government of the united states vs
TRANSCRIPT
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Government of the United States vs. Purganan
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government sent to the Philippine Government a note requesting the extradition of
Mark B. Jimenez. After several motions, the petition for extradition was eventually
set for hearing. The petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest." Before the RTC could act on the petition for extradition, respondent
Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed
that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC granted
the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing.In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000. The RTC directed the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Petitioner now assails the procedure
adopted by the trial court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez.
Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for bail.
ISSUE:Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings.
HELD:
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore;
in extradition which is sui generis in a class by itself they are not. An
extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call
into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
(including the right to bail). To begin with, the process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt
or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite.
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The extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted
of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. The
ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether
the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the
executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not
flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
Note:
Right to bail cannot also be invoked in civil proceedings.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia Jr.
FACTS:
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Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court for
several crimes. DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. RTC then issued an order of arrest
and Munoz was arrested. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed in the same
case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. RTC Judge denied the
petition for bail. Later, the RTC Judge inhibited himself from trying the case and
was replaced by respondent judge Olalia. Respondent judge granted the petition for
bail. Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent judge. Private respondent
on the other hand, maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one's liberty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may avail the right to bail despite
the ruling in Purganan.
HELD:
Although the right to bail is not applicable to extradition proceedings,
however, the Court cannot ignore trends in international law: (1) the growingimportance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being
given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of
countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,
this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges
have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee's right to bail. If bail can be
granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
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invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
"the machinery of criminal law." A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest,
to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Private respondent had been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the
purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potentialextraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail
(the burden is therefore on the extraditee to show proof that he wont take flight).
The standard of proof required in granting or denying bail in this case can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
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prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
Note:
The Court in this case thinks that there should be a reexamination on the case of
Purganan.
The unique part of this case in comparison with Purganan is that the extradite is
entitled to criminal due process where the right to bail springs.
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RULE 114
Bail
SECTION 1. Bail Defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a person incustody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance
before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
given in the form of corporate surety; property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.
SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. All kinds of bail are subject to
the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall
remain in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by the
court or these Rules;
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(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and
despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat. In
such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of the
final judgment.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section. Photographs
(passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the face, left and right
profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail. (2a)
SECTION 3. No Release or Transfer Except on Court Order or Bail. No person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order
of the court or when he is admitted to bail. (3a)
SECTION 4. Bail, a Matter of Right; Exception. All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)
HEIcDTSECTION 5. Bail, When Discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to
the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
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the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; CAHTIS
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (5a)
SECTION 6. Capital Offense Defined. A capital offense is an offense which, under
the law existing at the time of its commission and of the application for admission
to bail, may be punished with death. (6a) EHTISC
SECTION 7. Capital Offense or an Offense Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua or LifeImprisonment, not Bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)
SECTION 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. At the hearing of an application
for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial
but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to testify. (8a) I
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SECTION 9. Amount of Bail; Guidelines. The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily,
but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (9a)
SECTION 10. Corporate Surety. Any domestic or foreign corporation,
licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently authorized to act as such,
may provide bail by a bond subscribed jointly by the accused and an officer of the
corporation duly authorized by its board of directors. (10a) DaIACS
SECTION 11. Property Bond, How Posted. A property bond is an
undertaking constituted as lien on the real property given as security for theamount of the bail. Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the
accused shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title on file with
the Registry of Deeds if the land is registered, or if unregistered, in the Registration
Book on the space provided therefor, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the office of
the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his compliance and
his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the property bond
and his re-arrest and detention. (11a)
SECTION 12. Qualifications of Sureties in Property Bond. The qualifications
of sureties in a property bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each must be a resident owner of real estate within the Philippines;
(b) Where there is only one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the
amount of the undertaking;
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(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify in an amount less than
that expressed in the undertaking but the aggregate of the justified sums must be
equivalent to the whole amount of the bail demanded. AECacT
In all cases, every surety must be worth the amount specified in his own
undertaking over and above all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from
execution. (12a)
SECTION 13. Justification of Sureties. Every surety shall justify by affidavit
taken before the judge that he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the
preceding section. He shall describe the property given as security, stating the
nature of his title, its encumbrances, the number and amount of other bails entered
into by him and still undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine
the sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as it may deem
proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is qualified. (13a)
SECTION 14. Deposit of Cash as Bail. The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall bedischarged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and
applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned
to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. (14a)
SECTION 15. Recognizance. Whenever allowed by law or these Rules, the
court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that of a
responsible person. (15a)
SECTION 16. Bail, When not Required; Reduced Bail or Recognizance. No
bail shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall be released
immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is
destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
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A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the principal
penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or
on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court. (16a)
SECTION 17. Bail, Where Filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge,
or municipal circuit trial judge therein. CTEDSI
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be
released on recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the
case is pending, whether on preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (17a)
SECTION 18. Notice of Application to Prosecutor. In the application for bail
under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to
the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a)SECTION 19. Release on Bail. The accused must be discharged upon
approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section
17 of this Rule
When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who
accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other
supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good
reason, require a different one to be filed. (19a)
SECTION 20. Increase or Reduction of Bail. After the accused is admitted to
bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase or reduce its amount. When
increased, the accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the
increased amount within a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal
charge, who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or information,
may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and whenever a strong showing
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of guilt appears to the court, be required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu
thereof, committed to custody. (20a)
SECTION 21. Forfeiture of Bail. When the presence of the accused is
required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him
before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person
as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30)
days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said
period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production;
and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required
to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)
SECTION 22. Cancellation of Bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with
due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the
accused or proof of his death.The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the
bail. (22a)
SECTION 23. Arrest of Accused Out on Bail. For the purpose of
surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written authority
endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be arrested by a
police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.
An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant
if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where
the case is pending. (23a)
SECTION 24. No Bail After Final Judgment; Exception. No bail shall be
allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If before such finality, the
accused applies for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail.
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When no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow
his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to
serve sentence. (24a) EASCDH
SECTION 25. Court Supervision of Detainees. The court shall exercise
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary
detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly
personal inspections of provincial, city, and municipal jails and the prisoners within
their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire
on their proper accommodations and health and examine the condition of the jail
facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from adults,
ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with counsel,
and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the detainees.
In cities and municipalities to be specified by the Supreme Court, the municipal trial
judges or municipal circuit trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections
of the municipal jails in their respective municipalities and submit a report to the
executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction therein. HEITAD
A monthly report of such visitation shall be submitted by the executive judges to
the Court Administrator which shall state the total number of detainees, the names
of those held for more than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the crimecharged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and other pertinent
information. (25a)
SECTION 26. Bail not a Bar to Objections on Illegal Arrest, Lack of or Irregular
Preliminary Investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant
issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them
before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable
but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
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Alonte vs. Savellano
FACTS:Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna and Buenaventura
Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn
Punongbayan. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. The
petition for change of venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent
judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her "decision
to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty when
arraigned and waived pre-trial. Immediately following arraignment the prosecution
presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of
desistance and that she has no interest in further prosecuting the action. The
Prosecution then manifested that the State had no further evidence against the
accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then moved for the "dismissal of the
case" against both accused-petitioners. The two accused did not present any
countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor admitted the act
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charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was
submitted for decision." A decision was rendered convicting petitioners of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to due process in criminal proceedings were deprived
against petitioner.
HELD:
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction
is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are
tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot
possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
There were a few deviations from what otherwise should have been theregular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2)
the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor
have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in
the order of trial.
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People vs. Dramayo
FACTS:
The accused Dramayo, in one drinking session brought up the idea of killing
Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery case. The idea was for
Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao.
Soon their plans were executed. Early the next morning, he went to the house of
the deceased and informed the latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the
cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified.The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to
explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof.
Dramayo and Escubin was charged and convicted by the RTC for the crime of
murder. The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed
by Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character
that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro,
stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable
doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of
the seven accused were held culpable. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence were
overcame during the trial.
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HELD:
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. There is need, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of
the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered
by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did
he perpetrate the act that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.
By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is
that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt (the
definition of proof beyond reasonable doubt may be culled from this statement).Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal
charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to
acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality
be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person
who may be innocent.
The prosecution had already presented convincing evidence leading to the
guilt of the accused. The presumption of innocence can no longer protect the two.
What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no
reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted
likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were
not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It
must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had
been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being
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acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the
party or parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral
certainly having arisen as to their culpability.
Note:
Some of the defendants were acquitted because they testified in behalf for the
State.
Even if one of the accused is acquitted where conspiracy was involved in a crime, it
does not mean that the others would also be acquitted as well.
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
This petition filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly
similarly situated, sought to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for
being unconstitutional. Among the provisions contended is Section 4 of BP 52
which states:
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall
be conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of
constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence.
HELD:
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with
guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the
ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of
disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of
them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence,
and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that
because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged
with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facieevidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A
highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
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Marquez vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
In the petition, the Court is being asked to resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase is so
used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic
Act No. 7160). That law states:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate filed this petition for certiorari prayingfor the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate for
being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private
respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him was still
pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. A warrant issued by said court
for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account
of his alleged "flight" from that country.
ISSUE:
What is the definition of the term fugitive from justice?
HELD:
From the deliberations of the Oversight Committee (which finally came out
with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
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Code of 1991), it provided: "Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons
shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position: "(a) . . . "(b)
Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. " Private
respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in
charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight.
The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written.
An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
must remain congruent to it.
The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the
ponente (expressed during the Courts en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer
only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Note:
The correct definition of the term fugitive from justice (according to Atty. Gabriel)
include also those who took flight after being merely convicted of a crime orcharged with an offense.
The difference between this case and that of Dumlao is that the mere filing of a
complaint alone does not make a person fugitive. It is only when a person takes
flight after the filing he becomes a fugitive.
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Corpus vs. People
FACTS:
Petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In
this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. Petitioner was charged for
malversation of public funds. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge
because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons. The
Sandiganbayan found him answerable for the misappropriation. In this petition for
review of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner contends that the absence
of a post-audit which could have established his guilt that he malversed the public
funds was not enough to overcome the presumption of his innocence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not presumption of the accuseds innocence was overcame.
HELD:
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal
omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing of an information formalversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been
established. The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds
or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not
been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and
conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public
whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
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People vs. Holgado
FACTS:
Holgado was charged in the CFI with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of
Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty." During trial accused pleaded guilty without a counsel. The trial
court found him guilty and convicted him for the crime of kidnapping and serious
detention. Accused now sought the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accuseds constitutional right to counsel was violated.
HELD:
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is
expressly provided in our Rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that: "If the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his
right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires theaid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the Court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney."
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has
four important duties to comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his
right to have attorney before being arraigned; (2) After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) If he
desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio
to defend him; and (4) If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the
court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record
discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney
nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire
whether or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable
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time to procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by the
court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead
guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right
to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so
framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the
court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed
so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of
his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him
if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
Note:
This decision by todays standards has been modified by Rule 115.An accused is always entitled to a counsel whether he likes it or not.
Rule 115 presents a case where non-lawyers may represent a person in court.
RULE 115
Rights of Accused
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SECTION 1. Rights of Accused at the Trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may,
however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his
bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either
party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him. aTEHCc
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses
and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law. (1a)
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RULE 113
Arrest
SECTION 1. Definition of Arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)
SECTION 2. Arrest; How Made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person
arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention. (2a)
SECTION 3. Duty of Arresting Officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing
the warrant to arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or
jail without unnecessary delay. (3a)
SECTION 4. Execution of Warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of
arrest was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten
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(10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period,
the officer to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge
who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state
the reasons therefor. (4a)
SECTION 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
SECTION 6. Time of Making Arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and atany time of the day or night. (6)
SECTION 7. Method of Arrest by Officer by Virtue of Warrant. When making an
arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of
the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest,
except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so
inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but
after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to
him as soon as practicable. (7a)
SECTION 8. Method of Arrest by Officer Without Warrant. When making an
arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his
authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has
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escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform
him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)
SECTION 9. Method of Arrest by Private Person. When making an arrest, a
private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him
and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of
an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or
forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform
him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a)
SECTION 10. Officer May Summon Assistance. An officer making a lawful
arrest may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in
effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in
effecting the arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to
himself. (10a)
SECTION 11. Right of Officer to Break into Building or Enclosure. An officer,
in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as
provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to
be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto,
after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)
SECTION 12. Right to Break Out from Building or Enclosure. Whenever an
officer has entered the building or enclosure in accordance with the precedingsection, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)
SECTION 13. Arrest After Escape or Rescue. If a person lawfully arrested
escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a
warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)
SECTION 14. Right of Attorney or Relative to Visit Person Arrested. Any
member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of
another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such
person in the jail or any other place of custody at any hour of the day or night.
Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can also
exercise the same right. (14a)
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Amion vs. Chiongson
FACTS:
A verified complaint was filed by Baltazar D. Amion charging Judge Roberto
S. Chiongson with ignorance of the law and oppression. The complaint was relative
to a murder case pending before his court, in which the complainant is the accused.
The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a
counsel de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latter's objection thereto on
the ground that he had his own retained counsel. In his comment, respondent
judge alleged that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused-
complainant is justified because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the
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latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to
appear during hearings. He averred that the records of the case will show that the
accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly
foul, to delay the resolution of the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may appoint a counsel de officio against the
accuseds will.
HELD:
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right
to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the
accused in a criminal prosecution. Even if we were to extend the application of the
concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute
and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the
predilection of the accused. As held in People vs. Barasina, the word "preferably"
under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive asto preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation,
will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the charter."
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the
accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with respect to his choice of counsel is
not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other
equally competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the
pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
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People vs. Quitlong
FACTS:
The information for murder filed against the appellants failed to avert that they
conspired with each other in the commission of the offense charged. But then, after
trial, the RTC convicted the appellants as charged, finding that there was
conspiracy between and among them in the commission of the crime and the
indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to
forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum was imposed. The conviction
was based on the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the evening of
October 20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were
confronting the fishball vendor who did not admit that he had short-changed
Calpito, eight men approached and aggressively confronted Calpito and Gosil.
Appellant Emilio then embraced Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong held Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively.
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Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed
Calpito at the left side of his body just below the nipple which became the cause of
his death.
In this appeal, the Quitlong brothers argued among others that the RTC erred in
finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in
the information or complaint. The trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be
deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information logically convey
that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing
the offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that
purpose." It held that no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the
existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts
of the malefactors and attendant circumstances. It concluded that the Quitlong
brothers acted in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-principals for the
death of Calpito.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation was violated.
HELD:Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court,
evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all
its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been
apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and
procedural requirements. The right to be informed of any such indictment is
likewise explicit in procedural rules.
The practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against
him has been explained in U .S. vs. Karelsen. These are: First, to furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause,
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
had.
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In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must
be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of times, place, names
(plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged.
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated must:
state the name of the accused;
the designation given to the offense by the statute;
a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party;
the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense has been committed.
In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must
set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake
his defense.
One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons
is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which,if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by
competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own
participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime.
Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information
whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts
of his co-accused as well.
It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the
words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
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conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the
language of the respective statutes defining them."
Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an
accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened
to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily
be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the
accused.
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Soriano Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal
of Quezon City. The case assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then
an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand
to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. The
entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan
charging Soriano for violating RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of the charge.
In this petition, petitioner argued that the facts presented to the
Sandiganbayan make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the
provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. According to the petitioner,The
prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of
P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received,
the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending
preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that
the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to
the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the
offense proved, if at all, is Direct Bribery." (The Supreme Court explained that the
facts of the case is indeed in resemblance for Direct Bribery and not in violation of
RA 3019)
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ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be convicted for the crime of Direct Bribery
instead if it would be found out that the Sandiganbayan committed error in
convicting him for violating RA 3019.
HELD:
In the light of the foregoing, Court agrees with the petitioner that it was
error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019. The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under
the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong.
A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly
makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation
of the right to be informed.
The Cour held that judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner
is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of thejudgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
Note:
It is therefore possible for a person to be convicted for crime B when it would later
be found out that the lower court erred in convicting him for crime A.
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RULE 120
Judgment
SECTION 1. Judgment; Definition and Form. Judgment is the adjudication by the
court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and the
imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. It must be written
in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law
upon which it is based. (1a)
SECTION 2. Contents of the Judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall
state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by
the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its
commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon theaccused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (2a)
SECTION 3. Judgment for Two or More Offenses. When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense. (3a)
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SECTION 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof . When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved. (4a)
SECTION 5. When an Offense Includes or is Included in Another. An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter. (5a)
SECTION 6. Promulgation of Judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading
it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is
absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the
clerk of court. DIETcC
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment
may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court havingjurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court
which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have
authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation
of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or
escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel. IEHTaA
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If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against
the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)
days from notice. (6a)
SECTION 7. Modification of Judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon
motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before
appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) CEDScA
SECTION 8. Entry of Judgment. After a judgment has become final, it shall be
entered in accordance with Rule 36. (8)
SECTION 9. Existing Provisions Governing Suspension of Sentence, Probation and
Parole not Affected by this Rule. Nothing in this Rule shall affect any existing
provisions in the laws governing suspension of sentence, probation or parole.
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Roco vs. Contreras
FACTS:
Cals Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The MTCC convicted petitioner for the violation charged. Petitioner went on appeal
to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right
to due process when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording
him of the right to present his evidence. The RTC vacated the MTCC decision and
remanded the cases to it for the reception of petitioner's evidence.
During the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a
"Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum",
requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal's Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them
certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999. The
MTCC issued an order granting petitioner's aforementioned request and accordingly
directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas. During the trial, the private
prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the
issuance of the requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by sayingthat judges order had become final and hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial
court issued an order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to
petitioner's request for the issuance of subpoenas.
In a resolution, the MTCC, this time thru Judge Edward B. Contreras (a different
judge), denied petitioner's request on the following grounds: (a) the requested
documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues
posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly
delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
Petitioner sought the matter to the RTC and then to the CA but to no avail.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum by respondent judge is violative of the
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constitutional right of the accused enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 14 (2) of the
Constitution.
HELD:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. In this jurisdiction,
there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum.
The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel
the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As
characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: The
subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad
testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the
witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents,
or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court
must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must bereasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow: In determining whether the production of the
documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it
is proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific
documents, or rather for specific proof and secondly, whether that proof is prima
facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial
examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted
with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be
enforced. Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., we held: Well-
settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a
'subpoena duces tecum,' it must appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the
book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material
to the issue before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document
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containing such evidence has been so designated or described that it may be
identified.
It thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the
relevancy and the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought
before it. Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be
subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and
readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. It is,
however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending
criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. We stress
that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.
The offense is already consummated from the very moment a person issues a
worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either by the drawer or
by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to
the drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie presumption that the
drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the
issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by
such payment. Here, petitioner would want it to appear that the books and
documents subject of his request for subpoena duces tecum are indispensable, or,
at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees. Based on the recordsbelow and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been
issued by Cal's Corporation with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips
of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the
corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents
requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this
Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of the appellate court. In short,
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the
attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay
the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.
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US vs. Javier
FACTS:
Doroteo Natividad fastened his carabao in his corral situated in the barrio of
Trapiches. On the following morning when he went to look after the animal, he
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found the gate to the corral open and that the carabao had disappeared. He
reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under
the leadership of sergeant Presa, on the 20th of November following, encountered
the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a
carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions.
On the following day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house
of one Pedro Monterola. The carabao was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one
which had been taken from his corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the possession of the accused. Accused was
charged and convicted by the trial court for theft of a large cattle.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the lower court erred in admitting
Exhibit B of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of
sergeant Presca regarding what he saw on Nov. 20. Appellant's argument is
predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses
face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5),
which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to
be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."
ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court committed an error in admitting exhibit B in
violation of accuseds right to confrontation.
HELD:
There are two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine Bill of
Rights which grants the right to confrontation. The first reason is the right of cross-
examination, and the second is that the tribunal may have before it the deportment
and appearance of the witness while testifying.
Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the statements
of Presa (now deceased), yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-
examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the mere
necessity alone of accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
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Talino vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not
needed and never made, on four government vehicles. The 4 cases were tried
jointly for all the accused until after the prosecution had rested, when Basilio,
Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed.
They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused
continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them,
Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his
participation in the questioned transactions. In due time, the Sandiganbayan
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rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang,
Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while
absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now
challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation
as guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners right to confrontatio