graham oppy (1991). semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions

19
GRAHAM OPPY SEMANTICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS* (Received 4 April, 1991) Nathan Salmon (1986a) (1986b) (1989) and Scott Soames (1987) (1988) defend a neo-Russellian account of the semantics of proposi- tional attitude ascriptions in which senses and modes of presentation play no part. They also defend an under-developed pragmatic theory in which senses and modes of presentation do play an important role. Graeme Forbes (1987a) (1987b) defends a neo-Fregean account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in which senses and modes of presentation play a crucial part. He contends that the view which is defended by Salmon and Soames is not really an alternative to the view which he defends. (Hence, I suppose, his view is not an alternative to their vi ew, either. ) There are two issues which I wish to take up. First, in sections I--V, I explore the question whether there are really any important differ- ences between the view defended by Salmon and Soames, and the view little which distinguishes between them. Second, in sections VI--X, I take up the somewhat neglected ques- tion of how theories of propositional attitude ascriptions in the Frege- Russell tradition ought to construe the notions of sense and mode of presentation. In his review of Salmon (1986a), Forbes (1987b) claims that it is possible to see the theory which Salmon advances in that book as a notational variant of the neo-Fregean theory of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions which Forbes (1987a) defends. Against this, Jose Branquinho (1990) claims that: "[While] there must be some sense in which Salmon's account could be seen as invoking the Philosophical Studies 67:1--18, 1992. 9 1992 Klu wer Aca der nic Publ ish ers Printed in the Net her lan ds

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Page 1: Graham Oppy (1991). Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

8/11/2019 Graham Oppy (1991). Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/graham-oppy-1991-semantics-for-propositional-attitude-ascriptions 1/18

GRAHAM OPPY

S E M A N T I C S F O R P R O P O S I T I O N A L A T T I T U D E

A S C R I P T I O N S *

(Received 4 April, 1991)

Nathan Salmon (1986a) (1986b) (1989) and Scott Soames (1987)

(1988) defend a neo-Russellian account of the semantics of proposi-

tional attitude ascriptions in which senses and modes of presentation

play no part. They also defend an under-developed pragmatic theory in

which senses and modes of presentation do play an important role.

Graeme Forbes (1987a) (1987b) defends a neo-Fregean account of

the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in which senses and

modes of presentation play a crucial part. He contends that the view

which is defended by Salmon and Soames is not really an alternative to

the view which he defends. (Hence, I suppose, his view is not an

alternative to their view, either.)

There are two issues which I wish to take up. First, in sections I--V,

I explore the question whether there are really any important differ-

ences between the view defended by Salmon and Soames, and the view

defended by Forbes. The conclusion which I defend is that there is very

little which distinguishes between them.

Second, in sections VI--X, I take up the somewhat neglected ques-

tion of how theories of propositional attitude ascriptions in the Frege-

Russell tradition ought to construe the notions of sense and mode of

presentation.

In his review of Salmon (1986a), Forbes (1987b) claims that it is

possible to see the theory which Salmon advances in that book as a

notational variant of the neo-Fregean theory of propositional attitudes

and propositional attitude ascriptions which Forbes (1987a) defends.

Against this, Jose Branquinho (1990) claims that: "[While] there must

be some sense in which Salmon's account could be seen as invoking the

Philosophical Studies 67:1--18, 1992.

9 1992KluwerAcadernic Publishers Printed in the Netherlands

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G R A H A M O P PY

s a m e k i n d o f c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s a s t h e n e o - F r e g e a n t h e o r y . . .

F o r b e s n o t a t io n a l v a r i a ti o n c la i m c a n n o t b e a c c e p t e d . (p . 2 2 ) I t h i n k

t h a t B r a n q u i n h o i s c o r r e c t t o a r g u e t h a t t h e

ctu l

c la im w h i c h F o r b e s

defends in h i s r ev iew i s de fec t ive . However , I a l so th ink tha t the

i n t u i t i o n w h i c h m o t i v a t e d F o r b e s ' c l a i m i s p e r f e c t l y s o u n d . S e c t i o n s

I I - - V o f m Y p a p e r a r e a d e f e n c e o f th i s p o s it i o n .

lI

I f w e a l l o w o u r s e l v e s a li tt le t e r m i n o l o g i c a l f r e e d o m , w e m a y r e p r e s e n t

o n e c e n t r a l c l a im w h i c h S a l m o n ( 1 9 8 6 a ) d e f e n d s a s f o ll o w s :

(S) ~ be l ieve s that p-7 is t rue i f f (3x) (A grasp s that Ru ssel t ian

p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p b y m e a n s o f t h e S a l m o n i a n g u i s e x a n d

B E L ( A , t h e R u s s e l l i a n p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p , t h e S a l m o n i a n

guise x) )

w h e r e B E L i s a t e r n a r y r e l a t i o n w h i c h h o l d s b e t w e e n p o s s e s s o r s o f

p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t ti t u d e s, R u s s e l li a n p r o p o s i t i o n s , a n d w a y s o f g r a s p in g

Russe l l i an p ropos i t ions (= Sa lmon ian gu i ses ) .

S i m i l a r l y , w e m a y r e p r e s e n t t h e F r e g e a n p o s t u l a t e f o r w h i c h F o r b e s

( 1 9 8 7 b ) c l a im s e q u i v a l e n c e a s f o l lo w s :

( F ) ~ i s b e l i e v e d b y A t o o b t a i ~ is t r u e i ff ( 3 x ) ( A t h in k s o f t h e

s t a te o f a ff a ir s th a t p b y m e a n s o f t h e F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n x

a n d B ( A , t h e F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n x ) a n d t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s

t h a t p is t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n x )

w h e r e B i s a b i n a r y r e la t io n w h i c h h o l d s b e t w e e n p o s s e s s o r s o f p r o p o -

s it io n a l a t ti t u d e s a n d F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n s .

I f we: ( i) iden t i fy Russ el l ian p rop os i t io ns wi th s ta tes o f af fa i rs ; ( ii )

iden t i fy F regean p ropos i t ions w i th Sa lmon ian gu i ses ; ( i i i ) iden t i fy the

r e l a ti o n o f g r a s p i n g - a - R u s s e l l i a n - p r ~ 1 7 6 1 7 6 1 7 6 1 7 6

gu ise w i th the r e la t ion o f th ink ing-o f -a - s ta te -o f -a f f a i r s -by -means -o f -a -

F r e g e a n - p r o p o s i t i o n ; a n d ( i v ) i d e n t i f y t h e r e l a t i o n B E L ( A , p , x ) w i t h

the p r od uc t o f the r e la t ions B (A , x ) and C (p , x ) - - w her e C (p , x ) i f f

t h e s t a t e o f a ff a ir s t h a t p i s th e c o n t e n t o f th e F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n x - -

then the r igh t hand s ides o f (S ) and (F ) a re a l so iden t ica l . In o the r

w o r d s , g i v e n t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y u n p r o b l e m a t i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s , S a l m o n ' s

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SEMANTICS FOR ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS 3

theory attributes the same truth-value to a sentence rA believes that p7

which Forbes theory attributes to the sentence ~ is believed by A to

obtain ~(and

vice versa .

However, as Branqhinho in effect points out, this does not show that

the two theories are notational variants. The crucial difficulty is that,

even after the proposed series of identifications, the left-hand sides of

(S) and (F) differ. In a familiar -- though perhaps objectionable --

vocabulary, one might say this: Salmon s account entails the same

distribution of truth-values to

de d ic to

propositional attitude ascriptions

which Forbes account gives to the corresponding

de re

propositional

attitude ascriptions. Less problematically, we can certainly say that the

theories of Salmon and Forbes disagree about the truth-values which

are assigned to sentences of the form ~ believes that p~. Hence, there

is no way that the theories can be construed to be notational variants

when the on ly th ing wh ich i s taken in to accoun t i s the d i s t r ibu t ion o f

tru th-va lues to sentences w hic h is m ad e b y these theories .

IlI

Despite the fact that Forbes actual argument is incorrect, the intuition

which motivates his argument is sound. As his translation scheme

suggests, the two theories invoke exactly the same theoretical entities.

Hence, the differences between the two theories must be due to the

different deployment of these entities in the theories. Thus, a charge of

(something like) notational variation could still be sustained if it could

be shown that these entities actually play the same sort of role in each

theory, but in different locations in those theories.

The crucial difference between the two accounts of sentences of the

form ~A believes that 1 v lies in the fact that Salmon s guises play a role

in p r a g m a t i c s which Forbes Fregean propositions play in seman t ics .

On Forbes theory, Fregean propositions play a role in the recursive

assignment of truth-values to sentences. On Salmon s theory, Salmonian

guises do not play this role. However, this is not to say that Salmon s

guises do not play a structurally similar role in the pragmatic com-

ponent of Salmon s theory. It seems to me that they must.

In order to account for the fact that his theory seemingly yields an

assignment of truth-values to sentences which is wildly at variance with

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4 G R A H A M O P PY

p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t u it io n , S a l m o n c l a im s t h a t t h o s e p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t u i-

t io n s a r e a c t u a l ly in t u i ti o n s a b o u t t h e c o r r e c t a s s e r ta b i li ty o f p r o p o s i -

t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a s c r i p t i o n s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , h e c l a i m s t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n a l

a t t i tu d e a s c r i p t io n s c a r r y ( c o n v e n t i o n a l o r g e n e r a l i s e d ) G r i c e a n i m p l ic a -

t u r e s a b o u t t h e S a l m o n i a n g u i s e s u n d e r w h i c h R u s s e l l i a n p r o p o s i t i o n s

a r e e n t e r t a i n e d .

S a l m o n t e l l s u s a l m o s t n o t h i n g e l s e a b o u t h o w t h e s e G r i c e a n i m p l i -

c a t u r e s g e t a t t a c h e d t o s e n t e n c e s . H o w e v e r , i t i s a s o b v i o u s t h a t t h e r e

m u s t b e a c o m p o s i t i o n a l t h e o r y in v o l v i n g S a l m o n i a n g u i se s w h i c h i ss u e s

i n a n a s s i g n m e n t o f a s s e r t a b i li t y - v a l u e s t o s e n t e n c e - c o n t e x t p a i r s a s it i s

t h a t th e r e m u s t b e a c o m p o s i t io n a l m e a n i n g t h e o r y f o r l an g u a g es w h i c h

i ss u e s in a n a s s i g n m e n t o f t r u t h -v a l u e s t o s e n t e n c e - c o n t e x t p a ir s . ( H o w

e l s e c o u l d w e a c c o u n t f o r t h e f a c t t h a t s p e a k e r s c a n r e c o g n i s e t h e

a s s e r ta b i li ty - v a l u e s o f n o v e l s e n t e n c e s ? H o w e l se c o u l d s p e a k e r s h a v e

t h e a b i l it y t o p r o d u c e a n d u n d e r s t a n d a p o t e n t i a l ly i n f in i te r a n g e o f

s e n t e n c e s w i t h a t t a c h e d a s s e r t a b i l i t y - v a l u e s ? ) M o r e o v e r , i t i s e q u a l l y

c l e a r t h a t t h i s t h e o r y w i l l h a v e e x a c t l y t h e s a m e s t r u c t u r e a s t h e n e o -

F r e g e a n t h e o r y o f F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h a t i s, i t is c le a r t h a t w h a t

S a l m o n s t h e o r y d o e s is to s h i ft s o m e o f t h e s t r u c t u r e w h i c h is f o u n d i n

t h e F r e g e a n t h e o r y f r o m s e m a n t i c s t o p r a g m a t ic s .

( T h is c o n c l u s i o n is li k e ly t o a p p e a r u n p a l a t a b l e t o d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e

t h e o ri s ts . A f t e r a ll, th e r e a r e o f t e n s u p p o s e d t o b e i n s u p e r a b l e d i ff ic u l-

t i e s w h i c h f a c e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a F r e g e a n s e m a n t i c t h e o r y . H o w -

e v e r , i t s e e m s t o m e t h a t if t h i s w e r e r i g h t , i t c o u l d n o t b e a w e l c o m e

c o n c l u s i o n f o r d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t h e o r i s t s , s i n c e i t w o u l d s h o w t h a t t h e y

a r e n o t b e a b l e to c o n t r u c t t h e p r a g m a t i c t h e o r i e s w h i c h t h e y n e e d i n

o r d e r t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e w a y w e a c t u a l ly s p e a k .)

N e o - R u s s e l l i a n i s m a n d n e o - F r e g e a n i s m a r e

structural

v a r i a n t s : t h e

s a m e r e c u r s iv e s t r u c t u r e s i n v o l v i n g t h e s a m e u n d e r l y i n g e n ti ti e s a p p e a r

i n e a c h t h e o r y . H o w e v e r - - a t l e a s t

prima facie

t h e t w o t h e o r i e s a r e

n o t n o t a t i o n a l v a r i a n t s ; f o r t h e y d i s a g r e e o n t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f t r u t h -

v a l u e s t o s e n t e n c e s , a n d t h a t c e r t a i n l y s e e m s t o b e a s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r -

e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m .

IV

T h e c o n s i d e r a ti o n s a d v a n c e d i n I I m a y s e e m t o c o n s t it u te a n a r g u m e n t

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I P T IO N S 5

f o r n e o - F r e g e a n i s m . A f t e r a l l, g i v e n t h a t t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n

t h e t w o t h e o r i e s l ie s in t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e r e c u r s i v e s t r u c t u r e i n v o lv i n g

F r e g e a n p r o p o s i t i o n s , s u r e l y w e s h o u l d o p t f o r t h e t h e o r y w h i c h g iv e s a

d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t r u t h - v a l u e s ( a n d a s s e r ta b i ll ty - v a l u e s) w h i c h is i n a c c o r d -

a n c e w i t h p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t u i ti o n .

W e l l, I m n o t s o s u r e . T h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r w e r e a l l y h a v e a n y

r e a s o n t o h o l d t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e a r e f l e c -

t i o n o f t h e t r u t h - v a l u e s w h i c h a r e p o s s e s s e d b y p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e

a s c r i p t i o n s , o r w h e t h e r t h e y a r e m e r e l y a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e a s s e r t a b i l i t y

o f t h o s e s e n t e n c e s . T h e t w o t h e o r i e s s e e m t o b e o n a p a r i n e v e r y

r e s p e c t - - i . e . t h e r e i s n o s i m p l i c i t y a r g u m e n t w h i c h f a v o u r s o n e r a t h e r

t h a n t h e o t h e r - - s o w e n e e d t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e r e l e v a n t i n t u i t i o n s

a r e t h e m s e l v e s d i r e c t e v i d e n c e w h i c h f a v o u r s o n e o f t h e a l t e rn a t iv e s , o r

w h e t h e r t h e y w o u l d o n l y c o n s t it u te s u c h e v i d e n c e i f t h e r e w e r e s o m e

f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t w h i c h g a v e u s g o o d r e a s o n f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t t h o s e

i n t u it i o n s d o s u p p o r t t h e v i e w w h i c h t h e y s e e m t o s u p p o r t . ( I d o n t s e e

t h a t i t is a n y u s e s a y in g : l o o k , L o i s L a n e re ally d o e s n t k n o w t h a t C l a r k

K e n t i s S u p e r m a n . F o r e a c h o f t h e t h e o r i e s p r e d i c t s t h a t t h is is w h a t w e

shal l say . )

T h e r e a r e c l e a r c a s e s i n w h i c h p h e n o m e n a s h o u l d b e a s s i g n e d t o

p r a g m a t i c s . ( C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p h e n o m e n a w h i c h G r i c e d i s -

c u s s e d i n h is o r i g i n a l p a p e r s o n i m p l i c a tu r e . ) T h e r e a r e a l s o c l e a r c a se s

i n w h i c h p h e n o m e n a s h o u l d b e a s s i g n e d t o s e m a n t i c s . ( S i m p l e s u b j e c t -

p r e d i c a t e s e n t e n c e s a r e s u r e l y o f t h i s s o r t, s in c e i n t h e i r c a s e t h e r e i s n o

r o o m f o r t h e s o r t o f d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d a s s e r t a b i l i t y w h i c h

d i r e c t r e f e r e n c e t h e o r i s t s c l a i m t o f i n d i n t h e c a s e o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l

a t t i tu d e a s c r i p t io n s . ) H o w e v e r , i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i tu d e a s c r i p t i o n s , t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o d i s t i n c t e l e m e n t s ( o b j e c t

a n d

s e n s e ) w h i c h m u s t

b e b r o u g h t i n t o p l a y m e a n s t h a t w e n e e d s o m e a r g u m e n t t o t e l l u s

w h e r e i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l o c a t i o n o f t h e s e f a c t o r s i n o u r t h e o r y .

P e r h a p s t h e r e i s a n a r g u m e n t w h i c h s h o w s t h a t t h e n e o - R u s s e l l i a n s

a r e d e f i n i te l y w r o n g . H o w e v e r , e v e n i f t h e r e w e r e s u c h a n a r g u m e n t i t

w o u l d p r o v e l it tl e, s in c e t h e r e is s o l it tl e d i f fe r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o

v i e w s . ( N o t e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t t h e v i e w s a g r e e o n a l l t h e p r e d i c t i o n s

w h i c h t h e y m a k e a b o u t w h i c h p r o p o s i ti o n a l a t t i t u d e a s c ri p ti o n s s p e a k-

e r s w i ll a n d w i ll n o t e n d o r s e . ) N e o - F r e g e a n s a n d n e o - R u s s e l l i a n s w o u l d

d o b e t t e r t o w o r r y a b o u t t h e i r c o m m o n p r o b l e m s - - e.g. e m p t y s in g u la r

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6 GRAHAM OPPY

terms, the nature of modes of presentation -- than to worry about their

alleged differences.

v

Forbes is well aware of the fact that his theory and Salmon's theory do

not agree on the assignment of truth-values to sentences of the form

believes that p~. Why then did he give the faulty argument which I

discussed in section I above? The answer to this question is, I think,

contained in the opening paragraph of his review. There, he says that

propositions are things which are the meanings of sentences and the

objects of propositional attitudes and then adds that: The important

questions are (a) according to the best philosophy of language, are the

meanings of sentences Russellian propositions or Fregean ones and (b)

does the most plausible philosophy of mind take the objects of the

attitudes to be Russellian propositions or Fregean ones? If there is to

be just one entity which is both t he object of propositional attitudes and

t h e meaning of the content clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions,

then the fact that there is a sense in which neo-Fregeans and neo-

Russellians take the same objects to be the objects of propositional

attitudes is good evidence that those theories are notational variants.

(Of course, neo-Russellians will s a y that the objects of propositional

attitudes are Russellian propositions. But when it comes to the explana-

tion of behaviour, they agree that one has to appeal to Fregean proposi-

tions -- i.e. to modes of presentation of Russellian propositions. So, in

the most important sense, they agree that the objects of propositional

attitudes are Fregean propositions.)

But, of course, in the sense in which neo-Fregeans and neo-Russel-

lians take the same objects to be the objects of propositional attitudes,

it is simply incorrect to attribute to the neo-Russellian the view that

there is just one entity which is both

t h e

object of propositional

attitudes and t h e meaning of the content clauses of propositional

attitude ascriptions. (In general, I think that one should be very careful

in talking about t h e meaning of sentences or types of sentences.

There are various different things which make good candidates for the

meanings of sentences, depending upon the theoretical purposes at

hand.) The claim that neo-Russellianism and neo-Fregeanism are nora -

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I P T IO N S 7

tion l

v a r ia n ts r e li es o n F o r b e s n e o - F r e g e a n a s s u m p t i o n th a t t h e

o b j e c ts o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t it u d e s w h i c h a r e i n v o k e d i n th e e x p l a n a t i o n

o f b e h a v i o u r a r e a l so t h e s e m a n t i c c o r r e l a te s o f t h e r e l e v a n t p r o p o s i -

t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a s c r i p t i o n s . B u t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s n o t s h a r e d b y d i r e c t

r e f e r e n c e t h e o r i s ts ( n o r b y o t h e r n e o - F r e g e a n t h e o ri s ts ) .

v I

S u p p o s e t h a t w e a r e a g r e e d t h a t w e w a n t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f

p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e s o r t w h i c h i s o f f e r e d b y n e o -

R u s s e l l i a n s a n d n e o - F r e g e a n s . ( T h i s i s a b i g a s s u m p t i o n ; h o w e v e r , I

d o n t w a n t t o g o i n t o

th t

h e r e . ) T h e n t h e r e a r e s o m e v e r y i m p o r t a n t

q u e s t io n s a b o u t m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a ti o n w h i c h n e e d t o b e a d d r e s s e d .

F o r d e f i n it e n e s s , I sh a l l a d o p t a n e o - F r e g e a n n o t a t i o n ( t h o u g h , a s I

e x p l a i n e d a b o v e , I d o n o t s u p p o s e t h a t a n y t h i n g m u c h h a n g s o n t h is ).

S i n c e th e f o r m a l a s p e c t s o f th i s s e m a n t i c t h e o r y a r e w e l l- k n o w n , I sh a ll

o n l y p r o v i d e a v e r y q u i c k o u t li n e :

T h e f i rs t t h i n g w h i c h w e d o is t o d e s c r i b e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h a r e

a s s i g n e d t o s e n t e n c e s r e l a t i v e to a c o n t e x t a n d a n a s s i g n m e n t o f i n d i v id -

ua l s t o va r i ab l es :

i )

t h e p r o p o s i ti o n e x p r e ss e d b y a n a to m i c fo r m u l a r - G b l . . , b ~

r e l a t i v e t o a c o n t e x t c a n d a n a s s i g n m e n t f i s ( G * , (b ~ . . . . ,

b n)), w h e r e G * i s t h e p r o p e r t y e x p r e s s e d b y F -G ~ i n t h e

c o n t e x t c , a n d b~ i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h i s t h e s e m a n t i c

c o n t e n t o f r-b ~ r e l a t i v e t o c a n d f .

(ii)

t h e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d b y ~-b b e l i e v e s t h a t A - ~, r e l a t i v e t o

c a n d f , i s ( (b , P r o p A , M o d e A ) , B ), w h e r e B i s t h e b e l i e f

r e l a t i o n , b i s th e c o n t e n t o f r b ~ r e la t i v e to c a n d f , P r o p A i s

t h e p r o p o s i t i o n e x p r e s s e d b y r - A ~ r e l at iv e t o c a n d f , a n d

M o d e A is a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t io n o f th e p r o p o s i t i o n w h i c h

is e x p r e s s e d b y r-A ~ r e l a t iv e t o c a n d f .

N e x t , w e g i v e a s t a n d a r d a c c o u n t o f t h e i n t e n s i o n s o f e x p r e s s i o n s

r e l a ti v e t o c o n t e x t s , a n d u s e t h is t o p r o v i d e a r e c u r s iv e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n

o f t r u t h r e l a t i v e t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e v a l u a t io n :

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8 G R A H A M O P P Y

O )

(ii)

a p r o p o s i t i o n ( G * , ( b l , 9 9 9 b . ) ) i s t r u e r e l a t i v e t o a c i r c u m -

s t a n c e o f e v a l u a t i o n E i ff t h e e x t e n s i o n o f G * in E c o n t a i n s

b 1 . . . , b n ) -

a p r o p o s i t i o n ( ( b , P r o p A , M o d e A ) , B ) i s t r u e r e l a t i v e t o a

c i r c u m s t a n c e o f e v a l u a t i o n E i f f ( b, P r o p A , M o d e A ) is a

m e m b e r o f t h e e x t e n s i o n o f B i n E - - i.e . i ff b b e l i e v es P r o p

A u n d e r M o d e A i n E .

O f c o u rs e , w e n e e d t o s a y a lo t m o r e a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f m o d e s o f

p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e t o s u p p o s e t h a t a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a -

t i o n o f a p r o p o s i t i o n w il l b e a t u p l e o f t h e m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e

c o n s t i t u e n t s o f t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n . T h u s , w e s h a ll h a v e :

i )

a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a p r o p o s i t i o n { G * , { b l, 9 9 9 b n) i s

a t up l e ( [G*] , [b l ], . . . , [bn ] ) , w he re [G*] i s a m o d e o f

p r e s e n t a t io n o f t h e p r o p e r t y G * a n d

[ b i ]

i s a m o d e o f

p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l b i.

a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t io n o f a p r o p o s i t io n { {b, P r o p A , M o d e

a ) , B ) i s a t up l e { [b ] , [P rop A] , [ M od e A ] , [13]), w he re [b ] i s a

m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e in d i v i d u a l b , [P r o p A ] is a m o d e

o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f th e p r o p o s i t i o n P r o p A , [ M o d e A ] is a

m o d e o f p r e s e n ta t io n o f t he m o d e o f p r e s e n ta t io n M o d e A ,

a n d [13] i s a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e b e l i e f r e l a t i o n B .

S o , o n t h is a c c o u n t , t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f t h e s e n t e n c e c b e l i e v e s t h a t

b b e l i e v e s t h a t a

w i t h re s p e c t t o a c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e c a n d a n

ass ignment funct ion f i s ( (c , ( (b , (F* , a) , ( IF*]1 , [ a ] l , B), {[bl2, [F*I2, [a]2,

[ [ F * ] t] 2 , [ [ a l ~ ] 2 , [ B ] 2 , B . ( T h e n u m e r i c a l s u b s c r i p t s i n d i c a t e t h e d e g r e e

o f e m b e d d i n g w i t h i n a t t i t u d e c o n s t r u c t i o n s . W h e t h e r [ a ] l i s i d e n t i c a l

w i t h [ a ] 2 - - a n d w h e t h e r [F *lt i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h [ F* I2 - - i s a q u e s t i o n

w h i c h I sh a l l n o t a d d r e s s h e r e . )

I t is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h is a c c o u n t t h a t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n w h i c h a t e r m

m a k e s t o t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f s e n t e n c e s i n w h i c h i t o c c u r s i s

d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e o r d e r e x p r e s s i o n s w h i c h o c c u r i n t h a t s e n t e n c e - -

a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , u p o n w h e t h e r o r n o t i t f a l l s w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f a n y

p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e ve r b s . H o w e v e r , t h i s is n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e s e m a n -

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I PT I O N S 9

t i c s i s n o t c o m p o s i t i o n a l - - f o r i t i s s t i l l t r u e t h a t t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t

o f a s e n t e n c e is a s t r u c t u r e d e n t i t y w h i c h is c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m t h e

s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s w h i c h t o g e t h e r m a k e u p t h e

s e n t e n c e . ( A l t e r n a t i v e l y , w e c o u l d t h i n k o f t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s o f

e x p r e s s i o n s o n p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n s o f u t t e r a n c e a s i n f in i t e m a t r i c e s in

w h i c h t h e re a p p e a r a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r e a c h d e g r e e

o f e m b e d d i n g i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i tu d e a s c r ip t io n s . H o w e v e r , o n a n y

o c c a s i o n , o n l y a f i n it e i n it ia l s e g m e n t o f t h e m a t r i x w i ll b e r e q u i r e d i n

o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f a s e n t e n c e i n w h i c h t h e s e

e x p r e s s i o n s o c c u r . O f c o u r s e , i f w e t a k e t h i s o p t i o n , w e w i l l n o t w a n t t o

s u p p o s e t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r o f t h e la n g u a ge m u s t s o m e h o w g e t

t h e s e i n f in i t e m a t r i c e s i n t o h e r h e a d ; ra t h e r , t h e i d e a w i ll b e t h a t a

c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r o f t h e l a n g u a g e is o n e w h o is a b le t o g r a sp t h e

s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s o f s e n t e n c e s i n a w i d e v a r i e t y o f c o n t e x t s o f u t t e r -

a n c e . )

v i i

S o f ar , w e h a v e o n l y t h e b a r e s t b o n e s o f a t h e o r y . T h e f i rs t m e a t o n

t h e s e b o n e s c o m e s w h e n w e c o m e t o l o o k a t w h a t K a p l a n w o u l d c a l l

t h e characters o f t e r m s - - i.e . w h e n w e c o m e t o l o o k a t th o s e f u n c t i o n s

f r o m c o n t e x t s o f u t t e r a n c e t o s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i s e

a n o t h e r l e v e l o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f p r e d i c a t e s a n d s in g u la r t e rm s . F o r ,

w h i l e I w o u l d a ll o w t h a t a n a m e li ke G e o r g e B u s h p i c k s o u t t h e v e r y

s a m e o b j e c t i n a l a r g e r a n g e o f c o n t e x t s , I w o u l d a l s o m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e

m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h i s a s s o c ia t e d w i t h th is n a m e w i ll v a r y

a c r o s s t h o s e s a m e c o n t e x t s .

S u p p o s e t h a t a p e r s o n P u t t e r s t h e s e n t e n c e Fred be l ieves that

George B ush i s f r i end l y i n a c o n t e x t c . S u p p o s e f u r t h e r th a t , i n c , F r e d

r e f er s t o F r e d , a n d G e o r g e B u s h r e f er s t o t h e c u r r e n t U . S . p r e s i d e n t ,

G e o r g e B u s h . T h e n P ' s u t t e r a n c e w i l l h a v e t h e c o n t e n t Fred, ( is-

f r i e n d l y * ,

George Bush} ,

( [ i s - f r iendly*] ,

[G eorge Bush]}},

B ) , whe r e [ i s -

f r i e n d l y * ] a n d [ G e or ge B us h] a r e m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i c h a r e

s u p p l i e d f r o m , o r d e t e r m i n e d b y , P ' s c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e .

T h i s is s ti ll f a i rl y t h in , f o r n o t h i n g h a s y e t b e e n s a id a b o u t t h e n a t u r e

o f m o d e s o f p re s e n ta t io n , n o r a b o u t t h e m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h t h e y g et

s u p p l i e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e o f se n t e n c e s w h i c h c o n t a i n

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10 GRAHAM OPPY

propositional attitude verbs. (One important point to note is that I have

been using the term mode of presentation as a name for whatever it is

that it the additional component of the semantic content of proposi-

tional attitude ascriptions. There things may turn out to have nothing to

do with those other entities which have been called modes of presenta-

tion by other philosophers.)

VIII

On the question of the nature of these modes of presentation, I think

that it is natural to investigate the thought that modes of presentation

must be some sorts of constraints on the mental representations which

people have of those individuals, properties and functions which are

parts of the semantic contents of the expressions of the language in

question. Thus, in my example, it seems to me to be natural to suppose

that

[George ush]

is a condition on the nature of mental representa-

tions of George Bush. Moreover, it seems to me to be plausible to

suggest that the proposition expressed by the sentence which P utters

will be true just in case Fred has mental representations of George

Bush and the property of being friendly which satisfy the constraints

imposed by

[George ush]

and Iis-friendly*], and in virtue of which

representations it is correct to say that Fred attributes the property of

being friendly to George Bush.

This is still a rather schematic suggestion, since the notion of a

condition on the nature of mental representations obviously requires

further clarification. What sorts of conditions or constraints on the

nature of mental representations are candidates to be modes of presen-

tation?

One obvious thought is that a mode of presentation can be a restric-

tion on the sort of information which is encoded in a mental represen-

tation. Consider, for example, a case in which we are talking about the

astronomical exploits of the ancient Babylonians. When our uses of the

words Hesperus and Phosphorus have single embeddings in propo-

sitional attitude constructions, it seems reasonable to suppose that the

associated modes of presentation might be object represented only as

visible in the morning sky and object represented only as visible in

the evening sky . Consequently, my utterance of the sentence

The

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I P T I O N S 1 1

ancient Babylonian astronomers believed that Hesperus is visib le in the

morning sky

h a s ( s u b j e c t t o a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f h a r m l e s s s im p l i fi c a-

t i o n ) t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t the ancient Babylonian astronomers,

Venus, i s -v is ib le -in - the -morn ing- sky*) , ( [ ob jec t r ep rese n te d on ly as

vis ib le in the morning sky ] , [ i s -v is ib le- in- the-morning-sky*]) ) , B) . More-

o v e r , t h i s u t t e r a n c e i s t r u e : f o r t h e a n c i e n t B a b y l o n i a n a s t r o n o m e r s d i d

s tand in the be l i e f r e l a t ion to the p rop os i t io n (Venu s , is -v i sib le -in - the -

m o r n i n g - s k y * ) v i a a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f V e n u s i n w h i c h it w a s

o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e i n g v i s i b le i n th e m o r n i n g s k y.

S i m i l a r l y , m y u t t e r a n c e o f t h e s e n t e n c e The ancient Babylonian

asuvnomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus has ( sub jec t to a ce r -

t a in a m o u n t o f h a r m l e s s s im p l i f ic a t io n ) t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t ( ( th e a n -

c ien t Baby lon ian as tonomers , (Venus , Venus , i s - iden t i ca l - to* ) , ( [ ob jec t

r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y a s v i si b l e i n t h e m o r n i n g sk y ], [ o b je c t r e p r e s e n t e d

on ly as v is ib le in th e e ven ing sky ] , [ is -identica l- to*]) ), B) . M or eo ve r ,

t h is u t t e r a n c e is fa ls e : f o r t h e a n c i e n t B a b y l o n i a n a s t o n o m e r s d i d n o t

s t a n d i n t h e b e l i e f r e l a t io n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s v i a t w o m e n t a l r e p r e -

s e n t a t io n s o f V e n u s , i n o n e o f w h i c h i t w a s o n l y r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e i n g

v i s ib l e i n t h e m o r n i n g s k y , a n d i n t h e o t h e r o f w h i c h it w a s o n l y

r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e i n g v is i b le in t h e e v e n i n g s k y .

O n e o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n w h i c h n o w a r is e s c o n c e r n s m y u s e o f t h e

l o c u t i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d a s . W h e n I s a y t h at s o m e o n e p o s s e s s e s a

m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t x i n w h i c h t h a t o b j e c t i s r e p r e s e n t e d

a s h a v i n g a p r o p e r t y F , d o I m e a n t h a t t h e p e r s o n i n q u e s t i o n m u s t

h a v e a n e x p l ic i t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y F a s

p a r t o f t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y F ? N o t n e c e s s a ri ly ; fo r I

w a n t t o a l l o w t h a t s o m e o n e m a y p o s s e s s a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n

o b j e c t x i n w h i c h t h a t o b j e c t i s r e p r e s e n t e d a s h a v i n g t h e p r o p e r t y F

p r o v i d e d t h a t i t i s i m p l i c it i n th a t p e r s o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t x h a s t h e

p r o p e r t y F . ( C u m m i n s ( 1 9 8 7 ) d i s c u s s e s a n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f

w h a t h e c a ll s i n ex p l ic i t c o n t e n t . S o m e o f h is s u g g e s ti o n s s e e m t o b e

r e l e v a n t (a s d o e s t h e d i sc u s s i o n o f t a c it b e l i e f i n D e n n e t t ( 1 9 8 7 ) a n d

R i c h a r d ( 1 9 9 0 ) ) ; h o w e v e r , I d o n o t p r o p o s e t o i n v e s t i g a t e h e r e t h e

q u e s t i o n o f h o w w e t e l l t h a t i t i s i m p l i c it i n a p e r s o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f

x th a t x h a s t h e p r o p e r t y F . )

A n o t h e r o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e a b o v e i s a n e x h a u s t i v e

a c c o u n t o f t h e n a t u r e o f m o d e s o f p r e se n t a ti o n . O n c e a g ai n, t h e a n s w e r

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1 2 G R A H A M O P PY

i s n e g a ti v e : I d o n ' t w a n t t o h o l d t h a t t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e c o n s t r a i n t s o n t h e

n a t u r e o f m e n t a l r e p r e se n t a t io n s w h i c h c o u l d b e r e le v a n t to t h e s e m a n -

t ic p r o p o e r t i e s o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a s c r ip t i o n s a r e c o n s t r a i n ts o n

w h a t t h e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e

r e p r e s e n t e d a s - - f o r s o m e t i m e s c o n s t ra i n ts o n t h e n a t u r e o f m e n t a l

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c a n (e .g .) c o n c e r n t h e c a u s a l h i s t o r y o f t h o s e r e p r e -

s e n t a t i o n s . ( T h e r e i s a n i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s s o r t o f c a s e b e l o w . ) H o w e v e r ,

m o s t o f t h e i n t e r e s t i n g p u z z l e c a s e s i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l

a t t i t u d e a s c r i p t i o n s d o i n v o l v e c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e r e l e v a n t m o d e s o f

p r e s e n t a t i o n a r e c o n s t ra i n ts o n t h e n a t u r e o f m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a ti o n s

w h i c h t a k e t h e f o r m o f c o n s t r a i n s o n w h a t t h e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e r e p r e -

s e n t e d b y th o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d a s.

T h e r e m a y b e f u r t h e r p o s s ib i li ti e s. O n e o f th e r e v i e w e r s o f th i s p a p e r

s u g g es te d th a t th e r e m a y w e ll b e e n d o g e n o u s c o n s t ra i n ts o n t h e m e n t a l

s t r u c t u r e s t h e m s e l v e s . I n a s e n s e , t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e : h u m a n m e n t a l

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s n o d o u b t s u b j e c t t o e n d o g e n o u s c o n s t r a i n t s . H o w e v e r ,

I d o u b t t h a t o u r o r d i n a r y p r a c ti c e o f m a k i n g a n d u s i n g p ro p o s i t io n a l

a t t i tu d e a s c r ip t io n s i s s e ns i ti v e t o s u c h c o n s t ra i n t s. T h e r e a s o n w h y w e

n e e d m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t h a t s in g u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s d o n o t a lw a y s

s u f fi c e t o p i c k o u t t h e s ta t e s o f m i n d w h i c h a r e c a u s a l l y o p e r a t i v e i n th e

p r o d u c t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r . B u t c o u l d it b e t h e c a s e t h a t th e s a l i e n t

d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t w o m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f a g iv e n s in g u l a r

p r o p o s i t i o n - - i.e . t h e d i f f e r e n c e w h i c h w e u s e t o p i c k o u t t h e f a c t t h a t

o n e r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r i s c a u s a l ly i n v o l v e d i n a g iv e n p i e c e o f

b e h a v i o u r - - is th a t o n l y o n e o f t h e m is s u b je c t t o a c e r t a i n s o r t o f

e n d o g e n o u s c o n s t r a i n t?

A g a i n , I s h o u l d e m p h a s i s e th a t m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t io n n e e d t o b e

p u b l i c l y i d e n ti f ia b l e a n d l in g u i st ic a l ly u s a b l e d i f f e re n c e s b e t w e e n m e n t a l

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h h a v e d i f f e r e n t c a u s a l p r o f i l e s , b u t w h i c h r e p r e -

s e n t t h e s a m e o b j e c t s ( o r p r o p e r t i e s ) . C o n s e q u e n t l y , a c c o u n t s o f

m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t io n s u c h a s t h a t o f f e r e d b y M c G i n n ( 1 9 8 9 ) - - a t

p p . 1 9 0 - - 1 9 2 - - d o n o t a d d r e s s m y p r o b l e m . It s e e m s v e ry r e a s o n a b l e

t o s a y t h a t m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m u s t a l w a y s b e p a r t i a l a n d a s p e c t -

s p e c i f i c . M o r e o v e r , i t a l s o s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e t o s a y t h a t t h i s i s a n

e x p l a n a t i o n o f h o w i t is t h a t th e r e c a n b e m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h

h a v e d i f f e r e n t c a u s a l p r o f i l e s , b u t w h i c h r e p r e s e n t t h e s a m e o b j e c t s ( o r

p r o p e rt ie s ) . B u t m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t io n i n m y s e n s e c a n o n ly b e

kin s

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I P T IO N S 1 3

o f m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a ti o n s - - s in c e th e m e n t a l r e p r e s e n ta t i o n s t h e m -

s e lv e s w i ll a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b e u n i q u e t o e a c h p e r s o n - - a n d i t is

p r e c i s e l y t h e b a s i s o f t h e s y s t e m o f c la s s if i c a ti o n i n t o k i n d s w h i c h

r e m a i n s t o b e e x p l a in e d . ( O f c o u r s e , I d o n ' t m e a n t o s u g g e s t t h a t

M c G i n n is c o n f u s e d a b o u t t h is : h e m a k e s i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t h e i s t a lk i n g

a b o u t m e n t a l c o n t e n t , n o t s e m a n t ic c o n t e n t .)

IX

W h a t o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e m e c h a n i s m b y m e a n s o f w h ic h m o d e s o f

p r e s e n t a t i o n g e t s u p p l i e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f u t te r a n c e o f s e n te n c e s

w h i c h c o n t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e v e r b s ? H e r e a g a i n , w h a t I h a v e t o

s u g g e s t is r a t h e r p r o g r a m m a t i c . T h e m a i n i n t u i t io n w h i c h I h a v e i s t h a t

t h e r e a r e a v a r i e t y o f w a y s in w h i c h i t c o u l d h a p p e n t h a t a g iv e n m o d e

o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t c o u l d b e c o m e p a r t i c u l a r ly s a l ie n t i n a

c o n t e x t o f u t te r a n c e .

O n e p o s s i b il it y is t h a t t h e p r e v i o u s u s a g e o f a w o r d i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n

c a n e s t a b l i sh a c o n n e c t i o n t o a c o n d i t i o n ( o r p e r h a p s t o a s e t o f r e l a t e d

c o n d i t i o n s ) o n m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o b j e c ts a n d p r o p e r t i e s . T h u s ,

f o r e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r t h e c a s e i n w h i c h J o e t u r n s u p t o h i s f i r s t d a y o f

w o r k , a n d is i n t r o d u c e d t o h is b o s s R o b e r t G r a n t ( a n e a t , c l e an ,

s o b e r - l o o k i n g g e n t w h o s p o r t s a t h r e e p i e c e s u i t a n d t i e ) . A f t e r w o r k ,

J o e g o e s t o t h e p u b , w h e r e h e i s r e g a l e d w i t h s t o ri e s a b o u t a h a r d - li v i n g

l u n a t ic w h o m e v e r y o n e re f e r s t o a s B o b b y . B e f o r e lo n g , J o e t i r e s o f

t h e s e s to r ie s , a n d s o h e s a y s: E n o u g h s to r ie s a b o u t B o b b y . T e ll m e

a b o u t m y b o s s. T h e r e i s a s o m e w h a t p a i n e d s ile n ce , a n d t h e n o n e

a m o n g s t t h e a s s e m b l e d c r o w d s t a t e s t h e o b v i o u s fa c t :

Joe hasn t r ea l i s ed

t h a t B o b b y is R o b e r t G r a n t.

I n t h i s c a s e , i t s e e m s t o m e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e p r i o r

u s e o f t h e w o r d B o b b y i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n se r v e s t o e s t ab l is h a

c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n i t a n d a m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t io n o f t h e f o r m o b j e c t

w h i c h p o s s e s s e s m o s t o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s a s c r i b e d t o B o b b y d u r i n g t h e

p r e c e d i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n . ( N o t e , b y t h e w a y , t h a t t h e p o s s i b il it y o f

c o n s t r u c t i n g t h is s o r t o f c a s e p r o v i d e s p a r t o f th e m o t i v a t i o n f o r

s u p p o s i n g t h a t m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a ti o n a r e c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t . A f t e r a ll,

i t s e e m s c l e a r t h a t w e c o u l d f u r t h e r s t i p u l a t e t h a t , i n t h i s e x a m p l e , i t i s

s i m p l y a n a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e n a m e B o b b y is t h e o n l y o n e u s e d i n t h e

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1 4 G R A H A M O P PY

c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e p u b - - f o r , i n fa c t, al l o f t h e ( o t h e r ) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n

t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n u s e t h e t w o n a m e s m o r e o r l e s s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y , a t

l e a st o u t s i d e o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e c o n s t r u c t i o n s . I n d e e d , ex ctly t h e

s a m e t h i n g h a p p e n e d t o J o e 's p r e d e c e s s o r i n th e jo b , e x c e p t t h a t th e

t w o n a m e s w e r e e v e r y w h e r e i n t er c h a n g e d )

T h i s s u g g e s t i o n m a y s o u n d f a m i li a r; a r e v i e w e r o f m y p a p e r s u g -

g e s t e d t h a t i t i s d e f e n d e d b y E v a n s ( 1 9 8 2 ) a n d B a c h ( 1 9 8 7 ) . I a m n o t

s u r e a b o u t t h i s, s i n c e i t is n o t c l e a r t o m e t h a t E v a n s ' a c c o u n t o f n a m i n g

p r a c t i c e s t e l l s u s a n y t h i n g a b o u t h o w n a m e s f u n c t i o n i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l

a t t i t u d e a s c r i p t i o n s . ( W h a t E v a n s a n d B a c h d o d e s c r i b e i s w a y s i n

w h i c h i t c a n c o m e a b o u t t h a t t h e p a t t e r n o f u s e o f a n a m e

outside

o f

p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t ti t u d e a sc r ip t i o n s c a n d e p e n d o n " m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a -

t i o n o f o b j e c t s " . B u t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s e e t h a t t h i s i s a d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t

f r o m t h e o n e w h i c h I d i s c u s s i n m y p a p e r . ) I s u s p e c t t h a t m y s u g g e s t i o n

a c t u a l l y o w e s m o r e t o L e w i s ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; h o w e v e r , I d o u b t t h a t i t i s i m p o r -

t a n t t o p u r s u e t h i s s u s p i c i o n .

A n o t h e r p o s s i b i li t y is th a t m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i n t e re s t s a n d

p u r p o s e s o f c e r ta i n p a r t i c ip a n t s i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n c a n s e r v e t o e s ta b l is h

c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n c e r t a i n e x p r es s i o n s a n d m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a ti o n .

C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , S c o t t S o a m e s ( 1 9 8 7 ) ' s w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e

a b o u t M a r y a n d h e r n e i g h b o ur .

S o a m e s a s k s u s t o s u p p o s e t h a t M a r y ' s n e i g h b o u r , S a m u e l C l e m e n s ,

is in t h e h a b i t o f s o li c it in g h e r o p i n i o n o f h i s m a n u s c r i p t s b e f o r e h e

s e n d s t h e m t o h i s p u b l i s h e r . M o r e o v e r , h e t e l l s u s t h a t M a r y t h i n k s

t h e s e m a n u s c r i p ts a r e w o n d e r f u l , a n d h e n c e t h i nk s t h a t S a m u e l C l e m e n s

( w h o m s h e k n o w s o n l y u n d e r t h a t n a m e ) i s a g r e a t w r it e r . B u t , a sk s

S o a m e s , d o e s i t f o l l o w th a t s h e t h i n k s t h a t M a r k T w a i n i s a g r e a t

w r i t e r ?

W e l l , f i r s t , S o a m e s i n v i t e s u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g s i t u a t i o n .

M a r y , w h o i s a s t u d e n t , h a s t a k e n a w r i t t e n e x a m i n a t i o n ; a n d h e r

t e a c h e r e x p l ai n s t h a t e v e n t h o u g h M a r y d i d v e r y w e l l o n t h e e x a m , t h e

r e a s o n w h y s h e d i d n ' t g e t a p e r f e c t s c o r e i s t h a t s h e d i d n ' t k n o w t h a t

M a r k T w a i n i s a g r e a t w r i t e r . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , S o a m e s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e

t e a c h e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s p e r f e c t l y a c c e p t a b l e .

H o w e v e r , S o a m e s a l s o i n v i t e s u s t o c o n s i d e r a d i f f e r e n t c o n v e r s a -

t io n , w h o s e p u r p o s e i t t o d e t e r m i n e M a r y ' s o p i n i o n o f v a r io u s a u t h o rs .

T h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h o u s e t h e n a m e " M a r k T w a i n " t o

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I P T IO N S 1 5

r e f e r to S a m u e l C l e m e n s , w a n t t o k n o w M a r y ' s o p i n io n o f h im . S o a m e s

s u g g e s t s t h a t o n e w h o k n o w s M a r y ' s o p i n i o n c o u l d s u r e l y r e p o r t t h a t ,

y e s i n d e e d , M a r y

k n o w s

t h a t M a r k T w a i n i s a g r e a t w r i te r .

I s u g g e s t t h a t , i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , t h e t e a c h e r ' s u t t e r a n c e o f

Ma ry d idn t

kn o w that M ar k Twa in is a great writer

h a s ( s u b j e c t t o a c e r t a i n a m o u n t

o f h a r m l e s s s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ) t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t ( N o t

((Mary, (Mark

Twain,

i s- a -g r e a t- w r i te r * ), ( [ o b j e c t r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e a r i n g t h e n a m e

M a r k T w a i n ] , [ i s- a - g re a t -w r i te r ] )) K ) ) . A n d I s u g g e s t t h a t , in t h e

s e c o n d c a se , th e u t t e r a n c e o f M a r y k n o w s t h a t M a r k T w a i n is a gr e a t

w r i t e r h a s ( s u b je c t to a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f h a r m l e s s s i m p l i f ic a t io n ) t h e

s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t

((Mary, (Mark Twain,

i s - a -g rea t -w r i t e r* ) , ( [ ob j ec t

r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e i n g t h e a u t h o r o f s u c h a n d s u c h w o r k s [ , [ i s - a - g r e a t -

wr i t e r ] ) ) K) .

I n t h e s e c a s e s , i t s e e m s p l a u s i b l e t o m e t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e m o d e s o f

p r e s e n t a t io n a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i n te r e st s a n d

p u r p o s e s o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s . I n th e f ir s t c a s e , t h e

m a i n i n t e r e s t o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n is in t h e m a r k

w h i c h M a r y s c o r e d o n a c e r t a i n t e s t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n

M a r y ' s o p i n i o n o f M a r k T w a i n is a n i n te r e s t i n h e r o p i n i o n o f h i m

u n d e r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f h i m w h i c h a r e r e le v a n t t o t h e te s t w h i c h

s h e h a s j u s t t a k e n - - a n d s o t h e y a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h

s h e a t t ri b u t e s to h i m u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i m i n w h i c h s h e r e p r e -

s e n ts h i m a s b e i n g c a l le d M a r k T w a i n . S i m i la r ly , i n t h e s e c o n d c a s e ,

t h e m a i n i n t e r e s t o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n i s t h e l i t e r a r y

m e r i t s o f t h e a u t h o r s o f c e r t a i n b o o k s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n

M a r y ' s o p i n i o n o f M a r k T w a i n is a n i n t e r es t in h e r o p i n i o n o f h i m a s

t h e a u t h o r o f c er t a in b o o k s - - a n d s o t h e y ar e i n te r e s te d i n t h e p r o p e r -

t ie s w h i c h s h e a t t r ib u t e s t o h i m u n d e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f h i m i n w h i c h

s h e r e p r e s e n t s h i m a s t h e a u t h o r o f c e r t a i n b o o k s .

F i n a l l y , I d o n ' t w a n t t o d i s c o u n t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e m a y b e a

d e f a u l t s e tt in g f o r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t io n t o

p r o p o s i t i o n s , v iz : t h a t , in t h e a b s e n c e o f d e f e a t i n g c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t io n s ,

t h e m o d e o f p r e s e n t a t io n w h i c h is a s s o c ia t e d w i th a n y t e r m is s i m p ly

s o m e t h i n g l ik e t h e d o m i n a n t m e n t a l re p r e s e n t a t i o n o f [ th e o b j e c t o r

p r o p e r t y i n q u e s ti o n ] ( w h e r e d o m i n a n c e h e r e is c a s h e d o u t i n t e r m s

o f t h e a m o u n t o f i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h is c o n t a i n e d i n m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a -

t i o n s ) . I n g e n e r a l , w e a r e p r e t t y g o o d a t a v o i d i n g t h e s o r t s o f s i t u a t i o n s

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1 6 G R A H A M O P PY

i n w h i c h t h e a n c i e n t B a b y l o n i a n a s t r o n o m e r s w e r e p l a c e d w i t h r e s p e c t

t o t h e p l a n e t V e n u s ; f o r , i n g e n e r a l , w e t e n d t o h a v e o n e c l e a r l y d o m i -

n a n t c o n c e p t i o n o f a n o b j e c t o r p r o p e r t y - - a n d , m o r e o v e r , i n g e n e r a l,

i t t e n d s t o b e t h i s d o m i n a n t c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h is c a u s a ll y i n v o l v e d i n

o u r d e a l i n g s w i t h t h o s e o b j e c t s a n d p r o p e r t i e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t s e e m s

t o m e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e t o s u g g e s t t h a t w e o n l y n e e d t o p o s t u l a te a

m e c h a n i s m w h e r e b y t h e d e f a u l t p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t s o m e o n e ' s d o m i n a n t

c o n c e p t i o n s o f o b j e c t s a n d p r o p e r t i e s a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f

t h e i r s t a t e s a n d b e h a v i o u r c a n b e o v e r r i d d e n . ( N o t e t h a t t h i s l a s t

s u g g e s t io n s e e m s t o g i v e a m o r e p l a u s ib l e w a y o f h a n d l i n g t h e c a s e i n

w h i c h M a r y i s s a i d t o k n o w t h a t M a r k T w a i n i s a g r e a t a u t h o r . A f t e r

a ll, it is n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g in t h e c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e w h i c h

i m p o s e s c o n s t ra i n ts u p o n h o w M a r y t h in k s o f M a r k T w a i n. W e w o u l d

n e e d t o b e t o l d a l o t m o r e a b o u t t h e c o n t e x t o f u t t e r a n c e b e f o r e a f in a l

a n a l y si s o f th e c a s e c o u l d b e m a d e . )

O n e c r i t i c i s m w h i c h m i g h t b e l e v e l l e d a t t h e t h e o r y w h i c h I h a v e

s k e t c h e d i s t h a t t h e c r i t i c i s m s w h i c h h a v e b e e n l e v e l l e d a t n e o - F r e g e a n

t h e o r i e s i n t h e l a s t t w e n t y y e a r s s h o w t h a t i t is u n t e n a b l e . I t s e e m s t o

m e t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i s m r e l i e s u p o n a n i m p o r t a n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

w h a t i t is t h a t r e c e n t a n t i - F r e g e a n a r g u m e n t s h a v e r e a l ly e s t a b li s h e d .

A u s e f u l w a y t o a p p r o a c h t h is i ss u e is t o c o n s i d e r a d i s t in c t i o n w h i c h

h a s b e e n d r a w n a m o n g v a r i o u s d i f f e r e n t c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e ( al le g e d ly )

F r e g e a n n o t i o n o f s e n se . ( H e r e , I f o l lo w B u r g e ( 1 9 7 7 ) a n d S a l m o n

( 1 9 8 1 ) ( 19 8 6 a ). ) A m o n g t h e s e n se s ( o r c o m p o n e n t s ) o f s e n s e w h i c h

c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d , t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t t h e f o ll o w i n g :

(i) S e n s e j : a p u r e l y c o n c e p t u a l o r t o t a l l y d e s c r i p t i o n a l r e p r e -

s e n t a t i o n w h i c h a l l f u ll y c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s a s s o c i a te w i th a

s i n g u la r t e r m

(ii) S e n s e : : a s e t o r c l u s t e r o f p r o p e r t i e s ( r e p r e s e n t e d i n a d o s s i e r

o r m e n t a l f i l e ) w h i c h s p e a k e r s ( m o r e o r l e s s ) i d i o s y n c r a t i -

c a l ly a s s o c i a t e w i t h a s i n g u l a r t e r m

(iii) S en se 3: t h e m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h t h e r e f e r e n c e o f a s i n g u l a r

t e r m i s s e m a n t i c a l ly d e t e r m i n e d

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S E M A N T I C S F O R A T T I T U D E A S C R I PT I O N S 1 7

( iv ) S e ns e4 : t h e s e m a n t i c v a l u e o f h y p e r i n t e n s i o n a l o c c u r r e n c e s

o f a s in g u l a r t e r m ( i.e . o f o c c u r r e n c e s o f a si n g u l a r t e r m

w h i c h f al l w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f v e r b s o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t ti -

t u d e )

M o r e o v e r , i t i s u s e f u l t o n o t e t h a t F r e g e ' s o w n v i e w - - o r , a t l e a s t , t h e

v i ew w h i c h is m o s t c o m m o n l y a t t r ib u t e d t o F r e g e , an d w h i c h is t a k e n t o

b e t h e s t a n d a r d t a r g et o f t h e o r is t s s u c h a s S o a m e s a n d S a l m o n - - r e li es

o n a n o t i o n o f s e n s e w h i c h i s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s e n s e 1,

s e n se 3 , a n d s e n s e 4 ( o r p e r h a p s s e n se 2 , s e n s % , a n d s e n se 4 ).

N o w , F r e g e ' s o w n v i e w , a s t h u s c h a r a c t e r i s e d , h a s b e e n h e a v i l y

c r i t i c i s e d - - e s p e c i a l l y , a n d m o s t f a m o u s l y , b y S a u l K r i p k e ( 1 9 8 0 ) .

H o w e v e r , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e m o s t t h a t t h i s c r i t i c i s m s e e k s

t o e s t a b l i s h i s t h a t i t i s n o t t r u e t h a t t h e r e i s o n e n o t i o n w h i c h c a n

p l a u s i b l y b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h s e n s e 1 + s e n s e 3 + s e n s e 4. M o r e o v e r , i t is

a l s o w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t t h e m a i n a r g u m e n t o f Na ming A nd Necessity

a i m s t o s h o w t h a t i t i s a m i s t a k e t o i d e n t i f y s en s e~ w i t h s e n s % - - i .e . i t

s a y s n o t h i n g a t a l l a b o u t s e n s e 4.

M o r e r e c e n tl y , t h e r e h a v e b e e n t h e o r is t s - - e .g . S a l m o n , S o a m e s - -

w h o h a v e c o n t e n d e d t h a t th e o n l y t h in g t h a t s en s e4 c a n b e i s t h e

r e f e r e n t o f t h e s i n g u l a r t e r m i n q u e s t i o n . H o w e v e r , a s fa r as I c a n s e e ,

t h e r e i s v e r y l it tl e p o s i t i v e a r g u m e n t w h i c h h a s b e e n g i v e n f o r th i s v i e w ;

r a t h e r , t h e m a i n d e f e n c e o f th i s v i e w h a s b e e n t h a t it i s h a r d t o s e e w h a t

e l s e s e n s e 4 c o u l d b e . ( I h a v e c r i ti c i se d t h e p o s i t i v e a r g u m e n t s e l s e w h e r e

- - se e W h y S e m a n t ic I n n o c e n c e ? , Australasian Journal o f Philosophy

f o r t h c o m i n g ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , I d o n o t p r o p o s e t o r e p e a t t h e s e c r i t i c i s m s

h e r e .) B u t o n e i m p o r t a n t r e s u lt o f t h e a b o v e d i s c u s s io n i s th a t t h e r e i s

g o o d r e a s o n t o s u p p o s e t h a t s en se 4's a r e m o d e s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e

s e n s e t h e r e d e s c r i b e d . H e n c e , i f - - a s I h a v e a s s e r t e d - - t h e r e a r e n o

g o o d p o s i t iv e a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o u r o f th e v i e w t h a t t h e o n l y t h in g t h a t

s e n s e 4 c a n b e is t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t w h i c h e x p r e s s i o n s h a v e w h e n t h e y

o c c u r o u t s i d e o f h y p e r i n t e n s i o n a l c o n s t r u c ti o n s , t h e n t h e r e a r e n o g o o d

g e n e r a l o b j e c ti o n s t o t h e p o s i t i o n w h i c h I h a v e d e f e n d e d t o b e f o u n d i n

t h e e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e . ( O f c o u r s e , a s I a r g u e d e a r l i e r , t h e r e i s t h e

f u r t h e r p o i n t t h a t S a l m o n a n d S o a m e s n e e d s e n s e 4 i n t h e i r p r a g m a t i cs ;

c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y c a n h a r d l y c l a i m t h a t t h e y h a v e s h o w n t h a t n e o -

F r e g e a n t h e o r i e s a r e u n t en a b l e . )

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  8 GRAHAM OPPY

NOTE

* This paper is based on sections of my unpublished Ph.D. thesis: Attitude Problems

(Princeton, 1990). I would like to thank: Gil Harman, David Lewis, Scott Soames, Bas

van Fraassen, Richard Holton, Steve Rieber, Len Goddard, Allen Hazen, and Kai-Yee

Wong for their assistance with my thesis, and/or with this paper. Also, I thank the

editors and reviewers of Philosophical Studies for helpful comments and suggestions.

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W o l lo n g o ng , N S W 2 5 0 0

A u s t r a l i a