global supply chain design considerations: mitigating product safety and security risks

Journal of Operations Management 29 (2011) 721736

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Journal of Operations Management

journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .co

Global supply chain design considerations: Mitigsecurity risks

Cheri Spe oua Information S 4882b Logistics, Mic ted Stc John H. McCo olleged Logistics, Uni

a r t i c l

Article history:Available onlin

Keywords:Supply chainRiskSafety

reasinf potdes

tegral crimtivesshipited.

security initiatives depends on top management mindfulness, operational complexity, product risk, andcoupling.

2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introdu

Over theincreasinglysuch disrupandsecurityet al., 2007;KleindorferA great deaof disruptiomay resultdents or naalso be intetions mayattack.

Variousexist. Many

CorresponE-mail add

Whipple), clos1 Tel.: +1 512 Tel.: +1 513 Tel.: +1 50

0272-6963/$ doi:10.1016/j.ction

last few years, academics and practitioners alike havefocused on supply chain disruptions and the impact oftions on supply chain design decisions, product safety, andnancial health (Blackhurst et al., 2005;CraigheadElkins et al., 2005; Hendricks and Singhal, 2003, 2005;and Saad, 2005; Rice and Caniato, 2003; Tang, 2006).l of this work has focused on addressing what typesns occur. For example, while supply chain disruptionsfrom a variety of unintentional causes such as acci-tural disasters (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005), there canntional supply chain disruptions. Intentional disrup-include theft, contamination/sabotage, or a terrorist

examples of unintentional supply chain disruptionsof these disruptions occur naturally including hur-

ding author. Tel.: +1 517 355 7448.resses: [email protected] (C. Speier), [email protected] ([email protected] (D.J. Closs), [email protected] (M.D. Voss).7 432 6407.7 353 6381; fax: +1 517 432 1112.1 450 3149; fax: +1 501 450 5302.

ricanes, tornados, oods, and may disrupt a supply chainstransportation infrastructure, supply routes, and/or manufactur-ing facilities. Unintentional disruptions can also be man-made. Anaccident (e.g., transportation-oriented, injury) could cause trans-portation delays or production stoppages or could negativelyimpact product quality (e.g., contamination). Unintentional con-tamination events occurwith some frequently in the food industry.The Center for Disease Control estimates that on an annual basis,unintentional contamination of food results in 76million illnesses,325,000 hospitalizations and 5000 deaths just in the United States(Mead et al., 1999).

Unfortunately, many disruptions have been the result of inten-tional acts which, like any type of disruption, can range in severity.Theft, for example, can signicantly increase a rms costs, butcan also shut down a source of supply as has occurred withincreased incidents of piracy on the open seas. There have alsobeen a number of events involving deliberate contamination ofproduct. In 1984, a religious cult intentionally contaminated saladbars in restaurants with a form of salmonella throughout theUnited States which resulted in 751 cases of illness; the initialattack was designed as a trial for a broader attack that wouldinvolve a strain of salmonella causing typhoid fever (World HealthOrganization, 2008). Increasingly, businessentities areanattractivetarget for intentional sabotage given that 80% of terrorist attacksagainst U.S. interests over the last thirty years targeted businesses

see front matter 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.jom.2011.06.003iera,, Judith M. Whippleb,1, David J. Clossc,2, M. Dystems, Michigan State University, N215 Eli Broad College of Business, East Lansing, MIhigan State University, N 325 Eli Broad College of Business, East Lansing, MI 48824, Uninnell Professor of Business Administration, Michigan State University, N 370 Eli Broad Cversity of Central Arkansas, 201 Donaghey Avenue, Conway, AR 72035, United States

e i n f o

e 28 June 2011

a b s t r a c t

Supply chain disruptions pose an inca framework to examine the threat opotential mitigation and supply chainThe framework was developed by inhigh reliability theory, and situationaidentify key safety and security initiapartner and service provider relationunder which each initiative is best sum/locate / jom

ating product safety and

glas Vossd,3

4, United Statesatesof Business, East Lansing, MI 48824, United States

gly signicant risk to supply chains. This research developsential disruptions on supply chain processes and focuses onign strategies that can be implemented to mitigate this risk.ting three theoretical perspectivesnormal accident theory,e prevention. The research uses a multi-method approach to(process management, information sharing, and supply chainmanagement) that can be implemented and the conditionsThe research results illustrate that the depth and breadth of

722 C. Speier et al. / Journal of Operations Management 29 (2011) 721736

(Dobie et al., 2000). The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Septem-ber 11, 2001 represent an intentional disruption with catastrophicimpact.

Supply chain disruptions, whether intentional or unintentional,have signioperationsSuch disrupvalue by aon averagedisruptionassociatednancial imbrand equiramicationity can resureverse supmay result2006). Evenative impacfully assessunder-inve(Hauser, 20edge that with less fotrophic inte

Since suintentionaland supplyers and reschain disruand hazardinterventiotative dataand in-deptsuch, this reof mitigatiomentedwitstrategies aenhance su

Followinsections. Thof disruptioare developanalysis aremethodologfollowedbytitative resuare provide

2. Literatu

This secresulting inon supply c

2.1. Examin

Supplywhere to1959; Hoovminimize tintegratedcurement, ttotal lande

acquisition, production, inventory, and logistics (Bowersox et al.,2006).

Supply chain design objectives have extended beyond cost. Theconcept of segmental customer service requirements has evolved

ggesiquealsoy ofut, ao meilityre reurthedimomewemaretionsuppventClossd as tsuscechaieenemeHarlZsidieme. Supperaces, aect thevennd, tse riabilichallarlysuppdivie mo-veer (tng, etchaitic inays, 9wateommortatpresnd aers

preseUniteondt cosupp1 bi(200naltForoff bandt. Sucant negative impact on both short and long-termand nancial performance (Kleindorfer et al., 2003).tions have been demonstrated to decrease shareholderlmost 11% (Hendricks and Singhal, 2003) and rms,, experience a 40% decline in stock price following a(Hendricks and Singhal, 2005). Negative consequenceswith supply chain disruptions extend beyond directpacts. Disruptions can also result in an erosion of

ty, loss of consumer condence, and may have legals. Additionally, disruptions that impact product qual-lt in product recalls which create the need for costlyply chain activities. Finally, supply chain disruptionsin the introduction of government regulations (Ravi,with growing evidence regarding the tremendous neg-t of supply chain disruptions,manyrmshave difcultying the potential for a supply chain disruption, and oftenst in sustainability capabilities to respond to disruptions03). Additionally, Chopra and Sodhi (2004) acknowl-rms often focus on reoccurring, but low impact riskscus on high-impact, but less probable risks (e.g., catas-ntional events).pply chains are vulnerable to both unintentional andactions, a better understanding of disruptionmitigationchain design strategies is critical for both practition-earchers. In particular, this research examines supplyptions in three high risk areas-food, pharmaceutical,ous materials and focuses specically on supply chainns that can improve product safety and security. Quali-was collected within all three high risk industry sectorsh empirical data was collected in the food industry. Assearch uses amulti-method approach to examine typesn and supply chain design strategies that can be imple-hin a supply chain and contingencies that impactwhichre selected. The research offers recommendations topply chain security.g this introduction, this research is organized into vee rst section develops a framework examining the rolens on supply chain design. Next, testable hypothesesed and results from exploratory and qualitative dataused to illustrate these hypotheses. A quantitative

ical approach is described for testing the hypothesesqualitative insights that offer explanation for the quan-lts. Finally, conclusions and future research directionsd.

re review

tion reviews and integrates three research themesa framework describing the inuence of disruptions

hains.

ing disruptions: impact on supply chain design

chain design decisions have historically focused onlocate facilities (e.g., plants, warehouses) (Greenhut,er, 1948; Losch, 1954). The primary objective was tohe total cost of transportation. With the advent oflogistics, integrated manufacturing, and strategic pro-he perspective broadened to focus on minimizing thed cost and included considerations such as material

and suthe unwhilelosophcost, bated tavailab

Moeven fabilityused sbut thestructsprevenand/orthese etions (deneor aresupplyhave bprocur2004;2004;manageventsity to oresourto prottionalrisks aof thesustain

Theparticuof the(e.g., inthat thtwentyto buyshippisupplydomeshighwigable9400 cTranspmercetrade, acontainand rein the

Beynicancost ofUS$ 15Shefvice pegoals.trade-recordproducts that rms need multiple supply chains to meetservice requirements of different customer segmentsoperating within required cost parameters. The phi-this era was not to simply minimize total deliveredlso to understand that design strategies could be cre-et delivery requirements in terms of both time and.cently, supply chain design objectives have extendedr to include supply chain security, risk, and sustain-ensions. The security and risk terminologies have beenhat interchangeably in supply chain research to date,

ergent literature is beginning to reveal that these con-conceptually different. Supply chain security entails theof contamination, damage, or destruction of productsly chain assets, and includes an acknowledgement thats may occur from intentional and unintentional disrup-andMcGarrell, 2004). Alternatively, supply chain risk ishe extent to which supply chain outcomes are variableptible to disruption, and, thus, may be detrimental to an (Zsidisin et al., 2005). A variety of supply chain risksidentied including supply disruptions, breakdowns,nt failures, and forecast inaccuracies (Chopra and Sodhi,and et al., 2003; Johnson, 2001; Spekman and Davis,sin, 2003), and, as previously stated, much of the risknt literaturehas focusedon lower-impact, unintentionalply chain sustainability refers to a supply chains abil-te without interruption due to constraints in facilities,nd capacity. Thus, security measures are put in placee supply chain against potential risks, including inten-ts. These security measures should defend against suchhus, may prevent (or minimize the negative impact)sks from occurring, thereby, increasing supply chainty.lenges associatedwith supply chain safety and security,resulting from intentional acts, are signicant. Muchly chain is unguarded and only the most visible partsdual facilities) are regularly protected. It is estimatedvement of a single container may involve as many asdifferent entities to transport the container from sellerhrough customs, inland transportation, internationalc.) (The Economist, 2002). Furthermore, the breadth ofn infrastructuremakes total protectiondifcult. TheU.S.frastructure includes roughly 47,000miles of interstate9,000miles of Class I railroad track, 26,000miles of nav-rways, 64,000 miles of oil pipeline, 5200 airports, andercial waterway facilities (United States Department ofion, 2005). Finally, the sheer magnitude of global com-ents a signicant hurdle. Ninety percent of internationallmost one-half of U.S. imports, are transported via cargo(United States Customs and Border Protection, 2004),nts almost nine million containers unloaded annuallyd States.the size and scope of the infrastructure, there are sig-sts associated with protecting the supply chain. Thely chain defense and security is anticipated to exceedllion annually (Russell and Saldanha, 2003). Further,1) posits that supply chains will incur cost and ser-ies because of conicts between security and businessexample, a rm within a supply chain may have toetween a higher priced supplier with a proven qualitya lower priced supplier that may offer a lesser qualitypply chains may be redesigned to apply more resilient

C. Speier et al. / Journal of Operations Management 29 (2011) 721736 723

transportation capabilities (e.g., use of air freight to reduce vari-ability associated with delivery lead-times, outsourcing to rmsin more stable countries of origin, or considering alternative portsof entry to avoid port congestion) to enable more sustainabledelivery. Adferent sourdisruptions

2.2. Normasecurity

Normalprovide a btions and tmitigate surobust reseaother acade2005). Whiframe supporganizatioto examinedescribed acussed to fr

Normal aanalysis ofgests that acconditions1984, 1999componenttime delivealso involvproduct/peonizations arwhile the ti(Perrow, 19coupling tyinto activitinegative im

An orgasupply chaand/or unfable, andwhbe immediinteractionsdifcult to eand may creassociated wtion (Perrowthe compleis used in scomplexitymarketplacto global (m

NAT cantions noalso, intentcoupling, wamong supfor greaterdiscussionplexity of tcertainly ex

In a simprocesses tzational relaccidents (R

has focused on specic organizations in accident-prone/hazardousindustries (dened as those that are tightly coupled and havingcomplex interactions) to identify specic organizational practicesthat increase reliability. Thus, HRT research has focused on organi-

in intic con havironaircest takes

endoablins tos (Wused

shipinitiammhemuentlturessalsongesirlintionsdustiatemak

to prT thy sys/tranter sonaln HRed ts arto u

or alse tostockile Ned dre d

te, 19ctionthato beshis coidentperse pectionno

he idtinu

itionriskpingntaryre d

ain ble (Shditionally, additional inventory may be carried at dif-ces within the supply chain to buffer against potential.

l accident and high reliability theory: implications for

accident theory (NAT) and high reliability theory (HRT)ackdrop from which to examine supply chain disrup-he factors, including supply chain design, which canch disruptions. Both NAT and HRT have developedrch streams across business, healthcare, sociology, andmic disciplines (Sagan, 1993; Weick, 2004; Wolf, 2001,le these theories have not been widely employed toly chain research, their focus on normal accidents andnal reliability provide a meaningful lens from whichsupply chain disruptions. NAT and HRT will be brieynd then the complementary aspects of each will be dis-ame the theoretical lens implemented in this research.ccident theory (NAT) was developed from an in-depththe Three Mile Island nuclear plant disaster and sug-cidents are inevitable, and therefore normal,when two

exist-tight coupling and complex interactions (Perrow,). Tight coupling occurs when supply chains haves (e.g., participating rms, processes, such as just-in-ries) that are highly interdependent. Tight couplinges very little, if any, process slack or buffering ofple/etc. Thus, when processes, components, and orga-e tightly coupled, the potential for an incident increasesme available for recovery from that incident diminishes94; Rijpma, 2003). Similarly, a supply chain with loosepically has excess slack, buffering, and time designedes, potentially facilitating faster recovery or possibly nopact should a disruption occur (Perrow, 1984).nization experiences complex interactions within itsin when underlying processes involve unanticipatedmiliar events, where such events are not clearly visi-en the impact of events on underlying processes cannotately nor fully comprehended (Perrow, 1994). Thesebetween normal processes and events may make itasily access information about products and processes,ate unintended consequences because of the difcultyith isolating activities to a single process or organiza-, 1994). While NAT (and HRT) discuss complexity as

xity of interactions, the label supply chain complexityubsequent sections of this paper. Thus, supply chainwill focus on the inherent complexity in a focal rmse as it sells goods and services from local (least complex)ore complex) marketplace.be expanded to the realm of supply chain disrup-

t only are unintentional accidents inevitable, butional events may prove inevitable (e.g., theft). Tighthich occurs via interdependence and synchronizationply chain members, potentially affords an opportunitydamage from an intentional event. Given the previousregarding the number of handoffs and the vast com-he global supply chain network, complex interactionsist within many supply chains as well.ilar way high reliability theory (HRT) focuses on thehat a rm can implement to ensure continued organi-iability and reduce or even eliminate the possibility ofoberts, 1990a,b). Much of the research in this stream

zationsdramanizatiorisk enplants,to suggwhatma tremnot discedurefailure(2009)leadersafetyship coa key tsubseqing a cuawaren

HRTby chaother arestricline inimmedand toeffortthe HRsecuritdesigncompuintentiFrom aenhancruptionappliedplans fresponbuffer

Whexaminliteratu(LaPorintersenismsplace ttion. Ton accgationpractichas trabeyondusing tthe con1997).

Addticulardeveloplemeliteratuply chpossibdustries that could experience a signicant failurewithnsequences, but had not in other words, the orga-s proven itself to be highly reliability despite its highment. Examples of such entities include nuclear powerraft carriers, and air trafc control. This is not meanthat these entities are not error or incident free. Rather,high reliability organizationsdifferent is that theyhaveus capacity to respond to such incidents in a way that isg, and, then, to learn from and restructure their pro-mitigate similar future incidents and avoid dramaticeick and Sutcliffe, 2001). For example, McFadden et al.HRT to examine patient safety in hospitals and found

commitment and a safety culture positively impactedtives and safety outcomes. The importance of leader-itment to and visibility around key security initiatives ise to acknowledge here and will be brought up again insections. We have labeled the role of leaders in creat-

e around security as one ofmindfulness-creating visibleabout the importance of securing the supply chain.has implications for intentional events as illustratedin the airline industry since September 11th and

e terrorist incidents. Policy changes regarding carry-onserve as an example of a joint attempt by the air-

ry and the federal government to put into place anresponse to reduce the potential of terrorist activitiese such a response a standard check-in process in anevent further attacks. Other examples that highlighteory include information technology and informationtems. As computer hackers become more savvy andsmitmore elaborate viruses or other disruptive actions,oftware programs must also respond by preventingactions that would compromise personal information.T perspective, the reliability of a supply chain can be

o better protect against disruptions whether such dis-e intentional or unintentional. As an example of HRTnintentional events, rms have developed contingencyternative production facilities and/or delivery routes innatural disasters and/or may hold more inventory as(e.g., during hurricane season).

AT and HRT have spawned broad research streams andifferent facets of accidents there is a growing body ofescribing the complementary nature of these theories94a,b; Rijpma, 1997). These researchers describe theof NAT and HRT as a focus on the protection mecha-rmsand (fromourperspective supply chains) canput int respond to organizational and (supply chain) disrup-mplementary view stems from both theories focusingpreventionNAT from a system design and risk miti-pective and HRT from an integration of organizationalrspective. As such, the intersection between theoriesfor supply chain disruption research by extending NATrmal accidents to include intentional incidents whileeas of HRT incorporating learning fromdisruptions intoous supply chain design improvement process (Rijpma,

ally, HRT posits that specic supply chains are at par-for disruption and, thus, have a greater impetus ina high degree of organizational reliability. This com-perspective is consistent with recent supply chain

escribing the need for both a secure and a resilient sup-ecause prevention of disruptions may not always beef and Rice, 2005). Table 1 compares elements of NAT


Table 1Normal accident and high reliability theory.

Normal accident theory High reliability theory

General premise Accidents are normal and will occur although steps can)

Accidents are preventable (Roberts, 1990a, 1990b).

Conceptual f and1997)

Identies organizational strategies to reduce potentialproblems and promote organizational reliability(Weick, 1987)

Nature of re hnts

Focus on organizational practices and culture thatpromote reliability (Roberts, 1990a, 1990b)

Perspectives ention Tight coupling can be mitigated using differentstrategies (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991):Time pressure redundancyInsufcient slack bargaining and negotiation,system exibility

Perspectives en waystood by

Complexity can be mitigated using different strategies(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001)

Technological complexity continuous training,responsibility and accountability, and decentralizeddecision makingInteraction complexity training and socialization;informal networks for solving problems; redundancy;empowerment of employees to intervene in situationInformation Source Complexityuse of directinformation sources

and HRT inchain reliab

2.3. Integraprocess with

Tomoreintegrates tinal justicea lens to moational crimfully underidentify cortional crimeand Felson,nomic or psvary are crimofmotivatelocations.

Situationgenerates aof the connerable victPreventionfor offendervation, vuln(Clarke, 199lic and privhave been s1995; Felsointentionalcore issue.cient motivprotection m

In the cointentionalof the threterrorist); athat can beity); and/or

arke, 1998). Thus, an intentional action can only occur whens a highlymotivated offender, a suitable target at an availablen, and/or an absent or insufcient guardian. Guardianshipes routine precautions that individuals and supply chainssafeguard employees, products, capital investments, and

ss pr, andc acttion.Disaove

elopOrgabe taken to minimize occurrence (Perrow, 1984raming Theory on the causation (complex interactions

coupling) of specic types of accidents (Rijpma,

search Primarily industry or specic incident focus witemphasis on restructuring high risks environme(Tenner, 1997)

on tight coupling Failures can escalate out of control before intervcan occur (Perrow, 1994; Rijpma, 2003).

on complex interactions Increased complexity among systems creates thpotential for an independent event to interact ithat can not be foreseen by designers or undersoperators (Perrow, 1994)

order to describe characteristics associatedwith supplyility.

ting crime prevention and the disaster managementNAT/HRT

fully shape the NAT/HRT perspective, this research alsohenotionof situational crimeprevention fromthe crim-literature. This is an important perspective as it providesre fully understand intentional acts of disruption. Situ-e prevention provides an important backdrop to morestand intentional threats and to help a supply chainresponding security and protection approaches. Situa-prevention builds upon routine activity theory (Cohen1979) which argues that themotivation for crime (eco-ychological benets) is largely invariant but what doesinal opportunities, generated through the intersection

d offenders and vulnerable targets accessible in specic

and Clthere ilocatioincludtake tobusinetargetsspecidisrup

Thecan beto devFig. 1.al crime prevention builds upon these principles andsimple, but powerful formula: crime is the productuence in space and time of motivated offenders, vul-ims or targets, and the absence of effective guardians.seeks to make criminal acts less attractive or feasibles bymanipulating some combination of offender moti-erability of targets, and presence of effective guardians5, 1997). Applied in the context of a number of pub-

ate settings, situational crime prevention interventionshown to consistently prevent crime (Eck andWeisburd,n and Clarke, 1997; Clarke, 1997). As such, whether anevent is inevitable (NAT) or preventable (HRT) is not theSituational crime prevention assumes that, given suf-ation, criminal attempts are inevitable without properechanisms in place.

ntext of situational crime prevention, prevention fromaction requires that attention be given to at least onee possible prevention levers: the likely offender (e.g.,suitable target (a specic object-product or containerattacked, transportation network, manufacturing facil-a physical location where the attack can occur (Felson

Recover

Fig. 1. Supocesses from intentional acts. As potential offenders,locations become salient, supply chains can implementions in an effort to mitigate or prevent an intentional

ster Management Process (Helferich and Cook, 2003)rlapped with the situation crime prevention theorya framework of supply chain security as shown in

nizations that are able to appropriately prevent, detect,

SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY FRAMEWORK: INTENTIONAL DISRUPTION PREVENTION

Planning Offender

noitacoLtegraT

Detection y

Response

ply chain security framework: intentional disruption prevention.


respond and recover from a security incident occurring anywherewithin the supply chain have created a resiliency (potentiallythrough supply chain design capabilities) to ensure sustainablesupply chains (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Shef, 2005). Thedisaster madetection, rsupply chairity incidensupply chaincident. Dincident. Wtainer sealwith a bioloof detectionto it doingincident ismobilizingpeople fromand bringinery involvechain starteparties.

Note thaFig. 1 to intional disrupotential nacies (e.g., wproduct is rport of entrafter which

2.4. Qualitaevaluate the

Given thsafety andThe rst stusing a grotioned theovalidity of ton the systory (StrausmarketingGiunipero e2009).

A groundesigned toeld (e.g., isome divergapproachesmentation odevelop themethodologtheory resenomenon isaddress a coof the phen

Once keresearch teaa broader aempirical mapproachesnomenon,wand securitygiven the re

2.5. Data collection

Setting: data were collected from large and small rms in thefood, pharmaceutical, and hazardous materials industries. These

ries aectaial foapplthodle soturet (Glews-h, liotheresea2009the dalysiollecrviewmberwithonduiers,ed apatinkingsupereer dularlall thtialld indmat

ng th, quaqueers (nt aneorier wittructraiseemb

er traere

o clameserenting:not, reved bh thewithnvolvey thhersew ste,muallyimilaeryconcnagement process consists of four stages (planning,esponse and recovery) and documents the actions an should undertake before, during, and after a secu-t (Helferich and Cook, 2003). Planning represents theins efforts to formulate actions in anticipation of anetection is the supply chains ability to recognize anhile some incidents are easy to detect (e.g., a con-broken), others are not (e.g., contamination of foodgical agent that goes undetected). The real challengeis to ascertain that an incident has occurred prior

any harm. The response stage begins as soon as thedetected and reects short-term responses includingequipment to respond to the emergency, removingdanger, providing for those affected by the incident,

g necessary services and systems back on-line. Recov-s the long-term efforts necessary to get the supplyd again and often places the most strain on involved

t the disaster management process, while applied intentional disruptions, can also be applied to uninten-ptions. In other words, supply chains could plan aroundtural disasters (e.g., hurricanes) by creating contingen-hen hurricanes of a certain magnitude are detected,e-routed through buyer/seller distribution centers, ory) as an appropriate response to the potential disasternormal recovery plans resume.

tive analysis to conceptualize hypotheses andoretical foundations

e focus of this paper was to extend the research onsecurity, a multi-methodological approach was taken.age of research was to employ an inductive methodunded theory approach to examine the aforemen-retical foundations in order to assess the potentialhe theoretical lens. Grounded theory approaches focusematic gathering and analysis of data to derive the-s and Corbin, 1998) and have been widely used inand supply chain research (Gebhardt et al., 2006;t al., 2006; Malshe and Sohi, 2009; Mellos and Flint,

ded theory approach to studying a phenomenon isbuild theory directly from data collected from the

nterviews, document analysis, etc.). While there areent views on how to best implement grounded theory(Glaser, 2001; Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the imple-f a strong data coding mechanism to help researchersir interpretations is an important component to theical process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The grounded

archmethodology is often appliedwhen a researchphe-in a relatively early stage of development and/or tomplex issue with signicant variation in making senseomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987).y themes emerged from the qualitative analysis, them developed a survey instrument to collect data fromrray of rms where this data could be assessed usingethods. While both the qualitative and quantitativeoffer strengths and weaknesses in examining a phe-e believe that using both approaches to examine safetyissues in supply chain design is particularly importantlative nascent research focused in this area.

induston exppotentvisible

Memultipto capcontexinterviresearcson toof theet al.,guidetive anwere cby inte

Mespeakwere c(supplidentiParticiest ranand/oragers wbe und(particacrosssequenthe fooardous

Usi(1994)endedreviewagemeHRT thfamiliasemi-sissuesteammmembnotes worder ting the25 diff

Codwe didinsteaddescribthrougciatedwere itied kresearcinterviview siindividwere swere vferentnd the associated supply chains were selected basedtions that there would be signicant differences in ther disruptions, the impact of such disruptions, and theication of disaster management processes.s: The grounded theory approach encourages the use ofurces of data interviews, observation, documents, etc.a breadth of issues and to understand these issues inaser, 2001). The research relied primarily on personalgiven the emerging nature of supply chain security

ttle empirical work has been conducted (in compari-r longer-standing supply chain phenomena) and muchrch in supply chain security has been descriptive (Voss). As such, the interviews were implemented to helpevelopment of measures and constructs for quantita-s. In addition, organizational documents and websitested and examined to triangulate commentary providedrespondents.

s of the research team typically scheduled a site visit tomultiple rm respondentsalthough some interviewscted via telephone. In addition, supply chain partnerscustomers, and supply chain service providers) werend datawas gathered froma sampling of these partners.g rms were asked to provide access to their high-executive/manager responsible for security, quality,

ply chain management. In some rms, multiple man-interviewed as each of these functional areas mightifferent managers responsibility, while in other rmsy smaller rms), one individual might have oversightree functional areas. Finally, interviewswere conductedy by industry. Interviews were initiated with those inustry, followed by the pharmaceutical, and nally, haz-erials industries.e techniques prescribed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yinlitativedatawas collected.A interviewguidewithopen-stions was developed and pre-tested with academicby drawing from the literature in supply chain man-d criminal justice disciplines as well as the NAT ands) and with industry practitioners from each industryh supply chain security issues. The interview guidewasured, but allowed for the researchers to explore newd during the interview process. Two or more researchers participated in every interview. Each research teamnscribed notes taken during the interviews and thesediscussed after the interviews by the research team inrify any issues or questions aswell as to identify emerg-. Interviews were conducted with 75 managers acrossrms.In order to reduce the potential for categorization bias,develop a priori supply chain design dimensions butiewed and coded the supply chain security initiativesy respondents. Multiple research teammembers culledinterviewnote transcripts looking for key themes asso-the research framework. Four research team membersed in the coding process and each team member iden-emes that were discussed at each interview site. Twoindependently identied themes associated with eachite. Once themes had been developed for each inter-embers of the research team examined the themes rstand then as a group to determine which theme labelsr and focusing on a similar concept and which labelsdifferent from one another and focusing on very dif-epts. Based on the independent and team process, four


key themes emerged across industries from the qualitative analy-sis relating to supply chain disruption mitigation and design andthese four themes serve as the focus on this research: supply chainsecurity process management, security information sharing, sup-ply chain pprovider se

The resustructs to 1These preseactivities ubelow.

2.5.1. SuppSupply c

towhich sedetect, prevmay occur aservices, ordiscussionsto create insecurity asexample, ofrom a largedivisions) icarriers andregarding p

Participafunctional pproduct anrisks. Procedents to tethe participthat they anlate recallsincidents intiveness of

2.5.2. SuppSupply c

to which sutimely fashsystems protrends in prcauses of thchain netwpartners toin critical sAs indicatemeans to ctainty in exwith the Ninterdependgreater sharan early wa

Informamation thatservice proproblems odiscussed tused in thecontact listpersonnel,and carrieravailable.

2.5.3. Supply chain partner security managementSupply chain partner security management characterizes the

procedures to monitor and assess the degree to which the supplychain partner is making appropriate investments to mitigate secu-

k. Shessarand fiqueet aSuppity smigtionpplieandrvieers dnshipely ha seca sigre gf cosoured rshipardinsupprts iningrodurticpecteith kms sn me

Suppally,s thechaffortsf secuecurers stendg aalsoers (erehoroduendeuledwas

othe

en thhis ry faced. Totenay im2) Suach fartner security management, and supply chain servicecurity management.lts of this coding were validated by presenting the con-0 executives responsible for security at eight rms.ntations resulted in a more precise sculpting of thenderlying each concept. Each construct is discussed

ly chain security process managementhain security process management assesses the degreecurity provisions have been integrated into processes toent, respond, and recover from a security incident thatnywhere within the supply chain (e.g. ow of product,information). This construct emerged from interviewhighlighting various strategies that rms had adoptedtegrated supply chain processes in an effort to improvewell as to better respond should an incident occur. Forne food industry rm discussed the decision to move, decentralized transportation process (across multiplento a centralized transportation network to ensure allservice providers adhered to the rms expectations

rotection.ting rms often discussed the development of crossrocess maps or owcharts to understand supply chaind information ows and to identify potential securityss management also included the use of simulated inci-st the integrity of procedures and processes. Many ofating rmsdiscussedmonthly or quarterlymock eventsd their supply chain partners participated in to simu-

, contaminations, and information hackers. Simulatedcluded table-top exercises designed to test the effec-a supply chains security capabilities.

ly chain security information sharinghain security information sharing focuses on the degreepply chain partners share accurate information in aion to address security-related incidents. Informationvide a rst defensemechanismbywhich to understandoduct contamination, missing shipments, and the rooteseoccurrences. Theowof informationacross a supplyork provides increased visibility between supply chainhelp discover and recover from incidents and can resultupply chain design initiatives (Blackhurst et al., 2005).d by Zhou and Benton (2007) information sharing is aapture supply chain dynamics and thus reduce uncer-ternal and internal environments (p. 1363). ConsistentAT and HRT frameworks, tight coupling and complexencies between supply chain partners should result ining of information betweenpartners, in part, to providerning about possible exceptions and problems.tion systems also play a critical role in gathering infor-can be subsequently sharedwith suppliers, customers,viders, and government agencies to identify potentialr to create recovery actions. One of the participantshe development of a corporate level contact list to beevent of contamination or other major disruption. Thisincludes executives, division chiefs, corporate affairsand suppliers. The list also includes backup supplierss that may be called upon if primary partners are not

rity risis neccatedas a un(Dobie2001).a securbilitiesdisruptive suchain h

Inteproducrelatiorms ranteeaboutto ensubility onot toincreasduringers regwhereingeffoas traitheir psive cethe extion won a rruptio

2.5.4.Fin

assessesupplytheir eness ocargo sprovidmay inor usintationsprovidandwavious pto be tuct hacarrier

3. Hyp

Givguide tsize kepropossent pthat mRisk; (ness. Eef (2001) posits collaboration with external partnersy to ensure that security procedures are communi-ollowed. Collaboration between rms has been cited, critical factor in any comprehensive security programl., 2000; Rinehart et al., 2004; Varkonyl, 2004; Wolfe,ly chain partners capabilities need to be veried fromtandpoint as partners who lack sufcient security capa-ht be replaced. In addition, as the overall level of supplyrisk increases, buyers are more likely to select alterna-rs better able to protect product throughout the supply-offs (Ellis et al., 2010).w respondents from multiple food and pharmaceuticaliscussed the increased importance of having a trustingwith suppliers. Key respondents indicated that their

eavily on their suppliers protection initiatives to guar-ure product supply. In addition, multiple rms talkednicant reduction or even elimination of spot buyingreater control over product quality and reduced possi-ntamination. Further, one rm discussed the decisionce any product internationally due to the perceivedisk of contamination or loss of control over the productment. Finally, some rms spent time training suppli-g the potential for product contamination, particularlyliersmight include small family-run farms. These train-ncludedbotheducation regarding security issues aswellin how suppliers could best protect themselves andcts. Additionally, participants discussed more exten-ation and audit programs for suppliers to ensure thatd codes of behavior were followed. External integra-ey suppliers and customers had the greatest inuenceupply chain agility which represents one potential dis-chanism (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009).

ly chain service provider security managementsupply chain service provider security managementsame procedures for service providers as discussed for

in partners. Multiple respondent companies discussedwith transportation carriers to increase driver aware-rity threats (e.g., risks when stopping at a truck stop,ity, etc.). Similarly, multiple rms require that servicecreen drivers to decrease the risk of hiring a driver whoto do harm through product contamination, hijacking,vehicle or cargo for malicious purposes. These expec-extend to other transportation modes and full-service.g., third party providers that offer both transportationusing). In one example, truck drivers had to report pre-ct transported before the rm would release productred by the carrier in this case, if the previous prod-could potentially contaminate the rms products, thenot authorized to take the load.

sis development

e integration of three theoretical foundations used toesearch, the hypotheses developed attempt to synthe-tors of importance across the theoretical perspectiveshe researchers identied four key factors that repre-tial considerations from each theoretical perspectivepact a rms security efforts, including: (1) Product

pply Chain Complexity; (3) Coupling; and (4) Mindful-actor isdescribedbelowand is related to the four themes


or elements identied in the qualitative results as key disruptionmitigation and design strategies.

3.1. Product risk

Certain types of products are likely to be perceived as risky either dand/or theSpecicallyrisk includemeat andmore suscea numberfood/dairy/agriculturedistributedto potentialbution of livbroad-basemore lethaland animalharmful towilling offe(Moncke, 2

Further,target of inproduct ha(World Heativeness ofbe applied t1997). Suchcess managrecover frotry are like(HACCP), asharing regwould be immation shainclude suphypothesize

H1. Firmsthan those

a. supply chb. supply chc. supply chd. supply ch

3.2. Supply

Firms man increasemore likelyply chain coare more liagement, foand recovesome of theincreasing tvisibility. Fiity are morservice part

4 Foradditio

supply chaincomplexitywill strive to reducecomplexitybyholdingpartners more accountable for their security efforts. As part of theinterviews, many rms discussed having more detailed audit pro-cedures for suppliers and service providers in an effort to increasestandardiza

H2. Firmstha

ply cply cply cply c

s thy nepplyle, inive toigh prossfprodore, w

croshat hduct


uplin

s thexpee invwarrcou

ocessr froightesuppkingcoupeir sy. Asst linrivey hoir sec

irmstha


indfu

ile mtitorre agtheue to the nature of the product or supply chainpotential for unintentional or intentional disruptions., food products that have been identied as highperishable (i.e., not processed) agriculture products,

dairy (Casagrande, 2000; RAND, 2003) as they areptible to damage/spoilage (Moncke, 2004). There areof reasons that perishable products, in general, andagriculturepose such signicant risk. First, livestockandproduction typically occurs across highly unsecuredgeographies and as such, provide an accessible targetoffenders. Second, the holding, processing, and distri-estock is highly concentrated facilitating very fast andd spread of any contaminant. Third, there are far manyand contagious biological agents that can attack plantss than humans. These biological agents are often nothumans and accessible, making it relatively easy for ander to obtain and apply against an accessible target004).the food industry is believed to be a particularly salienttentional sabotage because ingestion of contaminateds the potential to cause widespread injury or deathlth Organization, 2008). In order to reduce the attrac-a target, highly specic preventative measures need tooeliminateor reduce thedamage that canoccur (Clarke,preventative measures could include enhanced pro-

ement (e.g., processes to prevent, detect, response andm an incident). For example, rms in the food indus-ly to use of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Pointfood safety process adopted by the USDA.4 Informationarding potential threat levels or suspicious incidentsportant for rms in a more risky position. This infor-

ring should extend beyond the four walls of the rm toply chain partners and service providers. Therefore, we:

that have higher risk products have increasedrms with less risky products.

ain security process managementain security information sharingain partner security managementain service provider management

chain complexity

anaging more complex supply chain interactions haved risk of experiencing a supply chain disruption and aretomake investments tomanageor even reduce the sup-mplexity where warranted (Perrow, 1984). Such rmskely to invest into supply chain security process man-r example, in order to better prevent, detect, respond,r from any incidents. Further, such rms can managesupply chain complexity in supply chain hand-offs byhe information sharing to increase overall supply chainrms that have greater levels of supply chain complex-e likely to aggressively manage their supply chain andner initiatives regarding security. Firmswith signicant

nal informationonHACCP, seehttp://www.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/haccp.html.

a. supb. supc. supd. sup

Firmsecuritthe suexampattract(e.g., hucts aclevel oTheref

H3. Arms tthe pro


3.3. Co

Firmrisk ofto makwherelooselyrity prrecoveof the toverallto tractighterage thsecuritweakewill stpling bfor the

H4. F


3.4. M

Whcompeare mowithintion of operations. Therefore, we hypothesize:

with greater supply chain complexity have increasedn those rms with less supply chain complexity.

hain security process managementhain security information sharinghain partner security managementhain service provider management

at face high levels of risk need to be cognizant of greatereds for the supply chain. This greater risk compoundschain complexity factors for supply chain design. Forthe chemical industry, certain products may be moreterrorists due to their explosive or hazardous qualitiesroduct risk). Given the vast movement of such prod-potentially accessible areas (e.g., open rail yards), theuct risk is compoundedby the supply chaincomplexity.e hypothesize:

s rms with greater supply chain complexity, thoseave risky products have increased to reducerisk level.


g

at have tighter coupling relationships have an increasedriencing a supply chain disruption and are more likelyestments to manage or even loosen the relationshipsanted. Such rms are more likely than those withmorepled relationships to invest into supply chain secu-management to better prevent, detect, respond, and

m any incidents. Further, such rms can manage somer coupling by increased information sharing to enhancely chain visibility. This is particularly true with respecttechnologies, such as RFID and GPS. Firms that haveling relationships are more likely to aggressively man-

upply chain and service partner initiatives regardingthe security of any supply chain is only as strong as thek (Shef, 2001), rms with tight coupling relationshipsto manage the potential negative impact of tight cou-lding partners and service providers more accountableurity efforts. Therefore, we hypothesize:

with more tightly coupled partnerships have increasedn those with more loosely coupled partnerships.


lness

any rms are compelled by government, industry orstandards to make investments in security, other rmsgressive about building a more visible security culturerm. Creating more visible awareness is an attribute of


high reliability organizations and has been referred to as mindful-ness (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Highlymindful organizations areable to identify changing circumstances and when such circum-stances necessitate an organizational response to more stronglyposition theway inwhicanda safetyoutcomes inwill positivsupply chai

Executivture is hypoeffective seage frank dfor the saferms branment and dexample froa chief secsecurity comtiatives. Intparticipatinsecurity thrplaces secufront-line e(Shef and

Organizaassess directhe rm sigsecurity ofa strategicand higherthat look bechain disrupbrand/repurity culturemore likelyple, may daResearchGrtomake suprity effortsmore visibl

H5. Moreare less min

a. supply chb. supply chc. supply chd. supply ch

4. Researc

A quantment of thquantitativsecurity actsible disrupfour themation sharinmanagemecomplexityin an iterachain and cfood industModicatio

round until researchers determined that questions were clear andachieved the original survey goal.

The quantitative survey data was collected from a targetedindustry the food industry whereby the sample included food

acturanagive vnvitifromisorsrmspondenceere

tion ondeithertota17%

r unr9) wsesste renceseralgentersoxamypotarimvalided fagsweh itemendcico dpply

sk wrisk:poulss p, 200plyl vamarksugs ast agarfeitograas acatthroplingg onr. Fime dexhibaseupplitht-in-arkpply-timrm (in general) to avoid disruption. Similarly to thehMcFaddenet al. (2009) found leadership commitmentculture positively impacted safety initiatives and safetyhospitals, this research hypothesizes thatmindfulness

ely impact the development of a secure and resilientn.e commitment to security and fostering a security cul-thesized as a necessary condition for implementing ancurity environment. Topmanagement needs to encour-iscussions regarding the importance of security, bothty of stakeholders and to maintain the value of thed. Top management must be visible in their commit-edication to implementing security initiatives. As anm the exploratory interviews, some rms have createdurity ofcer position or a cross-functional corporatemittee to provide additional structure for security ini-

erestingly, annual security audit reports, used by someg rms, also include a focus on information technologyeats, executives foster a culture among personnel thatrity among their top priorities. A culture that empowersmployees to demonstrate a security mindset is also keyRice, 2005).tional mindfulness focusing on security is difcult totly, but can be observed based on the manner in whichnals the importance of security (e.g., having a chiefcer). Firms that consider supply chain security to bepriority perceive greater levels of security initiativessecurity performance (Voss et al., 2009). Similarly, rmsyond the threat of terrorism as a potential for a supplytion and think about the potential impact on the rms

tation are more likely to create a more mindful secu-(EyeforTransport, 2004). Specically, mindful rms areto recognize that product contamination, for exam-mage customer perceptions of their brand (Aberdeenoup, 2004). As such,moremindful rms aremore likelyply chain design investments in order to enhance secu-than rms that have not made supply chain security ae aspect of their business. Therefore, we hypothesize:

mindful rms have increased than those thatdful.

ain security process managementain security information sharingain partner security managementain service provider management

h method

itative methodology was developed as the second ele-e multi-method approach taken in this research. Ae survey was designed to more fully investigate theions taken by rm and the resulting response to pos-tion threats. The survey instrument measured the

tic construct areas (e.g., process management, informa-g, partner security management, and service providernt) as well as assessed the level of risk, supply chain, coupling and mindfulness. The survey was pre-testedtive fashion by administering it to qualied supplyriminal justice academicians as well as a number ofry managers and others familiar with security efforts.ns were made to the survey following each pretest

manufrity mexecutletter irangedsupervtheir the resexperidents wthe opIf respowere elope. Arate ofdata o(n=19was asand ladiffere

Sevconverby Andwere epriorihwith vfactorexpectloadinfor eacrecom

Speused trisk, suuct ri(highmeats/ered le(RAND

Supegoricarms(2001)cultieproteccountewithgeimpactdiversieffects

Coufocusinsupplie in-tiwouldsupplywith srms wing jusstock mless sujust-iners drawn from mailing lists of supply chain and secu-ers (and higher) working at food manufacturers. Anice president at a very visible food rm wrote a coverng respondents to participate in the study. Respondents

presidents, vice-presidents, directors, managers andwith 58% of the respondents indicating that they werepresident/vice-president or director. Seventy percent ofents indicated that they had 15 years or more of workin the food industry. A total of 1373 potential respon-asked to complete the survey. Respondents were givenf completing the survey on-line or in hard copy format.nts elected to complete the hard copy format, responsesfaxed ormailed back to researchers in a pre-paid enve-l of 239 surveys were returned for an overall response; 40 surveys were deemed unusable due to missingealistic responses rendering a nal sample size of 199ith a usable response rate of 14%. Non-response biased by comparing demographic characteristics of earlyspondents; 2 difference tests indicated no signicantbetween the groups (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).steps were utilized to purify construct measures, assessvalidity, and assess discriminate validity as prescribedn and Gerbing (1988). First, item to total correlationsined. Items with low correlations as they relate to the ahesized scaleswere deleted. Exploratory factor analysisax rotationwas used to assess internal and discriminantity. As noted in Table 2, each item loaded highly on thector (all loadings greater than .6) and all cross-factorre less than .3. Second, Cronbachs alphawas examinedm within a construct and the reliabilities exceeded theed 0.70 cut-off (Nunnally, 1978).supply chain-level and product-level information wereevelop the four independent variables of: productchain complexity, coupling, and mindfulness. Prod-

as measured using the following binary scheme:products that could be easily contaminated (e.g.,

try/sh/produce); low risk: products that were consid-erishable and more shelf stable (e.g., canned goods)3)chain complexity was measured using a 4-level cat-riable describing the supply chain complexity of theetplace-local, regional, national, or global. As Shef

gests, global relationships present added security dif-focal rms are less able to monitor their partners andinst theft, contamination, or insertion of unauthorizedcargo. Hendricks et al. (2009) illustrated that rmsphicaldiversicationhadgreaternegative stockmarketresult of a disruption than rms with less geographicalion as greater diversication leads to more deleteriousughout the supply chain.was measured using a 4-level categorical variablethe need for synchronization between a buyer and

rms managing the synchronization associated with justeliveries when participating in a global supply chainbit very strong coupling while rms managing a localwould require less buyer/supplier coupling. Consistent

y chain complexity, prior research demonstrates thatmore supply chain slack (e.g., rms with less demand-time/global sourcing requirements) had less negativeet impact when a disruption occurred while rms withchain slack (e.g., rms with more demanding global

e sourcing requirements) had greater negative stock


Table 2Dependent variable factor analysis and reliabilities.

Construct items Factor loading

Supply chain security process management .918Our rm has processes in place to prevent a contamination/security event in oursupply chain

.849

Our rm has processes in place to detect a contamination/security event in oursupply chain

.830

Our rm has processes in place to respond to a contamination/security event in oursupply chain

.875

Our rm has processes in place to recover from a contamination/security event inour supply chain

.775

Supply chain security information sharing .846Our rms information systems could provide the following information within 24hfor each food item transported within the past year:

.760

The name of the immediate previous source and immediate subsequent recipientThe origin and destination pointsThe datThe nuDescripRoute a

Our rmsinformatioOur rmsinformatioOur supplrespond to

Supply chainOur rm hwith suppOur rm uwith suppOur rm uwith custoOur rm a

Supply chainOur rm vemployeeOur rm cOur rm v

market im2009). As sto which aa more distglobal.

Finally,served as arity as a strasupply chaiutation; (2)security; ansecurity asthe willingnsafety-orienpoint Likertresults) andcategorize t

Table 3Dependent va

Process manInformationSC partner sSC service pr

** p-value < .0e the shipment was received and releasedmber of packages in the shipmenttion of freightnd transfer points through which the shipment movedinformation systems provide our supply chain partners with timelyn they need to respond to contamination/security incidentsinformation systems provide our supply chain partners with validn they need to respond to contamination/security incidentsy chain partners can provide us the actionable information we need tocontamination/security incidentspartner security managementas dened consequences for supply chain partners who fail to complyly chain security proceduresses security audits to determine if relationships should be maintainedliersses security audits to determine if relationships should be maintainedmersudits the security procedures of contract manufacturers

service provider security managementeries that service providers perform security background checks on theirsollaborates with service providers to improve their security programs

eries that service providers monitor transportation assets

pact when a disruption occurred (Hendricks et al.,uch, we measured the coupling based on the degreerm needed to manage just-in-time deliveries acrossributed supply base breadth: local, regional, national or

mindfulness was measured using three items thatn indicator of the rms interest in positioning secu-tegic priority: (1) Our rms senior management viewsn security as necessary for protecting our brand or rep-Our rmhas a seniormanagement position focusing ond (3) Our rms seniormanagement views supply chaina competitive advantage. These three items representess (or lack thereof) of a rm to create a security andted culture. All three items were measured using a 5-scale. The items were averaged (per the factor analysisthen the average scores were divided into quartiles tohe variable.

5. Results

The survappropriatecorrelated dgle, overallsignicant rthat the decorrelated wpresented i

Table 4that all of185) =4.26,p< .003); ming signicathere wereuct risk s

riable correlation matrix.

Process management Information sharing

agement 1 .397**

sharing 1ecurity managementovider management

1..778

.781

.777

.890.775

.891

.843

.798

.792.770

.697.604

ey data was analyzed using MANOVA. MANOVA is antest to implement when the data consists of multipleependent variables and yet it is desirable to run a sin-statistical test to minimize the potential for overstatingelationships. A correlation analysis (Table 3) conrmedpendent variables in the sample were all signicantlyith one another and as such, the MANOVA results are

n Tables 47 and Figs. 24.provides the overall MANOVA results demonstratingthe main effects are signicant (product risk: (F (4,p< .003); supply chain complexity: (F (12, 185) =2.52,indfulness: (F (12, 185) =2.81, p< .001)) or approach-nce (coupling: (F (12, 185) =1.66, p< .065)). In addition,three 2 way interactions that were signicant: (prod-upply chain complexity: (F (36, 185) =2.09, p< .017));

SC partner securitymanagement

SC service providermanagement

.214** .569**

.448** .439**

1 .404**

1


Table 4Hypothesis testing M ANOVA results (reporting of complete model).

Independent variable df F p value

Intercept (4, 185) 1143.32 .000Product risk (H1) (4, 185) 4.26 .003SC complexity (H2) (12, 185) 2.52 .003Product risk complexity (H3) (36,185) 2.09 .017Coupling (H4) (12, 185) 1.66 .065Mindfulness (H5) (12, 185) 2.81 .001Product risk coupling (36, 185) 2.87 .001Product riskmindfulness (36, 185) 1.41 .158SC complexity coupling (36, 185) .783 .800SC complexitymindfulness (36, 185) 1.35 .086Couplingmindfulness (36, 185) 1.60 .016

MANOVA generates four related yet unique tests to determine the signicance of the F-statistic (Pillais Trace, Wilks Lambda, Hotellings Trace, and Roys Largest Root).Pillais Trace is the most conservative of the four tests and as such, we report the signicance of the F-test based on Pillais Trace to minimize Type I error. All three-way andfour-way interactions were tested as part of a holistic model and were all insignicant.

product risk coupling: (F (36, 185) =2.87, p< .001); and cou-plingmindfulness: (F (36, 185) =1.60, p< .016). None of the 3 or4 way interactions were signicant.

Hypothesis 1 suggests that rms with high risk products aremore likely to invest in supply chain design investments. TheMANOVA results indicate that higher risk rms investmore heavilyin process management (F (1, 185) =13.81, p< .001) and informa-tion sharing (F (1, 185) =5.06, p< .026) than those rms with lessrisky products (process management means: 4.22 as compared to3.45; information sharing means: 4.39 as compared to 3.80). Sup-ply chainpartner securitymanagement is not signicantlydifferentacross high and low risk products (F (1, 185) = .008, p< .929) nor isservice providermanagement (F (1, 185) = .759, p< .385). Therefore,Hypotheses H1a and H1b are supported and H1c and H1d are notsupported.

Hypothesis 2 suggests that rms having greater supply chainsupply chain complexity are more likely to invest in supply chain

design investments than rms facing less supply chain complexity.The MANOVA results indicate that high supply chain complexityrms investmore heavily in processmanagement (F (3, 185) =2.92,p< .037), information sharing (F (3, 185) =4.00, p< .009), supplychain partner security management (F (3, 185) =2.81, p< .042),and service provider management (F (3, 185) =2.82, p< .042) thanrms having less supply chain complexity. As noted in Table 6:process management: high supply chain complexity rms havesignicantly greater process management activities (4.24) thanmoderate or low supply chain complexity rms (means: 3.77, 3.53,3.41); information sharing: high supply chain complexity rmshavesignicantly greater information sharing activities (4.40) thanmoderate or low supply chain complexity rms (means: 4.15, 3.93,3.41); and low supply chain complexity rms have less informa-tion sharing activities than moderate rms; supply chain securitypartner management: high supply chain complexity rms havesignicantly greater supply chain security partner management

Table 5Between subje

Independen

Product risk(1,185)

gemengemen

Supply chain(3,185)

gemengemen

Product risk(3,185)

gemengemen

Coupling (H(3,185)

gemengemen

Mindfulness(3,185)

Product risk(3,185)

Couplingm(9,185)

* p< .05.** p< .01.cts effects for signicant main and 2 way interaction effects.

t variable df Process management

(H1) Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security manaSC service provider mana

complexity (H2) Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security manaSC service provider mana

supply chain complexity (H3) Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security manaSC service provider mana

4) Process ManagementInformation sharingSC partner security manaSC service provider mana(H5) Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security managemenSC service provider managemen

coupling Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security managemenSC service provider managemen

indfulness Process managementInformation sharingSC partner security managemenSC service provider managemenF p value

13.81 .000**

5.06 .026*

t .008 .929t .759 .385

2.92 .037*

4.00 .009**

t 2.81 .042*

t 2.82 .042*

7.28 .032*

2.46 .031*

t .122 .947t 2.66 .050*

1.37 .2551.05 .372

t 2.74 .046*

t 3.07 .030*5.06 .002**

3.08 .030*

t 5.10 .003**

t 4.78 .003**

7.28 .000**

2.46 .065t 1.57 .200t 2.55 .059

2.60 .009**

.26 .985t 1.71 .092t 1.86 .064


Table 6MANOVA results for main effects means and standard deviations.

Independent variable Condition Process managementmean (s.d.)

Information sharingmean (s.d.)

Supply chain partnersecurity mean (s.d.)

Service providermanagement mean(s.d.)

Product risk (H1) Low 3.45 (.08) (2) 3.80 (.10) (2) 2.28 (.10) 2.71 (.10)High 4.22 (.11) 4.39 (.13) 2.39 (.13) 2.93 (.13)

Supply chain complexity (H2) 1 3.41 (.20) (4) 3.41 (.23) (2,3,4) 2.36 (.23) (3,4) 2.19 (.24) (4)2 3.53 (.14) (4) 3.93 (.17) (4) 2.31 (.27) (4) 2.98 (.17) (4)3 3.77 (.12) (4) 4.15 (.14) (4) 2.00 (.14) (4) 2.62 (.14) (4)4 4.24 (.11) 4.40 (.13) 2.70 (.13) 3.13 (.14)

Coupling (H4) 1 3.72 (.17) 4.11 (.20) 2.42 (.20) (2) 2.86 (.21) (2)2 3.48 (.16) 4.02 (.18) 1.76 (.19) (3,4) 2.16 (.19) (3,4)3 3.92 (.12) 3.93 (.13) 2.27 (.14) (4) 2.85 (.14) (4)4 3.89 (.12) 4.19 (.14) 2.77 (.14) 3.15 (.14)

Mindfulness (H5) 1 3.36 (.13) (2,3,4) 3.64 (.16) (2,3,4) 1.58 (.16) (2,3.4) 1.92 (.16) (2,3,4)2 3.72 (.13) (4) 4.14 (.15) (4) 2.32 (.15) (4) 2.77 (.15) (4)3 3.76 (.13) (4) 4.07 (.15) (4) 2.66 (.15) (4) 3.03 (.16) (4)4 4.4 (.16) 4.44 (.18) 2.89 (.19) 3.67 (.19)

Table 7MANOVA results for supply chain complexity risk interaction.

Independent variable Condition Low risk m

Complexity(H3b) .26)

.18)

.13)

.15)

.30)

activities (2rms (meanhigh supplyvice providsupply chaiHypotheses

Proc

ess M

anag

emen

t

Fig. 2. Compleagement.risk level Process management1 2.45 (2 3.17 (3 3.45 (4 4.17 (Information sharing1 2.52 (

2 3.69 (.21)3 3.87 (.15)4 4.37 (.17)Supply chain partner security1 2.26 (.30)2 2.06 (.21)3 2.12 (.16)4 2.73 (.17)Service provider management1 2.08 (.31)2 3.04 (.22)3 2.40 (.16)4 2.94 (.17)

.70) than moderate or low supply chain complexitys: 2.00, 2.31, 2.36); and service provider management:chain complexity rms have signicantly greater ser-

er management activities (3.13) than moderate or lown complexity rms (means: 2.62, 2.98, 2.19). Therefore,H2a, H2b, H2c, and H2d are supported.

Complexity (low to high)

High risk Low Risk

xity by risk level interaction for process management process man-

Hypotheuct risk andwith both hity are morthan rmscomplexitythat the in

Info

rmat

ion

Shar

ing

Fig. 3. Comean (s.d.) High risk mean (s.d.)

0.290.240.214.32(.18)

0.34

0.28-0.254.44 (.21)

2.43 (.34)2.73 (.28)1.84 (.25)2.66 (.21)

2.27 (.35)2.87 (.29)2.93 (.25)3.34 (.22)

sis 3 predicts an interaction effect between the prod-supply chain supply chain complexity such that rmsigh risk products and greater supply chain complex-e likely to invest in supply chain design investmentswith less risky products and/or less supply chainin their supply chain. The MANOVA results indicate

teraction is signicant for process management (F (3,

Complexity (low to high)

High risk Low Risk

plexity by product risk level interaction for information sharing.


High risk Low Risk

Serv

ice

Prov

ider

Man

agem

ent

Fig. 4. Complment.

185) =7.28,and servicefor supplyp< .947). Fowith higheand informcomplexityin process mlevels of supand H3d armeans are r

Hypotheto invest incoupling. Thcance (F (9,tightly couner securityprovider mwith loose cp< .372) nop< .255). Asagement: msupply chaimoremodenicantly dprovidermagreater supthanmoremsignicantlthe overalland two ofnone of the

Hypotheto invest iare less miful rms inactivities:(2) Informchain partn(4) Servicenoted in Thave signithan moderand low magement acmindfulnesactivities (4

rms (means: 4.07, 4.14, 3.64); and lowmindfulness rmshave lessinformation sharing activities than moderate rms; supply chainsecurity partner management: high mindfulness rms have signi-

greater supply chain security partnermanagement activitiesthan.32, 1y paprovgreaate oand lnt a5b, H

cussi

resnt aacturto inchaicompain dg, suer men thincremeSuppin suves.tedanager major

dfulnder rfactin cohaveupplyy. Ae higcessowevrs ored thpro

rviceget thComplexity (low to high)

exity by product risk level interaction for service provider manage-

p< .032), information sharing (F (3, 185) =2.46, p< .031)providermanagement (F (3, 185) = .2.66, p< .05) but notchain partner security management (F (3, 185) = .122,r process management and information sharing, rmsr risk products invest in greater process managementation sharing activities for all levels of supply chain. However, rms with lower risk products only investanagement and information sharing activities at highply chain complexity. Therefore, Hypotheses H3a, H3b,

e supported and H3c is not supported. The interactionseported in Table 7 and are illustrated in Figs. 24.sis 4 suggests that tightly coupled rms aremore likelysupply chain design investments than rms with loosee overall MANOVA test result was approaching signi-185) =1.66, p< .065) and the results indicate that morepled rms invest more heavily in supply chain part-management (F (3, 185) =2.74, p< .046) and service

anagement (F (3, 185) =3.07, p< .030) than those rmsoupling. Neither information sharing (F (3, 185) =1.05,r process management is signicant (F (3, 185) =1.37,noted in Table 6: supply chain security partner man-ore tightly coupled rms have signicantly greatern security partner management activities (2.77) thanrately coupled rms (means: 2.27, 1.76) but are not sig-ifferent than loosely coupled rms (2.42); and servicenagement:more tightly coupledrmshave signicantlyply chain security partnermanagement activities (3.15)oderately coupledrms (means: 2.85, 2.16) but arenot

y different than loosely coupled rms (2.86). Given thatMANOVA test statistic is only approaching signicancethe underlying dependent variable tests are signicant,H4 hypotheses are supported.

cantly(2.89)2.66, 2securitservicecantlymoder1.92);agemeH5a, H

6. Dis

Theagememanuflikelysupplychainply chsharinprovidbetweing inmanagment.investinitiatiassociacess mprovid

A mis mina broasecondply chachainswith ssecuritthat aring prorisk. Hpartnedesignserviceand seing tosis 5 suggests that more mindful rms are more likelyn supply chain design investments than rms thatndful. The MANOVA results indicate that more mind-vest more heavily in all four supply chain design

(1) Process management (F(3, 186) =5.06, p< .002);ation sharing (F(3, 186) =3.08, p< .030); (3) Supplyer security management (F(3, 186) =5.10, p< .003); andprovider management (F(3, 186) =4.78, p< .003). As

able 6: process management: high mindfulness rmscantly greater process management activities (4.40)ate or low mindfulness rms (means: 3.76, 3.72, 3.36)indfulness rms have signicantly less process man-tivity than moderate rms; information sharing: highs rms have signicantly greater information sharing.44) than moderate or low supply chain complexity

across thedriver is tigsupply chaicoupled rmpartners. Ininitiatives dcomplexityaction.

From aNatural Accwhich to utenets of susions of boto intentiosynchronizmoderate or lowsupply chain complexityrms (means:.58); and lowmindfulness rms have less supply chainrtner management activities than moderate rms; andider management: high mindfulness rms have signi-ter service provider management activities (3.67) thanr low supply chain complexity rms (means: 3.03, 2.77,ow mindfulness rms have less service provider man-ctivities than moderate rms. Therefore, Hypotheses5c, and H5d were all supported.

on and conclusions

ults have important implications for security man-nd are highlighted in Table 8. First, supply chainsing and transporting more high risk products are morevest in process management and information sharingn design initiatives. Similarly, greater inherent supplylexity results in greater investments into the sup-esign initiatives of process management, informationpply chain partner security management, and serviceanagement. Further, there is a strong interaction effecte product risk level and supply chain complexity result-eased supply chain design investments into processnt, information sharing, and service provider manage-ly chains having tighter coupling are more likely topply chain partner and service provider managementFinally, rms having leaders with greater mindfulnesswith security and risk are more likely to invest in pro-ement, information sharing, and partner and serviceanagement initiatives.factor driving supply chain design security initiativesess. Firms with mindful executives have implementedange of design initiatives to enhance their security. Aor driving supply chaindesign security initiatives is sup-mplexity. Firms participating in highly complex supplyincorporated information sharing as well as initiativeschain partners and service providers to enhance their

third factor driving supply chain re-design are productsh risk. Firms with such products are rening operat-es and increasing information sharing to reduce theirer, these rms are not implementing initiatives withservice providers. This could suggest these rms haveeir supply chain to minimize the role of partners andviders. Alternatively, the lower means for supply chainpartner management may indicate that rms are try-eir own house in order before reaching out to partnerssupply chain (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). The nalht coupling which results in redesign initiatives withn partner and service providers. It is critical that tightlys integrate their security efforts with the supply chainsummary, the depth and breadth of a rms securityepends on top management mindfulness, supply chain, product risk, and coupling in decreasing order of inter-

theoretical perspective, the results support the use ofident andHigh Reliability Theories as a useful lens fromnderstand supply chain design issues. Specically, thepply chain complexity and coupling-the critical dimen-th NAT and HRThighlight the difculty of respondingnal and unintentional security disruptions given theation of supply chain partners and breadth/interactions


Table 8Summary of signicant main and interaction effects.

Supply chain factors inuencing security efforts Supply chain disruption design themes

Process management Information sharing SC partner security Server provider

Risk levelSupply chainRisk level sCouplingMindfulnessCouplingmRisk level c

M=signicant

associatedmarketplachighlights tlocation, anfocused on(e.g., attracproducts. T

Webelieprovides trsophisticateshould be eply chain stand greatetures/interainitiativesshould focuply chain brecalls and/lem occurremelamine ithe breadthin-depth ex

Similarlytion framewresearch shof target fadesign initiasupply chaiof high risktion, futurethe offendeinitiatives.interest forchain netwmethods, wsupply chai

Finally,in this reseawith rmswals industriconditionsthat manufbroadly toevaluate anwould appl

In additiresearch, than informatdesign by reners or contheir informSimilarly, g

ns alrovebet

mees.iatinctiveew. Ten a-spea starinng inshas vee likse cuay he cuvesthe ducans ham incust

en thchadevpothmporrelerstearcissuinduwhicresute hies thbasezardoM Mcomplexity M Mupply chain complexity I I

M Mindful Ioupling I

main effect; I = signicant interaction effect.

with supply chain partners supporting more globales. In addition, the situational crime prevention lenshe importance of understanding the potential offender,d target. In this research, the testing of hypothesesthe notion of target by examining the inherent risktiveness of the target) associated with different foodhe results also demonstrate the validity of this lens.ve that the integration of these theoretical perspectivesemendous direction for future research. First, a moredexaminationof supply chain complexity andcouplingxamined in order to more fully understand which sup-ructures and interactions lead to more tight couplingr complexity and the degree to which these struc-ctions can be supported with the supply chain designexamined in this research. As such, future researchsonmore fullyunderstandingwhoparticipates ina sup-eyond 1st tier suppliers and customers many recentor product contaminations highlighted that the prob-d prior to the 1st tiered supplier (e.g., lead paint in toys,n milk at farm level, etc.). More fully understanding/depth of the supply chain network involves a moreamination of cohesion., we explored aspects of the situational crime preven-ork by examining a specic facet of the target. Future

ouldexamineadditional target facets including the levelcility protection, differences in supply chain securitytives among different high risk products, differences inn security design initiatives among very different typesproducts (e.g., food vs. hazardous materials). In addi-research should examine aspects of the location andr tomore fully understand supply chain security designLocation, in particular, would appear to be of criticalsupply chain researchers. Specically, how do supplyork design (i.e., which countries, what transportationhat border crossings, etc.) issues inuence the types ofn security design initiatives that are implemented.the supply chain research design initiatives examinedrchwere a product of qualitative interviews conductedithin the food, pharmaceutical, and hazardousmateri-

es. Future research should more fully test the boundaryof the integrated theorydoes it apply only to rmsacture/distribute these products or does it apply more

nizatioto impmationable tochoice

Initto effelarly nhas bevendoralmosttion shinvestimationsystemwho arAs theplier minto thwith ineven ttomersvendorplatfordata to

Givsupplystep inand hymore iing theIn thethe resdesignstandphasetitativealternadescribmodelthe haother industries? In addition, future research shouldd examine other supply chain design initiatives thaty in these and other industries.on to the theoretical implications associated with thisere are a number of practical implications. First, fromion sharing perspective, rms alter their supply chainquiring greater visibility of information between part-sider changing partners to those that are able to meetation needs when higher risk products are involved.

reater supply chain complexity andmoremindful orga-

6.1. Qualita

The reseparticular thatwas cochain disrucorroboratiresults of thits supply cto further imanagement management

M MI

M MM M

so make greater investments into information sharingsupply chain security. Thus, greater visibility of infor-ween partners or changing partners to those that aret information needs become critical supply chain design

g or maintaining a partnership based on the abilityly share information between partners is not particu-he compatibility of information systems between rmsfactor in merger and acquisition decisions. Similarly,cic enterprise resourceplanning systemshavebecomeandard within some industries to facilitate informa-g between suppliers and customers. Many rms areinformation systems capabilities that facilitate infor-

ring and our results have implications for informationndors. Most suppliers have a multitude of customersely to be using different information systems platforms.stomers demand more real-time information, the sup-ave difculty sending data that can be easily integratedstomers information system. Suppliers may be faceding in signicant customization of existing systems orplication of some systems to ensure that critical cus-obtain the information they need. Information systemsve an opportunity to develop middleware and otherdependent tools that allowsuppliers tomoreeasily sendomers regardless of their software platform.e nascent amount of empirical research focusing on

in security assessments, this research serves as a rstelop constructs concerning security design initiativeseses examining conditions that make these initiativestant. However, this research also focused on determin-vancy and boundary conditions of the research ndings.phase (qualitative data collection across industries) ofh, we saw signicant consistency in the supply chaines implemented across industries. To more fully under-stry boundary conditions, we added a third researchh served as a validation tool to determine if the quan-lts gathered in the food industry could be seen in angh risk industry-hazardous materials. The next sectione nal stage of this research validating the empiricald on food industry initiative using qualitative data fromus materials industry.tive validation

arch validation process focused on the selection of arm whereby both NAT and HRT applied as well as rmncernedwith both unintentional and intentional supplyptions. As such, Dow Chemical was selected to provideng evidence that validates and supports the empiricalis research. Insights into how Dow Chemical manageshain provides the opportunity to share best practicesmprove the understanding and applicability of these


results examined in this paper Specically, the following sectionreviews four supply chain design investment areas that highlightaspects of product risk level, supply chain complexity, coupling andmindfulness and the corresponding approaches taken in processmanagemeand servicerity.

Dow Chproduct usiDow Chemihighly hazeffort to recerns. The chain: (1) sping contai

With reson redesigshipments aardous matreduce thetions. Thisincluding cotive sourcemanagemena less hazacess manageintegrate prcustomersrial shippedby reducingsupply chaiproduct risk

In additpartner chacustomer dship highlyrisk). Acrossamount ofreduced suclonger at ris

With reing, Dowsconditionsof every inrapid comminformationagement). Tsystem (GPhas not onlresponse tieet utilizawhich enabthese changpling inhere

Dow Chedesign. Doweet of 26,02007) and tcar securitybe temperederailmentprovider ma

The naegy focusesproviders, cpreparedne

service provider management). Dow reaches out to local emergenceresponders along transportation routes where hazardous materi-als travel to train responders on how to handle different chemicals.Dow is also activity in industry groups as a method for improving

ry stase sitho

y-coptimuniti

nclu

atingt safpplyents

uired imthathe nelately chs resmineeratutivey cony caplacntialationdisgive

searccostant cimewe hoe the

wled

s resecuried toiversmm(s) anf Ho

nces

n Grok repomacen, J.C.ew an423.ng, J.Snal ofrst, J.,ved ags. Intex, D.Jnd edheidelly chagemnt, information sharing, partner security managementprovider management to enhance supply chain secu-

emical is a large multinational company shipping bulkng multiple surface and ocean transportation modes.cal indicates that less than 1% of its shipments are ratedmat, the company has invested signicant time and-evaluate supply chain design in light of security con-rm has identied four drivers of a sustainable supply

upply chain design; (2) supply chain visibility; (3) ship-ner design; and (4) enhanced collaboration.pect to supply chain design, Dow Chemical has focusedning supply chain ows to reduce the number ofnd/or the distance the containers travel for highly haz-erials. As such, Dow Chemical is looking at ways tosupply chain complexity inherent in its current opera-has been accomplished through multiple mechanismsnverting to less hazardous materials by using alterna-

s of supply (product risk, supply chain partner securityt) or by converting the highly hazardous material tordous derivative prior to shipment (product risk, pro-ment). Specically, Dow has worked with suppliers toocesses resulting in the combining of chemicals at theproduction sites to reduce the level of hazardous mate-. Therefore, supply chain design has been achievedsupply chain complexity by focusing on process and

n partner security management and reducing inherent.

ion, Dow has made supply chain and service providernges and adjustments. For example, Dow has evaluatedemands to determine whether it would be too risky tohazardous product desired by the customer (productthe chemical industry, a recent report suggests that thehazardous material produced or transported has beenh that 38 million residents in the United States are nok (Orum, 2006).spect to supply chain visibility and information shar-goal is to know the real-time location and ladingof every HazMat railcar and door-to-door trackingtermodal container. This type of visibility facilitatesunication and response to potential risks and incident(supply chain security partner and service provider man-

o this end, Dow is working to install global positioningS) capabilities where most needed. To date, this efforty increased visibility, but it has also improved deliveryme to customers, reduced inventory levels, improvedtion, and more quickly identied in-transit problemsled recovery plans to be put in place quicker. As such,es provide a mechanism for addressing the tight cou-nt across the supply chain.mical has played a leading effort in shipping containeris the largest bulk shipper in North America and its

00 railcars is the second largest in the world (Reese,hereforehas signicant cause for concern regarding rail-. Dow has worked to reduce the ability for a railcar tod with and to improve the safety of a railcar should aoccur (e.g., example of process management and servicenagement).l prong of Dows supply chain sustainability strat-on enhanced collaboration with third party service

arriers, and local communities to enhance emergencess should an incident occur (supply chain partner and

industThe

sible wsecuritworkoopport

6.2. Co

CreproducThesumovemels reqrisk anPart offul of tinter-ra supp

Thito exathe litdescripsecuritsecuritput ina potethe relnot asresultsthis refrom asignicment texaminmanag

Ackno

Thiland Seawardthe Unor recoauthorment o

Refere

Aberdeemarphar

Andersorevi411

ArmstroJour

Blackhuderition

Bowersoseco

BraunscsuppManndards and processes.upply chain re-design efforts would not be pos-ut top management support. Dow has created ancerned culture that encourages innovation and net-ization to ensure it focuses on continuous improvementes (e.g., mindfulness).

sion

andmonitoring a global supply chain design to supportety and security is an increasingly difcult proposition.chaincomplexityof industry supplychains (e.g., product, information ow, etc.) coupled with product risk lev-rms to muchmore proactively and aggressively assessplement appropriate supply chain design capabilities.proactive stancemeans rmsmust beco

global supply chain design considerations: mitigating product safety and security risks

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