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G lobal ization and the post-cold war order I A N C L A R K

• I ntroduction 514

• A typology o f order 514

• The elements of conte m porary order 5 16

• Global ization and the post-Westphal ian order 519

• Global ization and legiti macy

• An i nternational order of global ized states?

• The global fi nancial crisis

• Conclusion

Reader's G u ide

Th is chapter exp lores the nature of the o rder that

has deve loped s ince the end of the cold war. It asks

whether that o rder is d i sti nctive. I t also asks whether

global izat ion is its defi n i ng featu re. After d isti ngu i sh ing

between various types of order-international , world,

and global-the chapter sketches the main i ngred ients

of the contemporary o rder. These extend wel l beyond

the trad it ional domain of i nternational m i l itary secu­

rity. The argument then addresses global izat ion as one

of the forces that he l ped to br ing the cold war to an

521

523

524

525

end, and i nvestigates the associated trend towards a

post-Westphal ian order. It also exp lores the ways i n

wh ich global izat ion now causes problems and ten­

s ions i n the present o rder, especia l ly with regard to its

legitimacy, given profound i nequal it ies. The chapter

ends by suggest ing that global izat ion reflects changes

with i n states, not j ust between them: what i s d isti nc­

t ive about the present order is not the i m m i nent

dem ise of the states-system, but the conti n uat ion of

an i nternational order, the constituent un its of which

are global ized states. Th is analysis i s fu rther confi rmed

by the response to the fi nancial cr is is s i nce 2008.

I A N C LA R K

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with three key questions. The first is whether there is now a distinctive pattern of order in the post-cold war world (see Box 33.1) and, if so, what are its principal elements. The second is whether this order should be defined in terms of glo­balization. The third asks what is now happening to globalization, and what challenges it faces.

Study of the overall character of the post-cold war order remains problematic. While there have been stud­ies aplenty of individual aspects of this present order (ethnicity, identity, religion, peacekeeping, humanitar­ian intervention, globalization, regionalism, economic transition, climate change, democratization, integra­tion, financial instability, terrorism and the war on it, weapons of mass destruction, regime change, etc.), we still lack any grand synthesis of its essential nature.

In analysing the contemporary order, we need to be mindful of how much greater are the demands upon, and the expectations about, the i nternational order today than previously. In earlier periods, the interest in the international order was largely 'negative', and lay

A typology of order

At the present moment, our ideas about order are being pulled in a number of competing directions (see

Table 33.1) . At the one end, they continue to be largely state-centred and retain traditional concerns with the structure of the balance of power, the possibly shifting

in prevention of any threats that might emerge from it. The interest is now 'positive' as well, as the inter­national order is a much greater source than hitherto of a range of social goods. It can deliver information, economic resources, human rights, intervention, access to global social movements and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and an abundance of cultural artefacts. Many of these 'goods' may be regarded as unwelcome, but they remain highly sought after by some governments and sectors of soci­ety around the world.

• The pri ncipal characteristics of the contemporary order that give it its d istinctive qual ity are difficult to discern.

• Our understand ing of, say, the inter-war period {1 91 9-39) is i nformed by how it ended, but we do not yet know how our present period wi l l 'end'.

• The international order now del ivers a range of international 'goods', but also a wide range of 'bads'.

polarity of the international system, and the current forms of collective security. At the other is a widen­ing agenda that encompasses the relationship between economic and political dimensions, new thinking about human security (see Ch. 29), debates about the

Box 33.1 Elements of d iscontin u ity and conti n u ity between cold war and post-cold war orders

Cold war

Soviet power in Eastern Europe B ipolar competit ion R ival ideologies G lobal security integration M i l itary security as h igh pol it ics

Discontinuity

Continuity Some security structures, e.g. NATO Economic global izat ion H u man rights Reaction against secular state Mu lt ip le identit ies Environmental agendas Poverty in the South

Post-cold war

Dissolution of the Soviet U n ion Un i polar peacemaking Supremacy of l i beral capita l ism G reater regional autonomy National identity as high pol itics

Chapter 33 Global ization and the post-cold war order

Table 33.1 Typologies of order

Units Characteristics

Globalized

International

World

Global system

States

Human ity

G lobal ized states

End of national pol it ies, societies, and economies

Concern with agenda of sovereignty and stab i l ity

Concern with agenda of rights, needs, and justice

Globalized international Agenda of managing relations between states penetrated by global system but sti l l d isti nguishable with i n it

distributive consequences of globalization, the role of human rights, the impact of environmentalism, and strategies for human emancipation. Clearly, a number of differing, and potentially competing, conceptions of order are at work.

These draw our attention to a number of important distinctions. Are we to judge the effectiveness of order solely as an aspect of the inter-state system, and thus speak of international order? Or are we to widen the discussion and consider order in terms of its impact on individual human lives and aspirations, and thus talk of a world order? Such a distinction is widely noted in the literature, and is replicated in the similar distinc­tion between international society and world society (Clark 2007). However, how does the introduction of the concept of globalization affect the analysis? Does globalized order signify the same thing as world order or something different? An attempt will be made to answer that question towards the end of this chapter.

The search for the definitive elements of the con­temporary order proceeds within quite separate theoretical frameworks (see the Introduction to this chapter) . The first is the broadly realist (see Ch. 6).

This concentrates on the structure of the post-cold war system, especially on the number of great power actors and the distribution of capabilities among them. It defines order largely in terms of the security struc­ture. It spawned a debate in the early 1990s about the polarity of the post-cold war system, about the possi­bility of a renewed concert, and about the worrisome eventuality that a return to m u ltipolarity could herald the erosion of the stability generated by the cold war's bipolarity. It gave rise to a debate about primacy and hegemony (Clark 201 1) .

The second is broadly liberal in derivation and focuses on regimes and institutions, and their associ­ated norms and values (see Ch. 7). Its central claim is that patterns of integration and interdependence had

become so deeply embedded in the cold war period, albeit for strategic and geopolitical reasons, that they had by then created a self-sustaining momentum.

Since complex systems of global governance had been spawned in the interim, these regimes would survive the collapse of the 'realist' conditions that had given rise to them in the first place.

A third line is the one that assesses order in terms of its achievement of individual human emancipation. The mere fact of stability among the major powers, or the institutionalization of relations among the domi­nant groups of states, tells us little about the quality of life for most inhabitants of the globe. If it is true, as writers like Ken Booth (1999) argue, that governments are the main source of the abuse of human rights, we need to do more than study the international human rights agreements that these very governments enter into, but look also at what is really happening to people on the ground (see Ch. 30).

A fourth line of exploration is directly via the litera­ture on globalization. This chapter asks simply whether or not globalization may be thought tantamount to a form of order. Must we speak of globalization as an on­going process without any end-state, or can we instead speak of a globalized order as a distinctive political form (see Ch. I)? The latter view is clearly set forth in the suggestion that the contemporary Western state conglomerate, collectively, constitutes an 'emergent global state' (Shaw 1997: 503-4; 2000). Globalization, on this view, represents an incipient political order in its own right.

Key Points

• When we speak of order, we need to specify order for whom-states, peoples, groups, or i nd ividuals.

• I nternational order focuses on stable and peacefu l relations between states, often related to the balance of power. It i s pr imari ly about m i l itary security.

• World order is concerned with other val ues, such as

justice, development, rights, and emancipation .

• A pattern of order may advance some values at the expense of others.

I A N C LA R K

The elements of contemporary order

The 'social -state' system

Initially, there is the basic nature of the contemporary state system itself. The state system is 'social ', first, in the sense that states over the past century have performed a range of social functions that distinguish them from earlier phases. The great revival in the political viabil­ity of states, from the nadir of the Second World War, is attributable to the largely successful undertaking of this task. While not all states are equal in their ability to deliver these functions, most would now list respon­sibility for development and economic management, health, welfare, and social planning as essential tasks for the state.

It is 'social' also in the second sense that pressures for emulation tend to reinforce common patterns of behaviour and similar forms of state institutional structure . Historically, states have emulated each other in developing the social and economic infra­structures of military power. Now this task has broadened as states seek to adopt 'best practice' in terms of economic competitiveness and efficiency. They also face the social pressure to conform to cer­tain standards of human rights, and this has permit­ted a measure of dilution and delegation of the state's exclusive jurisdiction over its own domestic affairs, as reflected .in notions of responsibility to protect (RtoP) (see Ch. 31) . In consequence, some of the key rules of the states-system (sovereignty, non-intervention) are undergoing considerable adaptation, and this gives the contemporary order many of its complex and ambivalent qualities.

Identity and the nation-state

A second feature is the multiplicity of issues about identity that have become prevalent since the 1990s. Some of these revolve around contemporary forms of

Box 33.2 Elements of order Structural elements

Polarity Multi lateral ism Regional ism Two worlds

Purposive elements

Social-state Identity Economic order Li beral rights

nationalism (see Ch. 25), and are subject to contested assessments as to whether they represent a 'new' nation­

alism, or a reversion to a pre-existing primordial ism. The state is both challenged and reinforced by a wel­ter of additional crises of identity-tendencies towards apparently new forms of political community driven by ethnic separatism, regional identities, new transna­tional projects, new social movements, and the return to culture/religion (see Ch. 26). The key question here is the extent to which these are wholly new tendencies, or whether they represent some kind of historical atavism. The politics of identity at the beginning of the new mil­lennium affects the social nature of the state, as it raises explicit questions about citizenship-who is to count as a citizen, and what is the nature of the contract between state and citizen (see Ch. 32).

It must not, however, be imagined that all such issues of identity have emerged only in the aftermath of the cold war. For example, it could be said that there has been a widespread reaction throughout much of the developing world against what has been seen as the imposition of a modernizing, Westernizing, and secu­lar form of state. The revolution in Iran in 1979 is a case in point, and cautions us not to assume that ' identity politics' were invented simply with the end of the cold war. This is particularly so with regard to the resur­gence of religion as a factor in international relations. While it may seem that religion has suddenly been rediscovered, the more plausible account is that it had never gone away, but had simply been less visible under the alternative distractions of the cold war.

Polarity and the col lectivization of security

A key area of concern remains the traditional security order. This addresses the present distribution of power, and whether that distribution should be described as un ipolarity, or as bipolarity, multipolarity, or some kind of hybrid. This debate has shifted considerably since the early 1990s. At that point, expectations of a resumption of multipolarity were widespread, and a US-centred unipolarity thought likely to last for a 'moment' at most. Thereafter, US predominance became much more clearly established, so that analysts rou­tinely referred to American hegemony, or some kind of American empire (see Ch. 4) . This trend resulted from US economic successes during the 1990s, coupled with

the on-going difficulties of its other competitors. Japan's economy stagnated over the same period. Russia became embroiled in protracted and deep-seated domestic political and economic transformation. The European Union, although it has both widened and deepened, continues to have difficulty in acting decisively on its own in international crises. In consequence, a key deter­minant of the present security order has been the role of the USA, and its willingness to become involved in gen­eral maintenance of order. This element has been highly variable, with the prominent US role in Kosovo in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003 standing in marked contrast to its unwillingness to become engaged in Rwanda in 1994 or Sudan in 2005-6. More recently, the prodigious growth of the Chinese economy, and of other emerging powers, has contributed to the sense of the end of the unique phase of US primacy (see Ch. 5).

The organ ization of production and exchange

Another prominent dimension is the political economy of the present order. Central to it is the degree of stability in the international trading and financial systems. The former remains beset by disputes between the world's three great trading groups or triads, and their trading relationship with the developing world; the latter shows periodic signs of undergoing meltdown, as during the financial turmoil that afflicted the East Asian econo­mies towards the late 1990s, and the global economy in 2008. This economic order is partially managed by those elements of governance institutionalized in bod­ies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Chs 16 and 27). The resulting economic order penetrates deeply: such bodies do not determine just the rules for international trade and borrowing, nor shape exchange rates alone. The full effects of this international ization of production include its impact on the many other things that determine the quality of human lives: production of military equipment, the condition of the environment, social welfare, access to medicines, human (and specifically child) rights in the area of labour, and gender inequalities in the economy and in processes of development.

Multi lateral management and governance One remarkable aspect of the order is the extremely dense network of contemporary forms of international

Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order

governance (regimes, international organizations, and INGOs). These cover most aspects of life, includ­ing developments in legal (human rights, war crimes, the International Criminal Court), environmental (UNFCCC and post-Kyoto agreements) , and economic regimes, as well as in the core peacekeeping activities of universal organizations like the United Nations. To what extent can we sensibly refer to globalization as giving rise, in turn, to a system of global governance? What is its potential for further development? Are cur­rent international regimes dependent on the underlying power structure of Western dominance and reflective of Western liberal preferences, and how sustainable are they given the cultural diversity of the present world? These issues link the discussion directly to the next ele­ment of order, since much of this regime infrastructure is to be found at a regional level.

Regional ism

The development of contemporary regionalism (see

Ch. 26) is yet another key to understanding the emerging order. This takes various forms, including economic (trading regions) , security (such as NATO), and cultural activities. The intensification of region­alism is occasionally viewed as a denial of globaliza­tion, but is more plausibly regarded as one aspect of it, rather than as evidence to the contrary. The fact that a number of regions feel the need to develop regional institutions is itself a manifestation of glo ­balization, in the same way that the universal spread of the nation-state, as the principal political form, was an earlier product of globalization. Nonetheless, there are interesting questions about the significance of regionalism for the post-cold war order, such as the seemingly greater degree of autonomy 'enjoyed' by regions since the end of the cold war, and the role of regions in constituting new forms of identity. There is a paradox that, with the loss of cold war constraints, regions appeared to have greater autonomy-while, at the same time, levels of interpenetration and global­ization continue to indicate diminished possibilities for regional insulation.

The l i beral rights order

Arguably, this is the feature with the most striking continuities to the cold war period. Human rights had become a conspicuous feature of post-1945 interna­tional politics, largely in reaction to the catastrophic

I A N C LA R K

experiences of the period before 1945 (see Chs 30 and

31). This theme was a paramount aspect of the cold war period itself and was again highlighted with the col­lapse of the Soviet bloc, since that event was portrayed as a major step forward in extending the liberal order. In this respect, the focus on l i beral rights is another ele­ment of continuity between the two periods. However, the post-cold war order is paradoxically under pressure precisely because of its seemingly greater promotion of a type of universalism, thought to be evoking forms of religious and cultural resistance.

This relates directly to wider questions about the future of democratization. How this develops is of momentous import for the future stability of the inter­national order, and touches on a series of interrelated issues: the status of democracy as a universal norm; the current variable experience with democratization, including in the aftermath of the Arab Spring; the pres­sures on democracy arising from globalization (and hence the appeals for cosmopolitan forms of democ­racy); and the future of democracy as a source of inter­state peace and stability (see Ch. 15).

North-South and the two world orders

Any examination of the contemporary order must give a high profile to the apparent gulf within it, separat­ing the experience of the industrialized North from the increasingly marginalized South. Some see the tensions to which this gives rise as undermining the prospects for longer-term stability (see Ch. 29). Are North-South relations more stable now than in pre­vious eras, or do they remain precariously rooted in inequalities of power, massive gaps in quality of life, and incompatibilities of cultural values? (see Case

Study 1). It is also a very moot point, and a key area of disagreement, whether globalization is aggravating these inequalities, or, as its supporters believe, whether it remains the best available means of rectifying them in the longer term. Otherwise expressed, are the prob­lems of the South due to the processes of globaliza­tion, or to the South's relative exclusion from them? In any case, does this divide threaten the durability of the post-cold war order, or must we simply recognize it as a key component of that order, and for that reason

Case Study 1 Developing state health and unequal global izat ion

© www.istockphoto.com/Alida Vann i

Of the global health burden of death by i nfectious d isease i n the early 2000s, some 82 per cent occurred i n Africa and Southeast Asia, and less than 5 per cent in Europe and the Americas {WHO figures). At the same t ime, the region of the Americas contained some 1 0 per cent of the total burden of d i sease, yet 3 1 per cent of the world's health workers. In comparison, Africa suffers 24 per cent of the global burden of d i sease, with only 3 per cent of the health workers {WHO figures). Clearly, there is a sharp m is­match between need and the avai labi l ity of resources to meet it. This situation is compounded by movement of trai ned health personne l towards h igh and midd le i ncome countries. Wh i l e the

developed world volubly voices its concerns about the spread of i nfectious d i sease, the developing world remains re latively pow­erless to staunch the i nward flow of other d iseases, such as those associated with smoking and d iet. Those now encroach upon its own populations. Est imates p lace the projected death burden associated with smoking as fal l i ng between 70-80 per cent upon developing countries by 2030.

The developing world thus faces the prospect of a 'double burden', s imu ltaneously carryi ng a d isproportionate share with respect to both i nfectious and non- i nfectious d i sease. I f this is global izat ion, it is highly unequal , with the flow of harms in the one d i rect ion far su rpass ing the return traffic in the opposite. The p icture is equal ly stark when viewed from the perspective of remedial act ion, particu larly with respect to medical research and the avai labi l ity of medic i nes. In broad terms, we fi nd the app l ication of the crude, but suggestive, 1 0:90 ratio. A mere 1 0 per cent of research spend ing global ly i s devoted to add ress those health problems that account for 90 per cent of the global d isease burden. The situation is particu larly vexed as regards research i nto medic i nes, and the i r avai lab i l ity (at an affordable price). The 80 per cent of the world's popu lation i n the develop­i ng world accounts for on ly some 20 per cent of global sa les of pharmaceuticals. The reason i s straightforward ly that the bulk of research and production is geared to those i l l nesses that affl ict the developed world in part icular, because that is where the effective economic demand for medication is to be found.

understand it as an element of structural continuity with its predecessors?

As against this image of two monolithic blocs of North and South, other analysts insist that this concep­tion is now out of date. The impacts of globalization cut across states and not just between them, yielding complex

Key Poi nts

• Order is shaped by the changed nature of states and of the tasks they perform.

• Security is increasingly dealt with o n a multi lateral basis, even when th is does not conform to classical 'collective security' models.

• The global economy is primari ly shaped by relations between the th ree key group ings (North America, Western

Chapter 33 Global ization and the post-cold war order

patterns of stratification that defy easy classification into North and South. There are enormous variations and inequalities within states, and within regions, not just between them. For this reason, it may be too artificial to speak of two such orders, as there is much more diversity than such crude dichotomies tend to imply.

Europe, and East Asia) and is managed by a panoply of Western-dominated i nstitutions.

• Human rights have a much h igher profi l e than in earl ier h istorical periods.

• Are there two separate orders i n the North and South, or a more complex d iversity of orders?

G lobalization and ttie post-Westphalian o rder

There is a tendency to regard the current high degree of globalization as simply a consequence of the end of the cold war. This view has become coupled to a more gen­eral argument about the end of the Westphalian order (see Box 33.3).

Not surprisingly, many commentators see the post­cold war period as characterized by the intensification of the processes of globalization, particularly with regard to financial integration. The global financial

order is now virtually universal in its reach, as is the influence of its principal institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

On this reasoning, it is the ending of the cold war that has allowed the further spread of globalization, and we can therefore regard the scope of globalization as a point of difference between the cold war and post-cold war worlds. Unfortunately, there is a danger in such an analysis. The problem is that to regard globalization as

Box 33.3 I nterpretat ions of global ization and the end of the cold war

'The end of the Cold War d iv is ion i nto competing world orders marks a crucial substantive and symbol i c transit ion to s i ngle­world economic , cu ltural and pol itical orders.'

(Shaw 1999: 194)

'America has ceased to be a superpower, because it has met its match : global izat ion-a global izat ion wh ich , moreover, i t he lps to promote despite not managing to master total ly its meaning.'

(Laidi 1 998: 1 70)

'G lobal izat ion is the most sign ificant development and theme i n contemporary l ife and social theory to emerge s ince t he col l apse of Marxist systems.'

(A/brow 1 996: 89)

'G lobal ists cont inue to maintain that there are big, fin-de-siecfe transformations under way in the world at large, which can be laid at the door of someth ing cal led global ization . Th is new era­popu larized as "a world without borders" and symbol ized by the d i smantl i ng of the Berl i n Wal l-ostens ib ly came i nto its own where the cold war left off.'

(Weiss 1 999: 59)

'To tal k of 1 989 as the beginn i ng of global isation is very m islead­ing . . . [G] lobal isation . . . was happen ing dur ing the Cold War and has contin ued s i nce. If the Cold War system dominated i nterna­tional pol itics from 1 945 to 1 989, then its successor is American hegemony, not global isation .'

(Leg rain 2002: 7 7)

I A N C LA R K

simply the consequence of the end of the cold war is to neglect the extent to which globalization also served as a cause of its end. In other words, globalization marks a point of continuity, not simply discontinuity, between the two periods.

In a wider sense, the danger with such a proce­dure is that it neglects other dimensions of continuity, such as in the construction of a liberal capitalist order (Ikenberry 2001). What is the historical evidence for this type of argument? Its principal element is the view that globalization developed out of the core of Western capitalist states that formed during the cold war. This became such a powerful force that it finally both weak­ened the other cold war protagonist, namely the Soviet Union, and also made the point of the cold war increas­ingly irrelevant. As regards the Soviet Union, what damaged and eroded its capacity as a military power was precisely the fact that it had not become integrated into the financial and technological sinews of global capitalism. As regards the logic of the cold war as a whole, the existence of a hostile Soviet bloc was cru­cial in the initial integration of the Western system. By the 1980s, however, this system was effectively self-sus­taining, and no longer required any external enemy to provide its dynamic for growth. In this sense, the Soviet Union had become redundant as far as the needs of the dominant Western system were concerned.

If globalization was both an element of the pre­existing cold war system and also stands out shar.ply as an element of the contemporary order, it needs to be seen as a point of continuity between the two periods. This logic, in turn, requires us to concede that the pres­ent order is not sui generis, as it contains within it ele­ments that were already present during the cold war. This suggests that the contemporary order should be understood as not wholly distinct from that which pre­ceded it. But if globalization is the element that binds both together, can it be also the key to understanding the present order?

The claim that globalization defines the essential quality of the present order has been denied for a num­ber of reasons. Most generally, if globalization is seen as a long-term historical trend-with various waves­then to interpret the present order in terms of global­ization does not say enough about what is specific to the current situation in particular.

Beyond this, globalization has been described as the dystopic absence of order. The general claim is that 'no one seems now to be in control' (Bauman 1998:

58) . It is for this reason that globalization has come to be associated with a more general thesis about the demise of the Westphalian order. This system had typified the order since 1648, and its hallmarks were clearly defined states, with hard borders, each enjoy­ing full sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The rules of the game dictated that states would not intervene in the domestic affairs of each other. Globalization, in contrast, is thought to ques­tion the efficacy of borders . This is very much so in the case of the global economy, where it is suggested that borders no longer mean as much as they once did. It also applies to other aspects of political life, such as human rights and humanitarian intervention, where the norms of the Westphalian order have come under increasing pressure.

All these arguments suggest that globalization may be inadequate as the exclusive conceptual basis for understanding the contemporary order because of what globalization does. It is too varied in its effects, and so lacking in purpose and goals, so that we can­not visualize a single order constructed on that basis alone. Indeed, the main theme of these writings is just how disorderly the process of globalization is. But a different form of argument can be made on the basis of what globalization is, not just what it does . We need to be more precise about its nature, and not look only at its effects. This will be set out in the final section, after we have reviewed some of the political problems that appear to be attached to globalization today. These arise exactly from that sense of purposelessness and lack of control.

• Global ization is often portrayed as an effect of the end of the cold war because this led to its further geographical spread.

• At the same t ime, global ization needs to be understood as one of the factors that contributed to the end of the cold war. I t was the Soviet U n ion's marginal ization from processes of global ization that revealed, and i ntensified, its weaknesses.

• Accord i ngly, global izat ion should be regarded as an element of conti nu ity between the co ld war and post-cold war orders.

• There is reason for scepticism that global ization is the exc lusive hal lmark of contemporary order.

• G lobal ization embodies a range of often competi ng values.

Globalization and legitimacy

On the face of it, globalization potentially creates sev­eral problems for the political stability of the current order. Not least is this so with regard to its legitimacy (see Box 33.4) . There is a widely shared view that the emergence of a diffuse protest movement against glo­balization is symptomatic of a new wave of resistance to it. This creates tensions at several levels. The central problem is understood to be one of the limited effec­tiveness of democratic practice in present world condi­tions. At a time when so much emphasis is placed on the virtues of democracy, many question its viability when organized on a purely national basis, given the context of globalization. There are two facets to this issue: representation and accountability. It is all very well for citizens to be represented in national elec­toral institutions, but what voice does this give them in controlling those very economic, social, and cul­tural forces that cut across national borders, if their own governments do not have the capacity to deal with these? Conversely, this creates an issue of account­ability. There may be little point in holding national and local politicians accountable through elections if these politicians remain relatively powerless to exercise

Chapter 33 Global ization and the post-cold war order

influence over global corporations, global technology, global environmental changes, or the global financial system. These concerns apply specifically to just how democratic are bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as interna­tional organizations such as the United Nations. On a regional level, there has been recurrent anxiety about the so-called legitimacy deficits that afflict the institu­tions of the European Union (see Ch. 26) . The general issue is the lack of congruence between the geographi­cal organization of our various political systems, and the 'deterritorialized' nature of our current economic, social, and political activities.

In the face of these concerns, there has been much debate about the role of an emerging global civil society (Keane 2003). This embraces a variety of cross-national social movements, including anti-globalization activ­ists as well as a multitude of international non-govern­mental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Their proponents see these movements as the only feasible way of directly influencing global policies on such matters as development, environment, human rights, and international security, and hence

Box 33.4 The debate about global izat ion and legitimacy

'The process of global ization has had a m ixed impact on the legiti ­macy of i nternational organ izations. The demand for i nternational co-ord ination and common action has obviously i ncreased. But at the same t ime, the effectiveness of IOs has d im in ished .'

(Junne 200 1 : 2 18- 1 9)

'G lobal structures violate commitments to the politics of consent: there is a global democratic deficit that must be reduced if world ­wide arrangements are to be legitimate.'

(Linklater 1 999: 477)

' I t wi l l be argued that the r is ing need for en larged and deepened i nternational cooperation in the age of global ization led to the establ i shment of new international i nstitutions with specif ic fea­tu res. As a resu lt , the i ntrusiveness of those new international i nstitutions i nto national societies has increased d ramatical ly.'

(Zurn 2004: 261 -2)

'The democratic project is to global ize democracy as we have global ized the economy.'

(Barber 2002: 255)

'Some theorists have pointed to the activity of social movements working beyond state borders as a method of i ncreas ing demo­cratic practice. They see a contrad iction between the fact that the structu res of power . . . are fi rmly rooted i n the global context, but partici pat ion, representation and legit imacy are fixed at the state level .'

(O' Brien et al. 2000: 2 1 -2)

'However much i nd iv id ual I NGOs and global social move­ments may have contr i buted to the extens ion of democratic pol it ics across the wor ld , they do not cu rrent ly possess the requ is ite degree of legit imacy and accountab i l i ty to be con ­s idered a s democrati c representatives i n a g lobal ized po l i tical com m u n ity.'

(Colas 2002: 1 63)

'Rather than reform, these crit ics i ns ist that what is requ i red is an alternative system of global governance, privi legi ng people over profits, and the local over the global.'

(Held and McGrew 2002: 64)

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as the best way of democratizing global governance. Others, however, remain sceptical. There is nothing inherently democratic about global civil society as such, as there is no legitimate basis of representation or accountability to many of these movements (Van Rooy 2003). They may simply represent sectional interests, and make policy hostage to those that are better orga­nized, have greater resources, and are more vocal.

Indeed, from the perspective of many govern­ments in the South, global civil society may aggravate the inequalities between rich and poor. Civil society is resented as an extension of the power of the North, for the reason that such movements have a much more solid basis in the developed world, and are more likely to speak for its interests. This is illustrated, for example, in the tension between the economic develop­ment objectives of many governments in the South and the preferred policies of many environmental move­ments in the North. The possible objection is that this

perpetuates the sense of two contrasting global orders, one for the North (represented both by strong govern­ments and strong civil society movements) and another for the South (led by weak governments, and weakly organized civil society) . This may contribute to a per­ceived crisis oflegitimacy for the state in the developing world (see Case Study 2) .

Key Points

• Trad it ional democracy does not offer effective representation in the global order.

• National e lections may not make pol it ic ians accountable if they cannot control wider global forces.

• There is a heated debate about whether global civi l society can he lp to democratize i nternational i nstitutions.

• Some governments i n the South remain suspicious of social movements that may be better organ ized i n developed countries.

Case Study 2 The cr is is of deve lop ing state legitimacy

© www.istockphoto.com/adrian brockwel l

The idea of the two world orders-one applying to the r ich and stable North and the other to the poor and unstable South-re in ­forces the image of a cris is of state legitimacy i n the South. Many of these have, s i nce decolon izat ion, been depicted as q uasi ­states (Jackson 1 990), not enjoying the fu l l capacities of strong states. The per iod s ince the end of the cold war has rei nforced this tendency. I t has become commonplace to refer to a number of 'fai led states' (e.g. Lebanon, Cambod ia, Afghan istan, Somal ia , Rwanda, ZaYre, Z imbabwe), i nd icating their inab i l ity to maintai n central order with i n the state, or to produce at least m i n imal condit ions of social welfare and economic subsistence. In some

cases, law and order has broken down i nto civi l war, creati ng fief­doms organ ized by rival warlords.

The deployment by the i nternational commun ity of a num­ber of peacebu i l d i ng m issions has been imp l icit ly justified on the grounds of the 'fai l u re' of these national authorit ies to maintain order on their own, especia l ly i n the aftermath of i nternational or civi l confl i ct . Th is has been associated with the revival of doc­trines of trusteesh ip i n the i nternational community, charging the strong with some responsib i l ity for protect ing the welfare of the weak.

However, there is considerable resentment against th is not ion of fai led states, and i t i s often suggested that the fai l u res are exactly the outcome of the structural condit ions that the Northern powers have themselves created by their economic and pol it ical actions. This resentment leads to charges that the i nstruments of the i nternational community are being used to erode the pol it ical legitimacy of Southern governments, thereby making Southern societies more vu lnerable to i ntervention , and more adaptable to the preferences of the rich states. Th is i s fu r­ther compounded when the most powerfu l states themselves quest ion the legit imacy of some governments, by designati ng them as rogue states, or sponsors of terror ism, and question ing their fu l l entit lement to be represented i n i nternational negotia­tions, or to enjoy equal rights with other states. The objection raised is that state fai lu res, and the result ing d im i n ished legiti ­macy of developing states, are not 'objective' condit ions but the products of Northern pol i cies.

Chapter 33 Global ization and the post-cold war order

An international order of globalized states?

The chapter now returns to the question of whether globalization can be regarded as the defining element in contemporary order. Globalization could be taken to represent the mainstay of today's order only if it superseded all traditional elements of the international order. But if globalization is an addition to, not a sub­stitute for, the existing international order, then it is not wholly adequate to the task of providing us with the single key to the post-cold war order.

If it can be convincingly held that globalization is not some process over and above the activities of states, but is instead an element within state transformation, we can develop on this basis a conception of the global­ized state. Globalization does not make the state disap­pear, but is a way of thinking about its present form. By extension, globalization does not make redundant the notion of an international order, but instead requires us to think about a globalized international order. In short, what is required is a notion of international order composed of globalized states.

Much of the confusion results from the tendency to see globalization as exclusively pertaining to the envi­ronment in which states find themselves: globaliza­tion is a force wholly external to the individual states , and demands an outside-in perspective on the result­ing outcomes (see Fig. 33.1) . On this view, globaliza­tion is a claim about the degree of interconnectedness between states , such that the significance of borders, and the reality of separate national actors, is called seriously into question. There is no denying that this is part of what globalization signifies. But what such a one-sided interpretation leaves out is the extent to which globalization refers also to a 'domestic' process

Global ization State

Figure 33.1 Outside- i n view of global ization

of change within states . Regarded in this alternative way, globalization can be understood as an expression of the profound transformations in the nature of the state, and in state-society relations, that have devel­oped in recent decades. This requires an inside-out view of globalization as well (see Fig. 33.2). This leads us to think not of the demise or retreat of the state, but about its changing functionality: states still exist but do different things-they do some things less well than they used to, and also have taken on new responsibili­ties in exchange.

Even in an age of globalization, there remain both states and a states-system. We need to face the seeming paradox that there can indeed be an international order of globalized states.

Key Poi nts

• Global ization is often thought of as an extreme form of interdepend ence. This sees it exclusively as an outside-in development.

• The impl i cation of such analyses is that states are now much weaker as actors. Consequently, they are i n retreat or becoming obsolete.

• But if global izat ion is considered as a transformation in the nature of states themselves, this suggests that states are sti l l central t o the d iscussion o f order: they are d ifferent but not obsolete. This leads to the idea of a global ized state as a state form, and i ntroduces an ins ide-out element.

• In th is case, there is no contrad iction between the norms and rules of a state system operat ing alongside global ized states.

Global ization

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State

Global ization +

Figure 33.2 I nside-out view of global ization

THe global financial crisis·

The on-going financial upheaval since 2007 lends fur­ther support to the core argument of this chapter. On the one hand, it certainly seemed to reaffirm the strong version of the globalization thesis that the world is so powerfully interconnected that no state can isolate itself from harmful impacts. This was demonstrated in the speed with which the sub-prime credit implosion in the USA transmitted itself globally. As the squeeze on international lending affected the real economy, pro­duction and trade experienced sharp falls. Small states such as Iceland and Ireland, and then Greece, seemed 'hollowed out' by this financial globalization. As part of the associated crisis in the eurozone, even larger econo­mies such as Spain and Italy have been placed at risk.

On the other hand, the response to the crisis gave the lie to those accounts suggesting that the global economy was no longer embedded in state and political structures, and somehow was able to operate autono­mously. The most striking feature of the events of 2008 was the return of state action to underwrite the bank­ing and financial sectors. Leading states, including the USA, had to bail out the banks, either through loans, or effectively through forms of nationalization. Even the USA, the bastion of laissez-faire capitalism, undertook unprecedented levels of governmental intervention in the economy, including the automobile industry. As governments introduced their various stimulus pack­ages to try to push their economies out of recession, there was even a barely concealed attempt to interfere with the market by veiled forms of protectionism.

+ Globalization

In short, if the discussion of globalization hitherto had tended to proceed on the basis of a false opposi­tion between globalization and state power-viewed as in a zero-sum relationship where more globalization further weakened the role of states-then the financial crunch of 2008 made abundantly clear the extent to which a global economy and global finance remained critically dependent on structural supports from state sources. Indeed, this age of globalization witnessed the return to unusually high levels of state capital ism in the so-called market economies.

The major challenge to a business-as-usual model for the future global economy comes from climate change. While responding to this challenge appears particularly difficult during an economic recession, with many competing demands on public finances, the move towards a post-carbon economy is being presented as an opportunity for, not an obstacle to, economic recovery. How far, and how fast, this will go depends on interlocking domestic and interna­tional negotiations. Domestically, many governments are trying to enact 'clean energy' legislation, or to introduce carbon trading schemes, to curb emissions. Internationally, much depends on whether an effective post-Kyoto regime can be implemented, and whether it will deliver an acceptable deal that involves all major emitters, whether 'developing' or not (see Ch. 22). It is no 19nger possible to talk about the future of globaliza­tion without placing responses to climate change at the centre of the discussion.

What all this suggests is that we are not witnessing the end of globalization. More realistically, the financial crisis points towards the beginning of the end of one version of it. That particular model of Anglo-American financial deregulation, which has reigned supreme since the 1980s, does, indeed, now face major challenges (Gamble 2009). It certainly faces an almost universal crisis of legitimacy, both at the governmental and at the civil society levels. By itself, however, this does not indicate the end of globalization. Levels of interdepen­dence remain very high. While there is, at the moment, a strong desire to insulate national economies from the worst excesses of deregulation, this is unlikely to go as far as policies aimed actively at cutting national econ­omies adrift from the global. Virtually all states retain high stakes in this economy. While there is much talk of a burgeoning Chinese economy coming to take the place of the USA as the most powerful influence, there is noth­ing to suggest that China is about to lead the attack on the international economy, given its own high dependence on access to it. Had China wished to destroy the liberal

Conclusion

In short, we now face a hybrid situation in which states share a host of responsibilities with both intergovern­mental organizations and a multiplicity of non-govern­mental and transnational actors. This does not, however, mean that the international order has become redun­dant. It means simply that it needs to be redesigned to take account of the new division of labour between states, global networks, and the rudimentary forms of global governance. As long as states persist as impor­tant sources of political agency, they will construct a states-system with its own rules and norms. It is this that we regard as the essential basis of the international order. Currently, the identity of states is undergoing

Questions

Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order

project, 2008 presented its best opportunity for doing so. Instead, China played its part in helping to bail out the stricken US economy. We do not yet face the end of glo­balization, because there is no major state interested in acting as the champion of de-globalization. Nonetheless, critical to the future evolution of the global economy, as with many other aspects of the international order, will be what kind of relationship, or accommodation, proves possible between the US and China, as they still repre­sent distinctively different types of globalized states.

Key Poi nts

• Toxic debts rapidly infected the global fi nancial system. • State i ntervention was needed to support the system.

• We are seeing the end of one version of globalization, rather than the end of global ization.

• Responses to c l imate change are now a key d river of the futu re shape of the global economy.

• De-global izat ion has no pol it ical champion.

considerable change, to the extent that we can describe them as globalized states. But these globalized states still coexist within an international order, albeit one that now differs from its recent historical forms. This order is cur­rently seeking to develop a set of principles to reflect that transformation. The quest for a post-cold war order is the expression of this uneasy search. There is no reason to assume that recent trends are irreversible, as the revival of the security state after 9/1 1 would seem to indicate. Likewise, the return to forms of state capitalism during 2008 was almost wholly unexpected. The globalized state of the late twentieth century is evidently not the only model of likely state development in the future.

Is the post-cold war order sti l l an i nternationa l o rder?

2 How i m portant an e lement i n the contemporary order is the condit ion of global ization?

3 How wou ld you d i st i ngu ish between an i nternational and a world order, and wh ich is the

more i mportant framework for assess i ng the contemporary s ituat ion?

4 I n which respects are the ' identit ies' of states undergo i ng change?

I A N C LA R K

5 How wou ld you defi ne the polarity of the contem porary i nternat ional system? 6 Is regi.ona l i sm a contrad ict ion of global izat ion? 7 Is the promi nence of democracy and l i beral rights convi nc ing evidence of the i mpact of

global izat ion? If so, why is global izat ion so prob lematic for democracy? 8 I n which ways is global ization creat ing problems of pol it ical l egit imacy? 9 Does the 2008 fi nancia l cr is is point to the end of global ization?

1 0 I s the idea of an i nternational order of global ized states contradictory?

Further Read ing

International order

Bul l , H . ( 1 977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmi l lan) , especia l ly Part 1 . P rovides the standard i ntroduction to th is issue from an i nternational society perspective.

New world orders and the post-cold war world

Clark, I. (2001 ), The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press). Presents a gu ide to the debates about the post-cold war period, viewing the order as the equ ivalent of a h i storical peace settlement .

I kenberry, G.J . (2001 ) , After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Pr i nceton , Nj : Pri nceton U n ivers ity Press) . Also sets post-co ld war deve lopments in the i r h i storical context and argues for the emergence of an i ncreasi ngly 'constitutional ' i nternational order after 1 945 .

Globalization in the present order

Clark, I . ( 1 997) , Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford U n ivers ity Press). P laces the contemporary debates about g lobal izat ion in h i storical perspective.

-- (1 999), Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press) . Develops a theoretical account of global izat ion i n terms of state transformation .

Cohen , j . L . (201 2), Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality. Legitimacy and Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge U n ivers ity Press). Traces legal and human rights imp l i cations .

Friedman, T. L . (2006), The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century (London : Pengu i n) . A detai led journa l i st ic account of the i mpacts of global izat ion .

Holden, R .J . (201 1 ) , Globalization and the Nation State, 2nd edn (Houndm i l ls : Palgrave). Good summary of the re lationsh i p between global izat ion and the state.

International legitimacy

Clark, I. (2005) , Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press). Exp lores the natu re of legitimacy with i n the states-system .

-- (2007), International Legitimacy and World Society (Oxford: Oxford U n iversity Press). Tries to exp la in how world society norms are adopted by i nternational society.

-- (201 1 ) , Hegemony in International Society (Oxford : Oxford U n ivers ity Press) . Discusses a cond it ion of pr imacy with legitimacy.

The global financial crisis

Gamble, A. (2009), The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession (Bas ingstoke: Palgrave Macm i l lan) . An overview of the economic d rama of 2007-9.