Global Value Chains in EU Anti-Dumping Practice

The Economic Impact of Anti-Dumping Duties on Intermediate Goods and the “Union Interest Test”

National Board of Trade, June 2012. ISBN: 978-91-86575-38-0

The National Board of Trade is the Swedish governmental agency responsible for issues relating to foreign trade and trade policy. Our mission is to promote an open and free trade with transparent rules. The basis for this task, given us by the Government, is that a smoothly functioning international trade and a further liberalized trade policy are in the interest of Sweden. To this end we strive for an efficient internal market, a liberalized common trade policy in the EU and an open and strong multilateral trading system, especially within the World Trade Organization (WTO).

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Table of Contents

Abstract............................................................................................................................................................. . 2

Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... . 3

Does.the.Union.Interest.Test.Apply.to.the.User.Industry?........................................................................... . 4

What.are.the.Typical.Costs.to.Users.Brought.by.Anti-Dumping.Measures?.............................................. . 5Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-molybdenum ................................................................ 6Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-silicon .............................................................................. 7Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on silico-manganese .................................................................... 8

Conclusions....................................................................................................................................................... . 9

Annex................................................................................................................................................................. . 11

Notes.................................................................................................................................................................. . 12

References........................................................................................................................................................ . 13

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Abstract

Vertical specialisation makes trade in intermediate goods an increasingly important part of manufacturing in Europe. While the sourcing of input goods from third countries is key to the competitiveness of the industry in the European Union (EU), this economic reality is not appropriately considered in anti-dumping practice. This report examines EU anti-dumping policy with regard to its impact on users of goods that are subject to anti-dumping measures. In particular, this is done in light of the fact that the interest of industrial users has not once influenced the outcome of an anti-dumping proceeding (at least since 1998). The assessment suggests that the current anti-dumping practice makes it virtually impossible for user industries to demonstrate an overriding interest in an open supply of intermediate goods. Statistical assessments in two cases and partial-equilibrium model simulations in three cases serve to illustrate the fact that anti-dumping measures are often associated with highly unbalanced costs and gains to the EU industry.

The author of this paper is Carl Johan von Seth, Trade Policy Adviser, National Board of Trade.

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Introduction

Increasing vertical specialisation and offshoring con-tinuously make trade in intermediate goods an essen-tial aspect of manufacturing in Europe. The high growth in trade during the past decade has been heavily underpinned by the development of globalised supply chains. While economists have only fairly recently been able to properly quantify the effects of deregulated trade in capital and intermediate goods, a growing body of literature now points to considerable gains from such liberalisation in terms of economic growth and higher wages.1 It has thus become clear that imposing high tariffs on input goods is harmful to domestic producers and the economy as a whole.2 Still, metals, chemicals and other raw materials remain very popular targets in anti-dumping policy. More than two thirds of all cases investigated by the European Com-mission between 1998 and 2010 comprised such inter-mediate goods. Anti-dumping duties on intermediate goods are typically 20–30%, with a few examples of duties exceeding 100%. Anti-dumping investigations usually suggest that these types of measures affect industrial users merely at the margin; a price increase for an input good has little or no impact on the com-petitiveness of the user industry, it is argued.

In the current EU anti-dumping legislation, the ‘Union interest’ (previously ‘Community interest’) clause was set up to create room for the consideration of the interest of users and consumers. According to Article 21 of the basic anti-dumping regulation, meas-ures shall be based on an “appreciation of all the vari-ous interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users”. In one anti-dumping case, the European Commission states that: “the primary purpose of the Community interest test is to determine whether there are any overriding interests against the imposition of measures despite

the exist¬ence of injurious dumping. This calls for an appreciation of all economic interests in the Commu-nity”.3 However, the Union interest test, as it is cur-rently applied, leaves great room for discretion.

Two previous studies have assessed the implemen-tation of the Union interest test in anti-dumping investigations. One assessment conducted by the National Board of Trade in 2005 examined this aspect of anti-dumping policy in 20 cases.4 The Board sug-gested that the economic interest of those, other than the complainant, were being dealt with in passing, using a routine set of arguments in favour of inter-vention. To better balance the analysis of the Union interest, improvement was suggested in four areas. First, it was suggested that the value of trade poten-tially affected should be taken into account. This parameter varies greatly, but rarely attracts any atten-tion in investigations. Second, the size and impor-tance of the protected industry should be considered in light of the significance of the user industry. Third, concerns of anti-competitive behaviour in the EU market should be taken into account. Fourth, investi-gations should also consider the interest of parties that have not voiced an opposition in the case.

Another study from 2009 examined the Union inter-est test in 32 anti-dumping cases, looking at arguments in favour and in opposition of measures.5 In 24 cases, interested parties raised concerns about price increases. In 17 instances, concerns about supply shortages were raised. Users voiced concerns about anti-competitive behaviour on part of the protected industry in 10 cases. Still, the European Commission assessed, in 24 cases, that duties were not going to affect the users financially. Failure to respond timely or properly to the Commis-sion’s questions was used as evidence for the non-sig-nificant impact on users in as many as 24 out of 32 cases.

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Does the Union Interest Test Apply to the User Industry?This study has examined anti-dumping cases initi-ated between 1998 and 2010 with respect to investi-gation outcomes. Cases have been counted on a case-by-country basis (meaning, one procedure against two countries constitutes two cases), so the number of considered cases amounts to 287.

Among the 287 anti-dumping cases investigated by the Commission between 1998 and 2010, approximately one third were terminated during the formal investigation. The most common reason for terminating proceedings at this stage was a withdrawal of the complaint (see Figure 1). In approximately 4% of cases, proceedings were dropped with reference to the Union interest. The cases were: disc changers for cars6, CD-Rs7 and DVD-Rs8, of which all three are mainly consumer products. In all these cases, the EU industry held an insignificant market share (around 0–2%), and the imposition of measures would affect a vast share of imports. In the disc-changer case from 1999, the following assessment was cited:

On the basis of an average duty of 20% on the import value of the product concerned, the amount of duties imposed on imports of this product would represent between 6 and 10 times the total value of production of the Community industry during the investigation period. Even if production were to be expanded in accordance with the plans of the Community industry, the total value of produc-tion would, in the foreseeable future, only be a fraction of the amount of duties imposed. The above situation results from the fact that around 81% of the disc-changers sold within the Community during the investigation period originated in the countries under investigation.9

It seems reasonable to expect, at least, that this type of impact assessment is made in any anti-dumping investigation, yet it is rare. It is even rarer when looking at cases involving intermediate goods, even though one may argue that the stakes are potentially higher in these cases.

Measures imposed (73%)

Against the Union interest (4%)

Dumping or exports below de minimis (9%)

Lack of causation (4%)

Withdrawal of complaint (15%)

No export found (2%)

Figure 1. Outcome of Commission investigations and reasons for terminating proceedings, measures initiated 1998-2010

Source: Official Journal and own calculations

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What are the Typical Costs to Users Brought by Anti-Dumping Measures?In reality, the Union interest provision of the anti-dumping regulation provides little guidance regard-ing how the impact of anti-dumping measures should be assessed. In one case, the European Commission states the following.

The community interest test is not a cost–benefit analy-sis in the strictest sense. While the various interests are put in the balance, they are not weighed against each other in a mathematical equation, not least because of the obvious methodological difficulties in quantifying each factor with a reasonable margin of security within the time available.10

While there is no doubt that conducting reliable assessments of costs and benefits from anti-dump-ing measures is no easy task, this should not be used as an excuse to forgo any attempt to weigh evident economic interests against each other.

The overall impact of anti-dumping measures is investigated by the National Board of Trade (2012), where a statistical anal-ysis of the impact of anti-dumping measures is carried out. In the study, it was found that the protected sector gains, on average, 1 percentage point of the EU market share as a result of anti-dumping measures. The pro-tected EU industry increases its prices by, on average, 10% and increases its sales volume slightly less. As the anti-dumping measures

have an impact on all imports, the user industry pays significantly higher prices on the concerned product. Additionally, users pay the anti-dumping duties (usually around 20–30%) on inputs purchased from the targeted countries. Based on these effects, the Board conducted an economic welfare analysis in order to weigh the costs and benefits against each other. The welfare assessment suggests that for every euro gained by the protected industry, users and consumers lose, on average, 4.5 euros.

Whereas this result suggests that there seems to be a discrepancy between the application of the Union interest test and the economic outcome on an aggregate level, it might be of interest to take a closer look at some individual cases. The following section draws from the method described above, making an assessment of three anti-dumping cases involving

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intermediate goods. The statistical (ex-post) assess-ment is carried out together with a partial equilib-rium analysis (a method based on theoretical models of trade). Both these methods come with considera-ble drawbacks, and the results should be interpreted with some caution. Together, they may still shed light on the issue of the Union interest. Technical descrip-tions of the methods are found in the Annex.

Partial equilibrium trade models have already been used as an alternative in contributing to a more rigorous assessment of the Union interest.11 These models, together with trade and production data and estimated parameters, produce simulations of income effects from changes in trade policy. The model used here (the ‘Copenhagen Anti-dumping Model’) adopts a standard framework of trade, including imperfect substitutability between traded goods and national product differentiation. It takes into account changes in tariff revenues, producer income and consumer income. Data may be obtained from the Eurostat databases Comext and Prodcom. On fair grounds, model simulations of this sort have been subject to criticism. In particular, models cannot entirely capture the particular effects of anti-dumping policy. Still, simulations, if used correctly, are useful tools in carrying out a general assessment of the economic impact of measures.

In order to examine the pattern of costs and benefits in the EU industry, three anti-dumping cases were selected for review and simulation: ferro-molybdenum, ferro-silicon and silico-man-ganese. These products are inputs in the steel industry and where chosen because of their nature, as typical intermediate goods found in markets that are relatively easy to for an analyst and reader to understand. Note that, in this study, the ferro-sili-con case is not subject to the statistics-based wel-fare analysis, due to lack of comprehensive data.

Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-molybdenum12

Ferro-molybdenum is a ferro alloy used in steel-alloy and cast-iron products. In 2000, the sole two EU producers of this product launched a complaint regarding alleged dumped imports from China. The ferro-molybdenum case resulted in definitive anti-dumping measures against Chinese exports, which represented a major part of the EU market. In 2001, definitive measures, consisting of an anti-dumping duty of 22.5%, entered into force. Measures were suspended in 2006 due to changes in market con-ditions, i.e. increasing prices for the concerned product. However, it was later discovered that this change would continue, so duties were formally repealed in 2008.

In 2000, the EU market for ferro-molybdenum amounted to some 150 million euros. EU producers held a market share of 20%. China was the domi-nant exporter, supplying the EU market with ferro-molybdenum worth approximately 95 million euros. Levels of production, trade and employment are shown in the following table.

Table 1. Key figures for the ferro-molybdenum market in the EU 15, as of 2000

Extra EU-15 total exports €12,619,240

Extra EU-15 total imports €113,405,110

Imports subject to measures €95,000,000

EU-15 production for the EU marketC:a 20% of the total market (confidential)

Number of employees in the protected industry 92

Number of employees in the user industry 750

Source: Eurostat, European Commission, National Board of Trade’s calculations

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Three years after the imposition of measures in the ferro-molybdenum case, imports from China had ceased almost entirely. Instead, imports from other third countries increased by close to 500%. The price on ferro-molybdenum from EU produc-ers increased by 50% (during the same period, the price index for intermediate metals was up by just 13%). The price of imports from China and other third countries increased with almost as much. Still, the protected industry’s sales were down by 50% three years after the imposition of measures.

Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-silicon13

In 2006, an industry body representing most of the EU producers of ferro-silicon, launched a complaint against alleged dumping from China, Egypt, Kazakh-

The investigation argued that ferro-silicon rep-resented only a small share of total production costs of users, and that the measures did not con-travene the Union interest. As our simulations show, however, the cost–benefit analysis is not favourable for the EU industry as a whole.

In the ferro-silicon case, there is a pattern in the development of imports and prices which is similar to the ferro-molybdenum case. Imports from the

Table 3. Key figures for the ferro-silicon market in the EU 25, as of 2006

Extra EU-25 total exports €38,606,510

Extra EU-25 total imports €450,787,670

Total imports subject to measures €328,000,000

EU-25 production for the EU market €135,250,023

Number of employees in the protected industry 1,281

Number of employees in the user industry 180,000

Source: Eurostat, European Commission, National Board of Trade’s calculations

Table 4. Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-silicon

Protected industry income* €+8,300,000

User industry income* €-65,000,000

Ex-ante estimated cost to benefit * 8:1

Ex-post estimated cost to benefit** 4:1

* Denotes simulation based on data before measures, ** denotes statistical analysis based on data before and after measures.

The market situation and investigation outcome in this case indicated a priori a relatively significant impact on the market, considering the high anti-dumping tariff and the large amount of Chinese exports. Nevertheless, as users were, according to the investigation, unable to provide substantiated claims on their interest, it was concluded that the impact on users would be negligible. The Board’s assessment suggests the following effects of the measures.

Table 2. Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on ferro-molybdenum

Protected industry income* €+2,900,000

User industry income* €-20,400,000

Ex-ante estimated cost to benefit* 7:1

Ex-post estimated cost to benefit** 4:1

* Denotes simulation based on data before measures, ** denotes statistical analysis based on data before and after measures.

stan, Macedonia and Russia. Ferro-silicon is an alloy which is used as a deoxidiser in steel and iron prod-ucts. Definitive anti-dumping measures in the ferro-silicon case were imposed in 2007. Since then, exports from China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Macedonia and Russia have been subject to duties of 5 to 33.9%.

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In the investigation, the imposition of measures were said to affect users marginally. However, the same date definitive measures took force, measures were suspended with reference to recent changes in market conditions. Explicitly, this was due to a sud-den price increase occurring after the investigation period. Measures were suspended after consulta-tion with the protected industry.

Table 5. Key figures for the silico-manganese market in the EU 25, as of 2006

Extra EU-25 total exports €8,985,830

Extra EU-25 total imports €415,561,530

Total imports subject to measures €55,000,000

EU-25 production for the EU market €160,583,488

Note: Data on employment was inconclusive. Source: Eurostat, European Commission, author’s own calculations

In the decision temporarily suspending duties it was argued that “[Silico-Manganese] is a key raw material used for the production of steel”. While this claim was taken into account and made explicit when suspending measures, apparently being important in this decision, it was left unmentioned in the formal investigation. After a period of tem-porary suspension, measures entered into force again, without explicit consideration of the inter-ests of the users of any kind. In line with the earlier examples, simulations suggests that the economic effects were highly unbalanced.

Table 6. Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on silico-manganese

Protected industry income €+712,000

User industry income €-3,669,000

Ratio of industry costs to gains* 5:1

Note: * Simulation based on data before measures

targeted countries decreased significantly, whereas imports from other third countries doubled. Three years after measures were imposed, the sales of the protected industry were approximately the same as those before the measures. Prices did increase sig-nificantly during the same period; the price of imports from third countries as well as EU market prices increased by approximately 40% (the sector’s price index increased by 13%).

Economic impact of anti-dumping measures on silico-manganese14

Anti-dumping proceedings concerning silico-man-ganese were launched in 2006. Producers repre-senting half of the EU production stood behind the complaint. In December 2007, measures on silico-manganese were imposed against Chinese and Kazakh imports. Duties were established at 8.2 and 6.5% respectively.

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Conclusions

Anti-dumping measures are intended to align the price of allegedly dumped imports to the price lev-els of the EU industry. As such, successful anti-dumping measures result in costs to users, as their purchase prices on intermediate goods will increase. Looking at data on trade and prices on products that have been subject to anti-dumping measures, it is apparent that prices increase signifi-cantly on products originating both from targeted countries, protected EU producers and producers in other countries. At the same time, EU producers protected by anti-dumping measures do not seem to be able to increase their sales in many cases.

In this regard, it is worth noting that there is some discrepancy between estimations based on simulation and assessments made with post-meas-ure data. In particular, simulations fail to project that prices in targeted countries increase as a result of anti-dumping measures. What is more, simula-tions suggest an increase in the sales of protected EU industry while this is not supported by data. This results in some notable differences in the con-clusions of the assessment techniques used in this study. However, it reflects, in essence, the difficulty of isolating the real causal effects of anti-dumping policy. A careful approach is perhaps to consider the causal effects to lie somewhere in between the simulations and the statistical data.

In addition to the measurable parameters assessed here, one should keep in mind the indirect costs from the regulatory uncertainty and unfore-seen changes that anti-dumping measures bring to the industry. Notably, anti-dumping measures often force firms to cancel shipments and reallocate

production facilities to other third countries.15 While such solutions are in fact explicitly advo-cated by the European Commission in as many as half of the anti-dumping proceedings16, they impose significant costs to the industry without adding anything to other EU producers.

What is more, one should also carefully con-sider the disadvantages anti-dumping measures on intermediate goods mean to downstream industries on the international market. In the current anti-dumping practice, this concern is too easily dis-missed. One investigation cited the following assessment:

The overall effect, they [the user industry] argued, was to place the Community steel producers at a disadvantage internationally. As regards previous measures, it should be noted that the majority of the previous measures have now expired. As concerns the cumulative effect of measures on a number of raw materials, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate the impact of distorted market conditions arising from the presence of dumped imports. As such, the effect of anti-dumping measures, even when imposed on a number of raw materials affecting the same industry, should not have a distorting effect.17

The line of argument of the above quote seems rather inconsistent with a later claim in the same case, namely that the concerned product was a key product for the steel industry and therefore, argua-bly, important to its international competitiveness. This side of the coin was not exposed by the Com-mission until measures were temporarily sus-pended due to a price boom in the concerned product. The concern of downstream producers

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being disadvantaged in import competition and on export markets should be taken more seriously in the Union interest test. This is particularly relevant in the Union interest test, as internationalised firms are increasingly able to relocate and specialise when costs change.

The picture of the Union interest rendered here remains very complex. However, it is evident that the user industries are put at considerable disad-vantage in anti-dumping proceedings compared to the industries seeking protection. On request, user industries will not be able to ‘substantiate’ claims

that they suffer from anti-dumping measures (many will not even be able to recognise the source of, for example, an upstream price change). While the users, in the cases considered above, are indeed large companies with turnovers and payrolls much greater than those of the protected industries, this does not mean that costs from anti-dumping meas-ures are not present – even if the impact is impossi-ble to spot in the financial statements. As losses from measures are shared by a large number of companies, users are left without effective means of voicing opposition.

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Table A2. Welfare effects of anti-dumping duties on EU producers and users.

Producer gain Consumer loss

“First-order effects”(effects of price changes at given volumes)

dPiEU QiEUt-1 ∑ dPij Qijt-1; j = AD, NAD, EU

“Second-order effects”(effects of changes in volume arising from price changes)

(1/2) dPiEU dQiEU (1/2) ∑ dPij dQij; j = AD, NAD, EU

Total effects dPiEU QiEUt-1 +(1/2) dPiEU dQiEU

∑ dPij Qijt-1 + (1/2) ∑ dPij dQij;

j = AD, NAD, EU

Annex

1. Partial equilibrium model calibration

(1) Duetsch, L., L. (1993). Industry Studies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

(2) Hertel, T., Hummels, D., Ivanic, M. and Keeney, R., 2004, How Confident Can We Be in CGE-Based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements.

(3) The choice of supply elasticity here diverges from the standard parameter structure in most general and partial equilibrium models in that it is set to equal the domestic supply elasticity. This is in order to avoid overestimating trade diversion effects from anti-dumping measures. In this manner, our results are closer to empirical results in, for example, Khatibi (2007) and Lasagni (2001).

2. Welfare effects of anti-dumping duties on EU producers and con-sumersThe estimated average ratio between EU producers’ benefit and EU consumers’ loss is based on an analysis of producer surplus and consumer surplus

changes for each of the anti-dumping cases in the selected sample.

The changes of surpluses are calculated using the following equations:

whereP = Import unit value priceQ = Import volumei = Product concernedj = CountryAD = Countries subject to anti-dumping dutiesNAD = Countries not subject to anti-dumping dutiesEU = Intra-EUt = Year 1, year 2, year 3

PAD is the unit value price from countries subject to anti-dumping duty, including the cost of the duty (i.e. PiAD = PiAD + (1+Ti) PiAD, where T = cost of the duty tariff).

Prices are adjusted by Eurostat’s producer price index (industrial domestic output prices on inter-mediate goods).

Table A1. Parameters

Price elasticity of demand -0.3 (1)

Elasticity of substitution 8.4 (2)

Price elasticity of supply 1.2 (1)

Export price elasticity of supply 1.2 (3)

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Notes

1 OECD, 2012

2 For an in-depth discussion of global supply chains and trade policy, see the National Board of Trade, 2012.

3 Farmed Atlantic salmon, Norway, Chile and the Faeroe Islands, OJ133, 29 May 2003.

4 National Board of Trade, 2005.

5 Davis, 2009.

6 Certain laser optical reading systems, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, China and Taiwan, OJ18, 23 January 1999.

7 Recordable compact discs (CD+/-R), China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, OJ305, 3 November 2006.

8 Recordable digital versatile discs (DVD+/-R), China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, OJ293, 20 October 2006.

9 Certain laser optical reading systems, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, China and Taiwan, OJ18, 23 January 1999.

10 Footwear with uppers of leather, China, Vietnam, OJ 98, 6 April 2006, p.3.

11 See Svensson and Thelle, 2005.

12 This case covers CN code 7202 70 00 00 (symmetric to PRODCOM 2007 nomenclature, code 27.10.20.50).

13 This case covers CN codes 7202 21 00, 7202 21 90 and 7202 29 00 11 (symmetric to PRODCOM 2007 nomencla-ture, code 27.10.20.20).

14 This case covers CN codes 7202 30 00 and 8111 00 11. Due to asymmetry in relation to PRODCOM nomenclature, only CN 7202 30 00 is covered (i.e. ferro-silico-manganese, PRODCOM code 27.10.20.30).

15 In connection to this study, a small number of multinational companies were asked to describe their actions in relation to EU anti-dumping measures on intermediate goods. Among the firms, the common solution appeared to be relocating factories from the targeted country to other third countries. One company was able to elaborate on the costs for this procedure, stating that they paid approximately 1 million euros in anti-dumping duties before having set up a new factory, in a neighbouring third country, for approximately 350,000 euros. In this process, the company also carried unidentified costs for cancelling a large number of shipments and dismantling production at their previous factory in China.

16 National Board of Trade, 2005.

17 Silico-manganese, China, Kazakhstan, OJ 137, 5 December 2007.

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References

Davis, L., 2009, ‘Ten Years of Anti-dumping in the EU: Economic and Political Targeting’, ECIPE Working Paper, European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels, Belgium.

Duetsch, L. L., 1993, Industry Studies, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, USA.

European Commission, 2011, Anti-dumping cases and statistics. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/stats.htm. [Accessed: 20 June 2011].

European Commission, 1998–2010, Official Journal of the European Union, Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do.

Francios, J. and Copenhagen Economics, 2004, ‘A Model for Global Simulation of EU Anti- Dumping Policy’, unpublished.

Hertel, T., Hummels, D., Ivanic, M. and Keeney, R., 2004, ‘How Confident Can We Be in CGE-Based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements’, GTAP Working Paper No. 26, Center forGlobal Trade Analysis, Purdue University, USA.

OECD, 2012, ‘Policy Priorities for International Trade and Jobs’, (ed.), D. Lippoldt, e-publication, available at: www.oecd.org/trade/icite.

Khatibi, A., 2009, ‘The Trade Effects of European Anti-Dumping Policy’, ECIPE Working Paper, European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels, Belgium.

National Board of Trade, 2005, ‘Treatment of the “Community Interest” in EU Anti-Dumping Investigations’, Stockholm, Sweden.

National Board of Trade, 2012, ‘Business Reality and Trade Policy – Closing the Gap’, Stockholm, Sweden.

National Board of Trade, 2012, ‘Do EU Producers and the EU Economy Really Benefit From Anti-dumping Policy?’, Stockholm, Sweden.

Lasagni, A., 2000, ‘Does Country-targeted Anti-dumping Policy by the EU Create Trade Diversion?’, Journal of World Trade. 34(4): 137–159.

Svensson, P. and Thelle, M. H., 2005, ‘Economic Assessment of the Community Interest in EU Anti-Dumping Cases’, National Agency for Enterprise and Construction, Copenhagen, Denmark.

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