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Introduction to…

Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business Mining SWIA – Methodology and Project Phases

Emerging field findings related to…

Community consultation Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Informal payments Licensing issues Grievance Mechanisms Labour conditions

Current core funders:

UK DFID

DANIDA

Norway

Switzerland

Netherlands

Ireland

Founding partners:

MCRB ObjectiveTo provide an effective and legitimateplatform for the creation of knowledge,capacity and dialogue concerningresponsible business in Myanmar, basedon local needs and internationalstandards, that results in moreresponsible business.

MCRB defines ‘responsible business’ as ‘business activities that work for the long-term interests of Myanmar and all its people’.

www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org15 Shan Yeiktha Street, Sanchaung, Yangon. Tel/Fax: 01 510069

I. Scoping of the Sector •Develop foundational knowledge base to target field research for validation and deepening of data. Months 1-4

II. Identification and Assessment of Impacts•Validate foundational knowledge base with primary data collected through field research from targeted locations across the country of focus.

Months 5-6

III. Mitigation and Impact Management•Identify measures that will help avoid, minimise, mitigate potential impacts of the sector. Months 6-9

V. Consultation on draft SWIA and Finalisation •Present SWIA findings and conclusions, as well as recommendations, to be validated through consultations with representatives of government, companies operating/planning to operate in the country, and representatives of civil society organisations, trade unions, international organisations, donor governments.

Months 10-12

I. Pre-Screening II. Scoping

III. Idenification& Assessment

of Impacts

IV. Mitigation and Impact

Management

V. Consultation & Finalisation

Focus on mining of tin, tungsten, gold, limestone and the production of cement.

MCRB field visits to Karen, Shan, Kachin, Bago, Sagaing, Mandalay, Kayah and Tanintharyi regions.

Interviews with company, government and CSO representatives as well as local communities and mine workers in the informal and formal sector.

Large, industrial as well as medium-, small- and subsistence-scale mine operations and processing facilities visited.

More than 1500 individual stakeholders consulted.

Most mines visited had not carried out any meaningful consultations.

Where consultation had occurred, it was for more recent projects, oftencarried out either to;(a) satisfy the EIA consultation requirement, or (b) obtain community signatures as part of mine licensing process.

There was no or inadequate consultations regarding land seizure, resettlement and compensation for accidents.

Consultations were often carried out with male village heads only; were not undertaken in local languages; planned within short timeframes and/or far from the affected communities; undertaken after the project had already been initiated.

Some consultation included a special representative from an armed group

.

No mines visited had an operational-level grievance mechanisms in place and continuous consultation was rare.

Cases of ongoing company-community engagement centered on donations rather than project-induced issues. On the whole, donations consulted on more frequently than other topics.

Any on-going consultation was most frequently informal and may have taken place through village or religious events rather than as part of company outreach strategy.

Community members interviewed by MCRB recommended that companies consulting on EIAs should provide a summary of findings in non-technical language with plenty of time for community to review document prior to consultation meeting.

Some of the issues reported by community members included...

EIA consultants invited all villagers to a consultation but only gave one day’s advance notice

During consultations, EIA consultants used Burmese which is not the local language; there was an informal translator but not a professional

EIA consultants only spoke to the village leaders/heads of households

Community members felt that EIA consultants purposefully used technical terms during the consultations so people could not understand

Companies would organise small consultations, but only one time, when they needed signatures to sign off on project

One company only consulted with group of village elders who were supportive of project

Promises made to communities by companies (regarding job opportunities, compensation etc.) not honoured

Many mines had failed to carry out required EIAs.

Community reports indicate that EIA consultation process is frequently flawed.

Companies reported not knowing how to carry out an impact assessment and therefore asking other companies for their reports to adapt and ‘copy-paste’.

MCRB review of EIAs obtained through field visits also revealed copy-pasting and references to other countries.

Many mining company EIAs reviewed by MCRB are not thorough and complete assessments of past, current and potential environmental and social impacts.

One minerals processing factory manager admitted to not understanding the EIA process and therefore not implementing an EMP.

A prospective ‘pit owner’ may get an informal ‘license’ by applying jointly with a village administrator at the township Forestry Department. The applicant pays a fee to the department in the presence of the village administrator, the size of which is unknown, to obtain the permission to operate an informal mine on forest land.

Taxes were collected from unlicensed miners by local authorities as well as armed groups, often based on the horsepower of machines used by miners. In one area, ‘pit owners’ would pay a yearly fee of 20 lakh per excavator used in cash to armed group.

Some armed groups also tax ‘pit owners’ at the mine site 2-3 times per year. In one area visited, such payments averaged at 100,000 MMK for one pit.

‘Pit owners’ may also pay additional informal taxes to the local government. In one case, 50,000 MMK was collected from ‘pit owners’ on a monthly basis by the village administrator.

There were reports of inappropriate payments made to mining enterprise production monitors by mining companies themselves. One mine reported that they record a monthly bribe to a production monitor as ‘CSR’ in their accounts.

Several cases where donations were made to village administration or village elders were seen as illegitimate by wider community. Such payments made to personal accounts and managed by individuals with limited oversight by company

In nearly all locations visited there were overlapping land claims either between different mining companies, between mine companies and other types of companies and/or between mines and communities.

Issues with inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination meant that licenses awarded at Union-level and regional level to different companies were found to overlap.

A lack of coordination was also found to create issues with legal enforcement.Township-level authorities reported that they could not enforce regulations where mine licenses had been awared by district-level authorities, even where license-holders are not complying with regulation.

Township-level authorities from various departments also reported communication issues between the township and district-levels.

Companies did not have effective grievance mechanisms in place, most companies had no grievance handling system whatsoever.

Companies frequently reported that they felt that formal grievance mechanisms were unnecessary as they had an informal understanding with communities about their openness to hearing complaints.

Some companies referred to staff members while others used ‘mail boxes’ for workers or community members to submit complaints. No information was provided on how grievances would be handled and so these mechanisms were most often not used or trusted.

In some of these cases, there were language barriers between mine or factory staff and community members.

UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights set out good practice on complaints and grievance handling which can be used.

Formal sector Informal (unlicensed) sector• Rare reports of child labour • Child labour on mine sites not unusual

• Lack of HSE enforcement and training – many mines had policies not adhered to

• Lack of knowledge about unsafe practices –miners expose themselves to harm, e.g. mercury

• Often inadequate PPE provided; workers do not wear equipment supplied

• Most often no PPE

• No mines visited had an employee union

• Excessive working hours, 24-hour long shifts including underground

• Excessive working hours, 24-hour long shifts including underground

• Procedures for awarding compensation in case of accidents unclear, compensation ofteninadequate

• Often no compensation in case of accident

• Gender discrimination in pay and access to work • Women often work with chemicals, womensometimes

• Some companies retain worker salaries illegally • Some ‘pit owners’ retain workers salaries to pay back loans on machinery; workers underpaid

• Workers frequently do not have a contract; someworkers with contracts not given a copy

• Companies make extensive use of ‘dailylabourers’

• Workers live in poor-quality accommodation; some have inadequate access to water for drinking and sanitation; some may not comeand go freely (e.g. locked in residences from 9pm-7am)

• Gold miners burn mercury amalgam in their homes

Field findings identified four main governance issues in Myanmar’s mining sector;

Lack of community consultation, not least in regard to land

Poor complaints/grievance handling

Labour/HSE law

Informal payments/donations and a lack of transparency

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