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Governance, Capacity and Legitimacy: EPAs, EBA and theEuropean Union’s Pacific Regionalism after Cotonou

Martin Holland and Malakai Koloamatangi

Introduction

The European Union’s relationship with the Pacific has historically been interpretedthrough the wider prism of the ACP – the African, Caribbean and Pacific – countriesthat formed the EU’s development partners under the four Lomé Conventions (1975-200). As one might suspect, the numerical and geographical imbalance within thisgrouping of some 70+ states has meant that Pacific issues have been primarily shapedby African agendas and interests as the EU sought to adopt a common approach to theincreasingly diverse ACP group. This conference paper explores the current EUapproach to the Pacific within the new ACP partnership Agreement signed in Cotonouin June 2000 that is designed to shape EU-Pacific relations till 2020.

Historically, the major policy objectives of the Lomé Conventions were ascommendable as they were ambitious: the promotion of EU-ACP trade; agriculturaland industrial development; special aid for the least developed states; and, support forregional cooperation. Lomé’s most substantive innovations were the adoption of non-reciprocity as the basis for trade policy with the ACP and the introduction of exportstabilisation schemes. Despite these benign and radical intentions, the Loméexperiment came to be widely regarded as a policy failure - by both the EU and theACP. Radical reform was demanded resulting in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.This contemporary phase of EU-ACP relations now links the EU (with the inclusionof East Timor in 2003) with 78 countries – but Cotonou, like its predecessor Lomé,again relies on the ACP as the framework for the relationship.

This analysis of EU-Pacific relations since 2000 falls into two parts. First, the paperexamines the motivations behind the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and discussesthe significant reforms - economic and political - that it seeks to introduce into EUdevelopment policy with respect to both the ACP as a group and to the Pacificseparately. Economically, the most fundamental change is the transition from non-reciprocity to free trade through regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)as the basis for future economic relations. Second, the paper focuses on a renewedemphasis on good governance, institutional capacity and democratic conditionality.Above all else, Cotonou seeks to facilitate the reintegration of developing countriesinto the global economy and thereby make redundant the need for any special ACPprivileges and protections. Whether such a normalization of the EU-ACP/ Pacificrelationship can be achieved is the critical focus of this analysis.

The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Past policy failures were the motivation for reform. In particular, the institutional andpolicy-making contexts of each ACP country on effective development were seen asserious and fundamental impediments. The past practice of uniform preferential tradeaccess and direct aid had generally failed to transform ACP economies. Trade figures

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demonstrated that the ACP’s share of the EU market had declined markedly over thelifespan of Lomé (to just 2.8% by 1999) and remained dependent on a narrow rangeof primary products depressingly reminiscent of a colonial economic structure(Holland, 2002: 169). The economic remedy proposed by the EU was extreme –differentiation based around a commitment to free trade. These radical proposals werepartially moderated through concessions and safeguards – but the basic principle ofACP free trade areas was established, marking a paradigmatic departure from thespirit of Lomé. Thus, trade liberalization, accompanied by democratic institutionbuilding, was the new international context that the successor to Lomé was obliged toembrace. Consequently, the Partnership Agreement emphasizes the political aspectsof development and not just the economic. The importance of institutional capacity,the support of civil society and the role of the non-state sector in promotingdevelopment underpin this new Cotonou philosophy.

Cotonou - Objectives, Principles and Extending Political Conditionality

The broad objectives of the Partnership Agreement are defined in Article 1 as:

to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and socialdevelopment of the ACP States, with a view to contributing topeace and security and to promoting a stable and democraticpolitical environment….and the gradual integration of the ACPcountries into the world economy. (Partnership Agreement, Art. 1)

European support and encouragement to assist in developing regional integrationprocesses are expressly mentioned as mechanisms that can assist in realising theseprimary EU-ACP objectives. In addition, Article 2 outlines four “fundamentalprinciples” that will govern relations between the EU and the ACP. First, the equalityof the partners and local ownership of the development strategies was stressed. As thetext states “The ACP States shall determine the development strategies for theireconomies and societies in all sovereignty”. Second, in order to foster the widestpossible involvement and participation in political and economic affairs, thepartnership is open to “all sections of society, including the private sector, and civilsociety” as well as central government. Third, it is stated that “Dialogue and thefulfilment of mutual obligations” is pivotal to enacting the intent of the partnership.And lastly, “Differentiation” in the arrangements for ACP countries and for regions(reflecting different levels of development) becomes a fundamental principle,distinguishing between those more able to compete in the global economy and theleast-developed countries who will retain special protection. This last principle is themost significant departure from the uniform Lomé approach. It carries with it seriouspotential ramifications by paving the way for a multi-speed approach to futuredevelopment that will inevitably differentiate between different regions of the ACP.

For reasons of political expediency, yet somewhat confusingly, the Agreementdistinguishes between “essential elements” and a “fundamental element” (Gomes,2000: 11). Duplicating Lomé IV, three “essential elements” are identified: respect forhuman rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. These are expected to governthe behaviour of the EU and ACP both domestically and internationally. Article 9

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describes these in the following terms. Firstly, human rights are defined as “universal,indivisible and inter-related”: all fundamental freedoms and human rights, “be theycivil and political, or economic, social and cultural” must be protected and promotedunder the Agreement. Secondly, universally recognised democratic principles mustunderpin the legitimacy and legality of State authority (reflected in its constitutional,legislative and regulatory system, and the existence of participatory mechanisms): onthe basis of these universally recognised principles, each country develops itsdemocratic culture. And thirdly, the Agreement stipulates that the structure andauthority of government “shall be founded on the rule of law, which shall entail inparticular effective and accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal systemguaranteeing equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject to the law.”Breaches of any of these essential elements may ultimately lead to a country facingsuspension from the Agreement. Any party to the Agreement can bring such a breachto the Council of Ministers which, within 15 days, must then engage in “consultation”with the offending country on how best to remedy the situation. Where consultationproves unsuccessful or is refused, or in cases where immediate action is necessitated,“appropriate measures” in accordance with international law and proportional to theviolation, may then be taken. However, full suspension from the Agreement is seen asa measure only of last resort (Article 96).

The text dealing with good governance and corruption is largely new and was notsimply duplicated from the earlier Lomé provisions. The concept is defined in thefollowing terms:

… good governance is the transparent and accountablemanagement of human, natural, economic and financialresources for the purposes of equitable and sustainabledevelopment. It entails clear decision-making procedures atthe level of public authorities, transparent and accountableinstitutions, the primacy of law in the management anddistribution of resources and capacity building forelaborating and implementing measures aiming in particularat preventing and combating corruption. (Article 9.3)

Achieving this broad joint definition was in itself considered a notable success(Gomes, 2000: 12). Provisions for the regular assessment of good governance arebuilt into the Agreement, taking into account “each country’s economic, social,cultural and historical context”. However, due to ACP opposition “good governance’did not constitute an “essential element” of the Agreement and was given thesomewhat different status - that of a “fundamental element”. The consequence of thismodification is that breaches of ‘good governance” cannot lead to any sanctions orsuspensions being invoked by the EU. The only exception is for cases of financialcorruption where suspension can again be an option of last resort.

It remains to be seen whether this political conditionality will be substantive orprimarily cosmetic and selective. The greater involvement of civil society could provea litmus test. For the EU, the involvement of non-governmental actors is essential tothe consolidation of democracy, a characteristic Europe regards as a precondition foreconomic development. Thus the promotion of democracy and democratic norms –bolstered through political dialogue – has become the core element in the EU’sdevelopment policy towards the Third World in general, as well as the Pacific

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specifically. However, “good governance” can be viewed as a minimalist condition -the efficient management of public affairs – or as an inclusive one that involvespluralistic processes, norms and a rejection of corruption. Some commentators haveargued that the democratic agenda of Cotonou is unrealisable – and when coupledwith poverty alleviation – sets unrealistic and unobtainable goals (Holland, 2002:203). A framework for partnership may be able to contribute to these objectives, but itis an unreasonable expectation for Cotonou alone to achieve these outcomes.

The new agreement does present the Pacific and the EU with a broader basis on whichto engage in political dialogue, however. In principle at least, any issue of mutualinterest can be discussed. Explicit references to new topics - peace building andconflict-prevention (Article 11) and migration issues (Article 13) – have beenincorporated providing a legal basis for the development of EU-ACP joint policy inthese areas. These topics – peace, conflict and migration - are, in part, a logicalconsequence of the incorporation of development goals as one element within theEU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht.

Financing and the EDF

An additional economic aspect of Cotonou – like Lomé - concerns development aidto complement trading relations. As Table 1 illustrates, Europe has used a specialfunding mechanism – the European Development Fund (EDF) - separate from theCommunity budget to finance its development policy with the ACP. The ACP states’disappointment with the proposed size of the new EDF was familiar and reflected thesentiments of all the previous Lomé renegotiations. Their argument was that thepriority given to poverty eradication seemed inconsistent with the financialcommitment.

Table 1 Financing of Development Co-operation 1958-2000

Convention Fund Date No.States

EIB**(ECUm)

EDF*(ECUm)

Total(ECUm)

Treaty ofRome EDF 1 1.1.1958 31 -- 581 581Yaoundé I EDF 2 1.7.1964 18 64 666 830Yaoundé II EDF 3 1.1.1971 19 90 843 933Lomé I EDF 4 1.4.1976 46 390 3124 3514Lomé II EDF 5 1.1.1981 57 685 4754 5439Lomé III EDF 6 1.5.1986 66 1100 7754 8854Lomé IV EDF 7 1.3.1990 69 1200 10800 12000Lomé IV(review) EDF 8 4.11.1995 70 1658 12967 14625

* (Includes grants, special loans, STABEX, SYSMIN)** (Own resources, loans)Source: The Courier (1990) No. 120, p.26 and (1996) No. 155, p.12.

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The final level of resources for the 9th EDF was set at €15.2 billion over the five-yearperiod - €13.5 billion in the EDF and €1.7 billion from the European InvestmentBank’s (EIB) own resources – a figure that was only a marginal increase over the 8th

EDF (with no increase in real terms). To compromise, the EU agreed that unspentbalances from earlier EDF allocations could be carried forward, making the total ofnew and old funds available over €25 billion (see Table 2). Pointedly, the greaterfinancial impediment may continue to be the actual disbursement of the fundseffectively and efficiently during the lifetime of the 9th EDF rather than a limitedbudget. The EDF’s record has repeatedly shown that disbursement faces seriousobstacles due often to insufficient institutional capacity in many ACP States, as wellas within the Commission. At the time of the signing of the Cotonou Agreement €9.9billion remained uncommitted from previous EDFs. Critics have noted that no targetsor timetable for levels of disbursement have been set and predict that continued lowlevels of disbursement will also come to characterise Cotonou and undermine themain policy objective of poverty eradication (Laryea, 2000: 16).

Table 2 Partnership Agreement Financial Resources 2000-5 (€ billion) €

• 9th EDF - comprising 13.5 Long-term envelope (10.0b) Regional envelope ( 1.3b) Investment facility ( 2.2b)

• Remaining balance from previous EDF 9.9• European Investment Bank (EIB) individual resources 1.7

TOTAL 25.1

Source: ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, SpecialIssue, The Courier, European Commission, Brussels.

Cotonou also provides for three significant macroeconomic policies: debt-relief;structural adjustment; and, export earnings stabilisation. The introduction of financialmeasures aimed at debt-relief was a significant break with past practice and reflectedthe success of global pressure, as well as of a change in member state positions on theissue during the late 1990s (especially in Germany and the UK). Resources coveredby the Agreement can now be used for debt relief initiatives that have internationalapproval: the EU has also given an undertaking to examine whether additionalresources can also be mobilised to reduce the debt burden. While welcoming this EUinitiative on debt-relief, the ACP continues to argue for greater EU involvement insupport of a fully-funded international Highly Indebted Poor Countries programme, aswell as the cancellation of unsustainable debt levels incurred by the ACP (Laryea,2000: 16). Support for structural adjustment – particularly those which addressregional integration issues - is also extended in the Partnership Agreement. JointACP-EU assessment of such macroeconomic programmes is envisaged to “ensure thatadjustment is economically viable and socially and politically bearable” (Article 67).To determine whether structural adjustment programmes can receive funding, the EUhas accepted the principle that provided the criteria employed by the principalmultilateral donors (such as the IMF and World Bank) are met, then EU financialsupport is “automatic”. In this way it is hoped that disbursement of funds can be

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accelerated and that fewer Commission staff resources are committed to structuraladjustment programme assessments. Finally, the spirit of both STABEX andSYSMIN are incorporated in the Agreement. Long-term support is provided “in orderto mitigate the adverse effects of any instability in export earnings, including in theagricultural and mining sectors” (Article 68).

EPAs – Economic Partnership Agreements

Cotonou presents a blend of past practice and innovation. The one area where thePartnership Agreement can justifiably claim innovation concerns the context withinwhich development occurs, emphasising trade development and investment. Asargued above, the EU’s remedy for this has been to depart from Lomé’s privilegedtrade preferences approach to embrace free trade as the better mechanism foreconomic growth. Transition periods notwithstanding, this constitutes a radicaldeparture from the past uniform basis of economic relations between the EU and theACP that had developed over twenty-five years.

Importantly, in contrast to Lomé’s uniformity, the Partnership Agreement nowdifferentiates between levels of development for ACP states. The Least DevelopedCountries (LDCs) remain principally governed by the traditional Lomé approach,while the more economically able ACP states are to have the new conditions forliberalized economic partnerships applied to them. Practically all LDC exports willbenefit from non-reciprocal free access to the EU market by 2005 (the sugar and beefprotocols being the only major exceptions to this). The EU’s approach to the LDCsreflects a wider international assessment of the particular economic situation of thesestates. The EU’s role is, however, crucial as 40 of the world’s LDCs are signatories ofthe Cotonou Agreement.

The radical reform of trading relations, therefore, applies specifically to the non-LDCACP states. A series of deadlines for the progressive abolition of trade barriers andthe introduction of WTO compatible free trade have been promulgated in Article 37of the Agreement. September 2002 was set as the launch date for negotiations oneconomic partnership agreements with a view to their introduction no later than 1st

January 2008. During this interim period the current Lomé IV trade regime will bemaintained although some commodity protocols will undergo review. But agreementson trade liberalization seem far from inevitable with all of the ACP states:consequently, Cotonou makes provision for an assessment in 2004 to determine whichof the non-LDC ACP are not in a position to move towards free trade. For thesestates, alternative arrangements will be examined that can provide them with “a newframework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformitywith WTO rules”.

Even for those non-LDC states regarded as suitable, a further review in 2006 willassess whether a longer transition beyond 2008 is necessary. For those countries ableto meet the original deadline a transitional period will have to be agreed upon beforeall elements of the negotiated trade agreement are fully implemented. The wording ofthe Agreement is cautionary on this point noting the need to take into account thesocio-economic impact and variable capacity of ACP countries to adapt and adjust toliberalisation. Consequently, negotiations will “be as flexible as possible in

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establishing the duration of a sufficient transitional period … and the degree ofasymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement” (Article 37). No timeframefor the transition is specified, but other agreements suggest that up to twelve years isquite possible. In addition, Article 37 raises the issue of WTO compatibility in severalplaces and calls on the EU and ACP to “closely cooperate and collaborate in the WTOwith a view to defending the arrangements reached”. Elsewhere the Agreement callsfor identification of common ACP-EU interests and a more effective lobbying of theWTO agenda to promote a development perspective foreshadowed in the Doha round.Clearly conflict at the international level is widely anticipated. Given these intra-ACP-EU issues and the external challenges, the agreement signed in Cotonou in theyear 2000 may only fully impact by 2020. Despite the Agreement’s insistence that thenew trade agreements will come into force on 1st January 2008, clearly there is ampleopportunity for delay – either justified or intentional.

The precondition for these Economic Partnership Agreements is the development ofregional groupings within the ACP: the template is for group-to-group economicrelationships, not for a series of bilateral and ad hoc agreements between the EU and78 individual ACP actors. This assumption and challenges it presents for the ACP ingeneral, and the Pacific in particular, are significant. Effective regional integration is asensitive and often contentious economic and political issue between ACP Stateswhich will require detailed and painstaking inter-state negotiations over several yearswithout the guarantee of success. Importantly, many of the anticipated regionalgroupings combine relatively developed ACP economies with those classified asLDCs. Any effective regional integration that combines these two groups will beespecially difficult to achieve. And simultaneously, these ACP states will also have toliberalise their economies in line with international standards and may face significantpolitical and social upheaval. Under such circumstances 2008 could prove to be anillusionary deadline for most of the eligible ACP states.

Trade liberalization is to go hand-in-hand with a wider range of cooperation acrossassociated areas. For example, the Partnership Agreement covers competition policy,intellectual property rights, information and communication technologies,standardization, consumer protection, the environment and labour standards. Onbalance, Cotonou certainly presents a more complete set of arrangements on which toconstruct the EU-ACP partnership than its predecessor. The overall aim, however,remains ambitious and long-term in nature – “sustainable development” that leads tothe “gradual integration of the ACP States into the world economy… implemented infull conformity” with WTO provisions (Article 34).

Differentiation: a Trojan horse?

The undeniable message from Cotonou is that the EU preference is to promote ACPregional integration and deal primarily on a region-to-region basis. Such adevelopment of course corresponds to the EU’s own original philosophy and isconsistent with a view of integration as a global process. However, the EU alsoregards regional integration as the most effective route through which the ACP statescan re-enter the international economy. In the words of Article 35.2 of the PartnershipAgreement, “regional integration is a key instrument for the integration of the ACPcountries into the world economy”. Practical support is given to this through Articles

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29 and 30. These cover the promotion of single unified regional markets, cross-borderissues as well as direct assistance for the institutionalisation of regional integration.Furthermore, regional integration, if it does promote growth, is also seen as a meansfor realising Europe’s major development policy objective: the reduction of poverty.It may also help to bridge the gap between the LDCs and other developing countrieswithin a particular region. All of these potential advantages are, of course, premisedon the political requirement that any form of regional integration is based on, and willcontribute to, democracy and good governance. The corresponding economicrequirement - sound economic management – including the removal of intra-regionaltariffs (and a subsequent loss of revenue) may prove problematic, and require arevision in the Cotonou free trade timetable.

Contrasting, yet parallel with, the emphasis on regional integration are the specialdifferentiated provisions for LDCs in the Partnership Agreement. Cotonourealistically recognizes the dichotomy that had always existed within the ACP butwent largely unrecognised in Lomé: namely, that between the very least developedstates and the other developing ACP countries. Cotonou uses the LDC category as anew organizing principle for its economic reforms: development status under thePartnership Agreement now determines the appropriate trade regime (see Table 3).

Table 3 List of Least Developed Countries

ACP LDCs: Non-ACP LDCs:

Sudan, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad,Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, SierraLeone, Liberia, Togo, Benin, Central AfricanRepublic, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tomé and Principe,Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi,Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda,Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Comoros,Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Haiti, Solomon Islands,Tuvalu, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Samoa and East Timor

Yemen, Afghanistan,Bangladesh, Maldives,Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar,Laos, and Cambodia

There are 49 LDCs on the UN list: 40 of these are ACP countries. All GSPpreferences for Myanmar have been suspended, and this also applies to EBApreferences. Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/devel/eba4_sum.htm

As is the case for LDCs in general, Cotonou’s LDCs are predominantly drawn fromAfrica: for the ACP, only seven LDCs (one in the Caribbean and six in the Pacific)are not African. However the LDC ration in the Pacific presents a serious challenge tothe objective of integrating this region into the global economy. While the actual formand shape of regional integration that emerges is legitimately the exclusive concern ofthe states involved, all the possible configurations must inevitably include a numberof LDCs. Indeed, Article 29 of the Partnership Agreement gives as one of theobjectives of regional economic integration as “fostering participation of LDC ACPStates in the establishment of regional markets and sharing the benefits”.

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The Agreement is not completely silent on these issues and does not require LDCs toadopt trade liberalisation regimes. It recognises that LDCs need to be accorded“special treatment in order to enable them to overcome the serious economic andsocial difficulties hindering their development” (Article 85). Specifically, theprovisions for the new economic and trade regime propose that by 2005 at the latest“essentially all products” from the LDCs will have duty-free access “building on thelevel of existing trade provisions of the Fourth ACP-EC Convention” (Article 37).But the broader policy issue remains problematic. How will future free tradeagreements between any regional grouping – including the Pacific - and the EUaccommodate these protectionist needs of LDCs? Detailed rules of origin and tariffcontrols needed by the LDCs would appear to conflict with any notion of tradeliberalisation and demand high compliance costs. And this position is furthercompounded by the separate “Everything But Arms” (EBA) EU initiative of 2001.

To summarise the effect of Cotonou, other than for the LDCs, the continuation of theLomé framework has been largely abandoned and the principle of trade liberalisationhas replaced that of non-reciprocal privileged access. While the shock of this changewill be somewhat cushioned by lengthy negotiation and transition periods that retainsome aspects of the Lomé acquis, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the focus anddirection of EU-ACP relations. However, these reforms are ultimately dependent on awider global agenda and on improved institutional capacity that can enhance policyimplementation. Without better, quicker and more coordinated implementation (onthe part of the ACP, but also the EU) the primary objective of the PartnershipAgreement – poverty reduction – will remain impossible to attain. The challengesthat confront the effective implementation of Cotonou – in terms of legitimacy,institutional capacity as well as governance issues - is discussed in the followingsection.

The European Union in the Pacific project

Our research focuses specifically on what might be called the political dimensions ofdevelopment. That is, those political processes and institutions that the EU regards asbeing contributive to the overall development of Pacific Island Nations (PINs).1 Thesedimensions have been pointed out, to wit: legitimacy, institutional capacity andregional integration. Admittedly, some of these elements sit more easily with the‘political’ tag than others but this is not the most suitable place to defendcharacterisations nor is it justified, since to a great extent our metier in this context isto examine these concepts, employing the EU’s definitions2 (not defending themnecessarily), in relation to how they appear or otherwise in PINs. Of significance, andin relation to definitions, and the proper time and space for such analyses, is whengaps and anomalies, if any, appear between the assumptions and reality.

1 In this case the 14 member states of the Pacific Islands Forum plus Timor Leste which joined theACP states in 2003 and is also an Observer at the Pacific Islands Forum.2 It is interesting, and fallacious of course, to regard these variables as ‘belonging’ to the EU alonesince all the ACP states were party to the formulation of the agreement and are legally bound by it assignatories. It is a reflection somewhat of the chasm between the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ that the formeris at times exclusively disowning while the latter is always, or attempts to be, inclusive.

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Cotonou in context

In this regard, the EU, in similar fashion to other donors in the region, has formulatedand stated its thinking about what we are concerned with in the following way.However, theoretically, there is perhaps a need to differentiate between levels andtypes of milieu in which processes are expected to operate. (Again this can be said ofdevelopment assistance to PINs generally.) At an initial level one can find specificstatements regarding political dimensions in the Cotonou agreement. The accent here,to recapitulate, is on dialogue (Article 8.1), construction and revitalisation of politicalinstitutions and recruitment of all sections of society (Article 8.7), politics and societyto be informed by democracy, human rights and the rule of law but some concessionis granted for the conditioning effect of local institutions and traditions (Article 9.2),and stable government (Article 10.1), market economics (Article 10.2) and a secureenvironment through a ‘spirit of partnership’ (Article 11.1) is also important.

At a basic level, the Cotonou agreement is quite specific about what the partners deemto be important in their relationship. It spells these out while the signatories to theagreement are expected to abide by them. As already mentioned, in cases wheredifficulties arise from misunderstanding, differing interpretations, and violations ofthe agreement, there are clear procedures for the clarification of areas of difficulty,resolution of disputes or, very rarely, suspension of a partner as a direct result of itscontravention of the agreement.3 Suspensions are infrequent because of a number offactors including the need to engage (for various reasons), the relatively peaceableway by which PINs exist and interact, and the difficulty of substantiating a partner’smanifest guilt. In other words, unless a partner commits a clear and serious breach,justification for suspension is generally problematic. One of the reasons for thiscomplexity is the very nature of the multitude of unspoken assumptions, in addition tothe codified ones, upon which Cotonou operates.

General assumptions

The tenets of democratic politics and society, although unambiguous in some areas,are tangled in others, and this has bedevilled both theoreticians and practitionersalike.4 These characteristics are of the following nature and they form the secondarylevel. For a democracy to exist politically and socially, it must be comprised:politically of, among other things, representative, responsible and responsivegovernment; culturally, of a civic, civil and egalitarian ethic; economically, ofcapitalism; of a social plurality; competent institutional-structural capacity; legally, ofan independent judicially; stability; and, to a lesser extent,5 of regional integration.These elements are not all essential for a democracy by any means, and the history of

3 Fiji, to date, is the only Pacific ACP state that has had its aid discontinued, as a consequence of the2000 coup, though assistance has since been restarted.4 This is one of the developments that should contribute towards closing the ‘assumption-reality’lacunae to which we have already alluded.5 Though the case can be made that similar to security, regional integration helps to undermine nationalinstability allowing for peaceful, and efficient, governance.

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democratisation in both western and non-western societies is testimony to that fact.But some are clearly more fundamental than others. For instance, one could hardlyregard a regime that excluded its citizenry from electing their governmentsdemocratic. Therefore the equal right (and sometimes choice) to elect representativesto parliament contributes to democracy. The point here is that the very nature ofdemocracy (and of humans) makes any simple claim to comprehensivenessdisingenuous. Moreover, this is the primary difficulty with which Cotonou has tocontend, let alone succeeding contentions such as that concerning inapplicability, asseems to be courted by the statement “This regular assessment shall take into accounteach country’s economic, social, cultural and historical context” (Article 9.4).

Research design

Legitimacy

We have narrowed our focus down to certain variables. On one hand, as in mostresearch approaches, though the field of concentration may be quite restricted there isscope for expansion when that course of action is warranted. On the other hand, the‘specificity’ of our research design is in some ways still somewhat extensive. It isgenerally agreed that legitimacy is a desired outcome for both political evolution andeconomic development. Legitimacy is undoubtedly crucial for regime survival but wehave interpreted this in an expansive way to include both the letter and spirit ofCotonou that we referred to earlier as the basic and secondary levels respectively.This led us to include in our examination good governance, democracy, rule of law,protection and promotion of human rights, transparency, accountability, and theinclusion of non-state actors in the development process, to a name a few, togetherwith the factors underlying our secondary assumptions such as an open societalculture and stability. In turn we posed pointing questions about the EPAs such as:what legitimacy, if any, has been garnered by the process? Is the policy about EPAsone that is ‘owned’ by society as a whole or is it a decision by the elites? What is therole of civil society or non-state actors in all this? Are the assumptions linkingdemocracy and development even relevant to the Pacific context and, if not, how dowe construct applicable alternatives? In relation to the EU: Should the EU encourageand facilitate the democratic debate on EPAs in the Pacific? Is it possible to generatea political culture about EPAs?

Institutional capacity

In line with conventional thinking on development, the capacity of local structures toadapt, absorb and aid development processes is now regarded as being crucial for asuccessful development strategy. Sound and competent institutional structures andprocesses, therefore, are indispensable to effective policy implementation. Competentbureaucracies are needed for intra-regional integration as well as relations with theEU. Some relevant questions here are: how do you enhance institutional capacity inthe PINs? How do you phase out the era of the overseas consultant and build up thecapacity, both human and physical, of PINs? Relating more to the EU: is it helpful forthe European Commission to require that the PINs deal with the Directorate-GeneralDevelopment for aid, development, and institutionalisation and the Directorate-

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General Trade for economic aspects of the EPAs? In assessing civil society and goodgovernance, what forms and mechanisms will the Commission use? Will there becommon criteria for all or specific ones for each culture?

Regional integration

There are certain preferences that the EU has with regards to its development andtrade relations. One of these, as already stressed above, is its wish to interact withpartners on a region-to-region multilateral basis rather than encourage country-to-country bilateral relations. Furthermore, it argues that not only would this make senseorganisationally but that such a setup would benefit countries more than were they tointeract bilaterally with the EU. The general assumption on the part of the EU seemsto be the that EU integration model can be replicated outside Europe regardless oflocal conditions. This is in spite of the fact that such notions are not easily entertained,even in Europe. Some concerns: what is the depth and extent of political integration inthe Pacific? Is greater political integration developmentally necessary? Will economicintegration be successful even? Some EU related questions: is regional integrationreally a precondition for developing EPAs? What is the political viability of EPAs?Can one have economic regional integration and an EPA with the EU without acomparable political regional integration or similar cultural or worldviews?

Investigative matrix

Taken together these issues and the questions they raise, and, eventually, the findings,whether negative or positive, that they may generate will not only be of concern to theEPA process but, as can be seen with the nature of the examination itself, will also beof some utility to region-wide issues. Indeed this combination is evident in the tableof questions that is reproduced below. The questions provided the template for theelite interviews that we have conducted up to this point, and hope to conduct further.The questions however were not meant to be hard and fast and restrictive. Rather in alot of the interviews, the questions were furnished mainly to provide some uniformityand systemisation. In some they acted as pointers only. And in others still theyprovided the general background against which interviewees projected their ownthoughts and opinions. Overall, however, the queries added extra meaning to earliergeneral prodding while at the same time they attempted to elicit responses that weredeemed to be pertinent to individual contexts. In that way, it was hoped that theresearch, while producing results that could be used as general propositions for theregion as a whole they were also specifically robust enough to be utilised byindividual PINs.

Table 4 General template of interview questions

Development Political Civil society EU, Cotonou,EPAs

Internationalrelations andregionalisation

Approaches todevelopment:what and who itshould involve aholistic approachinvolving allsectors of societyor concentrated ina few; and shouldbe‘directed/managed’ or totallydirected by market

Capacity building –Pacificunderstanding ofthe idea. Whatexactly has beendone and whatneeds to be done?

Civil society andtheir role indevelopmentThecontextualisationof CSOs, NGOsin the Pacific andwhetherconditionsdetermineoutcome Orshould there bean universal

EU-Pacificrelations:successes andchallenges

Regionalisation;Pacific IslandsForum functionand role; PICTAand PACER; isregionalintegrationpossible/desirable? What are theforces forintegration andwhat are theimpediments?

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holistic approachinvolving allsectors of societyor concentrated ina few; and shouldbe‘directed/managed’ or totallydirected by market

What is the inputfrom the Pacificinto the generaldirection ofdevelopment andpolitical evolutionin the Pacific? CanPacific islandsinfluence theorientation andcontent of theseprocesses?

Cultural change/development

Developmentsectors/strategiessuch as, whereapplicable,fisheries, forestryHow do youdevelop them?

Developmentalinfrastructure, foreg, transportation(land, air and sea);roads; airports;public utilities

Small island statesissues

exactly has beendone and whatneeds to be done?

Rule of law: Is ruleof law entrenchedinconstitutional/legalterms? Is itpractised in reality?Does it have afundamentalmeaning for thelife of society?How well does itsit with other formsof rule?

Democracy anddemocratisationand thinking aboutthese ideas andprocesses and howit should beinstituted, how tosustain it and makeit durable, takinginto account theunevenness of thedemocratisation inthe region. Are themeasuring devicesappropriate for thePacific or shouldwe devise othermodes of gaugingdemocracy? Isdemocracy onlyimportantpolitically andeconomically?

Leadership issues –is there a will toimprove? Is there a‘culture ofsuccess’,innovation etc?How would youcharacterise therelation betweengovernment andpeople? What isthe duty, in yourview, of the rulersvis-à-vis the ruled?Do democraticprinciples informleadership ethics?If not, then what?What is thetraditional/culturalprecedent?

contextualisationof CSOs, NGOsin the Pacific andwhetherconditionsdetermineoutcome Orshould there bean universalapproachregardless oflocalenvironment?How involvedare they? Arethey treated withfairness bygovernment? Arethey consultedand encouragedto participate?

Media – do theyparticipateeffectively in thedevelopmentalprocess? Arethey valuedparticipants innationaldialogue? Arethey trulyindependent?How protectedare their positioninsociety/politics?

What specificstructures,procedures are inplace to ensurecivil society iseffectivelyincluded in theEPAconsultationprocess? And iscivil societyinvolvementmeasurable?

Media coverageof EU

Developmentpolicy and EU

Perceptions ofEU – how do yousee the EU as anentity? What isyour experienceof it?

Perceptions ofCotonou andLome: Acomparison?

Experience andthinking aboutEPAs – theprocess andobjectives,deadline andother relatedissues

Will EPAs, apartfrom impactingon economicmatters, enhancethe generalpoliticaldevelopment ofyour country?

Pacific as part ofACP – theefficacy of theACP idea –merits andproblems

Conditionality –will it work?Generalthinking/experience about it

EU and bilateralrelations betweenmember statesand Pacific; inwhich context istrade/economicdevelopmentbetter, bilateral ormultilateral a laEU’s objective?

and PACER; isregionalintegrationpossible/desirable? What are theforces forintegration andwhat are theimpediments?

Conflictresolution;security, terrorismand the role of theEU

Outside actors inthe region

Globalisation:economic andothers; WTO

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What is thetraditional/culturalprecedent?

Efficacy of thePacific Way indevelopment?

Provisional results

General remarks

In response to the general secondary assumptions that we listed earlier, the followinggeneral remarks can be catalogued here, but not wanting of course to obviate thedanger of sweeping statements. Conditions among PINs are characterised by theirunevenness and despite similarities in many areas, their heterogeneity in others havethwarted, and will continue to impede, efforts at designing region-wide solutions tocommon problems including orchestrated attempts at development.

There are varying systems of government which includes: variations on theWestminster model, presidential system, monarchy, and attempts at fusing traditionaland modern systems of rule, while the protection and respect for human rights is stillan issue in some polities. Politics, electoral systems and party systems are stable,stagnant or both in some places but unstable in others. There is a persistence oftraditional cultures in the face of modern transitional tendencies. Civil societyorganisations are numerous but an insignificant number play any part in ‘officialdevelopment’ activities. There is some development capacity in some economies butmostly rudimentary in all. A legalistic framework for the rule of law can be found inmost jurisdictions but the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary isquestionable in others. Social pluralism in some societies is matched by intolerance inother PINs. Finally, the continued increase in the sprouting of many regionalorganisations coincides with the review of the Pacific Islands Forum as well as theinstitutionalisation of the free trade ethic represented by the Pacific Island CountriesTrade Agreement (PICTA) and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations(PACER). It is clear that these elements exist in contrast to both the dictates ofCotonou and general political thinking in the western tradition that contributed to, andprovided the justification for, the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. The instances inwhich these indices act as contradistinctions to initial assumptions indicate themeasure of the difficulty which the EPAs will have to encounter if they are to besuccessfully negotiated and implemented.

Country-specific findings

We provide below a sample of our data on five of the Pacific ACP states. The groupcomprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau, Tonga and Vanuatu. In conducting the

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interviews6, we provided an extra dimension to the issues of legitimacy, institutionalcapacity and regional integration. We deliberately solicited the interviewees’ responseto the question: what are your perceptions of and/or experiences with the EU and/orEPAs? The main rationale behind this was partly to invite an opinion in cases whereinterviewees had no thoughts on the basic issues but may have possessed generalimpressions and sentiments regarding the EU and EPAs generally, and partly as aresult of an illuminating just-concluded study on New Zealanders’ attitudes towardsthe EU and how that reflected their level of understanding of EU affairs, pointing toareas where the relationship may be improved (Holland and Chaban, 2003).Conclusions from that study underscored the centrality of mutual understanding andawareness in country-to-country, and more so in region-to-region relations. Ourfindings from each Island group are briefly outlined below.

Table 5 Group summary: Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau, Tonga, Vanuatu

Legitimacy Institutionalcapacity

Regionalintegration

Perception/experienceof EU and EPAs

CookIslands

Politicalinstability

Democraticgovernmentalstructure

House of Ariki

Good governanceissues

Media freedomunder threat

Relatively opensociety

Judicial‘conundrum’

CIANGO; non-state actors loose

Decreasingpopulation

Small island state

Developing

Large publicsector; recentreform

Expatriatessupplement localskills andexpertise

Newcomer toACP; EUcontribute togovernmentexpenditure

Foreigninvestment notencouraged (!)

Reluctant toabandon specialarrangementwith NZ

Reject fullintegration withNZ or otherPacific Islands

Lukewarmattitude towardsfree trade area

Member of PIFand otherregionalorganisations

Generally good attitudetowards EU though regretsEU bureaucracy

Good experiences withEPA negotiations but pointto encumbered process anddelay in progress

Fiji Ongoing politicalinstability

Race and landproblems

Chiefly traditionin politics

Largerpopulation

Better skilledworkers

Robust privatesector

Recentindications ofacceptance of‘inevitability’ ofintegration andfree trade

Site of mostregionalorganisations

Has had long experiencewith EU because of tieswith UK and sugar exports

Often at forefront of EPAnegotiations

Stand to gain most fromEPAs

6 We generally relied on elite interviews involving a cross-section of society, as well as secondarysources to inform our analysis. Some 70 taped interviews and transcripts are kept by the authors,containing over 100 hours of interviews that were conducted from October 2003-April 2004

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Governanceproblems

Media generallyfairly treated andregarded

Questions ofjudicialindependence

Multitude ofNGOs; somesuch as CCFreviled bygovernment;growing role indevelopment

Fairlyexperienced withdemocraticgovernment

Site of highereducationinstitutions

A well-developedsugar industry

Infrastructuredevelopment

Goodtransportationnetwork

‘Cosmopolitan’society

Benefits ofregionalisationfor workforce,economy

regionalorganisations

Ratu Mara’sinfluence on theregion

Member of PIFand otherregionalorganisations;joinedMelanesianSpearheadGroup in 1996

EPAs

Good representation inBrussels

EC delegation to Pacific inSuva

Palau US influence ingovernancestructures

Toodemocratic (!)

Judicialcompetence

Strong chieflyparticipation ingovernment

House of chiefs

Independentmedia

Political stabilitysave some lapses

Small populationbase

Small land area

Largegovernmentbureaucracy

Well-travelledpeople

Growing Asianworkforce

Growing privatesector

Substantial USgrants

Good standard ofliving

Needs technicalassistance

Member of PIFand otherregionalorganisations

Sees itself aspart ofMicronesia

Rejects ‘South’Pacific idea

Rejects greaterintegration

Relatively inexperiencedwith EU and EPAs

Compares EU aid to USaid

Brussels bureaucracy

Hopes for new EC officein Pohnpei

Tonga Entrenchedmonarchicalsystem

Prodemocracymovement

Middle-sizedpopulation

High literacy

Lack technicalexpertise

Part ofPolynesianHeritage Trustin the past

Long-timemember of PIFand otherorganisation

Has long experience withEU; present secretary offoreign affairs is usual EUcontact

Experienced with EUbureaucracy

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Future uncertainwith ailing, agedmonarch

Chiefs notparticularlystrong butpositionguaranteedconstitutionally

Interference withjudiciary

New media lawsinterfere withrights to freespeech/mediafreedom

TANGO; manyNGOs recentlyconsulted

Stratified culture

Relatively‘stable’

Large publicsector; recentreform

Needdevelopmentinfrastructure

and otherorganisation

Tries to befriendly witheveryone

Seems to benon-committalon greaterintegration

Regard EPAs as necessarystep to continued EUrelations, furtherdevelopment

Vanuatu Politicalinstability

Problems withombudsman inpast

Council of chiefs

Unstable ‘party’system’

French andBritish legacy iedual systems

VANGO; welldeveloped NGOs

Egalitariancultures;multicultural,multilingual

Churches strong

Media problems

Largerpopulation base

High illiteracyrate

Larger land mass

Needinfrastructure

Need technicalassistance

Need to developprivate sector

Has had publicsector reforms

Exportsagriculturalproducts; hassome minerals

Part of PIF,MSG and others

Unconvincedabout merits ofgreaterintegration

Tends to look toNew Caledoniaas role model

Some problems with EUrelations; communicationnot good; some misuse ofaid in the past

View EPAs as beingnecessary

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Concluding remarks: plus ça change plus c’est le même chose? ‘…’ikai ke tuku evaka ka e fai ha kakau’7

Several qualifications would prevent us from making definitive statements about theEU’s post-Cotonou Pacific regionalism both from the standpoint of EU-ACPpartnership and, given our research data to date, EU-Pacific relations. Importantamong these are Cotonou’s ‘inherent’ difficulties as highlighted by free trade versusnon-reciprocity and LDCs versus non-LDC issues, the difficulty associated withapplying relatively uniform political standards to disparate and differing regions,countries and islands and our project’s embryonic nature. Despite this, it is possible touse some of the data from Table 5 to make a few tentative and general remarks, butalso to be conscious that the verdict has not yet been reached.

The EU’s attempt at engagement, despite its shortcomings, seems to be based on adesire to assist the PINs if not into reintegration with the international economy thenin the very least to begin to fend for themselves. Underlying motivations propellingthese exchanges are, understandably perhaps, not as simplistic or as one-dimensionalas that. But these sentiments, however, would have to be stoical given theinconsistency of political circumstances and developments in the region. From ourdata, it is clear that governance, legitimacy and capacity issues (including economicdimensions specifically) are (barely) adequate in some places but wholly in need ofreform in others. In some ways, rather than being seen to be joining with other outsideactors in the region in pushing for the reform of governance structures, the EU may beseen as contributing to the ‘problem’ since some PINs do not take kindly to‘interference’ and these issues, for instance democratic governance, are hardly newbut have been confronted by Islands for sometime.

The objective of recruiting civil society into development planning and activities,however laudable, is proving to be difficult since a lot of governments do notrecognise the value of such an exercise. Even the idea of regional integration (orgreater cooperation) is problematic. An interesting example is the Cook Islands. Theyprefer to remain in association with New Zealand but would not want a deeperrelationship. Nor would they want this with other PINs. But they do not want todisassociate itself from New Zealand either. If the Cook Islands do not desire greaterintegration, and it is in some form now, what would other fully independent Islandswant?

PINs, for their part, are generally willing to persevere with the relationship and withthe EPAs for the most part, enjoying meanwhile the generosity of the EU, if not the‘complex bureaucracy’ in Brussels. However, one clear impression from our data isthis. Given the situation in which Pacific ACP states find themselves at this particulartime, and being cognizance of what the EU is trying to do and how it wants to do this,Islands should be allowed, indeed empowered, to find solutions for themselves and intheir own time. One suspects that there is ample room in this post-Cotonouenvironment for that.

7 Tongan saying, literally ‘…the boat should not be abandoned while one swims’. Meaning: no matterhow bad or difficult a situation may be one should persevere with it.

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