god, emptiness, and ethics

7/27/2019 God, Emptiness, And Ethics

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God, Emptiness and EthicsAuthor(s): Masao Abe

Source: Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 3 (1983), pp. 53-60Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1389914.

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BUDDHISTETHICSRE-EXAMINED

God,Emptiness ndEthicsMasaoAbeSchoolofTheology t ClaremontClaremont,California

I have been asked to presenta final evaluation,from a Buddhistperspective,ofthe overall discussionof this panel. It is, however,extremelydifficult for me toevaluate the foregoingstatementsby four scholarsof such high caliber,eachofwhom is distinctive in his ideas and arguments. During the discussion, theyhave taken up in a complex form many importantissues related to the theme.As a result, all that I can do in limited space is to consider the most centralissues of the discussion,make comments, and add my own view. That which Itake to be the most central ssue of our discussion s the role of ethics in relationto ultimate realityas understoodin Buddhism and Christianity.This is a ques-tion of the role of ethics in relation to the realizationof Emptinessas ultimaterealityin Buddhismand, in comparisonwith this, the roleof ethics in relationto God as ultimate realityin Christianity.To clarifythe Buddhist standpoint Iwill discuss(1) the relation between Emptinessand dependent co-origination,and (2) the two-truths heoryin MadhyamikaBuddhism.Now, to encapsulateCobb's and Rupp's interpretationsof the Buddhistper-spective, let me quote Eckel'ssummary,which I think is quite accurate.In hispaperEckelsays:

Cobb and Rupp approach he Mahayanamaterial n differentways,but theyend with remarkablysimilar judgments. They both emphasize the non-dualisticaspectsof the Mahayana, ound not only in the literaryexpressionsof the Zen tradition, but also in such classic Indian statements as Nagar-juna's 'Thereis no difference between sapsara and nirvaoa,and there is nodifference between nirvata and samsara' Madhyamakakarika,4.19). Cobband Rupp then use this material to picture the Mahayana radition as onethat is so radical n its dissolution of conceptualdistinctionsthat the histori-cal process, as a reality, simply slips away. The gradual transformationofwhat is into whatought to be is dissolvedin the contemplationof the eternaltruth reflectedequallyin everymoment.

Buddhist-ChristianStudies 3 (1983). ? by the East-WestReligions Project,Universityof Hawaii.All rightsreserved.

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Against this understandingof the Mahayanaposition by Cobb and Rupp, Eck-el, relyingmainlyon Svatantrika-Madhyamikaaterials,emphasizesthat thenegativeexpressionsof Madhyamikahought arealwaysbalancedbystatementsthat stress the purposeful practiceof religious life. He also emphasizesthatthe understandingof Emptinessis not an event outside time, but a continu-ous emptying in which moralactionplaysa significant,indeed a crucial,part.In this regard,Eckel further talks about the two-truthstheoryin the Madhya-mika school to whichI will return ater.Thurman alsoemphasizesthe inseparabilityof the insightof Emptiness romethical actionand the interdependencyof metaphysicsand ethicsin Buddhism.On this basishe criticizes both Cobb and Rupp, saying that they are not freefrom the typicalWesternunderstandingof Buddhism as ethicallyinsufficient.In particular,ThurmanstronglycriticizesCobb as if Cobb wereattackingBud-dhism. In my view, however, Cobb is actually emphasizing the different rolesof ethics in Buddhismand Christianity,which are basedon two different Ulti-mate Realities.He is stressing he need for mutual transformation f Buddhismand Christianitythrough their encounter. I agree with Thurman, however,when he saysthat both Christianityand Buddhism have a kataphaticway andan apophatic wayof dealing with the question of ultimacy, simply, both themovement from the relativeto the ultimate(loving God, cultivatingWisdom),and the movement from the ultimate to the relative (loving one's neighborsince God is love, practicing elflessgreat compassion).As for Rupp's typology of the Zen-type and Existentialist-type ofmodern religious commitment, Thurman makes the criticism that Rupp's

Zen-type arises from his drasticoversimplificationof Zen Buddhism. Ifind Rupp's typologyof Transactional s. Processive and Realistvs. Nomi-nalist, guite interesting and provocative.Also his third type, Christiandefinition of God, is suggestive.We must give carefulthought to the merit ofRupp's typologicalformulation.Nevertheless,I almosttotally agreewith Thur-man's critiqueof the Zen-type outlined by Rupp. To characterizeZen as a'holistic acceptance'type of religion, Rupp quotes D. T. Suzukiand T. R. V.Murti.Forinstance, Murti'sinterpretationof Nirvanais quoted as supportforthis contention:

There is only change in our outlook, not in reality .... The function ofprajna[wisdom] is not to transform he real, but only to create a change inour attitude towards t. The changeis epistemic(subjective),not ontological(objective).The real is as it haseverbeen.1I completely disagreewith this interpretationof Nirvaoa, for in his interpreta-tion, Murtioverlooksthe discontinuitybetween samisarand Nirvana.In Bud-dhism, sarpsaras realized as the beginninglessand endless processof living-dying. There is no continuous path from sarpsarao Nirvana;in other words,

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what lies between sampsarand Nirvaia is not a mere continuous epistemicchange, but a discontinuousontological change. Only when the beginninglessand endless processof living-dyingitself is realized as 'death' in the true senseis sarpsara, ust as it is, realized as Nirvaoa-Nirvaoa as the liberation fromliving-dying. Without the realizationof sarmsaras 'death' in the true sense,there can be no realizationof Nirvanaas 'new life' liberatedfrom transmigra-tion. Change in our outlook or epistemic change is only somethingwhichhappensin the processof sarpsara, nd never eads us to Nirvaoa.The same is true with Zen. The crucialpoint of Zen practice s daishi ichibanzetsugo ni yomigaeru, Upon the Great Death we are reborn through com-plete extinction or shin/in datsuraku;datsurakushinjin, Body and minddropping off-dropped off body and mind. This is far more than a transfor-mation in the disciples' point of view'2 as Rupp understandsZen practicetobe. However, Rupp is perceptive enough to recognize that Murti'ssharpdis-tinction between epistemological and ontological change is problematiconthe idealisticpremiseswhichinformthis whole tradition. 3Thus, he says, Foron those premises, a change in consciousness s also a change in the real. 4However, the interconnectednessof consciousness(subject) and the real (ob-ject) is legitimately realized not before, but only after the realizationof GreatDeath. Accordingly,I cannot accept Rupp's characterization f Zen as mani-festing a typeof merely epistemological transcendence.On the basis of the above rough summary,we may formulatethe points ofdiscussionas follows: Does the nondualistic nature of Buddhist Emptinesseventually dissolve ethics and history?If not, how can Emptinessor Nirvataground the Buddhist view of ethics and history?To promote interfaith dia-logue, these questionsmust be clarifiedin comparisonwith Christianity.BothEckeland Thurman have alreadypresentedtheir illuminating answers o thesequestions. In the following, I would like to offermy own understanding.In the Madhyamika-kaikad, dependent co-origination and Emptiness (andthe MiddleWay)areexpresslydeclaredto be synonyms.'

It is dependent co-originatingthat we term Emptiness (Sznyata); this is adesignation(prajnapti)basedon some material. It alone is the MiddleWay.When dependent co-originationand Emptinessare graspedas synonymstwothings are indicated:(1) dependent co-origination s Emptiness,and (2) Empti-ness is dependent co-origination. The meanings of dependent co-origination in (1) and (2) are not altogetherthe same. When Gautama Bud-dha preacheddependent co-origination,he emphasizedthat everything n theuniverse without exception is co-arisingand co-ceasing;nothing is self-existingor unchangeable;this mundane world is in samsara, n the endless processoftransmigration; o take this conditioned as unconditioned is the basicperver-sion which is the root of clinging and originates n avidya, i.e., ignorance.The

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Buddha thus showed the wayto attainNirvanaby realizingthe dependent co-originationof everything n the processof sarpsara.However, in the Buddha'steaching, although the transmigrational spectof dependent co-originationwas clearly emphasized, emptiness or the lack of self-existentrealityof phe-nomenal things was just implied. It was Nagarjunawho made explicit thenotion of emptiness implied in dependent co-origination and preachedthewayto enlightenment by awakeningto the emptiness of things in this world.Hence, his emphasis on eightfold negation and the negation of all possibledualistic distinctions. Nagarjuna, however, equally stressed that sunyata isupadaya-prajinaptidesignationorconventionbased on some material)whichisa synonymofpratitya samutpada.Here dependent co-origination s regraspedin the light of Emptiness.Accordingly,in his identificationofpratitya-samutpadaNagarjuna,by indi-cating that dependent co-origination is Emptiness, refers to 'dependent co-originationin samsara' n which all dualism or conceptualdistinction must bedissolved into Emptiness. On the other hand, by indicating that Emptinessisdependent co-originationhe signifies 'dependent co-origination n Nirvana'inwhich all dualism orconceptualdistinctionis reconstructedn the realizationofEmptinesswithout any possibilityof clingingto distinction. Thesenegativeandpositivemeaningsof Emptinessareimplied when Nagarjunadiscussespratitya-samutapadaas asynonymof snyata.In order to makethis point clearer, et me quote a well knowndiscourseof aChinese Zen master, Ch'ing-yuan Wei-hsin of the T'ang dynasty. It runs asfollows:

Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen I said, 'Mountains aremountains; watersarewaters.' After I got an insight into the truth of Zenthrough the instructionof a good master,I said, 'Mountainsare not moun-tains;watersarenot waters.'But now, havingattained the abodeof final rest(that is enlightenment), I say, 'Mountains are reallymountains;waters arereallywaters.'

His understandingof mountains and watersin the first state before Zen prac-tice indicatesrelativityor distinction realizedin the mundane worldor conven-tional realm. In the second stage in which he understands hat mountains arenot mountains and watersare not waters,he realizesEmptinessand the lackofself-existentreality n whichrelativityor distinction between things is resolved.All distinction is emptied and the non-duality of reality is realized. At thisstage, however,Wei-hsin realizesonly the negative aspectof Emptiness.But byemptying Emptiness, he finally realizes its positive or affirmative aspect atwhichpoint he says, 'Mountainsarereallymountains;watersarereallywaters.'In this awakeningto true Emptiness,the relativityor distinctionof everythingis most clearlyand definitelyrealizedwithout attachmentto it. The dependentco-arisingand co-ceasingof everything n the universe s fully realizedjust as it

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is, without attainmentand suffering. Along the lines of Wei-hsin, we can statewith full justification:Before Buddhistpractice,I thought 'good is good, evil is evil.' When I hadan insight into Buddhisttruth, I realized 'good is not good, evil is not evil.'But now, awakeningto true Emptiness I say, 'good is really good; evil isreallyevil.'

Conventional ethics based on the dualistic view of good and evil must be dis-solved in the realization of Emptinessfor such ethics entail an endless conflictbetween good and evil. But this dissolutionis just a negative aspectof Empti-ness. In the positive aspect of the emptying of Emptiness, the distinctionbetween good and evil is most clearlyrealized without any clinging to theirduality. Hence, Buddhist ethics is established in the realization of trueEmptiness.As both Eckel and Thurman emphasize, Buddhist Emptinessis not merelyan ontological ultimate reality devoid of practicalcommitment. The insightinto Emptinessis alwaysinseparablyconnected with ethical action. However,this unity of the ontological realizationof Emptinessand ethical action mustinclude the dissolutionof conventional ethics and the constructionof ethics inlight of true Emptiness.This last point inevitablyleads us to considerationofthe two-truths heoryin MadhyamikaBuddhism.The two truths aresamvrti-satyaandparamartha-satya.Samvrti-satyas theconventional or mundane truth which is valid for practical iving. It includescommon sense, ethical judgment, and scientific knowledge, all of which arebased on conceptual distinction, and are constructed verbally. In contrast,paramartha-satyas ultimate truth, whichis sunyata,Emptinesscompletelyfreefrom conceptual distinction and beyond verbalexpression.Fromthe point ofview of ultimate truth, conventionalor mundane truth, howevertrue it may bein its own right, is nothing but ignoranceor falsehood. Thus, the two truths areessentiallydifferent from one another. The conventionaland the ultimate donot constitutea twofold divisionof the world,however.It is not that one half isconventional and the other ultimate. Rather, the conventional and the ulti-mate areco-extensive;both pervadethe entire world. This means that there isno continuous path from the conventional to the ultimate. However, muchconventional truth is accumulated, it can never reach ultimate truth. Onlywhen conventionaltruthis realized asignoranceandthereby completelyturnedover does ultimate truth emerge. Being empty and nondualistic, however,Emptinessnot only negatesconventionaltruthbut alsobrings t to fruition.Once ultimate truth is awakenedto, it constructsconventionaltruth on thebasisof Emptiness.Svatantrikaermsthis vyavasthapana, stablishment of theconventional. In one sense, ultimate truth cannot express tself apartfrom theconventional realm. Only in the conventional world can ultimate truth beexpressed. In short, only by the negation of mundane truth is ultimate truth



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MASAOABErealized:only through the self negation of ultimate truth does it express tselfin the mundane world. Thisis the relationshipbetweenconventional truthandultimate truth, in which they are dynamically identical while essentiallydifferent.As I suggested before, ethics belongs to conventional truth. However, trueand genuine ethics may be in the mundane world, it cannot arriveat ultimatetruth as Emptiness.There is no continuous path from ethics to Emptiness. Inorderto reachEmptinessethics must be realizedas ignorance and be turnedovercompletely. However,this is only the negative aspectof Emptiness.In itspositive and affirmativeaspect, in which Emptiness empties itself, ultimatetruth expresses tself in the form of ethicsand ethics is therebyreestablished nlight of Emptiness.Accordingly, although ethics belongs to the conventional realm, it is notsubordinate o the realizationof Emptiness,forultimate truthcanexpress tselfonly in the mundane world. In this sense Emptinessmay even be said to besubordinateto ethics. In Madhyama-kakarika, agarjunasays, The ultimatetruth is not taught apartfrompracticalbehavior.'6 In Nagarjuna he ontologi-cal realizationof Emptiness s alwaysconnectedwith practicalandsoteriologicalconcerns.In this connection it may be in order to examine the relation between sarp-saraand Nirvaia. Originally,Buddhismrejectsattachment to sarpsara ssome-thing real and preachesthe necessity of reaching Nirvana, in which one isemancipatedfromsuchattachmentand the resultantsuffering.Nirvana s thusregardedas the goal of the Buddhist life. However, in the Prajoaparamita-sutras,which constitute one of the most important groupsof Mahayana utrasand form the backgroundof MadhyamikaBuddhism, not only attachment tosaipsarabut also attachment to Nirvaoa is rejected. Do not abide in sarpsaranor abide in Nirvaoa is a main emphasisof the sutra.When one overcomesattachment to samsara hrough practice,one awakensto sunyataand attains Nirvaoa. At this point avidya or ignoranceceases andprajnaor wisdom is realized. When the eye of wisdom is opened, one comes torealize that not only oneself but also everythingin the universe is in Nirvana.This is why MahayanaBuddhismdeclares hatsomokukokudoshikkaijobutsu,All the trees and herbsand lands attain Buddhahood. If one says, I haveattainedNirvaoabut trees and herbs,he and she do not attainNirvaoaasyet,one's attainment is not an authentic one. The attainment of trees and herbsand otherpersons s not an objectiveevent. Togetherwith one's attainmentthewhole universe attains Nirvaoa. This is clearly termed by Dogen dojijodo,simultaneous attainmentof the way. Since the whole universehasnow attainedNirvanawith oneself, the flux of time is completelyovercomeand historyendsin this Nirvana.This is the wisdomaspectof Nirvana.Nirvaoa as understoodin this way, however, is still involved in at least thefollowing two problems:(1) People who areunderstoodby an enlightened oneto have alreadyattainedNirvanado not necessarily ealize that they themselves

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are in Nirvana. Many of them view themselves as still involved in sarmsara.'Simultaneous attainment' is not yet objectivelyactualized. (2) Accordingly, fone abides in Nirvaoa and simply enjoys his or her own emancipation and ismerelysatisfiedwith 'simultaneousattainment,' that personis not completelyfree from selfishness.Enjoyingone's own Nirvanaaloof from sampsara,ne for-gets the sufferingin whichfellow beingsare still involved.Due to these two problems, one should not abide in Nirvana, but return tosamsara o save others fromsuffering.Here, history begins in Nirvaoa, and it isendless, for those who take themselves to be unenlightened are innumerableinthe world at present and will continue to appearforeverin the future. Thus,historyis the endless processof actualizing 'simultaneousattainment' in timeand precisely his is the compassionateaspectof Nirvana.Accordingly,true Nirvaoa in MahayanaBuddhism is not a quiet and staticstate of mind beyond the flux of samsaraas seen in the case of the Arhat, butrathera dynamicfunction of moving freely back and forth between so-calledsamsaraand so-calledNirvaoaas seen in the case of the Bodhisattva.Theper-fection of wisdom, i.e., prajnaparmita,s not realizedin Nirvanabeyond sam-sara, but in the midst of samsara, n which compassionateactivitiesaregoingon through the abandoningof Nirvana. Truecompassion s not realizedin thesupramundanerealm of Nirvaoa. Nor is it the humanisticlove in the realm ofthe mundane world. Rather, it is compassionwhich is based on the wisdomrealizedin Nirvaoa,and yet is deeplyworking n the munde world. InNirvana,mahaprajnaand mahakaruna, .e., true wisdom and true compassion,are nottwo but one. Buddhistethicsand historyare established in this dynamicmove-ment of true Nirvana. Nirvaoain MahayanaBuddhismis therefore not merelythe goal of the Buddhist life but also the point of departurefrom which theBuddhist life properlybegins. When Nirvana s simplytaken as the goal, ethicsmay be dissolvedin Emptinessand history may not be clearlyrealized. This iswhy throughout its long history MahayanaBuddhism has emphasized Do notabide in Nirvana and severelyrejectedan attachment to Emptinessas a rigidviewof nothingness or a literalunderstandingof negativity. 'In conclusion, we can say it is of course not the case that Buddhism is lessethical than Christianity.Ethicalaction is equallyessential to both Christianityand Buddhism. However,the natureor character f ethics as understood n thetwo religions is not the same. This difference in the understandingof thenature of ethics, as Cobb suggests, is relatedto the different realizationof theultimate in the two traditions, that is, the principleof rightnessin Christi-anity and Emptinessin Buddhism. Cobb says, In the Bible, Yahweh is por-trayedas righteous, and the appropriateresponseto Yahweh's righteousness shuman righteousness. Due to the transcendentcharacterof this divine righ-teousness, if I am not wrong, Christianethics becomes an eschatologicalethicswhich is somewhat future-oriented. Accordingto so-called realized eschatol-ogy, the justiceof God is alreadyconsummated, but in anothersense, it is notyet. Christian ethics and its dynamism are based on this tension between

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alreadyand notyet. In Christianity,however, 'already'and 'not yet' arenot co-extensive: 'not yet' has priorityover 'already.' This is why even the realizedeschatology s future-oriented.On the other hand, in Buddhism 'already'and 'not yet' arecompletelyco-extensive and in a dialectical tension. This is becausein light of the wisdomrealizedin Nirvana,the whole universe s already n Nirvanaand time and his-toryceasedthere, but in light of compassionequallyrealized in Nirvaoa, innu-merablefellow beingsaresubjectivelynotyet enlightened and time and historythus begin. This dialecticalunityof 'already'and 'not yet' is possiblebecause ttakesplace not in God whose essential natureis rightness,but in true Nirvaoawhich is the realizationof Emptiness. Buddhist ethics and its dynamism arebased on this dialectical tension of 'already'and 'not yet', a tension which isnot future-orientedbut absolute-present-oriented.Thus, in Buddhism, at eachand everymoment of history, a development toward the endless future is atonce the total returnto the root and sourceof history,that is, unchangingeter-nity. Conversely, he total returnto this root and sourceof history s also devel-opment toward the endless future. The processof history s a successionof suchmoments whose dynamicstructureconsistsof an advance which is simultane-ouslya return,a returnwhichis simultaneouslyan advance.Christianethicsis an eschatologicalethics, basedon the principleof rightnessas stressed n Protestantism,and it is future-oriented.Buddhist ethics is com-passionateethics, as stressed n Mahayanareligiosity, based on the realizationof Emptiness, and it is absolute-present-oriented.Since they are significantlydifferent, they can learngreatlyfrom each other. When they learn and deeplyappropriateeach other, Christianitywill become MahayanaChristianityandBuddhism will become ProtestantBuddhism.

NOTES1. George Rupp, Beyond Existentialismand Zen, p. 38. Originallyfrom T. R. V. Murti, TheCentralPhilosophyof Buddhism, p. 273-274.2. Ibid., p. 38.3. Ibid.4. Ibid.5. Madhyamaka-karika,XIV: 18.6. Ibid., XXIV 10.

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god, emptiness, and ethics

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