goldstone jack rethinking revolutions

8/22/2019 Goldstone Jack Rethinking Revolutions

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Rethinking Revolutions:

Integrating Origins, Processes, and Outcomes

Jack A. Goldstone

he myth o revolutions treats them as sudden detonations o popular energy andsocial change. Dramatic acts on a particular day the all o the Bastille in Paris on14 July 1789 and the midnight storming o the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg (then

called Petrograd) on 24 October 1917 have come to symbolize the French and Russian revo-

lutions. When most people think o revolutions, they think o a rapid series o events, taking

a matter o weeks or months, during which old regimes all, new regimes are constructed, and

the population accepts (or is orced to accept) the new order.

Studies o revolution have also tended to ocus on the explosive moments o revolution

and to dwell mainly on the conditions that led to such explosions. This emphasis has led tothe state-centered theories o revolution, in which the onset o revolution is viewed mainlyas a problem o state collapse, to be explained by structural vulnerabilities in certain kinds o

states. To the extent that such works examined the processes and outcomes o revolutions,these were treated mainly as contests over state power, growing more extreme and resultingin stronger, more authoritarian rule by regimes that had to become tough to seize and hold

state power in the ace o numerous domestic and international opponents.

These theories have been challenged by the unolding o the color revolutions thatbegan in the 1980s: the yellow revolution in the Philippines, the velvet revolution in Czecho-slovakia, the orange revolution in Ukraine, the rose revolution in Georgia, the cedar revo-lution in Lebanon, and the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Along with the anticommunistrevolutions in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria, these events seemed toollow a novel path. They unolded as a series o moderate conrontations between crowds en-

gaged in peaceul demonstrations and powerul authoritarian states that lost the condenceto deend themselves. The latter conceded power to the opposition or negotiated a change o

regime, leading to new governments that were in direct contradiction to the pattern most

1. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A ComparativeAnalysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1979); Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebel-

lion in the Early Modern World(Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1991); Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revo-

lutionary Theory,Annual Revie w of Pol itical Science 4 (2001):

139 87; Misagh Pars a, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions:

A Comparative Analysis of Iran, N icaragua, and the Philippines

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jeff Goo d-

win, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements,

1945 1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); John

Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

2. Goodwin, No Other Way Out, chap. 2.

3. See especially Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions ; Skocpol,

Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1994); and Goldstone, Revolution and

Rebellion.

4. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchick, International Diffusion

and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions, Communist and

Postcommunist Studies 39 (2006) : 283 304; Mi chael McFaul,

Transitions from Postcommunism,Journal of Democracy16,

no. 3 ( 2005): 5 19.


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R e v o l u t i o n s

oten noted by state-centered theories weaker

and more democratic than the party -based au-thoritarian systems they replaced. These di-erences have led some scholars to questionwhether these events were in act revolutionsat al l, or perhaps some new species o event reolutions or electoral revolutions.

In act, the causes o these color revolu-tions were much the same as noted in the state-

centered theory or prior revolutions: (1) a fscal

or economic deteriorationthat undermines stateauthority; (2) divided elitesthat split over how,and whether, the current regime can resolvethe crisis; (3) sucientpopular grievances directed

against the stateto enable signicant mass mo-bilization o either urban or rural populationsto oppose the government; and (4) the coales-cence o diverse opposition groups around anideology of oppositionthat justies and encourages

rejection o state authority.

What di erentiates these color revolu-tions rom the more explosively violent andautocracy-producing revolutions must there-ore not be a undamental dierence in causesbut something crucial in the processes through

which they unolded and the conditions and ac-

tions that produced their distinctive weak/lib-eral state outcomes. Yet we lack a theory o revo-

lutionary processes and outcomes o sucientdepth and variety to identiy crucial elements

or turning points in the process o revolutionsthat would explain these divergent outcomes.The best-developed theory o revolutionary pro-

cesses remains the classic natural history ap-proach. Yet these scholars looked at only a ewcases and sought to identiy a uniorm course o

events leading to a similar outcome, rather than

to develop a typology o trajectories or accountor key dierences in outcomes.

Interestingly, the color revolutions werenot the rst revolutions to exhibit this behav-

ior. The Netherlands revolution against Spain

(1566), the British Glorious Revolution o 1688,

the American Revolution (1776), the JapaneseMeiji Restoration o 1868, and the Chinese Re-publican Revolution o 1911 are usually seenas anomalous events by scholars o revolution,oten treated as not truly revolutions at all be-cause they lacked the terrorizing v iolence andauthoritarian outcomes o more typical majorrevolutions. Though the Netherland and Amer-

ican revolutions involved lengthy wars againsttheir colonial masters, and the Meiji Restora-tion involved a substantial civil war betweenregional armies and the military orces o thecentral government, none o these events in-volved serious or systematic violence by revo-lutionaries against the elites o the old regime.Moreover, all o these events resulted in regime

changes rom authoritarian monarchies to lessauthoritarian and oten weaker regimes: a re-

public in the Netherlands that was more asthe title proclaimed a Union o P rovincesthan a centralized state; a constitutional mon-archy in Britain with a strong but oten dividedParliament dependent on local interests; a weak

conederation o states as the United States; anoligarchic parliamentary regime in Japan; and a

weak republican government in China that wassoon dominated by warlords. In several respects,

these events were thus similar to the color revo-

lutions o recent years, suggesting not so much

an entirely new phenomenon in the past two de-cades as the reemergence o a ormerly rare but

not unknown pattern o revolution.

In this essay, I oer a more complex de-scription o revolutionary processes, with twelve

possible stages. These twelve stages are notin-tended to demarcate a universal or inevitablesequence. Rather, they are components o therevolutionary processes that usually occur in

various revolutions. But some stages may be miss-

ing in certain cases, and these components may

occur in varied combinations and sequences

5. One could add to this list the Iranian constitu-

tional revolution of 1905, the electoral rejection of

the Pinochet regime in Chile in 1988, the protest s that

brought down the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia

in 1998, and the negotiated ending of the apartheid

regime in South Africa in 1994. The Mosaddeq revolu-

tion in Iran in 1953 and the Allende victory in Chile in

1973 could also have become early color revolutions,

but they were rapidly overturned by U.S.-supported

military coups.

6. Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design

and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 152. On

refolutions, see Timothy Garton Ash, The Uses of Ad-

versity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (Cam-

bridge, UK: Granta, 1989). On electoral revolutions,

see Bunce and Wolchick, International Diffusion.

7. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions

Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation; Foran

Taking Power.

8. Lyford Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Crane

Brinton,Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage

1965).


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and to dierent degrees and with dierentcontent. I contend that what dierentiates thecolor-type or democratic revolutions old andnew rom the more typical major revolutionis precisely their characteristic combinations othese components.

Twelve Components That Constitute

Revolutionary Processes

The ollowing components may be seen as ele-ments that constitute the revolutionary process.

Dierences in their combination and charac-ter either absent or present and with varyingdegrees o severity or intensity distinguish var-

ious revolutionary trajectories. They are analyti-

cally separated, although in actual revolutionsthey oten overlap. Sometimes events seem tomove backward and then orward, as revolu-tions move rom one component to the next,

then return and repeat earlier components be-ore moving orward. Oten these componentsor their intensity can be discerned only aterthe process is well along or complete. The list o

components is as ollows:

1. Elite deection and the ormation o

opposition

2. Polarization and coalition building

3. Mass mobilization

4. Initial regime change

5. Further polarization

6. Counterrevolution7. Civil war

8. International war

9. Radical regime change and terror

10. Revolutionary moderation

11. Renewed radicalism and terror

12. Regime consolidation

In most historical cases o revolution, stages 1,2, and 3 orm a suite o changes that developbeore the overthrow o the old regime, with all

three going on at the same time and reinorcing

one another. However, the intensity and charac-ter o these conditions can vary considerably. For

example, polarizat ion and coalition buildingmay lead to considerable domestic unity i thepolarization is mainly against a oreign colonial

power, rather than against a domestic class orelite. The mass mobilization may involve mainly

the middle class or have a dominant lower-class

base (peasants or urban workers). The charac-ter and intensity o these three components will

matter greatly or developments ater the oldregime alls.

These lead up to stage 4, the initial re-gime change. Usually, the initial regime change

occurs beore all the tensions and contradic-tions in the opposition coalition have been re-solved. Then stages 5 9 orm another suite oconnected events, as these stages oten occurtogether or in tight sequence as a cluster oevents, again mutually reinorcing one another.

Only when radical ism, counterrevolution, andcivil and international wars have ended has therevolution reached a stage o moderation andstability.

Even that stage is not the end, however, as

many revolutions experience a urther stage orenewed radicalism; only when that re burnsout does the revolution settle down into a con-servative or stable consolidation, in which the

main goals o the regime are simply to prosperand remain in power. The ollowing sectionsdiscuss each o these stages in more detail, with

examples rom the history o revolutions to show

how variation in these components can shapethe process and outcomes o revolutions.

The Character of the Revolutionary Suite:

Elite Defection, Polarization, and Mass

Mobilization

Rulers depend on the support o elites mili-

tary ocers, state bureaucrats, nobles, religiousleaders, politicians, intellectuals, and proession-

als (i.e., lawyers, doctors, engineers, proessors,and managers). When people are distressed bygovernment actions (or inaction in the ace ohardships), and express their anger throughriots, peasant revolts, workers strikes, demon-strations, and other acts o disorder, it is eliteresponses that determine whether such actions

will spread and grow into revolution.

Riots, peasant revolts, and strikes have oc-

curred oten throughout history, but they onlyrarely give rise to revolutions. Such actions areusually put down by the armed orces o the gov-

ernment beore they threaten the existing so-cial and political order. As long as the militaryand police remain loyal, well disciplined, andcompetently commanded, and the states o-cials can provide them with money and eec-tive administration, popular disorders whichmay be costly and disruptive and may even lead


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to changes in policy wil l not succeed in over-turning regimes.

To overturn a government, an organizedopposition must exist that is capable o persuad-

ing the military to desert the regime or o rais -ing an alternative orce capable o engaging the

military. The opposition leaders must also nda way to combine the anger o various groups,each pursuing its own protests and grievances,into a national movement against the regime.This inevitably requires the skil ls o elites whocan ormulate a persuasive vision o a bettersociety, undermine the credibility o the exist-ing rulers, and organize suciently large-scalepopular protests, or suciently strong armedorces o their own, that then can challenge the

government.

Thus the potential or a truly revolution-ary process arises only when skilled and infuen-

tial members o society start criticizing the re-gime, calling or change, and seeking ollowers

who will help them promote their new vision osociety. But when elites look or ollowers, theirchoices depend on their inclinations and the so-

cial structure o their society.

In most traditional and developing coun-tries, the vast bulk o the population has beenpoor peasants or workers (miners and urbancrats and construct ion workers). Mobilizingthese groups is thus essential or a meaningul

challenge to the regime. While more moderateor conservative leaders may shy away rom rous-

ing these groups, other elites are likely either to

seek to mobilize and organize these elementso society or to pressure the regime by usingthe uprisings o peasants or workers. This wasthe pattern o the classic social revolutions inFrance, Russia, and China, as well as more re-cent revolutions in Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba,Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Elite mobilization o,or reliance on, lower-class uprisings, however,

injects into the revolution strong demands orclass-based redistributive change as part o therevolutionary program.

While an uprising is the most commonstarting point or revolution, it is not the onlyone. In countries with a large middle class andorganized working class, as with middle-income

countries, it may be possible to mobilize mainly

urban groups workers, students, businesspeo-ple, proessionals, and white-collar workers to

protest against mismanagement, corruption, or

economic ailures by the regime and to ocusmore on democracy and airer economic op-portunities than on redistribution o as sets.This kind o mobilization appears to have been

the dominant pattern in the modern color revo-

lutions and in the anomalous historical casesas well.

In some cases, this choice o mobilizationis an option or elites, rather than a structuralnecessity. In the 1560s in the Netherlands, 1688

in England, the 1770s in the American colo-nies, and certainly Japan in the 1860s, Chinain 1900 1910, and the Philippines in the 1980s,

large reservoirs o agrarian poverty and discon-

tent existed outside the major cities. In Chinaand the Philippines prior mobilization o therural poor had been done or redistributive ends

(the Taiping and Nien rebellions in China, theNew Peoples Army in the Philippines). Yet revo-

lutionary leaders in all these cases chose to dis-tance themselves rom class-based redistributive

claims and ocus on nationalist-based mobiliza-tion against unpopular leaders who were viewed

as threats to their own countries: the Spanishmonarchy in Holland, the Catholic King JamesII in England, the erratic King George III in the

American colonies, the ineective shogun inJapan, the Manchu dowager empress in China,and the corrupt Marcos crony regime in the

Philippines. In this respect, the leaders o theanti-Soviet and anticommunist revolutions inEastern Europe and the Soviet Socialist Repub-

lics acted similarly, ocusing nationalist passions

on unpopular leaders who were identied withRussian leadership or with domination o theirruling Communist parties.

Thus a key actor dierentiating the clas-sic social revolutions rom the color-type revolu-

tions is whether any o the deecting or opposi-tion elite seek to inject a substantial class-based

component into their eorts at antiregime mo-bilization. While this seems almost unavoidable

in most societies with large impoverished peas-ant and worker populations, it becomes more o

a choice in societies that also have signicantcommercial or emerging industrial centers (asin the Netherlands, England, the United States,

late-nineteenth-century Japan, early-twentieth-century China, and the Philippines) and is themore likely pattern in already substantially


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urban industrializing countries, as in the or-mer Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

O course, a revolutionary movement gen-

erally consists o quite dierent groups pressedinto tactical coalitions or even acting separately

against the regime. Even in times o crisis, di-erent elites and groups are aected in varyingways, and many may wish or minor reorm orslow change, while others seek more rapid ordramatic shits in policy or personnel. Yet rul-ers who respond to a crisis weakly and ineec-tively whether by persisting with their course,changing course requently and wildly, or sim-ply turning on their critics and opponents can

alienate more and more past supporters. Thisprocess pushes varied groups together, lead-ing to a polarization o many diverse elementsagainst the regime.

Sometimes elites with very dierent views

or example, business and religious elites or mil-

itary and proessional elites reach out to oneanother to orm antiregime coalitions. At other

times, events perhaps a military or nancialcrisis, particularly corrupt or violent acts by the

government, or the prospect o oreign inter-vention orce elites into one anothers arms,as they recognize that they must act togetheri they are to survive a crisis and bring aboutchange. As one amous revolutionary, Benjamin

Franklin, told the signers o Americas Declara-

tion o Independence (leaders who representedlarge and small states, northern industrialists,and southern plantation owners), advising them

to put aside their dierences and cooperate ithey were going to challenge the King o Eng-land or control o the United States: We musthang together, gentlemen . . . else, we shall most

assuredly hang separately.

The character o the various groups andelites involved in the revolutionary oppositionhas crucial implications or the revolutionary

process. Where the groups supporting the revo-lution include bothmoderate elements ocusedon broad nationalist goals or mainly urban/liberal aims or political change andclass-based

groups seeking more radical destruction o,

and/or redistribution rom, elite groups, theBrintonian process o splits and radicalizationamong the revolutionaries ater the all o theold regime is likely to occur. By contrast, whereelites advocating class -based opposition areabsent or weak in the main revolutionary coali-tion, and class-based mobilization is not a major

source o revolutionary action, a dierent set o

processes and outcomes is likely to be seen.

One might ask, i revolutions can take the

orm o nationalist mobilization that narrowlytargets an unpopular leader, rather than class-based mobilization that targets a broader eliteor attack and redistribution, then why do somany anticolonial regimes exhibit the explosive

and violent character o classic social revolu-tions, rather than the pattern o the color revo-lutions lack o a strong class-based character?One may point to Algeria in the 1960s and Viet-

nam and Cambodia in the 1970s as nationalistrevolutions that nonetheless took on a highlyradical, violent, and authoritarian character.

The answer, I believe, lies in the regimespattern o elite deection, polarization, andmass mobilizat ion including elite choices.Algeria and Viet nam, i not Cambodia, hadsucient urban centers and organized work-ers to have staged urban nationalist revolu-tions in act the Algerian revolution began inthat ashion, as did the Vietnamese revolution

against France in 1945. Yet in both countries,the French response was to retake the cities byorce and drive the opposition into the coun-tryside or underground. The brutality o theFrench military response dealt with the initialthreat but did not win support. On the contrary,

it polarized the countries around opposition tothe colonial regime and provoked more radi-cal responses by the opposition elites. In Viet-nam, the revolutionary leadership, always with a

strong communist component, turned to rural

peasant-based mobilization to raise the orcesneeded to challenge the French. Those eliteswho cooperated with the French (or later theAmericans) over the decades-long struggle thatollowed became a class target or destruction

9. Misagh Parsa, Theories of Collective Actions and

the Iranian Revolution, Sociological Forum 3 (1988):

44 71; Goodwin, No Other Way Out.

10. QuoteWorld.org, www.quoteworld.org/quotes/

4954 (accessed 5 September 2008).


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and redistribution. In Algeria, revolutionaryleaders made the substantial numbers o Alge-rians o French origins (thepieds-noirs), as wellas those elites who worked with the French, col-

lective targets. While the communists remained

a minor infuence in Algeria, nativist hatred othe colonizing elite unctioned as a source o

violent mobilization against all those identiedwith the oreign regime.

In Cambodia, while there was insucient

development o the urban/working sector toprovide a basis or mass mobilization withouta strong peasant component, that mobilizationcould still have ollowed a more nationalist pat-tern aimed at overthrowing the U.S.-imposedLon Nol regime and restoring exiled King Siha-

nouk. Yet the communist leaders o the revolu-tionary movement, not satised with such a mod-

est target, wanted instead a major class enemy;

thus their development o the notion o a pureKhmer race o armers that had been exploited

allowed them to classiy all urban workers, any-one with western education, and all Chinese,Vietnamese, Chr istians, and other nonpureKhmers as class enemies to be destroyed.

Still, most o the extreme radical violencein revolutions does not occur in these earlystages o elite deection, polarization againstthe regime, and mass mobilization. To under-stand why such violence develops in some revo-

lutions but not others, one needs to return tothe unolding o the stages o the revolutionary

process.

Initial Regime Change

One striking element o the initial regimechange in revolutions is how oten it comesunexpectedly, even i there have been years oprevious elite or guerrilla opposition. Rulers re-

quently underestimate their opponents or over-estimate their own strength and importance

(including the loyalty or power o their internaland external allies). Rulers oten ail to see how

close their own supporters are to deserting them

or how much o the populace resents their rule.

Even i they have been ighting against ruralguerrillas, urban crowds, or dissident elites ormonths or years, they may dismiss this threatand be truly surprised when, ater taking somestep that reveals loss o control or outragingyet another key group o supporters, they nd

themselves standing alone, almost helpless, sur-rounded by enemies and beret o deenders.

In such conditions, rulers may fee, simply

leaving the reins o government to their oppo-nents, or in some cases negotiate their depar-ture rom the scene. The departure (or some-times capture and execution) o a widely eared

and hated ruler oten unleashes celebrations.The immediate atermath o destruction o theold regime is sometimes called a honeymoonperiod, in which relie and happiness are thedominant emotions in the country. Dancingin the streets, the ceremonial pulling down osymbols o the old regime, and proclamationso pride and loyalty to the nation and hopeor the uture are the order o the day. Peoplemay embrace, addressing one another as com-rades and citizens and brothers or sisters.

All kinds o behaviors that had been suppressed

under the old regime may burst orth in the new

air o reedom.

Yet order must be restored and a nationput back on its eet ater the loss o its govern-ment. Only rarely is it the case that the enemies

o the old regime are so united, and the ormer

allies and beneciaries o the old ruler so ready

to give up their power and privileges, that nourther conficts will ensue. More commonly,in a matter o months ater the all o the oldregime, the revolutionary orces start to bicker

among themselves over the shape o the new gov-ernment, the distribution o power and wealth,oreign relations, the conduct o the economy,control o the military, and dozens o other is -sues o government. These disputes oten starta renewed process o polarization between thenew revolutionary government and its critics.

Further Polarization

This stage, and its interweaving with the com-ponents that ollow, marks the crucial turning

point in the revolutionary process. Althoughthe potential or urther polarization ater theall o the old regime depends on the nature othe revolutionary coalition, and so is in part de-

pendent on the character o stages 1 3, the de-gree to which that potential is realized depends

on urther events and responses to those events

by revolutionary leaders.

Whether at the end o a lengthy guerrillawar or as the resu lt o a sudden capitulat ion


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in the ace o public demonstrations, when arevolutionary regime takes power rarely is therevolutionary movement o one mind on howto proceed. Even in cases such as Fidel Castrostakeover in Cuba and Mao Tse-tungs victory inChina, the revolutionary orces had made com-promises with or beneted rom the actions ogroups not under their control, such as urbanproessionals and sugar workers in Cuba andsmall and middling landlords in China. More-over, the revolutionary leadership itsel otencomes rom disparate groups with dierent

views on the degree and pace o change needed

to set the nation on a proper course.

In some cases, the revolutionary coalitionwas brought together by the more radical leaders

suppressing or disguising their ultimate goals.

Thus in Iran Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeinimade common cause with liberal proessionals,

women, students, and others to overthrow theshah, guarding the degree to which his planned

Islamic Republic would subordinate republi-can reedoms to Islamic rule. Similarly, in Cuba

and Nicaragua the Castroist and Sandinistorces initially were broadly inclusive o capi-talists and private businesspeople, minimizingthe degree to which their Communist belies

would eventually lead them to side with workers

and peasants against private property owners.The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia originally pre-

sented itsel mainly as a nationalist party andgained support rom many whose main goal was

simply the restoration o their king.

In other cases, the revolutionary coalition

included diverse groups that simply set asidetheir strong dierences in pursuit o a common

goal. For example, in the American coloniestherevolutionary leaders included both committeddemocrats in avor o state autonomy and eder-

alists who wanted a strong central government.In France in 1789, liberal aristocrats, reormist

clerics, and radical members o the Third Es-tate jointly pursued the goal o restricting royal

authority and changing the system o taxationbounded by privilege that scally weakened the

state. In Ukraine in 1989, regime opponentsincluded both anticommunists who, althoughRussian, wanted to reorm the corrupt and eco-

nomically ineective party-based regime, and

Ukrainian nationalists who wanted to create anew Ukrainian state.

In assessing what determines how ar po-larization in this stage goes, three actors arecrucial: rst, how extreme are the dierencesthat exist within the coalition o revolutionarygroups? Second, what circumstances accentuate

these dierences and give leverage to dierentactions in the revolutionary leadership? Third,

how crucial to the survival o the revolutionand the revolutionary state is it or one groupto triumph?

Interestingly, one actor that does notappear to matter is whether the more radicalgroups begin with a leading or subordinate role.

In the Russian Revolution, or example, the rad-

ical Bolsheviks played a modest role among therevolutionary groups that sought the end o the

czars regime, with the moderate Constitutional

Democrats playing the leading role. In theFrench Revolution, the Jacobins had not evenorganized themselves in July 1789. By contrast,in the Cuban and Chinese Communist revolu-tions, the dominant leaders rom the earlieststages o revolution were precisely those who

would adopt a radical communist program andpurge more moderate associates. Yet in all ourcases, the revolutions shited sharply in a moreradical direction ater the change in regime.

It is striking that in all o the cases both

older and more recent that ollow the patterno the color revolutions, the dierences withinthe revolutionary coalition may have led toweakness and div ision in the new regime, butthey did not progress to violent confict between

moderate and radical groups and a triumph othe radicals. The most important reason or this

is likely the actor that was noted beore: in thecolor-type revolutions, elite or popular groupsthat aimed to destroy or redistribute the assetso an entire class or ruling group did not orm

an important element in the revolutionary op-position. Yet this actor alone is not a sucientbasis or explaining the less radical character o

these revolutions, or even in the classical social

revolutions the main radical leaders and groups

initially played a minor or subordinate role.

Regarding the French and Russian revolu-

tions, were one not to look back knowing the

11. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions.


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outcome, but look orward rom July 1789 orFebruary 1917, one would say that radical groups

did not play a leading role in the revolutionaryopposition. Peasant and urban revolts were im-portant in these cases, but French peasants and

the Petrograd soviets did not seek radical goalsat this t ime, and the eventually dominant radi-cal leaders the Jacobins and Bolsheviks were

vir tually absent. Even in Iran in 1979, most othe regime opponents in the broad revolution-ary coalition that included students, bazaarmerchants, liberal proessionals, women, urban

workers, and the Marxist Mujahideen were seek-

ing nationalist and democratic goals, not the tri-

umph o radical Islam.

Thus we need to look or the circumstances

that intensiy the splits and empower the radi-cals in such cases.Usually, these emerge romany o the ollowing our components that oten

arise in revolutions: counterrevolution, civilwar, international war, and revolutionary terror.

These can give rise to intensied polarization, a

shit in strength rom moderate to more radical

groups, the adoption o extreme measures andauthoritarian state building.

The Postrevolutionary Suite:

Counterrevolution, Civil and International Wars,

and Terror, then Moderation, Renewed Radicalism,

and Conservative Consolidation

Crane Brinton laid out a process o revolutionthat has become the standard view o revolu-tionary sequences. Ater a honeymoon periodand an initial regime o moderates, there ol-lows confict with emerging radicals. The victory

o the radicals then leads to a reign o terrorin which radical policies are orced throughand implemented by coercion, moderates arepurged rom the government, and domestic en-

emies o the revolution are vigorously attacked.The radicals eorts to overthrow common pat-

terns o authority lead to counterrevolutionarymovements both inside and outside the coun-try, provoking civil and international wars.These wars allow military commanders to riseto the heights o power and to take leadershipo the revolution. These military commanders,needing to end disorder and restore nationalstrength, suppress the radicals. Eventually, oten

with the help o returning moderates, a stableand bureaucratic government emerges to leadthe nation. Many o the revolutionary ideals and

acts may be preserved, but the new regime nowseeks to live alongside other nations and put itscitizens to ordinary work, rather than devote it-sel to making and spreading revolution.

This ramework was based on Brintonsanalysis o the English Pur itan, American,French, and Russian revolutions. It was airly ac-

curate in describing the course o those revolu-tions. However, it did not take account o events

such as the Chinese Communist Revolution,with its commitment to permanent revolution

and recurrent eruptions o radicalism, or o the

many Third World revolutions o the twentiethcentury rom Mexico to Nicaragua withtheir more common pattern o external threator intervention but ew international wars. What

we nd when we expand our view is that eventsater the initial change o regime are ar morecomplex and variable than Brintons schema al-

lowed. In act, the sequencing o counterrevolu-

tion, wars, radicalism, and terror is quite varied.

Moreover, in many revolutions the init ial con-solidation ater a period o terror or war is notthe end o the story. Rather, revolutionaries who

eel the revolution has not gone ar enough or is

stagnating may seek to bring a second phase oradical policy to revive the spirit and action o

their revolution.Here, we look rst at the cases that Brin-

ton discussed and ind that even these weremore complex than his ormal schema. We then

look at additional cases or urther insights into

the ull range o post-regime change events.

In America, there really was no v ictory othe radicals or reign o terror. In part this wasbecause the revolutionaries, however dividedthey may have been between ederalists anddemocrats, eschewed any groups that sought to

target elites or classes or attack. But it is alsothe case that conficts between ederalists anddemocrats were able to play themselves out inrelative security, as there were no major coun-terrevolutionary threats rom within, nor werethere major military threats rom abroad ater1781 or another thirty-one years. Internally,there was disorder under the conederation that

12. Brinton,Anatomy of Revolution.


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threatened the new revolutionary regime, butthat was addressed in an orderly ashion by theConstitutional Convention and the construc-tion o a stronger national government. Yet con-

solidation under the Virginian presidents rom1800 to 1824 was not the end o political change.

America did experience a more radical move-ment to recapture the revolutionary spirit anddemocratize the government, but it occurred ageneration ater the revolution, with the rise othe Jacksonian Democrats in the 1820s.

In the English, French, and Russian revo-lutions, there were periods o dominant radical-

ism, counterrevolution, civil and internationalwars, and terror. Yet their sequencing was highly

varied. There were as many instances in whichwars and mass uprisings made the radicals asthere were in which it was radicals who madethe wars.

In England, while Parliament tried to work

out arrangements to limit the kings power, two

major events exacerbated elite divisions. First,class-based uprisings in Ireland in 1641, and toa lesser degree in England, orced Parliamentto consider raising an army, with the main ques-

tion being whether it should be under the con-trol o Parliament or the king. Second, in 1642the king decided to leave London and call anarmy to him at Nottingham; that let those inthe opposition who were most concerned to

limit royal power no choice but to arm andght. It was only ater several years o civil warthat the radicals the New Model Army tookleadership o the revolution, executed the king,

purged Parliament, declared England a com-monwealth, and went to war abroad.

In France, again it was popular uprisings,then the threat o war, that brought orth andempowered the radicals. The rural uprisings othe Great Fear were what helped provoke theNational Assemblys attack on noble rights in

August 1789. Yet even these radical measureswere taken in an orderly ashion and by thegreat majority o delegates. It was only with thestring o initial deeats in the war against Aus-tria and Prussia in spring 1792 that the moder-ates wholly lost control o the Assembly. The ex-

pansion o the war to include England, Holland,

and Spain the next year led to mass conscrip-tion and taxation, along with the institutions o

the Revolutionary Tribunal and Committee o

Public Saety. But these measures, along with acampaign against conservative clerics, provoked

counterrevolution, which in turn increased theintensity o the Revolutionary terror. Only withthe deeat o the Austrians and the ebbing o the

oreign threat in 1794 did the radicals lose their

grip on power, as a more moderate leadershipclosed down the Jacobins, used the army against

the Paris crowds, and tried to consolidate therevolution. Increased military threats external

and internal were thus the key actors leading

to radical power and terror. Still, war broughtradicals to power only in the early 1790s; Napo-

leons later wars helped to consolidate a moremoderate revolutionary regime that proclaimed

the rights o man yet welcomed nobles andre-created a system o rank and privileges. Therelationships among war, radicalism, and terror

were thus variable and contingent.

In Russia, the Bolsheviks would never have

come to power without the continued lossestaken by Russia in World War I. The Bolsheviks

opportunity arose when the moderate revolu-tionary government under Aleksandr Kerenskychose to continue the war, and the Kerensky re-

gimes military ailures atally undermined itsauthority. Yet even though war brought the radi-

cal Bolsheviks to power, in Russia, too, war didnot always urnish the justication or radical-ism and terror. The Bolsheviks were absolutely

brutal in pursuit o the civil war (1918 21) todeend their regime against Russian conserva-tives leading a counterrevolution. Yet the imme-

diate result was a return to moderation in the1920s under the New Economic Policy. It wasonly in the 1930s that Stalinist terror arose, with

purges and radical land seizures that resultedin the deaths o millions. This second radicalphase lasted until the onset o World War II;only ater the war did a more conservative con-solidation occur.

In short, the relationships among the tri-umph o radical policies, counterrevolution,civil and international war, and terror are com-plex and variable. A look at the ollowing casesurther demonstrates this complexity: Mexicoin 1910 34, Iran in 1979 2008, and China in1949 80.

The Mexican Revolution began with theoverthrow o the dictator Porrio Daz by orces

led by the moderate reormer Francisco Madero


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but supported by more radical groups and their

leaders, including Emiliano Zapata and Fran-cisco (Pancho) Villa. Zapata was a member othe landowning elite, but he supported peasant

claims or land against the expanding claimso railway, mining, and commercial arminginterests, especially claims by oreigners. Villaand other northern leaders had the supporto agricultural and industrial workers who ex-pected better terms under a government that

would stand up to oreign interests and wealthycapitalists.

However, once Madero took oice, hebroke with Zapata by ailing to vigorously pursue

land reorms. Maderos weak government andcontinued popular uprisings led General Victo-

riano Huerta to stage a counterrevolution, mur-

dering Madero and seizing power. Zapata andVilla responded by raising armies to overthrow

Huerta, promising radical change. Althoughthey succeeded in deeating Huerta, they wererustrated in their pursuit o change by moder-ate orces raised with U.S. support by theConstitutionalists led by Venustiano Carranzaand lvaro Obregn. Carranza became presi-dent in 1917, Obregn in 1920, and the Con-stitutionalist minister Plutarco Elas Calles held

the presidency rom 1924 to 1928. But theseyears were tumultuous: Zapata and Vi lla werekilled by government orces, and both Carranza

and Obregn were assassinated by rebels. More-over, the Constitutionalists modernizing pro-business and pro-U.S. regime, which sought torestrict the power o the Catholic Church andminimized land reorms, provoked yet anotherpopular uprising, the Cristero rebellion, whichtook three years to repress. From 1928 to 1934,three ocials held the presidency, but they re-mained subordinate to Calles, who dominatedthe government even while out o oce.

Thus rom 1910 to 1934, the sequence o

events was loosely as ollows: a revolutionarycivil war that deeated Daz was ollowed by themoderate Madero regime. Madero then brokewith his more rad ical supporters, producingirst a counterrevolution by Huerta and thenanother civil war led by radical leaders whodeeated Huerta. Yet Huertas deeat producednot peace but another civil war between radicals

and moderates, won by the Constitutionalists.Although economically moderate, the Consti -

tutionalists killed their radical opponents andstarted a major attack on the Catholic Church.This provoked yet another civil war, ollowed by

an interlude o moderate stability overseen byCalles.

One might have expected rom Brintonsmodel that the Mexican Revolution would then

nally settle into a consolidation phase, yetthat was not the case. The election o LzaroCrdenas as president in 1934 led to a renewedphase o radicalism, at least in policy. Crdenas

elt that the revolution had stopped short in itsgoals, and he surprised everyone by turningon Calles and pushing through massive landreorms, nationalizing oreign-owned oil com-panies and railways, and entrenching the Partyo the Mexican Revolution (later known as thePRI), through strong ties to labor and peasantorganizations and domination o local govern-

ment. Only ater this second radical phase dida more conservative consolidation o the revolu-

tionary regime occur.

The Iranian revolution against the shah in

1979 appeared to be a typical Brintonian revolu-

tion: ollowing a deection by clerical and thenbureaucratic and business elites, a broad coali-tion overthrew the shahs government. At theoutset o the revolution, these groups sharedinfuence: Khomeini even argued that clericsshould not seek oce, and Abu al-Hassan Bani

Sadr, a proessional educated in France, becamethe republics rst president. However, when Iraq

declared war on Iran in 1980, a power strugglearose between Bani Sadr and the clerics, whoeared a secular government would result ithe president won a military victory. Khomeiniturned on Bani Sadr, impeaching him romoce and executing many o his close riends(Bani Sadr himsel only escaped by feeing toFrance). Khomeini then led the transormation

o the new Iranian regime into a government

dominated by clerics in oce, with a radical mi-litia the Revolutionary Guards who increas-ingly harassed and punished those who opposed

the regime or ailed to accept the strict practice

o Islamic law.

With K homeinis death, and the electiono more pragmatic and moderate clerics as pres-

idents (Akbar Hashemi Rasanjani, 1989 1997;and Mohammad Khatami, 19972005), itseemed that the Iranian revolution was en route


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to a stage o consolidation. Yet here, too, a second

radical phase arose. Arguing that the Iranianrevolution had lost its way and not done enough

or the poor and devout, a ormer revolutionary

radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected

president in 2005. Ahmadinejad has supportedradical elements in the Iranian government,overseen stepped-up attempts to enorce Islamic

law, and promoted a more aggressive and ideo-logical oreign policy, supporting Shia and anti-

Israel movements in the Middle East.

The unolding o the Chinese Communist

Revolution, too, was distinguished by recurrentepisodes o radicalism and moderation. Im-mediately ater taking power in 1949, ater alengthy civil war against the Nationalists, MaosCommunist Party launched an extensive landreorm and a terror campaign against counter-

revolutionaries, who included landlords andanyone ormerly associated with the Nationalist

regime or oreign companies. This campaigncontinued through Chinas involvement inthe Korean War, which ended in 1953. Yet theKorean War was ollowed by a period o mod-eration, marked by the rst Five-Year Plan oreconomic development. This plan was a success

and even included a period o greater politicalopenness, the Hundred Flowers Campaign, in1956 57. Yet this was immediately ollowed byanother radical phase. In 1958, Mao began an

anti-rightist campaign o renewed terror againstsuspected counterrevolutionaries, and launched

the radical economic policy o the Great LeapForward. These plans were a a ilure, however,undermining both industry and agriculture and

producing tremendous amines. In 1962, withthe ailures o the Great Leap apparent, Maosrole was diminished and a period o economicrecovery was overseen by the moderate Commu-

nist leaders Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi.

This moderate phase was brie, however,

as in 1966 Mao launched a renewed radicalmovement, the Cultural Revolution. Anxiousthat the revolution was becoming too attachedto material progress and losing sight o its Com-

munist ideals, Mao aimed to inspire the younger

generation to take action to pursue radical egal-

itarian policies and punish anyone who seemedto deviate ideologically rom Maos Communistline. Liu and Deng were disgraced and impris-oned. This phase lasted until Maos death in

1976. There then ollowed a struggle betweenradicals who ollowed Mao and his idelity torevolutionary ideology and moderates who sup-ported Deng and his desire to downplay ideol-ogy in avor o taking measures to bring material

progress. In this struggle, the radicals were sup-

pressed, and a series o market-oriented reorms

were undertaken by Deng and his protgs.

In short, a close look at both Brintons clas-

sic revolutions and several other cases o violent

social revolution shows complex patterns o con-

fict, radicalism, and terror. The rise o radicals,

and their terror against their opponents, mostoten ollows civil or international wars. This

was the case w ith the New Model Army in Eng-land, the Jacobins in France, the Bolsheviks inRussia, the Zapata/Villa ascendancy in Mexico,

the rise o clerical rule in Iran, and Maos rstcampaign against counterrevolutionaries in

China. Yet wars can also bring exhaustion andbe ollowed by eorts at moderate economic re-

covery, as with the Bolsheviks New EconomicPolicy (1921 28) ollowing the Russian civil war,

Maos rst Five-Year Plan and Hundred Flowersmovement ater the Korean War, and the moremoderate presidents in Iran chosen at the endo the Iraq war. These cases also revealed an-other pattern, unseen by Brinton: a renewedphase o radicalism, oten two or three decades

ater the initial change in regime. This phase oc-

curred in revolutions that were not overturnedbut had begun to be consolidated or had takena turn toward moderation. Brought on by theelection or seizure o power by more radicalgroups seeking to renew revolutionary enthu-siasm and eliminate their enemies, this phasecould be mild or quite severe. Examples include

the Jacksonian movement and presidency in the

United States, the Stalinist collectivization andpurges in Russia, the Cultural Revolution inChina, the Crdenas presidency in Mexico, and

the Ahmadinejad presidency in Iran. In thesecases it was only ater this phase o renewed rad-

icalism that stable consolidation o the regimeoccurred.

What Made the Color Revolutions So Peaceful?

The variety o patterns o radicalism, terror,counterrevolution, and war encountered in thepreceding cases makes it all the more important

to ask, what made the color revolutions so peace-


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ul? Yet these examples also allow this questionto be answered in terms o varying trajectorieso revolution dened by the dierent character

and sequence o the components o the revolu-tionary process.

Three characteristics seem to distinguishthe color revolutions and their similar historical

predecessors:

1. In the prerevolutionary stages o elite deection,polarization, and mass mobilization the goals o the

revolutionary leaders do not include class-based or

ideological attacks on ruling elites but are limited to

nationalist and democratic aims, and do not include

a major mobilization o peasants or traditional urban

workers but instead rests mainly on mobilizing orga-

nized labor (miners, industrial workers), urban busi-

ness, proessional, student, and white-collar groups or

(as with the Japanese Meiji Restoration and the Nether-

land and American revolutions) organized regional

militias or local military orces.

In most recent cases, this orm o revo-lutionary coalition arises because the middle-income states in which they occur are predomi-

nantly urban/industrial rather than agrarian,and/or economic inequality is moderate. Class-based redistributive goals are thus less relevant.

This is in contrast to monarchical, imperial, orhacienda-type regimes or colonies where thereare vast income and status gaps among averagepeasants or workers and even local elites, so

that class-based mobilization is relatively easy.As Seymour Mart in Lipset wrote regardingthe American colonies: American social struc-ture did not possess those great gaps that areound between the common people and theirgovernment in more hierarchical colonies andstates.

In other cases, where there is potential or

peasant or traditional urban worker class-based

mobilization as in the Philippines in the 1980s

and England in the 1680s this character arises

because the main revolutionary opposition con-sciously distances itsel rom popular protestand discourages class-based mobilization.

Two important points need to be made:First, these eatures are not simply a restate-

ment o the well-known distinction betweenpolitical and social revolutions, in which itis asserted that the ormer aim only to changeregimes, while the latter aim to change classstructures. Rather, the distinction is betweenrevolutions that, ater taking power, experience

a lengthy period o moderate but weak govern-ment, as opposed to revolutions that experi-ence sharp divisions, counterrevolution, radi-calization, terror, and increasingly centralizedand authoritarian rule. Several revolutions thatdid nothave primarily a class base, such as theEnglish Puritan Revolution o the 1640s and the

Iranian revolution o the 1970s, nonetheless de-

veloped ideologically driven radicalization, ter-ror, and centralization. Second, some modernrevolutionary movements that did have primar-ily a class base, such as the antiapartheid move-ment in South Arica that brought Nelson Man-

dela to power, did not produce radical terrorby the new revolutionary regime. Instead, theantiapartheid revolution unolded like a colorrevolution, with a constitutional and democratic

regime, despite the clear potential or the black

revolutionary movement to launch a radical at-tack on white elites ater taking power.

Thus the absence o sharp social inequal-ity is not a necessarycondition or a color-typerevolutionary process; decisions by revolution-ary elites on how to dene their goals and how

to mobilize their ollowers can consciouslydownplay class-based goals. I those revolution-ary leaders are able to take power based on such

nonclass mobilization as with Mandela inSouth Arica and Corazon Aquino in the Phil-ippines they can win urther support or their

approach and discredit more radical actionsaiming at class-based warare.

At the same time, even i the process oelite deection, polarization, and mobilizationeschews class-based mobilization and goals in

avor o stressing nationalist and democraticgoals, that is not a sufcient conditionby itsel toassure a color-type revolutionary process. Many

radicalizing revolutions in act began in thisway, with class -based mobilizat ion either ab-

13. Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The

United States in Historical and Comparative Perspec-

tive (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 92.

14. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; Goodwin,

No Other Way Out.

15. Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions.

Parsa makes this point clearly wi th regard to the 1986

revolution in the Philippines.


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sent or playing a minor role: or example, theEnglish Puritan Revolution, the Russian Revolu-

tion (which, although initially brought about by

worker strikes in February 1917, did not see calls

or peasants to seize land and workers to seizepower until Lenin returned rom exile in April),

the Iranian revolution o 1979, or the Algerianrevolution o 1962.

Thus another key turning point in the rev-

olutionary process also needs to be considered:

2. The revolutionary process is not marked by a lengthy

or severe revolutionary war.

Revolutionary wars whether civil or interna-tional have the potential to radical ize thecourse o a revolution. Color revolutions usu-ally take power either ater an orderly and well-regulated military confict or, more commonly,through electoral contests and urban protests to

support the outcome o those contests againstthe old regimes reluctance to accept change and

leave power. The absence o the extreme pres-sures caused by international or civil war deniesthe radicals an opportunity to mobilize their sup-

porters and press or more radical measures.

Where a war o independence is oughtby existing military orces under the leadershipo established prerevolutionary local elites, aswas the case in the Japanese Meiji Restorationand the American Revolution, it is not likely togive substantial leverage to radicals. Yet when

the pressures o ghting or survival go beyondwhat existing orces can manage, and a substan-

tially new or greatly expanded military organi-zation needs to be conscripted, organized, andinanced, these exigencies place great stresson revolutionary movements. They may panicat the thought o internal traitors and purgethem; they may be driven to radical measures to

raise troops or unds (such as seizures o church

property or elite assets); or they may need to in-

doctrinate the population and troops with radi-

cal ideas to instill the will to ght. Moreover, imoderates oversee military ailures, these cangreatly discredit them and open the way orradicals to present themselves as patriots andnational saviors.

Revolutionary wars whether guerrillawars to take power or civ il or internat ionalwars that arise short ly ater the all o the oldregime are requently the actors that split co-

alitions, give opportunity and leverage to radi-cals, and justiy more extreme measures by revo-

lutionaries to secure the resources and loyaltyneeded to survive. Wars intensiy the search or

domestic enemies, inure leaders and ollowersto the violence that then spills into revolution-ary terror, and orce revolutionary governments

to become more centralized and authoritarian.

Yet as we have seen, while wars oten havebeen crucial to launching episodes o radicaldominance, wars also have given rise to periods

o exhaustion and moderation. Certain periods

o radical violence such as Stalins purges and

Maos Cultural Revolution were not instigated

by wars. Thus one more actor needs attentionin the revolutionary process:

3.Divisions in the revolutionary coalition ater win-ning power remain contained, rather than polarize into

fercely divided radical and moderate groups.

Because color revolutions are initiated with aminimal attention to class-based goals o radical

attacks on a particular group or class, and avoid

the pressures o revolutionary wars that bothgive radicals the opportunity to seize powerand lead governments to more extreme and au-

thoritarian measures, they generally avoid anextreme polarization among elites ater the rev-

olutions. The elites may actionalize and ghtbitterly or power as did the Federali sts andDemocrats in the new United States and the

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko blocs in Ukraineater the orange revolution. Yet such dierences

are generally over the means to achieve morelimited goals, such as economic growth policyor government organization, rather than oversuch undamentals as whether to collectivizeproperty or have a capitalist versus a socialistsystem. These dierences oten have the eecto producing an extended period up to a de-cade or two in which the new revolutionarygovernment appears weak and ocused mainly

on sorting out its internal policies, as opposedto the ruthless and powerul authoritarian re-gimes that typically emerge rom radicalizingrevolutions.

In radicalizing revolutions, the revolution-

ary coalition whether rom the outset or be-cause o war pressures has both leaders whowish to ocus mainly on nationalist goals andothers who are more committed to an ideologi-


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cally dened orm o government. Moreover,the latter have gained a dominant role in set-ting policies at times and indoctrinated manyin their goals. This means that even ater initial

victories over the old regime or counterrevolu-tionary oes, at home or abroad, the potentialremains or the reemergence o radical ervorand urther episodes o radicalization and ter-ror. While moderates may gain an upper handater a successul war or an economic setbackreduces the leverage o the radicals, the lattermay seize or engineer a later opportunity toreassert themselves. Radicali zing revolutionsthus not only suer an initial episode o radical-

ism and revolutionary terror but are prone toexperience later phases o renewed radicalism,when ideological ly ervent leaders are able toraise popular support or attack more moderateleaders or ailing to live up to the ideals o therevolution or leading it astray.

Two Types of Revolutions and a

Newly Dominant Form

This essay has argued or a new typology orevolutions, dividing them, depending on theprocess and outcomes they produce, into colorrevolutions and radicalizingrevolutions.

Color revolutions tend to occur in soci-eties with substantial urban and commercialsectors, organized labor, and moderate social

and economic inequality. In color revolutions,deecting elites seek to mobilize mainly urban,student, white-collar, mining, proessional, andbusiness supporters (and in some cases inde-pendent armers) or nationalist and usuallydemocratic goals, eschewing class-based mobili-

zation and attacks on entire elite groups. These

revolutions do not involve the creation o newarmies or civil or revolutionary wars (althoughin some cases they may involve mobilization orexpansion o existing militias under established

local elites). They thereore do not generallyinduce the kind o extreme measures that pro-voke counterrevolut ion or result in episodeso radical supremacy and terror. Instead, theoverthrow o the old regime is generally accom-

plished by a combination o strikes, urban dem-

onstrations, and electoral campaigns, although

in some cases violent conrontations with theorces o the old regime do occur. More impor-tant, once the new regime takes power, it doesnot experience polarization or radicalization or

engage in terror or civil war. Rather, it is likelyto experience sustained but moderate politicalcompetition over policies and government orga-

nization and thus to remain a somewhat weak or

ragile democracy until political and economicpolicies stabilize and promote growth.

Radical revolutions, by contrast, most com-

monly occur in countries with great status andeconomic inequality. Some o the revolutionary

leaders either rom the outset or as the revo-lution unolds seek to position themselves asleaders o radical class-based or ideology-basedmovements that target entire groups o elites or

the population or attack. Civil or international

wars provide opportunities that empower these

radicals to attack their domestic enemies andpush through extreme policies or the redis-tributive or ideological restructuring o society.

Periods o radical ascendancy, which can recuras late as two or three decades ater the all othe old regime, usually lead to more centralized

and authoritarian rule.

Historically, radical revolutions have been

the most common orm, especially with thespread o communist ideology in the late twen-tieth century. Color revolutions have been rarer,

owing mainly to the paucity o middle-incomecountries with moderate inequality seeking tothrow o authoritarian rulers, but also to thelimited appeal o color revolutions as a modelto emulate.

As we have entered the twenty-rst cen-tury, it is clear this balance is changing. Colorrevolutions seem likely to take over as the domi-

nant orm o revolution, spreading beyond theEastern European and ormer Soviet countriesthat popularized the concept. More countries

are achieving an income and inequality prolewhere class-based mobil ization has diminish-ing appeal. In addition, the model o electoralrevolution, in which oppositions rely on thedeerence that even authoritarian leaders in-creasingly show toglobal norms o legitimationby elections, and the international apparatus

16. Bunce and Wolchick, International Diffusion.


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o election monitoring and support to contestrigged results to challenge authoritarian lead-ers, is more viable and widely available thanks to

the spread o nongovernmental organizationsand international norms that support elections

worldwide. Finally, the success o and global ac-claim or leaders o color revolutions such asMandela and Aquino despite the struggles othe governments they have let in their wake as

well as the attention and success o the anticom-

munist color revolutions, have provided attrac-tive models to emulate.

In the uture, it seems likely that i revo-lutionary movements arise to overturn the re-maining authoritarian governments in China,Iran, Cuba, Egypt, and sub-Saharan Arica,they are more likely to be color-type revolutions

than radicalizing revolutions. Even in Egypt and

Algeria, where anxiety has arisen over whether

the electoral triumphs o Islamic parties willlead to Iranian-type radicalism, such an out-come seems unlikely. The Islamic revolution inIran could not have occurred without a broadcoalition o liberals, students, women, business,

and labor supporters; the Islamic clerics andtheir supporters among the peasants and urban

poor only gained leverage rst in the hostageconrontation with the United States and thenespecially in the war with Iraq. I not or that in-

ternational war, it is not evident that the Islamic

orces would have taken control o the revolu-tion. I an Egyptian or Algerian nationalist dem-

ocratic movement seeks to overturn its countrysautocracy, a radicalizing revolution is unlikely,unless the confict with the authorities involvesa guerrilla struggle or regime repression thateliminates or undermines moderate opposition

leaders and gives leverage to radicals (although,

unortunately, there is some evidence that suchtrends are occurring).

In sum, revolutions in the uture seem

more likely to produce weak democracies ratherthan radical authoritarian regimes. This is good

news or those hoping that peaceul revolutions

will be the wave o the uture. Yet it also suggests

that more research needs to be done to learnhow these weak democracies can best be helped

to nd their ooting and to avoid the kind oconrontations and conficts that could yet pro-duce more radicalized patterns o change.

17. Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist

Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2007). Schwedler has shown the

dominance of moderate politics in Middle East-

ern states where moderates are forced to compete

openly with moderate parties for support.

goldstone jack rethinking revolutions

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