MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2017ME15Docket: Oxf-16-82Argued: November9,2016Decided: January19,2017Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

GLORIACARIGNANv.

PAULR.DUMASJR.JABAR,J.

[¶1] PaulR.Dumas Jr.appeals froma judgmentof theSuperiorCourt

(Oxford County, Clifford, J.) granting summary judgment in favor of Gloria

Carignan and denying Dumas’s motion for summary judgment. Dumas

contendsthatthecourterredbyinterpretingaprovisionofthePaperStreets

Act,23M.R.S.§3031(2016),toapplyretrospectively.Weagree,andtherefore

vacate thecourt’sentryofsummary judgment forCarignanand itsdenialof

summaryjudgmentforDumas,andremandforfurtherproceedings.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]Thesummaryjudgmentrecordcontainsthefollowingfacts.Bradyv.

Cumberland Cty., 2015ME 143, ¶ 2, 126 A.3d 1145. Gloria Carignan owns

unencumbered title to real estate located at 3Holyoke Avenue in Rumford,

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Maine(the“CarignanParcel”).HerpropertyisdescribedinadeedfromJohnF.

HargreavestoGloriaF.HargreavesdatedSeptember15,2010,andrecordedin

theOxfordCountyRegistryofDeeds.TheCarignanParcelisfurtherdescribed

inadeedtoJohnFHargreavesandGloriaF.HargreavesbyRobertF.Perryand

Rita N. Perry dated January 26, 1979, also recorded in the Oxford County

RegistryofDeeds.TheCarignanParcelwasoriginallygrantedtothePerrysby

deedofRumfordFallsPowerCompany(RFPC)recordedonFebruary23,1973.

It isdelineatedas lots2153 through2159onRFPC’s subdivisionplan titled

Ninth Addition and Revision of Part First Addition Rumford (the “Ninth

AdditionPlan”),datedJuly8,1920,andrecordedonAugust4,1920.

[¶3]PaulR.DumasJr.ownspropertydescribedintwoseparatedeeds:

one (the “Casco Bank Parcel”) dated January 22, 1976, and recorded in the

OxfordCountyRegistryofDeeds;andanother(the“RumfordPaperCompany

Parcel”)dated July18, 2014, also recorded inOxfordCounty. TheRumford

Paper Company Parcel is delineated on the Ninth Addition Plan, and is

contiguoustotheCascoBankParcel,whichisdelineatedonasubdivisionplan

titledFourthAdditiontoRumfordFalls,datedAugust10,1906,andrecorded

September 19, 1906. Together, Dumas’s property (collectively the “Dumas

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Parcel”)includesplots2160through2176andthesouthernportionof2177as

shownontheNinthAdditionPlan.

[¶4] TheCarignanParcel isborderedon thewestbyWillowStreet, a

paperstreetdepictedontheNinthAdditionPlan.Dumas’slots2172through

2177areborderedbyWillowStreetontheeast,andhislots2160through2164

areborderedbyWillowStreetonthewest. AportionofWillowStreetruns

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directlybetweenpartoftheCarignanParcelandpartoftheDumasParcel.Two

otherpaperstreets,VineStreetandSalemStreet,abuttheDumasParcelbut

arenotatissuehere.

[¶5]WillowStreetwasneverformallyacceptedbytheTownofRumford,

andneitherpartyallegesanyprivateorpublicuseoftheroaduntilthe1970s,

whenDumasassertsthataportionofWillowStreetwasmaintainedforlogging

purposes.1

[¶6] RumfordPaperCompanyisthesuccessor-in-interesttoRFPC. In

conveyingtheCarignanParceltothePerrysin1973,RFPCexpresslyreserved

[f]orever,toandforitself, itssuccessorsandassigns. . .rightstoauthorize and consent to the authorization, construction, andmaintenance through any and all the streets, avenues, parks,reserved and other open places shown on the [Ninth AdditionPlan],ofsurfacerailwaystobepropelledbyhorses,electricityorsteam;orotherpower,orsewers,waterpipes,gaspipes,electric

1CarignandeniedDumas’sstatementofmaterialfactthattheroadwasusedforloggingduring

the1970sand1980s,andassertedthattheaffidavitsofRachelMeisnerandBrianMilligan,submittedinsupportofDumas’sstatementsofmaterialfacts,“failedtosetoutqualifyingfoundation.”Whileaconclusory and unsupported assertion of personal knowledge in an affidavit is insufficient toestablishtheadmissibilityofbusinessrecordspursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.56(e),seeBeneficialMe.Inc.v.Carter,2011ME77,¶¶15-16,25A.3d96,firsthandpersonalknowledgeofthefactassertedsatisfiestherequirementsoftherule,Cotev.Cote,2016ME94,¶20,143A.3d117.BecausebothMeisnerandMilliganassertedfirsthandknowledgeoftheuseofWillowStreetduringthe1970sand1980sbasedonpersonalexperienceandobservation,andCarignandisputesonlytheevidentiaryfoundationfortheiraffidavits,theiraffidavitsandthefactscontainedthereinareproperlyconsideredaspartofthesummaryjudgmentrecordhere.

Dumas,bycontrast,admittedCarignan’sstatementofmaterialfactthat“[a]tnotimewasthereuse or construction of the easterly side ofWillow Street at any timemeaningful to this cause ofaction.”

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wires,bothoverheadandunderground,andallothermattersandthingsforwhichstreetsarecustomarilyused....

WhenRumfordPaperCompanyconveyedtheRumfordPaperCompanyParcel

toDumas,itexpresslyincludedinitsconveyance“allofthefeeinterest,andany

otherinterestorrightsoftheGrantorpreviouslyreservedorotherwiseheldby

RumfordFallsPowerCompanyinWillowStreet...asshownupon[theNinth

AdditionPlan].”

[¶7]OnMay15,1997,theTownvotedpursuantto23M.R.S.A.§3032

(1997) to exempt from the time limitations of the Paper StreetsAct certain

paperstreetsinRumford,butdidnotincludeWillowStreet.Lessthantwenty

years before this action was brought, Carignan constructed a garage that

encroachesuponasectionofWillowStreetadjacenttotheCarignanParcel.She

hasneverrecordedintheOxfordCountyRegistryofDeeds,andnevergivento

anyrecordowner,anynoticeofclaimtoWillowStreet.

[¶8] OnNovember8,2013,Carignan filedacomplaintagainstDumas

andRobertRichard,anallegedcontractor forDumas,assertingsixcausesof

actionrelatedtoRichard’suseofWillowStreettoaccesstheDumasParcel.In

response,Dumasassertedaffirmativedefensesandcounterclaimed,pursuant

to the Paper Streets Act, P.L. 1987, ch. 385 (effective September 29, 1987)

(codified at 23 M.R.S. §§ 3027, 3031-3035 (2016); 33 M.R.S. §§ 460,

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469-A(2016))seekingadeclaratoryjudgmentthatCarignanhasnolegalrights

to anyportionofWillowStreet, thatDumashas aneasement touseWillow

Street toaccesshisproperty, and thatapubliceasementexistsoverWillow

Street.

[¶9]Carignanstipulatedtoapartialdismissalofherclaim,andamended

hercomplaint toseekdeclaratory judgment,namingDumas,RFPC,andNew

PageCorporationasdefendants.RFPCandNewPageCorporationwerelater

dismissed from the action, leaving only Carignan and Dumas as parties. In

January2015,CarignanandDumasfiledcross-motionsforsummaryjudgment

astoCarignan’sclaimandDumas’scounterclaimfordeclaratoryjudgment.

[¶10] OnMay 4, 2015, following a hearing on the cross-motions, the

SuperiorCourt(OxfordCounty,Clifford,J.)enteredanordergrantingsummary

judgmentforCarignananddenyingsummaryjudgmentforDumas.Thecourt

concludedthatpursuantto33M.R.S.§469-A(2016),addressingreservationof

title to proposed, unaccepted ways, Carignan, through her

predecessors-in-title,acquiredtitletothecenterlineofthatportionofWillow

Streetabuttingherproperty.Next,addressingtheissueofpublicandprivate

easementsinWillowStreet,thecourtrelieduponourholdinginTisdalev.Buch,

2013ME95,81A.3d377,toconcludethat23M.R.S.§§3031(1)and(2)(2016),

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which address public and private rights in proposed, unaccepted ways

recorded in subdivision plans, apply to subdivision plans recorded before

September29,1987.ThecourtfoundthatbecausetheTownneveraccepted

WillowStreet,anypublicorprivaterightstoitsuseexpirednolaterthan1940

pursuanttothoseprovisions.Additionally,thecourtconcludedthatCarignan

was not required to file notice of her rights to Willow Street pursuant to

23 M.R.S. § 3033 (2016) because public rights to the street had already

terminated.Finally,thecourtdeniedDumas’snuisancecounterclaimsbecause

hehadfailedtoallegeproperlysupportedmaterialfactsthathehasrightsin

WillowStreetthatareburdenedbyCarignan’sencroachinggarage.

[¶11]DumasfiledamotionforreconsiderationonMay18,2015,which

the court denied on July 29, 2015, and was entered on the docket on

February12,2016.OnFebruary24,2016,Dumastimelyfilednoticeofappeal.

M.R.App.P.2(b)(3).

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II.DISCUSSION

A. IssueonAppeal

[¶12]Dumasarguesonappealthatwhenreadtogetherwith23M.R.S.

§ 3032 (2016),2 23 M.R.S § 3031 (2016)3 cannot reasonably be applied to

subdivisionplansrecordedpriortoSeptember29,1987,becausesection3031

2Title23M.R.S.§3032provides,inpart:

1-A. Deemed vacation. A proposed, unaccepted way or portion of a proposed,unacceptedwaylaidoutonasubdivisionplanrecordedintheregistryofdeedspriortoSeptember29,1987isdeemedtohavebeensubjecttoanorderofvacationundersection 3027 if, by the later of 15 years after the date of the recording of thesubdivisionplanlayingoutthewayorportionofthewayorSeptember29,1997,bothofthefollowingconditionshavebeenmet:

A.Thewayorportionofthewayhasnotbeenconstructedorusedasaway;and

B.Thewayorportionofthewayhasnotbeenacceptedasatown,countyorstatewayorhighwayorasapublic,utilityorrecreationaleasement.

3Title23M.R.S.§3031provides,inpart:

1.Publicrights.Fromthedateofrecordingofasubdivisionplanintheregistryofdeeds,thepublicacquiresrightsofincipientdedicationtopublicuseofthewayslaidout on the plan. If a proposed way laid out in the plan is not accepted by themunicipalitywithin20yearsfromthedateofrecordingoftheplan,thepublicrightsinthatwayterminate.

2. Private rights. A person acquiring title to land shown on a subdivision planrecordedintheregistryofdeedsacquiresaprivateright-of-wayoverthewayslaidoutintheplan.Ifaproposed,unacceptedwayisnotconstructedwithin20yearsfromthedateofrecordingoftheplan,andiftheprivaterightscreatedbytherecordingoftheplanarenotconstructedandutilizedasprivaterightswithinthat20-yearperiod,theprivaterights-ofwayinthatwayterminate.

UnlesstitlehasbeenreservedpursuanttoTitle33,section469-A,whentheprivaterightsestablishedbythissubsectionareterminatedasprovidedinthissubsectionorbyorderofvacationbythemunicipality,thetitleofthefeeinterestintheproposed,unacceptedwayforwhichtheprivaterights-of-wayhaveterminatedpassestotheabuttingpropertyownerstothecenterlineoftheway.

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cannotbeappliedtothesamepaperstreetstowhichsection3032expressly

applies.4AccordingtoDumas,applyingsection3031topre-1987subdivision

planscausesthenonsensicalresultthatincertaininstancespublicandprivate

rights in proposed, unaccepted ways will be simultaneously preserved

pursuanttosections3032and3033andterminatedpursuanttosection3031.5

Carignan counter-argues that section 3031 can be reconciled with sections

3032and3033becausesection3031governspublicandprivaterightsofuse,

whilesections3032and3033governpresumptions,procedures,andremedies.

B. StandardofReview

[¶13] Cross-motions for summary judgment are reviewed de novo

pursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.56.F.R.Carroll,Inc.v.TDBank,N.A.,2010ME115,¶8,

8A.3d646.Wewill“considerboththeevidenceandanyreasonableinferences

that the evidence produces in the lightmost favorable to the party against

whomthesummaryjudgmenthasbeengrantedinordertodetermineifthere

4Dumasconcedesthatpursuantto33M.R.S.§469-A(2016)Carignanistheownerinfeetothe

centerlineoftheportionofWillowStreetthatabutsherlot.Hearguesonlythatthecourterredinitsapplicationofsection3031toplansrecordedpriortoSeptember29,1987,andthathisrightofwayoverWillowStreetshouldthereforenothaveterminated.

5AlthoughDumasraisesotherissuesonappeal,becausewedeterminethatthecourt’sanalysisandapplicationofsections3031and3032ofthePaperStreetsActwasreversibleerror,aswasthecourt’sconclusionthatDumashadabandonedanyeasementtowhichhemightbeentitled,wedonotaddressDumas’sothercontentionshere.

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isagenuineissueofmaterialfact.”Grantv.FosterWheeler,LLC,2016ME85,

¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242 (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is

properlygrantediftherearenogenuineissuesofmaterialfactandthemoving

partyisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.Doev.Williams,2013ME24,

¶10,61A.3d718;M.R.Civ.P.56(c).

[¶14]Wereviewdenovo“thetrialcourt’sinterpretationandapplication

of the relevant statutes and legal concepts.” Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp.,

2015ME63,¶19,116A.3d466.Wewillanalyzeastatute’splainlanguageto

effecttheLegislature’sintent,andwill“considertheprovisionatissueinthe

contextoftheentirerelevantstatutoryscheme.”Brooksv.Carson,2012ME97,

¶19,48A.3d224.

C. OperationofthePaperStreetsAct

[¶15]ThePaperStreetsActwasenactedin1987to“clarifytitletoold,

proposed,unacceptedstreetsshownonsubdivisionplans,andtoeliminatethe

possibilityofancientclaims.”Id.¶24(citationandquotationmarksomitted).

The various sections of theActmust be read as complementary,Fournier v.

Elliott,2009ME25,¶21,966A.2d410,andsections3031through3034“shall

be liberallyconstrued toaffect the legislativepurposeof” theAct. 23M.R.S.

§3035(2016).

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[¶16] Section 3031 of the Act grants the public rights of incipient

dedicationtowayslaidoutinarecordedsubdivisionplan,butterminatesthose

rightsiftheproposedwayisnotacceptedbythemunicipalitywithintwenty

yearsfromthedateofrecording.23M.R.S.§3031(1).Italsograntsaprivate

rightofwayoverthosewaystopartieswhoacquiretitletolandshownonthe

samesubdivisionplanastheproposedway,andterminatesthoseprivaterights

if the way is not constructed within twenty years after recording and the

private rights “are not constructed and utilized” within the same time. Id.

§3031(2).

[¶17]Section3032providesthatif,withinthelateroffifteenyearsafter

recording or September 29, 1997, amunicipality has not voted to accept a

proposedwaylaidoutinasubdivisionplanrecordedpriortoSeptember29,

1987,andithasbeenneitherconstructednorusedasaway,thenthewayis

deemedvacatedasthoughbyorderofthemunicipalitypursuantto23M.R.S.

§3027(2016).23M.R.S.§3032(1-A).Amunicipalitymayextendthedeadline

by filing notice. Id. § 3032(2). Any person “claiming to own a proposed,

unacceptedway. . .deemedvacatedundersection3032”mustrecordnotice

andbringaclaimpursuanttosection3033.23M.R.S.§3033(2016).

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D. RetroactiveApplicationofSection3031

[¶18] At issue here is whether section 3031 applies to pre-1987

subdivisionplans.Ourcommonlawpresumptionisthat“absentlanguageto

the contrary, legislation affecting procedural or remedial rights should be

appliedretroactively,whereaslegislationaffectingsubstantiverightsshouldbe

appliedprospectively.” InreGuardianshipof JeremiahT.,2009ME74,¶18,

976A.2d955(quotationmarksomitted);seealsoGreenvallv.Me.Mut.FireIns.

Co.,2001ME180,¶7,788A.2d165.Similarly,wehavesaidthat“allstatutes

willbeconsideredtohaveaprospectiveoperationonly,unlessthelegislative

intent to the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied from the

language used.” Coates v. Me. Emp’t Sec. Com., 406 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1979)

(quotation marks omitted); see also 1 M.R.S. § 302 (2016) (“Actions and

proceedingspendingatthetimeofthepassage,amendmentorrepealofanAct

orordinancearenotaffectedthereby.”).Therefore,unlesstheplainlanguage

ofthestatute,orsomeotherreason,requiresit,wewillnotinterpretsection

3031toapplyretroactively.

[¶19]Wehavenoted,discussingtheActasawhole,thatitwas“intended

to apply retroactively.” Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Me. 1996)

(notingthat“thelawwasintendedasa‘comprehensiveattempttodealwitha

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variety of title and titlemarketability problemspresentedby old, proposed,

unacceptedstreetsshownonsubdivisionplans’”(citingL.D.1776,Statementof

Fact (113th Legis. 1987))). By its plain language, section 3032 applies

retroactively to proposed, unaccepted ways “laid out on a subdivision plan

recorded in the registry of deeds prior to September 29, 1987.” 23 M.R.S.

§3032(1-A). Similarly, the secondparagraphof subsection3031(2)applies

retroactively, because that paragraph references section 469-A, which

“pertainstoconveyancespriorto1987.”Fournier,2009ME25,¶24,966A.2d

410;23M.R.S.§469-A(1).

[¶20]Thereare,however,certainprovisionsofthePaperStreetsActthat

we have held do not apply retroactively. For example,we have stated that

subsection3031(4)appliesonlytosubdivisionsrecordedafter1987,andhave

neverexplicitlyappliedsubsection3031(1)orthefirstparagraphofsubsection

3031(2)topre-1987subdivisions.Id.¶¶2,25-26.

[¶21] ThecourtbelowrelieduponourdecisioninTisdale toconclude

thatsection3031asawholeappliestopre-1987subdivisionplans.InTisdale,

wedecidedthatplaintiffswhosoughtadeclaratoryjudgmentastotheirrights

touse a right ofway couldnothave acquired rightspursuant to subsection

3031(2)because their lotswerenot shownona1969subdivisionplan that

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depicted the right ofway, and their deeds did not reference the 1969 plan.

Tisdale, 2013ME95,¶¶7,12,81A.3d377. Thus, rather thanaffirmatively

holdingthatsection3031appliesinitsentiretytosuchsubdivisionplans,we

determinedthattheplanatissueinthatcasedidnotmeettherequirementsof

subsection3031(2).Id.

[¶22] Ifwenowweretoapplysubsection3031(1)andtheentiretyof

subsection3031(2)topre-1987subdivisionplans,asCarignanurges,sections

3031and3032wouldbeinconflict.Section3032terminatespublicrightsin

proposed,unacceptedwaysifthoserightsarenotutilizedandthewaysarenot

accepted by the townwithin fifteen years after the date of recording or by

September 29, 1997,whichever comes later. 23M.R.S. § 3032(1-A)(B); see

Glidden,364A.2dat1315(statingthat“unlesstheaffectedmunicipalityaccepts

andconstructsthewayorfilesanoticeundersection3032(2)...anyincipient

rightsinthewayterminate”);seealsoLamsonv.Cote,2001ME109,¶19n.10,

775A.2d1134(citingGlidden,684A.2dat1315)).Subsection3031(1),onthe

otherhand,createsapublicrightofincipientdedication,andterminatesthat

public right if the way is not accepted within twenty years after recording.

23M.R.S.§3031(1).

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[¶23]Concurrentapplicationofthesetwoprovisionswouldleadtoan

absurdresult.Foranyproposed,unacceptedwaylaidoutonasubdivisionplan

recordedpriortoSeptember29,1987,oneofthreepublicrightstermination

dates would apply: the later of September 29, 1987, or fifteen years from

recording;ortwentyyearsfromrecording.If,forexample,asubdivisionplan

recorded in 1960 contained a proposed way, then section 3031 would

terminateincipientpublicrightsin1980,butsection3032wouldnotterminate

publicrightsuntilSeptember29,1997.

[¶24]Wethereforeholdthatsubsection3031(1)ofthePaperStreetsAct

does not retroactively apply to proposed, unaccepted ways laid out on

subdivision plans recorded prior to September 29, 1987. This holding

comportswithourjurisprudenceconcerningstatutoryinterpretationaswell

astheoverallpurposeofthePaperStreetsAct.TheActisintendedtoberead

broadly to clarify title to old, proposed, unaccepted streets, andprospective

application of subsection 3031(1) serves that purpose. Public rights to

proposed,unacceptedwaysrecordedpriortoSeptember29,1987,areclarified

byoperationofsection3032withinthelimitationsperiodestablishedbythat

section. Public rights to proposed, unaccepted ways recorded on or after

September 29, 1987, are clarified by operation of subsection 3031. Private

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rightstoproposed,unacceptedwaysareclarifiedbyoperationofsubsection

3031(2),aswellastheprocedureestablishedinsection3033.

[¶25] By reading subsection3031(1) to applyonlyprospectively, the

various provisions of the Paper Streets Act are brought into harmony. Any

interpretation that would apply subsection 3031(1) to apply retroactively

wouldyieldabsurdresults.

E. PublicRightstoWillowStreet

[¶26] Because the lower court erred in its application of subsection

3031(1)topre-1987subdivisionplans,itsconclusionthattheincipientpublic

rightstoWillowStreetexpiredby1940waserror.WillowStreetwasrecorded

priortoSeptember29,1987,andthereforethepublicrightstothewaywere

subject to section3032. It isundisputed thatWillowStreethasneverbeen

accepted as away by the town of Rumford. Pursuant to section 3032 it is

therefore considered vacated as of September 29, 1997, if it was not

“constructedorusedasaway.”23M.R.S.§3032(1-A)(A).Theissuetherefore

becomesafactualonethathingesonwhetherWillowStreetwas“constructed

or used as a way” so as to prevent its automatic vacation and therefore

terminationofthepublic’srightstoitpursuanttosection3032.

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[¶27]WillowStreetwasdepictedontheNinthAdditionPlan,whichwas

recordedonAugust4,1920.Dumasallegesthatbythe1970sthereexisteda

gravelroadoverWillowStreetwhichwasusedforfootandvehicletrafficto

accesstheDumasParcelforloggingpurposes.Specifically,Dumassubmitted

twoaffidavitswithhisstatementofmaterialfactsalleginguseofWillowStreet

duringthe1970sand1980s.Thefirst,anaffidavitswornbyRachelMeisner,

allegesthatduringthe1970sand1980s,Meisnervisitedherhusbandwhilehe

worked for Boise Cascade in an area to the south of the Dumas Parcel.

AccordingtoMeisner,WillowStreetwaspassablebycarandonfoot,andwas

“already a constructed way” prior to her husband’s work there. A second

affidavit, sworn by BrianMilligan, a former forester for Boise Cascadewho

supervised wood harvesting at the site, states that Willow Street was an

existinggravelroadatthetimeheharvestedthereinthe1970sand1980s,and

thatsomeworkwasdonetorepairthegravelandaddaculvertinthe1970s.

Neitheraffidavitspecifiestheyearsofuse,norallegesanyuseafterthe1980s.

[¶28] Rather thandisputingDumas’s allegationsof theuseofWillow

Street in the 1970s and 1980s, Carignan objects only to the admissibility of

affidavitsallegingitsuseinthe1970sand1980s.Thetrialcourtnoted,andwe

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agree,thattheaffidavitsuponwhichDumasreliesareadmissible.Seesupra,

n.1.

[¶29]Bycontrast,Carignanassertsinherstatementofmaterialfactsthat

WillowStreetwasneverdevelopedorimproved,whichDumasadmitstothe

extentthatWillowStreetwasnotdevelopedorimprovedbytheTownpriorto

1940.Aswepreviouslynoted,DumasalsoadmittedtoCarignan’sassertedfact

that“[a]tnotimewasthereuseorconstructionoftheeasterlysideofWillow

Streetatanytimemeaningfultothiscauseofaction.”AccordingtotheNinth

AdditionPlan,Carignan’sparcelabutstheeasterlysideofWillowStreet.While

itseemsimplausiblethatonlyonehalfofWillowStreetwasever“constructed

orusedasaway,”becauseafact-finderwouldneedtodecidebetweenthese

competingversionsofthetruth—whether,atwhattimes,andtowhatextent

Willow Street has been used or constructed within the meaning of section

3032—and accepting either Carignan’s or Dumas’s version of eventswould

yielddifferentresultspursuanttotherelevantlaw,thereisagenuineissueof

materialfact,andsummaryjudgmentastothedeemedvacationofpublicrights

in Willow Street was improper. See Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17,

92A.3d1154.

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F. PrivateRightstoWillowStreet

[¶30]Inadditiontoitsconclusionthatthepublicretainednorightsin

WillowStreet,thetrialcourtconcludedthatDumasretainednoprivaterights

inWillowStreetandhadacquiescedtotheencroachmentofCarignan’sgarage

on any easement he might hold over the way, thereby abandoning any

hypotheticaleasement.Thisconclusion,however,issupportedbyneitherthe

parties’statementsofmaterialfactsnoranapplicationofthelawtothosefacts,

forseveralreasons.

[¶31] First, subsection 3031(2) terminates private rights only if the

“private rights createdby the recordingof theplanarenot constructedand

utilizedasprivaterights”within20yearsofrecording. 23M.R.S.§3031(2).

Whilewehaveheldthatthesecondparagraphofsubsection3031(2)appliesto

pre-1987subdivisionplansbyreferencetotitle33M.R.S.§469-A,seeFournier,

2009ME25,¶24,966A.2d410,wehaveneverheldthatthefirstparagraph

appliestoretroactivelyvestabuttinglandownerswitharightofwayoverways

laidoutinsuchplans.Evenifsubsection3031(2)didapplyretroactively,which

wedeclinetoholdatthistime,thereisagenuinedisputeofmaterialfactasto

anyhistoricaluseorconstructionofWillowStreet.

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[¶32]BecauseCarignanallegesthatWillowStreetwasnotdevelopedor

improvedwithin the required time,whichDumas disputes, there remains a

question of fact as towhen Willow Street might have been privately used.

DumasdoesnotdisputeCarignan’sassertionthattheeasterlysideofWillow

Street—the side abutting Carignan’s property—has never been used, but

assertsinhisownstatementoffactsthatWillowStreetwasusedbyloggersfor

accessinthe1970sand1980s.NeitherpartyallegesanyprivateuseofWillow

Streetuntilthe1970s,andneitherpartyallegesanyuseatallafterthe1980s,

with the exception of Carignan’s encroaching garage. There is therefore a

genuinedisputeofmaterialfactastowhetherprivateusewasmadeofWillow

StreettopreserveDumas’srights,whetherbyoperationofthePaperStreets

Actorbyacommonlaweasement.

[¶33]Further,thetrialcourterredtotheextentthatitfoundthatDumas

hadabandonedanyeasementtowhichhemightbeentitled.Inordertofind

abandonmentofaneasement, thecourtwouldneed to find“(1)ahistoryof

nonusecoupledwithanactoromissionevincingaclearintenttoabandon,or

(2)adversepossessionbytheservientestate,”neitherofwhichisclearfrom

therecord.Lauxv.Harrington,2012ME18,¶21,38A.3d318.

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III.CONCLUSION

[¶34] Because we agree with Dumas that the court erred in its

applicationofsections3031and3032ofthePaperStreetsActanditsfinding

thatDumashadabandonedanyeasement towhichhemightbeentitled,we

vacate the court’s summary judgment in favor of Carignan and remand for

furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

Theentryis:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for proceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

JamesB.Haddow,Esq.(orally),Petruccelli,Martin&Haddow,LLP,Portland,forappellantPaulR.Dumas,Jr.StepheanC.Chute,Esq.(orally),SouthCasco,andThomasS.Carey,Esq.,Carey&Associates,P.A.,Rumford,forappelleeGloriaCarignanOxfordCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberRE-2013-66FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY