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Page 1: GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS · 11/7/2019  · GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS PMAP 8141: Economy, Society, and Public Policy November 7, 2019 rt e! Democracy and factions ... Private sector solutions

G O V E R N M E N T I N S T I T U T I O N SPMAP 8141: Economy, Society, and Public Policy

November 7, 2019Fill out your reading report

on iCollege!

Page 2: GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS · 11/7/2019  · GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS PMAP 8141: Economy, Society, and Public Policy November 7, 2019 rt e! Democracy and factions ... Private sector solutions

Democracy and factions

P L A N F O R T O D A Y

Governments in the economy

Limits of governments

Small factions and public goods

Addressing external effects

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A D D R E S S I N G E X T E R N A L E F F E C T S

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Someone isn’t paying enough

G E N E R A L P R O B L E M W I T H E X T E R N A L I T I E S

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Internalize the externality

S O L U T I O N T O A L L E X T E R N A L I T Y P R O B L E M S

Make SMC/SMB part of the equation so that the price fully reflects the external costs and benefits of a party’s actions

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Private sector solutions

Public sector solutions

Market-ish solutions

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Private sector solutions

Merging and acquiring

Natural governance

Coasian bargaining

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Public sector solutions

Regulations

Pigouvian taxation

Pigouvian subsidies

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Market-ish solutions

Caps + tradable permits

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Government issues 200 permits to allow for 1 unit of pollution

Plants A and B each get 100 permits

B will buy permits from A until they have 150 and 50 each

Pollution goes down while maintaining flexibility

It’s cheaper for A to abate pollution, so they don’t need as many permits

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Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)

Western Climate Initiative (WCI)

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EU Emissions Trading Scheme

American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009

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B U T T H E R E A R E P R O B L E M S …

Reduce damage now, consequences be damned

vs.

Minimize costsQuantity regulations get the right level of reduction, but it can be way expensive and can distort markets

Cap and trade keeps costs down, but doesn’t guarantee level of abatement

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G O V E R N M E N T SI N T H E E C O N O M Y

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What do governments do in the economy?

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S P E C I A L F E A T U R E S O F G O V E R N M E N T S

Only actor allowed to use legitimate force

Only actor with civil and human rights

obligations to its citizens

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T W O P O S S I B L E G O A L S

Maximize surplus(efficiency)

Ensure fairness

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Y A Y G O V E R N M E N T S

Governments can use public policy to fix inefficiency and unfairness

IncentivesRegulation

Persuasion and informationPublic provision

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An organization with the power to address

efficiency and fairness can also do great harm

B U T W A I T !

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“With great power comes great responsibility”

Peter Parker’s Uncle Ben

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B O O G O V E R N M E N T S

Use of force to silence opponents

Rent seeking, oligarchy, and self-enrichment

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L I M I T S O F G O V E R N M E N T S

Well-governed societies place limits on government power

ElectionsConstitutional restrictions

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D E M O C R A C Y A N D F A C T I O N S

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T H R E E K E Y I N S T I T U T I O N S

Rule of law

Civil liberties

Inclusive, free, and decisive elections

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What makes these different?

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Factions = badFix factions by removing

their causes…

…or minimizing their effects

Bigger republic = more competition =

better

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“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”

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Constitutional system empowers minorities; provides veto points

Pre-Bill of Rights

Assumes factions will never get big

Assumes multiparty systemDuverger’s law: plurality-rule elections + single-member districts = two parties

P R O B L E M S W I T H A R G U M E N T

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https://historyshots.com/collections/political-financial

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Minorities have inordinate power in democracies because of the

dynamics of small groupsCAVEAT: Minorities ≠ marginalized groups

Minorities with access to political system have inordinate power

Better term = interest groups

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S M A L L FA C T I O N S A N D P U B L I C G O O D S

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“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

Margaret Mead

“[I]ndividual, unorganized action will either not be able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest adequately”

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 7

W H Y D O W E N E E D F A C T I O N S ?

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Have you ever contributed to or volunteered in a national

political campaign?

How much did you benefit personally from that donation or from the outcome?

Why did you donate or volunteer?

How much did the group benefit from your work?

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Individual gains in large groups are essentially zero

Why would a rational, self-interested person donate to a national campaign or join a union or support activist causes?

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“The achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group”

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, p. 15

Achievement of goals = nonexcludable and nonrivalrous

Free riding!

G R O U P I N T E R E S T S = P U B L I C G O O D S

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Pax Britannica Pax Americana Pax Sinica?

How does this make hegemonic powers feel?

W H O S U P P L I E S G L O B A L O R D E R ?

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Have you ever contributed to a city-level (or lower!)

political campaign?

Have you tackled a single issue with a city council?

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You get individual benefits if you believe your marginal actions

will lead to actual changeSmall groups can harness this

Little free riding = more power (Madison was right!)

Benefits can be excludable

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How do large groups fix public goods problems (and stop free riding)?

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FederationMake big group feel small

Change individual calculus

CoercionIncrease the costs of not acting

Selective incentivesIncrease the benefits of acting

https://benefits.nra.org/

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FederationMake big group feel small

CoercionIncrease the costs of not acting

Selective incentivesIncrease the benefits of acting

Governments? Political campaigns? Unions?

Advocacy groups? Nonprofits?

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Small groups can be too powerful

oh no

The larger the group, the less it will further common interests

Madison’s solution = use big groups

M O R A L O F T H E S T O R Y

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Narrow special interests and passionate minorities can unduly influence policy

Concerned citizens (even if passionate!) are stuck with free riders

Concentrated interest groups vs. large latent groups

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What does this mean for democracy?

What does this mean for public administration and policy?

Is it okay that small groups wield substantial power?

What can we do about it? (or should we do anything about it?)

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L I M I T S O F G O V E R N M E N T S

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F A I L U R E S

Market failure

Government failure

Prices don’t reflect individual actions + allocation of resources isn’t Pareto efficient

Failure of political accountability

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“With great ability comes great accountability”Miles Morales’s father, Jefferson Davis

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G O V E R N M E N T F A I L U R E S

Economic infeasibility

Administrative infeasibility

Political infeasibility

Failure of government accountability

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E C O N O M I C I N F E A S I B I L I T Y

Public policy must be a Nash equilibrium to be successful

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A D M I N I S T R A T I V E F E A S I B I L I T Y

Limited information

Limited capacity(This is why you’re here!)

A policy might be adopted if there’s not enough state capacity

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P O L I T I C A L F E A S I B I L I T Y

A policy might not be adopted even if it’s great and there’s sufficient state capacity

Short-termism

Voting

Unequal access

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P O L I T I C A L F E A S I B I L I T Y

Short-termism

Implement policies that get you elected next cycle

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P O L I T I C A L F E A S I B I L I T Y

Unequal access

The rich can have a louder voice

Smaller groups can have a louder voice

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L O B B Y I S T S

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Who are politicians responsive to?

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V O T I N G

Anil CarlosBala

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V O T I N G

Condorcet paradox

Pizza > Burger

Vote intransitivity

Burger > Soup Soup > Pizza

V OT I N G

Condorcet paradox

Pizza > Burger

Vote intransitivity

Burger > Soup Soup > Pizza

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V O T I N G

Order of voting matters!

Speaker of the House (or whoever’s in charge of the agenda)

could theoretically guarantee any outcome

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

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A L T E R N A T I V E V O T I N G S Y S T E M S ?

Ranked choice / Instant runoffhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5SLQXNpzsk

Encodes more information in vote + changes campaign calculus

Still suffers from Condorcet paradox