grau

42 July -August 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW

THE UNITED STATES and its coalition alliesare currently engaged in counterinsurgencies

in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these are clearly dif-ferent countries and insurgencies, they have somecommon features. The guerrilla war in Afghanistangrew from the remnants of the Taliban movement—a loose confederation of Pashtun tribesmen underan overarching Islamic fundamentalist banner. TheTaliban’s Islamic Emirate was devoted to Pashtundominance and the restoration of 12th-century Is-lamic practices.

Foreigners from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,and other Sunni Arab and non-Arab cultures joinedthe Taliban. Even Chechens, Islamic Movement ofUzbekistan adherents, and Uighurs from China joinedthe foreign contingent, often as part of al-Qaeda.The Taliban was not a guerrilla force; it was a con-ventional force that fought and deployed in linearfashion using light-cavalry tactics based on pickuptrucks and leftover Soviet equipment. U.S. SpecialForces, working with the main ground forces of theAfghan Northern Alliance and strike aircraft, quicklydismantled the force.

The primary Taliban combatant was not theMujahideen warrior who had fought the Soviets forover 9 years, although many of the commanderswere. The primary Taliban combatant was a young

man who had grown up in refugee camps while hismale relatives were fighting the Soviet 40th Army.

Today, the Taliban is a fragmented force consist-ing of independent bands that call themselves Talibanbut have little allegiance to the original Taliban leader.These Taliban, unable to match Western coalitionforces in technology or conventional combat, havereverted to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Al-Qaedahas withdrawn from most of the direct combat andhas assumed an advisory and training role.

The guerrilla war remains local, Pashtun, Sunni,and disjointed, and with little apparent hierarchy andorganization. The war is primarily rural, and the guer-rillas enjoy sanctuary along Afghanistan’s easternborder with Pakistan. Funding is local, with someoutside donations, but the bulk now comes from thedrug trade. Maintaining the drug trade often justi-fies guerrilla activity.

The current Iraqi guerrilla war grew from a de-feated hierarchical party-state structure. The armyofficer corps, Baathist party, and Fedayeen militiawere secular state institutions drawn primarily fromthe ruling minority—Sunni Arab peoples. Much ofthe hierarchy and interrelations of the state struc-ture remain intact in the remnant guerrilla organiza-tion. Foreign combatants, including al-Qaeda mem-bers and Chechens, have entered Iraq to fight the

Something Old, Something New

Guerrillas,Terrorists, andIntelligenceAnalysisLieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired

43MILITARY REVIEW l July -August 2004

coalition. They do not blend in well, however, andmany have since left or assumed specialized sup-port roles such as bomb manufacturer, suicidebomber, or instructor.

The Iraqi combatants have little experience infighting as actual guerrillas, but some do havecounterinsurgency experience against Kurds andShia Iraqis. The insurgency has a strong urban com-ponent, particularly in Baghdad, Mosul, Fallujah, AlSulaymaniyah, Samarra, and Tikrit. The rural guer-rilla war is primarily restricted to the Sunni trianglewest-northwest of Baghdad. The urban guerrillasrely primarily on improvised explosive devices (IEDs)because their marksmanship is not good. Iraqi guer-rillas lack a ready sanctuary, but they are well fundedwith billions of U.S. dollars held by Iraq’s formerleaders. They have ready access to large stocks ofweapons and explosives.

The military intelligence effort devoted to com-bating either insurgency has little in common withconventional intelligence operations in support ofconventional maneuver war. Intelligence preparationof the battlefield, order of battle, templating forces,signals intelligence; measurement and signatureintelligence; and electronic intelligence take dif-ferent forms or are not applicable. The S2 or G2has a different type of war and needs to take a

different approach to dealing with it, much as theU.S. approach to peacekeeping evolved during thepast decade.1

The S2 and G2 are involved in a form of policeinvestigative work, specifically police investigationsdealing with gangs and narcotrafficers. Associationmatrixes, network analysis, cultural analysis, gene-alogy, event-pattern analysis, language-pattern analy-sis, traffic-flow analysis, and financial-transactionanalysis are police tools that should be staples of theintelligence effort in a counterinsurgency.2 Adoptingthese tools does not imply adopting accompanyingrestrictions on combat lethality or local rules of en-gagement that apply to police forces.

Afghanistan now has an elected civilian govern-ment, and there will be one in Iraq. Convertingformer police states to those governed by rule of lawwill cause many problems, but new Afghan and Iraqipolice forces are being trained and equipped to dealwith local problems. The collection efforts of localpolice forces must also be integrated into the intelli-gence process. The military and police conduct co-vert and overt collection for different functions andunder different rules. Still, raw data and intelligenceproduced might be mutually supportive.

Some advocate harsh, brutish measures to collectuseful intelligence against terrorists and guerrillas.

An Iraqi translator working with the 1st Armored Division speaks withFacility Protection Service members manning a checkpoint, February2004. These men often speak with drivers who obtain muchinformation through their travels and rest stops.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS


They point to the efficacy of torture and extraordi-nary means employed by the French during the 1957battle for Algiers, concentrating on its tactical suc-cess and ignoring its strategic failure.3 This politicallycharged argument influenced the French presiden-tial election of 2002. Proper investigative tools andinterrogation techniques, a well-organized intelli-gence database, and well-trained soldiers and policeshould obviate and prevent any such misguidedshortcuts.

Gang WarfareCharting the guerrillas’ orders of battle, tables of

organization and equipment, and line and blockcharts is fantasy in Afghanistan and nearly so in Iraq.In these insurgencies, intelligence personnel aretracking gangs, not constituted forces. The problemis equivalent to police determining who are in whichgangs, what territories they control, and what arma-ments, tactics, logistics, and patterns they use. Po-lice and Drug Enforcement Administration investi-gators know how to do this because they have beendoing it for years.

Culture counts, and intelligence personnel needto understand the language, history, and culture ofthe area in which they must work. Army foreignarea officers (FAOs) are trained in these areas andneed to be assigned to brigades, not hoarded at se-nior headquarters. FAOs are “the unconventionalmen . . . , largely out of sight . . . , carrying the loadand transforming the world order.”4 FAOs are es-sential to understanding the culture, but problems re-main, even when good FAOs are present.

The nature of Afghan and Iraqi societies makesthe populace expert at hiding, dissimulating, and de-ceiving. Loyalties are to family, close associates, fel-low villagers, and clan or tribal members. Censusdata are so dated as to be almost useless. In thecase of Iraq, Baathist party membership rosters, mili-tary manning charts, police records, and Fedayeenregistration books are useful; however, prime intel-ligence is derived from analysis of family genealo-gies, development of association matrixes, and con-tact network charts (link analysis). These techniques,of course, are less applicable to outsiders and bor-der crossers.

Two things the police have going for them are thebeat cop who has worked the neighborhood foryears and police snitches who, for a fee or a favor,keep the police informed. Overt and covert closed-circuit TV (CCTV) networks, close liaison with thelocal police department, development of agent net-

works, and detailed data files on known guerrillashelp the intelligence section gain local insight fast.Information technology can also help. Specialists canintercept, track, and triangulate cell phone calls. TheRussians killed Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaevwith a beam-riding missile that locked onto his cellphone transmission. Geographic InformationSystems software can use the Global PositioningSystem to locate sites of past ambushes and IEDattacks and calculate possible future attack sites, as-sembly areas, safe houses, and residences. Pattern-analysis mapping software can predict sites andlikely times of attack.5

Geographic profiling, a police technique that com-bines spatial analysis and psychological behavior pat-terns of criminals, looks at such factors as distanceto the crime, demographics, landscape analysis, pat-tern analysis, crime scene forensic analysis, and psy-chological criminal profiling. Ambushes, raids, IEDand mortar attacks, sniping attacks, and other guer-rilla actions are complex serial crimes. Police canuse geographic profiling to identify separate groupsor group members, provide theoretical profiles, de-termine likely residences or likely attack times,routes, and tactics.

Property ownership and mapping, also a valuabletool in counterinsurgency, can identify communitypower brokers, vested interests, and family connec-tions. Financial transactions, cell phone transmissions,and travel patterns can also provide valuable datato intelligence analysts. Finding the guerrilla is afunction of detective work. Who is he? Who doeshe work with? Who are members of his family, andwhere do they live? What is his background? Whoare his associates?

Extensive data files are a boring but necessarypart of finding the guerrilla. However, computerdata-mining can ease the job considerably by pro-viding assistance in incident (crime scene) analysis,optimum force deployment, risk assessment, behav-ioral analysis, DNA analysis, force protection, andinternet and infrastructure protection.6 All the toolsof police investigation are relevant. Technologymakes it easier, but a lot of old-fashioned footworkand analysis is still required. Military lawyers and thesupporting psychological operations (PSYOP) andcivil affairs units should be briefed regularly and vis-ited to prevent incidents and turf issues.

The 4th Infantry Division (ID) captured SaddamHussein based on intelligence developed from link-pattern analysis. The 4th ID is the most modernized,digitized, and computerized division in the Army, yet


intelligence personnel who did the link-pattern analy-sis did it the tedious, old-fashioned way, using padsof butcher-board paper, yellow stickies, and a largewall chart.7 Some dedicated intelligence personneldid a brilliant job, but time and energy could havebeen greatly reduced with current software appli-cations and computerized databases.

Intelligence in a counterinsurgency needs a na-tional computerized database that can be readilyshared by the police and coalition military. Doing thisrequires uniformity in software and procedures. Thedatabase should also have a reach-back capability.A database is only as good as its data, so standardforms for felony tracking and debriefing are essen-tial. The database should allow ready access to gangintelligence, crime/event mapping, modus operandi,and routine data such as property ownership, andtelephone and financial records. Existing databases,such as those of the National Agency Center, Na-tional Criminal Investigation Service, and evenLexisNexis, a commercial database for legal andother research, could serve as models.

Investigative software should be available to allsubscribers, compatible with the national database,

and have compartmented capabilities for classifiedmaterial. Analyzed intelligence and raw data shouldbe available on the national database. Naturally,the base should be dual-language so the host nationcan participate and eventually take it over. The baseshould be Web-enabled and available to unitstraining in the United States before deploymentto the area.

The police Real Analytical Intelligence Database(RAID) software might be a good start point. RAIDtracks people, vehicles, weapons, events, and finan-cial data; handles partial numbers, genealogies, andassociations; links events to people and things; andhas an Analyst’s Notebook for link-pattern analysis.Although RAID is designed for local law enforce-ment, it is Web-enabled, which gives it a statewideand nationwide capability. PATHFINDER and theAnalyst’s Notebook are two Department of De-fense software programs that can be modified toperform many of the same tasks.

To train analysts to work with such software andmodern investigative techniques is a separate issue.Analysts require training in information-gathering,data-mining, data development, case management,

A soldier lifts astyrofoam lid cover-ing the hole whereformer Iraqi PresidentSaddam Hussein washiding, 13 December2003. Link patternanalysis by the 4thInfantry Divisionbrought the soldiersto this location inAd Dawr, Iraq.



link-flow-event analysis, detecting hidden assets,postseizure analysis, matrix development, chart de-velopment, pattern analysis, alternative competinghypotheses, and communications analysis. AnacapaSciences, Incorporated, and regional High-IntensityDrug Traffic Area offices run excellent police-analyst courses. The Defense Intelligence Agencyand the U.S. Northern Command Intelligence De-tachment at Fort Leavenworth run similar excellentmilitary-analyst courses.

Nontechnical police methods also exist that couldapply to counterinsurgency. The local police mustbe honest and respected. Police departments needto be well equipped and well trained. Police integ-rity is key, so higher pay, background checks, drugtesting, and anticorruption units are essential, andpolice captains need to be accountable for the crimerates in their precincts. Confidential informantswho produce information should be paid on time andtheir identities protected. The sites of guerrillaattacks need to be treated as crime scenes, andforensic specialists need to work for or with theintelligence community. Liaison between the policeand the intelligence community is essential—justas it is among intelligence offices. Social servicesalso play a role. Guerrillas and other criminals do nothang out in neighborhoods that are clean, safe, andin good repair.

Translators and InterrogatorsHuman intelligence (HUMINT) is the driving

force in intelligence production and analysis in acounterinsurgency. The military does not have nearlyenough FAOs, translators, and interrogators who canspeak the dominant languages (Dari, Pashtu, Uzbek,Urdu, Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, and Farsi) in thesetwo insurgencies. Mastery of the primary form ofthe language is not always enough, because local dia-lects frustrate effective communication. Further-more, soldier/linguists often have little training in theculture, history, and customs of the regions.

Intelligence cells are frequently at the mercy ofcontract translators whose command of English (andeven sometimes the target language) is spotty. If thetranslator is local, he has better community accessand acceptance but is subject to local threats andblackmail. If the translator is an outsider, he is lessa target for threats and blackmail, but also lesstrusted and accepted by the locals. Often people willnot want to speak through a local translator becausethey are providing information they might not wantothers to know. They prefer to talk to uniformed

personnel. Vetting of translators is tricky and oftenmeans that the translator never gets inside intelli-gence offices. Barring translators from intelligenceoffices limits translator input.

Working with a translator is a process that requirestime and rehearsal. Just because a person speaksEnglish and the target language does not mean heis literate. In Iraq, 60 percent of males and 70 per-cent of females are not educated above the 8thgrade. In Afghanistan, the literacy rate is below 10percent.

The translator must understand the topic beforehe can interpret the conversation correctly. Thetranslator will frequently need crash training in mili-tary topics, civil engineering, medical treatments, orbanking laws before he can serve effectively inspecialized areas. Interviews should be rehearsedto ensure the translator understands the topic ofconversation and has time to master unfamiliarvocabulary.

The user and translator must develop a close re-lationship so translators feel they have the freedomto criticize and offer constructive suggestions.(Please do not broadcast PSYOP messages duringthe call for prayer. Please tell your soldiers to re-move their sunglasses when they talk to people.Please tell your soldiers not to point their guns atpeople at checkpoints.) The interrogator shouldschedule more time for conversations because trans-lated conversations normally take three times as longas the same conversation would between nativespeakers. The translator also needs frequent breaks.Nonstop translation work is tiring, and tired transla-tors make mistakes. Further, using multiple transla-tors provides checks and balances to the agendastranslators have—and each ethnic and religiousgroup has its own agenda.

Body language is another important part of com-munication, particularly when working through atranslator. Both parties have plenty of time to studythe other’s body language while the translator isworking both sides of the conversation. Knowingand controlling body language can help sell the mes-sage.

It is essential to know how accurate a translatoris, but determining this is difficult. The easiest wayis to have a fluent U.S. translator monitor the trans-lator. If a good U.S. translator is not available, theinterrogator can make a videotape to evaluate later.Many translators want to please the participants ina conversation, so they shade the conversation, tell-ing each side what they want to hear. Many trans-


lators are unaware of the nuances of the English lan-guage, so “request” might become “demand.” Hon-est translations are critical.

The translator should not be used in a “good cop,bad cop” role. That is a task for interrogators. Thetranslator must maintain a neutral posture and beviewed as a conduit of information, not part of theenforcement regime.

Patrols, Checkpoints, and DriversPatrols, checkpoints, drivers, and pilots can gen-

erate excellent HUMINT. However, getting the datais not an automatic process. All participants have tobe regularly briefed as to what they are looking for.(What is taking place outside this mosque today? Areweapons openly displayed there? Are there more orfewer people outside the mosque than normal? Howmany? How did the people react to your presencenear the mosque? Are there any banners displayedby the mosque? What does your translator tell youthat they say? Was the mosque loudspeaker used foranything besides the call to prayer? What did the trans-lator say the loudspeaker message was? Was any-one wearing headbands or distinctive clothing nearthe mosque? Did anything strike you as unusual?)

Debriefing is crucial and easily neglected. Soldierswant to maintain their equipment and get somechow and rest after a mission, but the mission is not

over until participants are debriefed. Timely, profes-sional debriefing is essential because it provides in-formation, keeps observers focused, and keeps theintelligence effort tuned to the tactical arena wherethe counterinsurgency is fought. Of course, there isovert collection and covert collection. A good agentnet is also essential, and agents should be trained,assigned targets, briefed, and debriefed just as care-fully as the soldiers in the patrol.

Checkpoints can be a good source of information.Permanent vehicle checkpoints are not as effectiveas mobile vehicle checkpoints because people whocannot pass a checkpoint will normally avoid it.People are more accepting of a vehicle checkpointthan a pedestrian one. While the primary objectiveof the vehicle checkpoint is to interdict supplies,weapons, and likely enemies, the primary objectiveof the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information.Professional behavior by checkpoint personnel is es-pecially important. Tips for successful pedestriancheckpoints include the following:

l Interview pedestrians individually and privately.Covert CCTV taping of the interview can be usedto counter charges of inhumane treatment.

l Give each person approximately the sameamount of time regardless of whether they are pro-viding information or not. Have a system in place soindividuals with lots of information can easily and

A soldier of the Afghan National Army trans-lates what a local Afghan man is saying to a19th Special Forces Group sergeant during a Medical Civil Action Program visit to Poli-charki, Afghanistan, 5 February 2003.



confidentially contact the unit for a lengthy debriefing.l Offer each individual coffee, tea, cigarettes,

candy, or other comfort items as appropriate.l Apologize for and explain the need for the in-

terview or brief search.

l Organize and control the waiting area. Provideseating and place a polite, patient person in chargeof it. Secure the area against attack.

l Maintain tight security but do not openly bran-dish weapons.

Iraqis detained and held atForward Observation Base (FOB)Eagle after a mortar tube andmortar rounds were found in theirpossession in a village near Balad,Iraq, 10 October 2003. Themortar was aimed toward FOBEagle, which had come underattack that morning. Firm handlingof prisoners should not translateinto unnecessary harshness,which is counterproductive togood HUMINT. Proper investiga-tive tools and interrogationtechniques, a well-organizedintelligence database, and well-trained soldiers and police shouldobviate and prevent any suchmisguided shortcuts.


Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the For-eign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.A. from the Universityof Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the U.S.Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army Russian Institute, the DefenseLanguage Institute, and the U.S. Air Force War College. He has held various commandand staff positions in the continental United States, Europe, and Vietnam.

NOTES1. Timothy L. Thomas, “Preventing Conflict Through Information Technology,” Mili-

tary Review (December 1998/January-February 1999): 44-57, and “IT Requirements forPeacekeeping,” Military Review (September-October 2001): 29.

2. Much of the material in this article comes from interviews with CW4 Trammell R.Davis; Captain Pat Grove, Kansas City Police Intelligence Center; Jose Jimenez, Re-tired Police Lieutenant, New York Police Department; Tom Mink, Senior Security Spe-cialist, Commerce Bank; Major Robert Peters, Military Intelligence, U.S. Command andGeneral Staff College; Detective Phil Stockard; Midwest High-Intensity Drug Traffick-ing Area (HIDTA); Sam Thompson, Midwest HIDTA; Sergeant Greg Volker, Kansas CityPolice Department; and Detective Shelly Volker, Midwest HIDTA. The author retains re-sponsibility for the contents of the article.

3. Bruce Hoffman, “A Nasty Business,” The Atlantic Monthly (January 2002).

4. Robert Kaplan, “The Man Who Would Be Khan,” The Atlantic Monthly (March2004): 56.

5. Lois Pilant, “Crime Mapping and Analysis,” The Police Chief (December 1999): 44.6. Colleen McCue, Emily S. Stone, and Teresa P. Gooch, “Data Mining and Value-

Added Analysis,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (November 2003): 3.7. Farnaz Fassihi, “Two Novice Gumshoes Charted the Capture of Saddam

Hussein,” Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2004, 1.8. Geoffrey B. Demarest, “Tactical Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict,” Military In-

telligence (October-December 1985): 19.9. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Intelligence on Demand: An Interview with Stephen

Cambone, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence,” The ISR Journal (1 December2003).

l Use a trained interrogator.l Do not try to control too large an area or stay

in one place too long.l Do not act immediately on information a pe-

destrian provides if that would compromise thepedestrian’s safety or future cooperation.

l Have women present when interviewingwomen and have women search women.8

Information SharingThe U.S. intelligence community is large and per-

vasive. Unfortunately, various agencies run their in-telligence data and analysis in bureaucratic stove-pipes, which run straight from the tactical level tothe highest strategic levels with little sharing alongthe way. In theory, the community is supposed toshare intelligence at the highest strategic level andthen pass that information back down to the peoplewho need it. In practice, this seldom happens. Rawdata are seldom passed back—just agreed-on intel-ligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenizedproduct from which dissenting views and contradict-ing evidence has been removed or discounted so thecommunity can have a common view. This practicemight serve policy-level intelligence customers, butit does not provide timely, relevant intelligence to thetactical user.

If intelligence does come back down the stove-pipe, it often arrives too late. Indeed, the tactical useroften lacks clearances and tickets to get the ap-proved product. Undersecretary of Defense StephenCambone is trying to change this pattern, but he hasto fight decades of practice, procedures, and train-ing to do so.9

The tactical intelligence officer needs to meet,visit, and cultivate counterparts in other agencies toaccess raw data and preliminary analysis as it goesup the various stovepipes. Conversely, the tacticalintelligence officer needs to reciprocate so the rela-

tionship is mutually supportive. Other intelligenceagencies also experience difficulties with thestovepipes.

Intelligence sharing extends to neighboringunits, coalition partners, sister services, and combatservice and combat service support units. Militarypolice and truck drivers see more of the country-side than anyone and should be a prime sourceof information.

Getting on TopIntelligence in counterinsurgency, which has al-

ways been a tough job, differs from intelligence formaneuver war in its more protracted nature and re-quirement to function more in a cultural context.Technology and modern police investigative tech-niques can help. Intelligence data can be generatedby traditional means (such as patrols and agents),gathered as events occur, or helped along. Lots ofdata are necessary. Anti-American rallies should befilmed and individuals identified for follow-up action.DNA and voice files can be initiated. Ground andair sensors have improved markedly over the pastdecade and should be used and maintained. Cellu-lar telephones and computer communications are anexploitable technology. Efforts should be made tomake sure that these are available for the generalpopulace and potential guerrilla alike.

Bribes and rewards often produce results if theyare believed and do not get the informer killed. Agood local agent network remains an essential partof counterguerrilla work. If intelligence determinesthat the guerrilla is buying something distinctive(name-brand backpacks, mountain boots, or explo-sives), perhaps electronic tags or chemical tags couldbe inserted before delivery. There are many waysto find the guerrilla. A comprehensive, coordinatedapproach, using the latest science and proven tech-niques, can do just that. MR


grau

News & Politics