RD-A194 334 SKAC'S 3-52 RAITED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE AND THEIVPOSSIBILITY OF REMAINING IN NON FLYING DUTIES(U) AIRcoin.. MD STAFF COLL NAHMELL AFB AL R W SCOTT APR 98

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STUDENT REPORTSACS B52RATED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE AND

TH PSSIBITY OF RMtINING IN NON FLYING1t DUTIES

NAX ROALD W. sa=r 88-2365"insights in to tomorrow"...

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REPORT NUMBER 8-2365

TITLE SAC'S B-52 RATED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE AND THEPOSSIBILITY OF REMAINING IN NON-FLYING DUTIES

MAJOR RONALD W. SCOTT, USAFAUTHOR(S)

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR MICHAEL MUNK,

FACULY AD ISOR 3822 ACSC STUS

LT COL JEFF PARKER, HQ SAC/DPRORSPONSOR OFFUTT AFB, NEBRASKA

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542

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2.. This study addresses the possibility of allowing the excess B-52, rated, field gradeinventory currently in SAC, to remain in duties other than flying. It may mean missingthe 9 or 11 year checkpoint in gate requirements. It looks at the reasons why SAChas the excess and analyzes why it would be better for the LS Air Fbrce as a whole

to allow these field grade officers to remain away from their WS. The goal is to

produce a nuch more evenly distributed SAC resource and, at the same tine, help theAir Fbrce field grade short fall in certain support areas.)

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PREFACE

This study discusses options for the management ofrated field grade officers in the Strategic Air Command, inparticular those associated with the B-52. The basis forthis analysis is SAC is overmanned in field gradeauthorizations in some specialties and they have a largepool of field grade officers in the rated supplement (orother jobs not associated with their MWS) scheduled toreturn to flying duties. Although there are favorablepoints for keeping rated personnel identified with aparticular weapon system, the question of the good of the USAir Force overall should be addressed.

My experience in SAC rated officer assignements at theAir Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) often involvedthis exact concern. When rated officers complete a touraway from their major weapon system (MWS), the nextassignment is usually back to the MWS to either re-indentifyor complete gate requirements. If there is no requirement,then why bring them back? Within AFMPC and HO SAC/DPRORthere is certain recognition of the problem, but no formalpolicy exists of how to deal with it.

The issue of the management of rated officers wouldinvolve an entire paper itself; the management of just therated officers at one bomb wing could be quite anundertaking. This paper does not attempt to do that orsuggest MPC and SAC change the current gate managementprogram. It does is propose a way to manage this excessfield grade inventory until, through attrition, the excessis gone. It is a short term solution and will not adverslyaffect SAC B-52 manning now or in the future. Beforeimplementing the suggestions, consideration should be givento gate management, field grade manning and overall manningin the B-52. The discussion following does so and thenoffers possible suggestions.

Many people had a hand in providing the information forthis study. First of all, thanks to all the personnelexperts in the bomber assignment section at AFMPC. Withouttheir cooperation, this would not have been possible. I havenever worked with a better group of guys. Next, the folksat HQ SAC/DPROR, Lt Col Jeff Parker and his crew. A trueteam of professionals. In addition, I would like to expressmy appreciation and offer a special thanks to Major MikeMunk, my project advisor, for his assistance andprofessional advise. Finally, to my wife Carol, thanks forher concern and support, and to my sons Jason and Sean,thanks for putting up with this.

iii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Ronald W. Scott came from HQ AFMPC where heserved from July 1983 to July 1987 as an action officer forSAC rated officer assignments; Chief of the Bomber Sectionand finally Branch Chief of the Bomber/Tanker AssignmentTeams. While at MPC he was responsible for insuring themanning of SAC's newest MWS, the B-lB bomber, and wasinstrumental in such programs as the FB-111 transfer and theKC-135R model build. His operational experience includestours in the B-52 at Minot AFB ND and Barksdale AFB LA as anavigator and radar navigator. Following his tour atBarksdale AFB, Major Scott was assigned to MPC. Major Scottis a distinguised graduate from OTS and was commissioned in1974. He completed his undergraduate work in businessadministration at the University of Texas, Arlington andreceived his MBA from Louisiana Tech.

i

ivi

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_____-.TABLE OF CONTENTS -

Preface ....... .......................................... iAbout the Author ......................................... ivTable of Contents ......................................... vExecutive Summary ........................................ vi

CHAPTER ONE--INTRODUCTION ................................. I

CHAPTER TWO--BOMBER RESOURCEBackground .............................................. 3Requirements ............................................ 4Summary ................................................. 5

CHAPTER THREE--AVIATION CAREER INCENTIVE PAYUtilization of Rated Officers ........................... 6Gate Situation in SAC ................................... 7Summary ................................................. 8

CHAPTER FOURSpecific Requirements .................................. 10Summary ................................................ 13

CHAPTER FIVEConsiderations .......................................... 14Concusions .............................................. 15Recommendations ........................................ 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 17

Accesio, ForNTJS CRA&,"

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4 those of the author and should not beconstrued as carrying official sanction.

"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 88-2365

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RONALD W. SCOTT

TITLESAC'S B-52 RATED FIELD GRADE RESOURCE ANDTHE POSSIBILITY OF REMAINING IN NON-FLYINGDUTIES

I. Purpose: To determine if B-52 field grade manningwill support allowing senior officers (majors and lieutenantcolonels) to remain in duties other than operational flying,to explain the need for such a program, and address thebenefits of such a program.

II. Problem- SAC is experiencing an overage in fieldgrade authorizations in operational units, and evenly mannedor better in authorized slots in headquarters positions.Field grade officers are returning to overmanned units fromstaff positions to re-identify with their weapon system but,once they are back, the units are finding it difficult tokeep them trained. This input of additional experience willaffect future sustainment and stability. ___

III. Data: The excess in SAC's field grade manning is aresult of over absorbtion and the Vietnam build. Asoperational units became overmanned, the excess was allowedto fill other Air Force requirements. Now MPC and SAC are

vi

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- CONTINUED

returning these rated officer to re-identify with their MLJSor complete gate requirements. Many of the positions theyare coming from are short in field grade manning; theofficers could better serve the Air Force by remaining wherethey are. In addition, an input of field grade officers notneeded would produce a false requirement for sustainment andaffect long term manning.

--IV. Conclusions: SAC could, without violating anyregulations or adversly affect manning, allow certain fieldgrade officers to remain away from their MJS. The programshould be implemented as soon as possible. In the shortterm, the rated supplement will be at a false high until theexcess has phased out through attrition.

V. Recommendations: Each specialty should be handledsepartely, based on the needs of the Air Force and SAC.Each specialty has unique qualifications and cannot beinterchanged. Aircraft commanders should have the mostliberal policy, based on the excessive inventory. Radarnavigators will have to be more closely managed, but theinventory still supports some remaining away from the MWS.Electronic warfare officers will be the most difficult. Thepopulation as a whole is very young and the experience andguidance are needed. Until the unit requirements arefilled, the viable field grade officers scheduled to returnto the 1WS should do so. These are not revealingrecommendations but, hopefully, they have provided some goodrationale for why SAC and MPC should manage their fieldgrade rated force a little differently. The recommendationswill produce a much more evenly distributed SAC resource.

vii

Chapter One

INTRODUCTI ON

The Strategic Air Command (SAC) is currently overmannedin some field grade authorizations in operational units, andevenly manned or better in the authorized slots at theheadquarters (15:--). The resource managers at Headquarters,Military Personnel Center (MPC) are facing a unique problem.Field grade officers are completing tours away from theirmajor weapon system (MWS) and due to return; some havecompleted their flying requirements, some have not. Theproblem is, these returning officers are, in most cases4filling a critically manned position and are returning toovermanned units. SAC, at times, does not have enough seatsin the aircraft (8-52) to keep them trained.

During the past fours years MPC has tried to evenlydistribute these returning field graders as equitably aspossible. However, in the past year especially, the numberreturning has increased to the point some units find itdifficult to gainfully employ them.

This paper is not intended as a guide to employ thesereturning officers, but as a suggestion of a better way topossibly manage the resource in the short term--3 to 5years. Proposals will not adversly impact long term manningbut, as will be shown later, will improve it.

The intent of this project is to examine the currentpopulation in SAC and analyze it from a gate and anauthorized/assigned perspective. Does SAC have theresources to support its requirements? Can SAC afford toallow field graders to remain in duties away from the MWS?Is there a gate problem in SAC that would prevent thesereturning officers from remaining in these duties? Forexample, would a large number of officers fail the 9 or 11year checkpoint should this suggestion be implemented? Ifso, would it impact the rated force as a whole? In order toaccomplish this, the following areas will be analyzed:Chapter 2 will provide some background; how SAC got intothis positon and a brief discussion on requirements;

Chapter 3 will discuss Aviation Career Incentive Pay

(ACIP), the utilization of rated officers and an analysis of

the gate situation in SAC; Chapter 4 addresses field grade

and specific manning requirements. Finally, Chapter 5 willsummarize and offer some suggestions.

2

I

Chapter Two

BOMBER RESOURCE

BACKGROUND

The intent of this chapter is to give background onmanacement of the bomber rated force and how it pertains toallowing bomber officers the opportunity to broadenprofessionally in other career fields. This chapter willbegin with a short history of the Rated Distribution andTraining Management process, discussing how it has evolvedover the past two decades. It will explain some of theterminology and then discuss bomber rated management today.The intent of this discussion is to provide a back-ground of what has transpired in the past, what is current-ly affecting the bomber force and its impact on allowingbomber resources to remain in support duties.

In the late 1960s the bomber force was relatively bal-anced. Then, due to our commitment to the growing conflictin Southeast Asia, a higher requirement for additionalpilots and navigators was necessary. In response to thisrequirement, the Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT)production rate was increased (9:--).

Then, in the mid-1970s, the US began a drawdown of itsinvolvement in Southeast Asia and subsequently our rated re-quirement was reduced. However, UFT rates remained high andthere was a large number of pilots and navigators cominginto a system that could no longer absorb them. The bombermanagement system did not react to this. The result of thehigh UFT rate and the reduced requirement was a surplus ofpilots, navigators and electronic warfare officers (EW.JO)(9:--).

The surplus was accounted for by increasing the statedrequirements by more than 2000 in 1978 (9:--). The majorityof this increase was in the rated staff and training author-izations. Also, UFT rates were reduced to the lowest levelin 30 years. In 1979 retention went to an all time low,

3

* * I

however, in a year that was the worst ever, the bomber forcewas z ffected the least. In a time when other majorcommands, the Tactical Air Force (TAF) in particular, werehit hard and produced somewhat of a deficit, the bomberworld kept its surplus, and SAC has yet to recover (5:--).

Current retention figures indicate somewhat of animprovement in the surplus; this, in combination with theB-IB build, has helped significantly. In some specialities,radar navigators in particular, we are facing a possibleshortage. However, currently all SAC bomber units areovermanned in all positions - in addition, all positions,except EWO, are overmanned in field grade authorizations(6:--).

Many of the support fields are experiencing a shortageof field grade officers (11:--); SAC is over in field grademanning. The Military Personnel Center (MPC) and SAC RatedOfficer Assignments are working hard to resolve this fieldgrade surplus problem in the operational area but, in theforseeable furture, SAC is going to be in a position ofmanaging from an overage and the Air Force is going to be ina position of filling more requirements than it has people;the two should complement each other.

REQUI REMENTS

In order to ensure a smooth flow of UFT productionrates over a five year period (coinciding with the Five-YearDefense Plan) a plan was developed known as the RatedManagement (RDTM) concept (10:2). Basically, the conceptties officers to a major weapon system group by using a RDTMcode. For example, an officer in the bomber group would becoded "E." The second letter identifies the specificaircraft. A B-52 resource would be coded "EC." The RDTMconcept combines similar mission/type aircraft and providesa basis for effective management of all rated resources.One of the most important basis of RDTM is the area ofrequirements (10:3).

"Rated requirements are statements of the Air Forceneed for pilots and navigators (lieutenant throughlieutenant colonel). They are published following everymajor budget exercise and are based on the funded Air Forceprogram as of that exercise." (10:3) Bomber requirements.can be divided into three main categories: force, pipeline,and training. The composition of these categories in lightof this study is not an issue, it is to show requirementsfor each MWS. Present and expected future inventory showrated requirements must be guarded closly. Because of theextrordinary expense associated with training a rated

4

officer, it is not cost effective to use them in jobs wherea rated presence is not needed. However, MPC has determinedthere is a need for rated presence in some support areas andthis presence is known as the rated supplement. MPC hasestablished a certain level, based on extensive studies, ofthe rated supplement; it is neither a ceiling nor a floorbut, determined by force availability and force requirements(16:z - ) .

SUMMARY

This chapter was designed to give some background onSAC's bomber rated management process, a short history onthe bomber force and a brief description on the evolution ofthe RDTM concept. Next the requirements, as developed underthe RDTM concept, was presented. While realizing thenecessity of keeping rated personnel flying, the ratedpresence in support fields has been re-evaluated and it hasbeen determined we do need a rated presence in certainfields.

5

Chapter Three

AVIATION CAREER INCENTIVE PAY (ACIP)

Many times officers ask "Why do I have to remain flyingfor any certain amount of time?" This chapter will explainand, in the process, will discuss the ACIP and the Air Forceview on completion of flying requirements--or gates (theutilization standard for rated officers).

UTILIZATION OF RATED OFFICERS

In 1974 Congress passed the Aviation Career IncentiveAct (ACIA). It was designed to impose a standard to manageall rated officers (pilots and navigators). The standard iscommonly referred to as the "gate." It requires ratedofficers "... be assigned operational flying duties forspecific amounts of time by certain career checkpoints tomaintain their entitlement to continuous aviation careerincentive pay when assigned to nonqualifying duty." (3:12)The spirit of the law requires that an officer must performat least 6 years of operational flying by the 12th year ofaviation sevice. Once an officer has completed this 6years, he can be selected for duties other than flying.

In addition, the Air Force has established a policy ofmanaging as many rated officers as possible to 9 years ofoperational flying by the 18th year of aviation service. Inorder to qualify for ACIP until 25 years of officer service(the maximum allowable), rated officers must fly 11 yearsoperational by 18 years of aviation service; not an AirForce policy. In summation, UFT graduates will fly untiltheir first gate (6 years) is complete; the Air Force goalis to manage as many members as possible to 9 years and, asrequirements dictate, try to get as many as possible 11years of operational flying by 18 years of aviation service(5:--).

6

GATE SITUATION IN SAC

An examination by MPC in early 1987 revealed SAC is notcurrently facing a gate management problem. The purpose ofthe study was to see if SAC, due to its large inventory, hadthe capability to get their resource 11 years of flying andto reveal how many were currently in danger of violating oneof their gates. Unintentionally, the study showed SAC couldallow some officers to bust their 9 or 11 year checkpointwithout fear of impacting experience levels or stability.In fact, as will be explained later, it would help. Of thetotal bomber pilots and navigators the following datareflects SACs current gate situation (4--):

TOTAL BOMBER PILOTS: 2602Missed first gate: 0Missed second gate: 2Missed third gate: 38

Note: There are 60 pilots currently in jobs other thanoperational that must return to fly in order to meettheir 2d gate.

TOTAL BOMBER NAVS: 2787 (Includes EWOs)Missed first gate: 0Missed second gate: 8Missed third gate: 42

Note: There are 17 navigators currently in jobs other thanoperational that must return to fly in order to meettheir 2d gate. Above includes EWO.

In addition, the following figures indicate the gateinventory SAC has and the total inventory based onrating (RTG) and weapon system group (WSG), an explanationwill follow (4:--):

----------------------RTG-P WSG-BOMBER ----------------------

YEAR SUP INV GATE INV FLEX TOT INV

87 3411 1992 42 244288 3631 1924 47 240989 3516 1902 45 239490 2953 1895 36 234591 2661 1895 29 2314

7

------------ RTG-N WSG-BOMBER ---------------------

YEAR SUP INV GATE IN) FLEX TOT IN)

87 3927 2739 30 304288 4357 2734 37 303589 4400 2722 38 309090 3880 2688 31 310791 3551 2653 25 3107

The first category, SUP INV, refers to supportable in-ventory, or the number of personnel who can acquire theirgates. These people are in both flying and nonflying jobsand can rotate between the two. The GATE INV is the numberof flying positions that are necessary to allow thesupportable inventory. The FLEX category is most important.It shows the flexibility of movement an inventory has in andout of flying positions and still achieve gate requirements.The higher the FLEX the more movement can occur withoutconcern for gates. The lower the FLEX, the force must bemanaged very carefully. It, in effect, depicts how closethe supportable inventory is to the gate inventory. Thetotal inventory is simply all flying and non-flyingpositions (4:--).

What the above reflects, from a purely statisticalperspective, is the supportable inventory and the flex-ibility figures indicate SAC is not facing a gate managementproblem; they have the capability to allow every ratedofficer the opportunity to acquire all their gates. SACcould, in fact, still allow a certain number to flow backand forth without regard to the current field grade officersaway from flying duties. The FLEX category indicates now isthe time to leave officers in positions other than flying,should SAC choose to do so. However, in FY 91 SAC willbegin to experience considerable flexibility problems inboth the pilot and navigator force; this is primarily due toforecast force cuts. By that time, the field grade problemshould begin to ease through attrition.

SUMMARY

This chapter dealt with aviation career incentive payand the current gate status in SAC. When consideringwhether or not to allow an officer to remain in duties otherthan flying or operational, where he/she will not acquiregate time in, these two factors should be salient points.The intent here is to show SAC is acheiving its gatemanagement goal and why SAC brings people back to fly. Italso points out SAC could afford to allow some officers to

violate their 9 or 11 year checkpoint without impact on theSAC rated force. They are important factors in the overallhealth and readiness of SAC and in individual careers.

9

Chapter Four

SPECIFIC REQUXIREMENTS

One of the reasons SAC should not be so quick to returnthese experienced field graders is sustainment. Sustainmentis the ability to train, experience, and maintain aninventory capable of meeting stated requirements (10:7).This chapter will explain the need for new inputs isnecessary to sustain the force and why SAC does notnecessarily need to return all of its field grade officers.

It is possible to compute how fast a particular forceneeds to be replaced and it can be figured in several ways.The two most common are the Total Active Rated Service(TARS) and the Cumulative Continuation Rates (CCR). Bothmethods are used by MPC. How fast a force turns overdetermines the number of inputs required to sustain it(11:--).

There are many factors considered in the computation ofthe TARS of a particular MWS. Retention, retirement,mortality and other reasons for leaving the rated force areconsidered. Stated in a simple fashion, it is the averagetime of rated service for the population being examined.TARS is affected by year group size, as in the huge buildduring the Vietnam conflict which will become retirementeligible during the next 3-5 years. In addition, TARSfollows closely with the retention of the 6-11 group, themost important factor. CCR is used in retention andprediction studies. CCR is a percentage of the ratedofficers entering the 6th year of rated service who willcomplete their 11th year (4:--). The following indicatesthe TARS and CCR for SAC at end 1987 and an average over thepast five years, 1982 - 1987 (4:--):

10

, i .... ,, • • ,

IW r fA .WFr

PILOTS NAVSTARS (End '87) 13.3 14.0CCR (End '87) 58.5 70.0

AVG TARS 13.9 14.2AVG CCR 67.7 73.6

Note: Pilots includes co-pilots and Nays includeRadar Nays and EWOs.

The preceding figures indicate SAC does not have aproblem with stability. Both the TARS and the CCR show aslight decline in the past year, but that can be explainedby the extrordinary retention rate the Air Force experiencedover the period of the average. That, combined with someretention problems over the past year, has caused a slightdecline.

It is very difficult to predict the inventory require-ments, but a sustainment rate can be determined by dividingthe total requirements by the TARS; this would determine therate at which UFT would have to produce rated officers inorder to sustain the requirement. The possibility toconsider is the sustainment rate may not equal what theparticular force is able to accept. The ability of a MWS toabsorb is the limiting factor.

The "ability of a given force structure to accept newinputs without causing adverse impact to the force itself isabsorbtion." (10:15) The three main factors to consider incomputing an absorbtion rate are experience, stability andactual ability to train more inputs.

SAC's absorption policy is a function of availabletraining seats as well as self-imposed experience andstability goals. In the past, SAC has been willing toabsorb beyond its requirements, and in doing so has built anexcess inventory (this in combination with the Vietnambuild). In order to gainfully employ this excess, SAC hasalso been willing to allow members to leave the rated forceto work in other career fields--career broaden. In themeantime, the absorbtion has continued beyond requirements;TARS and CCR are high, indicating good stability, and thefigures below show experience is at a healthy level (12:--):

POSITION EXP REQ EXP LEVEL (AVG)A/C 56% 86%RN 56. 79%EW 45% 68%

The continued over-absorption policy SAC employed inthe past (only this year has SAC changed this policy) built

11

an excessive inventory, but because SAC allowed people toleave the rated force, it did not affect experience orstability. SAC was able to train and experience the forcethey were bringing on board because they were allowing aportion of their rated force to exit on the experienced end.These people who were allowed to leave have been promoted tofield grade, completed their tour away from the 1114S and arescheduled to come back. An influx of excess field gradewould create a management problem. The chart below is areflection of the field grade manning in the operationalunits currently in SAC, they indicate known gains and losses(6:--):

POSITION 05 04

AUTH/ASSIGN AC 51/70 169/213AUTH/ASSIGN RN 42/37 161/163AUTH/ASSIGN EW 16/7 109/35

The above numbers reflect combined 8th and 15th AirForce numbers and do not include co-pilots or navigators.They indicate a large overage in aircraft commanders; abouteven in radar navigators and under in electronic warfareofficers. This shortage of field grade officers in the EWOarea is a reflection of the population as a whole. They arevery-young; the one specialty that could use field gradeinputs.

In addition to these numbers, the following areforecast gains from the May and June Rated Officers ReviewBoard (RORB), the rated people coming available forassignments in those months. They are not reflected in theabove figures (13:--).

PILOTS NAVIGATORS

MAY AVAIL 20 7JUN AVAIL 41 29

The above figures are not unusual for summer rotationassignments and the next three months of availables shouldbe about the same size. What is important about thesenumbers are the characteristics. In the May availables 16of the 20 pilots are field grade, 9 are Lt Colonel; 5 of the7 navigators are field grade, 2 are Lt Colonel. The Junefigures are worse. Of the 41 pilots, 35 are field grade, 20are Lt Colonel and of the 29 navigators, 23 are field gradeand 10 are Lt Colonel. The navigatior numbers include bothRN and EWO.

12

The preceding figures pertain to field grade officersonly; the following figures are overall manning in SAC(6:--) :

15TH AF and 8TH AF(Total)AC (AUTH/ASGN) 505/546RN (AUTH/ASGN) 572/576EW (AUTH/ASGN) 503/576

What do these numbers mean? The TARS, CCR andexperience levels indicate a very stable experienced forcethat, at the present time is turning over at about the rightrate. An injection of field grade officers into a forcethat is already overmanned in field grade and overmannedoverall, will create a false TARS, CCR and experience level,thereby causing a false sustainment figure.

This injection, primarily in the summer months, willcontinue to occur until this huge overage of field gradeofficers begin to disappear due mainly to attrition.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the sustainment of SAC's B-52force. The variables MPC and SAC considers when trying toarrive at a sustainment figure were introduced. TARS, CCRand experience levels are all factors affecting the rate atwhich a force must absorb in order to sustain itself.Unnecessary inputs of field grade officers produce falserequirements for sustainment and increase the experiencefigures. This affects long term manning by showing no needfor additional inuputs. Finally, the field grade manningin SAC B-52 units and the forecast gains and the affectsthese inputs could have on SAC's 8-52 force were shown.

13

..... ...

Chapter Five

CONSI DERATIONS

As briefly alluded to in a previous chapter, the AirForce as a whole began building for the Vietnam conflict andmuch too late real ized the UFT production rate was too highfor the requirements after the conflict ended. SAC was oneof the commands who agreed to continue to absorb this excessbeyond requirements, the reason is of no relevance to thispaper. On top of an already excessive inventory, SAC addedeven more. In the early years this was not a problembecause the increase could be initially trained and thenallowed to move on to other areas; SAC was essentiallybanking this resource until needed, anticipating the buildof a new MWS. What could not be forseen was the delay. Hadthe B-I come on line when originally planned, SAC might nothave the excess field grade resource, at least it would bemore evenly distributed between the B-52 and the B-1B.

What is most apparent in the numbers presented is theimbalance in the field grade manning among the differentspecialties. There is a large supplement in the AC category(both field grade and overall), approximately even in RNs,and, although the EWs are overmanned, they are significantlyshort in the field grade structure. Unfortunately, thespecialties are not interchangeable. This imbalance is notdue to improper management, but to several factors such asretention, UFT production, promotion rates, etc. Again, howthe imbalance occured is not important now, but what to dowith it.

Each specialty should be managed separately, and MPCand SAC are currently doing so in an excellent manner thatshould prevent a future imbalance. What can be done withthe current situation? As presented, there is nothing toprevent SAC from allowing the field grade officers currentlyin other fields from remaining there, in fact a large numberwould be better utilized. The rated supplement positionssome of these field grade officers currently hold arecritically short in field grade manning. These career areas

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would be very willing to retain them (11:--). By allowingthese officers to remain away from flying requirements (eachwould have to be reviewed individually) SAC would be solvingtheir field grade problem and helping the support problem.This could not be a temporary move. Unless there is anabsolute necessity to bring these field grade officers back,they should remain there until retirement, or existingrequirements change. This agreement would have to be madebetween SAC and the using command when the assignment orextension is made. The problem would be solved throughattrition, over the next 3 to 5 years.

CONCLUSI ON

This paper has examined SACs rated force to evaluatewhether it could allow certain field grade officers toremain away from the MWS. SAC could, without violating anyregulations (ie. AFR 36-20), or affecting manning and wouldbe helping the Air Force as a whole.

The solution would, by no means, be simple. The mostdifficult intangible to overcome will be the action officersat MPC and SAC ingrained mind set that every rated officermust return to the MWS to complete 7 and 11 years of flyingor re-identify with the MLWS. If the requirement exists,then they should return; if not, they should be allowed toremain where the Air Force can best .utilize them. The ratedsupplement numbers would be at a false high for the next 3to 5 years until this excess has phased out throughattrition. Then, once this problem is corrected, carefulmanagement of the current force will prevent it fromoccurring again.

RECOMMENDATI ON

As suggested, each specialty should be handledseparately and on a case-by-case basis. Aircraft commandersare the most abundant and can have the greatest flexibility.Until the numbers begin to improve (and they must betracked), SAC should be very will ing to allow them to remainin the positions other than operational requirements. Infact, SAC should insist whenever possible. There will becircumstances when the individual will not want to remainout of flying and these should be handled on a case by casebas i s.

The radar navigators are not as simple but handled muchthe same way. SAC should not be so permissive but, on theother hand, do not close the door completely. The fieldgrade manning in the RN positions is perfect right now;there is no need to return the excess to the MIWS,

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especially It col. The resource now will perpetuate itselfand the number of field graders currently in operationalduties desiring to broaden should be allowed to do so on acase by case basis, with a tendancy to be on the restrictiveside. Care must be taken to insure junior captains are notallowed to.exit to early, the 10 year point should be theearliest time to consider. To do so will create the samesituation the AC resource is facing.

The most difficult will be the EWOs. As much aspossible, until the field grade requirements are met, majors(and to a certain extent It cols) should be returned to theMWS upon completion of their tour. Of course there will beextenuating cases, and these should be handled accordingly.The junior force the EWs are currently facing will matureand produce the field grade resource necessary in the next 3to 5 years and allow a relaxation on professionalbroaden i ng.

These are not easy tasks, but they are not impossible.Following the above recommendations will produce a much moreevenly distributed SAC resource.

h

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCES CITED

Official Documents

1. Rated Management Division, Deputy Chief of Staff forPlans and Operations, HQ USAF. Rated ManagementDocument. Vol I. Washington, DC: October, 1985.

2. Rated Management Division, Deputy Chief of Staff forPlans and Operations, HO USAF. Rated ManagementDocument, Vol II. Washington, DC:October, 1985.

3. US Department of the Air Force. Officer Assignements.AF Regulation 36-20. Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Office, 1986.

Unpublished Materials

4. Becker, Jeff, Maj, USAF. "Gate Management." Briefingpresented to HO SAC/DPROR, March 1987.

5. Scott, Ronald W., Maj, USAF. "Spread-the-Word."Briefing presented to operational units uponvisit by HQ AFMPC/DPMROS.

6. Holoviak, Samual J., Maj, USAF. "Squadron AccountingModel." Document used by action officers atHQ AFMPC/DPMROS to account for operationalresources.

7. Jones, Robert R., Maj, USAF. "The Fighter Pilot ForceSustainment-Absorbtion Dilemma." Research Studyprepared at the Air Command and Staff College, AirUniversity, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1982

S. Nelson, George, Lt Col, USAF. "Plans for IncreasingUPT Rates." Talking Paper, Washington, DC,16 June 1983.

9. O'Neil, Michael, Lt Col, USAF. "Undergraduate FlyingTraining Rates." Talking Paper, Washington, DC,16 June 1983.

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CONTINUED10. Scaperotto, Charles, Mai, USAF and Ulmer, Michael, Mai,

USAF. "The Fundamentals of Fighter Assignments: AGuide for the New Assignment Officer." ReseachStudy prepared at Air Command and Staff College,Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,April 1987.

Other Sources

11. Becker, Jeff, Mai, USAF. Force Analysis Branch, HOAFMPC/DPMYAF, Randolph AFB, Texas. Telecon,December 1987.

12. Hannon, John, Capt, USAF. Bomber Assignments Branch,HO AFMPC/DPMROS, Randolph AFB, Texas. Telecon,December 1987.

13. Holoviak, Samual J., Maj, USAF. Bomber AssignmentsBranch HQ AFMPC/DPMROS, Randolph AFB, Texas.Telecon, December 1987.

14. Klienertz, Dale, Ma, USAF. Bomber Assigments BranchHQ, AFMPC/DPMROS, Randolph AFB, Texas. Telecon,December 1987.

15. Parker, Jeffrey, Lt Col, USAF. Chief, SAC Rated OfficeAssignments, HQ SAC/DPROR, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.Interview, November 1987.

16. Trogdon, Gary A., Capt, USAF. Chief, Rated SupplementSection, HO AFMPC/DPMROM, Randolph AFB, Texas.Telecon, November 1987.

17. Wong, Bruce, Maj, USAF. Chief, Bomber AssignmentsSection, HO SAC/ DPROR, Offutt AFB, Nebraska.Telecon, November 1987.

B. RELATED SOURCES

Other Sources

18. US Air Force Military Personnel Center: Computer ATLASStatistical Summary Inquiry, Number 18146,11 September 1987. HQ AFMPC/DPMYAF, RandolphAFB, Texas.

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