goodhand, j. the drugs economy and post-conflict peacebuilding in afghanistan

Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

JONATHAN GOODHAND

This article examines how the drugs economy emerged, evolved and adapted to transform-ations in Afghanistan’s political economy. With a primary focus on the conflictual war topeace transition following the signing of the Bonn Agreement, the relationship betweendrugs and political (dis)order is explored. Central to the analysis is an examination ofthe power relationships and institutions of extraction that developed around the drugeconomy. Expanding upon a model developed by Snyder (2004), it is argued that jointextraction regimes involving rulers and private actors have tended to bring politicalorder whereas private extraction regimes have led to decentralized violence and politicalbreakdown. This model helps explain why in some parts of Afghanistan drugs and corrup-tion have contributed to a level of political order, whereas in other areas they have fuelleddisorder. Thus, there is no universal, one-directional relationship between drugs, corrup-tion and conflict. Peacebuilding involves complex bargaining processes between rulersand peripheral elites over power and resources and when successful leads to stable interde-pendencies. Counter-narcotics policies have the opposite effect and are thus fuellingconflict.

In 2007, Afghanistan was responsible for 93 per cent of the world’s opiates. Noother country has ever had such a dominant position in the global supply ofopiates. However, in 2002 the opium economy was not seen as a priority of thenewly installed Karzai regime or its international supporters. The US-led interven-tion that overthrew the Taliban was primarily concerned with counter-terrorismand political consolidation. Coalition forces initially turned a blind eye to poppycultivation and trafficking, fearing that counter-narcotics efforts would upset thefragile political coalition that had been forged to pursue the ‘war on terror’; butbetween the Bonn Agreement of 2002 and the Afghan Compact of 2006,counter-narcotics rapidly rose up the policy agenda, based on the growing percep-tion that the opium economy was a significant driver (as well as a symptom) ofinsecurity and bad governance.

Although there is a large body of research on the upstream dimensions of thedrug economy – particularly the micro-level dynamics of cultivation1 – thedownstream side remains relatively opaque and there has been very little workon the political effects of the drug industry.2 This article examines the intercon-nections between drugs, corruption and peacebuilding.3 Based upon the assump-tion that behind peacebuilding stands statebuilding – the construction oflegitimate political authority – this article focuses on the various pathwaysthrough which drug-related corruption has influenced processes of political

International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.3, June 2008, pp.405–423ISSN 1353-3312 print/1743-906X onlineDOI:10.1080/13533310802058984 # 2008 Taylor & Francis

consolidation (and crisis) since the fall of the Taliban regime. It argues that there isno universal uni-directional relationship between drugs, corruption and conflict.In some parts of the country drugs and corruption have contributed to a level ofpolitical order, whereas in other areas they have fuelled disorder. FollowingSnyder,4 it is argued that political order is more likely where rulers and privateactors have developed joint institutions of extraction around valuable resourcessuch as drugs. One policy implication of this finding is that peacebuilding inAfghanistan is likely to be the result of complex bargaining processes betweenrulers and peripheral elites, which may ultimately lead to stable interdependen-cies. Current counter-narcotics policies have the opposite effect and are thus fuel-ling conflict.

Corruption and War to Peace Transitions

Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office or public responsi-bility for private, group or sectional gain. Typically, corruption is seen as an impe-diment to a successful war to peace transition. In Kosovo, post-conflictpeacebuilding has been accompanied by the growing penetration of the state bycriminal structures, particularly in the judiciary, whereas post-settlementLiberia is in danger of heading back to the highly unstable spoils politics thatled to the outbreak of war in the first place.5 However, it has also been arguedthat corruption may facilitate the creation of a new political order (or the conso-lidation of an old one) and the dividends of peace obtained through corruptionmay outweigh the costs of inefficiencies.6 Put another way, donors may have toaccept that priming the patronage pump is one of the costs of peace.7 Historicalexperience, as opposed to current liberal orthodoxies,8 provides some support forthis position.

Thomas Gallant, in a study of brigandage and piracy from a world historicalperspective, makes a convincing case for the role played by illegal networks ofarmed predators in facilitating the spread and global triumph of capitalism.9

Bandits were deeply insinuated in the process of state formation and state conso-lidation. They acted as brokers between centre and periphery, facilitating capital-ist penetration of the countryside by increasing monetization, encouragingmarketization and by providing a venue for upward economic mobility.Through a process of either co-opting or crushing rural outlaws in frontierregions, states experienced a ‘border effect’ that strengthened their capacities.Put simply, ‘bandits helped make states and states made bandits’.10 Contempor-ary statebuilders may adopt similar tactics: the Burmese drug lord Khun Sa, forexample, has played a catalytic role in state formation by forcing Rangoon toimpose control over its frontiers.11 Similarly, Snyder convincingly argues thatalthough opium initially fuelled chaos by providing a key source of income torebel armies, after 1990 it contributed to the consolidation of a stable militaryregime that ended the civil war and forcibly imposed political order.12 The key,according to Snyder, is how institutions of extraction involving rulers andprivate actors develop around these resources. Four possible extraction regimesare posited – ‘private’, ‘public’, ‘joint’ or ‘no extraction’ – each leading to

406 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

different outcomes in terms of political (dis)order. If rulers are able to buildinstitutions of joint extraction, lootable resources can produce political orderby providing the revenues to govern. Rulers may deploy sticks (coercion orlegal instruments) to deny private actors independent access to resources, orcarrots (amnesties, tax breaks) to encourage them to share and invest their reven-ues. Patronage and corruption may be part of the bargaining process.

The links between corruption and peacebuilding therefore depend upon theparticular types and settings of corruption. ‘Successful’ corruption, according toReno, has occurred when informal networks have been grafted on to thecentral authority of states.13 In cases where the bureaucratic apparatus ofthe state was permitted to intervene in a wide array of activities, especially theeconomy, it was able to co-opt local authority structures – a practice that ishighly at odds with contemporary economic ideology. Therefore, the effects ofpost-conflict corruption on peacebuilding processes depend on a range ofcontext-specific factors. These include: the structure of power relations (pre-and post-conflict); the nature of resources (licit and illicit) available to differentgroups; the social capital upon which leaders can build constituencies; the inten-sity, duration and legacies of the conflict period; the nature of the ‘grand bargain’or peace settlement; and the role played by international and regional actors. Asexamined below, all these factors have played a part in shaping the complex anddynamic pattern of relationships between drugs, corruption and peacebuilding inAfghanistan. Although this article focuses on the post-Taliban period, some back-ground on the wartime period is required so as to understand better the contem-porary dynamics of drugs and corruption.

The Afghan War Economy

The political economy of the Afghan wars can broadly be divided into threephases: first, the cold war period, spanning the Soviet invasion of 1979 to thefall of the Najibullah regime in 1992; second, the intra-mujahedin civil war,which lasted until the emergence of the Taliban and their takeover of Kabul in1996; third, the period of Taliban rule until their removal by the US-led coalitionat the end of 2001. Between each phase there were significant shifts in the wareconomy. Key factors included: the changing role of international and regional(state and non-state) patrons; the types, sources and magnitude of external andinternal resource flows; new patterns of capital accumulation and investment;the emergence and evolution of politico-military structures; and the mobilizationof social networks (ethnic, religious, tribal and regional) by militaryentrepreneurs.

During the cold war period of the conflict, massive inflows of military andfinancial assistance to the regime and the mujahedin (from the Soviet Unionand the US, respectively) fuelled the expansion of a war economy, producingboth rentier rebels and a rentier state. In the struggle for pre-eminence amongstthe Peshawar-based resistance groups, the cultivation of foreign patrons wasthe key to building constituencies within Afghanistan. The influx of externalfunds contributed to the rapid monetization of the economy, and provided the

THE DRUGS ECONOMY IN AFGHANISTAN 407

start-up capital for commanders to begin investing in the production, processingand trafficking of opium.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline in superpower patronage ulti-mately led to the fall of the Najibullah regime. Military entrepreneurs had todevelop new strategies to generate revenue. They did this primarily throughtaxing the expanding drugs trade14 and cross-border smuggling, by securingsupport from neighbouring countries, and from transnational religious networks.The emergence of the drugs industry denoted a major transformation of theAfghan economy from largely subsistence agriculture to commercial, export-oriented farming.15

The decentralization of the war economy led to a regime of private extractionwhereby private economic actors enjoyed exclusive, unregulated, and untaxedcontrol over the income generated by resources.16 The lawlessness, criminalityand corruption of this period contributed to the groundswell of support for theTaliban, particularly in the south of the country when they first emerged in1994. It also led to a new political coalition between the Taliban and the merchantclass of the Afghan–Pakistan borderland, whose trucking and smugglingbusinesses were undermined by the chaos of warlord rule. The Taliban takeoverled to the emergence of a joint extraction regime. In this third phase of the Afghanwar economy, the Taliban consolidated their hold over 90 per cent of the countryand in so doing centralized the means of coercion and predation. This period sawthe consolidation and expansion of the drug economy. Opium was a de facto legalcommodity, as indicated by its cultivation on prime agricultural land.17 Althoughthere are competing explanations as to why the Taliban introduced and success-fully enforced an opium ban in 2000, it seems probable that it was a bargainingploy to gain international recognition.18 Therefore, during these three phases ofthe conflict, Afghanistan emerged as the global leader in opium production,based upon a ‘triple comparative advantage’ of favourable physical, politicaland economic conditions: a cultivation environment that produces opiumpoppies with a high morphine content; chronic insecurity and institutional weak-ness that resulted in inadequate or non-existent forms of regulation; and poorinfrastructure and rural poverty that prevented the development of alternativelicit livelihoods. Over the years, Afghans have developed the know-how, expertiseand market connections to build upon these comparative advantages in order tosurvive, accumulate, or wage war.19

Post-Taliban Afghanistan and the Re-emergence of the Opium Economy

Although the removal of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn Agreementtransformed the political landscape, many of the structural factors underpinningthe opium economy remained unchanged. A range of factors contributed to the re-emergence of the drug economy. First, the Taliban’s opium ban had the twineffects of creating a tenfold increase in prices and a growth in opium-relateddebt in rural areas. Poor farmers had little choice but to plant poppy in November2001 in order to repay their debts. For more wealthy farmers, high prices createdstrong incentives to allocate land to poppy. These factors were reinforced by the


end of the drought, which meant an increased availability of wheat (a competingcrop) and an improvement in security, which freed up internal and externalmarkets.20

Second, the CIA’s policy of providing several hundred million US dollars tocommanders to buy their support in the ‘war on terror’ essentially flooded themoney market. The exchange rate of the dollar with Afghan currency washalved and this rapid deflation created incentives to unload US dollars intoother currencies or other profitable investments. As the US offensive occurredduring the poppy planting season, dollars were quickly recycled into loans tofarmers to finance next spring’s poppy crop.

Third, coalition forces initially adopted a laissez-faire policy towards drugs,born out of the strong tension between counter-insurgency and counter-narcoticsobjectives. Counter-insurgency efforts require good local allies and intelligence.However, local warlords are unlikely to provide either support or intelligenceto those who are destroying their businesses.21

Fourth, the criminalization of opium had the effect of keeping prices highbecause of the associated ‘risk premium’ (in contrast to previous phases of theconflict when it was essentially a licit commodity), which forced those involvedin the opium industry to look for protection beyond the state. In Afghanistan,there is no shortage of non-state ‘specialists in violence’. Consequently, theTaliban in the south and military entrepreneurs elsewhere have been able to gen-erate political capital (and revenue) by providing protection to the peasantry andto traffickers from state-led counter-narcotics efforts. The decentralization of vio-lence and insecurity in the countryside was compounded by the failure to extendthe International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul.

Contemporary Features of the Opium Industry

According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) figures, opium cultiva-tion rose from 165,000 hectares in 2006 to 193,000 hectares in 2007 – thiswas after a 59 per cent increase between 2005 and 2006.22 National productiongrew from 6,500 tons to 8,200 tons. However, national figures mask considerablefluctuations in cultivation over time and diversity amongst provinces.23 Currently,cultivation is concentrated in the south, with 70 per cent of production concen-trated in the five provinces bordering Pakistan. Helmand is responsible for 50per cent of the entire opium crop in Afghanistan and produces more narcoticsthan any other country. In the north and centre poppy cultivation has diminished,and the number of poppy-free provinces more than doubled from six to 13 in2006.24

At both the upstream and downstream ends of the value chain – Afghanfarmers and drug consumers in the developed world – markets are characterizedby numerous actors who are ‘price-takers’; but the number of actors at the inter-mediate stages is much smaller and this is where price setting and price manipu-lation takes place.25 This practice corresponds with other (licit and illicit)commodity markets in Afghanistan, in which there are low barriers to entry at


the bottom, but few actors and stronger forms of regulation further up thechain.26

The vast bulk of the value-added is generated outside Afghanistan.27 In 2005–06 the total export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan equalled about 38per cent of non-drug GDP, down from 47 per cent the previous year owing togrowth of the non-drug economy. In 2006 the export value of drugs wasUS$3.1 billion, compared with US$2.7 billion in 2005. UNODC estimates that76 per cent of the income from narcotics goes to traffickers and heroin refiners(most of which is accrued to a limited number of bulk buyers and large-scalespecialist traders) and 24 per cent to farmers.28 In order to reduce risks, a signifi-cant part of revenue is spent on payments to ‘security providers’ and governmentofficials. Since 2002, criminalization and law enforcement efforts have increasedthe ‘risk premium’ charged by opium traders, which is reflected in higher prices.

Although frequently described as a vertically integrated value chain, in prac-tice the opium economy might better be conceptualized as a number of inter-connected but constantly mutating networks. There is no evidence to indicatethe emergence of a hierarchically controlled, cartelized drug economy, though arecent UNODC/World Bank study reported growing market integration, withHelmand and Kandahar becoming centres of gravity that influence prices inother markets.29 A further sign of the maturity of the industry is the increasedamount of opium refined into morphine and heroin within Afghanistan30 andthe shift in quality and purity of heroin.31 UNODC now estimates that 90 percent of the world’s opium is processed in Afghanistan.

Post-Bonn Peacebuilding and the Criminalized Peace Economy

In the post-Bonn period the war economy has mutated into a criminalized peaceeconomy. Three factors have contributed to this problematic transition: (a) therole of international actors; (b) the post-conflict ‘grand bargain’ forged in Bonn;and (c) the character of the emergent Afghan state.

First, in the international sphere there have been extreme tensions and incon-sistencies over the means and ends of intervention. A ‘light footprint’ approachwas adopted by Lakhdar Brahimi, the then Special Advisor to the UnitedNations Secretary-General. This involved working through domestic power-holders (many of dubious legitimacy) and maintaining a limited peacekeepingpresence in Kabul while an alliance of US-led coalition forces and regional strong-men pursued the ‘war on terror’. Counter-terrorism was prioritized over state-building, and the strategy for pursuing the former undermined the latter asregional strongmen re-established their spheres of influence in the provinces.The problem of the ‘light footprint’ was compounded by the invasion of Iraq,which had the effect of redirecting diplomatic, financial and military resourcesaway from Afghanistan. Between Bonn and the Afghan Compact the US positionshifted away from its original minimalist agenda, and the Compact reflects a moremaximalist approach to statebuilding. However, it also reflects the confusionaround competing and perhaps incompatible priorities. Liberal peacebuildingskirts around these tensions by assuming that all good things come together;


but the failure to prioritize between the ‘war on terror’, defeating the Taliban,statebuilding, counter-narcotics and reinventing the NATO alliance has oftenled to second-best, hybrid solutions – one example being the provincial recon-struction teams (PRTs) that were, in effect, the poor man’s solution to theproblem of failing to extend ISAF forces into the provinces.32

Second, the Bonn Agreement did not constitute a sustainable peace settlement.It signified a victor’s peace involving a coalition of actors who fell on the ‘rightside’ of the ‘war on terror’.33 The problem was that the losers retained theircapacity to challenge the new political dispensation. The Bonn Agreement leftthe largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, feeling disenfranchised, and by excludinggroups sympathetic to the interests of the Taliban and Pakistan, it invitedspoiler behaviour and continued conflict.

Third, in parallel with the ‘official’ political transition with its benchmarks ofthe emergency loya jirga, the constitutional loya jirga and elections, there has beenan ‘unofficial’ transition in which power has coalesced around factions andgroups that established a strategic edge in the war years. These groups continueto have access to means of protection and predation. Elections had the effect ofentrenching power structures in the provinces and real power in Afghanistan isnow closely linked to the capacity to generate money and patronage throughthe drug economy.34

As central government is so weak and dependent on unreliable externalpatrons, power-holders in the periphery have a level of autonomy and leverage.In the bargaining processes between central and peripheral elites, the latter calcu-late that it may not be safe to throw in their lot with the former, leading to thecontinuation of fluid political arrangements that take the form of ‘spot contracts’or constant ‘hedging’.35 The nature of these brokering relationships varies fromregion to region, depending on the area’s constellation of political and militaryactors and its potential for profitable extraction. Therefore, there is a deep inter-penetration of formal politics with informal structures of networks and factionsand, as Mustaq Khan has shown in other contexts, internal political stability isnot maintained through fiscal policy, but largely through off-budget and selectiveaccommodation of factions organized along patron–client lines.36

Drugs, Corruption and State Crisis

According to the World Bank, the drugs economy has induced a ‘vicious circle’ ofbad governance that endangers the re-establishment of security, the rule of lawand a legitimate economy. Opium, it is argued, constitutes a ‘grave danger tothe entire statebuilding and reconstruction agenda’.37

The poppy economy has several direct and indirect impacts upon both thedegree of the state and the kind of state. It is widely believed to underwrite a par-allel set of power structures, lubricate clientelist relations and feed endemic cor-ruption.38 Current-day corruption appears to be built upon earlier practices ofpatronage, but one of the principal differences between the pre-war and post-war economy is the level of monetization of everyday relationships.39 The statehas become the major avenue for accumulation and inter-factional competition,


and drugs have had the effect of increasing the stakes and therefore the costs ofappointments.

The Ministry of Interior (MoI), according to one report, is afflicted by ‘multi-tiered graft’ and ‘concentric circles of corruption’.40 According to one general inthe MoI, up to 30 per cent of the department’s foreign-donated finances goastray.41 In an investigative report on the drugs trade it was reported that apolice chief in a poppy-growing area could expect to pay up to US$100,000 inbribes for six monthly periods for a salaried position that pays US$60 permonth.42 Highway police, until they were disbanded, were also believed to beheavily involved in facilitating and taxing smuggling, and drugs were reportedlysmuggled through government law enforcement vehicles. In the same article,Afghan officials privately admitted that perhaps 80 per cent of the personnel atthe MoI might be benefiting from the drug trade. Furthermore, in a recentreport by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) on police reform,an interviewee described the MoI as a ‘shop for selling jobs’, confirming itsreputation as one of the most corrupt ministries.43 This problem is not restrictedto the MoI; of the 250,000–400,000 civil servants who are working within theAfghan government, Afghan officials estimate that perhaps 100,000 of these aredirectly benefiting (through transportation fees, profits, or bribes) from the drugtrade.

The drug economy has become a vehicle for accumulating power. Politicalentrepreneurs, who want to be seen as ‘legitimate’, have a ‘remote control’engagement with the drugs trade, which involves working through connectionslower down the chain.44 A complex pyramid of protection and patronage hasemerged, providing state protection to criminal trafficking.45 This assemblageof actors, networks and institutions, like the opium economy itself, is extremelyfootloose and flexible, and patterns of capture and corruption can shift acrossministries and other institutions in order to evade regulatory mechanisms.46

The drugs economy provides a mode of accumulation that enables militaryand political entrepreneurs to ‘capture’ parts of the state. The wholesale absorp-tion of factional networks into the government administration at the national andlocal levels negatively affects the ‘degree’ or capacity of the state. Those who roseto prominence during the war years and have used their strategic edge to enter thenew Afghan state lack the administrative skills and know-how (unlike the techno-crats) to work effectively with donors, manage projects and deliver services to thepopulation. The drug economy also constitutes a huge quantity of untaxedincome. Government revenue amounts to only 4 per cent of GDP, limiting thestate’s ability to deliver services and increasing its dependence on externalresources.

Drugs influence not only the capacity, but also the perceived legitimacy of thestate. If the key challenge of post-conflict peacebuilding is the construction oflegitimate political authority, the widespread perception of corruption under-mines the emergence of this authority. Corrupt officials are the face of governmentin the districts; but corruption has got so out of hand that the discourse on corrup-tion has been skilfully mobilized by the Taliban and anti-government elements.47

Corruption became a powerful public issue at the time of the parliamentary


elections when it was popularized by Ramazan Bashar Dost, an MP from Kabul.48

A study by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, which interviewed 1,258 Afghans, foundthat 60 per cent of respondents believed that this administration was more corruptthan any other in the past two decades.49 The Courts and the MoI were high-lighted as particularly corrupt. This damaging perception of corruption has alsospread into the international sphere, undermining the support for further aidamongst voters in Western countries. As President George W. Bush has stated,he does not want to ‘waste another American life on a “narco-state”’.50

Drugs, Corruption and Statebuilding?

The mainstream discourse on drugs, however, exaggerates its political and finan-cial influence – so far there is little evidence to suggest that the state is wholly sub-ordinate to drugs interests. Although there are some indications of growingintegration in the drug industry, it is far from being a hierarchical, cartelizedentity that is able to exert influence on the state in a coherent manner. Drug net-works tend to be decentralized and constantly mutating, with actors at each levelof the chain being only ‘partially sighted’. Although drug money represents a sig-nificant source of rent for military and political entrepreneurs, other (licit andillicit) income streams, including large inflows of foreign aid, play a role inbuying votes, positions and favours. Also, because of the overall growth of thelicit economy since 2002, the relative size of the drug economy has declined.Finally, political decision-making involves a complex mix of factors in whichfinancial, political and social resources are brought into play. Tribal, ethnic, pol-itical and religious allegiances can – and frequently do – trump economic self-interest. Thus, although drugs are a factor in political decision-making, the‘narco-state’ discourse exaggerates their role by raising them to a position ofprimacy.

The drug economy is conventionally viewed as an index of state power, so thatlow capacity regimes are more likely to have a ‘drug problem’ than high capacityregimes. During the war years, Afghanistan developed a strong global compara-tive advantage in illegality as a result of state collapse and the emergence of mili-tary entrepreneurs and transnational networks able to facilitate the trade.Although this created an enabling environment for the emergence of the drugeconomy, different structural factors encouraged its consolidation and expansion.The most rapid expansion of the drugs trade has coincided with two periods ofstatebuilding – first, during the Taliban regime when the number of opium-growing provinces grew from ten to 23, and second, during the Karzai regimewhen it grew from 24 to 32 provinces. While many other factors contributed tothe spread of opium cultivation and one should be careful not to confuse corre-lation with causation, the common assumption that state collapse and warlordismalways provide favourable conditions for the drug trade is empirically inaccurate.In Burma, for example, a major expansion of the narcotics industry in the 1990soccurred during a period that also saw the end of the civil war, the demobilizationof ethnic and communist insurgents, and the successful restoration of a militaryregime’s grip on power.51 As Diego Gambetta and others argue, mafias need


states to provide a level of stability and predictability in economic and politicalrelations.52 The drugs mafia supported the Taliban when they first emerged pre-cisely because they could provide state-like functions in terms of security and lawand order.

The pathways through which drugs and corruption affect peacebuilding pro-cesses are far more ambivalent and context-specific than the mainstream discourseallows. The effects of lootable resources such as drugs appear to vary according tothe political structures in place and the associated institutions of extraction.53

Illicit drugs lend themselves to regimes of joint extraction because they present dif-ficulties either for private agents or for rulers to establish monopoly control. Asthere are low barriers to entry, drugs are a diffuse resource, and their illegalityposes a barrier to entry for the public sector – as Snyder noted, it is not feasibleto have a Ministry of Opium (though some would argue that the Afghan Ministryof Interior is performing that function). Moreover, joint extraction is easier tosustain in the face of lootable resources with a renewable and elastic supply –as in the case of illicit drugs. Whether drug-related corruption is stabilizing ordestabilizing depends on the level of centralization, the nature of the bargainsstruck between rulers and private actors, and the role of international policies.Rulers can deploy a range of sticks and carrots in order to get private actors toco-operate in joint extraction. They can use coercion, the threat of no extraction(drug eradication policies) or legal inducements. A number of factors may lead tochanges in the equilibrium of joint extraction, including shifts in the powerbalance, changes in the value of lootable resources, changes in leadership (the‘bequeathability’ problem) and grievances over the division of spoils.54

In Afghanistan, the institutions of extraction that link rulers at the centre withprivate agents on the periphery vary from area to area, but the crucial dividing lineat present is between governance in the south and in the north. In the south, theextraction regime resembles the situation that existed during the Soviet invasion,when rebels commanded a near monopoly over drug-related rents. Large swathesof the south have now become ‘non state spaces’55 where the government hasneither the capacity nor the legitimacy to mobilize capital or coercion in orderto enforce institutions of joint control (or no extraction).56 This contrasts withthe Taliban period, when revenues from the drugs trade (which was essentiallya licit activity) were used to concentrate the means of coercion and consolidatepolitical control. The change in leadership, the shift in the balance of power57

and the increase in the value of opium have occurred at a time of growing grie-vances in the south, as Pashtuns felt excluded from the new political dispensation.

The political dynamics in the north, however, are very different. Arguably anew equilibrium has emerged, leading to institutions of joint extraction. Thepower balance between the centre and periphery changed as a result of unevenlyimplemented disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes aimedat ex-combatants and the stabilizing presence of international forces, becausewarlords had less to fear from an attack by rivals. The political equilibrium hadthe state essentially maintaining a protection racket, with private actors payingfor protection from harassment by the government or from other competitors.The state’s carrots and sticks (non-enforcement of the law or the threat of


eradication) are deployed in such a way as to force private actors to co-operate bysharing their income. Conversely, regional strongmen have not dispensedaltogether with their militias and have reached an accommodation with thestate in return for a policy of limited interference. The stability of this equilibriumvaries from area to area but there is no automatic and straightforward relation-ship between the drug trade and violence.58 Violence is likely to be instrumentaland limited and is most frequently a consequence of market dysfunction and dis-organization; because it is bad for business, the default setting may be violenceavoidance. When wielders of force become owners of capital they are subject tothe logic and rules of economic activity, and markets may increasingly controland transform such groups.59

Whereas in the pre-war period the border regions suffered from a politicaleconomy of neglect – their sparse populations and limited resources made themunpromising sites for state formation – during the war years they becameimportant strategic resources and sites of accumulation. The post-Bonn con-struction boom has been funded largely by drug money, so to a great extenteconomic activities in the hinterland are actually responsible for the peace divi-dend experienced by the centre. Although much of the proceeds from the drugeconomy have been invested outside the country, there are visible signs ofinward investment in drug-producing areas and there has been a recycling ofmoney into licit businesses.

The opium economy has produced significant increases in rural wages and isan important source of credit for poor rural households. Opium profits fuel con-sumption of domestic products and support the importation of high-value goods.Whereas other markets in Afghanistan are extremely fragmented, the drugeconomy represents the closest thing there is to a national market, involvingmulti-ethnic networks and strong north–south integration. According to theUNODC and the World Bank,60 the opium economy has had a stabilizingeffect on the currency by having a significant net positive impact on Afghanistan’sbalance of payments.61 The IMF has warned that successful counter-narcoticsefforts could adversely affect GDP growth, the balance of payments and govern-ment revenue.62

Does opium-fuelled growth represent an Afghan version of the robber baronphase in American history? Were the political and economic transformationswrought by the war and the drug economy actually the motors for a process ofprimitive accumulation? Afghanistan has undergone major transformationsduring the war years, including a shift from subsistence agriculture to anexport-based cash crop economy, resulting in growing inequality between thepeasantry on one hand and political and military entrepreneurs on the other.Perhaps the specialists in violence, drug traffickers and businessmen, who pros-pered during this period, represent an emergent capitalist class. As AntonioGiustozzi notes, many of these actors have now invested too much in the‘peace’ for them to seek a return to war.63 To some extent in the north of thecountry, buying out the spoilers has worked. In Burma, peace proved more profit-able than war because the returns on opium increased dramatically after ceasefireagreements were reached between the military and insurgents. However, in


Afghanistan, the war in the south and the international narcotics regime are likelyto prevent such a transition from occurring.

The connection between drugs, corruption and legitimacy is also far morecomplex than the international discourse allows. External actors have tended tofocus exclusively on the illegitimacy and harmful effects of corruption. Certainlyits negative impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans cannot be denied. Trans-actions of bribery and corruption always take place in power relationships thatstratify, marginalize and exclude;64 but not all forms of corruption are equallyharmful or equally wrong in the eyes of most Afghans. Impartiality in publicservice, for example, may not always be seen as a virtue. It seems probable thatpeople will tolerate corruption if the state can deliver some tangible benefits tothem and their families. These benefits may constitute public goods such as secur-ity, law and order and justice, or private goods including jobs, ‘gifts’, or favours.Interestingly, the local discourse on corruption appears to be far less focused ondrugs than the international discourse. Instead, anger is directed more towardsperceived misuse of foreign funding and corruption amongst ‘non-governmentalorganizations’ – these are the issues, rather than drugs, that Bashar Dhost mobi-lized around during the parliamentary elections. Afghans also see corruption inother areas of international engagement, including the links between US securitycontractors, Afghan militias and corrupt officials. Involvement in the drugseconomy is not seen as a deviant activity, and to a great extent the drug industryis far more ‘pro poor’ than the aid industry as it has permeated the rural economyand provided a safety net for poor households.

The connection between statebuilding and drugs is therefore more complexthan is commonly assumed. One could hypothesize that rather than being alinear relationship that progresses from ‘low capacity regime/high drug pro-duction’ to ‘high capacity regime/low drug production’, the historical trajectoryhas been closer to an inverted ‘U’. When state capacity is low, drug production isminimal and illegality grows as state capacity improves during the early phases ofstatebuilding; this is followed by a decreasing reliance on shadow economyactivity as the state matures into a high capacity regime.

Corruption and Counter-narcotics Policies

As highlighted above, there is a big gap between the (possibly unrealistic) aspira-tions outlined in Bonn of a liberal democratic state and the reality five years laterof a shadow state deeply penetrated by political factions and drugs interests.Karzai’s ‘big tent’ approach, which prioritized stability over reforms, hasenabled ‘reform-resistant’ elements to consolidate their position and consequentlyact as spoilers within government. A whole raft of initiatives to build accountabil-ity, transparency and greater effectiveness have been blocked or diluted, in largemeasure because they challenge the interests of key actors in the central and pro-vincial administrations. These include reforms to the police and judiciary, publicadministration reforms and anti-corruption measures.65

The failure to confront drug interests through substantive reforms to the mostpowerful ministries also reflects the competing objectives of international


players and leads to inconsistent policies, as highlighted earlier.66 Hamid Karzai,particularly in relation to the drugs issue, is caught in the dual legitimacy trap.Paradoxically, drug eradication may build Karzai’s external legitimacy while sim-ultaneously undermining his domestic standing. He has declared a jihad on drugsand he has deployed notions of religious sin and collective shame to persuadefarmers to desist from poppy cultivation; but illegality does not mean that suchactivities are regarded as illegitimate. Many Afghans view counter-narcotics(CN) policies as an externally driven, Western agenda. Criminalization and era-dication may end up undermining government legitimacy – particularly whenthe government cannot deliver on its part of the bargain by providing alternativesources of livelihood. Laws that lack legitimacy consequently require a greaterreliance on coercion. Eradication efforts end up attacking farmers who votedfor Karzai.67 International forces are also de-legitimized by association in theeyes of many Afghans, who were initially supportive of coalition forces. CN pol-icies may accentuate inter-ethnic/north–south tensions as eradication efforts inthe south highlighted the perception that the government was ‘anti-Pashtun’.

In addition to their effects on the legitimacy of the state, CN policies haveimportant opportunity costs and may indirectly undermine state capacities. AsKoehler argues, the ‘narco-state’ may be less of a threat to Afghan statehoodthan a ‘foreign steered counter-narcotics proxy state’.68 The legitimacy ofAfghan statebuilding is running the risk of being sacrificed for a ‘quick resultcounter-narcotics enforcement machinery’.69 Therefore, even if CN efforts aresuccessful on their own terms (which they are not), ultimately they run thedanger of undermining the more fundamental goal of statebuilding. Controlregimes tend to reflect de facto power relations and the state’s involvement incounter-narcotics has generated perverse incentives for misgovernment. Thethreat or application of eradication or interdiction has been used to underminepolitical enemies or extract resources. It has also enabled producers to eliminatecompetitors and led to de facto consolidation of the drug industry. In 2007around 10 per cent of the poppy crop was eradicated according to UNODC,but these were mainly marginal fields, the result of ‘corrupt deals between land-owners, village elders and eradication teams’.70 The eradication figures them-selves have become a source of corruption – local officials are reported toinflate the figures as governors are compensated at US$120 for each eradicatedhectare.71

One province that was initially considered a success for poppy eradication wasNangahar. In 2005, there was a 94 per cent decrease in poppy cultivation and onlya limited rebound in 2006; but by 2007 there had been a major rebound in pro-duction. The Nangahar ‘experiment’ provides some insights into the perverse pol-itical and economic effects of ‘shock therapy’ elimination. Following a similarapproach to the Taliban in 2000, the Karzai government delegated responsibilityfor reducing cultivation to local power-holders. The chief bargaining tools avail-able to the state were to offer a level of autonomy to warlords (a regime of jointextraction) or to threaten eradication (a regime of ‘no extraction’). Local strong-men who made the transition into the administration realized that being a warlordor jihadi commander might be less secure and less lucrative than a position in the


state bureaucracy;72 but warlords have not necessarily thrown in their lot with thegovernment and continue to hedge their bets. In Nangahar their part of thebargain was to ‘turn off’ production, but when the quid pro quo of substantialdevelopment assistance did not materialize, the economic effects of the banrapidly undermined support for the government.

It has been argued that by focusing on poppy production and acreage, CNefforts are using the wrong metric of success. It makes little sense to concentrateon the part of the chain that involves 80 per cent of the stakeholders but only 20per cent of the value. Eradication leads to price increases, which transfers profitsfrom farmers to traffickers. Therefore, the focus should be on trafficking, where80 per cent of the profits are located. However, interdiction efforts have providedleverage to corrupt officials to extract enormous bribes from traffickers. Such cor-ruption has attracted former militia commanders who joined the MoI after beingdemobilized.73 Not surprisingly, very few high-ranking government officials havebeen prosecuted for drug-related corruption.

A greater focus on indictment since 2005 has led to several high-profile arrests,including a high-level Interior Ministry official, Lt-Col. Nadir Khan, who was sen-tenced to ten years in prison for stealing and selling 50 kilograms of confiscatedheroin.74 The overall aim of interdiction, complemented by other CN measures,according to Ali Jalali et al., should be to turn opium cultivation and traffickinginto high-risk activities in a low-risk environment.75 However, as the Transna-tional Institute notes, the ‘choices about who and who not to indict, arrest orextradite seem to be arbitrary, irrational or highly politicized’.76 Furthermore,those attempting to do anything about drugs and corruption are unlikely tokeep their jobs. For example, Ge. Aminullah Amerkhel, the chief of borderpolice at Kabul Airport, was suspended from his job, reportedly because he wasarresting too many drug traffickers.

There is a complex and ambiguous relationship between counter-narcoticsand statebuilding, and heavy-handed eradication may have perverse effects andundermine the legitimacy and capacity of the central state vis-a-vis local strong-men. Returning to Snyder’s analysis, counter-narcotics policies are likely tocreate political disorder because they render joint extraction infeasible by impos-ing high costs on government participation. As experience from Colombia andelsewhere shows, ‘externally induced prohibition against joint extraction is thecause of violence and disorder because it forces governments into a lethal confron-tation with drug cartels’.77

Conclusions

This article has outlined how the drug economy emerged, evolved and adapted totransformations in Afghanistan’s political economy. Central to this analysis hasbeen an examination of the power relationships and institutions of extractionthat developed around the drug economy. It is argued, following Snyder, thatjoint extraction regimes involving rulers and private actors have tended tobring political order whereas private extraction regimes have led to decentralizedviolence and political breakdown. In the post-Bonn environment, both regimes


can be detected, with a fairly clear dividing line, following the mountains of theHindu Kush, between the north and south of the country. This political divideis a legacy of the war years and the division of spoils following the Bonn Agree-ment. In the north, drugs, to some degree, have played a role in cementing politi-cal relationships between the centre and periphery and in so doing helped create alevel of political order. In the south, however, they have fuelled the combateconomy and enabled the Taliban to generate political capital by protecting thepeasantry and traffickers; but drugs are the symptom rather than the driver ofthis insecurity in the south.

Drugs and drug-related corruption are not inherently conflictual, and depend-ing on underlying power relations they may produce order or disorder. Corrup-tion may be the most efficient means for individuals or groups to cope with apolitical economy of high uncertainty, scarcity and disorder.78 It is as well toremember that corruption is not the worst thing that can happen, comparedwith the real possibility of state collapse and a return to civil war. From a histori-cal perspective, processes of early state formation were never linear and smooth,and states, bandits and criminality have frequently been close companions.

A drug-free Afghanistan cannot be achieved in the short term, particularlywhile pursuing a war. Efforts to eliminate narcotics in an ungoverned or badlygoverned state have become increasingly militarized; and law enforcementapproaches that operate either through patronage-based networks or parallelinstitutions created by foreigners have limited purchase. A zero toleranceapproach to drugs and corruption is therefore unworkable and has perverseeffects.

Peacebuilding and counter-narcotics are two distinct and not even comp-lementary objectives. International actors need to consider whether theirprimary objective in Afghanistan is to build sustainable peace or to implementan international drug prohibition regime. CN policies are determined by the inter-ests of Western countries and their problems with drug consumption, rather thanthe long-term interests of Afghan citizens. Clearly, states cannot be made to workfrom the outside79 and legitimate institutions are the product of long-term dom-estic political processes.80 The bargaining between rulers and private actors andthe institutions of extraction referred to in this article are central to the processof statebuilding.

Perhaps there is a limit as to how far the argument can be pushed that revenuesfrom the drug economy can pay for peace as well as war. Does this mean thatpeacebuilding is concerned exclusively with constructing political order in theabsence of violence rather than adhering to a higher standard of positive peace?It is clear that corruption cannot simply be dismissed as a Western crusade,given its negative impacts on the lives of most Afghans and the fact that there isa constituency within Afghan society pushing for more stringent measuresagainst corruption and drugs – these policies have their importers as well astheir exporters. Yet surely there is a fruitful middle ground to explore betweenconsolidating an illiberal, warlord-dominated peace and pursuing the so-called‘post-conflict make over fantasy’,81 which sets out an idealized end state butdoes not provide any road map for how to get there. The most productive


approaches to counter-narcotics, anti-corruption and post-conflict statebuildingin Afghanistan and elsewhere are likely to involve transitional arrangementsthat enable the country gradually to move towards being less drug dependentand less corrupt. Paradoxically, standalone counter-narcotics efforts are likelyto impede such a transition.

NOTES

1. See David Mansfield, ‘Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressingthe Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangahar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan’, Reportfor the Project for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan, 2004; Mansfield andAdam Pain, ‘Opium Poppy Eradication: How do you Raise Risk where there is Nothing toLose?’, Briefing Paper, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Sept. 2006, Kabul.

2. With the exception of Michael D. Shaw, ‘Drug Trafficking and the Development of OrganisedCrime in Post Taliban Afghanistan’, in Doris Buddenberg and William Byrd (eds), Afghanistan’sDrug Industry, Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for Counter-narcotics PolicyUNODC, World Bank, 2006, pp.189–214.

3. The article is based on fieldwork conducted in 2005–06, funded by the UK Economic and SocialResearch Council and the Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.

4. Richard Snyder, ‘Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of ExtractionFramework’, Working Paper No. 312, July 2004.

5. See Reno, this issue.6. Philippe Le Billon, ‘Buying Peace or Fuelling War? The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’,

Journal of International Development, Vol.15, 2003, p.420.7. Paul Smoke and Robert Taliercio, ‘Aid, Public Finance and Accountability: Cambodian Dilem-

mas’, in James Boyce and Madelene O’Donnell (eds), Peace and the Public Purse, Economic Pol-icies for Postwar Statebuilding, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007, p.55.

8. Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 2004.

9. Thomas Gallant, ‘Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism, and State Formation: Transnational Crimefrom a Historical World-systems Perspective’, in Josia Heyman and Alan Smart (eds), Statesand Illegal Practices, Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999, pp.25–62.

10. Ibid., p.25.11. Alfred McCoy, ‘Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and Commodity in the Career of a Khun Sa’, in

Heyman and Smart (see n.9 above), p.158. Arguably if one views the Taliban as proto-statebuilders, their control and taxation of the poppy economy was a factor that enabled themto extend their control over the country and concentrate the means of coercion.

12. Snyder (see n.4 above), p.12.13. See Reno, this issue.14. As a result of successful counter-narcotics efforts in Pakistan, most of the poppy cultivation and

much of the refining capacity had shifted across the border into Afghanistan, particularly in thesouthern and eastern borderlands.

15. Barnett Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb., 2007, pp.57–78.16. Snyder (see n.4 above).17. In fact marijuana was viewed by the Taliban as far more haram (unIslamic/illegal) because it was

used for local consumption.18. Other interpretations are that it was a strategy to push up prices – which rose by a factor of 10

following the ban – or that it was driven by religious concerns.19. See my typology of the combat, shadow and coping economies that evolved in the course of the

Afghan wars, ‘Afghanistan in Central Asia’, in Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Goodhand,War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges for Transformation, London: InternationalPeace Academy/Lynne Rienner, pp.45–89.

20. David Mansfield, ‘Beyond the Metrics: Understanding the Nature of Change in the RuralLivelihoods of Opium Poppy Growing Households in the 2006/7 Growing Season’, Report forthe Afghan Drugs Inter-departmental Unit of the UK Government, May 2007.

21. Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism’,Washington Quarterly, Vol.28, No.4, pp.55–72.

22. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2007.


23. David Mansfield, ‘Responding to the Diversity in Opium Poppy Cultivation’, in Buddenberg andByrd (see n.2 above), pp.47–76. The post-Taliban period has seen the emergence of new areas ofcultivation, including Bamyan, Nuristan, Khost and Wardak provinces.

24. The sustainability of these decreases can be questioned and drugs trafficking also continues in thenorth.

25. William Byrd and Olivier Jonglez, ‘Prices and Market Interactions in the Opium Economy’, inBuddenberg and Byrd (see n.2 above), p.136.

26. Anna Patterson, Going to Market: Trade and Traders in Six Afghan Sectors, Kabul: AREU, 2006;Sarah Lister and Adam Pain, Trading in Power, Kabul: AREU, 2004.

27. Byrd and Jonglez (see n.25 above), p.130; David Zetland, ‘Markets for Afghan Opium and USHeroin: Modeling the Connections’, Social Science Research Network, 23 Jan. 2003, p.4 (at:http://ssrn.com/abstract¼668761), for instance, calculates that opium that costs US$90 perkg at the Afghan farm gate becomes US$2870 per kg (refined heroin) in Pakistan, which inturn increases to US$80,000 per kg in the US wholesale market and finally US$725,000 atretail prices. The cross-border mark-up from Pakistan to the United States is 2,400 per cent com-pared with the norm of 12 per cent for most agricultural products.

28. UNODC (see n.22 above).29. Byrd and Jonglez (see n.25 above).30. In 1995, 41 per cent of opiate-based exports were in the form of heroin, but by 2002 this had risen

to 72 per cent.31. Different opiates do not have the same purity and their prices depend on their quality and charac-

teristics. At the low end of the spectrum is ‘brown sugar’ and at the high-quality end is ChinaWhite, with a level of heroin chlorhydrate reaching up to 98 per cent. A global conversionratio of between 6–10 and 1 is used to calculate the quantity of opium required to produceheroin and morphine. In Afghanistan a 7:1 ratio is commonly used.

32. PRTs are described by Barnett Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada as an attempt to create an ISAFeffect without an ISAF presence, Rubin and Hamidzada, ‘From Bonn to London: GovernanceChallenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping,Vol.14, No.1, p.12.

33. The four main groups at the Bonn talks were the Northern Alliance, the Pakistan-based PeshawarFront, the Iran-backed Cyprus group and the Rome group representing former King Zahir Shah.

34. For example, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that after the parlia-mentary elections an estimated 80 per cent of the candidates in the provinces and 60 per cent inKabul maintained contacts with armed groups and drug traffickers, Integrated Regional Infor-mation Network, ‘Afghanistan: Rights Body Warns of Warlords’ Success in Elections’, 18 Oct.2005.

35. Astri Suhrke, ‘When More is Less: Aiding Statebuilding in Afghanistan’, Discussion Draft forResearch Partnership on Postwar State-building, 2007 (at: www.state-building.org).

36. Mustaq Khan, ‘Markets, States and Democracy: Patron–Client Networks and the Case forDemocracy in Developing Countries’, Democratization, Vol.12, No.5, 2005, pp.704–24.

37. World Bank, ‘Afghanistan – State Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty’, WorldBank Country Study, Washington, DC, 2005.

38. Afghanistan ranked 172 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2007 CorruptionPerception Index.

39. Elizabeth Harrison, ‘Unpacking the Anti-corruption Agenda: Dilemmas for Anthropologists’,Oxford Development Studies, Vol.34, No.1, 2006, p.21.

40. Arthur Kent, ‘Covering up for Karzai and Co’, Policy Options, July–Aug. 2007, pp.11–17.41. Ibid., p.11.42. Pay grades have subsequently changed and a provincial police chief is now paid between US$500

and $600 per month, Scott Baldauf, ‘Inside the Afghan Drug Trade’, Christian Science Monitor,13 June 2006.

43. Andrew Wilder, ‘Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police’, IssuesPaper Series, AREU, Kabul, June 2007.

44. For example, in Jurm district of Badakshan a local commander has reached an agreement with aparliamentarian who has close links to the President’s office. In return for delivering votes and theongoing support of the population, the commander receives the parliamentarian’s patronage. Inreturn, the parliamentarian turns a blind eye to poppy cultivation.

45. Shaw (see n.2 above). For example, one former mujahedin commander, Din Muhammed Jurat,became a general in the Ministry of Interior and is widely believed to be a major figure in orga-nized crime. Rubin (see n.15 above).

46. Buddenberg and Byrd, ‘Introduction and Overview’ (see n.2 above), p.6.


47. For example, in 2006 the Taliban introduced their own ‘code of conduct’, which aims to setstandards of professionalism and behaviour in contrast to the perceived corruption of govern-ment. Henry Schuster, ‘The Taliban’s Rules’, CNN, 7 Dec. 2006 (at: www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/12/06/schuster.12.6/index.html).

48. ‘It [corruption] is a disaster for the Afghan people . . . Mr Karzai doesn’t really want to fight cor-ruption, and the international community too, doesn’t want to fight corruption in Afghanistan’,Bashar Dost, cited in Kent (see n.40 above), p.12.

49. Cited in Fisnik Abrashi, ‘Afghan Bomber Hits U.S. Embassy Convoy’, The Washington Post, 19March 2007.

50. Cited in James Risen, ‘Poppy Fields Are Now a Front Line in Afghan War’, New York Times, 16May 2007.

51. Snyder (see n.4 above), p.2.52. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press, 1993.53. Snyder (see n.4 above).54. Ibid., p.9.55. James Scott, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have

Failed, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.56. It should be noted that the drug trade in the south still depends upon the tacit collaboration of

state officials; it would not be able to function without the collaboration of provincial governors,police officers, border guards, customs officials and so forth.

57. The presence of a virtually open border, the Taliban’s establishment of safe havens withinPakistan’s tribal territories and the introduction of tactics of asymmetrical warfare includingsuicide bombing have shifted the balance of power in favour of the insurgents.

58. See David Mansfield, ‘Governance, Security and Economic Growth: The Determinants of OpiumPoppy Cultivation in the Districts of Jurm and Baharak in Badakshan’, A Report for GTZ/AKDN, Feb. 2007. Mansfield contrasts the level of stability in Baharak district with Jurm inBadakshan province and relates this to the particular configuration of political and militaryplayers in each locale and their relationship to provincial authorities.

59. Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs. The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism,Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.122.

60. World Bank, ‘The Investment Climate in Afghanistan. Exploiting Opportunities in an UncertainEnvironment’, 2005.

61. The stable value of the new currency has been an important factor in the popularity of the gov-ernment and a source of national pride, Rubin (see n.15 above), p.6.

62. ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan: 2004 Article IV Consultation and Second Review’, Country ReportNo. 05/33, IMF, Feb. 2005.

63. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen’, International Peace-keeping, Vol.14, No.1, 2007, pp.75–89.

64. Dieter Haller and Cris Shore, Corruption. Anthropological Perspectives, London: Pluto, 2005,p.17.

65. The Afghan government recently published its ‘Anti-corruption Roadmap’ and established a US-backed Criminal Information Unit within the MoI to reduce corruption by strengthening internalaffairs and accountability mechanisms; but Afghanistan’s anti-corruption chief, Izzatullah Wasifi,has a troubling past and an Associated Press investigation found he was convicted two decadesago of selling heroin in the United States. Matthew Pennington, ‘Afghan Anti Corruption Chiefis a Convicted Drug Trafficker’, USA Today, 2007 (at: www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-03-09-afghan-corruption_N.htm).

66. In 2005, US Drug Enforcement Agency agents and Afghan counterparts found nine tons of opiumin the office of Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, governor of Helmand, but the CN team wasblocked from taking any action against the governor who had close ties to American andBritish military intelligence and diplomatic officials, Risen (see n.50 above).

67. Barnett Rubin and Omar Zakhilwal, ‘A War on Drugs or a War on Farmers?’, Wall Street Journal(Eastern edition), New York, 11 Jan. 2005.

68. Jan Koehler, ‘Conflict Processing and the Opium Poppy Economy in Afghanistan’, Jalabad: GTZProject for Alternative Livelihoods in Afghanistan, 2005.

69. Ibid. p.70.70. UNODC (see n.22 above), p.v.71. Transnational Institute, ‘Missing Targets. Counterproductive Drug Control Efforts in Afghani-

stan’, Drug Policy Briefing No. 24, Amsterdam, Sept. 2007.72. Koehler (see n.68 above).


73. Rubin (see n.15 above).74. Carlotta Gall, ‘Opium Harvest at Record Level in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 3 Sept. 2006.75. Ali Jalali, Robert Oakley and Zoe Hunter, ‘Combating Opium in Afghanistan’, Strategic Forum,

Institution for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, No. 224, Nov. 2006.76. Ibid., p.11.77. Snyder (see n.4 above), p.9.78. Le Billon (see n.6 above), p.424.79. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, Making States Work. From State

Failure to Statebuilding, New York: International Peace Academy, 2004.80. Marin Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, Development and Change,

Vol.33 No.5, 2002, pp.1001–24.81. Christopher Cramer, Civil War is not a Stupid Thing. Accounting for Violence in Developing

Countries, London: Hurst, 2006.


goodhand, j. the drugs economy and post-conflict peacebuilding in afghanistan

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