Governance by Numbers: Comprehending the EU’s New Economic Governance Re-

gime and its de-politicization effects

Ludwig Zurbriggen,

Senior Lecturer,

Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts, Zentralstrasse 9, CH-6002 Luzern

Ludwig.zurbriggen@hslu.ch

Paper for Industrial Relations in Europe Conference (IREC) 2018

Leuven 10-12 September 2018

1. Introduction : European economic governance After the financial crisis of 2008, in 2012, the EU adopted the so-called “six-pack” of EU

regulations and directives, which makes economic policies (including wage policies) of all

Member states subject to surveillance procedures of the new European economic govern-

ance regime (NEG). The new regulations and directives allow the EU to fine Eurozone

countries that do not comply with European Council recommendations. These recommen-

dations are directed towards Member States whose macroeconomic or fiscal situation is

categorized as “excessively imbalanced” by the European Commission. Non-compliance

with recommendations based on the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure can lead to

fines of the amount of 0.1 percent of GDP. Moreover, the European Commission has the

option to interrupt funding of projects financed by the European Structural and Investment

Funds. Only a qualified majority of Member States in the Council can reverse the fine

decided by the Commission. The fine for excessive deficits is of the amount of 0.2 percent

of the GDP.

Some researchers vigorously criticizes the European economic governance by the European

Commission. Critical political economist Mark Blyth (2015) has shown that the Commission

has enforced austerity in the southern Member states of the EU. Public expenditure has

been significantly reduced. The French political economist Salais (2013) argues that the

thresholds for macroeconomic imbalances and excessive debt are designed to harmonize

the law-making in the Member states. He vigorously criticizes the abandoning of full-

employment as an aim of economic policy. Raveaud (2016) states that the Macroeconomic

Imbalance Procedure does not address social or environmental risks for the Economic and

Monetary Union. From a constitutional point of view, the legal scholar Supiot (2015) criti-

cizes that the rule of law is subordinated to the governance by numbers. Kreuder-Sonnen

and Joerges (2018) claims that European economic governance has taken an authoritarian

turn. In contrast to this critical literature, Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2016; 2018) observes a

learning process through the framework of the European Semester, the new Economic

governance regime of the EU that strengthens social concerns.

It is striking how far away different assessments of the European Economic governance can

be. The critical analysis focuses on the negative effects of austerity and policy recommen-

dations that move the balance of power between trade unions and employers toward the

employer of an individual company. This paper investigates if these policies are changeable

under the current rules of the European Economic Governance. Is there a contentious use

of performance indicators for trade unions? How can they politicise the Commission’s rec-

ommendations? On the other hand, researchers underline the inclusion of social issues in

the framework of the European Economic governance. Is this inclusion of social issues

evidence strong enough to support the thesis of a social European Semester? What do

key-concepts in the Commission recommendations indicate about their political orienta-

tion?

The paper identifies specific ways of framing the problems in the European economy by

analyzing key-concepts and key-performance-indicators used in documents related to the

Macroeconomic imbalance procedure. Moreover, the paper aims to describe the styles of

legitimizing neoliberal polices in the EU. The use of key-concepts and key-performance

indicators implies symbolic power. Bourdieu uses this concept in order to grasp the coop-

eration of those over whom the power is exercised with the power holders. The key-con-

cepts and performance-indicators used in the macroeconomic imbalance procedure shape

the problem framing by neoliberal technocrats. The Juncker Commission’s objective is to

combine the containment of macroeconomic imbalances of Member states with the im-

plementation of a social policy that serves as a productive factor for the economy. The

Commission recommendations for Member states tend to move the balance of power away

from labour and business unions towards individual companies and company-level worker

representation. These recommendations are ambivalent because they demand the adjust-

ment of wages and collective agreements to local conditions. In contrast, they diffuse best

practices for social and economic policies throughout the European Union, regardless of

local conditions. The interpretation of performance indicators identifies these best practices.

European wide conflicts between workers and business owners and between Member states

are not taken into account. As a result, the European Commission sees no need to develop

political compromises between conflicting interest groups and Member States. Instead, the

Commission frames these conflicts as problems of macroeconomic imbalances that need

technocratic solutions, identified by best practices in the EU.

2. Framework of intervention in Member States domestic policies by the European Commission : The European Semester Process

The country-specific recommendations are an element of an encompassing process, namely

the European Semester. This semester consists of several sequences, marked by the pub-

lication of official documents.

The EU Commission publishes the Annual Growth Survey and the Alarm Mechanism Report

simultaneously in November. This is the start of the European Semester. In 2017, The EU

Commission labels France’s economic imbalances as excessive. This label opens the way

for an in-depth review of the national economies by the EU Commission. This investigation

results in country report for the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.

As a reaction to the country report, France reveals in their National Reform Program how

it plans to correct the observed macroeconomic imbalances in April. Then, the EU Com-

mission publishes its country-specific recommendations in May, based on the National

Reform Program. The publication of the country-specific recommendations mark the end

of the European Semester. Until October, it is up to the Member States to comply with

these recommendations.

The European Semester is an encompassing political surveillance process. The Mac-

roeconomic Imbalance Procedure is one stream in this process. The MIP has distinctive

features that differentiates it from the Excessive Debt procedure. The Directorate General

of Economic and Financial Affairs (DG Ecfin) gives in an institutional paper in 2016 “The

Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Rationale, Process, Application. A compendium” a

overview of the procedure as part of the European Semester. The paper aims to legitimize

the MIP by explaining the legal framework and the application of the MIP. Some important

observations can be made by analysing this document. The MIP does not include automatic

mechanisms for fining Eurozone countries, which do not comply with the thresholds set in

the scoreboard. In contrast, the Excessive Debt Procedure includes such mechanisms based

on the Fiscal Compact and Two-Pack regulations. In the paper, the DG Ecfin evaluates the

financial crisis of 2008 by claiming macroeconomic imbalances, both external and internal,

as key factors in starting the balance of payments crisis. In contrast to this evaluation, the

DG Ecfin observes in a footnote that some Member States (Latvia, Ireland, Spain) complied

with the Stability and Growth Pact rules before 2008, but became in need of financial

assistance after the crisis of 2008. The basic principle stated by European Commission

(2016, p. 16) is that risks call for surveillance: “The crisis lead to a rethinking of European

economic governance in the EU.” As a result, the Commission implements the surveillance

of imbalances without taking into account other causes of the financial crisis of 2008.

This new European economic governance relies on numbers because the Commis-

sion starts a process of surveillance of Member Stages legitimised by thresholds of mac-

roeconomic indicators. The European Commission (2016, p.17) states:”(…) numerical rules

play a role only at the start of the MIP process, in the form of prima-facie screen of possible

risks in the Alarm Mechanism Report by means of the scoreboard. As challenges are multi-

faceted and recommendations may concern a large array of policy instrument, numerical

targets and triggers applied across the board cannot solely capture the underlying eco-

nomic complexity.” This shows that the EC is well aware of the limits of a governance by

numbers. Nevertheless, thresholds legitimize the EC to intervene in policy areas that are

part of national sovereignty. The EC argues that surveillance and correction are necessary

because there are potential negative spillovers from Member States with imbalances to

other Member States. Moreover, sudden stop or reversal of capital flows as well as persis-

tent competitiveness divergences risk to endanger the functioning of the European Mon-

etary Union. According to the EC, the MIP helps national governments to implement

structural reforms and best practices, while countries keep autonomy in fiscal and financial

matters. The EC argues that imbalances contribute to create macro-financial risks such as

current account reversals, banking crises or asset market crashes. The EC asserts that all

Member States with imbalances need specific monitoring. The scoreboard in the Alarm

Mechanism Report serves to select the countries for an in-depth review. In addition, the

EC (2016, p. 33) reveals that there are divergent opinions on the relevance of unemploy-

ment indicators for macro-financial risks. Whereas the Commissions sees them as relevant,

the Council of the Finance Ministers of the Member States does not. The EC (2016, p. 35)

implies that the scoreboard ensures parsimony. In addition to parsimony, it serves com-

munication purposes. The EC concludes that the scoreboard thresholds indicate alert levels.

These alert levels indicate which Member States need an in-depth review.

In-depth reviews account for the diversity among Member States. They describe

country-specific properties of the macroeconomic situation. The EC states that comparison

across countries, interpretation of driving factors and understanding interactions among

indicators guide the economic interpretation of the scoreboard. In contrast, the EC does

not take into account the interactions among Member States as principle of scoreboard

interpretation. The EC (2016, p. 42) states that the in –depth-review takes into account

country-specific information in order to refine the interpretation of the scoreboard indica-

tors. The in-depth review addresses national policy challenges such as taxation, infrastruc-

ture, and regulation of labour and product markets. According to the EC (2016, p. 44), the

in-depth review interprets the significant developments in a unitary way. It identifies root

causes of macro-financial risks, such as market distortions or incorrect expectations. The

EC implies that these causes prevent the smooth correction by markets. In contrast to the

abstract identification of root causes of macro-financial risks, the EC explains that the rec-

ommendations must take into account country-specific institutions and conditions.

The EC describes the MIP in rather abstract terms, using the macroeconomic vocabulary.

The economic interpretation of the scoreboard claims that adjustments to imbalances are

necessary in order to safeguard the “proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary

Union”.

3. Scoreboard performance-indicators. Identifying “dangerous” Member States

The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure is a governance tool for the Commission that

consists of monitoring and correcting macroeconomic imbalances within Member States.

The EU has introduced this Procedure in 2012 in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The

scoreboard for the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure is a central element to identify

Member States in need of in-depth-reviews. Its interpretation determines whether the

Commission considers further in-depth-reviews of imbalances necessary.

The MIP scoreboard contains five indicators for external imbalances, mostly in relation to

GDP, for instance current account balance. These 5 indicators serve to monitor the com-

petitiveness of Member states. Another five indicators concern internal imbalances, focus-

ing on variation over time such as housing prizes, financial sector liabilities, and debt public

and private in relation to GDP. The scoreboard accounts for the employment dimension

with indicators focusing on changes of unemployment rates in a 3-year-period

For each indicator, the Commission has defined thresholds. Overstepping these thresholds

indicates alert levels for these Member States that lead to in-depth reviews and country-

specific-recommendations. This investigation results in a country report for the prevention

and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.

Figure 1 European Semester 2017. Macroeconomic imbalances. Results of the in-depth reviews 2017

The Figure 1 “European Semester 2017. Macroeconomic imbalances. Results of the in-depth

reviews 2017” is very instructive with regard to the classification of the Member States

through the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. Member States that do stay within the

thresholds of the scoreboard indicators are not subject to in-depth-reviews. In contrast,

overstepping these thresholds legitimises the Commission to proceed to in-depth-reviews

of the economic situation of a Member state.

4. Outcomes of MIP: legitimate intervention, depoliticizing recommendations, peer-pressure among Member states

The Commission has until 2018 never fined a Eurozone country for excessive macroeco-

nomic imbalances and non-compliance with the Commission’s recommendations. Never-

theless, the surveillance of the Member States has specific effects. From the Commission’s

point of view, the MIP is fulfilling its function. The EC (2016) claims that the MIP surveillance

contributes to the macroeconomic adjustment of Member States’ national economies.

Moreover, the EC affirms that the MIP enhances policy compliance by the Member States

with the European Council recommendations

The EC specifically alleged that the MIP has increased peer-pressure among Member Stats

for compliance with the European Councils recommendation. The EC states that the Mem-

ber States have developed a common understanding of policy challenges and policy re-

sponse. The reporting on policy implementation by the Member States contributes to the

peer-pressure.

We conclude that the thresholds in the MIP scoreboard are a device for legitimizing inter-

ventions of the European Union in domestic policy arenas. Generally, the thresholds rely

on a European average. The average depends on the economic performance of the Mem-

ber states and can change from year to year. As a result, the classification of the Member

states according to the degree of macroeconomic imbalance depends on the economic

performance of other Member states. The MIP increases the pressure exercised mutually

by the Member States to perform according to the “best” performers, defined by the score-

board. The MIP with its scoreboard contributes to unifying the perception and evaluation

of the problems and the solutions in the realm of public policy.

This mechanism opens the door for ad-hoc interventions through country-specific recom-

mendations. The Member states cannot rely on explicit rules to which they need to comply,

but the Commission incites them to react to moving thresholds on imbalance indicators. It

is in the discretion of the EU Commission to decide whether the Member state in imbalance

has made enough progress in line with Council recommendations.

The growing realm of necessity, expressed in terms of macroeconomic imperatives makes

the room for political decision-making smaller. We interpret this as a process of de-politi-

cisation. The European institutions and national governments accept these macroeconomic

imperatives. There is little political debate on the appropriateness of the chosen indicators

and thresholds. The EC specifically alleged that the MIP has increased peer-pressure among

Member Stats for compliance with the European Councils recommendation.

The economic governance by scoreboard indicators tends to make power relations among

Member states invisible. The thresholds in the scoreboard define a space of economic

practices that are reasonable and contribute to the stability of the Economic and Monetary

Union. Not achieving these thresholds gives the Commission the power to monitor eco-

nomic and social policy in the Member States and making recommendations. One can

assume that the recommendations imply a best practice of economic and social policy that

sets the standard for all Member states. We hypothesize that export- and innovation-led

growth is the model the Commission wants the Member States to follow. The German

economy would be the example to follow with the exception that the Commission recom-

mends Germany to spend more for infrastructure. In this context, it remains invisible how

different Member states, based on their power resources, struggle to impose their eco-

nomic growth-model. The economic interpretation of the scoreboard indicators excludes

explicitly interactions among Member States.

We hypothesize another depoliticising effect. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure

undermines transnational political space formation based on social cleavages. The Council

recommendations for the Member states with macroeconomic imbalances intervene in

policy areas where political struggle between interest groups, political parties and social

movements has structured the political field. These actors have generally been active within

national borders. By extending the realm of necessity, the European Union has severely

limited the policy space for these actors. European Politicians with different political back-

ground have accepted the necessities of macroeconomic balances. They discuss the policy

areas treated in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure in macroeconomic terms. With-

out macroeconomic expertise, one cannot participate in these discussions, he or she has

no voice. As a result, direct contestation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and

its model of best practices is difficult.

Recommendations for France

A closer look at the Commission recommendations for France is in order. Table 1 shows

key-concepts in European Commission’s country-specific recommendations for France and

in other documents related to the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. The table com-

pares recommendations from the Barroso Commission with those from the Juncker Com-

mission. Both Commissions have in common to underline the negative effects of the

„rigidities“ of the wage-setting mechanisms. Moreover, they both recommend decentraliz-

ing collective bargaining to the company level.

Macroeconomic analyses assumes that these recommendations lead to a better adjustment

of wages to local economic conditions and external shocks. Consequently, under both

Commissions, macroeconomic interpretations prime over considerations of worker rights

in labour law and compromise finding between conflicting interests in labour relations. In

contrast, the two Commissions differ in the focus of their recommendations with regard to

labour costs and skill formation. Unlike the Barroso Commission, the Juncker Commission

emphasizes skill formation by vocational education and on-the-job training. The Barroso

Commission underlined in contrast negative effects of the wage setting system and the

minimum wage. Nevertheless, the Juncker Commission has supported the deregulation in

the labour law, walker worker rights and legal provisions.

Table 1 Recommendations for France: The Barroso and Junkcer Commissions compared

Table 1 Recommendations for France. Barroso and Juncker Commission in comparison

phrases from CSR and

other MIP-Documents

for France under Com-

mission President

Barroso Juncker

rigidities of wage setting distorts the labour markets

rigidities if wage setting hinder adjustment capacity of the economy

reform wage setting

contain minimum wage

for company-level collective agreements

reducing labour costs serves vul-nerable groups

labour cost not mentioned

reducing labour costs serves the functioning of the labour market without distortions

support for labour law „El Khomry“

reduce wages derogations from general legal provisions

minimum wage hurts vulnerable groups

lower social security contributions

rigidities in wage setting slow down developments in productiv-ity

rigidities in wage setting limit re-allocation of workers across sec-tors and occupations

skill formation and training on-the-job, vocational education

deviant cases social dialogue on firm-level

costs of dismissals are not particu-larly high; non-cost-competitive-ness is a problem

inequality as a risk

slight success if active labour mar-ket policies on young, low-quali-fied and unemployed workers

France fares better than the EU av-erage on poverty social exclusion and inequality

Strikingly, the Barroso Commission recognizes economic problems due to weak non-cost-

competiveness“, but does not address the problem in his recommendations. Similarly, the

Juncker Commission recognizes inequality as risk for the French economy, but does not

address the problem in its recommendations. The EC (2016, p. 67) presumes that the French

government undertook in 2015 policy commitments in accordance with the European

Council recommendations.

Until now, the paper has analysed the MIP based on documents of the European Commis-

sion. A change in perspective is in order. The description of the gap between the recom-

mendations and a pure neoliberal policy agenda will give a deeper understanding of the

specificity of the Juncker Commission’s recommendations. The assessment of French busi-

ness leaders will make clearer the difference between the Juncker Commission’s political

agenda and distinct neoliberal agenda. The European Business Union BusinessEurope asks

the national business unions to assess the country-specific-recommendations and the Na-

tional Reform Program. The French business union MEDEF comments allow identifying

neoliberal policy principles which the European Council/Commission does not or only par-

tially recommend. We use these disagreements between MEDEF and the European Com-

mission as an indicator for neoliberal policy principles which the European Commission

avoids or waters down in their recommendations for France. The following interpretations

focus on labour market related policy principles. MEDEF has observed a shift away from

labour law deregulation and wage cuts towards skill-formation as the recommended poli-

cies. As a result, MEDEF criticizes the Juncker Commission from excluding the “rigidities” in

the labour market from the recommendations. MEDEF says: “The Commission's country

specific recommendations are globally appropriate. However, for MEDEF, the priority re-

garding corporate taxation is the reduction in taxes on production factors and not a wid-

ening of the tax base or an additional reduction in tax rate. Regarding labour market

reform, one issue was missing: addressing the labour law rigidity.” MEDEF insists on further

deregulation of the labour law

In contrast to the Commission, MEDEF demands a reduction of social security contributions

for employers. MEDEF argues that this reduction would increase company competitiveness.

On the other hand, MEDEF supports the recommendations on skill formation by calling for

a reform of education and training. Furthermore, MEDEF demands further reduction of

labour costs: “Labour market reforms were undertaken in the second Semester 2017: labour

law reform is achieved, vocational training, apprenticeship and unemployment insurance

scheme reforms are currently discussed. They demonstrate government's willingness to

push into the right direction by introducing more flexibility and simplification, facilitating

professional mobility, placing business at the centre of the training system, answering to

labour market needs”. In addition to public action for vocational training, MEDEF wants a

reform of the unemployment insurance, thus “strengthening job seekers control”. Note that

the neoliberal agenda demands the retreat of state-intervention in areas where rights of

workers are concerned, while the neoliberal agenda demands stronger state-intervention

in the area of controlling unemployed workers.

Strikingly, Commission recommendations for France deviate partially from the neoliberal

pathway traced by the Barroso Commission until 2014 and observed by some researchers

(Amable, 2017; Baccaro & Howell, 2017). This change from the Barroso to the Juncker

Commission lead to the partial dissatisfaction of MEDEF with the Commission’s recommen-

dation in 2017 for France. The limitation of the number of recommendations and the in-

clcusion of social issues indicates the Commission aim of reducing the possibilities of con-

tention and politicization. By including social issues in the macroeconomic frame of eco-

nomic problems, the Commission makes its political agenda acceptable to the Member

States and the European Parliament.

Depoliticising neoliberal policies by “socializing”

Clauwaert (2017, 2018) provides the number of country-specific recommendations to all

EU Member States on wage and employment related issues. According to Clauwaert, the

number of recommendations are lower under the Barroso Commission than under the

Juncker Commission. It is clear that the Juncker Commissions deliberate aim to reduce the

overall number recommendations is reflected in the decreasing numbers over time. The

Juncker Commission seeks to simplify the European Semester and to limit the opportunities

for potential critique and contestation of the country-specific recommendations. Con-

versely, the number of recommendations on wage related issues has only slightly de-

creased. This stability is due to the persistently high numbers of recommendations on

wage-setting-mechanisms. There is a greater continuity between the Barroso and the

Juncker Commission with regard to policy recommendations for wage-setting- mechanisms

than for other policy principles. Both Commissions have seeked to adapt wage-setting to

local conditions of companies, thereby improving their competitiveness and capacity for

adjustment to external shocks. In contrast, Clauwaert alleges that the Juncker Commission

has introduced social concerns, based on the European pillar of social rights.

Another case of depoliticizing is the decentralization of collective bargaining between trade

and business unions. The recommendations push consistently for decentralizing collective

bargaining. The recommendations argue that branch-level agreements are economically

sounder than national agreements. Firm-level agreements are economically sounder than

branch-level agreements because they increase the capacity to balance macroeconomic

imbalances. In contrast, transnational political space formation would imply collective bar-

gaining on a European level between European Business and worker representatives. A

transnational political space of conflict resolution and interest mediation is an indicator for

successful politicization processes in economic governance.

The Commission and the DG Economic and Financial affairs may have changed their role

in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. They are no more only “guardians of the

treaties” but they act also as if they were “international managers” (Georgakakis, 2017)

using management techniques of multinational corporations in order to achieve commonly

agreed objectives. Mudge (2015) labels these managers as “European economic technocrat.

They use scoreboards, benchmarking and indicators to govern economic and social policies

in the Member States. These techniques have already been tested in several policy areas

(Halpern, Lascoumes, & Le Galès, 2014) in the European Union. Erne claims that the Com-

mission manages the Member States as if they were subsidiaries of a multi-national cor-

poration.

Economic Governance has changed from soft-law procedures to procedures that threat

Eurozone countries with fines proportional to their GDP for non-complying with the rec-

ommendations. The objectives of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure are not soft

anymore, but hard because non-compliance with the Council recommendations for reme-

dying with “macroeconomic imbalances” can be sanctioned by considerable fines, that have

to be paid every year a euro-zone country does not comply sufficiently in the eyes of the

Commission.

As a result, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure empowers the Commission to impose

a macroeconomic view of central institutions in domestic policy areas, such as collective

bargaining, labour law unemployment policy and fiscal policy. Thus, political actors that do

not master the vocabulary of macroeconomics or do not share this view of domestic insti-

tutions are disarmed in the political debate on these issues in the European institutions.

5. Conclusion The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure raises obstacles to the politicisation of country-

specific-recommendations because they are framed in macroeconomic vocabulary and

they are presented as necessities for the Economic and Monetary Union.

The numerical objectives set by the Commission are not stable. They depend on GDP

developments and the performance of the Member States, because the thresholds are

upper and lower quartiles of the indicator distribution. The Commission incites the Member

States to search for economic best practices and to implement these best practices in their

domestic policy arena. Benchmarking has become widely accepted method for identifying

best practices. It is not an instrument only for soft-law anymore as in the open-method-

of-coordination, but has become a hard instrument, threatening Eurozone countries with

« bad « performance with yearly fines.

The regulation of the economy is not only based on directives and regulations, but also

on surveillance procedures of Member States. Economic governance has become on object

of governance by numbers. In contrast to directives and regulations, governance by num-

bers intervenes legitimised by benchmarks and thresholds that change from year to year

because they depend on the performance of all Member States. This dependence increases

the uncertainty about the thresholds and the capacity to stay within the limits of these

thresholds. On the other hand, Commission recommendations consistently favour the con-

trol of unemployed workers by active labour market policies, the decentralization of col-

lective bargaining to the lowest level possible, social dialogue between employer and

worker representatives and skill formation through on-the-job training. The Member States

contribution to the stability of the EMU is measured by performance-indicators. Member

States are expected to implement the Council recommendations, thus achieving economic

performance within the limits defined by the MIP scoreboard.

The Macro-economic Imbalance Procedure has strong depoliticising effects because it

frames many social conflicts with macroeconomic concepts. Thereby, the Commission sets

the goals and makes country-specific-recommendations that are difficult to challenge. The

EU institutions consider the compliance with the recommendations necessary for a stable

EMU.

On the other hand, the comparison of different Member States may increase the conflict

intensity between Member states, based on their categorisation as imbalanced, excessively

imbalanced, and in need of corrective action.

These are preliminary results. Other procedures are relevant for the surveillance of Member

states: the Excessive Deficit Procedures has strong effects on national budgets. Through

Macro conditionality, the access to EU regional and social funds depends on the compli-

ance of Member States with Council recommendations. The paper has not discussed the

objective relations between major actors in the European economic governance. The same

is true for the interaction among actors within European institutions.

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