

tegi

c le

ader

ship

to M

embe

rs

on th

e im

porta

nce

of A

id fo

r Tra

de, a

nd a

dvoc

ated

to

Mem

bers

the

impo

rtanc

e of

this

initi

ativ

e. T

he

achi

evem

ent o

f the

laun

ch o

f thi

s in

itiat

ive

is w

idel

y at

tribu

ted

to th

at D

irect

or-G

ener

al. S

imila

rly, i

n th

e fa

ce o

f the

mos

t rec

ent e

cono

mic

cris

is, t

he

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

app

rove

d an

initi

ativ

e by

the

Sec

reta

riat t

o m

onito

r inc

reas

es in

pro

tect

ioni

sm

amon

g M

embe

r Sta

tes.

Alth

ough

the

DG

did

not

fo

rmal

ly a

ppro

ach

the

Mem

bers

hip

for a

ppro

val o

f th

is a

ctio

n, m

ost M

embe

rs a

ppea

r to

conc

ur th

at

this

was

a u

sefu

l stra

tegi

c ef

fort

on th

e D

G’s

par

t.354

2D

oes

the

MO

/IO h

ave

proc

esse

s th

at fa

cilit

ate

impl

emen

tatio

n of

new

st

rate

gic

prio

ritie

s?

No

evid

ence

.


3W

hat p

erce

ntag

e of

reso

urce

s ar

e se

t as

ide

for s

peci

al in

itiat

ives

dec

ided

by

and

cont

rolle

d by

a s

ubse

t of t

he fu

ll m

embe

rshi

p?

No

earm

arke

d bu

dget

. The

WTO

der

ives

its

inco

me

from

Mem

bers

’ co

ntrib

utio

ns, w

hich

are

bas

ed o

n a

form

ula

that

take

s in

to a

ccou

nt

each

one

’s s

hare

of i

nter

natio

nal t

rade

. Mis

cella

neou

s in

com

e is

min

or

(con

tribu

tions

from

obs

erve

rs a

nd s

ales

).355

Som

e M

embe

rs d

o pr

ovid

e ex

tra b

udge

tary

re

sour

ces

to th

e W

TO S

ecre

taria

t and

to th

e En

hanc

ed In

tegr

ated

Fra

mew

ork

for c

apac

ity

build

ing

to d

evel

opin

g co

untri

es, s

ome

of w

hich

are

ea

rmar

ked

for s

peci

fic tr

aini

ng, t

echn

ical

ass

ista

nce,

or

Aid

for T

rade

act

iviti

es in

par

ticul

ar c

ount

ries.

356

VI.

The

lead

er is

exp

ecte

d to

att

ract

, ret

ain

and

deve

lop

tale

nt th

roug

h-ou

t the

org

aniz

atio

n1

Doe

s th

e or

gani

zatio

n ta

ke s

taff

surv

eys

to a

sses

s st

aff s

atis

fact

ion

and

perfo

rman

ce a

nd d

o le

ader

s ut

ilize

the

resu

lts o

f the

se s

urve

ys?

Yes,

ther

e ar

e re

gula

r rep

orts

on

staf

f sat

isfa

ctio

n.35

7

2Is

the

lead

er a

sses

sed

on m

ento

ring

and

coac

hing

of s

ubor

dina

te s

taff?

No

evid

ence

.

VII.

MO

/IO h

as s

truct

ures

that

enc

oura

ge le

ader

ship

to e

ngag

e w

ith d

iver

se r

ange

of s

take

hold

ers

The

maj

or a

nnua

l out

reac

h ev

ent i

s th

e P

ublic

For

um, w

hich

attr

acts

abo

ut 1

,000

par

ticip

ants

. Dur

ing

pres

s br

iefin

gs, t

he D

irect

or-G

ener

al re

gula

rly p

rese

nts

rem

arks

. Bey

ond

annu

al e

vent

s, s

uch

as th

e pu

blic

foru

m

and

mee

tings

with

par

liam

enta

rians

, the

org

aniz

atio

n do

es n

ot h

ave

form

al m

echa

nism

s in

tend

ed to

ens

ure

regu

lar i

nter

actio

n w

ith s

take

hold

ers

from

indu

stry

, civ

il so

ciet

y or

par

liam

ents

. Rat

her t

hese

occ

ur th

roug

h pa

rtici

patio

n in

ad

hoc

mee

tings

and

con

fere

nces

arr

ange

d by

the

Sec

reta

riat o

r the

rele

vant

sta

keho

lder

s.35

8

Ther

e ar

e no

form

al m

echa

nism

s fo

r rec

urrin

g st

akeh

olde

r con

sulta

tions

with

the

DG

or a

ccre

dita

tion

for i

nput

in

to th

e w

ork

of th

e or

gani

zatio

n or

ong

oing

neg

otia

tions

. The

WTO

’s re

gula

r com

mitt

ees

are

open

onl

y to

M

embe

r Sta

tes,

alth

ough

sta

keho

lder

s ca

n no

w o

bser

ve s

elec

ted

parts

of d

ispu

te s

ettle

men

t pro

ceed

ings

.

The

WTO

Dire

ctor

-Gen

eral

inte

ract

s in

form

ally

with

th

e he

ads

of m

any

inte

rnat

iona

l org

aniz

atio

ns. T

he

WTO

is n

ot a

spe

cial

ized

UN

age

ncy.

How

ever

the

head

of t

he W

TO d

oes

parti

cipa

te in

the

UN

Chi

ef

Exec

utiv

e B

oard

mee

ting.

The

WTO

DG

par

ticip

ates

in

the

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Endnotes

1. Jupille, Mattli and Snidal (2013).

2. This occurs in the OECD. Source: email correspondence with an OECD senior official, 17 June 2014.

3. Please send your input to Shubhra Saxena Kabra, World Economic Forum at [email protected]

4. See: http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf.

5. See: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm.

6. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI.

7. The terms of appointment were published in a press release on 5 July 2011. See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm.

8. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm.

9. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm.

10. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?mappingid=y3p1dhO74YQ%3d&img=i6nZpr3iSlU%3d.

11. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.

12. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.

13. Martinez-Diaz (2009).

14. Unlike the private sector, remuneration and benefits in international organizations are, in most cases, not tied to performance management indicators. Instead, such organizations set fixed salaries for all staff, including their leadership. Those within the UN system – and even some outside it, such as IOM – follow a standardized pay scale. Although benefits may vary, they are generally determined by the cost of living in the respective locations of headquarters (e.g. New York, Geneva, Washington DC) rather than by a leader’s performance.

15. For example, Pascal Lamy in 2009. See: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_29apr09_e.htm.

16. For example, Donald Kaberuka’s statement in 2005. See: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/.

17. Martinez-Diaz (2008), p. 388.

18. Martinez-Diaz (2008) looked at the following: IMF, World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IDB and EBRD.

19. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].

20. MOPAN (2012).

21. For instance, Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, resigned in 2007 over an alleged conflict of interest in respect to employment.

22. See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf.

23. UN (2013). See: http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardsE.pdf [accessed 6 September 2014].

24. AfDB also has a code of conduct for staff (1999), and one for leaders (2007).

25. UN (2006). See: http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml [accessed 18 September 2014].

26. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].

27. The list of 2012 disclosures is available from: http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml.

28. See also: New Zealand State Services Commission (2012). Leadership Success Profile. Wellington: State Services Commission.

29. Interview with the senior staff development officer, 26 July 2013.


30. UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360-degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. This was in response to staff criticism that promotions were “not based on skills and suitability”, but on “seniority and influence of sponsors” (UK Department for International Development [DFID], Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). For more on the survey, see: Turk and Eyster (2010).

31. EBRD (2012). Annual report [online]. See: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.

32. Interview with senior IOM official, 31 July 2013.

33. UNHCR (2013a).

34. Turk and Eyster (2010), p. 170; UNHCR (2013b).

35. UNDP (2011). Budget Estimates, 11.

36. In 2012, IOM’s total revenue was $1.2 billion, and only 0.7% or $9 million was unearmarked. See: IOM (2013). IOM Financial Report for the Year Ended 31 December 2012. Geneva: IOM.

37. Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 Sept 2013.

38. This consisted of: 20% unrestricted, 32% broadly earmarked (i.e. at the regional, subregional or thematic level) and 47% tightly earmarked (country or sector). Source: UNHCR (2012).

39. See: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2013/key_principles_WHO_financing_dialogue.pdf.

40. MOPAN (2013), Annual Report 2012. See: http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_Annual_Report_2012.pdf.

41. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/Origins.aspx.

42. For an example of the response in 2008, see: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf.

43. For the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, 2011 edition, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf.

44. This number increased with the creation of South Sudan in 2011. It will increase again, to 80, once the processing of Luxembourg’s application for membership is complete.

45. For the 2013-2022 strategy, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB_Strategy_for_2013%E2%80%932022_-_At_the_Center_of_Africa%E2%80%99s_Transformation.pdf

46 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf

47 See p.180 of the Annual Report 2012: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf


49 For example, see Kaberuka’s statement 2005: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/

50 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf)

51 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf







57 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Corporate-Procurement/Departmental_Annual_Reports/AfDB%20TFAR%202010%20Final.pdf

58 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-president-declares-2010-successful-but-momentous-year-at-annual-meetings-opening-ceremony-8143/

59 AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf

60 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf

61 Framework for enhanced engagement with civil society organizations 2012 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf

62 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf

63 MOPAN evaluation of AfDB 2012 http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012.pdf; http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf ; http://www.ausaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/afdb-assessment.pdf

64 The other funds are the Technical Assistance Special Fund, Japan Special Fund, Pakistan Earthquake Fund, Regional Cooperation and Integration Fund, Climate Change Fund and Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, as well as grant co-financing activities. The ADB also manages a number of trust funds, including the Japan Scholarship Program and Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. ADB Financial Profile 2013, Asian Development Bank, 2013, p. 27-33. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-financial-profile-2013.pdf.

65 Those powers reserved for the board of governors include the following: – Admit new members and determine the conditions of their admission – Increase or decrease the bank’s authorized capital stock – Suspend a member – Decide appeals from interpretations or applications of this agreement given by the board of directors – Authorize the conclusion of general agreements for cooperation with other international organizations – Elect the bank’s director and president – Determine the remuneration of the directors and their alternates, and the salary and other terms of the president’s

service contract – Approve the general balance sheet and the bank’s profit-and-loss statement, following review of the auditor’s

report – Determine the reserves and the distribution of the bank’s net profits – Amend this agreement – Decide to terminate the bank’s operations and distribute its assets – Exercise such other powers as are expressly assigned to the board of governors in this agreement

Source: Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 28. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1965/charter.pdf.

66 Ibid; on term limits: Article 30 (3).

67 Asian Development Bank Financial Profile 2013, p. 6-8.


68 Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank: Time for new leadership”. Embassy, 13 March 2013. See: http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank presidency: looking beyond Japan”. Guardian, 22 April 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Bernes, T. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. CIGI Papers, No. 13, February 2013. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. See: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf.

69 For Eswar Prasad’s ADB publications, see: http://www.adbi.org/viewcontact.php?contactid=2091&sectionID=217.

70 Sender, H. “Bankers fear Chinese push to head ADB”. Financial Times, 28 February 2013. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0df9d2c8-81d9-11e2-ae78-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.

71 Jiwei, L. “China’s Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Kazakhstan, Astana. 2014. Asian Development Bank; see: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/2014/gov/PRC_47th_AM_GS-17.pdf.

72 Anderlini, J. “China Expands Plans for World Bank Rival”. Financial Times, 24 June 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1012282-fba4-11e3-aa19-00144feab7de.html#axzz3GKKD6HtZ ; Smith, G. “China aims to break U.S. hold in Asia with rival to World Bank”. Fortune, 25 June 2014. See: http://fortune.com/2014/06/25/china-aims-to-break-u-s-hold-in-asia-with-rival-to-world-bank/.

73 Pilling, D. “Japan head of ADB welcomes rival Chinese fund”. Financial Times, 29 May 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66a56628-e581-11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.

74 Wilson, E., Rowley, A. and Gilmore, S. “New Chinese-led development bank seen as threat to ADB.” Emerging Markets, 3 May 2014. See: http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3337351/New-Chinese-led-development-bank-seen-as-threat-to-ADB.html. The difficulty of China increasing its quota was also confirmed in an interview by Kazu Sakai, ADB Director of Strategy and Policy. Sakai noted that such a change would be politically difficult, given the United States’ interest in preventing an increase in Chinese influence within the institution, and especially vis-à-vis Japan with whom it has a close relationship.

75 Nakao, T. “Closing Statement at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors”. 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Manila, 5 May 2013.

76 Nakao, T. “Opening Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Astana, 4 May 2014. See: http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches.

77 Ownership as of 2012: Japan (15.6%), United States (15.6%), China (6.4%), India (6.3%), Australia (5.8%), Remaining 62 members (50.3%). Annual Report 2012. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-annual-report-2012.pdf

78 The election of the most recent President has brought this trend under intense scrutiny. See: John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank: Time for New Leadership.” Embassy [Ottawa] 3 Mar. 2013. Web. http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank Presidency: Looking beyond Japan.” Guardian [London] 22 Apr. 2013. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Thomas Bernes. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. Working paper no. 13. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013. CIGI Papers. Web. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf

79 Yasutomo, Dennis. “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition.” Japan’s Foreign Aid. Ed. Bruce Koppel and Robert Orr. Westview, 1993, p. 318.

80 Ibid, p. 44.

81 Lim & Vreeland (2013).

82 STRATEGY2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Strategy2020-print.pdf


83 ADB Results Framework. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/r166-08.pdf

84 2012 Development Effectiveness Review. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/defr-2012.pdf

85 Link to Annual Evaluation Reviews: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/resources/1222

86 Link to Reports: http://compliance.adb.org/dir0035p.nsf/alldocs/BDAO-7Y65HQ?OpenDocument&expandable=4

87 Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pcp-2011.pdf

88 Nakao, Takehiko. “Address to 88th Meeting of the Development Committee.” 88th Meeting of the Development Committee of the World Bank. Washington, DC. 12 Oct. 2013. Web. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/16/000442464_20131016104728/Rendered/PDF/818700BR0State0C00Box379845B000Copy.pdf

89 Takehiko Nakao. “Opening Address.” 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors. Astana. 4 May 2014. Web. http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches

90 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila. Asian Development Bank (June 2011): http://www.adb.org/documents/code-conduct

91 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AT ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GUIDELINES TO AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Conflict-of-Interest-18December2012.pdf

92 Guidelines for Gifts and Entertainment. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Gifts-Entertainment.pdf

93 GUIDELINES ON ACCESS DURING INVESTIGATIONS TO RECORDS, EMAILS AND DOCUMENTS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Access-during-investigations.pdf

94 Guidelines on Form and Content of Allegations. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Form-Content-Allegations.pdf

95 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/code-of-conduct.pdf

96 Annual Review of Salary and Benefits for International Staff, National Staff, and Administrative Staff. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2013. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/salary-benefits-review-2013.pdf, p. 5

97 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy.

98 Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 34, Point 5.

99 Daniel Yew Mao Lim and James Vreeland. “Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council.” World Politics 65.1 (2013), p. 44.

100 Ibid.

101 The former director-general speaking to Lim & Vreeland in 2010, however, noted that if projects don’t acquire Japanese support, they do not proceed to the Board in the first place (Ibid, p. 44).

102 Work Program and Budget Framework 2013-2015. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/work-program-budget-framework-2013-2015_0.pdf

103 Funds and Resources. Asian Development Bank (2013): http://www.adb.org/site/funds/main


104 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy

105 Olivier Serrat. Engaging Staff in the Workplace. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2010. Web. http://adbdev.org/sites/default/files/publications/27586/file/engaging-staff-workplace.pdf

106 Strengthening Participation for Development Results. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/strengthening-participation-development-results.pdf, p. 20-30.

107 ADB Perceptions Survey (2013), p. 7.

108 Independent Evaluation website: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/attributes-independence

109 See, for example, a recent assessment of the ADB: Assessment of the Asian Development Bank. Rep. MOPAN, 2013. Web. http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/Main_findings-_ADB_2013_assessment.pdf

110 International Aid Transparency Initiative. Asian Development Bank Becomes IATI Signatory. N.p., 30 Jan. 2013. Web. http://www.aidtransparency.net/timeline/asian-development-bank-becomes-iati-signatory;

111 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml

112 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml

113 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014

114 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI

115 http://www.cgdev.org/blog/cgd-europe-asks-who-should-be-ebrds-next-president

116 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf


118 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf



121 EBRD Financial Report 2011 (pp. 72-76): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/fr11e.pdf.

122 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.

123 “The EBRD and Civil Society in 2012/2013.” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May 2013): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/factsheets/csoE.pdf

124 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/about/compas06.pdf

125 Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon. US Department of State Archives (12 December 1970). See: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d43.

126 Mander, B. “Mutual aid works for Latin America”. Financial Times, 24 September 2012. See: http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/c1628ce2-03a3-11e2-bad2-00144feabdc0.pdf.

127 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.

128 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132

129 Nancy Birdsall. “The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank: Fit for the 21st Century?” Center for Global Development no. 039 (April 2014).


130 A. Schotter (1981). “The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.” Power, Voting, and Voting Power (ed. M.j. Holler). Physica-Verlad, Wurzburg; M.O. Hosli (1996). “Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34(2): 255-273.

131 Jonathan Strand (2003). “Measure voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank.” Economics of Governance (4): 19-36.

132 Birdsall (2014), p. 7.

133 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080

134 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132

135 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080

136 Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare (March 2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36399223

137 Building Opportunity for the Majority (2007). Inter-American Development Bank (Washington D.C.): http://www.iadb.org/news/docs/BuildingOpp.pdf

138 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737

139 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737

140 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856

141 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856

142 Proposal for allocation of FSO resources (2013-2014): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37360465

143 Krasner, Stephen D. Power Structures and Regional Development Banks. International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring, 1981: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706477

144 Human Capital Strategy (2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36290863

145 Strategy for Promoting Citizens Participation in Bank Activities (2004): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=483088

146 See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.

147 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington DC.

148 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm

149 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main6.pdf

150 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm

151 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm

152 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm

153 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf

154 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm

155 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2012/eng/pdf/ar12_eng.pdf


156 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm

157 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC

158 Interview with a former IMF official, June 2013, Oxford

159 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/101213b.pdf

160 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/112513.pdf


162 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm







169 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf





174 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm

175 See example of the response in 2008: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf

176 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1364.htm177 IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures, available at: http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-IOM/docs/facts_figures_

en.pdf; and IOM. 2012. Financial Report: 18.

178 IOM. 2012. Human Resources Report, Annex. Geneva: IOM; and IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures. Geneva: IOM.

179 Reinalda, B. 2011. “Secretaries-General of International Organizations and their Career Development: An Analysis of Nine Humanitarian IGOs”. In Paper for the World Conference on Humanitarian Studies, 2-5 June, at Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA.

180 IOM. 2009. Review of the Organisation Structure of IOM. Geneva: IOM.

181 Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 September 2013. Swing made performance management and ownership of the organization by member states top priorities. He has put strong emphasis on proper use of the performance appraisal system, which is currently being updated to account for organizational changes of the past five years. The DG has also established good measures to ensure that HR policy responds to the organization’s needs; implemented a mandatory rotation process; revamped staff regulations to harmonize conditions of service; taken a zero-tolerance approach to fraud, corruption and unethical behaviour; and taken steps to ensure good gender distribution. (DFID. Working Paper on IOM, 17).

182 See IOM Constitution. 1989. Article 18 (1).


183 The DG is paid at the salary rate of an Assistant Secretary General. Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013 and Interview with senior IOM officials, September 2 2013.

184 IOM 1989. Constitution, Article 18(2).

185 See also IOM Organizational Structure, http://www.iom.int/cms/about-iom/organizational-chart accessed 4 August 2014.

186 See for example: F. Georgi, 2011. For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and its Global Migration Management. In The Politics of International Migration Management. M. Geiger and A. Pecoud. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 45 - 72.

187 DFID, Multilateral Review 2011. Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK aid through multilateral organizations, March 2011, DFID: London: 1987.

188 Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013.

189 For a listing of IOM’s evaluations see: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/organizational-structure/evaluation/external-evaluations.html

190 The four core areas are detailed in the UNDP strategic plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating global progress on human development. The UNDP also manages the UN’s “resident coordinator” system to ensure in-country coordination between UN agencies, and publishes an annual report on human development. These are reformulated in the most recent strategic plan, and three areas of work are highlighted: inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience; and sustainable development pathways. See: UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 20.

191 For more on the selection of board members, see: UNDP. Information note about the Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPs, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive_board/information_noteontheexecutiveboard [accessed 19 September 2014].

192 UN. 1994. General Assembly Resolution 48/162, Article 22. New York: UN.

193 The UNDP’s expenditure was $4.53 billion for development activities (provisional for 2012). UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 25.

194 See: http://www.undp.ro/undp/human-resources/ [accessed 19 September 2014]; and UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 5.

195 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results: UNDP, 3.

196 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 24.

197 Ibid.

198 Rogers, K. “UNDP cuts HQ staff, creates new lower-level jobs”. Devex, 3 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-cuts-hq-staff-creates-new-lower-level-jobs-83612 [accessed 14 July 2014]; and Santamaria, C. “UNDP to establish crisis response unit”. Devex, 16 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-to-establish-crisis-response-unit-83693 [accessed 14 July 2014].

199 The researchers were unable to find these online and no interview participants were aware of one. However, the MOPAN review 2012 UNDP is rated well for ‘key documents available to the public’ MI 1.3. As 77% of survey respondents rate it as adequate or above in transparency.

200 This policy was established in 1958 for UNDP’s predecessor – the Special Fund - and continues to apply for the Administrator. See: General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York. GA Resolution 2029 (XX) Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a United Nations Development Programme. It was subsequently outlined in UN General Assembly. 2005. ‘Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments: confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme’ Note by the Secretary General, A/59/240, 3 May 2005.

201 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.



203 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013.

204 Interview with former senior UNDP staff member, 7 August 2013.

205 Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo 2009. “Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design.” Review of International Organizations 4(4): 403. MOPAN donors at headquarters were asked about the extent to which ‘senior management demonstrates leadership on results management. More than 70% rated UNDP as adequate or above on this indicator’. MOPAN, UNDP Report, MOPAN, 2012: 21.

206 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.

207 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.

208 UNDP, 2011, Budget estimates: p.11.

209 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.

210 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013.

211 UN. 2013. Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. UN: New York. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/transparency/overview.html UNDP also has an Ethics office (established in 2007), which creates UNDP’s ethics policy and coordinates with UN ethics committee.

212 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.

213 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York: 24.

214 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013; Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 28 August; Email correspondence with UNDP senior staff member, Feb 27, 2014.

215 General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York, article 21. This Resolution stipulated the conditions for UNDP’s predecessor, the Special Fund, which the UNDP inherited. These were: ‘The Special Fund shall be administered by a Managing Director under the policy guidance of the Governing Council. The Managing Director shall have the over-all responsibility for the operations of the Fund, with sole authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects submitted by Governments’. For more on the Board’s functions see: UN General Assembly. 1994. Resolution 48/162, Article 3. New York: United Nations.

216 As stipulated by the Resolution: ‘projects shall be undertaken only at the request of a government or group of governments eligible to participate in the Special Fund’. General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, Article 31, 1958, New York. The resolution stipulates other tasks such as: ‘the managing director shall establish and maintain close and continuing working relationships with the specialized agencies concerned with those fields of activity in which the Special Fund will operate, and with the International Atomic Agency…’. The Managing director shall be responsible for the evaluation of project requests…and authorized to contract the services off other agencies. The Managing Director shall make appropriate arrangements to follow the execution of projects. The Managing Director shall report to the Governing Council on the status of projects and the financial position of the projects and programmes’.


218 Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 7 August 2013.

219 The percentage of earmarked contributions were calculated from the UNDP Cumulative Review as follows. Total contributions: 4.64 (regular and other resources) + 1.33 (bilateral earmarked) + 1.53 (multilateral earmarked) + 0.93 (programme contributions) = 8.43 billion; Total earmarked: 1.53 + 1.33 = 1.88 billion and Percentage Earmarked = 1.88/8.43 or 22%. UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York, p.25.

220 The UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017 highlights declining core financing as a one of UNDP’s top challenges. See: UNDP. 2014. ‘Changing the World, UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017’, UNDP: 8. For a clear overview of UNDP’s


financing sources see Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.

221 Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.

222 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.

223 UNDP. 2011. UNDP Institutional Budget Estimates for 2012 – 2013. Executive Board of the UNDP, UNFPA and the UNOPS: New York: 24 – 27.

224 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results, UNDP. Xiii.

225 As part of a broader humanitarian response, UNHCR is typically the cluster lead for protection, shelter and camp management/camp coordination in IDP situations. UNHCR’s total “population of concern” (including refugees and internally displaced persons) is 35.8 million. UNHCR. 2013. Displacement – The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012. Geneva: UNHCR, 3.

226 UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950, Annex, UNHCR Statute.

227 UNHCR holds annual plenary meetings with ExCom and regular meetings with its standing committee throughout the year. For information on UNHCR, ExCom members and how to apply, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html [accessed 19 September 2014]. With its membership growing rapidly, ExCom has become increasingly unwieldy as a governing committee (interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013).

228 UNHCR’s ExCom also submits an annual report to the third committee. Although it was created by ECOSCO, it functions like a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. See Betts, A., Loescher, G. and Milner, J. 2012. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Second Edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 108-109.

229 UNHCR. 2013. Global Report 2012. Geneva: UNHCR.

230 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.

231 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. “Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 22:2, 159–172.

232 Loescher, G. 2002. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

233 BBC News. 2005. “Lubbers quits over UN sex claims”. 20 February 2005. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4282333.stm [accessed 19 September 2014].

234 Goodwin-Gill, G. 1991. “Developments”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 3, 120.

235 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198.

236 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. Geneva: UNHCR.

237 Ibid. The new Global Service Centre based in Budapest, Hungary has centralized administration and support functions at a reduced cost, compared with having these staffed in Geneva.

238 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198. Note that some donors are supportive of UNHCR taking a more expansionist role in humanitarian coordination and natural disasters.

239 Email correspondence with the UNHCR executive office, 11 November 2013.

240 Main sources: Interview with Jane McAdam, 24 July 2013; Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013 and Email Correspondence, 20 May 2014; Interview with UNHCR Personnel Administration, Payroll and Performance Management, Human Resources (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Senior Staff Development Officer (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.


241 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter II, Functions of the High Commissioner, paragraphs 8 – 12.

242 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, Article 13. The UN Secretary General has a contract with the High Commissioner which outlines his salary and other job details. Telephone interview with Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. However the HC is elected by the General Assembly and, in principle, should not be subject to authority or direction by the SG. Email correspondence with International Refugee Law Expert, 19 May 2014.

243 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013. Also note that UNHCR does make much of its policy and other terms of reference available online. They do have a draft of new terms of reference for Assistant High Commissioner (protection) on the website as this was a newly created post (2005).

244 For more detail on this see G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.

245 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, paragraph 13.

246 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

247 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

248 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013. The Secretary General on this occasion engaged in extensive consultations with Member states and as no single candidate emerged he submitted two candidates to member states. See: G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.

249 NGOs argued that candidates should be interviewed and their biographies and answers were made public. Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.

250 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013.

251 For details on the Global Strategic Priorities see: UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2014 - 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec230e916.html

252 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 22, 2: 170.

253 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.

254 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013. UNHCR established an independent Ethics Office in 2008 which reports directly to the HC. Its functions are to: provide confidential advice to staff and senior management on ethical issues (e.g. conflicts of interest; gifts; use of UN assets); promote a culture of integrity and accountability; raise awareness and develop standards and education of ethics issues; administer the financial disclosure programme; implement the policy on the protection of staff from retaliation. Executive Office of the United Nations High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee. 2009. Report on the Ethics Office, EC/60/CRP.21, 24 August 2009.

255 UNHCR, 2004. Code of Conduct, 1.

256 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.

257 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. The Global Trends Report details the numbers of ‘persons of concern’ including refugees, IDPs, stateless and other displaced peoples. Note that evaluating UNHCR and the High Commissioner’s performance solely on these numbers is problematic as they are affected by factors beyond UNHCR’s control.

258 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.


260 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. Note that UNHCR develops its own independent guidelines based on these. Interview with UNHCR Human Resources Official, Budapest, 26 July 2013.


261 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.


263 Through the GLC, UNHCR hopes to ‘measure more systematically the impact of learning on staff to ensure that approaches used add real value’ and are adjusted to remain relevant (Turk and Eyster, 2010: 171). UNHCR have a Senior Staff Development Officer, Head, Management, Leadership & Communications based in Budapest. They develop and convene a leadership programme for senior staff (such as heads of missions). The role of the Senior Staff Development Officer is to ‘support the work of the management/leadership and external relations Unit, with a primary responsibility for the conceptualization, design, development and delivery of management and leadership related learning programmes for various levels of management. S/he is accountable for pro-actively supporting the learning culture in UNHCR by aligning effective learning with institutional goals’. See UNHCR, Job Description, Senior Staff Development Officer (Management and Leadership), 2012 available online. They provide training up D1 level Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.

264 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.

265 Telephone Interview with UNHCR 30 July 2013.

266 The High Commissioner’s functions are outlined in the UNHCR Statute, Chapter II, paragraphs 6 – 12. The Statute also states that ‘The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies’ and that he ‘shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council…’ UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Paragraph 11.

267 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.

268 These shifts are captured in: UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.

269 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013.

270 Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.

271 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.

272 UNHCR established a committee to develop action plans and carry-out survey recommendations in 2011. Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.

273 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 22, 2: 159 – 172.

Staff surveys, according to DFID’s working paper, found that staff are dissatisfied with promotions and postings as it is felt that promotions are ‘not based on skills and suitability’ but ‘seniority and influence of sponsors’ (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). To increase staff confidence in the transparency and fairness of recruitment and promotion UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360 degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). This suggests senior management are responding to staff surveys.

274 Telephone interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.

275 IBRD articles of agreement; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20049557~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.

276 IDA articles of agreement and by-laws; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:21353441~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.

277 IFC articles of agreement; see: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/Articles+of+Agreement/.

278 MIGA convention; see: http://www.miga.org/documents/miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.


279 ICSID convention; see: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.

280 WB organization chart; see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf.

281 World Bank projects and operations; see: http://www.worldbank.org/projects.

282 World Bank. Annual Report 2013; see: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16091/9780821399378.pdf?sequence=1, p. 6.

283 Thorton, P. “World Bank Revamp”. Guardian, 18 November 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/08/world-bank-job-cuts-jim-yong-kim.

284 World Bank. Annual Report 2012; see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf.

285 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

286 Rushe, D. “World Bank candidate Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says job will go to Jim Yong Kim”. Guardian, 16 April 2012. See: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/16/world-bank-president-jim-kim.

287 Lowrey, A. “World Bank, Rooted in Bureaucracy, Proposes a Sweeping Reorganization”. The New York Times, 6 October 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=0.

288 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.

289 World Bank Archives. “Robert Strange McNamara”. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html.

290 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.

291 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.

292 Farnsworth, E. “The BRICS Try to Bank”. U.S. News & World Report, 18 July 2014. See: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/07/18/brics-development-bank-could-challenge-world-bank-and-imf.

293 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/PresContConfCopy.pdf

294 Steven Weisman. “Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank.” The New York Times (May 18th, 2007): http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all

295 Kahler, Miles. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Institute for International Economics; Washington, DC 2001

296 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford

297 Minutes of the WBG Board meetings http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64256109&piPK=64818889&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=51146024

298 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC

299 World Bank Archives. The Presidency of Robert McNamara: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html;.

300 WBG Strategy for 2030 approved in April 2013 http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-goals2013.pdf


302 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf


303 See Steven R. Weisman, ‘Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank’ New York Times, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

304 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHICS/Resources/ethics_code_2013-Mar13-CRA.pdf.

305 IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s organizational effectiveness http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/matrix_eval.pdf


307 WBG Annual Report 2012 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf

308 Harding, “World Bank: Man on a mission,” Financial Times.


310 See Note xii.

311 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html

312 Interview with a former official, July 2014

313 IEG evaluation of trust funds (2011): http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/tf_eval.pdf


315 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=4&



318 MOPAN Annual Report 2012 on the World Bank http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012_1.pdf http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf.

319 World Bank Group Strategy, attached for the October 12, 2013 meeting of the Development Committee: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html.

320 World Bank. DIME: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,contentMDK:23422972~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3998212,00.html

321 Interview with a former official, July 2014

322 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdfhttp://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB132/B132_R14-en.pdf

323 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf

324 http://www.who.int/employment/staff_regulations_rules/EN_staff_regulations_and_staff_rules.pdf

325 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5

326 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5

327 http://www.who.int/dg/Report_card_cover_28_06.pdf

328 http://www.who.int/about/role/en/index.html, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/GPW_eng.pdf


329 http://www.who.int/about/agenda/en/index.html

330 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html

331 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html

332 Van Grasstek, C. 2013. The History and Future of the World Trade Organization, Part V. See: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_14_e.pdf.

333 “Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.

334 World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO legal texts”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.

335 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

336 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm

337 http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/509.doc

338 Interview with former WTO official, July 2014

339 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014

340 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.



343 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/gc_09sep13_e.htm

344 WTO Annual Report 2012: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf


346 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013




350 Interview with a former WTO official, July 2014


352 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dft_panel_e/future_of_trade_report_e.pdf



355 WTO Annual Report 2013: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_chap8_e.pdf




359 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf


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