grand strategy

American Grand StrategyAmerican Grand StrategyAmerican Grand StrategyAmerican Grand Strategy

Concepts, Theory, History and FuturesConcepts, Theory, History and Futures

Presentation by Dr. Steven MetzPresentation by Dr. Steven Metz

U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies InstituteU.S. Army War College Strategic Studies InstituteApril 8, 2023April 8, 2023

Concepts and TheoryConcepts and Theory

Definitions, Levels, Dimensions, and ComponentsDefinitions, Levels, Dimensions, and Components

DefinitionDefinition

Strategy is the integrated and coherent use of power resources to Strategy is the integrated and coherent use of power resources to attain desired objectivesattain desired objectives– It is in contrast to an ad hoc or "muddling through" approachIt is in contrast to an ad hoc or "muddling through" approach

– Can be formal or informalCan be formal or informal

Strategy has two dimensionsStrategy has two dimensions– The The horizontalhorizontal dimension integrates effort across organizations and across dimension integrates effort across organizations and across

the elements of powerthe elements of power

– The The vertical vertical dimension plans for the mid- and long-term futuredimension plans for the mid- and long-term future

Strategy has two componentsStrategy has two components– Augmenting one's own strengthAugmenting one's own strength

– Deterring, weakening, thwarting or defeating opponentsDeterring, weakening, thwarting or defeating opponents

LevelsLevels

GrandGrand strategystrategy: patterns of behavior involving the integrated use : patterns of behavior involving the integrated use of power resources in pursuit of national objectivesof power resources in pursuit of national objectives

National security strategyNational security strategy: The component of grand strategy : The component of grand strategy dealing specifically with preventing, deterring, or defeating state dealing specifically with preventing, deterring, or defeating state or non-state threats or non-state threats

MilitaryMilitary strategystrategy: the component of grand strategy dealing : the component of grand strategy dealing specifically with preparing for, deterring, preventing, or specifically with preparing for, deterring, preventing, or conducting armed conflict by shaping the security environment, conducting armed conflict by shaping the security environment, strengthening friends, or acting directly against with opponents strengthening friends, or acting directly against with opponents and enemiesand enemies

RegionalRegional strategystrategy or strategies or strategies

Elements of StrategyElements of Strategy

EndsEnds: national objectives as defined by leaders and : national objectives as defined by leaders and elites, sometimes on their own, sometimes through elites, sometimes on their own, sometimes through consensus buildingconsensus building

MeansMeans: power resources—time, people, effort, : power resources—time, people, effort, moneymoney– military, political, economic, informationalmilitary, political, economic, informational

WaysWays: methods, procedures, and techniques for : methods, procedures, and techniques for using means to promote or attain endsusing means to promote or attain ends

The "5-2-2" Approach to Grand StrategyThe "5-2-2" Approach to Grand Strategy

Grand strategy has five Grand strategy has five componentscomponents– Definition of an appropriate Definition of an appropriate world roleworld role

– Identification of strategic Identification of strategic objectivesobjectives

– Characterization of Characterization of opponents or threatsopponents or threats (identification of, concept of motivation, (identification of, concept of motivation, strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)

– Identification of preferred and acceptable Identification of preferred and acceptable methodsmethods (applications of the elements of (applications of the elements of national power, e.g. containment)national power, e.g. containment)

– Identification of the appropriate level of Identification of the appropriate level of mobilizationmobilization Grand strategy has two Grand strategy has two determinants determinants (independent variables)(independent variables)

– The The internal internal (perceptions and preferences as articulated and shaped by leaders; state of (perceptions and preferences as articulated and shaped by leaders; state of the economy)the economy)

– The The externalexternal (actions of opponents, partners, fence sitters) (actions of opponents, partners, fence sitters) Grand strategy has two additional shifting central characteristics: the Grand strategy has two additional shifting central characteristics: the coherencecoherence of of

the strategy and its the strategy and its supporting consensussupporting consensus

Opponents adjust and adaptOpponents adjust and adapt– Edward Luttwak's "paradoxical logic" of strategy—what appears best often is Edward Luttwak's "paradoxical logic" of strategy—what appears best often is

not when facing an adapting opponent who seeks to deter, weaken, thwart, or not when facing an adapting opponent who seeks to deter, weaken, thwart, or defeat usdefeat us

Means/ends imbalances sometimes developMeans/ends imbalances sometimes develop– Three solutionsThree solutions

» Revise the endsRevise the ends» Make the ways more effectiveMake the ways more effective» Increase the meansIncrease the means

The global security environment, the nature of the The global security environment, the nature of the threat, and the nature of armed conflict changthreat, and the nature of armed conflict changee

Effective StrategiesEffective Strategies

Strategies require constant refinement and adjustmentStrategies require constant refinement and adjustmentStrategies require constant refinement and adjustmentStrategies require constant refinement and adjustment

Strategic CultureStrategic Culture

A nation's way of making and adjusting strategyA nation's way of making and adjusting strategy A nation's way of defining who affects strategyA nation's way of defining who affects strategy A nation's level of acceptable riskA nation's level of acceptable risk A nation's normative frameworkA nation's normative framework

Strategic culture is vital, but sometimesStrategic culture is vital, but sometimesoverlooked or underestimated. It includes:overlooked or underestimated. It includes:

Strategic culture is vital, but sometimesStrategic culture is vital, but sometimesoverlooked or underestimated. It includes:overlooked or underestimated. It includes:

A Strategic Approach to StatecraftA Strategic Approach to Statecraft

Think and act strategicallyThink and act strategically Constantly refine and adjust their strategyConstantly refine and adjust their strategy

– Formal or informal methodsFormal or informal methods

– U.S. today has the most elaborate formal method of strategy U.S. today has the most elaborate formal method of strategy formulation ever seenformulation ever seen

Develop methods to identify, educate, reward, and Develop methods to identify, educate, reward, and empower strategic thinkers and leadersempower strategic thinkers and leaders

Successful nations tend to be those whichSuccessful nations tend to be those whichSuccessful nations tend to be those whichSuccessful nations tend to be those which

HistoryHistory

The American Approach to Grand StrategyThe American Approach to Grand Strategy

Intermixed TraditionsIntermixed Traditions

Crusading spiritCrusading spirit– A nation defined by values--"beacon on the hill"A nation defined by values--"beacon on the hill"– Proselytizing policy--spread democracy and human rightsProselytizing policy--spread democracy and human rights– Low tolerance for moral ambiguityLow tolerance for moral ambiguity– Need to be on the side of "good" and to have partnersNeed to be on the side of "good" and to have partners

IsolationismIsolationism– Still powerful, particularly in the nation's heartlandStill powerful, particularly in the nation's heartland– Did not apply to the Western HemispherDid not apply to the Western Hemispheree

EconomismEconomism– Distance from threats and importance of trade led to tendency to define interests Distance from threats and importance of trade led to tendency to define interests

in economic termsin economic terms LegalismLegalism Realism--a European "import"Realism--a European "import" Reliance on technological solutions to problemsReliance on technological solutions to problems

The Reluctant PowerThe Reluctant Power

Even though the U.S. was the world's dominant Even though the U.S. was the world's dominant economic power by the early 20th century, it was a economic power by the early 20th century, it was a reluctant political and military powerreluctant political and military power– Led the creation of the League of Nations, then rejected itLed the creation of the League of Nations, then rejected it

World War II was the death knell of isolationismWorld War II was the death knell of isolationism

In Search of a StrategyIn Search of a Strategy

Initial vision for the post-war Initial vision for the post-war world was "collective security" world was "collective security" built on the United Nationsbuilt on the United Nations

Immediate and extreme Immediate and extreme demobilizationdemobilization

Emergence of the communist Emergence of the communist challenge and the Cold Warchallenge and the Cold War

A mission without a strategyA mission without a strategy

The Coalescence of ContainmentThe Coalescence of Containment

"Containment" coined by George Kennan"Containment" coined by George Kennan– Immediate and widespread acceptance of Immediate and widespread acceptance of

conceptconcept– Debate over how to implement it and its extentDebate over how to implement it and its extent

DebatesDebates– Was it purely political/economic or military?Was it purely political/economic or military?– Where did it apply? Where did it apply?

» Europe only? Everywhere?Europe only? Everywhere?

– What were the acceptable means?What were the acceptable means?» Roll back? Support to insurgents? Covert action? Roll back? Support to insurgents? Covert action?

Alliances with friendly dictators? Political warfare?Alliances with friendly dictators? Political warfare?

The Truman StrategyThe Truman Strategy

"Pactomania""Pactomania" Marshall PlanMarshall Plan Military technological superiorityMilitary technological superiority

– U.S. would not match the Soviets man for manU.S. would not match the Soviets man for man– Quality would substitute for quantityQuality would substitute for quantity

Strategic nuclear superiorityStrategic nuclear superiority National Security Act created a more effective and coherent National Security Act created a more effective and coherent

organizationorganization Beginning of covert actionBeginning of covert action Internal security—focus on subversionInternal security—focus on subversion

The Eisenhower StrategyThe Eisenhower Strategy

NSC 68 and the militarization of containmentNSC 68 and the militarization of containment Fear of adverse effects of large defense budgetsFear of adverse effects of large defense budgets Massive Retaliation and the ascendance of the airpowerMassive Retaliation and the ascendance of the airpower Application of containment to new regions like Middle Application of containment to new regions like Middle

East, Southeast Asia, and Latin AmericaEast, Southeast Asia, and Latin America Association with friendly dictatorsAssociation with friendly dictators Lukewarm acceptance of decolonizationLukewarm acceptance of decolonization Mobilization of national scientific and technological Mobilization of national scientific and technological

resourcesresources Increased emphasis on national air defenseIncreased emphasis on national air defense

The Kennedy/Johnson StrategyThe Kennedy/Johnson Strategy

"People's war" as the prime threat, Third World as the "People's war" as the prime threat, Third World as the major battlegroundmajor battleground– Significant economic and security assistanceSignificant economic and security assistance

Emergence of counterinsurgency; focus of SOF on this Emergence of counterinsurgency; focus of SOF on this rolerole

Vietnam did severe damage to U.S. reputation as force Vietnam did severe damage to U.S. reputation as force for democracy and human rightsfor democracy and human rights

Sustained superiority in aerospace and naval powerSustained superiority in aerospace and naval power

The Nixon/Ford StrategyThe Nixon/Ford Strategy

"Vietnamization" and the abandonment of "Vietnamization" and the abandonment of counterinsurgencycounterinsurgency

The ascent of "realism" and an approach The ascent of "realism" and an approach utilizing utilizing a balance of power logica balance of power logic– Detente and the "China Card"Detente and the "China Card"

The search for proxiesThe search for proxies– Iran, Israel, Zaire, etc.Iran, Israel, Zaire, etc.

Emergence of the terrorist challengeEmergence of the terrorist challenge

The Carter StrategyThe Carter Strategy

A "return to principles"—stress on human rightsA "return to principles"—stress on human rights– Downplaying the Soviet threatDownplaying the Soviet threat– Attempt to pressure friendly dictatorsAttempt to pressure friendly dictators

Nadir of the U.S. militaryNadir of the U.S. military A Soviet global offensiveA Soviet global offensive

– Southern AfricaSouthern Africa– Latin AmericaLatin America– Augmentation of blue water navyAugmentation of blue water navy

Narrowing aerospace superiorityNarrowing aerospace superiority

The Reagan StrategyThe Reagan Strategy

Return to a hard line approach to SovietsReturn to a hard line approach to Soviets– The enemy of my enemy is my friendThe enemy of my enemy is my friend

» Angola, Nicaragua, AfghanistanAngola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan

Massive improvement of militaryMassive improvement of military– Holistic quality: people, leadership and training in addition to technologyHolistic quality: people, leadership and training in addition to technology

– Development of many major weapons systems and platformsDevelopment of many major weapons systems and platforms

Spending the Soviets into submissionSpending the Soviets into submission Great emphasis on missile defenseGreat emphasis on missile defense Emergence of "LIC" strategy, doctrine, and organizationEmergence of "LIC" strategy, doctrine, and organization

The Bush 41StrategyThe Bush 41Strategy

A strategy of hegemony and global communityA strategy of hegemony and global community– "Everybody wants to be my baby now""Everybody wants to be my baby now"

Wave of global political and economic reformWave of global political and economic reform Breaking away from friendly dictatorsBreaking away from friendly dictators Military downsizing (but in a rational way)Military downsizing (but in a rational way)

– The two MTW concept and the Base ForceThe two MTW concept and the Base Force

Involvement in multinational peacekeepingInvolvement in multinational peacekeeping

The Clinton StrategyThe Clinton Strategy

A resurgence of idealism--spread of values, A resurgence of idealism--spread of values, promotion of democracy and market reformspromotion of democracy and market reforms

Global engagementGlobal engagement Coalition building against "rogue" statesCoalition building against "rogue" states Humanitarian intervention and peacekeepingHumanitarian intervention and peacekeeping The revolution in military affairsThe revolution in military affairs

– Emphasis on creativity, nonlinearity, "out of the box" thinkingEmphasis on creativity, nonlinearity, "out of the box" thinking

Growing focus on asymmetryGrowing focus on asymmetry A stressed militaryA stressed military

– Declining size, increasing OPTEMPODeclining size, increasing OPTEMPO

The Initial Bush 43 Strategy The Initial Bush 43 Strategy

Perception that military Perception that military transformation needs a jump starttransformation needs a jump start

Relooking global engagement, Relooking global engagement, humanitarian intervention, and humanitarian intervention, and protracted peacekeepingprotracted peacekeeping

Renewed emphasis on missile Renewed emphasis on missile defensedefense

Skepticism of partnership with Skepticism of partnership with some former enemies, particularly some former enemies, particularly ChinaChina

Bush 43 Strategy Post 9/11Bush 43 Strategy Post 9/11

ObjectivesObjectives– Change the dynamics that generate terrorismChange the dynamics that generate terrorism– End support for terrorismEnd support for terrorism– Destroy terrorists with “global reach”Destroy terrorists with “global reach”

MMethodsethods– Military actionMilitary action– Law enforcementLaw enforcement– Improved intelligenceImproved intelligence– Homeland securityHomeland security

» Pre 9/11 the core of homeland security was forward defense, with some emphasis on air/missile Pre 9/11 the core of homeland security was forward defense, with some emphasis on air/missile defense and internal subversiondefense and internal subversion

» Post 9/11 close defense and the focus on internal counterterrorism paramountPost 9/11 close defense and the focus on internal counterterrorism paramount

– PartnershipsPartnerships» Fluid coalitions—friends defined by their relationship with the threatFluid coalitions—friends defined by their relationship with the threat» New partnerships—India, Central Asian statesNew partnerships—India, Central Asian states» Transformed relationship with Russia and, to a lesser extent, ChinaTransformed relationship with Russia and, to a lesser extent, China

Seeking a New Grand StrategySeeking a New Grand Strategy

Debates and IssuesDebates and Issues

The Current Debate: ComponentsThe Current Debate: Components

Appropriate world roleAppropriate world role» A spectrum:A spectrum:

Global ImperialGlobal Imperial Global Engineer Global Engineer Limited Limited

» Global imperial world roleGlobal imperial world role: the United States seeks to determine, shape or : the United States seeks to determine, shape or dominate security globallydominate security globally

» Global engineer world roleGlobal engineer world role: the United States seeks to shape security globally : the United States seeks to shape security globally primarily through partnerships and the use of international organizationsprimarily through partnerships and the use of international organizations

» Limited world roleLimited world role: the United States determines, shapes or dominates : the United States determines, shapes or dominates security in some regions but not others security in some regions but not others


Strategic objectivesStrategic objectives– Managing sources of threat and conflict versus ameliorating themManaging sources of threat and conflict versus ameliorating them

» Amelioration is preferably, but very expensive and riskyAmelioration is preferably, but very expensive and risky

– Augmenting regional security structuresAugmenting regional security structures» Is this a good idea if it diminished the U.S. role?Is this a good idea if it diminished the U.S. role?

– Democracy, good governance, or stability?Democracy, good governance, or stability?» In the long term, democracy is the only assurance of good governance and In the long term, democracy is the only assurance of good governance and

social stabilitysocial stability» In the short term, democratization is usually destabilizing and often does not In the short term, democratization is usually destabilizing and often does not

generate good governancegenerate good governance» Is democracy exportable?Is democracy exportable?

– Should the preservation of American hegemony be a strategic objective?Should the preservation of American hegemony be a strategic objective?


Preferred and acceptable methodsPreferred and acceptable methods– Rollback versus containmentRollback versus containment

– Unilateral applications of military power (last resort?, if necessary to Unilateral applications of military power (last resort?, if necessary to maximize effectiveness and minimize risk?, never?)maximize effectiveness and minimize risk?, never?)

» Role of nuclear weaponsRole of nuclear weapons

– Nature of relationships with partnersNature of relationships with partners

– When and how "hard" (military) rather than "soft" power will be usedWhen and how "hard" (military) rather than "soft" power will be used

– Respect for sovereignty when attacking enemiesRespect for sovereignty when attacking enemies

– Role of covert actionRole of covert action

– Should U.S. corporations and media play a more overt role in grand Should U.S. corporations and media play a more overt role in grand strategy?strategy?


Opponents or threats (identification, concept of motivation, Opponents or threats (identification, concept of motivation, strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)strengths, weaknesses, likely actions)– Should U.S. grand strategy remained focused on countering or Should U.S. grand strategy remained focused on countering or

defeating terrorism?defeating terrorism?» How much effort should be devoted to containing rogue states, preventing How much effort should be devoted to containing rogue states, preventing

proliferation, or managing the emergence of new global powers?proliferation, or managing the emergence of new global powers?

» How much effort should be devoted to non-military threats that affect security (global How much effort should be devoted to non-military threats that affect security (global organized crime, pandemic diseases, organized crime, pandemic diseases, migration, the adverse effects of migration, the adverse effects of globalization, etc.)?globalization, etc.)?

– Should the opponents or threats be defined by their choice of tactics?Should the opponents or threats be defined by their choice of tactics?

– Is the root cause of terrorism the absence of political and economic Is the root cause of terrorism the absence of political and economic opportunity?opportunity?


MobilizationMobilization– Are we a "nation at war"?Are we a "nation at war"?

» If so, why have we not undertaken more extensive mobilization?If so, why have we not undertaken more extensive mobilization?» Why has Congress not declared war?Why has Congress not declared war?

– Should we mobilize?Should we mobilize?

– If so, what effect will this have on:If so, what effect will this have on:» Non-military sources of national strength like the academia and Non-military sources of national strength like the academia and

educational system, the media, the science and technology communities, educational system, the media, the science and technology communities, industryindustry

» American dependence on foreign technology, capital, manufactured goodsAmerican dependence on foreign technology, capital, manufactured goods» Methods of military recruitment (i.e. volunteer versus a draft military)Methods of military recruitment (i.e. volunteer versus a draft military)» Personal rights and legal protectionsPersonal rights and legal protections

The Current Debate: DeterminantsThe Current Debate: Determinants

Internal Internal – Growing "red/blue" schism within the American publicGrowing "red/blue" schism within the American public

– Potential budgetary crisisPotential budgetary crisis» Impending demand for increase in social spending as the population agesImpending demand for increase in social spending as the population ages

» Trade and spending deficits could generate economic problemsTrade and spending deficits could generate economic problems

– Potential fading of support for an active American world rolePotential fading of support for an active American world role

ExternalExternal– Will other states attempt to contain or constrain the United States?Will other states attempt to contain or constrain the United States?

– Can traditional alliances be sustained?Can traditional alliances be sustained?

– Will effective regional security systems emerge?Will effective regional security systems emerge?

– What will America's opponents and enemies do?What will America's opponents and enemies do?

The Current Debate: CharacteristicsThe Current Debate: Characteristics

CoherenceCoherence– Current grand strategy is only moderately coherent, but this is normal in Current grand strategy is only moderately coherent, but this is normal in

the period following a significant strategic shiftthe period following a significant strategic shift

» The current era is analogous to the late 1940s when there was The current era is analogous to the late 1940s when there was agreement that containment was a good idea but disagreement over agreement that containment was a good idea but disagreement over how and where to apply it.how and where to apply it.

Supporting consensus Supporting consensus – Supporting consensus is fragile due to schisms in the American polity, Supporting consensus is fragile due to schisms in the American polity,

information saturation (which gives everyone a picture of an opinion information saturation (which gives everyone a picture of an opinion toward any application of national power), the way current strategy was toward any application of national power), the way current strategy was formulated (by fiat rather than consensus-building), and the lingering formulated (by fiat rather than consensus-building), and the lingering isolationist instinct outside the East and West coastisolationist instinct outside the East and West coast

Future Grand StrategiesFuture Grand Strategies

AlternativesAlternatives

Alternative 1Alternative 1

Additional major terrorist attacks in the U.S., possibly involving Additional major terrorist attacks in the U.S., possibly involving WMD, focus American on GWOT and remove any restraintsWMD, focus American on GWOT and remove any restraints

Very aggressive global posture including preemption and Very aggressive global posture including preemption and intervention in terrorism sponsoring states and regionsintervention in terrorism sponsoring states and regions– Long term presence or occupation of central states or regionsLong term presence or occupation of central states or regions

Partners and friends are defined solely by their role in GWOTPartners and friends are defined solely by their role in GWOT Significant increase in national mobilization and constriction of Significant increase in national mobilization and constriction of

personal rightspersonal rights– Development of a full national strategy to augment resourcesDevelopment of a full national strategy to augment resources

Significant increase in defense budget and size of the militarySignificant increase in defense budget and size of the military

The Lion UnboundThe Lion Unbound


Linear progression and success of existing strategyLinear progression and success of existing strategy– Political, economic, and social reform takes root in the current cauldrons of terrorism; this Political, economic, and social reform takes root in the current cauldrons of terrorism; this

undercuts the dynamic that generates terrorismundercuts the dynamic that generates terrorism

– National and regional security capabilities improveNational and regional security capabilities improve

The U.S. continues to play the dominant role in all regions, but this is accepted by The U.S. continues to play the dominant role in all regions, but this is accepted by most regional statesmost regional states

Emerging powers like China remain stable and integrate into the global Emerging powers like China remain stable and integrate into the global communitycommunity

Proliferation of WMD is controlledProliferation of WMD is controlled Transformation preserves U.S. military superiorityTransformation preserves U.S. military superiority Eventually, modest decline in U.S. defense budget, force size, level of national Eventually, modest decline in U.S. defense budget, force size, level of national

mobilization, and constriction of personal rightsmobilization, and constriction of personal rights

The Lion BenignThe Lion Benign


Multiple internal wars and state failures, including some in major Multiple internal wars and state failures, including some in major regional powers, create cascading security dilemmas and regional powers, create cascading security dilemmas and humanitarian disastershumanitarian disasters– A long list of potentials: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, A long list of potentials: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria,

Egypt, Ukraine, Colombia, Brazil, VenezuelaEgypt, Ukraine, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela

U.S. military involved in large scale, protracted stabilization U.S. military involved in large scale, protracted stabilization operations, probably in concert with some partnersoperations, probably in concert with some partners– Development of some method of strategic triageDevelopment of some method of strategic triage

– Emphasis on identifying and preventing internal war or state collapseEmphasis on identifying and preventing internal war or state collapse

Controlling "loose nukes" becomes the highest strategic priorityControlling "loose nukes" becomes the highest strategic priority

The Lion BeleagueredThe Lion Beleaguered


Some combination of frustration with Iraq, the widespread Some combination of frustration with Iraq, the widespread disintegration of regional security structures, domestic economic disintegration of regional security structures, domestic economic problems, alienation from traditional allies, and lessened dependence problems, alienation from traditional allies, and lessened dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum forces or allows the United States to on Middle Eastern petroleum forces or allows the United States to diminish its role in the security of some or most regionsdiminish its role in the security of some or most regions

Major security role in the Western Hemisphere likely to continueMajor security role in the Western Hemisphere likely to continue Greater focus on and shift of resources to homeland security rather Greater focus on and shift of resources to homeland security rather

than force projectionthan force projection Preservation of long range strike systems—nuclear and non-nuclearPreservation of long range strike systems—nuclear and non-nuclear

—to deter opponents—to deter opponents

The Lion DisengagedThe Lion Disengaged

Implications for the ArmyImplications for the Army

The greatest demands on the Army will come from grand strategies that The greatest demands on the Army will come from grand strategies that are active and which seek amelioration of the root causes of conflictare active and which seek amelioration of the root causes of conflict– The highest demand on the Army would come if these conditions hold and the The highest demand on the Army would come if these conditions hold and the

world sees frequent internal conflict, collapse, and humanitarian disasters in large world sees frequent internal conflict, collapse, and humanitarian disasters in large regional statesregional states

The least demands on the Army would be within a strategy of partial The least demands on the Army would be within a strategy of partial disengagementdisengagement– The Army's role would be support to homeland security and, possibly, participation The Army's role would be support to homeland security and, possibly, participation

in multinational peacekeepingin multinational peacekeeping

Linear continuation of the current strategy is likely to create an Linear continuation of the current strategy is likely to create an increased role for the Army (and, probably, a larger end strength) in the increased role for the Army (and, probably, a larger end strength) in the mid-term, with a decline coming as the strategy succeeds (probably 5-mid-term, with a decline coming as the strategy succeeds (probably 5-10 years)10 years)

Dr. Steven MetzDr. Steven MetzStrategic Studies InstituteStrategic Studies InstituteU.S. Army War CollegeU.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244Voice phone 717 245-3822 Fax 717 245-3820Voice phone 717 245-3822 Fax 717 245-3820Email: Email: [email protected]@us.army.milWeb: http://Web: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi// revised April 8, 2023

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