greek political oratory (penguin classics)

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CONTENTS

Innoduction

THUcyDIDEs: pERIcLEs ' FUNERAL spEEcH

L Y S I A S : A G A I N S T D R A T O S T H E N E S

A N D O C I D E S : O N T H E M Y S T E R I E S

I S O C R A T T S : P A N E G Y R I C U S

P H I L I P

DEMosrHEruns II]: For Megalopolis

On the Liberty of Rhodes

Philippic I

Olynthiac I

Olynrhiac II

Olynthiac III

Irrf: On the Peace

Pltilippic II

On the Chersonese

Philippic III

Glossary oJ' technical terms

Map

Chronologicul table of eaents between 5ro and, g6 e.c.

Bibliographjt

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235

249

264

268

270

272

I N T R O D U C T I O N

I . T H E G R O W T H O F A T T I C O R A T O R Y

WntN we speak of political oratory, we think first in terms ofthe great British orators of the eighteenth and later centuries,and of speeches in the House of Lords or House of Commonsrather than of speeches in a court of law. It is therefore importantto begin a discussion of Greek political oratory by emphasizingthe. fact that only a -small proportion of the extant work ofancient orators was of this kind, consisting, that is, of speechesmade in a constituent assembly and intended directly to influencepolitical policy. In fact almost the only speeches of this kindwhich we still possess in Greek are the shorter speeches ofDemosthenes, most of which are included in this volume, anda few ascribed to him, but now regarded as of doubtful authen-ticity. The great majority of extant Greek speeches are notdeliberative, but forensic, that is to say that they were deliveredin a court of law and aimed to secure the condemnation or theacquittal of an individual, as were Lysias' prosecution ofEratosthenes and Andocides' defence of himself against prosecu-tion for impiety, which are both included here. This ielectionalso includes two discourses of Isocrates, 'speeches' rvhichwere never actually delivered, but were published pamphletsemploying an oratorical form and style. Greek prose liteiaturesometimes adopted a convention of appearing in the form ofspeeches, like those of Isocrates, or of dialogues, like those ofPlato. Finally, the speeches in this selection are preceded by atranslation of the celebrated Funeral Speech, nominally ofPericles, which serves to represent a further division of Greekoratory, the epideictic, speeches made for public occasions. Itis most unlikely ever to have been delivered at all as it stands,since it is part of the Historlt of Thucydides. All these, however,share a markedly political content, and are closely associatedwith important political events or trends, and provide matter ofimportance for undersranding political history.

G R E E K P O L I T I C A L O R A T O R Y

All Greek oratory known to us is in the Attic dialect and wasdelivered or published in Athens. This of course is true of thegreat majoriry of Greek literature of the fifth and fourth cen-turies s.c. and is a fact which inevitably colours the views wehold of Greek life and politics. That oratory, like poetry,flourished in Athens can readily be understood. Athenianquickness of wit and tongue ensured it. It is not only in art, butin philosophy that Athens excelled. Nonetheless, there musthly" been speeches made by Spartans, Thebans or Argives,which are not preserved except for one or two which arg given,changed, if not improvised, in the pages of Thucydides. But itmust be remembered also that Athenian pre-eminence in speechmust have been reflected in the choice of passages for reprbduc-tion by later centuries. The actual selection may have dependeda lot on chance, or the requirements of rhetorical teaching, butit constitutes a judgemenr of posterity which, while it may haveallowed some things of value to perish, did not preserve muchof what was worthless. And the speeches which were so selectedare entirely Athenian.

Nor is any Greek speech extant which belongs to an earlierdate than about 4r7 8.c., the probable date of Antiphon'sspeech On the Murder oJ'Herodes. This is in part due to thecircumstances regarding publication, which will be mentionedbelow (p. tg). Addicted as they were to self-expression, rheGreeks seem not to have begun till then to write and record thespeeches which were made, despite the enormous importanceattached to the power to speak well. This is manifest from theHomeric poems onwards. Not only do we find speeches givento historical persons in the work of Herodotus and rhucydides,but they appear as forensic, not merely dramatic, as early asthe Eumenides of Aeschylus (458 n.c.), while the tragedies ofEuripides,rh9* frequent signs of familiarity with speech-makingboth as a habit and as an organized art. Herodotus and Thucy-dides, indeed, used speeches in an original fashion, but it'isunlikely that any of their readers supposed that the speeches inquestion had been delivered as they stood. They do, however,presuppose the habit of speech-making. The Herodotean speech,and after it the Thucydidean, presented ideas dramatically, in

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the words of an orator who made or might have made such aspeech on such an occasion. Such is Thucydides' Funeral Speech.Of a similar kind, too, is Plato's Apologt, which purports to beSocrates' defence at his trial. Plato was probably present onthat occasion, and in any case the general lines of Socrates'defence were no doubt well known. But Plato, as the greatdramatizer of Socrates) may with equal certainty be supposedto have worded his defence in keeping with the rest of thepicture he painted of him.

This last instance at any rate belongs to the fourth centuryn.C., but the true beginnings of Greek oratory are earlier.Prose is always later in the field than verse, but the rise ofpolitical freedom, especially in Athens, in the fifth century ledto the realization that prose as well as verse could be developedas a literary form, and that human needs of expression coveredwider ground in the pursuit of knowledge and the maintenanceof civic rights. From this need arose what is called the Sophisticmovement: the intellectual ferment of the fifth century had bythe latter half of it been systematized in the hands of profes-sional men of learning. They were in a sense successors of theearly philosophers, such as Heracleitus or Pythagoras, and theymetin the eagerintellectual milieuof Athens. Menlike Protagoras,Hippias, Prodicus and Gorgias professed among other thingsto teach and stimulate the art of speaking, both as one of anumber of cultural subjects (Plato makes Socrates discuss withProtagoras whether virtue can be taught) I and as a practicaltechnique of its own. Either part of this programme was ex-pected to be of value both in politics and in litigation, to whichGreeks were prone, and also to offer an inherent value in theimprovement of education. It was perhaps most desired for itsutility in a litigious community, and it is in this context thatthere arose the claim parodied by Aristophanes in the Clouds thatthe Sophistic training would 'make the weaker argument thestronger', while Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of that name ismade to contend that the subject which he professes is the(greatest and best of human concerns'.z These statements in-volve a claim to improve the citizen's ability to plead a case and

r. Plato, Protagorasr 324 seqq. z. Plato, Gorgias, 45 r d.


win it, but they were used as material for detractors, and can beseen behind Aristophanes' satire in the Cloud,s, and in Plato'smany dialogues criticizing the Sophistic movement. T'he Soph-ists took fees for the tuition they gave, and in due course beganto specialize in speech training. Some formed schools and com-posed a 'techne', a rhetorical handbook, as Antiphon did. Jebbdeclares s that Greek oratory begins with Gorgias, Attic oratorywith Antiphon.

Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily was born, like Protagoras, about485 n.c., and is known not simply as a rhetorician. He led animportant delegation to Athens in 427 to ask for Athenianassistance for his city. But it was probably his fame as a speakerwhich led to his nomination as a leader, as in the case of Teisias,who accompanied him. He is also known to have been chosento speak at the Olympic festival of 4o8. He is in the sequenceof Sicilian rhetoricians together with Teisias, the teacher ofLysias, and the reputed head of the movement, a certain Korax.Gorgias' claim to fame as an orator seems to have rested onskill in expression rather than on exposition or treatment of hismatter. His influence is said to have extended in particular toThucydides and Isocrates. The only continuous passage of hiswhich survives is itself part of a funeral oration. It must begranted that it is tiresomely overloaded with symmetrical anti-theses, and does not suggest great oratory. Nonetheless it canreadily be understood that this style explains some of the peculi-arities of the speeches which Thucydides includes in his narra-tive, and also the smoother antithetical method of Isocrates. Andit was to Gorgias more than to any other, as we see in Plato'sdialogue, that most early Greek orators of whatever originlooked up.

Born a little after Gorgias, Antiphon played a prominentpart in the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred in Athensin 4rr 8.c., which is his claim to political fame (a fame, likethat of Gorgias, due to rhetorical skill) and to which he owedhis execution. But his extant speeches are not political in thissense. He was perhaps the first to do in Athens what Gorgiashad not done (though Teisias did in Syracuse): that is, to organ-

3. The Attic Orotors (introd. p. cviii).


ize a school and compose a manual of oratory. He was also thefirst professional writer of speeches, and thus the precursor ofall the great Athenian orators. Greek orators did not deliverspeeches for others, as Cicero did, but wrote them for othersto deliver. Thucydides says that Antiphon never appeared incourt except in his own defence in 4rr, with a speech extolledfor its excellence, but in the event unsuccessful. His extantwork is confined to cases of homicide, in which he seemsto have specialized, and includes his four Tetralogies, sets ofspeeches in imaginary cases, two each for the prosecution andthe defence. These bridge the gap between theoretical accountsof the needs of oratory and actual speeches in court. He was apioneer in the practice and in the style of Attic oratory, writing,as did Thucydides, at a time which lacked a prose tradition.He is credited with many of the same characteristics of style asGorgias, but his work seldom reminds one of Gorgias' existingremnants. Both are said to have played a part in the teachingof Thucydides, but except for occasional phrases Antiphondoes not provide a strong resemblance to the speeches inThucydides' history, though he too is given to brevity, syffi-metry and antithesis. These are characteristics which probablyseemed to both writers to offer a method of bringing prose to theliterary level of poetry.

From these bcginnings, social and stylistic, Attic oratory roseand soon flourished. Of course Athenians had made speechesearlier than this, but they were probably extemporized. It issaid that Pericles was the first to deliver a written speech incourt, and it must be assumed that written speeches in theAssembly were a later habit. Pericles is described by the comicpoets, Eupolis and Aristophanes, who refer to his lightningspeed and persuasiveness.a But we have no record of hisspeeches except Thucydides' versions, nor of speeches by thefamous demagogues, Cleon, Hyperbolus and Cleophon. Inthe extant speeches forensic oratory appears first, and most ofthe early examples were written for delivery in court. Two ofthese which are particularly concerned with political events aretranslated here, those of Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, and

4. Aristophanes, Acharnians, 53r.


Andocides, On the Mlsteries. The oratorical antecedents of thesetwo orators are very different. Lysias learnt oratory from Teisiasof Syracuse before coming to Athens. As an alien, however, hewas not entitled to speak in court except during the briefamnesty after the fall of the Thirty in 4o4, when he deliveredthe speech against Eratosthenes. (See the introduction to thespeech, p. 39.) Most of the rest of his work consisted of speecheswritten for others. He was, however, distinguished enough tobe chosen to deliver the Funeral Oration at Athens (probably3gz B.c.) and a Panegyric Oration at Olympia (388 n.c.).Andocides, on the other hand, spent much of his life in exile,and there are but three of his known ll'orks of oratory, twodelivered in his own behalf, and one in the Assembly after hisacquittal. Jebb s calls him an amateur, rvhich is not surprisingsince we know nothing of professional study in his instance. Itis the occasion of his most important speech which makes itnoteworthy. Indeed it concerns an earlier event than that ofLysias, though it was delivered later. Both, though politicallyimportant, are forensic in form. But the majority of speechesby Greek orators were on narrower and more personal subjects,like those of Isaeus, who enjoyed a special reputation as anexpert in the composition of law-court speeches, particularlyin cases of inheritance. Perhaps it is partly because of suchnarrow and individual aims that Plato regards oratory with suchevident distaste and disparages it in a number of places. Hecalls it an art of spell-binding, and criticized its lengthyirrelevancer6 naming Pericles the greatest of orators, becausehe learnt from Anaxagoras, and could fortify his art withphilosophy.

There are also examples of epideictic speeches (the Greekword means speeches of display) delivered for particular occa-sions of importance. Mention has already been made of funeralspeeches by Pericles, by Gorgias and by Lysias. The Panegyricusof Isocrates is in form of this kind. But with the exception ofAndocides' speech On tlte Peace with Sparta, we have no de-liberative speeches from the Assembly till those of Demosthenes,the earliest of which rvas delivered in 354 B.c. It may be in part

5. The Attic Orators,p,88. 6. Plato, Phaedrus,z7oa,z7rd'e, z7z.

t 2


his eminence that secured his speeches from oblivion, but infact the practice of publishing deliberative speeches does notseem to hive begun much before his time and that of Isocrates.The speeches of litigants were commonly written from the lateryears of the fifth century 8.c., when oratory developed in theoryand practice owing to the habit of making handbooks ofrhetorical theory, and the habit of 'speech-writers'

Q,oy6ypacpot)composing speeches for clients to deliver. The publication ofpolitical speeches may, it is suggested,z have been begun byaliens, like Lysias, who were interested in politics, but notadmitted to the Assembly, or due to private circumstances likethose of Andocides, who seems to have published his On thePeace with Sparta by way of self-justification. These and thelike may have led to the practice of Isocrates and Demosthenes.Demosthenes, indeed, may well have been the first to publishdeliberative speeches already delivered in the Assembly. Suchspeeches may on occasion have been subject to alteration in theinterval, This is suggested, for instance, by some passages inPlrilippic 11/ whose genuineness has been doubted (see p. 249)as well as by the statement of Plutarch that comparisons weredrawn between Demosthenes' extempore speeches and hiswritten ones. In any case it appears that Demosthenes didpublish speeches in his lifetime, perhaps to substantiate theirpolitical importance.

2 . I S O C R A T E S A N D D E M O S T H E N E S

Within these limits stand most of the Greek orators of whomwe have knowledge, the Ten Orators, known to the first cen-tury A.D. in a list which became an established canon and thusensured its survival. The list includes Antiphon, Andocides,Lysias and Isaeus, whom we have mentioned, the two greatnames to whom we now go, and in addition Aeschines, thegreat opponent of Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lycurgus andDeinarchus.

One, however, Isocrates, made still another use of oratory.He was full of talent, as Plato makes Socrates describe him in

7. See George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. r74 seqq.

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a celebrated passage at the end of the Phaedrus,s and, had wideviews about the Greek world and particularly his native Athens.But he lacked the voice and the robust temperament needed foractive oratory. He therefore found his own niche as a teacher,and communicated his ideas as written pamphlets. But he didnot practise either activity on the same lines as his predecessors.He was a teacher of rhetoric, yet one who was neither a meretheorist nor a mere exponent of technique, and thereforedeparted from the practice of writing speeches for imaginarysituations, like Antiphon, because he regarded contact with realand vital questions as important. Yet he did not seek to achieveit by speaking. He was a sophist, as a man who took fees forteaching oratory. But in an early discoursee he makes a strongprotest against sophists for making extravagant claims whichthey can never fulfil, for being oblivious of practical aims andfor bringing discreclit on genuine teachers - charges littledifferent from Plato's. What he sought to instil into his pupilshe called 'philosophy'; but it was not what Plato meant by theword. He regarded the Platonic pursuit of truth as too un-practical, indeed as humanly unattainable, while Plato groupedhim with the Sophists, regarding them as tamperers with thetruth rather than seekers of it. Finally he was a passionateadmirer of Athens, but took no narrowly partisan view of herposition in Greece, desiring to see her lead a united Greeceagainst the Persian enemy whose attack had united her before.Isocrates was in fact a great liberal when liberalism was not thelanguage of the day, and his political ideas were in advance ofthose of his contemporaries. As such he may be called doctrinaireor idealistic, and as such he differs from the great speaker of theday, Demosthenes.

Isocrates' pursuit of rhetoric made it into a general culture,almost a liberal education. He did not go quite as far as Cicerowas to do Io in depicting the orator as the ideally cultivatedindividual. But he did regard rhetoric not solely as a means to apractical end, success at law, but as a development of human

8. See George Kennedy, The Art of Persaasion in Greece, p. z7g.g. Against the Sophists, rz.

ro. In De Oratore, passim,

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powers by the study of the written or spoken word, the logos,which would enable learners to improve their judgement of allkinds of activities, specialized or otherwise. This was an educa-tional system very different from Plato's and it is not whollysurprising if the two men were alienated from each other. Whetherthe tale of their enmity is true cannot be certainly determined.Opposite views are entertained.Il In any case we may imaginethat they differed considerably in temperament, as they did inoutlook. Plato scorned rhetoric, Isocrates believed in it, andhoped to find in it a means to recover for Athens and for Greecesome of their old life and vigour. This was to be achieved byteaching, and, no doubt, inspiring the young with the feelingswhich he wanted to disseminate. This is the purpose which thePanegyricu..s in particular was designed to serve, and in somedegree achieved. At least it greatly enhanced his reputation,increased the demand for his services as a teacher, and launched,if unsuccessfully, his campaign for the sinking of differencesand the solidarity of Greece.

This was not a theme which was due to his unaided invention.In particular it had been put forward by his master, Gorgias,on the occasion of his Olympic speech in 4o8 n.c., which hasbeen mentionecl. llut this Pan-Hellenism was suited to Iso-crates' outlook and to the aims he was setting himself, to bringhis pupils to the highest attainments by means of' the logos,and to affect the trend of politics by exerting an influence onthe leading men. In the aim of Pan-Hellenism he showed anexceptional insight into the needs of the age.t" It may seem tohave needed no unusual penetration to realize the differencebetrveen the atmosphere and the attitude maintained by theGreeks in the defeat of Persia in 49o and 48o e.c. and after thecollapse of Athens during the Spartan hegemony. But in timesof declining community of spirit it is easier to confine attentionto narrow aims and the securing of narrow gains, than to go

rr. cp. L. Robin in Phaedrus (Bud6) and Laistner's edition of Isocrates'Philip. One editor even takes the famous compliments on Isocrates in thePhaedrus as a slight. The passage of course relates to a time when Socrateswas adult and distinguished.

rz. See p. 28.

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against the common view and seek a genuine broadening ofoutlook. To have a real effect on public opinion and alter theattitude of the Greek states proved more than Isocrates couldachieve. In the Panegyicu.s he had rcalized the need to unitethem in attack on a common enemy, the same enemy, Persia,whose attack had united them in the great days of the past.With the stimulus of that aim he hopes that they will overcomejealousies about leadership and agree to accept that of Athens.This may have seemed somewhat naive. If so, the feeling - thatit was naive - was part of the spirit which needed to be overcome.But it was not oveicome. Andwhether or not he made overruresto other rulers (it is said that he approached both Dionysius ofSyracuse and Jason of Pherae, but this is disputed)" th. Philipshows him sufficiently disappointed of his previous hopes to feelthat the only chance lay in finding a single champion whocould rally the Greek states round his standard. For this purposehe saw a suitable figure in Philip of Macedon, clearly the leadingsingle ruler in the Greek world after 35o n.c., and sufficientlyintegrated in it to appear acceptable.r+

Yet never, or never until it was too late,ts do Isocrates'aspira-tions appear to have been taken seriously. This was not princi-pally because they did not appeal enough to Philip, nor becauseof the rise of Demosthenes, who took a different view. Bettert9 say that it was due to the political state of fourth-centuryGreece, to which we shall revert, and to something in the chai-acter of Isocrates himself, which must have been partly realizedby his contemporaries, and which makes us temper praise of aman who was ahead of his rime, by calling him too little of arealist. The philosophers, according to Plato, must be therulers, but they will never wish to rule. This applied to his idealstate. In the real world it seems doubtful whether they can everrule, not mgre.ly through unwillingness, but through inabilityto make sufficient compromise with the actual. It is a chargLmade by Isocrates against the sophistic philosophers, andperhaps against Plato himself, as we have seen. Now it rebounds

r3. See, for instance, Norlin, fsocrates (Loeb).14. On Philip's ancestry see fsocrates, philip,3z and note.15. i.e. after Chaeronea (see below, p.2il.

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INTRODUCTION

- on Isocrates; and we may speculate why exactly we feel it tobe just, not only in relation to his ideas, but to his smooth,unvarying style, so that we prefer Demosthenes, sensing thatgreatness depends in part upon success.

Not that Demosthenes was $eatly successful. Indeed he isgenerally regarded as the patriot who could never induce adeclining state to surmount self-seeking and revert to action.This is not wholly true. He was too great an orator to be alwaysunsuccessful, even though the times were against him too. Heis the culmination of this line of orators, the exponent ofpolitical oratory in our original senserr6 using his powers to s\,vaya political assembly and influence actual legislation. He saw thetruth, perhaps with a limited view, but without distortion orwishful thinking, unless it was indeed unrealistic to hope forany Athenian revival. If so, he was optimistic, where Isocrateswas doctrinaire or academic. In one sense the two men were atone, in another far apaft.Isocrates, Iike Demosthenes, had beenprepaled to castigate Athens for her unwillingness to faceunpleasant facts. Demosthenes, like Isocrates, was inspired bythe past greafiless of Athens, but he longed for her to recover itin the world as it actually was, not as it might become. ToDemosthenes, Isocrates (strangely enough we seem to have norecord of contact berween them) must have seemed to lack allcommon sense in expecting concord among Greek states withouta strong motive for it, or Philip's unselfish abandonment of thequest for power in Greece. But we can hardly fail to answerthe question which of them rvas right, and it will be asked againat a later point.

Meanwhile we may make some assessment of Demostheneshimself and of the claim of greatness that is made for him bylater Greek and Latin writers. Great oratory is not solely amatter of style, but also of character. Whatever else Dernos-thenes was, he was a man of courage. He must have felt at hisbest when he was wrestling with difficulty: with his owntemperament and physique, with his financial troubles after theearly death of his father, with acquainrances who found him

16. Here I omit reference to the numerous forensic speeches of Demos-thenes, which do not appear in this volume.

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tiresome, pompous. and selGrighteous (which he probably was)as well as with an inert- a_nd complacent Assembly. what-quali-ties has his oratory yhich are lacking in the others of his day ?critics of the time of cicero and later credit him with numerousstylistic features. Cicero himself dwells on his variety, subtlety,dignity.'z But we have to wait for the writer wrongly kno*n riLonginus to come ngafel, with 'rugged sublimityl:intensiry',and finally (stature'.t8

He was single-minded ln his foreignpolicy, however double-minded he may have been called by hiso-pponent, Aeschines,-and showed, as perhaps no one else amongthe ancients could, the ability both to give lofty expression t6a high cause and to make that contact with his audience whichis the essence of practical oratory, and which cicero describesunder the word 'flectere', the power to influence hearers. Weare not here much concerned with his private habits, except asthey affect our view of him as an orator and a statesman. Hemay be accused of disingenuous, even dishonourable dealingon occasion; the personal rivalries which coloured his pub6relations with, for example, Aeschines, were sometimes iordidand his expression of them, worded in the normal fashion ofthe time, displeasing. we shall find this tendency in a personalspeech, such as on_the crown, a forensic speech, but politicalin that it includes Demosthenes' assessment of his bwn career.It is too long fo1 inclusion here, but it will reinforce the impres-sion given by his speeches to the Assembly of an orator who canbe called great for discarding popularity in a lofty cause. onthe issue of success we must, in his case too, look more closely atthe history of his time.

3 . S T Y L E O F T H E A T T I C O R A T O R S

In introducing a translation not much need be said of style.But some attempt has been made in this one to differentiate

t7. Orator, tto.t8. on the Sublime, 34. The Greek word here translated 'stature' simply

means 'size'. This treatise, previously attributed to an author tt"-edLonginus of the third century A.D., is now thought to berong tb the firstcenturv A.D.

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between individual characteristics, though it cannot be hopedthat a translation will by itself make style or manner clear. Norcan style be entirely detached from character and conduct.Some mention has already been made of it in discussing theauthors referred to. And style was of great moment to theancients, particularly in the Ciceronian period and later, whenanalysis of the great treasure of Greek literature was prevalent.But, as with other critical study, the first to systematize it wasAristcitle, and Cicero's own works on oratory and later thetreatises On the Sublime and On Stjtlele can still be reckoned asindebted to him.

The Ciceronian age made much of a controversy on therelative merits of th"e Attic style as represented by" the bestAthenian orators of the fifth and fourth centuries s.c., and themore florid Asian style, so called, which had developed sincethat time. We need not spend time in considering this, thoughCicero devotes a little space to it.zo But it is to Attic that he paysmost attention, and to the differences within it. In this con-nexion Thucydides is mentioned, to distinguish his style fromthat of Lysias.2l Cicero specifically says that Thucydides hasno part in oratory, but that the speeches he includes 'contain somany remote and obscure passages as to make them barelyintelligible'. The translator can only attempt a faint suggestionof this Thucydidean style, which is perhaps due to intensefeeling packed into an antithetical style derived from Gorgias.It is as far as possible removed from the manner of Lysias.Ancient criticism of Lysias was no doubt based largely on thespeeches he wrote for others to use in court, so that Cicero, forinstance, denies him full grandeur of style, and Dionysiuscomments on his power of character-drawin1.,2 The speechAgainst Eratostltenes is in fact fuller than most of Lysias, andshows that his plain and natural narrative could give place onoccasion to more swelling oratory. But his most marked charac-

19. Ascribed to Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 3oo n.c.) this work is nowthought to belong to the first century A.n.

zo. Orator ,25,26.zr . ib id. , 3o.zz. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 4r.

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teristic is his straightforward ease of statement, and the essayOn Stjtle follows Cicero in stressing his 'charm'.rs The earlierorators were more practical in aim than Gorgias, and foundthat such an easy flow met their largely forensic needs. Ando-cides has it too, but his style suggests what is in fact true, thathe was not at first a professional speaker; the present versionhas been composed with the feeling that ordinary speechtouched with the colloquial might be nearest to the manner ofthe amateur.

Isocrates is a different matter. His methods were much moreself-conscious. The author of On tlte Sublime, who was appar-ently no strong admirer of Isocrates, quotes Caecilius'2+reference to Alexander as 'one who subdued the whole of Asiain fewer years than Isocrates took to write his Panegltric wgingwar on Persia', and later criticizes the Panegltricu.r itself for along-winded passage sufficient to spoil Isocrates' point.zs ButCicero points out, and we should remember, that Isocrateswrote with a view not to the 'thrust and parry of the courts,but to give pleasure to the ear'.26 It is a polished style in whichthe antithesis he had learnt from Gorgias is ironed out, thoughit is still at times perceptible,2T and in which period succeedsperiod 'with no less regularity than the hexameters in thepoetry of Homer','8 avoiding even hiatus as an undesirableroughness.ze It is thus a style of more beauty than strength,reflecting perhaps Isocrates' personality and his own praise ofa style which is as artistic as that of poetry.:o

Demosthenes was universally upheld by Greco-Roman authorsas the prince of orators, and has maintained that reputation

23. t venustas' r ' Xaprcvrrc pdq'.24. A Sicilian rhetorician who taught at Rome in the time of Augustus.25. iv, z, and xxxviii, 2, on Isoc, Panegyricus, 8. But see Norlin ad

loc.26. Orator,38.27. See Panegyricus, 8o, 84, for a passage which reminds us now of Gorgias,

now ofPlato's parody ofProdicus in the Protagoras.28. On Style,tr. Fyfe. rz.zg. ibid.,68. Hiatus is the gap or absence of a consonant, when one word

ends in a vowel and the next begins with one.

3o. Antidosis,46.


since. cicero speaks of 'one man's astonishing eminence inoratory),3l and though he finds some deficiency when hecompares Demosthenes to his imagined ideal ('he does notalways fill the measure my ear demands')t, hr finds in him'all the subtlety of Lysias, the brilliance of Hypereides and thevivid vocabulary of Aeschines',33 noting whole speeches that aremarked by subtlety, others by weightiness like some of thePh,ili.ppics, others by variety. cicero follows rvell-known storieslike that referred to in the introduction to Demosthenes (r) below,when he speaks of Demosthenes'stress on delivery,3a and thouehhe too avoided hiatus as harsh,:s his is not the smoothness

"of

Isocrates, but that of a practised and practising speaker. pre,eminently this is what Demosthenes is, and even if there arepassages in his work which are no more than practical and mayeven have dissatisfied Cicero, he can rise to oratorical heights,for instance in parts of Ofunthioc II or in the phitippic- IIIwhich justify the ianguage of the writer on The Sublime.

4 . O R A T O R Y A N D P O L I T T C S

Though oratory is an art particularly connected with politics,its rise in Greece coincides with a political decline. And this isno mere coincidencc. 'rhe

same factors at least contributed toboth. To say this makes it necessary to attempt some assessmentof the nature of this political decline ancl to justify the phrase,if we are to understand our orators themselves and to estimatethem in the context to which they belong. We can thereforehardly avoid some brief historical summary. Here reference ismade from time to time to the sectional introductions below,but inevitably there is some overlapping.

The Periclean age of the greatness of Greek, especially ofAthenian, civilization ended with the outbreak of war betweenAthens and the Spartan alliance in 43r s.c. Pericles himselfdid not long survive. And, though there was an interval in thefighting, war continued till the collapse of Athens after thebattle of Aegospotami in 4o5. This war, which in Gilbert

3t. Orator,6.

34. ibid., 56.32. ibid., ro4.35. ibid., r5o.

2t

33. ibid., rro.


Murray's words 'destroyed the hope of Hellenism',r6 wasfought to prevent the commercial expansion and imperialism ofAthens from having full scope and leading to the enlargementof Athenian power. Ever since the Athenian assumption of theleading role after the defeat of Persia in 479 B.c. the power ofAthens had shown this tendency to expand, when she changeda Confederacy of Aegean states, organized for defence againstPersia, into an Empire geared to her own advancement - agradual change which coincided with her development as ademocratic and maritime community. During the war Athens'resources and Athenian popularity underwent serious vicissi-tudes, but she did not refrain from further imperialism, notablyin the attack on Sicily between 4r5 and 4r3. This grandiosescheme ended in disaster, and the superstitious could look backon the sacrilege committed as it sailed (see the introduction toAndocides, p. 6r). Signs of strain began to appear, when acou,p d,'itaf put the city for a time in the hands of an oligarchicrdgime, in which the orator, Antiphon, took a leading part. ButAthens was not brought down till 4o4. By then Persia, almostforgotten for over forty years, had been invited back into Greekaffairs by Sparta to combat the Athenian fleet. With her re-sources now at art end Athens had to submit to Sparta and tooligarchic control. There was a reign of terror under the so-called Thirty Tyrants (see the introduction to Lysias, p. 39),and though it was not long before Athens reverted to democraticways, she did not regain her old wealth.

Then began the supremacy of Sparta, as the liberator ofGreece from Athens. The Spartans inspired even deeper hatredthan most liberators. The extraordinary Spartan communitydid not know how to govern except by rigid control. Within afew years Sparta was again at enmity with Persia and at warwith an alliance in which Athens, now recovered, though notfinancially, was joined by Thebes, Corinth and Argos. Havingbrought Athens down less than twenty years before, Persia nowhelped her to a naval revival, and then, growing nervous, in386 agreed to the much vilified 'King's Peace', whereby, withSpartan assistance, she dictated terms to the Greek states. After

36. Journal of Hellenic Stud.ies, LXW.

INTRODUCTION

t Spartan exploitation continued, and resentment againstSparta increased. It was vain at this time for Isocrates to writeof unity (see the introduction to the Panegtr.i,cus of Isocrates,p. gg), to praise the greatness of Athens and urge her leader-ship, even in partnership with Sparta. It was just at this time, in379, that-Spafta caused the disruption of the rising confederacyof Olynthus, an act subversive of unity. Howev-er, dislike ofsparta did stimulate Athens, perhaps influenced by Isocrates,to form a new confederacy of her own, with altruistii intentions.Eventually in 37r a conference of the Greek states took placeat Sparta, by which Athens and Sparta agreed to abandonempire in a pact of non-aggression. But Thebes, in the personof Epaminondas, claimed to sign on behalf of Boeotia. To thissparta took exception and, in contravention of the treaty justmade, attacked Thebes and, against the military genius ofEpaminondas, suffered a severe defeat at Leuctra.

Now it was the turn of Thebes to liberate the world fromSparta. The process continued for nine years - just so long asEpaminondas remained alive to conduct it. It included attackson the Peloponnese, the reconstitution of Messene, which was'liberated', and, as a further counterpoise to Sparta, the founda-tion of Megalopolis as a new city in the heart of Arcadia. ButTheban self-seeking and intransigence alienated fucadia as wellas other states, and brought Athens into the arms of sparta.They were allies in the campaign of Mantinea (362), when theymet the force of rhebes. Although successful in the battle,Epaminondas lost his own life; this was fatal for Theber, .rrdthe Theban supremacy collapsed.

If we cannot quite talk of liberation from Thebes, whosedominance was less complete and more short-lived thanSparta's, yet she raised numerous opponents among the Greekstates, two in particular at different times. Athenian power hadbeen regained in part, as has been seen, first in rlaction tolparta, when Persia allowed the repair of the fortifications (theL_9ng Walls of Athens) and Conon revived her naval strength.Then, after the King's Peace, Athens returned to vigour inlheSecond Confederacy of 378, which started as a genuine attemptto avoid the exploitation of her fifth-century Empire. Aftir

23


37o this confederacy was directed against Theban power inalliance with Sparta. But Athens suffered from continual lackof funds, and could not long maintain power in the Aegeanwithout resorting to some methods which did not live up tothe aims of the Second Confederacy. The reappearance ofcleruchies3T and the exactions of the mercenary forces whichfought for Athens, but subsisted on plunder, caused alarm anddiscontent. Itt 357 the important islands of Chios, Cos andRhodes revolted under the influence of the ambitious tyrant ofCaia, Mausolus (see introduction to Demosthenes (r), p. r7o).Peace was made in 354, but by then Athens had lost severalvalued possessions to the rising power of Philip of Macedon.

The other, and later, opponent of Thebes was Phocis. Herrise in response to Theban attempts to use the weapon of theAmphictyonic League:8 against her, and the onset of theSacred War, are referred to in the introduction to Isocrates'Philip (p. t:8), and the rise of Philip of Macedon in rhar toDemosthenes (r) (p. r7o). These need not be described indetail here. Peace between Philip and the Athenian alliance(excluding Phocis) was made in 346 and known as the Peace ofPhilocrates. For the last time Isocrates hoped to secure a leaderand general support for his campaign for unity, and to inducePhilip to assume this role. But the peace, which began withPhilip's destruction of Phocis, only lasted as long as it suitedhim, and ended in 34o, when the insistence of Demosthenesraised an alliance against him. In 338 Demosthenes' fears werercalized, and Philip, himself making use of an Amphictyonicdispute, marched south through the pass of Thermopylae, andoverwhelmed the Greek forces at Chaeronea. At last there hadbeen a rally in support of the view Demosthenes had voicedsince 35r, but the Greeks could not match Philip's trainedtroops and superior tactics.

Philip turned on Thebes, but spared Athens. Not for the lasttime the past greatness of Athens saved her from destructionby a conqueror who appreciated it, and saw a chance to gainher assistance by leniency. By the terms of peace Athens rvas

37. See note on fsocrates, Panegyricus, to7rp. rzo,

38. See note on fsocrates, Philip,74, p. r5z.

24


compelled to abandon her existing confederacy and join thenew Pan-Hellenic union proposed by Philip. The hegemony ofGreece now rested with Macedon, a monarchy outside the circleof the Greek states of the past. The first assembly of the newcongress was summoned at Corinth, though it was not till ayear later, 337, that Philip announced a new campaign againstPersia, and the arrangements for it were organized. Isocrateswrote to Philip to express his delight that his aim had at lastbeen accomplished. One enactment) however, the establishmentof three Macedonian garrisons at strategic points in southernGreece to maintain control of it, might have made him wonderif he was right.

5 . T H E D E C L I N E O F G R E E C E

Having made our summary, we must return to the suggestionthat in the fourth century in Greece the rise of oratory isconnected with a political declind, and to the question ofwhether the orators could make any contribution to combat it.We may see this decline in several different ways; we mayregard it as a political failure of the city state, the failure of theGreeks to achieve the unity which might have preserved theircontinued development in a political world to match theireconomic development. We may see it as a social failure of themiddle class to maintain and extend democracy because itsought to remain exclusive; or as the cultural failure of acommunity which kept to slave labour instead of pursuing thecuriosity which leads to fresh scientific developments.3e Finallywe may think of it as a psychological failure, a loss of confidenceon the part of a world clinging to its own past. In any case itinvolves, as two interacting factors, a tendency to particularismin which narrower interests are preferred to broader ones, anda tendency to the static in which the enjoyment of what alreadyexists takes the place of the pursuit of what is new. In a dis-cussion of political oratory we shall be more concerned withthe breakdown of the city state than with the other factors,though all are facets of a single situation.

39. See F. W. Walbank inJHS, LXry.

25

G R I E K P O L I T I C A L O R A T O R Y

This political disruption or particularization is due to indi-vidual or sectional self-seeking, which wished to establish itsown desires at no matter what cost to the community. Thegrimmest chapters of Thucydides+o describe the spread of thisevil, which he calls by the name of ' stasis', division in the statepursued with violence in quest of sectional ends, usually ofa kind which we should call ideological. Thucydides specifiesthe symptoms in a horrifying analysis. This is the positive sideof the disease, the virulent pursuit of private aims. The negativeside is the reluctance to be active for public ones. This can beseen in lighter, but no less telling lines in the comedies ofAristophanes, in the Ecclesiazusoe ot (3g3 B.c.), or earlier in theAclrarnians (4zS B.c.), in the picture of an Assembly reluctanrlygiving itself to public business, or in the Cloud; in that of theeffect of Sophistic teaching in reversing traditional moralideas.+2 Such changes of feeling, connected by common opinion,if that is what Aristophanes represents, with sophistic teaching,were changes in the direction of individual selGseeking. Andcommon opinion certainly took oratory, like sophistic training,as detrimental in tendency to the sound outlook of conservatism.It is true at any rate rhat the practice of oratory arose in directconnexion with the Sophistic movement, and was obviously con-ducive to exploiting private advantage.

The Greeks themselves were not oblivious of the disease inits political aspect. Attempts were made to break new groundand achieve a new basis for the organization of society eiiher bymeans of alliance on new terms or by actual federation. But thlnew was undermined or obliterated by the final efforts of the

4o. III,8z, 83.4r. Eccl., 2os-2o7. (The title of the play might be modernized as'Women in Parliament'.)

It's your fault, people of Athens, who liveOn public money, but all you think aboutIs private gain, every man for himself.

.42. Acharnian.s, opening lines; Clouds, passim. cf. Andocides, AgainstAlcibiades, zz:'That (the encouragement given to unconcealed bre*achesof morals) is why the younger generation spend their time in the law courtsinstead of in the gymnasium, and while the old serve in the forces, the youngorate, with the example of Alcibiades in front of them. '

'

z6


old. The Olynthian or Chalcidic Confederacy, for instanca,dates back to the fifth century. In 432 n.c. Olynthus, togetherwith other states, seceded from the Athenian Empire, largelybecause the old Confederacy of Delos, as it was originallycalled, had been turned by Athenian exploitation into an empireover unwilling subjects. During the grear struggle of thePeloponnesian War and after it the Chalcidic Confederacy beganto rival Macedon as a fringe power of the Greek world. Macedonwas largely disordered and inefficient between 4oo and 35g B.c.,when Philip rose to power, and the Chalcidic Confederacyseemed to promise better than others. One new feature of noteappeared in it, a principle of dual citizenship, by which citizensof each member state were citizens also of the Confederacy as awhole, and all laws and rights were to be shared equally.Olynthus was the nominal head of the Confederacy, butassumed no privileges apart from the others. At first confinedto a single promontory, the movement gathered adherentsfast, but two cities which were unwilling to be brought inappealed to Sparta, who forcibly dissolved the League in 37gB.c. The nerv grorvth had proved inadequate to resist theold.

Two other instances show the contemporary tendency to trythe confederate principle to sccure ends which were out ofreach of single cities. The Second Athenian Confederacy wasconceived in a spirit of altruism and of unity against the detestedpower of Sparta. The confederate states were to have their ownassembly distinct from that of Athens, and no measure affectingboth was to be valid till passed by both. There were to be nocleruchies, Do 'tribute', none of the hated features of the oldEmpire of the fifth century. Yet perhaps this was a negativeapproach with a limited aim. It failed eventually, as has beensaid, because Athens, perpetually short of funds, failed to avoidexploitation; cleruchies and the old abuses began to reappear,and in the Social War she was again involved against her allies.The Arcadian League, which was virtually created by Thebesafter Leuctra to curb Spartan power, and involved the foundationof the new city of Megalopolis as a federal capital to replacevillages in the neighbourhood, is a third insrance, however

27


specialized, of the attempt to supersede small units of organiza-tion in favour of larger ones.

These attempts to do what was necessary for Greek civiliza-tion by broadening its basis were altogether too weak for theirpurpose. They had not enough support to convince a worldaccustomed to warfare within itself. 'fhinkers

ancl oratorsalike failed to see a solution, even if they envisaged a need forit. Plato, if he may represent the thinkers, exemplifies twoopposed reactions to the problem, that of withdrawal and thatof compulsion. To imagine a Utopia (as he did) is to make toolittle contact with the actual. This is a withdruwal into thespiritual realm different from, but comparable with the laterwithdrawal of Stoicism. But the Republic also suggests the wayof compulsion with its arbitrary division of classes and its strongflavour of Spartan control. Compulsion is often enough used toend disagreement. The orators, too, had little to offer except torevert to the past and urge its virtues on the present. Isocratesalone had a sense of the needs of the time and an idea, howeverinadequate, of a remedy for them. In the letter to Archidamushe enlarges on the disorders of Greece as he does in the Philip,+tand urges co-operation and unity. In the Peace he had urgedthe abandonment of empire and the making of a peace whichshould not merely rest on ad hoc pfinciples to end the SocialWar, but should be permanent and embrace all the Greeks.Seventeen years later in the Philip he had decided, whether ornot for the first time, that unity could only be achieved underthe leadership of a single king or general. But throughout hesaw the need of good will and some compelling principle ofunity. When Pan-Hellenism came with Philip, and when theStoic homonoia (concord) was prefigured by the ideas of Alex-ander, both father and son might have been conscious of a debtto Isocrates. Yet he failed for lack of a principle that r,vascompelling enough. By the majority he went unheeded. It waseasier to stimulate an unwilling community to energy than toconcord. The stirring oratory of Demosthenes could animate alast stand for the aspirations of an earlier century, even if hishopes did not survive Chaeronea. By this achievement he

43. Philip,96, rzt, d. panegyricus, 167.z8

INTRODUCTION

rendered Isocrates' hopes as vain as his own. After that anypeace or agreement was one imposed on the Greek world, notgenerated by it, and any new deal would not arise from asettlement of differences, but from the enactment of a conqueror.So the splendid patriotism of Demosthenes reduced to in-effectiveness the ideals of Isocrates. It becomes vain to speculatewhether either could ultimately have succeeded. We mustprobably agree that the Greek civilization which rose at last tothe support of Demosthenes' efforts against Philip could neverhave risen to the pleas of Isocrates for concord and agreementwith him.

T R A N S L A T O R ' s N o r E

The introduction and the sectional introductions and notes areintended to cover ground necessary to the understanding of thespeeches themselves. They do not take the place of a history ofGreece, and matter not immediately relevant to the speeches isgenerally omitted. The text principally used has been theOxford Classical Text fbr Thucydides, Lysias and Demos-thenes, the Teubner text for the others. I have made consider-able use of Mr D. M. Macdowell's edition of the d,e Mysteriisand of Prof. M. 1,. W. Laistner's of the Philipltus.I am greatlyindebted to Dr W. Hamilton for invaluable assistance with thetranslation, to I)r M. I. Finley for reading and criticising theIntroduction, and to Dr T. T. B. Ryder for similar help with thesectional introductions and notes. The shortcomings which re-main are, of course, mine and not theirs.

T H U C Y D I D E S : P E R I C L E S , F U N E R A L S P E E C H


The funeral oration phich. Thurydides puts in the mouth of Pericles(Tltuc. II, 35-46) is one of the acknowledgetl masterpieces ofliternture. It is statecl to haae been d,eliaered, d,uring th,e winter of4Jr-4Jo 8.c., 0n th.e occasion of the public funeral of the deatl in.battle. It is not to be supposetl genuine in the sense of gioing theipsissima verba of Pericles. There haae been editors who hapeclaimed to find in it an indioid,uality distinct from other speechesin the work. But tltis is probabljt wisltfal th,inking. The momentnus,impressioe st1le, and, the torhtous sentences, are those of Thu.rydides.

He must hazse known that Peri.cles mad,e such a speeclt, on thisoccasion, and he would probabfu haae heard, how he treated thesubject, ezsen y''he pas not himself tltere to hear it. It ma1 haaebeen Pericles who saw this os an occosion to pra,ise tlte Atltenianwajt of hfe. If so, it was Thucydides who later sap it as a subjectadmirabll suited to a point in his History where that wa1 of ltfewas tlreatened by rpar, 0r eaen t0 a time after the war phen it h,adbeen ouertltrorDn. On an1 assurnption it ma1 seem to go tol far inidealizing a state pltich rpas s00tr. t0 pa,J the penalty, as Thucldideshimself unfailingly points out, for self-seeking and, ruthless int-perialism. But whetlter it is to be put dopn as history 0r lratzrJ)it is, witlt, the possible exception of the Apology of Somates, b1Plato, the best known speech, in Greek, and it remains one oJ'thegreat statements of human achieaement in the spiritual fieltl.

gt

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Hf,rsds "IvusNnd (ss'rf,ruId [o?-6t]

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orrunJ Jo pue tuesa.rd aqt Jo uor]?rrrupe eqt esneJ ot ,pru.ruog

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1 'p1no,u, tr ur IEnprAIpq frerro puu 'ecaarg

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'{reap 'pecllouun

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Jo esec eql ur esreôrlsalearS oqt pue e8ueqc allsoddo oqt stuool araq] 'enr1

llrsdel{l Jl

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3o odoq ,rau lnopr,u 'ounlloJslur

uI ueru lou sr 1I 'J?,t, Jo spJBzBq eql JoJ qJt?1$. ;nort ur snorxuB

eq lou pue 'o8e.rnoo ur r.uopeery 'uopoa.r; ur ssaurdd€q aos(pue1 rreql ,!4.olloJ .{l.ou plnoqs no1 'odeqs

lurrateru ur usqt reqterItrtds eqt uI 'uaru

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rq8r.r pue Surrep ,{q leql raqueuer 'teer8 req {urqt nod ueq16'req

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'qr8ual

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'.(uru.e passud .{aqt '.ruay

Jo tou 'f.ro13 3o rq8req eqt tB 'Juetsur

[BJrtrJc euo ur pue 'uorlce

,(11poq 3o ,fiqeer aql Surrnpuo 'Jnouoqslp Jo oruuu oq] 'erueu

3 ruo{ pag r{oqJ 'JepuoJrns ur u?ql $oJ JeêlBq/l{, l3 uorlcB urJeql?J pelsoJ uorlBAIEs leql Surlorlaq 'tueqt eJoJeq de1 req,u .ro3

Hf,ssds 'IvusNnd (sa'If,Iutd lb-zbl

'l;edep os pue turno lnor( JoJ tsBI .lnof doairr (erogoreqt trnoN'punoJ eq ot orB suezltrJ lseq eql eJoq]

'les eJe Jnolel yo sazrrd tseleerS aql eJeql,L rog 'so188nrts qonsJeUe oArIB Ua[ oru oq^4. II€ o] pue tuoql ot pre Jo u.{\oJJ s.,&rceq] sI srql puu 'ueru u1r^.or8 aru foqr pr flrc aqr ruor3 aJueuel-sns rreql e^reJer [r^4. uoJplrrlc rreqt lBr{] sr puoJes arlJ 'lBrrnq

snp ut uoncurlsrp lsJg Jreql pelraJoJ aler1 peop eqr dr{eer u1'perl

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Jo eluetues JorJq euo ur ge tr ssardxo [r.,t, 1 'pa.,u,opl,u.

oq ̂ \ou ilL& oq.&\ osoq] ot uoruo.{. Jo ontrrl eq} Jo 4eeds lsnu IJI

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I 'peep ors orl./$. oseql Jo sJorltoJq oqt Jo uolplrqJ oqt 'nof ;oy

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Jo {srr orlt ot uerplrqcJloqt roso ot ranod lenba uB oABr1 oq,{,t, uetu uao.&ueq alqrssodfluo ere ocqsn( pue ,(trlunbo ur eperu suortgreqrlep rod 'drrrnces

req ol Surppe pue ssol aqr pooS Suqeu ur 'urs8 elqnop E oq

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1 '8ur,{p str Jo pue 8urlr1 str Jo sseurddeq eql uI papunor oq

pporls eJrI B r?ql pue',llor.ros.rnod ur nod ol (qluap rreql ur uoqt

Ig-tfrl SACIOAf ,NHT

6t.

fpn'rodwax aaaq pory rytltle tuogtat 4Etw&qo aqtto aruan{w ary 0tpaqulnttns [1u aap'uu,n4no alfi luun uotloa,mls lo aru$ o $uao&umo Suaploq fitto : suatlt4 ot aSats ptul'.tapuusrCT ',to1na uolndgaqt 'Sof aunf u1 twrtodsoSav w n$t)s?p uptuall7 ary ndy' u o unl o a a 4o s p o !. t a d ru a n.t, a r0 r.u, s I s aF 3n s (' t a t of -f oh) rCq t n u y .{o,wat ya11ut-os atpto uotldutsap se pua,fiuoutru ruapla oto lo,ttuotatq,tapun a7n7s ato tunzrtn pal.twap ry ,totaputou st tltaads ary1

z'a glt up r(tt1fua nao.{o a7u atlt ru palp aH'ggt u! aadrutlO ru uoxruro nil&aun1 o puo 'Ta e6t ur. rQqaqotd(suatltf

tr tlnadg lonun[ axfi haqap ol uesoqt aq ot qSnoua paqsm74t!ts!.p soe aH "I.uautaaatrytu tt4 stqt taadat, rca plnzt at1 'sfins

alnaud.lo,tapoaQ ruanbat!puu ueaa2l-lla& o aantaq at1t1&nory pao'gtaaollanp su& suatlo ,ro.{ dr,r.1suaz1ry 11nt.{o tr1&tt. ary'patora"t. [11ntsudr [bn.ttlruap at7 xtaryl4 '1nfssatns uaaq aanLl ot ,martrdo Na saop ry'tstgf's1t7 so stwnlr ytut.f1anurry praaqep aooq or plos s! aq elt.lqerltaads n ut 'suatltr/ ut ?auxrwar otl(r ,Q.qt11 atlt .Zuoa r ou ary loauo'sauatltsott).t7 rytaa(un 0I aJul In fl pasn Tsun

'dn1suaz1ry pt?ap,tt)(210 sae ax! suatflv 01 u,tnp,t, s!r/ uo 'srynq[sa,tq1 u?un salucaatg par,ro(dns '(13uo.t7s pan '(tou pry snqrruwapd t13not7t) padotsasuTsrCT 'suaqt7.{o

ttot atp ngfa naod ry wd a.tae zLle spanCltt,qr11 atp fq t!ruap or rud aq ol aaslLlt 7s4[ atg &uorun aq ot tlSnouasnoudsotd ana [atp fiob u7 'su/.to

{o a.m|ntnuow aryt uo patr"tutrCaqt antla'snauna4 atq u! Qquqod paaq puo'rrb m suaqlfu pau,twat s#tqorq aap'paqsruoq soe ?!&tlJ to [t,tud rttrr,rrlw,aparfi uar!fu1 'asntonCg

lo sols?al tuo,tt nto1aul,t turoal aaoq u paw$s1 aq 'p.tnt11 tp san&ot.o,r.4 lo aruang[ut atp wol,! pat{o.rd atl par0 nryaqful 't's tff w papunq{ aaaq paq tltlqe 'tlwl unxlmosu? lryntlJ.{o tCuolot atp u! 'snt1t,wrua1o4 'nr1rut,tq rarua sltl ryqeatuu alqotaprsu,ot u tutds arl qruap ,srynr1da7 n{o wtlt uezuqs? q nxq 'utalne rcu s! ryru.q ,so1srC7 {o alnp arlJ 'r\qndaA aqtu! ltold [q ytauouuatu pur)'rytayy n (suatpV M ruaptsat utffitanl osu xteluq 17aa

'asntailg .{o sryaryda7lo uos n&unof atp sna sn1st7

N O I J S N C O U I N I

S I N f l H J S O J V U I J S N I V C V : S V I S A T

L Y S I A S

in control fiftee?t Jea,rs before.Now, as then, tlte most trusted ofthem, as a moderate of strong influence) was Theramenes. He wasinaited to negotiate with. Sparto, but negotiati,ons Dere prolongedand unsuccessful, and Athens suruiued onll at the price of demo-Iishing the 'Long Walls',, surrendering all but twelae ships, andallowing the return of exiles. These last pere largell oligarchic, and,their return helped the change of constitution pltich was uirtuallldemanded.

The change was initi.ated fut the so-called clubs (see 4j below),who, using tlte Spartan title, appointed fiae Ephors to exercisecontrol of the Ecclesia. Tlteramenes is not mentioned arnzng tltern,though. Critias and Eratosthenes are. But Theramenes wos tlteleader in a meeting with. Lysander, who claimed, that Athens had

forfehed, the agreement b1t delay in pulling down the nalls. Thismeeting inauguroted tlte glaernrnent of the Thirl, wlto werenominated from circles fouonrable to tlte oligarclry, in accordancepith. terms d,rapn u! b one of their number, Dracontides. Thelbegan pith, claims of a reformati,on, and proceetled, against anti-oligarchic informers, but soon went 0n to eliminate all whn opposed,their aiews, using informers of their own. Their confdence wasbased, on th,e llresence of a Spartan garrison for which, they lradasked,. The moderotes amzng the Thirtl disapproaed, of thesemeth,ods, and Therarnenes, supported, it was claimed. b1 Eratos-thenes, opposed Critias and th,e extremists, both in their productionof a 'Catalogue' of Tltree Th.ousond priaileged people who wereto be exempt from persecution, and, in measures taken against t/teclass of resident aliens, rpltose only crime was their wealth. Theattack began on aliens and on nn1 otlters who were thought ideo-logtcally unsound. Tltere ensued o reign of terror wh,ose nature isillustratecl in Llsias' narratiae. Thc death of Theramenes, which.resu,lted from his opposition, freed, the Thirty from all restraint.

In tlte pinter of that jteor (+o+) Thrasybulus led from Thebes asmall force of men nho ltad been, forced, into exile by the zsiolenced the Thirty, and, held 0, strong point at Ph.yle, comrnand,ing thepass oaer Mt Parnes. Tlte Thirry failed to dislodge him, and, hisforce steadily grev. He later crossed, th,e plain with oaer a thousantlmen, and made o night attack on the Peiraeus, occup1ing the highpart callerl Murychia and, f,ghting a successful engagement. Most

. 4 0

ERATOSTHENES

o/'the Th,irty retired, to a prearranged retreat at Eleusis. TheTlree Thousand deposed, th.em, and appointed a new commission often, whiclt included Eratosthenes and Pheidon, t0 treat pith. Thra-slbulus. Tltese, h,oweaer, sltowed no spirit oJ'compromi,se, and, weresoon besieged lry the growingforces of demotacJ/. When Llsonderwa; superseded, at Sparta, the uncompromising suppnrt for theoligarclty was abandoned and the garrison pithdrawn. A new pactwas made, ffirding an a,rnnestJl to eaeryone except the Tyantsth,emselaes.

['-6]

L Y S I A S : E R A T O S T H E N E S

Tsenn is no difficulty in opening this prosecution, gentlemen.The difficulry will be to bring it to an end. The nature and thenumber of the charges are due to the character and the quantityof the facts. Invention could never exaggerate their heinousness,nor veracity reach the end of the list. The prosecutor wouldcollapse, or the time run short. We seem likely to find in thiscase the reverse of the normal experience. Normally the prosecu-tion needs to explain the grounds for hostility to the defend-ants. But in this case it is the defendants whose hostility toAthens needs explaining, and the ground for such outrageousconduct towards the state. I do not claim that I am free ofpersonal reasons for animosity, but that everyone has abundantcause for it on private and public grounds alike. Personally,gentlemen, I have never before conducted a case for myself orfor anyone else, but I have been forced by the circumstances toprosecute Eratosthenes. In fact I have been frequently troubledby the fear that inexperience may render inadequate andincompetent my presentation of the case for my brother andmyself. I will try, however, to explain it from the beginning asbest I can.

My father, Cephalus, was incluced by Pericles to come toAthens, and lived here for thirty ycars, during which timeneither he himself nor my brother nor I took any part in legalproceedings either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Under thedemocracy we lived without giving or receiving offence fromanyone. When the Thirty began their government of wrong andintrigue, they declared that they must clear Athens of itsworse elements, and set the rest on the path of right and virtue.They had not the courage to live up to their declarations, as Ishall recall in regard to my own case and attempt to remindyou in yours.

At a meeting of the Thirty, Theognis and Peisonl made a

r. Two of the list of the Thirty given by Xenophon (Hellenica, II, 3, z).They are not mentioned elsewhere.

43

L Y S I A S 16-'+lstatement that some of the Metics were disaffected, and theysaw this as an excellent pretext for action which would bepunitive in appearance, but lucrative in reality. In any caseAthens was poverty-stricken, they said, and the Empire neededfunds as well. They had no difficulty in persuading theirfellows, to whom killing was nothing, while money was of greatimportance. They therefore decided to arrest ten people,including two of the poorer class, to enable them to claim thattheir object was not money, but the good of Athens, as in anyother respectable enterprise. They divided up the Metics'houses between them, and visited them. I personally was givinga dinner party when they called. They turned out my guestsand handed me over to Peison, while the rest went into thefactory and took an inventory of the slaves. I asked Peison if hewould let me go for a consideration. He said he would if it werea large one. I said I would give him a talent, and he agreed. Iknew him to be a man without regard for right or reason, butin the circumstances it seemed absolutely necessary to exact anundertaking from him. He gave an oath involving himself andhis children that he would get me off for a talent, so I went tomy room and opened *y chest. Peison saw what I was doingand came in. When he saw what was in it, he called two of hismen and told them to take the contents. Instead of the amounragreed, gentlemen, it contained three talents of silver, fourhundred Cyzikene staters, a hundred darics and four silver cups.So I asked for something for my journey, to which he repliedthat I ought to be thankful to get away with my life. I wentout with Peison, and we were met by Melobius and Mnesi-theides on their way from the factory. They met us actually at thedoorway and asked where we were going. They were on theway to my brother's, Peison said, to have a look at things thereas well. So they told him to go there, while I was to go withthem to Damnippus'house. Peison came up to me and urged meto say nothing. It would be all right, he said, he would be alongthere. We ran into Theognis with some others in his charge,and they handed me over to him and went off. At this point itseemed to me that I was in great danger and my death warrantalready sealed. So I called Damnippus and said, 'You are a

44

ft4-zol E R A T O S T H E N E S

friend of mine. I've been to your house. I've done nothing wrong,I'm simply being done to death for my money. That's what ishappening, so please use what influence you have to protect me.'He said he would, but he thought it better to mention it to Theo-gnis, who, he reckoned, would do anything for money. While hewas talking to him, as I knew the house and realized that it hadtwo doors, I thought I might try and escape that way. I reflectedthat if I were not caught, I should escape, and if I were, I shouldstill get qway if Damnippus persuaded Theognis to accept a bribe,and anyway nothing worse could happen than death. With thisidea I made off. They had the front door guarded, but thoughthere were three doors I had to pass, they were all open. Imade my way to Archeneos,'the shipowner, and induced himto go to the ciry and find out about my brother. He came backwith the news that Eratosthenes had caught him in the streetand put him in prison. After this news I went by sea next dayto Megara. Polemarchus was given the usual sentence by theThirty, the hemlock, without any indication of the reason forhis execution, let alone any trial or defence. After his death,when he was taken from the prison, it was not permitted touse any of the three houses we possessed for his funeral. Theyhired a shed and used that for it. There were also plenty ofclothes, but all requests were refuscd, and one of his friendslent a garment, another a pillolv or anything else they couldoffer for his burial. They had seven hundred shields belongingto us, they had a mass of gold and silver, bronze, ornaments,furniture and women's clothing to an altogether unexpectedextent, they had a hundred and twenty slaves, the best of whichthey appropriated, handing the rest to the public stock. Yetthey made a demonstration of their self-seeking and dishonesty,and of their character. Polemarchus' wife happened to havesome gold earrings, which she had had since she first came intothe family. These Melobius removed from her ears. Theyshowed us no mercy in respect of the smallest item of property.Because of our money they behaved to us as if they were filledwith resentment for the most serious delinquencies, though infact we had been entirely innocent of anything of the kind.We had carried out all our public obligations, we had made

45

L Y S I A S fzo-z7lnumerous contributions of money, we had been exemplary in ourbehaviour,.we had. perfoi'med every instrucqion we had beengiven. We had never made any enemies, but-bn ttre contraryhad on several occasions provided ransom for Athenian citizens.This was the treatment they thought reasonable for peoplewhose behaviour as aliens had been very different from theirsas citizens. They had frequently been guilty of driving Atheniancitizens into enemy hands, of executions without burial, ofdeprivation of citizen rights and of prevention of intendedmarriages. They are now brazen enough to appear in defenceof their case rvith the plea that they have done nothing wrongor objectionable. I wish this were true ! It is a benefit which Ishould very largely share. As it is, it is not true of their conducteither towards the state or towards me. As I have said, mybrother was done to death by Eratosthenes without any privateprovocation or any cause of public complaint against him. Itwas solely to satisfy his own lawless desires. But now, gentlemenof the jury, I propose to put him in the witness box and questionhim. Go into the box, please, and answer my questions.

LysIAs Did you arrest Polemarchus or not?ERATosrHrNrs I carried outthe government's commands because I

was afraid.LysIAs Were you in the Council when our affairs were under dis-

cussion ?ERATosrHnNps I was.LysIAs Did you give your vote in favour of the execution or against ?ERATosrHrNrs Against it.LysIAs In the opinion that we were not guilty?ERATosrHnNrs Yes.LysIAs In other words you were outrageous enough t<j vote for his

release and then take part in his execution. When you had amajority in favour of release, you claim to have opposed the execu-tion, but when Polemarchus' safety lay in your hands alone, yourushed him into prison. Do you suppose that the claim you say youmade without success deserves to be called creditable, and yet thatyour actual violence should go unpunished despite my demand andthe jury's ?

Nor, indeed, if his statement of opposition is true, can onefairly credit his claim that he was obeying orders. Presumably

46

[zt-s+1 ERATOSTHENES

they were not exacting a guarantee from him in regard to theMetics. So who could have been less likely to be given the orderthan a man who had opposed the project and made his opinionclear ? Who could have been a less promising agent than anopponent of their aims I To the maiority of Athenians it seemsan adequate account of what happened to attribute it to theThirty. But if the Thirty attribute it to themselves, how can itbe accepted as an accounti Ifthere existed a stronger power inAthens by which the order for homicide in defiance of rightwere given, one might see it as an extenuation. But in thiscase where can responsibility be placed if it is open to the Thirtyto plead the orders of the Thirty I In addition the arrest wasnot carried out in my brother's house, but in the street, whichmeans that Eratosthenes could have combined lenience withobedience to instructions. But he still seized and imprisonedPolemarchus. Everyone is enraged with people who enter theirhouses to demand possession of themselves or their relatives.Yet if the destruction of others for one's own safety deservesany consideration at all, such marauders deserve it more thanEratosthenes. It was dangerous for them not to fulfil theirmission, or to deny it when they had found someone. Eratos-thenes could have denied meeting or seeing his victim. Therewas no form of proof or examination which could have convictedhim if his opponents had wanted to. Had you been a man ofhigh character, Eratosthenes, you should have given informationto likely victims of injustice rather than collaborate in theirarrest. Actually your attitude is manifest from your actions. Itis not that of antagonism, but of satisfaction at these proceedings,and the jury should base their decision on your actions, not onyour words, and use known facts to judge what statements weremade at the time, where eye-witnesses are not obtainable. Itwas impossible for us to be on the spot, or even in our ownhomes, so that they were in a position to do all the harm theycould to the public interest while they artributed all the goodto themselves. However, your denial is something I will notcontest but acquiesce in, if you so desire. I only wonder whatyou would have done as a supporter of the Thirty, when as aso-called opponent you did Polemarchus to death.

47

L Y S I A S ls+-glTell me this, gentlemen. Suppose you had been Polemarchus'

brothers or sons. Would you have acquitted him ? You see,gentlemen of the jury, that Eratosthenes is committed to one oftwo statements, either that he did not arrest Polemarchus orthat he was right to do so. He has admitted to having wrongfullyarrested him, so he has made the choice of verdict easy for you.And in fact numbers of Athenians and aliens alike have comehere to learn your view. Either they will come to the conclusionthat misdeeds will get punished, or else this: that if they achievetheir aims they will have absolute power, while if they fail, theywill be on an equality with everyone else. Aliens in Athens willknow whether they are justified in proclaiming the banishmentof the.Thirty from their cities or not. If the sufferers themselvesare going to let them go when they have them in their power,the aliens will certainly regard it as superfluous to trouble aboutthem. Surely it must be thought outrageous that the victoriousgenerals at Arginusae should have incurred the death penaltyfor refusing to pick up the casualties at se\2 on the score thatretribution should be exacted for the death of patriots, and notmen like this, who as private individuals did all in their powerto cause a defeat on that occasion, and on accession to poweradmit to having deliberately caused the death of numerousAthenians. Should not they and theirs be subjected ro theextreme penalty at the hands of this court ?

I regarded the charges as sufficient at this stage. I considerthat a limit can be set at the point at which it appears that thedefendant merits the death penalty, this being the severestpenalty that can be exacted. I am therefore uncertain of therelevance of repeated accusations in the case of men who, evenif it could be doubly inflicted, would not be adequately punishedfor their actions. It is not legitimate for a man like this to adoptthe frequent practice ofabandoning any defence to the charges,and pursuing irrelevant personal topics. Such men are some-times successful in deception by describing their military valour,the ships they have captured at sea or the towns they havebrought into friendly relations. Make Eratosthenes tell youwhen they have brought about the death of as many enemies as

z. In 4o6 u.c.

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bg-+al E R A T O S T H E N E S

they have of their own fellow-countrymen, when they havecaptured as many ships as they have surrendered, when theyhave secured the friendship of any city to compare with ourown which they have enslaved. Let us hear of the enemy armsseized that will match what were taken from Athenians, of thefortifications destroyed to equal the wreck of their own city's.They even pulled down the armed posts round Attica, andproved that even the Peiraeus was not dismantled at the instanceof Sparta, but because they thought this would strengthen theirown r6gime.

I have often felt astonished at the audacity of any defence ofsuch people, till I reflect that to stick at nothing oneself is of apiece with upholding men like this. This is not the first timethe defendant has acted in opposition to the Athenian people.At the time of the Four Hundred he took part in the oligarchicalrevolution in the fleet, after which he abandoned his ship whenin command of it and fled from the Hellespont with Iatroclesand others, whose names I need not give. On his arrival inAthens he was engaged in opposition to the democratic party.I now put forward evidence of this.

(Eaidence of witnesses)

To omit the intervening period, when disaster came to Athensat Aegospotami, during the existence of the democracy fromwhich the coup d'itat cmerged, a body of five Ephors wasappointed by their fellow-members of the so-called Clubs,3 toassemble the people and to lead the conspiracy in action againstthe democracy. Eratosthenes and Critias \\'ere among theirnumber. They nominated leaders for the Tribes, gave instruc-tions on proposals for decision and persons to hold office, and

3. The political clubs were associations developed in the 5th century

mainly for the propagation of oligarchic ideas. We hear of them particularly

in Thucydides' account of faction as a feature of the politics of the latterpart of the century, and again in connexion rvith the oligarchic movement in

Athens (Thucydides, iii, 8z and viii, 54). They are idealized by Isocrates in

the Panegyricus (7g), though elsewhere he joins the majority vierv in Athens

by condemning them. The Aristotelian Constitution of Athens (34) dis-

sociates Theramenes from them, but this is probably because it is largely

concerned to voice Theramenes' views.

+9

L Y S I A S [++-so]assumed authority for any other measures they chose. Therethus came into being a conspiracy against the siate not merelyon the part of the enemy, but also among these Atheniancitizens, to prevent good decisions and secure widespread want.They were well aware that the only condition of thiir survivalwas calamity in Athens. They supposed that in your anxiety tobe rid of immediate disasters you would not give a thoughi tothe future. That Eratosthenes was one of these Ephors I willprovide evidence, not from his associates, whicl would beimpossible, but from his own hearers. Had these been wise,their evidence would have been used for his condemnation, andthey would have taken severe measures against the authors oftheir present troubles. Had they been wise, they would not haveheld to their oaths when the result was injury to individualAthenians, and yet lightly discarded them when the staremight have been the gainer. That concludes what I have to savon this subject. Call the wirnesses to the platform, please.

(Euidence oJ witnesses)

You have heard the evidence. Now, finally, after attaining tooffice Eratosthenes h19 nothing good to his name, but plintythat-is the opposite. Had he been a man of integrity, hii autywould have required him to avoid illegal proceedings, and tbmake represenrations to the Council about the falsitr. of all theindictments, about the untrue statements of Batrachus andAeschylides,+ which were mere figmenrs concocted by theThirty for the detriment of Athenian citizens. Indeed, glntle-men, the antagonists of democracy did not suffer by holdingtheir tongues. There were plentv of other tongues and hands t6achieve the greatest conceivable disasters for Athens. But goodwill towards her could surely have been made fully clear by [oodsense and opposition to wrong.

-Perhaps he could maintain that he was frightened, and someof you will find that adequate. But he muit not let his pleaprove him in open opposition to the Thirty. If he does, it willbe clear that he agreed to their proceedings and had enoughpower to avoid

i:tx*::',miJnru';:position' But he

5o

lso-szl E R A T O S T H E N E S

should maintain that it was the general interest he was con-cerned for, not that of Theramenes, who did much to injureAthens. But Eratosthenes regarded Athens as his enemy andher enemies as his friends. I have plenty of proof to establishthis, also that the differences which arose arnong the Thirtydid not concern the interests of Athens, but their own, and thedecision which party should carry out this plan of action andcontrol the state. Had the dispute been to secure the interest ofAthens, what finer moment for a man in power to display hispatriotism than at the seizure of Phyle by Thrasybulus I Yetinstead of making any declaration or taking action in support ofthe group at Phyle, he joined his colleagues in a journey toSalamis and Eleusis, where they threw three hundred Atheniancitizens into prison and sentenced them to death in a body.

When the scene changed to the Peiraeus and the disturbancesthere, and discussions began about a settlement, each side hadhigh hopes of its success, as both showed. The Peiraeus partyhad won the day and allowed the others to leave. They thenretired to the city and expelled the Thirty with the exceptionof Pheidon and Eratosthenes, and chose a government of theirbitterest opponents, taking the view that it would be reasonablefor opponents of the Thirty to be supporters of the Peiraeusparty. This body included Pheidon, Hippocles, Epicharis ofLamptra and others thought to be most opposed to Charicles,Critias and their club. As soon as they assumed power them-selves, they gave rise to still more violent dissension in Athens,against the Peiraeus. This clearly proved that their violencehad not been directed to the support of the Peiraeus party orthat of the victims of injustice, and that it was not feeling forthe dead or for probable victims that stirred them, but theexistence of greater power than theirs, or a quicker wa / towealth. On assuming control of the government and the city,they made common cause against the Thirty who had been thecause, and the people's party who had been the victims of allthe trouble. But it was made universally clear that if the expul-sion of the Thirty was just, yours was unjust, and if yours wasright, that of the Thirty was wrong. The course of events whichled to their accusation and expulsion was in no way different

5 r

L Y S I A S ls8-6rlfrom these. So there is cause for deep resentment that Pheidon,who was elected to secure a reconciliation and the recall ofAthenian citizens, should have pursued the same course asEratosthenes, adopting the same point of view, and should havebeen prepared to use the popular party to attack their ownsuperiors among the Thirty, while they refused to hand overthe control of Athens to the parry who had been deprived of itunwarrantably. Instead Pheidon went to Sparta and tried toengineer an attack on Athens on the pretext that the city wouldfall into Boeotian hands, with other statements designed asinducements.s As this failed, either owing to religious oppositionor Spartan antagonism, he borrowed a hundred talents tosecure a mercenary force and petitioned for Lysander to act ascommander. Lysander was strongly in favour of the oligarchyand against a free Athens, and most strongly of all against thePeiraeus party. T'hey hired all kinds of people in an attempt todestroy Athens, they brought whole cities into action, eventuallyincluding Sparta and any of her allies they could, and madetheir preparations, not for reconciliation, but destruction -had it not been for certain true patriots, to whom you mustmake it clear by punishing their enemies that you intend toshow your gratitude. All this you already know, and I am notsure there is any need to provide evidence, However I will pro-vide it. I need a rest myself, and some of you prefer to hearthe same thing repeated.

(Eaidence of witnesses)

Well, now I propose to tell the story of Theramenes, as shortlvas I can. And I must beg for your ind.tlgence for the cityisbenefit as well as for my own. I hope it will not appear to anyonethat in a case against Eratosthenes accusation of Theramenes isout of court; because I gather that Eratosthenes intends tomake use of the claim that he was an associate of rheramenesand a partner in his actions. He would have had a strong claimto have partnered Themistocles in building the walls, one may

5' Many exiled democrats had been given asylum in Boeotia, and it wasrumoured that Thebes had assisted rhrasybulus. This prediction wascalculated to induce Sparta to act.

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[6:-8] E R A T O S T H E N E S

suppose, if he claims to have assisted Theramenes in pullingthem down! But I hardly think the case is parallel. Themistoclesbuilt them in defiance of Sparta, Theramenes pulled them downby a fraud upon Athens. The result to Athens is the opposite ofwhat might have been expected. If the friends of Therameneshad perished with him, unless they had adopted the oppositecourse to his, it would have been no more than they deserved.Instead of this rve find a defence made of him, and attempts byhis associates to take credit as the authors of numerous benefitsinstead of untold detriment. In the first place, he was the primecause of the first oligarchy, when his influence caused theelection of the Four Hundred. His father \ryas one of the Com-missioners, and furthered the same movement, while he himselfwas held to be one of its firmest supporrers, which led to hisown election as Strategus. So long as his stock was high he main-tained good faith rvith Athens. But when he found that Pei-sander, Callaeschrus 6 and others were gaining ground on him,while the citizen body were no longer in their favour, he yieldedto his jealousy of them and his fears of the populace, and joinedthe faction of Aristocrates. He wanted to appear to be in withthe popular party still, so he accused and secured the death ofhis great friends, Antiphonz and Archeptolemus. His dastardlyconduct allowed him to sacrifice both the freedom of Athensfor his adherence to the oligarchs, and the life of his friendsfor his adherence to the populace of Athens.

But when he was in a position of the highest honour andestimationrt h. announced his intention to save Athens, andthen promptly caused its destruction, on the specious claimthat he had devised a scheme of great importance and enormousvalue. He promised to secure peace without the surrender of

6. Peisander played a considerable part in the oligarchic revolution of theFour Hundred (see Thucydides, viii, 54, 3 and 67,3). Of Callaeschrus it isonly known that he was one of the Four Hundred on that occasion, whileAristocriates is mentioned by Lysias, but nor by Thucydides, as a leader ofthe moderates among them.

7. See General Introduction p. ro, rr above.8. There is an abrupt change here, and we pass from the account ofThera-

menes in the revolution of 4rr 8.c., to refer now to his conduct after thebattle of Aegospotami.

53

L Y S I A S l6uz+lhostages, the destruction of the walls or the forfeiture of the navy.He refused to reveal his scheme, urging that he should be trusted.The Council of the Areopagus o was in charge of measuresfor the protection of'Athens, and there was much oppositionto Theramenes. They knew that normally secrets are preservedin dealing with an enemy, whereas Theramenes in the presenceof his own people refused to reveal what he intended to tell theenemy. And yet the people trusted him with the safety of theirwives and children and themselves. He broke all his promises.So obsessed was he with the need to make Athens small andweak that he led her to a proceeding as far removed from theproposals of the enemy as from the expectation of Athens. Hewas under no compulsion from Sparta. It was he himself whoput forward the proposal to pull down the walls of the Peiraeusand abolish the existing constitution. This was because he fullyrealized that unless every hope Athens had was speedily re-moved, instant retaliation would be taken upon himself. Finally,gentlemen of the jury, he did not allow a meeting of the As-sembly until the moment laid down by Sparta had been faithfullyobserved by him, and he had summoned Lysander's fleet andthe enemy force had taken up its position in the country. Then,with this position established, with Lysander, Philochares andMiltiades on the spot, they held an assembly, to forestallopposition or threats from any speaker, and to prevent a rightchoice by Athenian citizens, who were compelled to vote forthe measures they had decided on. Theramenes now rose andordered the city to be pur into the hands of thirty individuals,and the constitution in preparation by Dracontides to beadopted. Even as things were, there was a violent outburst inrefusal. It was rcalized that the issue of the meeting was slaveryor freedom. Theramenes, as members of the jury can themselvestestify, declared that he cared nothing for this outburst, as heknew that a large number of Athenians were in favour of thesame measures as himself, and he was voicing the decisionsapproved by Sparta and Lysander. After him Lysander spoke,

g. The Areopagus had been deprived of political functions in 462 s.c. Itis not known whether any enactment gave it a general power of supervisionat this time of trouble.

54

lz+-81 E R A T O S T H E N E S

and among other statements pronounced that he held Athensunder penalty for failing to carry out the terms of the truce,and that the question would not be one of her constitution, butof her continued existence, if Theramenes' orders were dis-obeyed. lfrue and loyal members of the Assembly realized thedegree to which the position had been prepared and compulsionlaid on thern, and either stood still in silence or left, rvith theirconscience clear at any rate of having voted the ruin of Athens.A few despicable characters whose deliberate intentions weretraitorous held up their hands to vote as they were told. In-structions had been given to eiect ten men secretly nominatedty Theramenes, ten laid down by the established Ephors, andten frorn the company present. They saw the weakness of theAthenian position and

-their o*n siretrgth so well that they

realized beforehand what would happen in the Assembly. Youneed not take this from me, but from Therarnenes. All I havesaid he himself included in his Defence in the Council,,o withhis reproach to the exiles that they owed their return to himwhile Sparta had never thought of them, and to his associatesin power that everything that happened, as I have described,had been due to him, and this was his reward for it - when infact he had given every sort of pledge and exacted oaths offidelity from them. All this and more, great and small, late andsoon, stands to his name in defiance of morality and right. Andyet people are brazen enough to call themselves his friends,though it was not for the welfare of Athens that he met hisdeath, but for his own outrageous conduct. It was a penaltythat would have been as just uncler the oligarchy he had dis-solved as under democracy. He had trvice enslaved Athens inhis contempt for her existing r6gime and his desire for revolu-tion. He made constant claim to the finest of titles, when hehad instigated the foulest treason.

ro. In the Council, i.e. in Theramenes' defence against the attack made onhim by the party of Critias, to which he orved his death.

Lysias' account of Theramenes is understandably coloured by strongfeeling against a champion of oligarchy, but even nowadays it is hard toassess Theramen€s. (See for the earlier period Thucydides, viii, 68 and 9o-94, for the later Xenophon, Hellenica II and III.)

5 5

L Y S I A S lzs-861On Theramenes the indictment is now complete. You have

realized, the need to exclude sympathy and pity from your view,and exact from Eratosthenes and his associates in power thepunishment they deserve. You have worsted your enemies inthe field. You must not submit to your opponents in this court.You must not let gratitude for their professed intentions out-weigh your indignation at their actual conduct. You must notconspire against them in their absence, and then, when youhave them, let them go. When fortune has surrendered them toAthens, you must not fall short of her lead.

This completes the indictment of Eratosthenes and the friendsto whom he will refer in his defence, as they were his assistantsin malpractice. But his position is nor a true parallel with thatof Athens. He dealt with his victims as accuser and judge inone; we resort to accusation and def-ence. His party put theinnocent to death without trial; you insist on fair trial for menwho were the ruin of Athens, whose penalty, however illegal,could never match their misdeeds. what treatment could bringupon them fair retriburion for their actions ? could their owndeath and their children's atone for fathers, sons and brothersput to death untried I Could the confiscation of their properrygompensate for their many depredations from the city, or forindividual citizens whose houses they sacked ? Since, rhen, noaction of any kind could match their deserts, it must be held un-justifiable to omit any penalty that could be inflicted upon them.

But it seems to me that a man who can appear before a jurynot of neutrals, but of the very people he has victimized, toput up a defence before the very witnesses of his evil actions,has set no limits either to his contempt of this court or to hisconfidence in outside support. Both these factors deserveconsidering in the realization that the defendants' past conductwould have been impossible without assistance, and theirpresent appearance could not have been made without theprospect of support from the same quarter, from people who,without intending to aid the Thirty, yet hope to seiure im-munity themselves for past and future actions alike, if you acquitthe ultimate engineers of wickedness when you have them inyour hands. one may also feel surprise at any intention to plead

56

[86-er] E R A T O S T H E N E S

for them. Will such a plea be made in the guise of respectablecitizens who expect their own merits to outweigh the defendants'guilt I I wish they had shown as much concern for the welfareof Athens as these did for her destruction. Or will they adoptthe defence of sophistry and claim special indulgence for theacts of the Thirty ? Remember that for the rights of Athensthey never set out to claim even bare justice.

It is also worth observing the witnesses whose testimony forthe Thirty is their own condemnation. They must think verypoorly of your memory and intelligence, if they expect a freeacquittal for the Thirty at the hands of Athenian citizens, whenEratosthenes and his associates made it dangerous for them evento conduct a funeral. Yet the defendants, by their release, couldregain the power to bring Athens down. Their victims by theirdeath have passed beyond retribution on their enemies. And itis a scandal that men who were unjustly done to death shouldhave had none who lived to show their friendship, while theabsolute destroyers of Athens should have crowds to attendtheir funeral, to judge by the hundreds preparing to defendthem. But I regard it as easier to stand alone in defence of yoursufferings than to defend the actions of the Thirty. Yet it isclaimed that of the Thirty the least harm of all was done byEratosthenes, and they make this a reason to defend him. Butit was greater than was inflicted by all the rest of Greece. Isthis not to be made a reason to condemn him ? You must showyour clear opinion. A verdict of guilty for Eratosthenes willmake clear your indignation at his actions. An acquittal willprove that you desire a repetition of them. Nor will you be ina position to say that you acted on the instructions of the Thirty.There is no one now to make you repudiate your opinion. Iurge you therefore not to condemn yourselves by acquittinghim. Nor must you imagine that your vote will be secret.Ir Youwill make your own decision manifest to Athens.

r r. The ballot in Athenian legal cases was kept secret, as the final guaranteeof good faith, by the practice of having two voting discs for each iuryman,one marked for acquittal, the other for condemnation, and two boxes, onefor operative, the other for rejected votes. It was then impossible for anyoneto see which disc was put into which box. Lysias'point, of course, is that thetotal vote will show the general attitude of the jury.

57

L Y S I A S Ig"-6)There are a few points which, before I close, I want to bring

before the parties both of the city and of the Peiraeus, so rhatyou can keep the disasters they brought on Athens in yourmind when you give your vote. First I address members fromthe city. Remember that your domination at the hands of theThirty was so absolute that you were compelled to fight a waragainst your own brothers and sons and your own fellow-citizens, a war in rvhich defeat has set you on an equality withthe successful, but victory would have meant slavery at thehands of the Thirty. As to private houses, the Thirty wouldhave extended theirs owing to their position, while civil warhas reduced yours. They did not reckon to share their benefitswith you, but they compelled you to share in their ill name,and adopted an attitude so overbearing that they were notprepared to be generous to gain your loyalty, but expected youto take on their unpopularity and keep your good will ro them.Since, then, you are now in the position of security, it is for youto do your utmost on your own behalf and that of the Peiraeusparty in exacting retribution. Reflect first that you were oncein the power of the most reprehensible elements in Athens,then that you now stand among the highest of her citizens, thatyou fight her enemies and deliberate on her problems. Remem-ber too the foreign soldiers then established on the Acropolis topreserve their domination and your slavery.

There is much more I could say to you, but this must suffice.I now turn to the party of the Peiraeus. First I urge you torecall the matter of your arms. You fought many engagementson foreign soil, yet you were never disarmed by an enemy, butonly by the Thirty, and in time of peace.rz Remember, then, thatyou were proclaimed exiles from Athens, the heritage of yourfathers, and even in exile your extradition was demanded. Letthis rouse in you the indignation you felt at your expulsion, andremind you as well of the other barbarity inflicted on you, ofmen seized from the market and the temple and done to death,of men dragged away from children, from parents and wivesand forced to suicide, and not even allowed the burial which

rz. After the formation of the catalogue of rhree Thousand the rest of thecitizens were deprived of their arms by a trick on the part of the Thirty.

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custom sanctions, because there were others who thought theirown power stronger than the retribution which heaven laysupon the wicked. Those of you who escaped death were subjectto dangers in many lands to which you wandered, invariablyproclaimed as exiles, starved of the needs of life, some withchildren left behind in the hostile country which had beenyour own, some elsewhere abroad. Yet against all oppositionyou returned to the Peiraeus. Many and great were your perils,but you behaved as men should, and set your people free orbrought them back to their country. Had misfortune causedyou to fail, you would have fled in fear of the same fate asbefore: that the cruelty of the Thirty would have denied theirvictims any of the rights of religion or sanctuary which servedto protect even the perpetrators of it, that your children inAthens would have been left to their barbarity, while thoseabroad would now be in slavery for default on small loans, andthere would be none to preserve them.

However, I do not intend to talk of what might have beenwhen it is beyond me to describe the truth of what wasperpetrated, which would be beyond the scope of any numberof accusers. But there has been no slackening in my eager regardfor our temples, which they sold or desecrated, for our city,which they brought low, for our shipyards, which they des-troyed, or for the cleacl, whom they failed to protect in their lifeand whom you must avenge after their cleath. I believe thesedead are listening to what we say, and will knorv that you aremaking your vote, and feel that every vote of not guilty will bea vote for their ou'n condemnation, every vote of guiliy one ofretribution on their behalf.

I will bring the charge to a close. You who have heard andseen and suffered, yours is the power. Cast your vote.

A N D O C I D E S : O N T H E M Y S T E R I E S


Andocides is best knopn for his connexion pith the mJ/sterinusincidents phich occurred. in Athens in the summer of 4r5 n.c.,just before the great expedition. to Sicill set sail. Th,e fleet rnas 0n.the point of deparnu'e, mhen it wns leorned that d,uring the nightthe imnges oJ-Hermes in, the streets hntl been defaced., A furtherreport saitl tlrat a party o_l'people, including one of the leaders oftlte expeditiort,, Alcibiades, ltacl conducted, parodl performances oftlrc Mlsteries, the sacred rituals of Demeter and, Persephone atEleusis, wltose secrecJ/ tpas prztected lry oatlts of the greotestTtossible solenmity. Tltis pro/a.natizn ma1 haae been o sopltisticatetlrebellion ttgainst canaention, but b7 the &ccnant giaen in th.isspeech it seerns to ltaae been carried out with surprising recklessness,,in tlte pres€flce of mtinitiated sloaes. As regards tlte mutilation oftlre Herms.e, it has been suggested that it may lta.ae been done eithirin an' ilttempt to postpone the expedition by the d,eliberate creationoJ'u batl zme?t, 0r as o, _first step topnrds an oligarcltic conspiracyphich pould crerte tlte need to linit the control of tlte state t0 aselect .few. lt is rutt c/ear hop it n,ou/tl hozte serz,ed these ends, andeun' if me allont for Atheniurt srtperstition, the incidents remainltartl to understand. But the netps cu,used widespread consternationat sttch acts of horrtflins socrilege, antl led to an intmediate attackon Alciltiades.Honteaer, he rpas allorped to sai.l on the expedition,since his enemies felt that if the case Dere brought up at once, h.isgreilt populari4t rpouhl saae ltinr.. wlten. he had, gnne, tltey recalled,kinr. to stand, his trial, but he tltought it prutlent to leaue Athensfar Sparta.

Andocides, a mem,ber of o, oLl, disti,guislted and wealtlrytfit,mil1, with political, perltaps oligarchic, interests, Dos ernung a

_ r. see glossary, p- 266. Thucydides' account of the incident, ofthe chargethat Alcibiades was involved in it, of his demand to be tried before sailinc Jnthe expedition, and of his final escape to Thurii in s. Italy areinBook-vl,27 -29 ,53 ,6 r .

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number denou,nced as irnplicated in these ffiirs. He is said to haoeescuped conviction and punisltment b1 admitting his own guilt andi,ncriminating zthers. In his speech. he denies this. But soon after-wards the so-ttt,lled decree o/'Isotimides forbade all rplto were gtiltlto/-sacrilege and had admitterl it, to enter the temples or tlte Agoraagain. Tltis mqt haae been. direct$t aimed ot Andocitles. In anycase he went into exile in C-yprus.He also t,isited other parts of theGreek world, und acquired some considerable wealth. He rnndeseveral attempts to return to ,4thens, but tpitltottt su,6cess, unt,il thegeneral. il,nxnestJ a/ier tlte expulsion oJ the Thirty in 4oj n.c.ullowed ltint. to rlo so.Ile nom took part in pfulic life, and heldsome ntinor offices. But in iloo B.c. he pas accu;ed by Cephisius,prompted by tlte riclt and cultureil Callias, oJ'aiolating the decreeof Isotimides b1 attending the celebration o./' the Mlsteries. Hisd,efence on tltis churge i,nvolaes him in two rnain questions, (i)wlrether lte was in foct guiltl on the cltarges coaeretl b7 Isotirnideldecree in 415 8.c., and (ii) whether it is not itself inaalitl since theomnestJ oJ-,to7 s.c. Wlxaterer rna)/ be thought of the legal issues,Andocides pon his case, ond conti,nued in Athens as a politician,being sent 0n an embasyt to Sparta in jgz n.c., which led, to hisspeech,, On the Peace. But mith the rest o/'the embass1 he wasprosecuted for bribery4 alnzng other charges, ond to aaoid, trial hereturned, onc€ more to exile.

['-s]

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Tun preparation my opponents undertook and the eagernessthey showed to injure me in every respect, right or wronf, fromthe first moment I arrived in this city, is something you-realizefor the most part, and I need go to no length about it.r What Ishall ask of you,_ gentlemen, is my rights, which are as easy foryou to grant as they are valuable for me ro receive: And the firstthing I want you to keep in mind is that I am here under nocompulsion either in the form of bail or of physical force. Itrusted in justice and in your integrity to determine rightly andnot allow me to be wrongfully done to death by -y aniagonists,but to preserve me in accordance with justice, with Aihenianlaw, and with the oaths you swore before embarking on the voteyou are going to make. It would be reasonable for you to holdthe same view about people who voluntarily submit to the riskof the courts, as they hold themselves. Any who were unwillingto abide by the court's decision and are self-condemned wrongldoersz may reasonably be accorded the same decision as thevhave themselves implied. But those who are confident of theiiinnocence and have stood by it may also reasonably expect fromyou the same opinion as their own, and not bc cor-rdemned outof hand. I am myself' a case irr poirt. I reccived news fromseveral sources that my enemies were saying that I would notstand firm, but would be offand away. 'why woulcl Andocideswant to face a suit of such a vital nature i If he left, he wouldhave all he needs. He has only to sail to cyprus, where he camefrom, and there rvill be plenty of land and a present of moneyall ready for him. Do you suppose a man in his position isgoing to stand trial for his life ? what would be the idea r Hemust realize the attitude of Athens towards him.' personally,gentlemen, I hold the opposite view. To live elsewhere in perfecicomfort and be deprived of my counrry is something I would

r. Parts of the early chapters are derived from rhetorical stock-in-tradeand also appear in Lysias.

z. i.e. by their failure to appear.

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A N D O C I D E S ts-81never accept, and even if Athens is in the condition my oppo-nents declare, I would far rather be her citizen than belong toany of the other states, prosperous though they may be at thepresent time. This being my view, I left it to you to decide onmy life. I therefore beg you, gentlemen, to show greater goodwill to me in my defence than to the prosecution. You mustrealize that, however fair you may be, it is the defendant whois the worst off. The plaintiffs have thought the whole casethrough at length and made their accusation without any dangerto themselves. I have fears and dangers and adverse prejutliceto contend with in making my defence. so it is reasonable thatyou should be more favourable to me than to my accusers. youshould bear in mind also the number of instances there are ofaccusations which have been shown up at once as such manifestlies that it would be much more welcome to you to punish theaccusers than the accused. others again, after telling lies whichhave brought people to undeserved execution, have been con-victed of perjury too late to benefit their victims. After numerousinstances of this kind you may reasonably disbelieve the state-ments of the prosecution. Whether their accusations are seriousor not the prosecutor's statement will show. whether they aretrue or false will only become clear after you have heard -ydefbnce.

I therefore wonder, gentlemen, at what point to begin mydefence. Should I start with the mosr recenf item, the iliegalityof the information laid against me, or rvith the decree of Isoti-mides,r which is obsolete, or with the laws and the sworn agree-Tent-s 1nade, or should I begin my account at the very begin-ning ? I will tell you what gives me the grearesr difficuity. it isthat you do not all feel equally strongly about all the .irr.g.r,but each has his own particular poini which he wourd iikereplied to first. Bur ro mention them all at once is impossible;so it seems to me best to tell the whole story from the beginningwithout omitting anything. If you hear a Cortect version of th6facts, you will easily grasp what lies my opponents have toldagainst me. I think you personally are prepaied to make a just

3. For this decree see introduction to the speech. It may even have beenpassed to force Andocides himself out of the iity, despite his acquittal.

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decision (which is what induced me to stand my ground), inthe realization that in private and public affairs alike your firstconcern is to give your vote in accordance with the oaths youhave sworn. And this is the saving of the state, despite certainopponents of this view. Here is my request to you; show a goodunderstanding in listening to my case, do not be adverse tome nor suspicious of what I say, nor seize on individual words,but hear my defence right through before giving your vote, asseems to you most equitable or most in accordance with theoaths you have sworn. As I said before, I will make my defencefrom the beginning, first of all on the actual charge that gaverise to the information laid against me, which is the reason formy submitting to this case: namely on the subject of the mys-teries; on this I shall plead Not Guilty, either of impiety, or ofinforming, or of any admission, and shall disclaim knowlcdgeof the truth or falsehood of the information brought beforc you.This is the first point I shall establish.

An Assembly was held for the generals fur thc Sicilian cxpccli-tion, Nicias, Lamachus and Alcibiades. Lanrachtrs' flagship harlalready set sail, when Pythonicus rose :rnd nrrrdc this annogncc-ment to the people: 'Athenians, you arc scncling out :r lirrcc ona large scale, and are prepared to take this risk rvirilc onc ol'thcgenerals, Alcibiades, has been holding a privatc pcrform:rnccof the mysteries in his house with certain others. If you rvillgrant immunity to the man I name, a servant of one of the meninvolved, who has not been initiated, he will recite the mysteriesto you. In any case you can do what you like to me, if this isuntrue.' Alcibiades made strong expostulations of denial, andthe prytaneis+ decided to order the uninitiated to withdraw,rvhile they themselves went in search of the young man Pythoni-cus named. They came back with Polemarchus' servant, whosename was Andromachus. They passed a vote of immunity; hethen said that mysteries were being celebrated at Pulytion'shouse, and Alcibiades, Niciades and Meletuss lvere the actual

4. See glossary.

5. There were several persons called Meletus. This one is not to be con-fused with the accuser of socrates. Phaedrus, however, whose name appearsamong those denounced by Teucros, is the friend of Socrates.

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A N D O C I D E S ftz-filcelebrants. He was among the people there, and saw it. Therewere slaves there too, himself and his brother and Hicesius, theflute player, and Meletus' servant. He was the first to give thisinformation, and provided the following names. Of thesePolystratus was arrested and put to death, while the rest wentoff over the border and were officially condemned to death.Take the list, please, and read the names.

(The list is read,.\ Denounced byAndromachus : Alcibiades, Niciades,Meletus, Archebiades, Archippus, Diogenes, Polystratus, Aristo-menes, Oionias, Panaitius.

This was the first information, gentlemen, given by Andro-machus against the men cited. Now call Diognetus.

(Diognetus re plie s t o And,o cid,e s' questi ons.)Were you Commissioner of Inquiries, Diognetus, when pythonicusreported Alcibiades in the Assembly ?I was.Are you aware of the information laid by Andromachus of events atthe house of Pulytion ?Yes.Are these, then, the names of the men against whom the informa-tion was laid ?That is so.

Now came a second lot of information. Teucros was an alienin Athens who had gone secretly to Megara, and from theregave notice to the Council that, if he were given immunity; hewould lay information about rhe mysteries in which he hadtaken part, and give the names of his associates in it, and reportwhat he knew of the mutilation of the Hermae. The council(which had full powers) passed a vote and sent for him fromMegara. When he arrived, he was given immunity, and gavethe names of his associates. These fled from Athens on Teucros'information. Now read the list of their names, please.

(The list is read'.) Denounced by Teucros: phaedrus, Gniphonides,rsonomus, Hephaestodorus, cephisodorus, himseld Diognet.rs,Smindurides, Philocrates, Antiphon, Tisarchus, pantocles.

Remember, gentlemen, that all this is agreed by you too.Then there was a third lot of information. The wife of Alc-

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maeonides, who had previously been the wife of Damon * hername was Agariste - gave information that at the house ofCharmides near the Temple of Zeus, mysteries were conductedby Alcibiades, Axiochus and Adeimantus. These also fled onthis information.

There was one further source of information. Lydus. the slaveof Pherecles of Themacus, gave information of mysteries con-clucted at the house of his master, Pherecles, at Themacus.Arnong others rvhom he denouriced was my father, who he saidhad been there, but rvas asleep with his cloak over his head.Speusippus, rvho was a member of the Council, passed thenames on to the court. Then my father provided sureties, andprosecuted Speusippus for illegality. The case came before ajury of six thousand,6 and Speusippus only got rwo hundredvotes. The person who persuaded and begged *y father to staywas myself, together with the rest of the family. Now callCalliasz and Stephanus, and also Philippus and Alexippus, whoare relations of Acumenus and Autocrator, who were exiledafter the information of Lydus. The first is a nephew of Auto-crator, and the second uncle to Acumenus. They must bepresumed to have had no liking for the man who caused theexile of their relatives, and they must have known who this was.

Please face the jury and give your evidence as to whether mystatements are true.

(Eaidence giaen)

You have heard the facts, gendeman, and they have beenattested. Now recall what my accusers have had the audacity

6. 6ooo was the total number of jury empanelled at one time (see glossary),and it appears that this is the only known insrance of the rvhole body sittingas a single court. This must be taken as indicating the degree of feelingcaused by the affair.

7. callias is here probably the son of relocles and brother-in-law toAndocides-(see 42 below). He must be distinguished from callias, the son ofHipponicus, Andocides' opponent in the case, rvho is referred to in the latterpart of this speech, and who is also the Callias of Plato's Protagoras.It rvashis grandfather, also Callias the son of Hipponicus, whose name was givento the Peace between Athens and Persia in 448 e.c. yet another cattiasappears in the decree (77 below), Callias of Angele.

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A N D O C I D E S ftg-zzlto say. This is the right procedure: to listen to the prosecutionand refute it. They stated that I gave information about themysteries, denounced my own father as having been there, andwas in fact an informer against him, which is a horrifying andoutrageous statement. The informer against him was Lydus,the slave of Pherecles, while it was I who urged him, indeedlvent on my knees and begged him to stand his ground and notrun a\r'ay abroad. What could have been the object of mygiving information against my father, as they claim, and thenbegging him to stay and be victimizedby my actioni Did Ipersuade him to face a trial in which he was bound to undergoone of two appalling results ? Because, if so, either I would bethought to have given true information against him, in whichcase I should be the cause of his death, or he would surviveand cause mine. As the law stood, a true information earnedimmunity, a false one was punished by death. But you knorvthat my father and I both survived, rvhich lvas impossible onthe assumption that I informed against him. One or other of usmust have been executed. Well, then, even if my father hadwanted to stand firm, do you suppose his friends would haveallowed him to stay or gone bail for him, instead of beggingand beseeching him to go somewhere where he could expect tosurvive rvithout causing my death I But in fact even when heu,as bringing a suit for illegality against Speusippus, he con-tinued to make this declaration: that he never went to Pherecles'house at Themacus. He demanded the torture of his ownslaves, without any question of passing over owners who offeredit, and compelling the unwilling.s When my father said this,rvhat was there left for Speusippus to say, if this story is true,except, 'Leogoras, what is the point of talking about slaves I

8. To us the practice of torturing slaves seems both barbarous and useless.But it is often mentioned by Greek authors, usually in instances which implythat the master invited or allowed the torture of slaves, because this wouldelicit the truth and so improve his case (cf. Aristophanes,Frogs,6rg-zo, rvherea list of 'all the regular tortures' is added with comic intent). The implicationalso follows that torture was not carried out except with the permission of themaster. This case of the Hermae, however, seems to have been thought soimportant as to justify special instructions for the use of torture in some caseswithout such permission.

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Has not your own son given information against you to theeffect that you were at Themacus I Cross-examine your father,Andocides, or else your immunity is forfeit.' Is this whatSpeusippus would have said, or not ? I should say it is. So if Idid go into court, or if there was a story about me, or anyinformation against me or any declaration, not by me againstanyone else, but by someone else against me, I invite anyone tostand up here and refute me. But in fact I have never heardof a more outrageous or misleading argument. All they thoughtnecessary was to have the nerve to make an accusation. Whetherit would be proved false, they couldn't care less. If their chargesagainst me had been true, you would have been enraged andthought no penalty bad enough for me. Accordingly I claimthat you should conclude that they are liars, and regard themas abominable, and take it as proved by the fact that, if the worstof their accusations are shown to be manifest lies, it is quitecertain that it will be perfectly easy to prove it of the others,which arc far less serious.

These, then, are the sets of information that were laid aboutthe mysteries: four of them. The names of the men who wereexiled after each of them have been read out in my defence, andduly vouched for. But I will add a further proof, to makeassurance doubly sure. Of the men who were exiled over thecase of the mysteries some died in exile, while others havereturned, and are here in court at my request. I therefore inviteanyone to use my time allowance q to raise an objection and claimthat I was responsible for the exile of any of them, or that I laidinformation against them, and that their exile was not due tothe information I have mentioned. If I am proved wrong, Iaccept any penalty. I now pause and make way for anyone whowishes to say anything.

Well, then, gentlemen, what happened next I After all thisinformation had been laid, a question arose about the reward.This had been fixed at rooo drach,mae by the decree of Cleo-nymus, and at ro,ood by that of Peisander, and there was a disputebetween the informers and Pythonicus, who claimed to have

9. The maximum length of speeches made in a law-suit rvas laid down, andthey were timed with a water-clock.

6s

A N D O C I D E S [28-3o]

been the first to bring an indictment, while Androcles put in aclaim on behalf of the Council'0 itself. It was therefore decidedin the court .of the Thesmothetae, that judgement should begiven by the initiated, when they had heard the informationgiven by each claimant. They voted the rewards first to Andro-machus, secondly to Teucros; and they received them at thePanathenaic Festival, Andromachus ro,ooo dracltmue andTeucros rooo. Please call the witnesses to this.

(Eaidence giaen)

As regards the mysteries, gentlemen, about which the informa-tion was laid, and about which you who are initiates have comeinto court, it has been proved that I committed no sacrilege,laid no information against anyone, and made no admissionabout it, nor was there any single misdemeanour, large or small,on my part against the two goddesses. And this is what it ismost important to me to convince you of. The statement of myaccusers, who let loose all these frightful outcries and madetirades about how others in the past had done acts of sacrilege,and what punishments had been inflicted on them - what hasall this to do with me i I am all the more inclined to make theseaccusations against tltem, and take this as my reason for claimingthat they deserve death for their impiety, while I deserveacquittal for having committed none. It would be unconscion-able if I were to be pilloried for other people's offences, whilein the knowledge that these lies were uttered against me by myenemies, you regarded them as more convincing than the truth.It is obvious that for such offences as this there exists no suchdefence as mere denial. A stringent test is needed, when peopleknow the facts. In my case the investigation is pleasant enough,because I do not need to beg and beseech you for mercy to savemyself on a charge of this sort. All I need do is to cross-examinethe prosecution and remind you of the facts. You will give your

ro. i.e. for distribution of the reward to the Council as being responsiblefor getting the information. The reward seems to have been rooo drachmaein the first place, rvith the larger figure added when the other seemedinadequate. Cleonymus and Peisander are both made the target of Aristo-phanes' wit in several places (e.g. Cloudsr 6T3 seqq., Cleonymus).

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vote under stringent oaths. You invoked tremendous impreca-tions on yourselves and your offspring, and swore to vote justlyon my case, and besides you have been initiated, you have wit-nessed the ritual of the two goddesses, which will make youpunish impiety and preserve the innocent. You must regard itas just as sacrilegious to condemn the innocent for sacrilege asto fail to punish the guilty. So with much girearer force than myaccusers I lay on you the charge, in the name of the trvo god-desses and for the honour of the rites you have witnessecl, andof all the Greeks u,ho come here for the festival, that if I havecommitted anv sacrilege, or if I have made any adrrissions, orlaid information against any human being, or if anyone else hasdone so about me) you put me to death, and I make no defbnce.On the other hand, if I have committed no fault, and prove it toyou with certainty, I request you to make it clear to all theGreeks that I was unjustifiably brought to trial. If rny accuser,Cephisius, fails to gain a fifth of the votes and is disfranchised,he will not be allowed to enter the precinct of the two goddesseson pain of death. So if you think my defence adequate on thesecharges, please indicate it, to encourage me in continuing it.

As regards the mutilation of the Hermae and the informationlaid about it, I will fulfil my promise ro you, and recount allthat happened from the beginning. On Teucros' arrival fromMegara and the grant of immunity to him he told what he knewabout the mysteries and also about the mutilation of the Hermae,and denounced eighteen people. Some of those denounced fledthe country, while others were arrested and put to death onTeucros' information. Please read me the names.

(The list is read.) Denounced by Teucros in the case of the Hermae:Euctemon, Glaucippus, Eurymachus, Polyeuctus, Platorrr Anti-dorus, Charippus, Theodorus, Alcisthenes, Menestratus, Eryxi-machus, Euphiletus, Eurydamas, Pherecles, Meletus, Timanthes,Archidamus, Telenicus.

Some of these have returned to Athens and are here now, andthere are also a number of relatives of those who were executed;I invite any of them to stand up in my time allowance and

rr. Plato here is not the philosopher. Meletus is the same as in note 5.

7r

ANDocrDEs [SS-9]charge me with responsibility for the banishment or death ofanyone named here.

After this Peisander and Charicles, who were among theCommissioners of Inquiry, but seemed most inclined at thattime to favour the popular party, declared that what had beendone was the work of a number of people, and was a plot tooverthrow the democracy,t2 which should be investigated with-out remission. Popular feeling was such that the moment theproclamation was made for the Council to assemble in theirHall, and the signal was down, the two events were simultaneous,the arrival of the Council and a flight from the Agora in a generaldread of arrest. This public disaster induced Diocleides to layinformation to the Council to the effect that he knew the menresponsible for the mutilation of the Hermae, who were aboutthree hundred altogether, and to state that he had witnessedthe affair and how he had come across it.

Now gentlemen, I ask you to give this your attention andrecall whether my statement is true, and discuss the matter.He said he had a slave at Laurium and had to take his earningsto him. He got up and started early, because he had mistakenthe time owing to the full moon. When he got to the entranceof the Theatre of Dionysus, he saw the figures of a lot of mengoing down from the Odeurnl: into the Orchestra. He wasfrightened at this, so he sat down in the shadow between thepillar and the slab on which stands the bronze statue of theStrategus. The men'he saw were about three hundred innumber, standing in a circle in groups of fifteen or twenty. Hesaw their faces in the moonlight and recognized most of them.His first idea, gentlemen, and an outrageous one, in my view,

rz. It is not easy to understand why this should have been supposed, whysuch alarm should have beer. roused, or why Peisander, who took part fouryears later in the oligarchic revolution of 4rr u.c., should have thought itcalled for a witch hunt of this kind. The parody of the mysteries may havehad no political basis, the mutilation of the Hermae was perhaps designed asan omen to prevent the sailing of the expedition to Sicily and to discreditAlcibiades, but there is little to connect anything that happened with anyserious attempt to overthrow the constitution.

The nature of the 'signal' referred to is unknown.13. The Odeum was next to the Theatre. There were bronze statues of

Mitiades and Themistocles in the Theatre. It is not clear which is meant.

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was that he was in a position to say that any Athenian he chosewas among their nurnber, and to den| the presence of anyonehe chose. After seeing this sight he went to Laurium; next dayhe heard of the mutilation of the Hermae, and at once realizedthat this rvas what these people had been doing. When he gotback to town, he found Commissioners already appointed, andthe informer's fee set at roo minae. Then he saw Euphemus (theson of Callias, son of Telocles) sitting at the blacksmith's, andtook him over to the temple of Hephaestus, and told him whatI have told you, horv he had seen us that night. He said he'djust as soon take money from us as from the state, so as to keepon terms tvith us. Euphemus said it was decent of him, andtold him to come rvith him to Leogoras' house, 'so as to meetAndocides there with him, and some others concerned'. So hecame next day and knocked at the door, when as it happenedmy father was just going out, and said to him, 'Are you the per-son they are waiting for ? Well, a friend like you is not to belightly clismissed.' With thar my father went off. This u'as thervay he tried to get at my father rvith the claim that he was inthe plot.r+ What u.e said, according to him, was that lve haddccided to give him tu.o talents of silver instead of the officialrao minae, ancl if wc succccclecl in our plot, hc shoulcl bc in onit, and we gave all cluc gulrantccs. 'Iir this hc sairl his rcply rvrsthat he would think it ovcr, ancl that u'c thcn tokl hinr ro corl1cto the house of Callias, son of Telocles, so as to havc him thcrctoo. This was his way of trying to incriminate my brother-in-law. Then, he said, he went to Callias', where he reached agree-ment lvith us and swore an oath on the Acropolis, while weagreed to give him the money the following month, but we lethim down and didn't produce it. So he came forward with hisinformrtion.

These were the circumstances of his indictment, gentlemen,and the men denounced were those he said he knew, forty-twoin number. The first he specified were Mantitheus and Apse-phion, who were members of the Council in session, and the

14. Leogoras' remark might have implied the knowledge either that theclub were about to offer Diocleides money, or rhat Diocleides could divulgethe plot. Either implication could suggest that Leogoras was involved.

I J

ANDocrDEs [SS-9]charge me with responsibility for the banishmenr or death ofanyone named here.

After this Peisander and Charicles, who were among theCommissioners of Inquiry, but seemed most inclined at thattime to favour the popular party, declared that what had beendone was the work of a number of people, and was a plot tooverthrow the democracy,,r2 which should be investigated with-out remission. Popular feeling was such that the moment theproclamation was made for the Council to assemble in theirHall, and the signal was down, the two events were simultaneous,the arrival of the Council and a flight from the Agora in a generaldread of arrest. This public disaster induced Diocleides to layinformation to the Council to the effect that he knew the menresponsible for the mutilation of the Hermae, who were aboutthree hundred altogether, and to state that he had witnessedthe affair and how he had come across it.

Now gentlemen, I ask you to give this your attention andrecall whether my statement is true. and discuss the matter.He said he had r ilru. at Laurium and had to take his earningsto him. He got up and started early, because he had mistakenthe time owing to the full moon. When he got to the entranceof the Theatre of Dionysus, he saw the figures of a lot of mengoing down from the Odeuml: into the Orchestra. He wasfrightened at this, so he sat down in the shadow between thepillar and the slab on which stands the bronze statue of theStrategus. The men'he saw were about three hundred innumber, standing in a circle in groups of fifteen or twenty. Hesaw their faces in the moonlight and recognized most of them.His first idea, gentlemen, and an outrageous one, in my view,

rz. It is not easy to understand why this should have been supposed, rvhysuch alarm should have beer, roused, or why Peisander, who took part fouryears later in the oligarchic revolution of 4n n.c., should have thought itcalled for a witch hunt of this kind. The parody of the mysteries may havehad no political basis, the mutilation of the Hermae was perhaps designed asan omen to prevent the sailing of the expedition to Sicily and to discreditAlcibiades, but there is little to connect anything that happened with anyserious attempt to overthrow the constitution.

The nature of the'signal'referred to is unknown.13. The Od,:um was next to the Theatre. There were bronze statues of

Mitiades and Themistocles in the Theatre. It is not clear which is meant.

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was that he was in a position to say that any Athenian he chosewas among their nurnber, and to deny the presence of anyonehe chose. After seeing this sight he went to Laurium; next dayhe heard of the mutilation of the Hermae, and at once realizedthat this rvas what these people had been doing. When he gotback to town) he found Commissioners already appointed, andthe informer's fee set at too minae. Then he saw Euphemus (theson of Callias, son of Telocles) sitting at the blacksmith's, andtook him over to the temple of Hephaestus, and told him whatI have told you, horv he had seen us that night. He said he'djust as soon take money from us as from the state, so as to keepon terms with us. Euphemus said it was decent of him, andtold him to come with him to Leogoras' house, 'so as to meetAndocides there with him, and some others concerned'. So hecame next day and knocked at the door, when as it happenedmy father rvas just going out, and said to him, 'Are you the per-son they are waiting for ? Well, a friend like you is not to belightly dismissed.' With that my father went off. This u,as thervay he tried to get at my father with the claim that he was inthe plot.I+ What r,ve said, according to him, rvas that we haddecided to give him two talents of silver instead of the officialtoo minae, and if we succeecled in our plot, he should be in onit, and we gave all due guarantees. To this he said his reply wasthat he woulcl think it over, and that we then told him to cometo the house of Callias, son of Telocles, so as to have him theretoo. This was his way of trying to incriminate my brother-in-larv. Then, he said, he went to Callias', lr.here he reached agree-ment with us and swore an oath on the Acropolis, while weagreed to give him the money the following month, but we lethim down and didn't produce it. So he came forward with hisinformation.

These were the circumstances of his indictment, gentlemen,and the men denounced were those he said he knew, forty-twoin number. The first he specified rvere Mantitheus and Apse-phion, who were members of the Council in session, and the

14. Leogoras' remark might have implied the knowledge either that theclub were about to offer Diocleides money, or that Diocleides could divulgethe plot. Either implication could suggest that Leogoras was involved.

I J

A N D O C I D E S l+s-zlrest followed. Peisander then rose and proposed the repeal ofthe statute passed under Scamandrius, so as to subject the mento torture and not let a night pass without the discovery of allthe names. This was received with applause. At this Mantitheusand Apsephion took refuge at the altar, begging to be sparedthe rack and to stand for trial on baiX. This they were reluctantlygranted, but the moment bail rvas laid down, they jumped ontheir horses and deserted to the enerny, leaving their guarantorshigh and dry, and faced with the same punishment as rhefriends they had gone bail for. The Council took steps in secretand arrested us and put us in the stocks. They called out theStrategi and instructed them to give orders for Athenians livingin Athens to arm and go to the Agora, firr the guard on the LongWalls to go to the Theseum, and residents in Peiraeu6 to themarket place of Hippodamus, and for the trumpet to sound forthe Knights to go to the Anakeion.Is 'fhe

Council were to goto the Acropolis and sleep there, the prytaneis in the Tholos.Meanwhile Thebes got wind of the business, and mountedguard on the frontier. But the cause of all the trouble, Dio-cleides, was hailed as the saviour of the country, and led crownedin a chariot, to the Prytaneum, where he was given a dinner.

This is the first thing I want you to recall, those of you whowere there, and to pass on to the rest. Next please call theprytaneis who were then on duty, Philocrates and the others.

(Exidence is giaen)

Very well, now I will read you the names of those who weredenounced, to show you the number of my relations he triedto incriminate, first my father, then my brother-in-law. Myfather he put down as being in the plot, my brother-in-law asproviding the house where the meeting was held. You shallhear the rest of the names. Read them, please.

(Th,e names are read, while Andocides comments)Charmides, son of Aristoteles. (This is a cousin of mine. NIy

father and his mother were brother and sister.)15. The mobilization must have been ordered in fear of a Peloponnesian

attack which might accompany the supposed conspiracy. For Anakeion, seeglossary.

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Taureas. (A cousin of my father's.)Nisaeus. (Taureas' son.)Callias, son of Alcmaeon. (My father's cousin.)Euphemus. (The brother of Callias, son of Telocles.)Phrynichus, the ex-dancer. (Another cousin.)Eucrates, brother of Nicias. (Callias' brother-in-law.)Critias.r6 (Yet another cousin of my father's - their two mothers

were sisters.)

These were all among the forty-two denounced.We were imprisoned all together. Night fell, the prison was

locked up, and relatives had arrived, a mother or sister or awife and children, and there was a miserable noise of weepingand wailing at the situation. Charmides, who was my cousinand my own age, and had been brought up with me in the samehouse from childhood, said to me, 'Andocides, you see what aterrible situation this is. I've never had occasion in the past tosay anything to worry you. But in the presenr state of things Imust. The people you've gone about with and been friendswith outside the family, they're the ones who have been chargedwith the things people are using to incriminate us, and theyhave been executed for it or else fled the country self-condemned.So if you have heard anything about this business, say so, andyou'll first of all save yourself, then your father, who may besupposed to be your first consideration, and your brother-in-law, husband of your only sister, and all the rest of your relationsand friends, myself included. I've never really done you anyharm in my life, and I've been your enthusiastic supporter atall times of need.' When Charmides said this, and every oneof them begged and prayed me in the same terms, I thought tomyself, 'I am really in the most terrible situation possible. AmI to see my own relations ruined unjustly and done to death,and their property confiscated, and allow them to be recordedpublicly as guilty of unspeakable sacrilege, when they arecompletely innocent, to let three hundred other Athenians beunjustifiably victimized, and disastrous mutual suspicion spreadall over the country - or tell Athens what I heard from Euphi-letus, the real culprit ?' There was this further consideration in

16. This is the Critias of the Thirtv.

75

A N D O C I D E S lsr-tlmy mind, that I reckoned that the wrong-doers who were reallyresponsible had some of them been executed on Teucros'information, while others had fled and been condemned todeath, and there were only four left who had not had informationlaid against them by Teucros for their offences - Panaetius,Chaeredemus, Diocritus and Lysistratus, who were the mostlikely of all Diocleides' victims to be thought guilty, as theywere friends of some who had lost their lives already. Thesefour could ill rely on survival in any case, while my relationshad certain death before them, unless someone told the govern-ment the truth. I therefore thought it better to cause fo"ur menthe loss of their rights with good reason (and they are still alivenow and back here in possession of their property) than toallow the others to perish without justification. So if any of yougentlemen, or any other citizens, imagined previously that Igave information against my own friends to procure theirdestruction and my own safety, which was the libellous tale myenemies told against me, I ask you to judge the matter in thelight of the facts. For at present I have got to render a truthfulaccount of my actions in the presence of the very men who wereguilty and fled the country for being so, and have the clearestknowledge of the truth or falsehood of my statemenrs. Indeed,it is open to them to refute me in my own time. I give mypermission. You, meanwhile, have to discover the truth. Themost important thing for me in this case is to be acquitted andclear my reputation, and that first of all you yourselves, and theneveryone else, should understand that there was nothing viciousor cowardly in anything I have done. It all came oi a mis-fortune to the country and to us, and when I said what I wastold by Euphiletus, I was thinking as much for the country asfor my family and friends, and for good reasons, not for anyreprehensible ones, in my opinion. And if that is so, I claimacquittal and exoneration. Now I ask you, gentlemen, becauseyou ought to take a human approach in your reckonings, asthough you were actually involved in this trouble - what wouldyou have done ? If you had a direct choice between a nobledeath and ignoble survival, one or the other, you might justifi-ably take a low view of what I did, though a good many people

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rvould have chosen as I did and preferred life to a noble death.But when the exact opposite was true, silence would have meantmy dying a disgraceful death myself, when I hadn't committedsacrilege at all, and letting my father go to his death, and mybrother-in-law and all those relations and cousins, whose onlvdanger was my refusal to reveal that others were to blame.Diocleides perjured himself to imprison them, and they had nochance of escape unless the whole truth were made public. Iwas on the way to becoming their murderer, if I hadn'f told yourvhat I heard, a'd I'd have brought three hundred Atheniani totheir death, and it would have been utterly calamitous to thecity. That would have been the result of not speaking. But as Idid speak, I was in a position to survive myself and rescue myfather ut9 -y family, and save the city a lot of anxiety anitrouble. Four men were due for banishment on my account,and they rtrere guilty. of the others previously denounced byTeucros those who were executed didn't owe their death to me,nor the others their exile. with all this in mind I came to theconclusion that the least of the necessary evils was to tell thetruth at once, convict Diocleides of perjury, and secure our ownsafety and his punishment for an unjustifiable attempt to ruinus and deceive the authorities - and gain the reputation of abenefactor and make money into the bargari'. I iherefore in-formed the council that I knerv lvho the culprits were, andmade known the facts, namely that the suggeition had beenmade at a party by Euphilerus, but I had opposed it, and thaton that occasion it was due to me that it aia not take place.Later I went up to cynosarges after a pony of mine, had-a falland broke my collar-bone, and was carried home on a stretcher.Euphiletus saw the state I was in; he told the others I had beenpersuaded to come in on the scheme, and had agreed to takepart and to deface the Hermes at the shrine of phorbas. Thisstatement was untrue, and that is the reason why the Hermesby our family house, which was ereced by the Aegeis tribe,was the only one in Athens not to be damaged, on thi ground,according to Euphiletus, that I intended to deface it. whin thevdiscovered this, there-was an outcry that I had knowledge ofthe affair, but had not kept my promise. Meletus and Euphi-letus

t l

A N D O C I D E S [6:-q]

came to me next day, and said, 'We've done this job, Andocides,and if you see fit to keep quiet, we'll be friends as before.Otherwise you'll get more trouble from us than any good youget on our account from others.' I told them the affair made methink Euphiletus a crook, but the danger to them wasn't thefact that I knew of it, but what they had actually done. In proofof this I provided my slave's evidence under torture that I wasill and unable to get up, and the Prytaneis seized the servantsof the house which had been the starting-place for their actions.The commissioners and the Council investigating the affair andfinding my account substantiated and universally admitted tobe true, next called for Diocleides. Not much questioning wasneeded before he admitted he was lying and begged fbr mercy,giving the names of the men who had urged him to tell the tale,namely Alcibiades of Phegustz and Amiantus of Aegina. Thesetwo took fright and fled the country. On hearing this you putDiocleides in court and condemned him to death, and on myaccount released my relations, who had been imprisoned andwere in danger of death, took back the fwo exiles, and returnedhome yourselves and disarmed, well rid of your troubles anddangers. In all this I deserve pity all round for what I wentthrough, but in regard to my responsibility for what happenedI should be accorded the highest possible credit. When Euphi-letus suggested that I should put my trust in a pledge which couldnot have been more treacherous, I opposed him and refused,and gave him the abuse he deserved; though after they hadcommitted the wrong, I joined in concealing it, and it was onthe information of Teucros that they were put to death or exiled,before we were imprisoned by Diocleides and were in dangerof our lives. Then I denounced the four, Panaetius, Diocritus,Lysistratus and Chaeredemus. They owed their exile to me, Iadmit. But my father, my brother-in-law, three cousins andseven other relations were saved unjustified execution.IsThat-they are all still in the light of day is due to me, as they

r7. Not the famous Alcibiades, but a cousin. The'exiles'mentioned belowmust be Mantitheus and Apsephion.

18. The numbers do not tally with the names given in Andocides' list ofrelatives above. There are various possible remedies.

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admit, while the disturber of the whole city and the cause ofextreme danger to it, was convicted, and you escaped consider-able risk and mutual suspicion. Again, I want you to recall thetruth of this, gentlemen, or to enlighten any who don't know it.\9*, please, call the men who were released by my action.They know the facts and will have the most certain evidence togive the jury. This is the trurh, gentlemen, and they will go onthe platform and tell you so for as long as you want their to.After which I will continue with the rest of my defence.

(Eaid,ence graen)'o

well, in regard to what happened on that occasion you haveheard the whole story, and my defence has been compiete, I amconvinced. But if there zi anyone who wants to ask anything orthinks it inadequate or that I've left anything out, let Limsta_nd up and say so, and I will add to my defence accordingly.- I will now proceed to the legal aspect. cephisius here

"in-

formed against me according to the law tto* in force, but hisaccusation belonged to an earlier law proposed by Isotimides,which does not concern me. His proposal was that those whowere guilty of saqilege and admitted it should be excludedfrom religious rites. But I was guilty of neither. I committedno sacrilege and made no admission. Also the decree is obsoleteand not valid, as I will clemonstrate. Florn,ever, I will pur up adefence on the point, in which, if I fail to convinc. you, it willbe my own loss, while if I succeed, I shall provide a iefence formy opponents.zo The truth shall be told. After the destructionof the fleet and the siege of Athens you debated the subject ofunity, and decided to restore the franchise to those who hadlost it, and the proposal was made by Patrocleicles. who werethe disfranchised, and rvhat were the circumstances in eachcase ? I will tell you. First, people who owed money to thetreasury: who had held offices, but not had their accountspassed, or were in debt for wrongful possession of property, or

rg. This rubric is omitted in the text, but must be assumed.zo. rf he proves the decree of Isotimides invalid for events before 4o3 8.c.,

he will be giving his opponents a defence for their own offences "o-*itt"dbefore that date.

79

A N D O C I D E S lzt-tlin consequence of the failure of public suits or fines imposedby a court, or failure to make good the rent for a public leaseor sureties to the state. All these were permitted to pay at orbefore the ninth prytany, and in case of non-payment theywere to be fined double and their possessions sold for thebenefit of the state. And there were examples of conviction forembezzlement or bribery, whose offspring shared their depriva-tion.2l This was one kind of deprivation of rights, but there wasanother kind, where the person was deprived, but the propertyretained and held in possession. These were cases of desertionor of avoiding military service or keeping a ship out of actionor of abandoning arms, or of wrongful summons on three occa-sions, or of injury to parents; these were all punished by lossof personal rights, but not of property. Others retained rightswith some limitations, being not wholly deprived, but in part,like the army; who for remaining in the ciry under the fyrants2zretained their rights in other respects, but were not permittedto speak in the Assembly or be members of the Council. Ofthese rights they were deprived, and this was the limitationimposed on them. Others were restrained from bringing actionsor from laying information, others from sailing to the Hellespontor to lonia, others from entering the Agora. Well, you votedto erase all such decrees in their official form and in all copies,and to give a general pledge of unity on the Acropolis. Pleaseread the decree of Patrocleides dealing with these. events.

Decree Proposed by Patrocleides: Inasmuch as the people of Athensdecreed an indemnity in respect of the disfranchised and of debtors,in order to make it possible to move measures and discuss them, thePeople shall pass the same decree passed at the time of the Persianwar, which proved in the interest of the People. In regard to thoseregistered as debtors rvith the Collectors or with the Treasurers ofthe Goddess Athena and the other Gods, or with the Basileus, or toany whose name has not been included in the list up to the last

zr. I follow D. M. Macdowell's text, which makes a necessary alteration inthe list of debtors to the state. The 'ninth prytany' means the ninth of theten divisions of the year.

zz. The 'tyrants ' meant are apparently the oligarchy of the four hundredin 4rr n.c.

8o

br84 ON THE MYSTERIES

Council in the archonship of Callias, those who were deprived ofcitizenship or were debtors, and all those who have had accountscondemned in the Auditors' office, by the Auditors or their asses-sors, or in whose case a prosecution on the audit had not been taken,or who have had imposed on them limitations or the fulfilment ofguarantees up to the relevant time, or any of the Four Hundredwhose names are still registered or any in respect of whom enact-ment of the oligarchy remains on the books, except such names asare officially recorded as not having remained in Athens, or whohave been condemned either by the Areopagus or the Ephetae orthe Prytaneum or the Delphinium or the Basileus, or have beenexiled for murder or sentenced to death either as homicides or astyrants; all others shall be obliterated by the Collectors and theCouncil in all instances,23 and all existing duplicate copies shdl behanded in by the Thesmothetae and other magistrates, the opera-tion to be completed u'ithin three days on the decision of the People.Such copies as have been ordered to be obliterated must not beprivately retained, nor used for retrospective complaints. Anybreach of this enactment shall render liability to the same penaltiesas those convicted or charged before the Areopagus, to ensure thehighest trust among Athenians in the present and in the future.

This was the decree which restored the disfranchised to theirrights. But the return of the exiles was not proposed by Patro-cleides nor decreed by you. After the peace with Sparta, thedestruction of the Long Walls, the return of the exiles and theestablishment of the

'fhirty, and then afterwards with the

holding of Phyle and the capture of Munychia, and all themiseries which I do not care to remember or to recall to you,2awhen, in fact, you returned from the Peiraeus, you were in aposition to impose penalties, but you decided to let bygones bebygones, and preferred the preservation of Athens to privaterevenges, resolving to wipe the slate clean all round. On thisdecision you elected a board of twenty to administer the citytill legislation could be passed. Meanwhile the code of Solonand the enactments of Draco were to hold. But after drawinglots for a Council and electing a legislative committee you foundthat a good many of Solon's and Draco's enactments left a

23. Deleting the unintelligible iv rrD \qpooicp. See Macdowell.24. See introduction to Lysias, Against Erotosthenes, p. 40.

8r

A N D O C I D E S [82-6]number of citizens liable to penalties for former acivities. Atan assembly on the point you passed a measure to make anexamination of all the laws and inscribe in the stoa such aswere approved. Now read the decree.

Demee. It is enacted by the people on the proposal of reisamenusthat_the city conduct its affairs according to thj ordinance ancientlyestablished, follow the laws of solon and his weights and measures,follow also the enactments of Draco as observed- in time past: thaiany further legislation which may be needed this committee electedby the council shall inscribe upon boards and exhibit before theEponymizs-for public inspection, and set them before the magis-trates within one month. Laws so set before them shall first beexamined by the council and also the legislative committee of 5oochosen by the demes under oath. It shall be permitted to any priiatecitizen who so desires to enter the council and make recommenda-tion for any improvement in the laws. when the laws are laid down,the council of the Areopagus shall be charged with superintendenceof the laws, and their maintenance by the magistrates. Lr*, ratifiedshall be posted on the wall where ihey were previously inscribedfor public inspection.

The laws were therefore examined in accordance with thisdecree, and those ratified were posted in the stoa. This beingdone, we passed a law by which you all a.t. Read the lar{please.

Law. No unwrimen law26 shall be put into operation on any subjectwhatever.

Is there anything omitted here which could occasion a magistratebringing a case or any ofyou taking any action except in iccord-ance with the written laws I Where therefore the iivocation ofan unwritten law is forbidden, it must be impossible to invokean unwritten decree.27 since, then, we reaEed that a lot of

25. The heroes after rvhom cleisthenes named the ten tribes. Theirstatues stood in the Agora. For the complicated provisions of the decrees ofTeisamenus see Macdowell, pp. t 95 seqq. In particular there is doubt about theclause committing the_guardianship of theia*s to the Areopagus, and howthis privilege is related to that removed from the Areopagus i i 462 v.c.

26. 'unwritten laws' in this passage are those not oth"Irily inscribed: thephrase is not used in our familiar sense of practices accept.a uy convention.

27. A dectee is a more temporary m""sure than a law.

8z

[8Geo] ON THE MYSTERIES

Athenian citizens were in positions of misfortune as the effectof laws or decrees previously passed, we laid down the code Ihave referred to for the precise circumstances which now hold,to prevent anything of this kind happening, or the possibilityof vexatious prosecution of anyone. Read the laws in question.

Laws. No unwritten law shall be put in operation on any subjectwhatever. No decree either of the Council or of the People shall havesuperior validity to that of a lalv. And no law shall be laid down toapply to a single individual, unless it applies also to the wholePeople of Athens, if it is not decided by six thousand voters bysecret ballot.

What remains? This law. Read it please.

Lnn. The judgements and arbitrations made in Athens under thedemocracy shall be valid. And the laws shall be in force as from theArchonship of Eucleides.2s

You enacted that the judgements and arbitrations made inAthens under the democracy should be valid to prevent thecancellation of debts or the repetition of suits, and to maintainthe validity of private agreements. But in the case of publicoffences which admit of public prosecutions or indictments orinformation ,or summary processes, for these purposes youdecreed that the laws dating from the Archonship of Eucleidesshould hold good. When it was decided to examine the laws,and after examination to post them, and that no unwritten lawshould be brought into operation about anything, that no decreeeither of the Council or the People should have superior validityto a law, that no law should be passed to apply to a singleindividual, if it did not apply to all Athenian citizens, and thatthe laws passed in the Archonship of Eucleides should be valid,then is there any possibility that any of the decrees made beforethe Archonship of Eucleides can have any validity at all ? Ithink not. But consider for yourselves.

Well, then, what about your oaths ? The one which holdsgood for the whole city, and which you have all sworn since thegeneral reconciliation, is this: 'And I will bear no ill will against

28. To the Archonship of Eucleides in 4o3 B.c. belongs the revision of thelaws which followed the expulsion of the Thirty.

83

A N D O C I D E S [qo-9+]any citizen except the Thirty and the Eleven, and not evenagainst one of these if he is willing to render account of hisconduct of office.' Where, then, you have sworn an oath not tobear ill will even to the Thirty (who were responsible for thegreatest miseries of all), if they rendered account of their office,you could scarcely have thought fit to do so against any othercitizens. Again, what is the oath of the council in power ar anytime ? 'I will not accept any information or summary process!n respect of previous events except against the

-eiiles.'rq

Finally what is your own oath, before you became members ofthis court I 'And I will bear no ill will nor induce another to do

9o, b-u1 I-will give my vote in accordance with the existinglaws.'And you must consider whether I seem right in claimin[to speak on your own behalf and that of the laws.

Now, gentlemen, consider both the laws and the accusers incourt,. and ask yourselves what basis there is which justifiesthem in making accusation. cephisius here leased a taxro fromthe treasury, collected the profits from farmers on the land tothe tune of 9o minae, but instead of paying it in absconded.Had he appeared, he would have been put in the stocks. Thelaw provided that the Council should have the power, in thecase of non-payment of dues, to put the delinquent in thestocks. So in view of the enactment in favour of the laws passedunder Eucleides Cephisius claims nor to repay lvhat he appro-priated, and the outlaw has now recovered his citizenship, andthe disfranchised citizen has turned informer because you areo-perating the laws at present in vogue. Meletus again, as youall know,3l arrested Leon under the Thirty, whicli resulted inLeon's death without trial. Yet this law was previously in force,and has been retained in operation as desirable: that the insti-gator of an action is liable to the same punishment as the actualperpetrator of it. Now Meletus is out of danger of a prosecutionfor homicide from Leon's heirs, because the laws to be enforced

_ 29. the oligarchs who fled to Eleusis in 4o3. see introduction to Lysias,Eratosthenes, above.

3o. See notes 34 and 4z below.3r. On the celebrated occasion when Socrates, ordered by the Thirty to

accompany Meletus on this assignment, refused.

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are those in operation under Eucleides. That he arrested Leon,he himself cannot deny. Epichares is another instance. A man

of the lowest character and intentionally so, who directs his illwill against himself, he was in the Council under the Thirty,but what is the wording of the law inscribed over the Councilchamber ? 'Anyone who served on the Council after the dis-solution of the democracy, roy be put to death with impunity,and his killer is without stain on his character, and can take theproperty of the dead man.' In that case, Epichares, is not anyonewho kills you regarded as being without a stain according toSolon's law ? Read me the law on the stone.

Lap. Decreed by the Council and People. Prytanis, the tribeAeantis: Secretary, Cleigenes: Chairman, Boethus: drafted byDemophantus. The commencement of this decree is to date fromthe year of the Council of five hundred appointed by lot for whichCleigenes was the first secretary.

If any man overthrow the democracy at Athens, or if any manhold office after the democracy is overthrown, he shall be an enemyof the Athenians and be killed without penalty to his killer, and hisproperty shall be confiscated to the state, and a tenth part of itgiven to the Goddess. And whoever shall kill such a man or shalltake counsel for his killing, shall be without stain and withoutguilt. And all Athenians shall swear upon unblemished victims,tribe by tribe and derne by dente, to kill any man 'who has done so.And the oath shall bc this: 'I will kill by 'word and by deed and withmy vote and with my hand, if I am able, rvhosoevcr shall overthrowthe democracy in Athens or whosocvcr shall hold any office afterthe democracy has becn ovcrtluown, or rvhosoever shall set himselfup to be a tyrant, or take part in setting up a tyrant. And if anyother man kill such a one, I 'rvill hold him sinless before gods andspirits for that he killed an enemy of the Athenians, and I will sellall the property of the man so killed, and rvill give one half of it tothe killer, and I will not hold back any of his share. And if any manin killing such a one or in seeking to do so be himself killed, I willdo good for him and his offspring just as for Harmodius andAristogeiton and their descendants. And all oaths that are sworn inAthens or in the camp or anywhere else which are adverse to thePeople ofAthens, I cancel and renounce.'These things all Atheniansshall swear upon unblemished victims as the customary oath beforethe Dionysia, and they shall call down many blessings on all such

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A N D O C I D E S [98-roz]as keep this oath, but upon him that shall break it destruction forhim and his offspring.

I ask you, as a practitioner of deceit and misrepresentation, isthis law valid or not valid ? The reason why it has suddenlybecome invalid, I suppose, is that the laws in force have to bethose of the time of Eucleides. As for you, though you cartyon your existence and go about Athens, you are not entitled to.Under the democracy you lived by informing, and under theoligarchy you avoided being made to disgorge rhe profits ofyour informingrz by bootlicking the Thirty. And you talk tome about 'association' and taking people's characters awayl Itwasn't a single individual you'associated'with - it's a pity itwasn't - you got a little from anyone who cared to, as everyonehere knows, and lived a life of immoral practices, despite yoursqualid appearance. Yet he had the temerity to accuse otherpeople, when by the laws of Athens he cannot even make a casefor himself. As a matter of fact, gentlemen, sitting as defendantduring his prosecution of me I felt, as I looked at him, exactlyas I would after arrest by the Thirty. If I had been pleadingmy case then, who would have been my accuser ? He wouldhave been ready for the job, if I didn't offer him his price. Soit is now. Who would have been my interrogator but Charicles,with his question, 'Tell me, Andocides, did you Bo to Decelea*and fortify it against your countryi ' 'No, I didn't. ' 'Well, didyou raid Athenian territory and carry off property, either onland or sea, at the expense of your felloli.-citizens?' 'No.''You didn't fight against your country at sea either, or help inpulling down the walls, or in abolishing the democracv, or forceyour way back to Athens l' 'No, I didn't do any of these things.''Do you expect to get away with it, then, and not die lihe somany others ?' Do you imagine, gentlemen, that I should have

32. On informers under the Thirty see introduction to Lysias, p. 40.Greek orators not infrequently resorted to abuse, even when it was irrelevant,if they thought it likely to produce an effect on the jury.

Charicles here appears as a member of the Thirty associated rvith Critias,and is imagined as a presiding magistrate opening a prosecution and accusingAndocides of failure to take part in the disloyal proceedings of the oligarchs.

33. Decelea in North Attica was fortified by the Spartans, as a base forattacks on Athens, in 4r3 8.c., and many oligarchs fled there.

g6 ' '

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met any other fate on your account, if I had been caught bythe Thirty ? And don't you think it appalling that, consideringthat I would have been done to death by them for doing noharm to Athens, as happened to others, I should not be ac-quitted now that I am on trial before you, whom I have neverharmed ? If any human being can be acquitted, I must be. As amatter of fact the information against me was given in accord-ance with established law,:+ but the accusation rests on thedecree made previously about others. So if you propose tocondemn me, have a care that it may not be my specialbusiness to give an account of what happened in the past, anda good many other people's business even more, either oppo-nents in the fighting with whom you have had a reconciliation,or exiles you have allowed back, or disfranchised citizens youhave restored. For their benefit you have published proclama-tions or cancelled laws or deleted decrees, and they now remainin Athens and trust you. If they realize that you are acceptingthe accusations of the accusers of the past, what do you thinkthey will suppose in their own cases ? Which of them do youimagine rvill want to enter a suit on the events of the past ?Rows of enemies and malicious prosecutors will appear whowill be eager to contend with them. Both classes are here nowto listen, but not with the same point of view. One lot will wantto know whether they can trust existing laws and the swornagreements between you, and the other to test your attitudeand see whether they are going to be free to make false accusa-tions and indictments with impunity, and to inform againstpeople and even get them imprisoned. This is the position,gentlemen. My life is on trial in this business, and your votewill give public demonstration whether your enactments are tobe trusted, or whether one needs either to square the informersor to run away from them and leave Athens with all possiblespeed.

But to show that your proceedings in aid of union are not afailure, but that what you have done is indeed to your creditand your advantage, I want to say just a little about this.

34. That of Isotimides. If this is regarded as still valid, then so are other

measures under which Andocides' accusers are guilty of other offences.

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During the time of great disasters to Athens, when the tyrants3sheld the city and the popular party were in exile, your ancestorsdefeated the tyrants in battle at Pallenium under the commandof Leogoras, Dy great-grandfather, and Charias, rvhose daughtermy grandfather married, and killed or condemned the tyrantsto exile or else let them stay, but not as citizens. Later, whenPersia invaded Greece, your ancestors realized the extent ofthe threatened disasters and the size of the Persian armament,and they decided to accept their exiles back and restore theircitizen rights, and let the success and the danger be the samefor all. After this they made mutual undertakings under themost solemn oaths, and claimed the right to take the front lineof the Greek force and meet the enemy at Marathon, on theassumption that their own valour would be found sufficient tobattle with the great numbers of the enemy. They fought andconquered, and set Greece free and saved their country. Afterso tremendous an achievement they did not think it right toharbour ill will. This was the reason rvhy, when they foundtheir city devastated, their sacred places burnt and their wallsand houses fallen to the ground, their unity of spirit enabledthem to acquire the sovereignty of Greece and hand down a cityas great and splendid as ours. Later on, in a time of no lessdisaster than that, you yourselves with the noble spirit of anoble race displayed the generosity that was in you, when youthought it proper to receive the exiles home, and restore theirrights to the disfranchised. What remains in you of their nobi-lity I The refusal to harbour ill will, in the remembrance thatour city rose from a small beginning in time past to greatnessand success. Such it could still be, if we, its citizens, could keepgood sense and unity together.

But these people even accused me on the score of the olivebranch which they said I deposited in the Eleusinium,36 whenthe traditional law said that to offer supplication at the mysteries

35. This refers to the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons. The battle towhich Andocides refers is hard to identify, but perhaps belongs to the time ofthe expulsion of Hippias with the aid of Cleomenes in 5ro n.c.

36. A sign of supplication forbidden on religious grounds during thecelebration of the mysteries.

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was punishable with death. They arc brazen enough, in anarrangement they themselves concerted, to be dissatisfied withfailing to succeed, and they raise an accusation against me asthe person guilty. When we returned from Eleusis, and theinformation had been laid, the Basileus appeared, to report onthe performance at the festival at Eleusis in accordance withcustom. The Prytaneis said they would take him to the Council,and ordered him to notify me and Cephisius to attend at theEleusinium, because the Council intended to hold its sessionthere according to Solon's law, which lays down a session inthe Eleusinium the day following the mysteries. So we appearedin accordance with instructions. When the Council were allpresent, Callias, son of Hipponicus, in his official garb, statedthat there was a suppliant branch on the akar, and displayed it.The Herald then proclaimed the question, who laid it there,and there was no answer. But we were there and Cephisius sawme. As no one answered, and Eucles here, after making rheinquiry, had gone in again - but call him, please. First of all,Eucles, witness to the truth of this statement of mine.

(Eaidence of witness)

As to the truth of my statement, evidence has norv been given.But it seems to me very different from what my accusers said.They said, if you remember, that the two goddesses themselvesmisled me into depositing the branch in ignorance of the law,so as to get me punished. But my contention, gentlemen, evenif my accusers' statement is as true as you like, is that I wassaved by the goddesses. If I deposited the branch, but failed toanswer, wasn't I working on my own destruction in placing it,and owed my survival to the chance of failing to answer, whichwas obviously due to the goddesses I Had they wished todestroy me, I'd have been bound to say I'd deposited thebranch, even if I hadn't. But in fact I didn't answer because Ididn't deposit it. When Eucles declared in the Council that noone had answered, Callias stood up again and declared thatthere was an ancient law that anyone depositing a branchin the Eleusinium should be put to death without trial, andthat Hipponicus, his father, had once expounded this to the

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Athenians, and he heard that I had laid the branch there. At thispoint up jumped our friend, Cephalus, and said, 'Callias, youare the most unprincipled crook in existence. F irst of all yougive explanations when you're one of the Heralds and are notallowed to, and secondly you call it an ancient law when thetablet you're sitting by orders a fine of a thousand dracltmae forplacing a branch in the Eleusinium. Then again, who told youAndocides placed it there t Call him, if you like, and we canhear too.' Then when the inscription was read, Callias himselfcouldn't say where he got the information, and it was obviousto the Council that he'd put it there himself.

Well, now, gentlemen, - perhaps this is what you'd like toknolv yourselves - what was Callias' idea in placing the branchthere ? I'll tell you the point of this plot against me. Epilycus,son of Teisander, was my uncle, my mother's brother. He diedin Sicily without sons, but he left two daughters who came tothe charge of Leagros and myself. At home his position wasnone too good. The property he left was worth less than twotalents, and the debts were more than five. However, I calledon Leagros, and said in front of our family that the right thingto do in the circumstances was to honour our relationship.3T ( Jnour position,' I said, 'it's not right to put other money affairsor personal considerations in front of Epilycus' daughters. If hehad lived, or had died worth a lot of money, we should haveexpected, as the nearest relations, to take his daughters. In thatcase it would have been our regard for Epilycus or for hismoney. Now it'll be our regard for what is right. So you putin a claim for one, and I'll have the other.' He agreed, and wetook them, as we'd agreed to do. Now it so happened that theone I claimed as my bride took ill and died. Her sister's stillalive, and Callias induced Leagros, with the promise of a

37.If a man died intestate and left a daughter, but no male heir, hisproperty and his daughter passed to the next of kin, who could claim tomarry the daughter, or else provide a dowry for her to marry someone else.In the case of the poorest class, to which Epilycus may have belonged, he wasobliged to do one or the other. The complication of this incident is due to thefact that Epilycus was also related to Callias, but not so closely as to Andocidesand his cousin, Leogoras. The only way in which Callias could forestallAndocides' claim, therefore, was by causing him to leave the country.

9o

fizo-z5l ON THE MYSTERIES

present, to let him have her. When I got word of this, I at oncepaid the deposit and brought a suit, first against Leagros, sayingin effect, 'If you want to put in a claim for her, good luck to it,but otherwise I will.' Hearing this Callias entered an action forhis own son to marry the heiress, on the tenth of the month,to prevent me making my claim. On the twentieth - this wasthe time of the mysteries - he paid Cephisius a thousanddrachmae, and informed against me and entered this suit.Seeing that I was holding my ground, he placed the branch withthe object of securing my death without trial, or getting rid ofme and offering an inducement to Leagros, so as to live withEpilycus' daughter himself. But as he saw that even so hecouldnlt get his own way without a fight, he then approachedLysistratus, Hegemon and Epichares, who he realized werefriends of mine and went about with me, and was so lacking inrespect for law or decency as to say to them that if I were at lastprepared to give up Epilycus' daughter, he was preparedto stop molesting me and to take Cephisius off and give mecompensation, according to my friends' estimate, for what hadbeen done to me. I told him he could go on accusing andframing me, and if I could get an acquittal, and Athensgot to know the truth about my case, I thought he in his turnwould be in danger of his life. And I'll be as good as my word,if you gentlemen will agree. Call the evidence to the truth ofmy statement.

(Euidence of mitnesse s)

After all, think of the son for whom he wanted to make a matchwith Epilycus' daughter. Consider how he was born, and howCaliias acknowledged him. It is another point you ought toknow of. He married the daughter of Ischomachus, and hehadn't been living with her a year before he took up with hermother and started living with her - mother and daughter atonce, of all unspeakable things for a priest of the Mother andDaughter to do,ts keeping them both in the house. He had noshame or scrupie in regard to the goddesses. Ischomachus'daughter felt that death was better than going on as she was,

38. i.e. Demeter and Persephone.

9 r

A N D O C I D E S Irz5-3o]and tried to hang herself, but was found before she succeeded.When she recovered, she ran away, so the mother drove thedaughter out. But she did no better, because as soon as he wastired of her he threw her out too, though she said she waspregnant by him. So when she gave birth to a son, he deniedthat it was his. The wife's relations took the baby and came tothe altar at the Apaturia with a victim, and told Callias to beginthe ceremony. He asked who the father was, and they said,'Callias, the son of Hipponicus.' 'That's me!' 'Yes, it's yourson.' He put his hand on the altar, and solemnly swore that hehad no son except Hipponicus, whose mother was the daughterof Glaucon. He called down complete destruction on himselfand his whole family, if this was not so. And so it will indeed be.Later he fell in love with the old war-horse3e again, took herhome and brought the boy, who was by now quite big, to theKeryces, and declared that he was his son. Callicles spokeagainst accepting him, but the Keryces voted according to theirrules, that when the father swore on oath that it was his ownson he was introducing, he should introduce him. Then hetouched the altar and again solemnly swore that it was his ownson, the true-born child of Chrysilla, whom he had previouslydisowned. Now please call witnesses of all this.

(Eaidenc e of witne s ses)

Now just consider, gentlemen, whether such a thing has everhappened in the Greek world before, that a man married a wife,then married her mother to follow the daughter, and themother drove the daughter out. Now, while he is living withher, he wants to g€t Epilycus' daughter, so that grand-daughtercan drive out grandmother, though what name we are to giveto the son, I can't think. I defy anyone, however ingenious, towork out a name for him. As there are three women his fatherwill have lived with, he is the reputed son of one of them, thebrother of another and the uncle of a third. Who would he behimselfl Oedipus or Aegisthus, or whatl

But there is still a small matter connecred with Callias whichI want to remind you of. Cast your minds back to the time

39.'Battle-axe' I Macdowell.

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when Athens was supreme in Greece and at the height of herprosperity, and Hipponicus was the wealthiest man in Greece.Then was the time, you well know, when there was a sayingamong the women and small children which ran through thewhole city, that Hipponicus was bringing up an evil geniuswho upset the balance of his affairs.+o You remember that,gentlemen. Well, how do you think the story of that period cameout ? Hipponicus thought he was producing a son, but it washis evil genius, who turned his estate upside down, and his goodsense, and his whole existence. That is the conclusion we mustcome to about him, that he was Hipponicus' evil genius.

But, gentlemen, why was it that people who are assistingCallias in this attack on me, and helping to rig this action againstme and contributing money for it, did not think me guilty ofsacrilege in the three years since I came back from Cyprus,though I initiated A*x+' from Delphi and other friends fromabroad, rvhen I entered the Eleusinium and did sacrifice, as Ithink myself entitled to do. On the contrary, they kept nominat-ing me for public services, first as Gymnasiarch at the festivalof Hephaestus, then to lead the Athenian representatives at theIsthmian and Olympic games, and then I was to be a controllerof the sacred treasury on the Acropolis. But now apparently itis impious and wrong of me that I appear at religious ceremonies.I will tell you why these people takc this line. Our distinguishedfriend, Agyrrhius, became chief collector of the two-per-centfor two years,4z and bought the tax for thirty talents, with theassistance of these associates who met by the poplar, and youare aware of their character. It seems to me that they held thisgathering there for two reasons, to receive money for not biddinghigher, and to get shares in the business at a cheap rate. Theymade three talents, and then, rcalizing the sort of business it

4o. I owe to Mr Macdowell this rendering of a pun in the Greek.

4r. A name is lost from the text here (unless it is concealed in the wordspev d\il"rpov).

42. This was a tax on exports and imports. Athens, like Rome later, madeuse of tax farmers for purposes of collection. In this instance they worked insyndicate, and Agyrrhius and his friends bought the contract twice insuccession for a lower rate than was necessary, making a profit whichAndocides prevented on the next occasion.

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A N D O C I D E S lrss-81was, and how valuable, they all clubbed together and shared itout to the rest, and then offered thirty talents again the nextyear. As no one was offering more, I came forward and put ahigher bid to the Council, till I got rhe contract for thirty-six.I thus got rid of them, arranged guarantors for myself, collectedthe money and paid it over to the treasury. Nor did I lose by it.Our company made a small profit. And I prevented the otherlot from appropriating six talents. They rcalized this and hacl alittle discussion, 'This chap isn't going to get anything out ofthe public funds, or let us do so either. He's setting up tomount guard against any profit-making there. And besides,any of us he sees departing from the straight and narrow he'llhave in court, and it'll be the end of us. We'd better put himout of the way by hook or by crook.' This was the job they hadbefore them, while yours was the opposite. Because I'd like youto have as many like me as possible, then for choice people likethem could be eliminated, but failing that there should be a forceto prevent their activities, consisting of men of good, honestcharacter in dealings with the people as a whole. Then, if theywant to, they will be able to be of service to you. I promise youeither to put a stop to such practices, and make them mend theirways, or bring the culprits to court and punish them.

They also accused me in connexion with my sea-goingcommercial undertakings, as if the reason why the gods savedme from danger was, apparently, to come here and be done todeath by Cephisius. But I don't believe the gods could holdsuch a view as not to punish me when they had me in suchterrible danger, if they thought I had done them wrong. Whatgreater danger could a man undergo than going on voyages inthe winter I When they had me physically exposed to this, andwere in control of my life and property, did they let me off inspite of it I Couldn't they have gone further and had my bodydeprived of burial ? Or again there was a war on, there werewarships constantly at sea, and pirates, and many were capturedby them and lost all their properry and ended their lives inslavery; there was alien territory, and many were strandedthere and subjected to the most terrible hardship, and died ofpersonal, physical injury - and then are we to suppose the gods

9+

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preserved me from all this, only to put their vengeance in thehands of the most unprincipled man in Athens, who claims tobe an Athenian citizen when he is not, a man no one among youin the jury, who know his character, would trust with any ofyour personal affairs I No, I think we ought to regard this sortof risk as under the control of men, and those at sea as theprovince of the gods. Then, if one can be permitted to make aguess about the nature of the gods, I think they would be filledwith anger and resentment if they saw people they had pre-served being done to death by human beings.

There is a further consideration worth keeping in mind,gentlemen, that you now have the reputation throughout Greeceof outstanding good character and wisdom by not turning toretaliation for the past, but towards the preservation of our cityand unity among its citizens. Many others have suffered disastersas great as ours. But the settlement of existing differences inhrppy reconciliation is rightly thought a sign of goodness andwisdom. So, since it is universally admitted thar you have thischaracter towards friend and foe alike, do not change yourminds, or agree to the loss of this distinction, or to a vote onyour own part which appears based on chance rather than onthought.

So I ask you all to hold the same opinion of me as of myforerunners, so that I may be enabled to follow their lead.Recall that they have resembled the city's grearesr and mostextensive benefactors for numerous reasons, but principally outof good will towards you, and the desire that, should they orany of their descendants be in danger or trouble, they might bepreserved by the fellow-feeling you would have for them. Andyou would have good reason to remember them. The whole cityexperienced the value of the character of previous generationsin Athens. When the fleet was destroyed, and there were plentywho wanted to plunge Athens into irreparable disaster, it wasthe Spartans who, enemies as they were, then determined topreserve the city because of the valour of the men who werethe founders of freedom for all Greece. Since, then, the city asa whole owed its preservation to the valour of your ancestors,I claim that the qualities of my ancestors may be the cause of

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A N D O C I D E S ['+s-8]my own preservation. To the deeds which then led to the safetyof Athens, my ancestors made no small contribution. It is there-fore just that I should share at your hands in the preservationyou yourselves were accorded by the Greeks.

Consider too the character you will find in me, if you acquitme. First of all, after possession of an income of which youknow, I was brought, through no fault of mine, but throughthe misfortunes of Athens, to the depth of want and poverty.After that I made a fresh livelihood for myself by honourablemeans, by *y own wits and my own hands. I knew what it wasto be a citizen of such a city, and what it was to be an alienresident in a foreign country, and I understood the nature ofsound and wise thinking, and the nature of error and adversity.I had experience of many people and many different circum-stances, which have brought me hospitality and friendship withkings and cities, and private friends as well, who rvill be yourstoo, if you acquit me, and you will be able to make use of themwhenever occasion offers. In fact, gentlemen, this is how itstands with you. If you put an end to me, there is no one leftof my family, which is destroyed root and branch. Yet youhave incurred no disgrace from the house of Andocides andLeogoras, since it has been ours. There was much more to beashamed of when I was in exile, and Cleophon,a3 the lyre-maker, lived in it. There has never been a time when any of youpassed this house of ours with the memory of any ill treatmentat our hands. My family held countless commands and canshow numerous trophies won from the enemy by land and bysea, held endless other offices, handled your finances withoutever failing in the examination of accounts, and without anyoffence committed on either side. It was a house of greatantiquify and great liberality to anyone in need. Nor was therea single occasion when any of them was involved in a suit andasked any return for these services. Do not, because they aredead, forget what they achieved. Remember their deeds, andbelieve that you see their figures before you begging you formy acquittal. Whom can I bring before you to plead for me ?

43. From the revolution of 4r r s.c. till the end of the war Cleophon wasthe leader of the democratic party in Athens.

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My father I He is dead. Brothers ? I have none. Children ? Theyare not yet born. You must take the place of father, brothersand children. In you is my one refuge, and to you my prayers andsupplications are addressed. B.g for me from yourselves,and spare me. Do not consent to create citizens from Thessalyand Andros because of your shortage of manpower,'{4 and atthe same time destroy men who are true citizens, and who havea duty, and the desire, and the power) to be good ones. Do not,I beg you. And I ask this, too. I have done well by you. Honourme for it in return. Then if you grant my wish, you will not bedeprived of the further good I have it in my power to do. Butif you accede to my enemies, then, if you later regret it, youwill not be able to do anything. So do not deprive yourselves ofyour hopes in me, nor me of mine in you. And I ask thesefriends, who have always given proof of nobility towards thepeople of Athens, to stand here and give you testimony of theiropinion of me. Come forward, Anytus,as Cephalus, and rnyfellow-tribesmen who have been chosen to act as my advocates.

44. A number of measures were taken between 4o6 and 4or B.c. to increasethe citizen body by enfranchising various classes of men.

45. Anytus had been a leading politician since being associated with Alci-biades and later Thrasybulus. Still later he appears as the prosecutor ofSocrates.

I S O C R A T E S : P A N E G Y R I C U S


Isocrates was born in 4SS a.c., and died at the age of ninery-eight.IIe was rpell educuted, tr,nd eurljt in his hfe catne u,nder the influenceof the leoding intellectuals of ilte period o/ the early Sophists,itt. partinilar oJ Gorgins, and lte is mentioned in the PhaedrusoJ- Plato (tfgo) as a fallower oJ' Socrutes and a Jlrtng lnanof aerl great promise. F'nancial dfficu,lties during the PeloponnesianWar ntade it necessary fbr ltim t0 enrn kis liaing, and afier aperiod of writing speeches Jitr use bjt litigants in the czurts,he tonned to teoching, first in Chios, but after about Jgo 8.c., inAthens. He rpas extremefit successful, and after the publication ofthe Panegyficus exlended, ltis clientlle outside Athens througlq theGreek world. His airns and rnethods are reJbrred to in the GeneralIntroduction (see 1t. r 3 serlq). He published, a number o/'works whichwere oratorical in -fonn,, but rpere not intendetl to be deliaered,, butto be reod. He clescribes in the Philip (Br) his reusons for giaing uppractical ora,tory und prqfbrrhry Io u/Jict the course o/'the Ttoliticalworld partlJ by his teuclting und ltortly b.y such essays as these.Tno oJ'thern appear in tltis book, the Panegyricus, in Jitrm anoration fo, n Pon-Hellenic gathering, and, tke Philip, a letteraddressed to Pltilip oJ'tVlacedon when Isocrates was a,h'ead1 ninetyyars old.

The Panegyricus, published in or after j8o n.c., was ostensibllrleaotecl t0 zne o/' Isocrates' main th.emes, the unification of' theGreek world. For this he looks t0 & recznciliation oJ-Athens and,Sparto. But tnuch af'the treatise czncerns th,efitness of Athensforthe leadership o/'Greece, and its general praise of Athens ffirdssome interesting cornpurisons witlt the Funerul Oration af PericlesQ. SS se(l(l.). It is the nxzre renxorkable because Athens, thouglt. inpart recorteredfrom her collapse in 4o48.c., was stillfar/iorn her old,wealtlx and, ,qreatness in a rporkl d,ominated, by Sparta, whosedisastrous policjt is much emphasized,. The Panegyricus thus refersfor the mzil part to eaents after tlte Peloponnesian War and,

I S O C R A T E S

before the rise ofThebes at the battle of Leuctra in j7r s.c. It deolsin particular with the method,s ond unpopularity of Sparta (rrZ)during the period,, with the career of Conon and rpith the King'sPeace.

Left xr,preme oaer Greece after 4o4B.c. Sqartl, earnetl unioersalltatred for the rigid, control she exerted,. Democrotic constitutionswere thrown aside ond a garri,son installed in each, citl under aSpartan glrernlr called, a harmost (rt) and a board' of ten(decurch,y) to goaern. Eten when ilte decarcl'ries proaed so unpopularthat tlrey were discarded, their place was taken by oligorckies,while tribute was leaied b7 former Ath.enian. depentlencies to main'tain o fleet.

But in spite of unpopularity Sparta ntaintained her ltegemony,and ffier the rebellion of Cyrus began to rnake ottacks upon Persio

for the recopture of Greek states in Asia, eaen tltough faced withdfficulties at ltorne and, a confederacy of opponents in tJte so-calledCorintltian War. One of the lteroes of these erents pas the Athenianadtniral, Conon, who, haaing escnped from Aegospotomi burningwith hatred of Sparta,ma.d,e his wal to Eaagoras, the pro-Atltenianruler of Salamis in Clprus. Togetlter they reinaigorated, the naaalpower of Persia, and it was Conon who brougltt about the defeat ofSparta at Cnidus in 391 s,c. This was ilte main eaent of wltotIsocrates calls the Rh,odian war Q4z) ltecause the main bottle wasnot far from Rhodes, whose reaolt from Sparta Conon h.ad secured.This battle, with its militarl coanterport at Coroneo just after-wards, so reduced Sportan pzner as t0 czm.pel an accomrnodationwith. Persio. Sparta sacceeded in turning the Persian King ogainsthis Greek allies, and in j87186 s.c. imposed on the Greek worldthe King's Peoce,deaised by Sparta and approaed, and dictated b7 theK*g. The only recalcitrant wos Eaagoros, wh,o despite the factthat the Peace assumed Persian control of Clprus, stootl againstPersia untilforced to suefor peace in j8r. It was in this period tltatIonianforces rnere used against lritn by Persia Qz4 and r34).

Eaents between the foll of tlre Tltirty in Ath,ens (see Llsias,Eratosthenes) and the publicotion of tlte Panegyricus s,re couered,by Xenophon's Hellenica (tr. Rex Warner in Penguin Classics asA History of My Times), Books III, il/, V.

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Tnn institution of festivalsr which include athletic competitionshas often led me to feel surprise at the large rewards offered formere physical successes, while the unselfish endeavour of menwho have set their whole being to work for the benefit of othersreceives no recognition, though they merit the greater considera-tion. Athletic physique might be doubled without any benefit toothers, while the public spirit of a single individual may bringprofit to all who care to participate in it. Nonetheless I havenot been discouraged or reduced to inactivity. In the assurancethat the repute my words will rvin me is sufficient reward Icome here to advocate a policy of war outside the bounds ofGreece, and unity within. f am aware that many who claim tobe men of intelligence have come forward to deal with this sub-ject. But I make a double claim to it, first in the hope of establish-ing such a distinction from them that mine will be thought thefirst word on the subject, and secondly in the initial belief thatthe best oratory is that which deals with the greatest themesand combines a display of the speaker's powers with the in-terests of his audience, as this does. In addition, favourablecircumstances still hold, so that the subject has not yet becomeobsolete. A theme should be brought to a close when the cir-cumstances which gave rise to it are over and with them the needto consider it, or when the discussion can be seen to havereached its conclusion and nothing further is left for others toadd. When the position remains unaltered and the ideas offeredare inadequate, there is surely need to consider in a philosophicalspirit a view whose successful presentation will rid us of thepresent internecine war and dissension with its unequalled evils.Again, if there were but a single way in which to present thesame material, the reply might be made that it is a waste of timeto weary an audience by repeating it. But as the nature of thetheme is such as to allow numerous variations of treatment, to

r. The Panegltricus was written as though for a Pan-Hellenic festival,though it was never delivered at one.

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I S O C R A T E S [8-'s]make it possible to increase or diminish the prominence ofdifferent aspects, to use a novel approach to early instances orsee the new in the light of the old, there is no cause to avoidground already explored, but rather to attempt to improve onprevious approaches to it. Past history is indeed a commonlegacy. But to make appropriate use of it, to take a right attitudeto its details and document it fully requires real soundness ofthought. And this, I think, is where the greatest advance can bemade in any art, not least in the culture which comes throughoratory. It demands that we shall value and give credit, not to thefirst in the field, but to the best performance, not to an originalchoice of subject, but to the ability to outdistance all rivals.

There is some tendency to criticize speeches which are toohighly elaborated for the ordinary man. Such critics make thegreat mistake of viewing a very elaborate discourse in the samelight as a speech in a private suit, as though both should have thesame character. They do not rcalize that one kind aims at ac-curacy, the other at display, that their own eye is on simplicity,but that the power to command perfection in oratory would beincompatible with a simple style. There is no difficulty in seeingthat they give their approval within their own familiar under-standing. I am not concerned with them so much as with theview that will reject any looseness of expression and will irritablydemand qualities in my work which will not appear in any other.To this I will speak a bold word in self-defence before embarkingon my theme. In general, opening passages are designed tomollify the audience and make excuse for the discourse which isto follow, by claiming either hasty preparation or the difficultyof finding words to match the greatness of the subject. I takethe opposite approach, and declare that, if I fail to do justiceto my subject, to my reputation and to the length, not only ofthe time now occupied by it, but of my whole life, I ask for nosympathy, but ridicule and contempt. I deserve it in the fullestmeasure) if I have no more than ordinary qualifications for solofty an undertaking.

So much, then, by way of preamble on personal grounds. IfI now turn to public concerns, the claims made at the outset,that we should sink our own enmities and divert them outside

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Greece, and the lengthy accounts of the disasters of war betweenGreek states and the benefits of an expedition against Persia,are true enough. But they do not begin at the best point to securetheir ends. The Greek states are divided berween Athenian andSpartan spheres of influence, the division being in most casesideological. Any idea, therefore, of doing common service toGreek states without reconciling the leaders is naive and un-realistic. Any attempt to go further than demonstrations andachieve something practical requires arguments to persuadethese t\vo states to divide the leadership on a basis of equality,and to turn the selfish demands which they now make on Greekstates into expectation of gain from Persia. It is easy to leadAthens to this view, but Sparta is still hard to influence, havingtaken upon herself the false idea of supremacy as her heritage.But a demonstration that this priority is ours of right ratherthan theirs may induce them to pursue the general advantageinstead of standing on precise legal claims.

This should have been the starting point for the other speakers,who should not have introduced discussion of points of agree-ment before dealing with controversial issues. At any rate thereare two aims which justify me in devoting considerable time tothis subject. I hope, preferably, to effect something of value, tosee an exchange of internal disputes for external war. Failingthis, it is my purpose to demonstrate lvhich are the states whichstand in the way of the best interests of Greece, and to show that,while our previous maritime supremacy was just, our presentclaim to leadership is no less so. In the first place, if in everyfield experience and influence are to be the qualification forhonour, we have an indisputable claim to recover the supremacywhich was once ours. It is impossible to point to a state whichcan boast as overwhelming a superiority in land warfare as isours at sea. Secondly, if the justice of this criterion is denied,and stress is laid on the frequency of political change and theephemeral character of political power, if it is urged that leader-ship, iike any other distinction, should go where either priority ofpossession or service to Greece afford a claim, then it is my un-altered opinion that that claim is ours. A full historical scrutinyof both qualifications will only serve to show our superiority

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I S O C R A T E S [rr-8]over our rivals. Our claim to be the most ancient, the greatestand the most universally famed of all cities is admitted. Butdistinguished as is the basis which underlies it, there is closelyconnected with it an even clearer ground for honour. Our titleto possession is not based upon the eviction of others or theacquisition of an untenanted rvilderness, nor on forming a mixedcollection of races.z The distinction and purity of our line hasenabled us to remain in unaltered possession of the land of ourbirth. We sprang from its soil, and can use the same names forit as for our own blood. We are the only Greek state which canproperly call our land by the names of nurse, fatherland andmother. Any justifiable pride, ilny reasonable claim to leader-ship, any memories of ancestral greatness, must shorv somesuch racial origins to support it.

Such, then, is the extent of our original gifts which werebestowed on us by fortune. The total of the benefits we haveconferred on others can most properly be reckoned by a sys-tematic account of the history of Athens from the beginning.To her, it will be found, the debt is almost entirely due, not onlyfor the uncertainties of war, but for all the organization whichforms the milieu of daily existence, the basis of political activity,and the means of life itself. But we are bound to set in the fore-front, not those benefits whose insignificance makes them for-gotten and neglected, but those others whose great importancein the past, as now, sets them everywhere high in the memoryand in the records of all mankind.

First, then, it was by means of our country that the first needof man's nature was provided. Even though the story may belegendary, it is still right that it should be recounted here.:When Demeter arrived in this district in her wanderings afterthe rape of Persephone, she showed favour to our forbears forbenefits received which can only be mentioned to the initiated,and conferred two gifts which surpass all others, the cultivation

z. This seems to refer to the semi-legendary 'synoecism of Attica', avoluntary merger of small sovereignties in Attica which in historical timeswas celebrated by the feast of the Synoikia. The inhabitants of Attica werecommonly supposed to have been autochthonous.

3. See note 7 below.

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of crops, which brought a higher form of life than that of theanimals, and the mysteries, which gave their initiates moreenviable hopes both for the conclusion of this life and for alleternity. It has come about that this city of ours was endowednot merely with the love of the gods, but with love for mankind,and consequently, having such wonderful things in her control,did not grudge them to others, but allowed all to participate inthem. We still perform these mysteries annually, and the stategave instruction about the practices conveyed to man and theirdevelopment and value. These are facts which, rvith a littleinformation added, no one could call in question.

First of all, the very reason which might be given for disregardof these stories, namely their antiquity, provides a valid argu-ment for belief in their truth. Their frequent repetition anduniversal currency are good cause for regarding them as reliable,though not recent. Secondly, we need not merely resort to theclaim that the story and the tradition of it come from a remoteperiod. We can bring stronger evidertce. Most of the citiesretain a memorial of the original benefit conferred on them inthe form of first fruits sent annually to ourselves, and thosewhich omit the practice have frequently been enjoined by thePythian oracle to bring the amount due and perform the ritualhereditary in our community. Indeed there is nothing whichmore clearly commands belief than words of divine enactmentand wide agreement among Greek peoples, rvhich claim thelvitness of ancient myth and present practice alike, and are sub-scribed to by current custom as well as by past records. Inaddition, if we set all this aside and begin our investigation fromthe beginning, rve shall find that the first inhabitants of the earthdid not at once come upon a form of life like the present, butgradually joined together to bring it into being. So there is noone who could be thought to have a better claim to have beendivinely provided with it, or else to have searched and found itthemselves, than men who are universally admitted to have beenthe first inhabitants, the most talented craftsmen and the greatestdevotees of religion. To dilate on the degree of honour due tomen who brought such benefits is time wasted. No one coulddevise a reward to equal such achievements as theirs.

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I S O C R A T E S [l+-q]So much is to be said about this greatest and first and most

universal of benefactions to mankind. About the same period+it was Athens who observed that most of the world was in thehands of non-Greek people, while the Greek states were confinedto a small territory, and led by shortage of living space into con-spiracy and internal strife, and decimated by starvation or war.She refused to acquiesce in these circumstances, and despatchedleaders into the Greek cities, who took over the most poverty-stricken, established themselves in command of them, fought anddefeated the non-Greek inhabitants and founded communitieson all the islands, securing the preservation of their followers andthe remaining population alike. They left these with enoughroom for survival, and afforded the colonists more than they hadbefore, since they took in all the territory which, as Greek states,we now own. Thus they also rendered easy later attempts atcolonization on Athenian lines, by making it unnecessary to facethe risks of acquiring territory for it, when colonists could goand live within the limits we had laid down. It is impossible topoint to any title to leadership more our own than that whichwas established before most Greek communities were firstcolonized, or more suitable than that which dispossessed non-Greek people and brought such prosperity to the Greeks.

But the part she played in these great achievements did notmake Athens neglect the rest of her duty. This was the beginningof her services to others, the provision of sustenance to the needy,which is a necessity for men who intend to order the rest of theirlives well. But taking the view that a life that depended solely onthis did not offer enough motive for the desire to live, she gaveenough care to the rest to ensure that the good things of humanexistence which are not the gift of providence, but the result ofour own thought, should in no case be outside the provision ofthis city, and in most instances be due to it. When she tookcharge of the Greeks, they lived a lawless life in scattered com-munities under the violent control of arbitrary power, or at themercy of anarchy. She freed them of these distresses by means

4. Already in Herodotus' time the ancients spoke of a migration to Ionialed by Athenians, and perhaps caused by the pressure of the Dorians intonorth-western Greece and the Peloponnese (see Herodotus, I, r47).

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either of her own government or of her example, by being thefirst state to establish law and organize a constitution. This isproved by the fact that in the earliest cases of homicide, plain-tiffs who desired to decide the issue by the use of reason insteadof force brought their suits under Athenian law.s Indeed it istrue of the crafts as well, that those which concern the necessitiesof life, and those directed to its well-being, were discovered orapproved byAthens, and so passed on to other people fortheiruse.

The general organization of Athens was contrived in a spiritof such universal friendliness and consideration as to be suitedboth to impecunious communities and to wealthy ones withrising prosperity, to be of value alike to the successful and theunsuccessful in their home affairs. Both classes derive benefitfrom us, and gain either pleasant association or a refuge of theutmost security. Again, as states in this region do not enjoyindividual selGsufficiency, but production is inadequate or ex-cessive in different respects, and conditions are such that it isvery difficult to secure markets, in some cases for exports, inothers for imports, Athens brought assistance in these difficultiesas well, by establishing in the Piraeus a central market of over-whelming value, in which commodities which others found ithard to secure piecemeal elsewhere, could all be obtained.

The institution of festivals, then, has earned proper com-mendation for numerous reasons: it promotes among the Greekstates the custom of a general truce,6 at which ingrained differ-ences are settled and there is a meeting together, and then afterthe performance together of religious ceremonies the relation-ship of blood which exists between us is recalled, and improvedrelations maintained with each other, renerving old associationsand making new ones. ln these festivals the time is not wastedeither for private individuals or for outstanding leaders. Theyallow a general gathering of the Greeks, and there is an oppor-tunity for the latter to demonstrate their successes, and for theformer to watch the competition of the great. Neither group

5. Traditionally the first court for homicide was the Areopagus, whosefoundation derived from the trial of Orestes by Athena, which is the subjectof Aeschylus' Eumenides.

6. The so-called 'sacred month' at Olympia.

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I S O C R A T E S l++-glneed feel discontented, but both have some ground for pride,either as they see the endeavours of the athletes for theirgratification, or as they reflect that everyone has come to enjoywatching them. Such are the benefits which arise from thesefestivals, and here too Athens has not failed to shine. She hasprovided numerous displays of the highest quality, outstandingfor their lavish expenditure or artistic excellence or both, whilethe vast number of our visitors has ensured that any benefitderived from association together is also included in hei bounty.A further gift of Athens is the chance to encounter the mostsure of friendships, the most varied of associations, and towitness contests not only in the field of speed and strength, butof word and wit, and of all sorts of other activities, for whichhigh prizes are awarded. In addition to the prizes Athens actu-ally offers she incites others elsewhere, because awards made byAthens are held in such esteem as to be the object of universaladmiration. Finally, festivals elsewhere are periodic gatheringswhich soon disperse, while the city of Athens is a standingfestival for its visitors which will last to the end of time.

Philosophy took a part in the discovery and development ofall these, and gave us education in the field of affairs and civilizedrelations with each other, drawing the distinction between mis-fortunes due to ignorance and others due to necessity, and teach-ing us to guard against the former and bear the latter bravely.Our city showed the way to it, and also gave honour to skill inwords, which is the desire and the envy of all. She realized thatthis alone is the particular and natural possession of man, andthat its development has led to all other superiorities as well.She saw that other activities showed such confusion in practicethat wisdom was often the way to failure in them, and folly tosuccess) while good and skilled powers of speech were outsidethe scope of the ordinary people, but were the province of thewell-ordered mind: and that in this respect wisdom and ignor-ance are furthest apart, and the birthright of a liberal educationis marked not by courage, wealth and similar distinctions, butmost clearly of all by speech, the sign which presents the mostreliable proof of education, so that a fine use of words gives notmerely ability at home, but honour abroad. Athens has so far

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outrun the rest of mankind in thought and speech that herdisciples are the masters of the rest, and it is due to her that theword'Greek'is not so much a term of birth as of mentality,and is applied to a common culture rather than a commondescent.

But I do not wish to dwell on the parts when I have under-taken to deal with the whole, nor do I make these the groundsfor myeulogyofAthensfor lack of the ability to turn to thebattle-field for it. This must suffice. therefore, for the claim to honourin these fields. I think our ancestors deserve no less glory for thedangers they have faced than for their other benefactions. Thestruggles they endured were not slight, nor few, nor undis-tinguished. They were many, they were severe and they weretremendous. They fought sometimes for their country, some-times for the freedom of the world; for they continued always tomake their city the common possession of the Greeks and thedefender of the victims of oppression. This leads to someaccusations of wrong policy, because of our habit of support forthe weaker, as though such ideas were not consistent with thedesire to eulogize us. It was not failure to realize how muchsafer large alliances are that led us to this policy, but, despite amuch keener realization of the consequence than others show,we still preferred to support the weaker even against our ad-vantage rather than join the aggression of the stronger tosecure it.

An indication of the character and power of Athens can beseen in some of the appeals that have been made to her. I omitrecent or trivial instances, but long before the Trojan wars,which must provide evidence in a dispute about ancestral cus-tom) rve were visited by the children of Heracles, and a littleearlier by Adrastus, son of Talaus, king of Argos.T Adrastus

7. Throughout these treatises of fsocrates, as elsewhere in ancient prose,the modern reader may feel surprise at the naivetd of reference to stories towhich we now deny historicity. Sometimes, as in the case of the Heraclidae,we may rationalize them on a basis of greater knowledge. What are called theDorian invasions, tribal movements in a southerly direction into the Greekpeninsula, were seen as the return of the children of Heracles (Heraclidae),who were driven out by his great persecutor, Eurystheus, and at one time

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ISOCRATES lss-6olcame after the disastrous expedition against Thebes because hefound himself unable to recover the dead at the Cadmeia,.andasked Athens to assist him in a calamity which affected everyone,and to refuse to see the dead in battle left unburied, or ancientcustom and established law set aside. The children of Heracles,in flight from the malice of Eurystheus) turned their face awayfrom other cities as unable to help them in their plight, andassumed that ours alone rvas capable of gratitude for the benefitstheir father had conferred on all mankind.

This gives a clear indication that even at that time At'hensshowed the quality of leadership. No one would deign to ask aidfrom an inferior or a subject state to the exclusion of the morepowerful, especially in an issue which was not private, butcommon to all, and which was unlikely to find any championexcept the aspiring leaders of Greece. Secondly, they were notdeluded of the hopes which had led them to seek their refugewith our ancestors, who took up arms against Thebes on behalfof the dead in battle and against the power of Eurystheus onbehalf of the children of Heracles. In the first case they mountedan expedition and compelled the surrender of the dead to theirrelations, in the second they made a counter-attack against thePeloponnesian troops which had invaded our territory withEurystheus, and defeated him and halted his aggression. They hadearned admiration for other actions, but these exploits added totheir high repute. These were no narrow successes, but made sogreat a change in the fortunes of each of the suppliants thatAdrastus went home rewarded for his mission to us by thecomplete success of his request, despite his enemies, whileEurystheus, who had expected to force his demands, found him-self a prisoner and compelled to make supplication in his turn.His adversary had been more than human, born of the blood ofZeus, a mortal, though with divine strength, and Eurystheushad subjected him to servitude and hardship without a pause.But when he treated Athens wrongly, his pride was reversed,

given refuge in Athens (see Bury, Hiuory ofGreece, p. 8o). Adrastus, defeatedin the attack of the Seven against Thebes, is said to have fled to Athens andbeen given refuge and support.

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and he was made subject to his victim's children and brought toa contemptible death.

There are many benefits to Sparta which stand to our credit,but that of the Heraclidae is the only one which it has occurredto me to mention. My point is this; after the opening of relationswith them by our rescue of them, the ancestors of the presentkings of Sparta, that is the successors of Heracles, descencied onthe Peloponnese, captured Argos, Lacedaemon and Messene andwere the founders of Sparta, and so initiated all their presentprosperity. This should have remained in their minds, and theyought never to have invaded a country which showed them theway to such high fortune. They ought not to have broughtdanger to a city which had itself risked danger for the sons ofHeracles, or to have first offered a kingship to his descendantsand then tried to bring slavery upon the state which preservedthem. But if we set aside questions of gratitude and fair dealing,and return to the original thesis in the accurate pursuit of truth,it is not the tradition of Greek states that leadership should goto the invader against the native, to the recipient against thegiver of benefits, or to suppliants against their preservers.

There is an even briefer proof. Of the Greek cities, apaftfrom our own, the greatest were, as they are still, Argos, Thebesand Sparta. But it is clear that our ancestors so far surpassedthem all, that it was we who, when Argos was worsted, gaveorders to Thebes at the height of her pride, and who in aidof the Heraclidae defeated Argos and the other Peloponne-sians, and brought safety to the founders and leaders of Lace-daemon, when they were in danger from Eurystheus. Thus, asfar as concerns the premier power in Greece I do not know whatclearer proof could be given.

I think I should also say something of Athenian action outsideGreece, especially as the thesis I have set myself concerns theleadership against non-Greek peoples. A complete account of allthese emergencies would take too long, but I will try to describethe greatest of thern in the same fashion as just now. Of all theseraces the highest capacity for rule and the strongest power isin the hands of Scythia, Thrace and Persia; all these have actuallyharboured designs against Athens, and she has been in conflict

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I S O C R A T E S 16z-t"lwith them all. In fact what argument remains valid for anyopposing view, if it is proved that every Greek state which couldnot secure her rights turned to us for aid, and every non-Greekstate which sought to enslave Greeks made her first attack on us ?

The most famous of these.wars was that with Persia, but in adispute about ancestral precedence equally valuable evidencecan be derived from ancient times. When Greece was still in-conspicuous, Athenian territory was invaded by Thracians underEumolpus, the son of Poseidon, and by Scythians together withthe Amazons,s the daughters of Ares, not simultaneously butduring the time when both peoples were trying to gain powerover Europe. They hated the whole Greek race, but they madeparticular complaints against Athens, and thought that by thismeans conflict with a single state rvould lead them to the controlof all. They did not succeed, but though our ancestors weretheir only opponents, they suffered defeat on a scale that mighthave suggested a war against the whole of mankind. Evidenceof the extent of the disaster they incurred is to be seen in thelength of time through which its story endured, which wouldnot be true of any but a most outstanding calamity. In the caseof the Amazons it is recorded that not one of the invading forcereturned, and the remainder were driven from their country asa result of their defeat here. In the case of the Thracians,though they had previously been neighbours of Athens, thedistance between them was greatly increased by the battle inquestion, which allowed the establishment of numerous races,tribes of all lands, and large cities in the intervening space.

These rvere splendid feats, exploits fitting for claimants toleadership. Akin to these which I have described, and crediblein their descendants) were the great achievements of the warsagainst Darius and Xerxes. They were the greatest of wars, andbrought more perils than ever occurred at any one time. Theenemy supposed themselves invincible from their numbers, andour allies thought their own courage incomparable, yet theAthenians surpassed them, in each case, in their appropriaterespect, showed their superiority in the face of every danger, and

8. These mythical wars appear in Greek authors of the great period, as theprototype of wars between Athens and Eastern peoples.

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on the field were awarded the palm of honour, soon afterwards toassume the sovereignty of the sea by the gift of the other Greekswithout dispute from the states which now wish to seize it from us. e

Let no one suppose me ignorant of the many services per-formed by Sparta for the Greek cause in those great days. Butthis is a reaslon to give still greater praise to Athens: that withsuch rivals to emulate she yet outdid them. But I desire to speakat somewhat greater length of these two cities, and not pass themtoo quickly by, so that we may have a memorial of both, of thecourage of their ancestors and their hostility to the enemies ofGreece. Yet I do not forget how hard it is for one who comeslate in time to speak of subjects which an earlier generation hasmade its own in words spoken by the leaders of the state on daysof public funeral.'o It cannot but be that the greatest of thesethemes have been used before, and only those of lesser noteremain. However, since it is of value to my discourse, I must nothesitate to recall some of what is left.

The most numerous of good services and the highest praisebelong, I think, to the men who risked their lives for Greece.Nonetheless, the generations which held power in the two citiesbefore that cannot properly be forgotten. It was they who gavetheir successors their first training, who first urged the people tothe pursuit of courage, and made them fierce antagonists of theinvader. They did not neglect the common good, nor exploittheir own gain in it to the disregard of others. They made ittheir care, because it was theirs, but rightly kept their handsfrom what was not. They did not reckon value by monetary

9. fsocrates refers several times to this general acknowledgement which

accorded to Athens the meed of valour in the Persian wars, but it does not

appear in Herodotus. The 'Thalassocracy' or sovereignty of the seas, rvhich

bilore 487 n.c. was held to belong to Aegina (and previously to other states)

went to Athens as the result of war with Aegina in 487 in which Themistocles

is credited with persuading the Athenians to build ships, thus leading to her

supremacy at sea. At Salamis Aegina was given the first ptize for bravery,

but after this the superior force of Athens and the desire of Sparta to confine

herself to the defence of her own land territory gave Athens a natural

supremacy.io. Notable occasions of this sort, besides the Funeral Oration of Pericles

translated above, had included one such speech by Gorgias and one attri-

buted to Lysias on the dead in the Corinthian war in 394 u.c.

I I 3

I S O C R A T E S 17G8zlgain, but believed the safest wealth, and the most honourable,to lie in a life conducive to present honour and to the glory ofgenerations to come. They did not compete with each other indaring, nor promote rash conduct of set purpose, but they weremore afraid to tre dishonoured by fellorv-citizens than to dienobly for their city, more ashamed at public wrong than now wearc at personal misconduct.

The reasor; for this rvas their concern for the precision andright intent of the laws, not so much those of private commerceas those of common practice in the life of every day. They knewthat for men of high breeding there is no need of many writtenwords, since agreement in a few principles will bring accord inprivate and in public alike. So deep-set in their thought was thecommunity, that even their dissensions arose, not in dispute asto which party should destroy the other and control the state,but which should be first to bring benefit to the whole. Theirclubs were associated, not for individual advantage, but for thegood of the nation.II The same interest governed their approachto the affairs of other states. They treated the Greeks withcourtesy, not insolence, laid claim to command, not despotismover them, and desired to be called their leaders, not theirmasters, for their protection, not their injury, winning theircities to friendship by good treatment, not subduing them byforce. They made their worcl more sure than an oath is in ourtime, and expected to abide by an agreement as binding beyondavoidance. They did not take pride in power so much as creditfor restraint, demanding in themselves the same attitude to-wards inferiors as they received from superiors, since theythought of their individual towns as their own abode, but ofGreece as the fatherland of all.

It was by adopting ideas such as this, and by training rheyoung in these habits of thought, that they raised so fine ageneration in those who fought against the invaders'from Asia,that neither thinker nor poet could reach the height of what theyaccomplished. And this may well be pardoned. It is as hard topraise men of outstanding merit as men of none. If these lasthave no actions worthy of praise, the first can engender no fitting

rr. On the political clubs see Lysias, Eratosthenesr 43,p.49, and note.

n4

[8:-z] P A N E G Y R I C U S

praise to match their actions. What praise could be of eQualmeasure with the stature of men who far surpassed the warriorsat Troy, in so much as while the latter took ten years over asingle city, these in a short time beat down the whole strengthof Asia and not merely gave safety to their own countries, butfreedom to the whole of Greece ? How should they shirk anyeffort, any toil, any danger, to gain fame in life, when for theglory they were to acquire at its ending they were so preparedto die ? Indeed, I think the war itself was divinely inspired inadmiraticln of their high courage, to ensure that such charactershould not go unobserved or come to death without renown,but should be accorded the same honour as the sons of the gods,who are called demi-gods. For while their bodies bowed to thenecessity of their mortal nature, heaven made immortal thememorial of their virtue.

Continuously, then, our ancestors and those of Sparta were incontention with each other, but at that time it was contentionfor the prize of honour, and they held themselves not in enmitybut rivalry. They did not seek the enslavement of Greece, tocourt the outside lvorld, but about the safety of all they were ofone mind, and contention arose only for the decision lvhichshould further it.

They made the first display of their courage in facing the forcesent by Darius. When the Persians made their descent on Attica,the Athenians did not wait for their allies, but made their owna war which rvas universal, and met an army which had dis-dained the whole force of Greece with their own force alone.That little army met their tens of thousands as though thedanger belonged to other lives than theirs. The Spartans, with-out a moment's delay after the report of the war in Attica let allelse go and came to our aid, with all the eager haste whichwould greet the ravaging of their own country. And here isproof of their speed in matching us. It is said of our ancestorsthat within one day after they heard of the Persian landing theywere there to resist on the boundaries of their soil, and won thebattle and set up their trophy in token of victory, while theSpartans within three days and nights covered twelve hundredstad,es with their army on the march. Such great haste there was,

I I 5

I S O C R A T E S l8t-g'lin the one army to take their part in meeting danger, in theother to meet it before assistance reached them. Later comesanother example, when the second expeditionl2 came, under theleadership of Xerxes, who left his royal domain and ventured tomake himself a general, collecting the whole of Asia in his army.About him everyone has used extravagant language, only tofind it came short of the truth. He showed such overbearingarrogance as to think it a slight thing to subdue the land ofGreece, and to desire to leave a meriorial higher than humanpride can reach. He did not give way unril he had planned andhelped to force into being a design which is the common talkof the world, how with his army he sailed over the mainlandand marched on foot across the sea, when he bridged theHellespont and drove a canal through Athos.

Against the pride and the achievements of Xerxes and thehost of which he was master, the Greeks marched out. Theydivided the responsibility, and the Spartans moved to Thermo-

.-,pylae against the land army with a thousand picked men and afew of their allies, to hold the pass and prevent further advancethere. Our own people went to Artemisium, with a citizen forceof sixty triremes to meet the whole enemy fleet. Their couragewas not inspired by contempt of the enemy so much as bydesperate rivalry among themselves. Sparta envied Athens thevictory at Marathon, and hoped to set themselves on equalterms, in the fear that twice successively our city might bethe saviour of Greece. For Athens, the main desire was topreserve the glory she had won, and to make it universally clearthat courage, and not chance, had won that victory, while hersecond aim was to induce the Greeks to fight at sea, to demon-strate that in battle at sea as well as on land courage is morethan numbers.

But equal though their daring rvas, their fortunes wereunequal. The Spartans were destroyed, and for victory inspirit they laid down their lives. It would be wicked to say thatthey suffered defeat, when not one of them deigned to seekescape. Our navy defeated the Persian advance guard, but

rz. i.e. the Second Persian War of 48o 8.c., as distinct from the campaignof Marathon in 4go.

r 1 6

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hearing that the enemy held the pass, they sailed back, andemployed such strategy th-ereafter, that, great as had been theirachievements before, in the later fighting they rvere still moreoutstanding. The allies were one and all in despondency. Thestates of the Peloponnese were engaged in fortifying the Isthmusand looking to their personal safety. The others were under thesubjection of the Persians, and co-operating with them, exceptsuch small cities as had been left out of consideration. Twelvehundred Persian ships were on the sea, and numberless landforces threatened Athens. Without a glimpse of safety, her allieslost to her and every hope dispelled, she might not only haveescaped the dangers that faced her, but accepted the signalhonours which the king held out to her in the hope that, if hecould join the Athenian fleet to his, he would at once subduethe Peloponnese as well. Yet they refused his gift, and wouldnot let anger at their betrayal by the Greeks rush them willinglyinto compromise with Persia. They prepared to fight for theirown survival, yet they pardoned the rest who had preferredslavery. They held that humbler states should seek their safetyas they might, but the claim to the leadership of Greece was notconsistent with escape from danger. A man of nobility, theyfelt, preferred a glorious death to a life of dishonour; and inthe same way, for a state that stood among the greatest it wasmore profitable to be blotted out of the sight of men than to beseen in slavery. It is obvious that this was their belief, since,being unable to match themselves against both forces at once,they took with them their whole people and sailed to theneighbouring island,t3 to make it possible to encounter each inturn. Indeed, it would be impossible to point to any greaterlovers of their country or of the Greek people than men who,to avoid bringing slavery on the rest, could endure to see theircity desolate and their land devastated, their sacred placespillaged and their temples set on fire, and the whole war centredon their own country. Even this was not enough for them:against twelve hundred warships their intention was to sailalone. They were not left to carry it out. The Peloponnesians

13. Most, according to Herodotus, moved to Troezen on the mainland,

but some to Aegina and Salamis.

t 1 7

I S O C R A T E S [97-roo]were filled with shame at such courage, and reflected that, ifour force were first destroyed they would never survive, andif we succeeded, their cities would be dishonoured. They werethus compelled to take their share of the danger. The uproarwhich took place in the action, the shouting and cheering whichare general in sea battles, I do not think it worth taking time todescribe. I am concerned with what is particular and relevantto leadership and in accord with my previous argument. Sooutstanding was Athens, with her force unimpaired, that afterthe city was sacked she contributed more ships to combat theperils of Greece than all the others who fought at Salamis, andthere is not a man so much at enmity lvith us as not to agreethat it was due to this battle at sea that we were successful inthe war, and that it was a victory which should be put down toAthens.

Indeed, when a campaign is intended against Persia, whoought to be given the leadership of it ? Surely it should go tothe winners of the greatest distinction in the previous encounter,who have many times stood alone in the forefront, and in theranks of the allied force have been given the highest award ofvalour. Surely it should go to the country which abandoned itsown land for the safety of the rest, which in ancient timesfounded most other states, and later rescued them from themost signal disasters. It would be outrageous treatment if, aftershouldering the greatest burden of hardship, w€ were expectedto receive less than our share of honour, if, after standing inthe front line, we were compelled to follow in the rear of otherstates.

Up to this point I am sure that it would be universally agreedthat the credit of Athens for benefactions to the Greek statestood the highest of all, and the leadership would rightly beaccorded to her. Afterwards, however) we are already faced bythe accusation that after assuming the naval supremacy, wehave been guilty of a great deal of harm to Greece, includingthe enslavement of Melos and the destruction of Scione.t+ My

14. Scione and Melos, both reduced by Athens and the populationmassacred or enslaved, were not parallel cases. Scione had been a full memberofthe Athenian Confederacy, but had revolted and asked aid ofthe Spartan

r r 8

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own view is, first, that it is no proof of bad rule that someopposing states are shown to have been severely dealt with. Itis a much more certain proof of good administration of ourallies' affairs that none of the states under our control wasinvolved in such troubles. Secondly, had any other states dealtmore leniently with the same situation, they might have reasonfor criticizing us. On the other hand, if this is not true and if infact it is impossible to control so large a number of states withoutpunishing offenders, we are surely to be commended forsuccessfully maintaining our empire for the longest possibleperiod with the fewest instances of harsh treatment.

I suppose there would be general agreement that the bestleaders to represent the Greek world are the people underwhom their subjects are happiest. Under Athenian supremacywe shall find that individual households progressed mostrapidly towards happiness, and cities increased in size. This isbecause with us there was no envy of advancement, no artificialcreation of disturbance by promoting dissident parties so thatboth should court Athenian influence. Our belief was that amitybetween allies meant thb success of the empire as a whole, andwe organized all states on the same legal system. We thought ofthem not on the basis of despotism, but of alliance, in which rvemaintained control of the whole, but allowed freedom to indi-vidual members; though rve lent assistance to democracy andopposed autocratic powers) because we held it to be unjustifiablethat the majority should be subject to the minority, that a classsuffering from economic, but no other inferiority should beousted from political control, that in a country which belongsto all there should be a distinction befween rthe constitutionallyprivileged and unprivileged, or that when nature has mademen fellow-citizens, law should disfranchise them.

Such among others were the objections to oligarchy which ledus to establish for other states the same constitution as our own,and I hardly think it needs justifying at greater length, especially

Brasidas and his army which had marched to Northern Greece. Melos hadnever joined Athens at any time, but was attacked for her obduracy inrefusing. Both incidents, however, were held reprehensible, and fsocrates isclearly in some difficulty to make a defence.

r19

I S O C R A T E S IroGro]when it can be done in brief. Athenians lived with it for sevenryyearsrs untouched by tyran.ny, free from external domination,untroubled by civil disaster and at peace with all the world.

Good sense demands gratitude for this far rnore than obloquyfor the cleruchies,r6 rvhich we sent to depopulated states forlocal protection, not out of self-interest. As evidence of this Ipoint out that we held very little territory in relation to ournumbers, but a large empire; that our warships were twice asmany as all the rest together, and fit to contend with twice asmany again; that Euboea, lying close to Attica, was naturallyrvell sited to assist our naval empire, while her other assetsmade her superior to any of the other islands, and we couldcontrol her better than our own territory. I add further thatwe knew from the experience of Greek and non-Greek alikethat the greatest prestige went to states which by devastation oftheir neighbours secured for themselves a life of idleness andplenty; yet nonetheless none of these facts could induce us tomaltreat the people of Euboea. We were alone among the greatpowers to tolerate a lower standard of living than people who\\rere accused of subservience to us. Indeed, had we pursuedour own interest we should presumably not have conceir.'ed adesire for Scione, which, as is common knowledge, we handedover to our refugees from Plataea, leaving untouclred the largeterritory of Euboea, which would greatly have increased theprosperity of us all.

Such has been our character, and such the proofs we havegiven of our freedom from rapacity. Yet \ve are unjustifiablyaccttsed by participants in the decarchies,rT lvho clicl violenceto their o\vn countries, made the atrocities of their predecessorslook trivial and left no room {br further extremes in the historyof rvickedness - men who on the pretext of Spartan principlespursued exactly the opposite practices, who lamented the

15. A rough estimate of the period between the Persian wars and the fall ofAthens.

r6. The'cleruchies'were a device whereby Athens allotted land in con-quered Greek territory to Athenian citizens, who became the olvners. Thesesettlements formed a major grievance against the Athenian Empire in thePeloponnesian War.

17. On the decarchies and harmosts see r17 and sectional introduction.

t20

[r ro-r5] P A N E G Y R I C U S

miseries of Melos but inflicted irreparable injury on their ownpeople. There is nothing in the realms of wrong and crueltywhich they have left unexplored. They set their trust in defianceof law, they cultivated treachery as right conduct, they chosesubjection to one of their own Helotsts in order to outrage theirown countries, they did more honour to murderers who shedthe blood of their people than to their own fathers, and reducedus all to such inhumanity that, while in the previous htppyperiod even small misfortunes found numerous sympathizers,the multitude of personal distresses in the time of the decarchiesmade us give up all pity for each other. No one had time forsympathi with others. There was no limit to their cruelty, noone was remote enough from politics not to be forced into con-tact with the suffering to which men of that character drove us.Can they be unashamed, when they treated their own cities with-out regard to law, and accused ours without thought of justice,can they, in addition, dare to criticize the public and private caseswe conducted, when they put more to death without trial inthree months than were ever brought to trial under the Athenianempire I As to banishment, civil strife, disruption of law, denialof rights, violence against children, indecency against women,seizure of property, there is no end to the list. I have this toadd of the whole subject, that the wrong-doing of which wewere guilty could easily have been ended by a single decree,but the murders and the lawlessness of that period 'would bebeyond any remedy.

And indeed the present peace and the autonomy, which doesnot exist in Greek states, though it appears in the terms ofpeace, are neither of them to be preferred to Athenian rule. Itwould hardly be possible to be enthusiastic about a state ofaffairs in which the sea is commanded by pirates and the citiestaken over by fighting men; when instead of war taking placebetween cities about territorial claims it is carried on insidethe walls between fellow-citizens; when more cities are reducedto subjection than before peace was made; and when thefrequency of revolution makes the inhabitants of cities moredespairing than the victims of exile, because they live in dread

18. Lysander rvas born of a Helot (i.e. serf) mother.

I S O C R A T E S [r r5-zr]

of the future, while the others always expect to return. So farare the people removed from freedom or autonomy that in factthey are either under tyrannies, or under the power of theharmosts, or in some cases depopulated or subject to Persian des-potism. Yet, when the Persians had the daring and the unjustifi-able insolence to cross into Europe, we dealt with them to theextent of not merely ending their invasion but forcing them toundergo the devastation of their territory, and submitting thefleet of twelve hundred ships to the humiliation of being preven-ted from launching a single warship west of the Phaselis.'s Theywere compelled to keep the peace and wait for events insteadof feeling confidence in their existing force. 'fhat this situationwas due to the great qualities of our ancestors is clearly provedby the disasters of Athens. The decline of our empire coincidedwith the beginning of troubles for the Greek states. After thedefeat at the Hellespont,zo when the leadership of Greece passedto others, Persia gained a naval victory and secured the controlof the sea, won the supremacy over most of the islands, madea descent on Laconia, stormed Cythera and sailed round thePeloponnese, raiding the country.

The clearest complete view of the transformation is given bya parallel reading of the terms of peace in our time and now.zrIt rvill be clear that then it was we who laid down the boun-daries of Persian territory, and in some cases stated tribute to bepaid, and barred her from access to the sea. Now it is the Kingwho directs the affairs of the Greek rvorld, gives orders forindividual states, and almost establishes a governor in eachcitv. There is little else lacking. It was he who tookcontrol of the war and presided over the peace, and hewho remains as a supervisor of the present political situation.

r9. The reference is to the mysterious Treaty of Callias in 448 e.c. whichconcluded hostilities between Greece and Persia.

zo. The defeat at the Hellespont is the battle of Aegospotami, and thenaval victory over the Greeks is that of Cnidus in 394 u.c. under the AthenianConon, once a commander at Aegospotami, who later joined Persia to serveagainst Sparta.

zr. The treaty referred to is the King's Peace or Treaty of Antalcidas, inwhich Persian terms were imposed on Greece by Sparta. See sectionalintroduction.

t22

ftzr-6f PANEGYRICUS

He is a despot to whose court we sail to accuse each other. Wecall him the Great King, as though we were subject prisonersof war, and if we engage in war with each other, it is on himthat our hopes are set, though he would destroy both sideswithout compunction.

We should be ready to reflect on this, to resent the presentposition, and to desire to regain our place as leaders. We shouldcast blame on Sparta for beginning the war with the aim ofliberating the Greeks and in the end reducing so many of themto subjection, for causing the revolt of the Ionian states fromAthens - which had been the source of their foundation and,so often, their salvation - and putting them at the mercy ofPersia, the enemy of their very existence and their unceasingopponent in war. At that time they were incensed at our per-fectly legal claim to control some of the cities, but now thatthese have been reduced to such slavery they feel no moreconcern for them. For these unfortunate cities it is not enoughthat they should be subject to tribute and see their strongplaces in the grip of their enemies; their communal troublesare intensified by personal suffering greater than under the taxcollectors of Athens. No Athenian inflicts such cruelty on hisslaves as the Persian punishment of free men. But the greatestmisery of their subjects is the compulsion to join in the fightfor slavery against the cause of freedom,zz and to endure theprospect of defeat rvhich will cause their instant destruction ora success which will plunge them further into slavery in thefuture.

At whose doors but Sparta's can we lay the blame for this IDespite their great power they stand aside and watch thepitiable plight of people once their allies, and the consrructionof a Persian empire out of the strength of Greece. In the pasttheir habit was to expel tyrants and to give their support to thepeople, but now they have so changed as to make war on freestates and throw in their lot with despotism. The city of Man-tinea, at any rate, is an instance. After peace had been made,the Spartans razed it to the ground. They captured the Cadmeia

zz. On the war between Artaxerxes and Evagoras see r34, r4r below, andsectional introductions p. roo.

r23

I S O C R A T E S ftzFvlat Thebes. They have now laid siege to Olynthus23 and Phlius,and they are giving assistance to Amyntas, king of Macedon,Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse and the Persian power in Asia,to help them to supremacy. Indeed, it is surely a paradox thatthe leading power in Greece should make one man master ofsuch countless numbers, and not allow the greatest of cities tobe autonomous, but drive it to an alternative of slavery or utterdisaster. The final degradation is to see the claimants to theleadership of Greece at war day after day with Greek states andin permanent alliance with a non-Greek people.

Let it not be supposed to be due to ill will that I make asomewhat brusque reference to these subjects after a preludepromising reconciliation. My intention in speaking in this wayis not to defame Sparta in the eyes of others so much as to puta check on her, in so far as my discourse is able, and to put anend to her present attitude. It is impossible to prevent wrongaims or inspire better rvithout strong denunciation of the oldones. But one should put dorvn damaging attacks as accusation,but beneficent criticism as admonition. The same words shouldbe taken in different ways according to the intention. A furthercriticism could be made of the Spartans, that they reduce theirneighbours to serfdom for the benefit of their own country, butthey refuse to do the same in dealing with the commolt interestsof the allied states, when they could settle diflerences with usand make the rvhole non-Greek world subsidiary to the Greek.Yet for men whose pride springs from nature rather thancircumstances this is much more the right pursuit than collectingtribute from islanders who deserve our pity, when we see themfarming the rocky hills for lack of good soil, while the main-land'+ is so productive that most of the land can be left idleand great wealth comes from the only part rvhich is cultivated.

It seems to me that an outside observer of the present politicalsituation would condemn it as utter insanity on both sides that

23. Olynthus capitulated to Sparta in 3Zg n.c. (see general introduction toDemosthenes (r)). Phlius in the Peloponnese was also reduced by Sparta in

37g.On Dionysius see note 35 below.24. i.e. inhabitants of Asia Minor under Persian power as a result of the

Peace.

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we risk disaster on such slender grounds, when we might enrichourselves in a moment: we tear our own land to pieces andneglect the harvest we could reap in Asia. Nothing is moreprofitable for Persia than to ensure our continuing to fight eachother for ever. But we never think of interference with Persianaffairs or of raising insurrection. When chance disturbances doarise, we help to allay them. Now that there are two armiesengaged in Cypruszs we allow Persia to make use of one, andbesiege the other, though both are Greek. The rebels arefriendly to Athens and subordinate to Sparta, while in the caseof Tiribazus' force, the most valuable section of his infantrycomes from Greek districts, and the greater part of his navalforce was commissioned in Ionia and would be much readierto share in a raid on Asia than to fight against each other forlittle profit. We never give any thought to this. We enter intodisputes about the Cyclades26 when there are these importantcities which rve have gratuitously presented to Persia, andwhich she holds, or will hold, or on which she has designs, andwhile she shows justifiable contempt for all the Greek states.The King has indeed achieved something which is beyond theachievements of all his ancestors. He has secured the admissionfrom both Athens and Sparta that Asia belongs to him, and hasassumed such authoritative control of the Greek cities there aseither to raze them to the ground, or build fortifications inthem. And all this is due to our folly, not to his power.

Yet there exists a sense of the impressiveness of Persiandominion, and an idea of it as invincible because of the greatimpression it has made on Greek history. My own opinion is thatthis is no deterrent, but an incentive to the proposed expedi-tion. If we have achieved agreement while Persia is in difficulties,and yet are still going to find it hard to face her, there must surelybe a great deal to fear, should there come a time when Persianaffairs are secure and Persian opinions united, while we are inour present condition of mutual hostility. Nonetheless, even ifsuch critics do agree with my contentions, they still do not givea correct view of the power of Persia. If they could show thatthe King has in the past proved superior to the fwo principal

zt. See note 22 above.

125

26. Islands in the south Aegean.

I S O C R A T E S Itly+27cities together, they might justifiably try to rouse some alarm.But as this is not the case, as Sparta and Athens were in opposi-tion when he simply added his weight to one side and causedits prestige to rise, this is no evidJnce of his power. In suchcircumstances as this it often happens that a comparativelysmall power may turn the scale. I could use this argument inthe case of Chios, and say that rvhichever party it joins becomesthe leading naval power. But it is not a sound criterion of thepower of Persia to ask what have been the results of her acces-sion to one side or the other. What have they been from herown unaided engagements ? First of all, after the revolt ofEgypt, what steps have been taken against its inhabitants ? TheKing sent his most distinguished generals, Abrocomas, Tith-raustes and Pharnabazus, to the scene.z7 They waited three years)during which they did more harm than good, and concludedwith so dismal a failure that the rebels, not content with free-dom, are now trying to secure control over their neighbours.Next there is the operation against Evagoras. He holds a singlecity, which, however, is surrendered to Persia by the terms ofthe peace. His kingdom is an island and he has had an initialsetback at sea, and can only muster three thousand light infantryfor the defence of his land. Yet this modest force is beyond thepower of the King of Persia to overcome. He has already wastedsix years, and if the past is evidence for the future there is moreprobability of a new revolt than of the suppression of this oneby the siege; such are the delays which are endemic in the King'saffairs. In the Rhodian War28 he had the good will of Sparta'sallies because of the severity of the conditions imposed on them,while he made use of Athenian crews and enjoyed the leadershipof Conon, who was both outstanding as a general and un-equalled in Greek opinion for reliability and experience of thehazards of war. Yet despite the assistance of so redoubtable anally the King allowed the power which stood for the defence ofAsia to remain under siege by a hundred ships, during whichtime he kept his men short of pay for fifteen months. So as faras the King was concerned the force would have been disbanded

27. This occasion is not known except from this passage.28. On the Rhodian War. see sectional introduction.

rz6

ft42-61 P A N E G Y R I C U S

two or three times, though owing to its commander and thealliance made with Corinth they contiirued till at last theywon a victory. This is the truly royal and impressive aspect ofhis proceedings which is so unceasingly emplrasized by theadvertisers of the King of Persia's greatness.

Thus it cannot be claimed that the examples I quote are notapt, nor that I pursue the trivial at the expense of the important.It is to avoid such a charge that I have made the greatest eventsin Persian history my subject, without forgetting other items,such as Dercyllidas'rq success against Aeolis with a thousandmen, or Dracon's capture of Atarneus and his devastation ofthe Mysian lowlands with three thousand light troops, orThimbron's action in crossing and ravaging the whole of Lydiawith only a few more, or Agesilaus' conquest with the army ofCyrus of virtually the whole district beyond the Halys.

The army which wanders about with the King gives no moreground for anxiety than Persian bravery. The former wercgiven clear proof by the army which marched in with Cyrus:othat they were no better than the coastal forces. I omit theirearlier def'eats, assuming them to have been divided in theirviews and unwilling to contend whole-heartedly against theKing's brother. But in circumstances such as after the death ofCyrus, when all the people of Asia were united, their conductwas so inglorious as to leave no room for the customary eulogiesof Persian courage. They faced six thousand Greeks,:t not

zg. Dercyllidas was Spartan commander it 399 e.c., having succeededThimbron. Draco was a harmost appointed by Dercyllidas. The campaign ofAgesilaus is that of 395 n.c. (see Xen., Hellenica III,4 seqq.)

3o. The rebellion of, Cyrus is referred to here for its indication of weak-ness in Persia and for Cyrus' instigation to the Greeks in Asia to revolt.This is Cyrus II, not Cyrus the Great. He made an attempt against hiselder brother, Artaxerxes II, to secure the Persian throne in 4or n.c., marchingon Babylon with an army of mercenaries, many of them Greek, includingro,ooo hoplites, among them the writer, Xenophon. At the battle of Cunaxaclose to Babylon Cyrus was killed owing to his own impetuosity. TheGreek leaders were betrayed and put to death by the Persians, and theremainder marched back to Trapezus (Trebizond) on the Black Sea, and sohome. (See Xenophon's The Persian Expedition, tr. Rex Warner - PenguinClassics. See also Isoc., Plrilipr Sg 2o77, p. r55 below.)

3r. Xenophon says 86oo.

r27

I S O C R A T E S [r4G5r]picked for their quality, but whose poor circumstances made itimpossible for them to make a living at home, who were ignorantof the country, devoid of allies, betrayed by their associates inthe march and deprived of the leader they had followed. Yetthe Persians proved so inferior to them that the King was indespair at the position and, having no opinion of his own forces,resorted to seizure of the mercenary leaders, despite the truce,in the hope that this illegality would throw their army intochaos, preferring sacrilege to open fighting with them. His plotfailed, because the army did not dissolve, but nobly weatheredthe storm. As they departed, the King sent Tissaphernes andthe cavalry with them. The Greeks were the victims of theirmachinations throughout this march, but still carried it throughas though they were under escort, despite their fear of un-inhabited districts and the feeling that their best hope rvascontact with the enemy in strength. To conclude the subject,this force had not been conducting a raid to take booty or sacka town, but had been in direct warfare against the King; yetthey returned to the coast in greater safety than his representa-tives in a mission of friendship. It thus seems to me that thePersians gave a clear demonstration of their own lack of spirit.They have been defeated frequently in the coastal region, andwhen they crossed into Europe they met with retribution ineither a miserable death or a dishonourable escape till eventuallythey made themselves ridiculous at the very doors of the Royaldomain.g2

None of this is extraordinary; it is entirely natural. It isimpossible for people with an upbringing and political habits ofthis kind either to know what courage is in general, or to recordvictories over their enemies. There could never arise either anoutstanding general or a good soldier in a r6gime like this,where the bulk of the population is utterly incapable of sustain-ing discipline or facing danger, and lacks the toughness neededfor war after an upbringing more suited to servility than that ofservants with us. Men of the highest distinction there live a life

32. This appears to refer merely to the battle of Cunaxa, rvhen after the

death of Cyrus the victorious Greeks waited a long time close to the King'spalace, and then could not be kept from marching home.

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[r5r-6] P A N E G Y R I C U S

which exists on a single level, not one of shared outlook orfree institutions. They spend their time showing arrogancetowards one class and subservience towards another, in thefashion most calculated to demoralize humanity. Physicallytheir wealth has made them over self-indulgent, while psycho-logically their monarchical constitution makes them degradedand cringing, since they are subject to constant regimentation atthe palace itself, falling to the ground and practising all sorts ofself-humiliation, and prostrating themselves in adoration of aman whom they address as a god, while it is gods rather thanmen whom they treat with disdain. Hence the so-called satraps,who go down to the coast, do not demean their upbringingthere, but continue in the same habits; they are untrustworthywith friends and unmanly with foes, and live a life of servilityor arrogance, contemptuous of their associates and subservientto their enemies. They certainly maintained Agesilaus' army foreight months at their o\vn expense, while the forces on theirown side were deprived of their pay for an equivalent time.They allotted a hundred talents to the captors of Cisthene,rrbut their own men from the expedition to Cyprus were treatedwith greater insolence than prisoners of rvar. Think of Conon,who after commanding the forces of Asia and shattering theempire of Sparta was outrageously seized for execution. Thinkof Themistocles, who defeated Persia at sea in defence ofGreece, and was then handsomely rewarded by them. Indeedhow can one accept friendship from men who punish theirbenefactors and show such blatant flattery of their attackers IThere is no one in Greece they have not treated wrongfully.There has been no cessation of their conspiracy against theGreek people. There is nothing in the Greek rvorld which isnot at enmity with the men who in that earlier war did notscruple to pillage the sacred places and the temples, and burnthem. For this reason one may praise the people of Ionia, whopronounced a curse upon anyone who should disturb or seekto restore the sacred places which were burnt - not for lack ofthe means to achieve it, but to secure for later generations amemorial of the impiety of Persia, a token of everlasting distrust

33. Captured by Agesilaus.

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I S O C R A T E S Ir56-6o]against the perpetrators of this sacrilege, and of warning toavoid and dread them, since they are seen to have done battle,not merely against ourselves, but against our worship of thegods.

I could say something similar of my own fellow-citizens.With all other states with which they have been at war theyaccept reconciliation and forget their differences. But to thepeoples of the mainland they do not even offer gratitude forbenefits received, so unrelenting is the anger they feel againstthem. There were many whom our ancestors condemned .todeath for joining the Persian enemy, and even now at publicmeetings, before any business is done, curses are pronouncedagainst any citizen who proposes agreement with Persia. And atthe celebration of the Mysteries the Eumolpidae and Kerykes,by reason of this hatred, proclaim the segregation from the riteof all non-Greek peoples as they do of homicides. So ingrainedin us is this hostility that in the realm of myth we most enjoydwelling on the Trojan and Persian wars, in which we can readof their disasters. It will be found that it is the wars betweenGreeks and Persians which have given rise to the compositionof triumphal odes, while wars between Greeks have inspiredlaments, and that the first are sung at feasts, the second recalledin mourning for disaster. And I think even the poetry of Homergained prestige from its magnificent eulogy of the warriors whofought against the non-Greek world, and that was the reasonwhy our ancestors desired his art to be celebrated in musicalcompetitions and in the education of the young, so that ourfrequent hearing of the epics should enable us to learn by heartthe hostility which was ingrained there, and so that emulationof the prowess of the men who fought there should lead to adesire for similar achievements.

It seems to me, therefore, that there is an overwhelming num-ber of inducements in favour of this war, and chief among themthe present opportunity, which ought not to be let pass. Itwould be contemptible to neglect it when it is here and regretit when it has gone by. There is nothing more that we couldneed for an attack on Persia beyond what is ours already.Egypt and Cyprus are in revolt against her. Phoenicia and Syria

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have been devastated by the war. Tyre,3a which they had setgreat store by, has been captured by their enemies. The majorityof the Cilician towns are in the hands of our allies, and the restcan easily be acquired. Lycia has never been subdued by anyPersian. Hecatomnus, the governor of Caria, has actually beenfor some time in secession from Persia, and he will take hisstand with us openly when we choose. From Cnidus to Sinopethere are Greek settlements in Persian territory, which willneed no persuasion to go to war) only the lifting of the banagainst it. Indeed, with such bases as these at hand and a warof such magnitude already besetting Asia, what need is therefor too precise a calculation of probabilities I When rhey arebeing worsted by small parts of our forces, there can be nouncertainty about their prospects if they are compelled to facethe u'hole.

This is the situation. If Persia takes a stronger conrrol of theseaboard towns, by stationing larger garrisons in them ttranbefore, perhaps the islands round the coast, such as Rhodes,Samos and Chios, Day incline to support her. But if we takeprior possession of them, the probability is that clistricts likeLydia, Phrygia and the rest of the inland region will come underthe power of our expedition in that quarter. For this reasor weneed to hurry and not waste time, to avoid the fate of ourpredecessors, who appeared later than the Persians, lost someof their allies, and were compelled to fight at a numericaldisadvantage, when they could have made their crossing withthe combined forces of Greece and subdued each of the regionsin turn. It has been proved that in cases of war against a mixedforce of varying origins one should not wait for them to attack,but try conclusions with them rvhile they are still dispersed.Our predecessors made this initial mistake, though they set itright afterwards, when they engaged in those tremendousbattles. But, if we are wise, rve shall take precautions from thestart, and try to effect a surprise by establishing an army againstLydia and lonia, in the knowledge that even the King findsunwilling subjects in the continental Greeks, and raises agreater force to surround him than any of theirs. And when we

34. Phoenicia, Syria and Tyre were attacked by Evagoras.

I 3 I

I S O C R A T E S ft6611transport a force stronger than that, which we could easily doif we tried, we shall be able without danger to harvest theproduce of all Asia. It is far more distinguished to fight him forhis kingdom than to wrangle with each other for the leadership.

It would be better to make the expedition during the presentperiod, so that our generation, which has had the losses, canenjoy the gains as well, and not spend all their days in suffering.The past has had enough of that, and every sort of miseryappeared in it, There are many ills that fall to the lot of humankind, but we added to the list more than our necessary shareof them in the wars, foreign and civil, which we brought uponourselves, with their consequences either of violent death athome, or lvandering abroad, men, women and children asrefugees, or mercenary service for lack of other subsistence, anddeath in battles fought for enemies against our own kith andkin. Of these ills no complaint has ever been uttered. Thesufferings in the poetical realm of fantasy are thought to bematter for grief, but the actual severe sufferings which can beseen as due to war are so far from rousing pity that the sufferersare more prone to rejoice at the ills of others than at their owngood fortune. Possibly *y orvn simplicity may come in forridicule, if I lament the sorrows of men in the circumstances ofthe present, u'hen Italy has been devastated, Sicily enslaved,rsso many cities surrendered to non-Greek captors, and when theremaining parts of the Greek world lie in the utmost danger.

I am surprised that leading statesmen in the Greek citiesthink a lofty attitude suitable, though they have always beenincapable of either speech or reflection to mitigate such asituation. If they deserved their reputation they should abandonall else, and introduce and discuss the subject of the expeditionagainst Persia. They might have helped to achieve somethingof value, and if they did give up before success came, at leastthey rvould have left their oracular utterances for the future.But men of the highest reputation spend their interest onconcerns of no importance, and have left it to men like me, who

35. f)ionysius I, tyrant ofSyracuse, invaded Southern Italyin l9r n.c. andsucceeding years, after being successful against the Carthaginians, who had

conquered much of Sicily a few years before.

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have abandoned politics, to advise on such vital issues. Nonethe-less, the more our leaders confine themselves to trivialities, themore vigorous should be the precautions u'hich the rest of ustake to avoid these besetting differences, At present peaceagreements are vain. We make no settlement, only postpone-ment of our wars, while we rvait for the opportunity to doirreparable damage to each other. However, we must put theseinternecine conspiracies aside, and set ourselves to activitieswhich will enable the cities to live in greater security and mutualconfidence. There is a simple and easy approach to this. It isimpossible to reach a secure peace without sharing in waragainst Persia, or to find agreement among Greek states, untilwe derive our assets frorn the same sources and engage in waragainst the same opponents. With this achieved, and with theremoval of economic anxiety - which dissolves friendships,changes association into enmity and plunges human beings intowar and dissension - we shall not fail to reach unity andenjoy good will towards each other. With this aim we shouldregard it as essential to lose no time in transferring this expedi-tion into Asia, in the certainty that we shall never derive anybenefit from our own internal warfare until we decide to usethe experience we have acquired from it against Persia.

Perhaps it may be thought that the treaty makes it desirableto wait and avoid haste or precipitate action about the expedition.The treaty means that states set free are grateful to the King,as the author of this freedom, while those which have beensurrendered to Persia are making bitter complaints, first againstSparta, and then against others who took part in the negotia-tions, as being responsible for their being forced into slavery.However, we should surely abolish these agreements, which havegiven rise to an opinion that Persia is the protector of the Greekstates and the guardian of peace, while some of ourselves areconcerned to injure and impair it. Most ridiculous of all, it isonly the worst of the items agreed in the treaty that we continueto observe. The clauses which confer independence on theislands and the Greek cities in Europe have been long inabeyance, and, though they remain inscribed on the pillars, areinvalid. On the other hand those which are to our discredit and

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I S O C R A T E S Ir76-8r]

involved the surrender of a number of our allies are still inexistence, and we ensure their validity. These we ought todelete and not allow to exist for a single day longer, because theyare orders given to us, and not agreements. It is universallyunderstood that agreements are made on a basis of mutualequality for both parties, while orders are designed to reducethe status of one side unfairly. We are therefore justified inaccusing the delegates who negotiated the peace on the groundthat they were sent by the Greeks, but acted for Persia. Theyshould have agreed either that each side should hold its ownoriginal territory, or that each should hold its own new acquisi-tions, or should hold what it held when peace was made. Oneof these principles should have been established and made a basisof unbiased negotiation, and finally so drafted. In the event noconsideration was allowed to Athens or Sparta, and Persia wasgiven complete mastery over Asia, as though it had been theKing we had been fighting for, or the Persian empire whichhad been long established and we recent settlers, though infact this position was a late acquisition of theirs, while we hadlong been the leading powers among the Greeks.

However, I think a different approach will show more clearlythe dishonour we have undergone and the rapacity of Persia.The whole world beneath the stars consists of two parts, calledAsia and Europe, and the King has appropriated half of it underthe treaty, as though he were making a division with Zeus in-stead of a settlement with men. He has compelled us to havethis inscribed on stone and erected in public temples, where itforms a far finer trophy to him than any he has won in battles.The latter rvere in honour of small and isolated successes, butthis records one which covers the entire war, and has beengained at the expense of all Greece. For this our anger isjustified, and we must take means to secure retribution andorder things properly in the future. It is a disgrace to expectin private to think of foreigners as servants, and in public toallow so many of our allies to be slaves to them; a disgrace thatat the rape of a single woman the Greeks of the Trojan warsshould join the victims of wrong in such universal indignationas to refuse any compromise till they had ruzed the presump-

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[r8z-6] P A N E G Y R I C U S

tuous offender's city to the ground, while we exact no combinedretribution for the insult to the whole Greek race, though wehave the power to make our very dreams realities. This ls theonly war which is in fact preferable to peace. It is more like areligious mission than a campaign, and desirable for the advo-cates both of peace and of war, the former of whom would beenabled to harvest their gains in security, the latter to acquiregreat wealth from the possessions of others.

There are numerous respects in which these activities wilrbe found valuable to us. What nation ought to be the object ofattack from a country which has no selfish gain to seek, but isconcerned solely with sheer justice ? Surely it should be theone with a history of past activity and present conspiracy againstGreece, with a permanent relation towards us of the same kind.Against what nation is envy justified for men who, while notexactly lacking in spirit, havc yet tempered courage withmoderation I Surely against a people who have been investedwith superhuman power, but have deserved less than themeanest among ourselves. Upon whom ought a campaign to belaunched by men who have always set their faces torvards piety,though they have a thought also for advantage I Surely upon apeople rvho by nature and heredity alike are their enemies, whoare possessed of the highest wealth and the smallest power todefend it. In all these points it is Persia which is vulnerable.

In addition we shall not even trouble the states by levyingsoldiers, the greatest burden to them in our internai *rir. ithink there will be far fewer who wish to sray at home thanthose who desire to be on the march. Who is there, young orold, who rvill be so inert as not to desire a paft in this army,led by Athens and Sparta and gathered for the freedom of theallied Greeks, sent out by all Greece for retribution on Persia ?How great is the renown, the memory, the glory one mustsuppose those who show the highest valour in such stirringdeeds will enjoy in their lives or leave behind them in death !Since the men who fought against Trojan Paris earned suchglory by the.capture of a single ciry, what must we think willbe the eulogies bestowed on the conquerors of all Asia ? Therewill not be a man in the realms of action or speech who will

r35

I S O C R A T E S Ir86-8]not strive with all his power or all his thought to create amemorial of his conception and of their courage which willlive through all eternity.

By now I no longer feel the same as at the beginning of myoration. I was then of opinion that I should be able to findwords to fit my subject. But I cannot attain to its magnitude.Much of my intention has escaped me. So you must yourselvesshare my imagination of the good fortune which would be ours,if we could change the present war among ourselves to a waragainst the mainland, and transfer the wealth of Asia to Europe.You must go home not merely in the capacity of hearers: anywho are strong in the sphere of action should raise each other'sspirit to reconcile our city with Sparta; any who lay claim tooratory should abandon their futile disquisitions on subjectslike money deposits,36 and turn their competitive instinctstowards the answer to the question what improvements canbe made in my presentation of the subject. You must reflectthat great promises preclude petty considerations and argu-ments which are unproductive for the audience who acceptthem, and demand those whose fulfilment will free them fromtheir present impotence, and convince their hearers that theyhave found the road to high success.

36. Norlin (Loeb edition) quotes the suggestion that the 'deposit theme'became a recognized phrase for a hackneyed exercise in the schools ofrhetoric.

I S O C R A T E S : P H I L I P


Tlte address to Philip of Macedon Das composed when Isocrateswas luer ninetl, and its tone dffirs fro* the prid,e and, optimismof the Panegyricus. Between 38o ond j46, phen the Philipappeared, there had been manl changes. The decli,ne in the fortunesof the new Athenian League and the eclipse of Sparta by Thebesma1 haae led Isocrates b1 about 37o t0 the belief tltat unitjt could,onljt be established under an indi.aidual leader. He is supposed, toh.aae sent addresses about that time to both Jason of Pherae (seertg) and Dionysius of Syacuse. If so, the deaths of both z)erJl s00nafterwards /iustrated his hopes. But this tradition is d,isputed, andthe letter which. has been thought to make a similar approach toArclridamus, King of Spartq ca,n hardly haae had the sameintention. A dffirent kind of change is the i,ncreasing use of mer-cenaries bl Greek stl,tes (see 96),pltose citizens became less read.lt totake part in pars such as that which, Isocrates was ad,aocating. Onthe other hand this rnade it easier to th.ink in terms of aryt arrnlunder o single great lead,er, a situation phich. would, also serae toemplol them.

The rise of Thebes was the outcome of the battle of Leuctra,phiclt, followed o Spartan inaasion of Boeotia in 37r. Tlae tablesDere turned on Sparta in the battle, which, pas the first of thetriumphs of Epaminondas, the general on phose brillionce theTheban su?rernacJ rested. With. this disaster the rule of Spartaended for tlte time, and, Thebes took steps to make sure it should notreturn. Apart rto* ilte expulsion of the Spartan harmosts (seeintroduction to the Panegyricus) more constructiae action rpastaken in the formation of an Arcadian League, in the foandationof the new city of fuIegalopolis as hs caphal, the rebuilding ofMantinea 0,s a counterpoise to Sporta and the recnnstitution ofMessene. In addition, Boeotian inaasions of Spartan territorjtfollowed; a Boeotian general, Pelopidas, made inroads intoIttrorthern Thessafit, andfreed some of its statesfrom the monarchical

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I S O C R A T E S

rale it had sufered under jason, in fazsour of a Thessalian league ;and_in {6 a Th,eban force seized Oropus from Athens (5).

Iy tlris process Thebes acquired some of the unpopuliritjt whichltad once been Sparta's. Atltens nnv began to sid,e with Sparta(see Demostltenes, For Megalopolis), mure resentment was iaused.by Thebon attempts to orercome Achaea and, in j6j, by theredaction of all Thessaly, phile a J/ear earlier Thebis

-earied as

deep ltatred as other Greek states in th.eir times by the total aboli,tionof a neigltbour state, orchomenus, an old riaal in Boeotia. wittxthe deatlr, of Epaminondas in j6z at the otherwise successful battlea-gainst sportg, at Mantinea, Thebes' domination began io decrine,haaing roused, as much hatred as Sparta's.

But Thebes Das still g, poner in th,e Greek world, as is sh.own bylter part in wltat is called the Sacred, War (5$. In j56 ph,ocis, incentrol Greece, haai.ng abandoned, the norD peakened Thebanalliance into which she had been forced found, herself a target forTlrebes, wh.o resented the independence of a former subordinite.Phocis inclwded the sanctuarj,t of Delphi (which is th.e reason forthe title_gioen to this war) and, tlte centre of the so-called Amphic-tjtonic League (74 and note). Thi,s ancient bodjt, formed, t0 prntectthe sacred site, sffired, the fate of other simi,lar instituiions inffiri,ng a frequent preter$ for manipulation and exploitation b1its most pgr,nerful members. By means of it Thebes imposed heaij,fines 9n Plrocis for alleged, sacrilege, with the implied threat ifqnagk t1 defoub oJ'payment. Phocis, h.oweaer, under the aigoroisIgadlrsltip of Philontelus and onoruarclrus, resp,nded b7 ieizingDelphi itself and its treasure, and, sent appeals to anti-Thebanstotes like Sparta. The resulting war lasted long, and b1 i,t phociswas raised to a temporary suprelnocJ ander onomarcltus. Philipwas brought into the conflict b1 Thessaly, and was at frst defeatidfut Onomarcltus. But his part in the war bri,ngs us to the speechesof Demosthenes, ond must be included in the introduction to thent(pp. r7o-7r).

['-6]

I S O C R A T E S : P H I L I P

You must not be surprised, Philip, if I do not begin u'ith thethesis which is to be put before you and will follow immediately,but with one in which I discussed Amphipolis. r I wish to say alittle about this first, to make clear that it is not due to ignoranceor failure to realize my present physical decline that I have setmyself the task of addressing you, but that it is a well-advised,deliberate intention.

Realizing the many ill effects of the recent war betlveen youand Athens over Amphipolis, I set out to discuss this countryand the surrounding district in terms unlike any put forwardeither by your supporters or by Athenian speakers, and as farremoved as can be from the ideas of either. Each party utteredan incitement to war, to accord with your respective aims in it.I gave no opinion on controversial subjects, but confined myselfto what seemed the line most conducive to peace. I declaredthat you were both mistaken in your view of affairs, and thatyou yourself were really fighting in support of the interests ofAthens, and she of the kingdom of Macedon. It was to youradvantage that this territory should be in our hands, and toours that no attempt at all should be made to secure it. Theimpression of this discourse on my audience was such that noneof them gave the conventional eulogy of its precision of formand purity of diction, but they admired its rruth to reality.They concluded that the only way to bring competition betweenyou to an end was, on your side, a belief that friendship withAthens was worth more than the revenues of Amphipolis, andon hers the lesson that she should avoid colonies of the sortwhich have four or five times been the ruin of their settlers,and look for districts further removed from the possible demandsof empire and nearer to people with habits of subservience, likethe region of Cyrene colonized by Sparta. In addition, youwould rcalize that although nominally ceding the district youwould actually keep control of it as well as retaining good rela-

r. On Amphipolis, see sectional intoduction to Demosthenes (I) (p. rZo).

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I S O C R A T E S [6-r r]

tions with Athens (you will have hostages for our good behaviourin every colonist who goes into your territory), while our peoplewould be brought to understand that their control of Amphi-polis would compel them to the same good relations withMacedon as they were led to maintain with Amadocus, in thepast by the presence of the settlers in the Chersonese.

This long discussion led my hearers to hope that the viervcould be disseminated, and that you would both admit yourerror and arrive at a beneficial compromise. Whether theiridea was sense or nonsense, they must have the responsibilityof deciding. But while I was engaged on this business, andbefore its conclusion, you made peace, and this vl.as sensible.Any form of settlement was to be preferred to a continuance ofthe miseries of the war. I felt the same satisfaction at thedecisions of the peace, and I thought it would be beneficial notmerely to us, but to yourself and the Greek states. Yet I coulclnot disengage my mind from the implications of the subject,but turned at once to the problem of securing the settlementand preventing my country from the quest for new enemiesafter a short interval. I turned the matter over in my mind,and concluded that the only way to prolong peace for Athenswas a decision by the leading states to relax their own tensionsby carrying the war into Asia, and to agree to merge the con-flicting self-interests of different states in an attempt uponPersia, a policy which I did in fact recommend in the Panegltri-cus. With this idea in mind and with the belief that it would beimpossible to arrive at a basis which would be more attractiveor have broader application or greater general advantages, I wasfired to write again about it. I have not forgotten my own situa-tion, and I rcalize that this proposal does not presuppose a manof my age, but one irr the full flower of life and of quite excep-tional character. I am also aware of the difficulty of expressingthe same thesis trvice with tolerable results, especially if theearlier publication was of a kind to give even its critics more toimitate and admire than its fervent sugiporters. However, I set

z. Amadocus shared with Cersobleptes the rule of Thrace from 359 n.c.,and favoured Athens. According to Demosthenes (Aristorates, r83) hisresistance to Philip saved Athens from'war with Cersobleptes in 353.

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aside these difficulties, and was ambitious enough in my oldage to hope to combine what I had to say to you with a con-clusive demonstration to my own pupils that to disturb generalassemblies with addresses presented to the entire crowd ofparticipants is in fact to address no one. Such disquisitionshave as little effect as the legal and constitutional enactmentsof a degree thesis. If one is to avoid an idle waste of words andachieve something of value, and if one clairns to have somethingof general interest to say, one must leave conferences to othersand secure a figure of high reputation in the fields of boththought and action to represent one's views, if anyone is to beexpected to attend to them. It was in this determination that Iformed the plan of discussion with you, not for personalreasons; although I should set great store by your enjoymentof such a discussion, this was not my real intention. I observedthat other men of distinction lived under the control of theirstate and of law, and were not in a position to exceed instruc-tions, and in addition were quite inadequate for the ideas to beput forward. You were alone in being privileged by fortune toenter into diplomatic relations with any state you liked, and tosay anything you thought fit, and also in being better equippedthan anv other Greek state with money and power, which arethe only natural assets towards persuasion or compulsion. IndeedI regard even my project as likely to need both these, becauseI intend to urge you to take the lead in a movement for Greekunity and in the campaign against the non-Greek world. Per-suasion u'ill be desirable in dealing with the Greeks, andcompulsion of practical use against the others. This aim coversthe whole discourse.

I shall not hesitate to mention the trouble I have been givenby some of my pupils, because I think it may be useful to hearit. When I revealed to them my intention to address a discourseto you, not for the purpose of display or as an encomium onyour military successes, which will be done by others, but inan attempt to urge you to a more fitting, noble and valuablecourse of action than that on which you have lately been engaged,they lvere so terrified that old age might have driven me out ofmy wits, as to give me an unprecedented reproof: it would be

I4T

I S O C R A T E S Ir8-23]an intolerable folly to contemplate a message of advice toPhilip, who might in the past have thought himself less of adiplomat than some, but after his recent noteworthy achieve-ments must think himself more so than most. 'Furthermore,'

I was told, 'his entourage includes the keenest intelligences inMacedonia, who, even if they are inexperienced in most othermatters, know better than you do where his advantage lies.You will find a number of Greeks who have settled there, menwho are by no means without distinction or ability, and hisassociation with them has not at all dimmed the greatness ofMacedon. The position he has achieved is ideal. There are noweak points in it. Why, the previous controllers of Macedonia,Thessaly, have been brought to such close relations with himthat any section of them feels greater confidence in Philip thanin other groups of their own fellow-citizens. The states in thatdistrict he has either brought into his own orbit by the benefitshe has conferred, or liquidated the really troublesome. He hasreduced Magnesia, Perrhaebia and Paeonia and made themsubject states. He has secured his power, official as well asactual, over the great bulk of Illyria, except for the Adriaticcoast.3 With all this behind him do you not suppose he rvillthink it pure stupidity to address discourses to him, and con-clude that you have a very distorted idea of the power of wordsand of his own intelligence ?' I will omit my initial dismay onhearing this, and my subsequent recovery and reply to it indetail, for fear of appearing complacent at making t neatdefence. But having, I thought, given a moderate rebuff to thecritics who had ventured to attack me, I ended with an under-taking that they should be the only people in Athens to rvhomI would disclose the discourse, and that I would accept theirdecision what to do about it. What their frame of mind waswhen they left, I cannot tell. But after a few days, when thetext was completed and I showed it to them, they changed theirattitude enough to feel ashamed of their outspoken tone, toregret what they had said and own that they had never made agreater mistake. They showed more enthusiasm than my own

3. Before meddling in Greek politics Philip established his control ofMacedonia itself, of which these are divisions. (See Demosthenes Ol. r. r3.)

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for sending the speech to you, and added their hopes that Ishould be received with gratitude for it not only by yourselfand by Athens, but by the Greek states in general.

The reason for this narrative is to prevbnt anything in myinitial argument, which'may appear unreliable or impossible orunsuitable, from giving you a distaste for the rest and makingyou reject it or feel the same as my friends. I hope you willkeep an open mind till you have heard the whole, because Ithink I shall have something to say which is both needed andvaluable. At the same time I rcalize how much difference thereis between the spoken and the written rvord, and how generallyit is assumed that discussion of serious and urgent subjects isspoken, while a speech which is under contract and intendedfor display is written. This is not an unreasonable distinction.When oratory is shorn of the appearance and the voice of thespeaker, and of the rhetorical transitions of a set speech, whenit lacks the immediacy and intensity of a practical aim andthere is no feeling of participation in actual persuasion, whenthe speaker is denuded of this and reads a mere list of items withan unconvincing lack of telling intonation, I think it is reasonableif his hearers find him dull. This present discourse may sufferfrom some such appearance of dullness, because I have notendowed it with the felicities of rhythm and decoration whichI used myself in my earlier days, and demonstrated as contri-buting to enjoyment and conviction alike. My age precludes allthis, and nowadays I am satisfied if I can achieve a simplepresentation of the actual matter. In your case too I think itwill be better to neglect inessentials and confine yourself tothis. It will enable you to form the best and most accuratejudgement as to whether there is force in my contentions ifyou discount the distaste connected with academic dissertations,and take each item as it is intended, rvithout regarding them asincidentals to be treated idly, but giving each the philosophicthought of which it is said thatyou are also capable. Such deliber-ation is to be preferred to common opinion as a basis for yourview. This, then, completes the preamble to what I have to say.

I shall now turn to the actual subject. I maintain that withoutdisregarding any of your own interests you should attempt to

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I S O C R A T E S lso-sslreconcile the states of Argos, Sparta, Thebes and Athens. Ifyou succeed in bringing these four together, there will be nodifficulty in securing agreement between the rest, which are allsubordinate to these, go to one or other of them for protectionat any time of alarm, and derive assistance from them. Thusyou have only to persuade four states to a reasonable attitudeto relieve all the rest of a multitude of troubles.

You should know that it would be inappropriate for you totreat any of these states with indifference, if you view theirhistory in relation to your own ancestors. You will find in eachcase a story of great good will and substantial benefits towardsyour people. Argos is your country of origin, and justicedemands that the same precedence shall be accorded her as toyour own parents.4 Thebes is the patron town of the founderof your race, to whom she renders particular offerings andsacrifices. Sparta has conferred on his descendants permanentkingship and primacy, while Athens is credited by reliabletradition with contributing to the immortaliry of Heracles in amanner which is easily ascertained but would be irrelevanthere, and with the preservation of his descendants.s Unaided,she withstood tremendous dangers in the struggle with Eurys-theus, whose violence she curbed, to rid the Heraclidae of theirrecurrent perils. For this the survivors, not merely on thatoccasion, but at all times, can feel justifiable gratitude toAthens, to whom they owe their lives and the benefits theyenjoy. But for the survival of the Heraclids they could neverhave come into being.

In view of the character of all these states you should haveno disagreement with any of them. But unfortunately we areall by nature more prone to be wrong than right. So rve shouldtake joint responsibility for the past, and for the future takecare to avoid repeating it. You should keep in mind the question

4. See Panegyricus, note 7. The Greeks r\rere very conscious of parentageand descent. Perdiccas I, from whom Philip was descended, was said to havebeen himself descended from an Argive hero (see Hetodotus Y, zz), andperhaps belongs to the seventh century u.c.

5. Apparently because Athens was supposed to have offered the firstsacrifices to Heracles.

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Izs-+') P H I L I P

what benefit you can confer, to prove clearly that yourconduct does honour to yourself and to their past achievements.The moment is now yours. If you pay your debts in gratitude,they will consider after this long interval of time that you areconferring an initial benefaction. And it is fine to feel that youare a benefactor to the greatest of states, and at once to makethe benefit as truly yours as theirs. Apart from this you willdissolve any ill feeling that may exist between you. In the lightof immediate good offices the disharmonies of the past areforgotten. Indeed it is also an obvious truth that in all humanaffairs nothing is so keenly remembered as assistance in mis-fortune. You see the misery that war has brought these states,and the parallel between them and individuals in a quarrel, whoare irreconcilable while their anger is rising, though after inflict-ing injury on each other they part of their own accord withoutout further mediation. This I think these states will do, unlessyou give them your attention.

It may be possible to venture obiection to my proposals onthe score that I am trying to persuade you to an attempt whichis not feasible, because friendship between Argos and Sparta,or between Sparta and Thebes, is impossible, nor could a balanceof power ever take the place of long habits of competition.When Athens held the principal power among the Greeks,and similarly when Sparta did, I do not think anything of thesort could have been attained, because each side could easilyhave frustrated the attempt. Now, however, I no longer takethis view. All the states have, I know, been reduced by mis-fortune to one level, and I think they will be much moreinclined to accept the benefits of unanimity than the old com-petitiveness. Further I agree that there would be no otherfigure capable of effecting this reconciliation. For you, however,these difficulties would not exist. It can be observed that youhave already achieved much that seemed beyond hope or reason,which makes it not unbelievable that this may be a further unionwhich you alone could bring about. High ideals and great abilityshould not confine themselves to the scope of ordinary men, butattempt what is only open to a character and a powersuch as yours.

I am surprised at the view that any of these proposals is

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I S O C R A T E S l+'-slimpracticable, and I wonder that those rvho hold it should notbe aware from their own knowledge or that of others thathistory records numerous wars of importance rvhose terminationhas brought great mutual benefit to the contestants.

'Ilhere hasnever been more violent enmity than that of the Greek statesagainst Xerxes. Yet the friendship which follorved 6 was onewhich, as everyone knows, A.thens and Sparta valued morethan that of the states which helped to secure the poiver ofeach. There is no need to go far back in history or outsideGreece itself. A full consideration of the disasters of the Greekstates will show that they were a mere fraction of the miserybrought to Athens by the Theban and Spartan hegemonies.Nonetheless, at the time of the Spartan campaign againstThebes and their attempt to disrupt Boeotia and disestablishits communities,z Athens led a force to obstruct their intentions.Then, when fortune changed, and Thebes combined x,ith allthe Peloponnesian states in a drive for the eradication of Sparta,Athens was again the only state to join in alliance with Sparta,and was in fact responsible for her survival. In view of suchchanges of attitude, and in the realization that the states havelittle thought of fixed hostility or sworn declarations or anythingelse except what they think is in their own interest, and that thisis what they foster and preserve with the utmost eagerness, itwould be sheer stupidity to suppose that this tendency rvill notpersist, especially when they will have you to superintendbetter relations, as well as the impelling force of their owninterest and the compulsion of their present miseries. My ownopinion is that with these factors to help you everything willcontribute to a satisfactory result.

6. A very hard statement to understand. As the text stands we should read'whose friendship'. I translate to render the apparent intention. We shouldtake Xerxes to stand for any Persian monarch and the passage to refer to theend of the Peloponnesian War or the late years of the fourth century whenboth Athens and Sparta turned to Persia for financial support. (See note onthe passage in M. L. W. Laistner's edition of'the speech.)

7. The history of Thebes constantly depends on whether the city was at anygiven time to be regarded as the overlord of the rest of Boeotia, or merely oneamong the many separate cities included in it. Thebes itself naturally tendedto seek the former position, her rivals to desire the latter.

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[+6-s'] P H I L I P

I think you can best discover whether the attitude of thestates to each other is peaceable or the reverse, if we discuss,not too superficially, but not in too great detail either, the mostin-rportant features of their present position.

First consider Sparta, not long ago the military and navalleaders of Greece. They have undergone such a change sincethe battle of Leuctra as to have been deprived of the supremepower in Greece and lose a valuable section of their Spartiatecitizens,s who preferred to die rather than survive defeat by theprevious victims of their own autocracy. In addition, they wentol1 to see all the Peloponnesian states who had previouslyfollowed their standard against others now siding with Thebesin an invasion of their territory; they were faced with extremedanger not rnerely to their crops in the open, but to their wivesand children in the very city and in the centre of government.oIt was a crisis in which failure meant instant destruction, andeven success brought no release from trouble. They have beenunder attack frclm the surrounding inhabitants of their owndistrict,Io distrusted by everyone in the Peloponnese, hated bythe bulk of the Greek states, harried night and day by their ownunderlings. They have not a moment's freedom from campaigns,from fighting or from support of their own people in distress.lVorst of all, they live in continuous fear of a reconciliationbetween Phocis and Thebes, who might return and subjectthem to greater ruin than before. In fact one cannot fail tosuppose that people with this attitude would be overjoyed tosee in charge of peace negotiations a man of importance capableof bringing existing warfare to a close.

Next Argos can be seen to be either in a similar case or aworse. Since the foundation of their state they have been like

8. On the true Spartiates the whole strength of Sparta depended.

9. Xenophon (Hellenica, VII, v.) records that Epaminondas actuallyentered Sparta on one occasion, but 'whether by divine agency or despera-tion' the Spartans repulsed him and his army.

ro. Laistner thinks this phrase refers to the state of Messenia as refoundedby Epaminondas in 369 (after Leuctra) by recalling and enfranchisingHelots from the region, or others expelled by Sparta from Naupactus, wherethey had been settled by Athens. Sparta hoped to regain this reconstitutedMessenia during the Sacred War (see Demosthenes, For ilLegalopolis,p. ry4),

r47

I S O C R A T E S ls'-slSparta, in a condition of warfare with their neighbours, withthis difference: that Sparta has operated against weaker, andArgos against stronger, opponents, which would be universallyowned to be the most disastrous position. Their misfortunes inwar have been such that almost every year they have had tosee their country ravaged and ruined. Worst of all, when theirenemies give them an interval from attackthey put the wealthiestand most distinguished of their own people to death, and derivemore satisfaction from it than others do from killing theirenemies.Il The reason for their disordered history is simplywar, and if you can bring it to an end, you will not merely ridthem of their own troubles, but enable them to initiate betterrelations with others.

The position of Thebes you know. After their magnificentvictory and the prestige they earned from it, their misuse oftheir success brought them to a level with the defeated andfrustrated. They had no sooner overpowered their opponentsthan they cast consideratibn aside and began to harass thePeloponnesian states, made unwarrantable inroads on thefreedom of ltaly, threatened their neighbours at Megara andmade encroachments on Athenian territory,Iz rvhile they sackedEuboea, and sent a naval force to Byzantium, as though sea andland alike were to come under their domination. Finally theyentered upon war with Phocis in the hope of a rapid defeat ofthe Phocian towns and an extension of their rule over the wholesurrounding district by gaining control of the Delphic treasureat the expense of their private funds. None of these hopesmaterialized. Instead of capturing the towns of Phocis they havelost their own, while their invasion of enemy territory does lessdamage than they undergo in returning to their own. In Phocisthey kill a few mercenaries, who are better dead than alive,while on their retreat they lose the most distinguished anddaring patriots they possess. Their affairs have taken such aturn that after cherishing hopes of universal domination they

r r . An oligarchic conspiracy at Argos in 37 r is said to have led to the deathof tzoo citizens.

rz. On Theban history of this time see sectional introduction. TheAthenian territory mentioned is Oropus (see Demosthenes, For Megalopolis).

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norv depend on you for their hopes of survival. I thereforebelieve that they too will soon fall in with your instructions andadvice.

So it would only remain for us to deal with the state ofAthens, were it not that she had the good sense to make peacebefore the others.ts As it is, I think she will make a positivecontribution to the project, particularly if she can grasp thatyour arrangements are designecl for the campaign againstPersia.

That it is not impossible for you to unite these states I thinkhas been proved by rvhat I have said. I go further and say thatI think I shall be able to give numerous examples to show thatit ivill be easy. If it is shown that others in the past have madeattempts which, though no more distinguished and lofty thanmy proposals, have yet been harder and more troublesome andhave succeeded, what further argument can there be againstexpecting you to be quicker to achieve an easy task than ahard onei

First consider the case of Alcibiades. He r,vas banished fromAthens,t+ and found that previous victims lay down underdisaster because the great name of Athens overawed them. Buthe refused to adopt their attitude. He thought he should attemptto force a return, and decided to rnake war on Athens. Itrvould be impossible to deal in detail with every event of thattime, and at this moment it would perhaps be tiresome. But hecaused confusion alike to Athens and to Sparta and the rest ofGreece, which brought upon ourselves the consequences whichare common knowledge, while the others ryere involved indisasters bringing calamities whose horrors have not yet faded,and Sparta, after her apparent success, traces her present troublesto Alcibiades. It was at his instance that they were lured intonaval ambitions, only to lose their military supremacy as well.Thus were one to date the rise of their present disasters fromtheir rise as a naval power, it could not be written off as untrue.Alcibiades, then, had all these responsibilities on his head when

r3. Peace of Philocrates, 346 n.c.14. In 4r5 B.c. (see introduction to Andocides, On the Mysteries, p. 6r).

He returned in 4o7.

r49

I S O C R A T E S 16r-21he returned to Athens, covered with glory, though not greetedwith universal applause.

Conon's career Is a few years later was the converse of Alci-biades'. Defeated in the naval battle at the Hellespont, not byhis own fault, but that of his fellow-commanders, he wasashamed to return home. He sailed to Cyprus, where he spentsome time on his private affairs, after which he learnt thatAgesilaus had crossed to Asia with a large force, and wasdevastating the district. Being a man of great spirit, thoughdevoid of all assets except his own person and his determination,Corron ,conceived the idea of a military and naval defeat ofSparta, then the leading state in Greece, and sent word to thePersian commanders with a promise to bring it about. Thereis no need to go further. He was joined by a fleet near Rhodes,and won a battle which overturned the Spartan empire, andbrought freedom to Greece. He thus not merely led to therebuilding of his country''s walls, but to the resuscitation of herfallen glories. There could have been little expectation that aman who had acted with such humility would reverse theentire affairs of Greece, and bring their states to dishonour orto power.

Next I mention Dionysius t6 - I want to offer several instancesto convince you of the ease of the proceedings I urge. He rvasof no great distinction in Syracuse either in birth, reputation oranything else. He indulged an unthinking, phrenetic desire fordespotic power, and was prepared to do anything which couldlead to it. He secured control of Syracuse, reduced all the otherGreek states in Sicily, and surrounded himself with naval andmilitary strength unequalled in his day. Cyrus 17 again, to passto a non-Greek instance, was exposed by the roadside by hismother, but rescued by a Persian woman, and lived to changethe world by becoming lord of all Asia. Thus, since Alcibiadesin spite of exile, Conon of misfortune, Dionysius of undistin-guished origins and Cyrus of the misery of his initial story went

15. On the career ofConon, see Panegyricus, trg) p. rz2, note 20, andsectional introduction.

16. On Dionysius of Syracuse, see Paneglricus, t6g, p. r32, note 35.17. This refers to Cyrus the Great.

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as far and achieved as much as they did, it must clearly beexpected that a man like yourself, of sirnilar birth, but with thekingship of Macedon and this widespread power to your name,will find it easy to bring about the unity of which I have spoken.

You may well reflect how valuable it is to engage in enter-prises whose success will set your reputation to rival the highestin history, while, even if your hopes are unrealized, you will atleast earn good will from the Greek states, which is a far finerachievement than the storming ofany number ofGreek cities. Suchsuccesses give occasion for resentment, hostility and ili feeling,none of which attaches to such a course as I am suggesting.If the gods granted you a choice of the pursuit or activity inwhich you would spend your life, there is no other, in mysubmission, which you could prefer to this. You will not merelywin the world's emulation, you will be able to congratulateyourself. It will surely be the acme of this kind of satisfactionwhen the most distinguished representatives from the Greekstates come in deference to your power; when you join them indeliberations for the common welfare, for which it will be clearno one else has such deep concern as yourself; and when yourealize that all Greece is agog with expectation of your aims,that no one is neglectful of your arbitration) some inquiring itstrend, others expressing the hope that you may not fail in yourintention, or afraid that you may be prevented by some fatalityfrom bringing it to its consummation. You could hardly fail tobe uplifted at such a situation, or to enjoy lasting felicity in theknowledge of your position as leader of such a world. And noone of even moderate intelligence could fail to urge you to aplan of action which would bring a double harvest of outstandingpleasure and inextinguishable honour.

What I have said on this subject might have seemed sufficient,had I not omitted one argument, not out of forgetfulness, butout of hesitation. Now I think I should put it forward. I believeit is in your interest to hear it, and my duty to maintain my usualcandour and discuss it. I realize that you are niisrepresented bypeople who are jealous of you 18 and are apt to incite their own

18. Perhaps Demosthenes and the 'war party', though the reference isnot confined to Athenians.

1 5 I

I S O C R A T E S [ts-t]states to disorder, and who suppose that general peace meanswar against their own individual interests. They leave every-thing else aside and concentrate on the subject of your power,whose rise they maintain is not in the interest of Greece, butagainst it. They declare that you have long harboured designsagainst us all; that an ostensible aim to befriend Messenia,Io ifyou arrange the position in Phocis, conceals the ambition tocontrol the Peloponnese; that initially Thessaly, Thebes and allthe adherents of the Amphictyonic confederacy are prepared tofollow you, while Argos, Messene, Megalopolis and numerousothers are ready to join the campaign and reduce Sparta toruin; and that once you achieve that you will find it easy toreduce all the rest of the Greek states. This is without substance,though they claim it as certain knowledge and their imaginarysubjection of the world to you wins them much support; pri-marily among people who hold the same pernicious aims asthese purveyors of rumour themselves, secondly in circleswhich give no real thought to international affairs, but in anentirely unperceptive attitude sympathize with any who claimto feel apprehension and misgivings about them, and againamong others who do not reject the idea of your having con-spired against the Greeks, but regard the charge as one to meritemulation. They are so remote from common sense as to fail tosee that the same argument can be used to do damage or bringsupport alike. At the present juncture, for instance, the state-ment that the King of Persia had designs against the Greeksand was prepared for an expedition against us would notamount to any criticism against him, but would show him in amore courageous and more estimable light. But if preferredagainst a descendant of Heracles, who was the benefactor of allGreece, this charge would be a matter of the deepest shame. Itcould not fail to be a reason for resentment and hatred to beproved a conspirator against causes for whose sake one's ances-

19. On Messene see note ro above. The Amphictyonic League \yas anancient association for the protection of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi.Athens and Sparta were members, but it was formed largely of states inCentral Greece, notably Thebes and Thessaly, until Macedon gained mem-bership in place of Phocis after the Sacred War.

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tor had elected to risk his life, and to make no attempt topreserve the good will which his achievements left behind, butinstead to neglect it for the pursuit of despicable and shamefulends. You should realize and not discount the growth of thisview of you, in which your enemies desire to involve you,though every friend of yours would confidently deny it. Yet inthese two opinions you will find the truest inclication of yourinterests.

Perhaps you regard it as petty-minded to pay any attentionto slanderous nonsense and its followers, particularly when yourconscience is entirely clear. But one should not be contemptuousof the masses or think little of high reputation in any quarter.The time when you can regard your public figure as high anddistinguished, and in keeping with yourself, your ancestry andyour achievements, is when you have imparted the sameattitude in the Greek states towards you as you see Sparta holdstowards her Kings, and your Companionszo towards yourself.It is not difficult to achieve this, if you are prepared to beimpartial towards all, to cease to be friendly towards one stateand distant towards another, and if you pursue a policy whichwill make you trusted in Greece and feared abroad.

I hope you will not be surprised, as I also pointed out toDionysius rvhen he became Tyrant, at an address of unusualfreedom from one who is not a military leader nor a politicalspeaker nor otherwise a power in the land. Nature left me lesswell equipped for politics than anyone. I have neither the voicenor the confidence to deal with crowds, or to drag mvself inthe dust and abuse and hurly-burly of the public platform. Butfor sound and educated thinking, though it may be thoughtsomewhat lacking in good taste to say so, I stake my claim andwould set myself not among those who are left behind in therace, but among the leaders. This is the reason why I attemptto offer advice, of the kind which is within my natural powers,to Athens, to the rest of Greece and to the leaders of mankind.

You have heard fairly fully of my own theme, and of the wayin which you should deal with the Greek states. As regards the

zo. The Greek word'companions'was used to refer to the Macedoniancavalry, and then officially for the King's bodyguard and advisers.

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I S O C R A T E S [8r-8]expedition into Persia, we will approach the states I called uponyou to reconcile and urge them towards it, when we can besure of their agreement. I shall now address arguments toyourself on the subject, but not in the same sense as at theperiod when I was previously writing about it. On that occasion Icalled upon my audience to hold me in ridicule and contempt ifI did not show myself capable of a discussion worthy of mysubject, my own reputation and the length of time the discussionoccupied.'I Now I am afraid that I may have offered a clis-quisition which is inadequate to all I said before. For apartfrom other things the Panegltricus,which enriched other devoteesof philosophy, has impoverished me. I do not wish to repeatwhat I wrote there, but I am not capable of producing freshideas. However I must not abandon my task, but go throughwith my undertaking to say whatever occurs to my mind aslikely to persuade you. If I make omissions and prove unableto recapture the manner of my earlier work, at least I think Ishall provide a pleasant outline for others to elaborate andcomplete.

I think I have established this as the basis of my argument,which is essential to a plan for a campaign against Asia. Onemust do nothing till one has secured from the Greek stateseither collaboration or considerable sympathy with the project.This was neglected by Agesilaus, who appeared the mostintelligent of the Spartans, from ambition rather than incapacity.He had two aims, both laudable, but inconsistent and incom-patible. His design was both to conduct war with Persia and torecall his associates 22 to their cities and give them control overproceedings. The result of his arrangements with his associateswas a series of difficulties and dangers for the Greeks, rvhilethat of the confusion which reigned at home was that he hadno time or power for war abroad. Thus his failure to grasp theproblem of that period affords a clear lesson that a correct design

zr. See Panegyicus, t4,zz. The same Greek rvord as appears in 8o above, here refers to Agesilaus'

friends, unless it has its semi-technical sense to refer to the political clubs,which existed throughout the Greek states (see on Lysias, Eratosthenes, 43),in which case Jebb thinks that Isocrates is confusing the rigid oligarchicalaims of Lysander with the much more accommodating ones of Agesilaus.

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rvill not include war with Persia without reconciliation of theGreek states and an end of the insanity which now afflicts them.This is the advice I have in fact given.

About this no thinking man would be rash enough to dis-agree. But if it occurred to anyone else to give advice about theexpedition against Asia, I think he might have recourse to theclaim that it rvas the experience of all who attempted waragainst Persia that they rise from obscurity to distinction, frompoverty to rvealth, from unimportance to the control of largeterritories and dominions. But it is not from such people as thisthat I draw my plea to convince you, but from the class whichappears to have been unsuccessful, I mean the men who tookpart in the army of Cyrus and Clearchus.z: They are admittedto have overcome in battle the entire force of Persia as com-pletely as if they had had only their women to conrend with,but when they still appeared to have the situation in their graspthey r,vere brought to disaster by the rash behaviour of Cyrus,rvhose excessive exultation led him to pursue the action farbeyond the rest into the middle of the enemy, where he waskilled. Nonetheless, afrer a disaster of this magnitude the Kinghad so little confidence in the force under his command as tosummon Clearchus and the other leaders to a conference, atwhich he promised them large presents of money and undertookto send the rest of the army home rvith full pay. After leadingthem on with such hopes as this, and after giving the mostsolemn assurances normal in that country, he seized them andput them to death. He preferred to violate the sanctions ofreligion rather than engage in battle against those desertedsoldiers. What plea, then, could have a bemer justification orcarry a surer guarantee i Even that army would cleariy haveovercome the power of Persia, had it not been for Cyrus. Butin your case the catastrophe of that time is easy to forestall, andthe force which overcame the strength of Persia can easily befar surpassed. And if provision is made for both these demands,one can surely feel confident in undertaking the campaign.

I hope it will not be supposed that I want to elude the fact

4. On the story of the Ten Thousand see on Paneglricus, r44, and,sectional introduction.

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I S O C R A T E S lsg-81that I have put some of this in the same fashion as before. As Ihave embarked upon the same ideas, I preferred not to causemyself uouble by insisting on a second satisfactory expressionof what has already been said. Were I engaged in a rhetoricaldisplay, I should attempt to avoid all such repetition, but in adiscourse of recommendation to you it would be stupid of meto attend more to diction than to matter, or when others appro-priate my style, to be alone in avoiding expressions of my ownprevious devising. Indeed I should make a successful use ofany phrase of my own which meets an urgent need and ispertinent, while I would not accept a borrowed one any morethan I did in the past.

So far, then, so good. Next I think I had better consider theforce you will have in comparison with that of the previousexpedition. Most important of all, you will have the good will ofthe Greek states, if you are prepared to abide by my advice aboutthem, whereas your predecessors were led to extreme hostility bythe Spartan decarchies. Indeed the Greeks thought that if Cyrusand Clearchus were successful, their orvn enslavement to Spartarvould be intensified, while success for the King would freethem from duress. And this is what happened. Secondly, asregards infantry, you will have a ready source from which todraw as many men as you like. Greece is now a land in whichit is easier to raise an army, and a stronger one, from displacedexiles2+ than from active citizens. But at that time there was nopermanent mercenary force. They had to collect men from thecities, and found it cost more in donatives to the collectors thanin pay for the fighting force. Furthermore, if we set out to drawa comparison between you, the intended commander and chiefof staffof the present army, and Clearchus, who was in commandon the previous occasion, we shall find that he had never previ-ously had charge of a force, naval or otherwise. He owed hisfame to the disaster that befell him on the continent, whileyour own achievements amount to an enormous total, which it

24.'The employment of mercenaries in Greece on a considerable scalebegan in the Corinthian War (fq+-Sqo) and gradually became more andmore firmly established' (Laistner). Indeed it became a difficult problem,on which see r2o, rzr below.

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would be well to elaborate if I were addressing other states,but in a discussion confined to yourself a catalogue of your ownsuccesses would appear superfluous and foolish.

It is worth while to make some mention of the two Kings ofPersia, one whom I am proposing that you should face, and theother whom Clearchus met, to give you some knowledge of thecharacter of each. The fatherzs of the present King conductedsuccessful wars against Athens, and again against Sparta, butthe present one has never been successful against any of theforces which have ruined his country. The first acquired thewhole of Asia from Greece by the treaty he made, the secondis so far from control of others that he cannot even controlcities made over to him. An observer woulcl be in doubt whetherhe had abandoned them or whether they had adopted a lordlycontempt for the power of Persia.

An account of the country itself and its condition would fillanyone with enthusiasm for attack. Egypt was in revolt aboutthe same time as the attempt of Cyrus,z6 but rvas afraid that theKing might raise his own force and overcome the difficulties ofthe Nile delta and all their orher defence works. However, herelieved them of this apprehension. He gathered the largestforce he could and marched against them. But he retired, notmerely defeated, but a figure of derision, incapable of being aking or commanding an army. The district which includesCyprus, Phoenicia and Cilicia, the source of Persian fleets, thenbelonged to the King, but has now either seceded or is in astate of warfare or other trouble to an extent which precludeshis deriving any benefit from the peoples of that district,though they will be conveniently placed for you, if you conductthis expedition against him. In addition ldrieus,zz the wealthiestpotentate on the mainland, is likely to be a stronger opponent ofthe King than the enemies now ar war with him. At least it

25. Artaxerxes II came to the throne in 4o5 s.c. He was not responsible forPersian successes in the Peloponnesian war, though he was, with conon'sassistance, for the battle ofCnidus. Arraxerxes III succeeded in 359._ 26. Egypt revolted from Persia at the end of the fifth century, and was notfinally recovered till 344. (See on Demosthenes, Rhod.es, norei z and 4)

27. Idrieus became King of Caria on the death of Artemisia in 35r n.c.(See on Demosthenes, Rhodes, note r.)

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I S O C R A T E S Iro3-8]would be most perverse of him if he were not eager for thedissolution of a kingdom which maltreated his brother andmade war on himself, and was continually conspiring to gaincontrol of his person and his wealth. This apprehension compelshim to show deference to the King at present, and to pay hima large annual tribute. But if you crossed to the mainland, hewould welcome your appearance with the feeling that you werecoming to his aid, while you will gain the adherence of numerousother satraps if you promise them freedom and disseminatethrough Asia a word whose currency in Greece has been thedownfall of the empires of Athens and Sparta alike.

I would try to go to greater length in describing the tacicswhich would enable you to overcome the King's power in theshortest time, were it not that I am afraid I might be subjectto criticism if without previous military experience I attemptedto advise a soldier of such great achievements as yours. So Ithink I had better say no more of that. As regards the rest ofthe subject, however, I think your father, and the founder ofyour dynasty and the originator of your race, if there were nodivine or human impediment to make it impossible, would givethe same advice as I do myself. I take their own achievementsas evidence. Your father maintained friendship with all thecountries I am advising l/ou to keep in consideration. Thefounder of your dynasty had loftier aims than his fellows anddesired kingship, but his designs differed from those of mostaspirants to similar ambitions, who acquired the distinction byfostering party disputes, violence and bloodshed in their orvnstates. Perdiccas28 left the area of the Greek world severely alone,and set his eyes on kingship in Macedonia. He knew that Greekstates do not usually tolerate monarchy, though other peoplesare incapable of organizing their own existence without somesuch personal power. In fact it was his knowledge of this thatgave his kingdom its personal character, which differed greatlyfrom others. He was alone among the Greeks in not claiming torule a racially unified kingdom, and therefore also in escapingthe dangers which monarchical rule incurs. We shall find thatrulers who have achieved this among Greek states have not only

28. Perdiccas of Argos (see note 4 above). Philip's father was Amyntas II.

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themselves been extirpated, but their race has been obliteratedfrom the sight of men, while Perdiccas both lived out a life ofprosperity himself, and bequeathed to his descendants thedistinction which had been his own.

As to Heracles,zs others have always sung the praises of hisbravery and catalogued his achievements, but his other attri-butes, which are qualities of mind, will prove to have had nofame accorded to them either in poetry or prose. I see this as adistinct and entirely unworked field, neither small nor barren,but abounding in fair fruit for praise and admiration, yer inneed of a pen to give it adequate expression. Had I come to thetask at a youltger age, I should have found it easier to point toyour ancestor as displaying greater pre-eminence over hispredecessors in intelligence, honour and justice than in physicalstrength. As it is, when I turn to him and rcalize the greatquantity of material which needs to be included, I find mypresent strength inadequate to the task, as I see that there wouldbe twice as much as you have now to read. I have thereforerefrained from mentioning most of it, choosing to keep a singleepisode, which, besides being a related and appropriate additionto my earlier argument, provides an opporrunity very much inkeeping with my present concern.

Heracles rcalized that Greece was obsessed by war, foreignand civil alike, and he brought this to an end, secured thereconciliation of the cities, and gave a demonstration to suc-ceeding generations of their proper allies and their proper oppo-nents in war. He carried out an expedition to Troy, then themost powerful state in Asia, and the superiority of his general-ship to that of later invaders of Troy is shown by the fact thatwhereas they laid siege to it with the whole strengrh of Greeceand barely reduced it after ten years, he took less than as manydays with only a small force and srormed the city with ease.After this he put to death the tribal kings on the coast on eitherside of the Greek continent, whom he could never have extir-pated had he not overcome their power. It was after these

29. On Heracles and the Fleraclids see on Panegyricus note 7, p. rog above.But Isocrates here does seem to show some originality, if it is not toosophistic a rationalization.

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achievements that he erected the so-called Pillars of Heracles,soas a trophy to signalize his victory over states outside Greece, amemorial of his own prowess and triumphs, and a boundarystone to mark the limit of Greek territory.

The reason why I have dealt with this subject is to make youunderstand that this essay is designed to urge you to action ofthe kind which your forbears judged the finest there could be.All thinking men should set the highest models before them-selves and try to live by them,,'and you most of all. The factthat there is no need to point to external examples, becausethere exists one in your own ancestry, must presumablf stimu-late you to emulation of your ancestor. I do not imply that youwill be able to match all the achievements of Heracles, whichwould be beyond the power even of some of the gods. But inrespect of the spirit that was in him, of his good will and kindlyfeeling towards the Greek people, you would be able to modelyourself on his aims. It is in your power, if you follow thesuggestions I have made, to rise to any distinction you will.The path from your present achievement to the greatestheights in the world is easier to travel than that from youroriginal position to where you now stand. But reflect that I amcalling upon you for an attempt which means that you will beconducting your campaign, not in unjustifiable alliance withnon-Greek peoples against Greeks, but in alliance with Greekagainst non-Greek, which is the right battle for descendants ofHeracles to fight.

Do not be surprised that I have tried throughout my argu-ment to urge you to work for the Greek people in a spirit ofkindness and good will. I realize that strained relations are alikepainful to initiate and to endure, while good relations are foundacceptable not only among human beings and animals; thosegods who are the givers of good gifts to us are addressed withthe title of Olympian, while the others who are invokedto deal with disaster and punishment have less attractiveappellations. It is the former in whose honour temples andaltars are consecrated by both individuals and communities,

3o. The title was commonly applied to the two big rocks on the Straits ofGibraltar, Calpe (Gibraltar) and Abyle (Ceura).

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while the latter receive no honour either in ritual or sacrifice,but are exorcized by the human race. With this in mind youshould make it your custom and persistent practice to ensurethat the right view shall be universally held of you. The ambitionfor greater fame than others enjoy must imply an understandinggrasp of action, which must meet practical demands and aspira-tions too, and the attempt to carry it out as opportunity offers.

Among plenty of examples to show that this is the rightpractice that of Jasoprt is outstanding. He had no achievementscomparable with yours, yet he attained great fame, not for hisactions, but for his claims. He made statements based on theintention to cross to the mainland for a war against Persia. Butsince Jason made such capital out of mere words, the opinionwhich you may expect to win must be high indeed if you carrywords into action, and attempt if possible the destruction ofthe whole Persian kingdom: or, failing that, the annexation ofas much territory as possible, the division of Asia, as sornesuggest, on a line from Cilicia to Sinope, and thirdly thefoundation of states in this area, and the permanent settlementof those vagrants who lack subsistence and are a danger to allthey meet Jz If we do not prevent these from congregating bymaking sufficient provision for them, before we realize it theywill reach numbers which will be a menace to the Greek worldas much as abroad. We take no thought of them, but are contentto ignore,a reason for general anxiety and a danger to all. Itremains for a man of high aspirations, an admirer of the Greekworld who can see further than his fellows, to make use ofthese people against Persia, to cut off a large range of territorysuch as has been suggested, to liberate these hordes of displacedpeople from the hardships they both undergo and inflict onothers, organize communities of them, and make them aboundary buffer state for our general protection. If you do this,

3r. Jason of Pherae was a vigorous and ambitious Thessalian king, rvhounited Thessaly before 37o B.c. and aimed at the hegemony of Greece, andeven at a Greek expedition against Persia. He marched to join the Thebans in37r, but arriving after the battle, induced them to make a truce. He had far-reaching schemes to seize the rights of the Amphictyonic Council and presideovef the Pythian Games, but rvas assassinated in 37o.

32. See note 24, p. 156 above.

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ISOCRATES ltzs-glyou will ensure both their satisfaction and the safety of us all.If, however, you fail to achieve it, there is in any case onething that will be easy, the liberation of Greek cities in Asia.

Whatever part of this programme you can carry out, or evenattempt, you cannot fail to gain greater clistinction than therest of, the world, and rightly, if you yourself make the firstrnove in this direction and urge it on the Greek states. Asthings are it would be reasonable for anyone to feel surprise atwhat has occurred and some contempt of the Greeks, when inthe non-Greek world - which we have always taken to be soft,unaddicted to war and eaten up with self-inclulgence - therehave appeared men who claimed the control of Greece, whileno one in Greece has the spirit to try to secure for her thecontrol of Asia. We are so far behind them, in fact, that whilethey had no hesitation even in taking the initiative in hostilityto Athens, we have not the determination to meet injury rvithretaliation. They admit that in all their wars they possessneither men, commanders nor any other valuable assets for anemergency, but send for everything from us. Yet we carry sofar our eagerness to do ourselves injury that when we couldhold secure possession of what is theirs we find petfy reasonsfor war among ourselves, or join in the reduction of Persianrebels. Sometimes without realizing it we side with our tradi-tional enemies in attempting the destruction of our own kithand kin.

I therefore think it is also in your interest, as the rest have solittle spirit, to take the lead in the suggested campaign againstPersia. But it is the duty of all others in the line of Heracles,and all who remain under the restraint of constitution or law,to retain their affection for the state in which they actually live,while you yourself, as being in a position to range at will,should look on all Greece as your country, as your ancestordid, and regard her dangers as yours and her needs as yourdearest concern.

There may be criticism of me from people capable of nothingelse, for calling you to this campaign against the non-Greekworld and to the care of the Greek world, without reference tomy own city. Had I been taking the initial step in putting

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forward this argument to any other country than my own,which has three times been the saviour of Greece, twice againstPersia and once against Sparta, I would agree that I had beenat fault. But it will be clear that she was in fact the first whichI approached with this exhortation, with the greatest ardour Icould command. But I realized that she had less concern forwhat I had to say than for the ravings of platform oratory. So Ileft her alone, though I did not abandon my business. I thereforedeserve universal commendation for using what power I possessin continuing unbroken hostility towards Persia, in criticizingany whose view differed from mine, and in trying to urge ailwho seemed likely to have the power, to confer any benefit theycould on the Greek states, and to seize from Persia her existingprosperity. This is the reason why I now make my address toyou, because I know that, while my arguments will be liable towidespread jealousy, the same actions carried on by you willbe received with general satisfaction. Words meet with noagreement, but benefits proposed in action will seem withineveryone's reach.

Consider further what a disgrace it would be to allow Asiato be more successful than Europe, non-Greeks more prosperousthan Greeks, to let the dynasty of Cyrus, the child exposed byhis mother, win the title of the Great King, while that ofHeracles, raised to the gods by his father for his virtues, isgiven a humbler style. None of this can be permitted. It needsto be altered to the exact opposite.

You must understand that I would have made no attempt topersuade you of any of this, had power and wealth appearedthe only advantage likely to come of it. I believe you have morethan enough of these already, and it is only insatiate greed whichprefers to risk life for the hope of them. These are nor the gainswhich fill my view when I address you, but the prospect ofwinning you the greatest and most glorious reputation. Remem-ber that man's body is mortal, and it is upon the fair fame, thehigh repute, the renown and the memorial which time bringsin its train, that his share of immortality depends, which it isworth any suffering, any endeavour to win. You will observethat for the noblest even of private individuals there is no

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other gain for which they will risk life itself, but for the sake ofhigh repute they will accept death in battle; and in generalthat the desire to win ever fairer and fairer fame is universallyextolled, while any other uncontrolled desire is held to show aregrettable lack of restraint. But most important of all is thefact that wealth and power may fall into the hands of enemies,whereas general good will and the other blessings I have men-tioned know no legatee except our heirs by blood. So I shouldbe ashamed not to advise you for these reasons to make thiscampaign and to do or die.

On this you will be best resolved, if you believe that it is notmerely by this discourse that you are called to action, but byyour ancestors, by Persian effeminacy, by the famous men,true heroes, who fought against Persia, and most of all by thefitting hour rvhich finds you in possession of greater srrengththan any previous European, and your adversary in deeperhatred and wider contempt than any monarch in history.

I would have given a great deal for the power to blendtogether all the discourses I have made on this subject. Thenthis one might have been a worthier representation of thetheme. However, you must attend to those parts of all of themwhose trend and purpose is towards this war, and then youwill be best advised about it.

I do not forget that many in Greece regard the King's poweras invincible. It is surprising that a power set under the rule ofa monarch without the blood or the understanding of a Greek,and based upon slavery, should be thought indissoluble by aGreek and a practised soldier in the ranks of freedom, when weknow that construction is always hard, but destruction easy.

Remember that the highest honour and admiration goes ingeneral to men who are capable both as statesmen and soldiers.So when you see the distinction which is accorded even in asingle state to men who have both these qualities, what mustyou expect will be the praises sung of you, when it is realizedthat in the political field you have been the benefactor of altthe Greek states, and in the military the conqueror of Persia ?I myself regard this as unsurpassable. No achievement can everbe greater than to bring us all out of such warfare to unity of

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spirit, nor is it probable that any other such force could existin the non-Greek world if you destroy their present establish-ment. No leader in future generations, however outstanding,can ever accomplish as much. Indeed, as regards past genera-tions, I can cap their achievements with those which already

91and to your name, without any pretence and in all honesty.when the nations you have reduced are more than the citiesdefeated by any other Greek state, it is obvious by a directcomparison of single instances that your achievements aregreater than any of theirs. However, I preferred to keep fromsuch an approach for two reasons: first because of the misusethat may be made of it, and secondly because I am unwillingto represent the present generation as more distinguished thanthe heroes of old.

You should reflect - to refer to ancient myth - that thoughthe wealth of Tantalus, the kingdom of Pelops, the power ofEurystheus would never be applauded in prose or poetry, yetnext to the outstanding character of Heracles and thb valoui ofTheseus the army that fought at Troy and their like would wineulogies the world over. Yet we know that the most famous andthe finest warriors among them held rule in tiny cities and smallislands. Nonetheless, rhey left throughout the world a fame roffanscend human glory. This is because all men eive theirhighest esteem not to the winners of the greatest iower forthemselves, but to the authors of the greatest benefit lo the restof Greece.

It is not only in regard to legend thar you will find thisopinion is held, but universally. Even our own city of Athenswould be given no praise for her maritime .-pir., for theenormous wealth exacted from allied states and deposited inthe Acropolis, or for the numerous instances in which sheassumed rights over other states - the right to destroy them, toincrease their porver or make what organization she chose. Itwas in her power to do all this, but the result of it has been aseries of accusations against her. But the battles of Marathonand salamis, and most of all her evacuation of her own countrvfor the safety of Greece, have won her universar praise. ThLsame opinion is held of sparta. she earns greater admiration

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I S O C R A T E S ['+8-sr]for her defeat at Thermopylae than for all her victories, andthe scene of the triumph of Persia against her is one for satis-faction and contemplation, while Spartan triumphs over otherstates are no matter of praise, but of displeasure, because thefirst is regarded as a memorial of valour, the second of self-seeking.

I hope you will go through and examine all I have written,and if you find any weakness or inadequacv in it, you will putthe blame on my age, which may reasonably be excused. But ifit is the equal of my previous publications, you will, I hope,suppose that it is the product, not of my old age, but of the willof heaven, which has no thought for me, but for the good ofGreece, which it seeks to deliver from her present ills, while itendows you with more than your present glory. I think youunderstand how the gods deal with human affairs. They donot directly bestow either the good or the evil which befallsmankind, but impart a disposition to each community whichensures that it is through each other's agency that we meet witheither. This may actually be an instance of it: they have givenme the province of speech, and you of action, in the view thatthis would be your best sphere of control, while in my casespeech would be the faculty to give least trouble to hearers. YetI fbncy that even in action you would not have succeeded in solarge a degree, had you not had some divine aid, not merelywith the aim of continuing your wars against the non-Greekinhabitants of Europe, but in the intention that you shouldbenefit by that early training, gain experience, make yourcharacter known, and then proceed to those ambitions to whichI have urged you.

I think you should respect all who speak well of your achieve-ments, but see the finest compliment of all in the belief thatyour character warrants still greater successes, and in the desireto go beyond laudatory remarks about the present and makefuture generations feel for what you have done an admirationunparalleled in the past. I wish I could continue in this vein rogreater length, but I cannot for the reason which I have toooften given already. It remains to summarize this essay and togive you the substance of it as shortly as may be. I maintain

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that you should be the benefactor of Greece, and King ofMacedoq, and gain to the greatest possible extent the empireof the non-Greek world. If you accomplish this, you will winuniversal gratitude: from the Greeks for the benefits they gain,from Macedonia if your tule of them is kingly and not tyrannical,and from the rest of the world if it is through you that they areliberated from Persian despotism and exchange it for Greekprotection.

The writing that has gone to this essay, its relevance andprecision, I cannot but leave to the judgement of my readers.I think I can say this with certainty, that no one could give youbetter or more suitable advice.

DE,MOSTHENES [ I ]

INTRODUCTION

Demosthenes rna,s ltorn in 384 n.c., th.e son of Demosthenes ofPaeania, an Attic deme. He was taught fut an earlier speaker,Isaeus, pho pas a lead,ing acloocate in prioate suits, and, Demos-thenes hirnself frst carne to the fore in 364, when he cond,ucted, aprosecution t0 preserTre his own prlperryl. Thus the man wh.o isunhsersalll acclaimed, as the greatest of Greek nratnrs began hiscoreer at an earll age. Yet he Das nlt pltlsically robust, and, wasthought unsociable, puritanical and, perhaps self+ighteous. If so,he ouercame the d,ffid,ence which, this reputation implies bjt a strongdetermination, which ntust have been characteristic of a man rohois said to haae irnprlved his aocal delioerl by declai,ming on tlteshore wi.th pebbles in his mouth. A writer of speeches and, teacher ofrhetori.c in his early day, he frst made his name with priaate, i.e.forensic, speeches irum JSZ olnwards, and the further ie went', tltemore he seems to haae mooed towards politics. His first publicspeech in 354 was th.at on the'slmmories' (see Olynthiac II, z9).Afto that we haae two speeches before the series for whiclt he ismost famous, wltich, czncern tlte relations between Athens and,Philip of Maced,on.

These two speecltes suggest tlrat, though. Philip was alreadltconspicuous in the affairs ofNorthern Greece as a,n opponent ofAt/tenian interests, Demosthenes lpes nzt J/et aliae to the d,anger lterepresentetl. (r) The fu* (For Megalopolis) deals with. the internalpolitics of tloe Greek stotes and with. questions of the balance o.fpower between tltem, whiclt Philip rDas s00n to render obsolete.After the battle of Manti,nea (j6z n.c.) Sparta, nzw aidetl lryAtltens, ltacl regained, sorne o/'her old power, antl in an attempt t0reclaer Messenia ltad suggested a retatrn to old ltound,ari.es, which,if agreed, pould haae justifed her own airns. Megalopolis, feelingherself tltreatened, b1 Sparta, hatl asked, Athens for an alliance.Demosthenes is speaking on. this request.His attitude mql appearforced and h,is predictions unlikely, but there still remai,ns szme

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importance in the balance between the stronger states, and tltepolitical integrity of the speaker is clear. (z) Th.e speech, On theLiberty of Rhodes, in 35r, again sh,ows Demosthenes' concep'tionof Athens 0,s the prltectzr of the weak. Rhod,es, with Chios, Cosand Byzantium, had, reaolted from tlte secontl Athenian Leoguei,n the so-called Social War in j57. Afterward,s Rhod,es wasbrought under an oligarcfut backed by Mausolus, the satrapof Caria. Aftu his death Rhod,es appealed to Ath,ens for libera-tion.

BJ JS, s.c. Demosth,enes begins to deal witlt, the subject oJ'fulaced,bn.He found, h,imself in opposition to the alreaQy establishedEubulus,wh,o successfulljt pursued a policy of peace and prosperiqt.The speeclres which appear in th.is book may be conaenientfit takenin two d,ioisions, those before and those after the Peace of Ph,ilo-crates, phich, conclud,ed Athens' first war with, Maced,on. In the

fust of tltese two d,ivisions the topics wh,ich, most need anollsis arethe ri,se of Philip himself, the Sacred War and the rise and fall ofOlltnthui.

Q) Philip was made regent of fuIacedon in j5g v.c., three Jeo,rsafter the battle of Mantinea, which brought a hah to the warbetweenThebes and Sporta. His ambition reaolutionized, u kingd,ontwhich h.ad, net:er playd, a lead,ing part in the politics oJ'the Greekst&tes. He soon secured ltis succession fut th,e liquidation of possibleriaals,, and his army b1 a thorough reorgonization.He next mad,esure of h,is finances b1 a rnoae to ocquire the rich, sour;e o/'gold,,Mount Pangaeus in Thrace, and the town of Amphipolis, whicltcomrnanded the district. Amphipolis h,od reoolted, from Athens in

424, and in 357 Pltilip made a secret poct to cznquer antl restoreit to Athens i,n exchange for Pytlna, a free town under Atheniancontrol. But the undertaking Das nzt fulfilled by Philip. Athenscontinuerl to talk ubout Am.phipolis, while Philip, finding Ath,ensoccupied with the reaolt of her dependencies in the Social War,improaed his position by gaining control of other Atheni,an. alliedcities in tlre north, Pydna itself os well as Potid,oea and, Metlrone,and, later Pagasoe, o voluable port in Thessall.

(z) The origins of the Socred War hatse olread,T been recounted(introduction to Isocrates' Philip). Philip's entrJ/ into the war hadbeen due to dissid,ent factions in Tkessaly since i,ts unifcation atnder

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jason (see note on Isocrates, Philip rrg). At first defeoted in JSJby Onomarchus of Phocis, Philip soon regained, strength, and, it wasin 352 that the fear of a moae tlrough the pass of Thermopylaeled Athens to obstruct h,im th.ere, perhaps the onljt time wh,enEubulus feh that hostile action was needed. The Sacred, Wardragged on untler new Pkocion leod,ers, Ph.afllus and Phalaecus,and it was nrt till 347 tltat a further request came from Thebesthat Pkilip should return and crush Phocis, with the und,erstand,ingthut ke sltould be a member of the Amphi,ctlonic Leagorc in Phocilplace. Terms were negotiated between him and Athens for a trealrwlticlt carries the name o/-a colleague q/ Eubuhts in th,e Athenianpeace partJ. Philip was enabled, to sentre tro great objects wh.enlte turned upon Phocis and forced her to sr,rrend,er, and, himselfcelelsrated, the Pythion games at Delphi.

(j) Tlte importunce of Olyntltus dotes from tke ffth. centurl,when cities in Cholcidice in reztolt from Atlrens formed, a leagueunder the leadership of Olynthus, rphiclt. was then too tlte principoltown in the district. To this reference is mod,e in the GeneralIntrod.uction (p. 2il. The league Dos suppressed b1 Sparta inj7g, but Oljtnthus rernained an importont town, which, at first omember oJ'the new Athenian confederacl, broke aDaJ fro* it andwas still strzng enough to be tlte object o/ an Athenian attack inj64, and, remained ot th,e head of tlte grnup of neighbouring towns.In JSZ, alarmed by Philip's advance, Olynthus proposed, alliancewith, Athens, but it wos rejected,, and, instead, it wos Philip who, toflatter Ofitntltus, made an alliance which he d,id, not mean tomaintain. In j5z Philip had a hold on Thessa$t as well as Amph.i-polis, pas increasing h,is fleet, wh.ich attacked, Athenian corn suppliescoming from the Hellespont, and had actualll acquired a footi.ng inThrace and odrsanced to the Propontis. Th,e next object of attacbroas clea,rll the peninsula of Chalcidice and, the power of Olynthusat the head of it. Philip had sffired from an illness, but recoaered,bJ JSr, antl after securing lri,s lllyrianfrontiers turned, to Ollnthuswith a new and, hostile approoch. This was appreciatetl b1 Demos-thenes in his Philippic I in j5r, but the.full immediacy of the need,for action i,s not apparent till j4g, when Phi,lip reolly turned, againstOlynthus. The Olynthiac oratizns Dere d,eliaered, while Philipwos engoged against the other confederate towns of Chalcid,i,ce. But

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Dernosthenes d,id, not attain his object, and Oljtnthus itself eventaallysuccumbed in j48, zntng to a reaolt against Athens in Euboea,which prooed a fatal distraction frorn the force phich was raisedto save Oljtnthus. Athens ltud, been roused, by Demostltenes, but notto the extent rerluired for trDl exped,itions a,t nnce, and, Euboea patclose at ltand and, a, ntnre urgent problem.

['-s]

D E M O S T H E N E S : F . O R M E G A L O P O L I S

IN my opinion, gentlemen, both parties are wrong,r both thesupporters of Arcadia and those of Sparta. Their accusationsand misrepresentations make them appear actual members ofthe states they support instead of Athenians. Such proceedingsmay be the proper function of the visiting delegations, but abalanced discussion of the facts with a reasoned view ofAthenianinterests and without bias is what is demanded in a discussionof policy by our own speakers. As it is, take away knownpersonalities and Attic speech, and I think that most peoplewould take one party to be Arcadian and the other Spartan. Irealize the diffculties of choosing the right policy, becausemembers share their delusions and their opposed aims, andanyone who tries a middle course, if the Assembly does notwait to master it, will please neither side and be pilloried byboth. Nonetheless, if this happens, I shall prefer to be told myideas are nonsense rather than to abandon mv view of Athenianinterests and allow the Assembly to be hoodwinked by certainmembers. If you will allow me, I will leave other rnuit.r, to

"later stage, and begin with the common ground of agreement,which I regard as most valuable to discuss.

No one, then, would dispute the value to Athens of a weakSparta and on this side a weak Thebes. Now the presentposition, to judge by frequent utterances in this assembly, isthat with the disestablishment of Orchomenus, Thespiae andPlataea,z Thebes is weakened, while, if Sparta is to securecontrol of Arcadia and destroy Megalopolis, she will return toher old power. We therefore need to be careful not to allowSparta to rise to a formidable power before the decline ofThebes,: not to allow the desired balance of power to alter

r. For the circumstances see sectional introduction. Rival delegations havearrived from sparta and from Megalopolis (to which Demosthenes oftenrefers as 'Arcadia') to invite Athenian support.

z. See note 7 on fsocrates, Philip, 43, p. 146.3. This obscure sentence seenx to be based on a fear of a return to

spartan domination if a Theban decline is more than counterbalanced bv a

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D E M O S T H E N E S ls-rolunperceived so that a Spartan rise exceeds the Theban decline.We should not take the other line of wanting Sparta rather thanThebes as opponents, which is not what we require, but thatneither shall have the power to injure ourselves. This is whatwould give us the greatest security.

The view will be put forward that this is sound enough, butthat it is scandalous if we are expected to ally ourselves withour opponents at Mantinea and render assistance to them againstour previous comrades in battle.+ I agree, but we need a savingclauser'provided the other states mean to play fair'. If we allintend to maintain peace, we shall give no assistance to Megalo-polis, because it will not be needed, and there will be norhingto set us against our comrades in arms. We are in alliance withone side already, according to their own account, and will nowbe so also with the other. What more'could be desired ? On theother hand, if they intend to discard principle and embark onwar, then, if the question is solely one of the sacrifice of Megalo-polis to Sparta, this would be a contravention of justice, but Iconcede that we should allow it and avoid friction with ourprevious comrades. But if it is generally known that once incontrol of Megalopolis, Sparta will proceed against Messene, Iask any harsh critic of Megalopolis what his next advice is tobe. There will be no answer. Indeed every man here knowsthat, with or without the consent of the party in question, wemust oppose Sparta on two counts, the sworn agreement withMessene and the value to Athens of her existence as a srare.Now I ask you to consider where you will draw the line ofresistance to Spartan aggression, so as best to satisfy honourand good feeling. Will it be in accordance with rhe interesr ofMegalopolis or of Messene I The first will show readiness toassist Arcadia and confirm the peace established as a result ofour efforts in war. The second will make it obvious that themotive for desiring the existence of Messene is not principle somuch as fear of Sparta. We need to observe justice in our con-

*/new Spartan rise, and exemplifies the idea of balance of power whichchar acterizes this speech.

4. i.e. against Thebes.

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siderations and our actions, but to combine it with an eye toour probable interest.

There is another argument from my opponents to the effectthat the recovery of Oropuss is what we should first attempt,and if we gain the enmity of our potential supporters in theproject, we shall have no one to help us. We must try to regainOropus, I agree. But the idea that Sparta will be antagonisticif we make an alliance with the elements which support us inArcadia is the one argument which is not legitimate for theparty which urged our assistance to Sparta when she was indanger. This was not the kind of argument they used, whenAthens was approached by the whole Peloponnese with therequest to attack Sparta, to persuade us to refuse (which iswhat made the others take the only alternative and go to Thebes)and to pay our money and risk our lives to save Sparta. Andwe should probably not have been prepared to do so, had webeen told that we would get no gratitude for it unless Spartawere given a free hand to do further damage. Certainly whatevermay be the effect of an Arcadian alliance in crarnping Sparta'splans, one must suppose that gratitude for their rescue at thelast gasp should outweigh resentment at the injuries they wereprevented from committing. How can they fail to assist us atOropus, at the risk of the most extreme danger to their repu-tation ? It seems to me impossible.

I am also astonished at the statement that an Arcadian alliance,with the policy which it implies, will mean aolte-face forAthens which will destroy all reliance on her. My own viewis the opposite. I do not think there is a man in the world whowould dispute the claim that Athens was the saviour of Spartabefore she saved Thebes, and latterly the saviour of Euboeatoo,6 and that she entered into an alliance with each, with oneand the same object in every instance. What object ? The rescueof the victims of aggression. If this is true, rhe reversal wouldnot be on the part of Athens, but of the party which refused to

5. Oropus was captured by Thebes in 366 B.c. : see sectional introduction.6, Athens championed Sparta against Theban atracks after Leuctra,

Thebes by the alliance against Sparta in 378, and Euboea when she liberatedit from Thebes in 352.

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abide by a just agreement. And it will be made clear that it isthe pattern of events which changes with variations of self-interest, and not the city of Athens.

It seems to me that the part played by Sparta is a reprehen-sible one. They now say that some parts of Triphylia ought tobe assigned to Elis, Tricaranum to Phlius, other parts of Arcadiato themselves; and Oropus to us. This is not with the aim ofsecuring for each of us our own possessions. By no means. Thatwould be a very late move towards benevolence. The aim is togive an impression of allowing all the states their various claimsto territory, So as to ensure that when Sparta moves againstMessene there shall be general support and a readiness to joinher, for fear that in view of the successful claims of eachstate with the specific agreement of Sparta they will be put inthe wrong, if Sparta's own claim is refused. In my view it ispossible that without any arrangement to cede Arcadian townsto Sparta Athens may regain Oropus with the co-operation ofSparta, if she is prepared to be reasonable, and of others whoare against Theban appropriation of further territory. But shouldit appear obvious that without allowing Spartan control of thePeloponnese we are not going to secure Oropus, then it wouldbe preferable, if this view is permissible, to let Oropus go ratherthan sacrifice Messene, and so the Peloponnese, to Sparta. I donot think this is the only issue between us - however I will omitwhat I had in mind - but I think we have a number of dangersto consider.

As regards supposed action by Megalopolis taken in theTheban interest and against our own, it is absurd to make thisa ground for accusation, and then, when their aim is friendshiptowards Athens and a return of mutual benefit, to start a policyof malignant frustration of this aim. This would be to fail torcalize that their previous eager support of Thebes is themeasure of the indignation these critics would earn for havingtaken such valuable allies from Athens, when they approachedher in preference to Thebes. This, I dare say, reflects for thesecond time the desire to make Megalopolis look elsewhere forassistance. But I know that a calculated judgement will showwhat I think the rest of you rvill endorse, that once Sparta is

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in control of Megalopolis, Messene is in danger. And once sheholds Messene, we shall find ourselves in alliance with Thebes.It will be far more to our credit as well as to our advantage toaccept alliance with Thebes ourselves as a counterpoise toSpartan ambition than to hesitate for fear of assisting Thebanallies and sacrifice Megalopolis, and later have to rescue Thebeswith an added danger to ourselves. I feel no security for Athensin a Spartan absorption of Megalopolis and renewal of power.I realize that once again their leaning to war is not defensive,but is aimed at the recapture of their old supremacy. Of theirambitions when they had it, you may have still greater know-ledge than I to justify apprehension.

I should very much like to ask speakers who declare theirdislike of Thebes or of Sparta whether it is a dislike based ineither case on a liking for Athens and her interests, or on aliking for Sparta or Thebes, as the case may be. If the latter, nosupport should be given to either. They are out of their senses.If they s&y,'forAthens', why enhance the other two? I assureyou that it is possible to bring Thebes down without increasingthe strength of Sparta. Indeed it is far easier. How this is so, Iwill try to explain. It does not need stating that right conductis something which everyone, even if they do not want topursue it, is up to a point ashamed to abandon, while misconductis openly opposed, especially by its victims. What we shall findto be the universal bane and the origin of all troubles, is thefailure to stand squarely by the right. To prevent this fromstanding in the way of a reduction of Theban power, we shouldmaintain the need to re-establish Thespiae, Orchomenus andPlataea, and co-operate with them, and expect it of others.This is after all the essence of honour and justice, the refusalto countenance the dissolution of ancient cities. At the sametime rve must not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to mal-treatment) nor allow the example of Plataea and Thebes toblind us to the destruction of already existing and establishedcities. If this becomes clear, the whole Greek world will desireThebes to give up alien possessions. Otherrvise, first of all weshall naturally have to expect Thebes to oppose the suggestion,when she realizes that the re-establishment of these cities means

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DEMOSTHENES ItGltlher own ruin; and secondly we shall be involved in incessanttrouble ourselves. What end can there be to it, if we constantlyallow the destruction of existing cities and demand the re-'instatement

of the destroyedlThe view which appears most constitutional demands the

. destruction by Megalopolis of the record of their treaty withThebes, if they are to be firm allies of Athens. But they declarethat friendship is not created by records, but by common inter'ests, and that what constitutes alliance, in their view, is assistanceto themselves. Personally, however deeply they fell this, I lookat it rather in this way. I think we should both ask them toobliterate the treaty and ask Sparta to remain at peace, and ifeither side refuses, we should side with the one which agrees.If while at peace, Megalopolis holds to the alliance with Thebes,it will be universally proved that Theban ambition rather thanjustice is what they seek to promote. If Megalopolis seeks alli-ance with Athens in all good faith, and Sparta refuses to main-tain peaceful relations, it rvill be universally obvious that itis not the reconstitution of Thespiae which excites Spartanenthusiasm, but the hope that Thebes will be engaged in warwhile they make themselves masters of the Peloponnese. But I .am surprised that there should be some who look with appre-hension at the idea that Sparta's enemies should be in alliancewith Thebes, but feel no anxiety at the prospect of their reduc-tion by Sparta - especially when history has now given apractical demonstration that while Thebes always uses suchallies as a makeweight against Sparta, Sparta uses them, whenshe has them, against Athens.

My belief, then, is that we should also remember that, if werefuse Megalopolis, her destruction and dissolution rvill meanthe possibility of an instant access of power to Sparta; whileher survival - and there have been equally surprising occur-rences - will with justification make her a firm ally of Thebes.If we accept her, Megalopolis will secure her preservation atour hands, but the result must be vieweC in relation to Thebesand Sparta, with a change of emphasis in the argument aboutrisks. If Thebes is the loser, as she should be, it will not meaninordinate strength in Spartan hands, since there will be a

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counterpoise in their close neighbours in Arcadia. But ifThebes recovers and survives, at least they will be the weaker forour alliance with Megalopolis and her gratitude to us for herrescue. So that it is in our interest on all counts not to abandonMegalopolis, nor to alloW her preservation (if it occurs) to beattributed to her own agency, nor to anyone else's but to ours.

Personally, then, gentlemen, I strongly claim to have declaredmy own view of the merits of the case without partiality towardseither side. I urge you not to abandon Megalopolis, nor indeedany other smaller power to a greater.

['-s]

D E M O S T H E N E S : O N T H E L I B E R T Y O F . R H O D E S

Ix a debate on so important a question, gentlemen, freedommust, I think, be extended to every participant. I personallyhave never considered it difficult to find the best ideas topresent to you - to be candid I think they are in your mindsalready. The difficulty is to induce you to carry them out. Amotion voted and carried is still as far from execution as before.There is one advantage for which you should thank heaven,that states which opened a war on us not long ago now see inus their only hope of survival. And the present occasion givesyou some cause for satisfaction, because you will be enabled, ifyou make the right decision, to take up the false and slanderousaccusations made against Athens and repel them in actualpractice, and enhance your reputation by doing so. The chargeof conspiracy was levelled at Athens by Chios, Byzantium andRhodes, and this was the ground on which they engineered thesubsequent war against us. But it will prove that the man lvhoheaded the project and pushed it through on the plea of friend-ship with Rhodes * I mean Mausolus r - ended by deprivingher of her liberty, while her self-styled associates, Chios andByzantium, gave her no support in her time of trouble; while thiscountry, of whom she was afuaid, proved her sole source of assist-ance. The general realization of this will lead to the universalassumption that the criterion of sound politics is friendship withAthens, and there could be no greater benefit to this country thanthe fostering of a state of goodwill without suspicion on all sides.

I am astonished to find in the same speakers an anti-Persianpolicy in the case of Egypt,, combined with fear of Persia in

r. Mausolus was King of Caria, but subject to Persia. He and his qucen,Artemisia, are perhaps best known to us from the great monument built inhis honour after his death. The Mausoleum (the name is now familiar as anordinary noun) included work by some of the great sculptors of the day,much of which is now in the British Museum, London.

z. In 358 B.c. an Egyptian king, Nectanebos, was at war with Persia andassisted by Sparta, though it is doubtful how far Athens shared the policy,especially in view of her capture of an Eg:yptian ship, which was the reasonfor Demosthenes' case against Androtion in 35S.

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dealing with Rhodes. Yet the latter is a Greek state, as everyoneknows, while the former is a part of the Persian empire. I thinksome of you remember that in a recent debate on Persia I wasthe first speaker, and I think I had no more than one supporter,if any, in the view that it would be wise not to base war prepara-tions on hostility to Persia, but to direct them against yourexisting enemies and be prepared for defence against her aswell in case of attack. And it was not a case of my expressing aview which was then rejected. The Assembly agreed. Now mypresent speech is a sequel to that one. If I served the King ofPersia, and were asked to advise him, I would give the sameadvice as I do here, and urge defensive warfare against anyGreek interference in his concerns, but no territorial claimsoutside his own realm. Now if it is your settled intention, gentle-men, to acquiesce in any accessions to Persian power which hisanticipation or chicanery can achieve, it is a wrong intention inmy judgement. If, however, you intend to stand for your rightsthrough thick and thin, at the risk of war if need be, first of all thestronger your decision, the less you will be forced to undergo, andsecondly, you will enhance your reputation for right judgement.

To show that there is nothing revolutionary either in mydemand for the liberation of Rhodes or in your action, if youagree with it, I will remind you of some past occasions whenthis policy proved successful. On one occasion Timotheus wassent to the aid of Ariobarzanes, with the added proviso 'that

there shall be no breach of the peace with Persia'. In view ofthe open revolt of Ariobarzunes s from Persia, and the garrisonon Samos under Cyprothemis, who was sent there by thesatrap, Tigranes, Timotheus abandoned the attempt to assistAriobaruanes, but besieged and liberated Samos. And right upto the present time this has not resulted in war. No one wouldregard offensive and defensive operations in the same light.Anyone will fight to the utmost against dispossession, but notto secure added possessions. They may aim at this in default ofopposition, but if prevented, they feel no resentment againsttheir opponents.

3. Ariobananes was satrap of Phrygia. These are the disturbances some-times referred to as the War of the Satraps.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [r r-r 5]Nor do I believe that even Artemisia would oppose such ac-

tion, if Athens is bent on it. I will go a little further into thesubject, and then ask you to consider whether I am right ornot. It is my view that if Persian activities in Egypt were toproceed according to plan,+ Artemisia would make a strongattempt to secure the dependence of Rhodes on Persia, not fromfriendship for the King, but in the hope that, if he were apermanent neighbour, she could confer a major benefit rvhichwould secure friendly relations with her. If, however, things goas they are said to be going, and the Persian objective is lost,she would rightly regard the island as having no further valuefor Persia at present, but as a threat to her own power and as anobstruction to any movement there. It therefore seems to methat she rvould prefer Rhodes to be in our power without anyopen surrender on her part than to be acquired by Persia.Indeed I do not think she will send a force, or, if she does, itwill only be a poor and ill-mounted one. As regards the inten-tions of Persia, for that matter, I will not claim any knowledge,though I would maintain decidedly that Athenian interestdemands that the King should make it clear whether he intendsto lay claim to Rhodes or not. It is not only the benefit ofRhodes that we shall have to consider when he does, but ourown and that of Greece as a whole.

Yet even if the present holderss of Rhodes were in fullcontrol of their own city, I would not have recommendedtaking their part, for any undertakings they might have made. Iknow that in the first place they incorporated some of thecitizen body with them to dissolve the democracy, and, whenthat was done, expelled them again. People who have notshown good faith with either party cannot be regarded asvaluable allies of ours either. Nor would I ever have made thisproposal out of consideration solely for the populace of Rhodes.I do not represent them, nor am I personally acquainted withanyone there. And indeed, even if I were, I would bnly make itwith a view to the interest of Athens, because the position of

4. Though Persia succeeded against the satraps, the revolt ofEgypt fromPersia was not reduced till a good deal later.

5. i.e. the oligarchy established by Mausolus.

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Rhodes is one in which, if this is consistent with support ofthem, I sympathize with the Athenian view. It is from resent-ment at Athenian insistence on her own rights that Rhodes haslost her liberty. They could have maintained alliance on termsof equality with Greeks who are their superiors, yet in fact theyhave become the slaves of foreign slaves, whom they havethemselves admitted to their own inner fortifications. I wouldalmost say, if we want to assist them, that what has happenedhas been good for them. Had they enjoyed success, I am notsure whether a place like Rhodes would now have been preparedto learn good sense. But experience and admonition havingtaught them the many ills that folly brings to mosr of mankind,they may, with luck, acquire wisdom for the future. This Ircgatd as no small benefit. In fact I maintain that we shouldtry to save them without feeling resentment, and remember themany occasions when we ourselves have suffered from con-spiracies, for none of which you would say we deserve to bepenalized.

Observe a further point, gentlemen. Our country has beenengaged in numerous wars, against democracies as well asoligarchies. You know this well enough. But the morive of eachof these encounters is perhaps a thing on which no one reflects.What is that motive ? Against popular governments it has eitherbeen a matter of private grievances which could not be solvedby public negotiation, or of partition of land, of boundaries, ofcommunity feeling or of leadership. Against oligarchies none ofthese considerations has applied; it has been an ideologicalmatter or a question of liberty. Indeed, I would not hesitate tomaintain that I think it better that all the Greeks should be ourenemies under democracy than our friends under oligarchy. Indealing with free states, in my vierv, there is no difficulty aboutregaining peace, while with oligarchy even friendship is precari-ous. There can be no good feeling between oligarchy anddemocracy, betu'een the desire for power and the aim at a lifeof equality

It is surprising that the idea should not be current that withthe oligarchies at Chios or Mytilene, or now at Rhodes, indeedI might say in any instance in which men are induced to submit

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D E M O S T H E N E S [rg-"+]to this sort of subjection, the constitution of Athens itself sharesthe danger, surprising that the inference should never bedrawn that in a world organized oligarchically Athenian demo-cracy can never be allowed a place. Her enemies realize thatthere is no other state to bring freedom back into the world,and the origin of so much potential injury to themselves iswhat they will seek to destroy. In general, injury may besupposed to lead to the hostility of the injured party. But thesubversion of a political way of life and its change into oligarchyshould be regarded, I urge, as fatal to all aspiration to freedom.Besides, a democratic community like ourselves should be seento have the same feelings towards victimized peoples as weshould expect others to have towards ourselves in the event ofour suffering a fate which we should all deplore. Even if theview is held that Rhodes deserved its fate, this is not the momentfor satisfaction at it. In the uncertainty of the future for anyone,the fortunate should always show consideration for the welfareof the unfortunate.

I hear frequent reference to the fact that when disaster over-took our democracy 6 in this country, we yet had sympathyfrom well-wishers. At present I intend to refer briefly tq oneof them only, Argos. I should not wish this country, with itsreputation for aid to the unfortunate, to be shown less forwardin this respect than Argos. Living as neighbours to Sparta,rvho was in open command of land and sea alike, Argos showedno fear or hesitation in declaring her friendship towardsAthens, and 'when Spartan representatives came, we learn, todemand the extradition of Athenian refugees, the decree ofArgos was that they should leave before sunset on pain of beingtreated as enemies. It would be a disgrace, gentlemen, thatlvhen the people of Argos showed no fear of Spartan authorityand power at such a time, \ile as Athenians should be intimidatedby a non-Greek power, and a woman at that. Indeed Argosrvould agree that she has been often worsted by Sparta, whilewe have had frequent victories over Persia and never a defeat,either from his subordinates or from the King himself. Or, ifhe has ever won success against Athens, it has been by bribery

6. During the rule of the Thirty at Athens.

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of the most despicable of Greek traitors and by no other means.Even that brought him no benefit. You will find that theperiod in which he used Spartan power to weaken Athenscoincided with his own perils from Clearchusz and Cyrus. Sothere has never been either an open victory or a successfulconspiracy against us. In some quarters I gather that Philip isoften disregarded as unimportant, and Persia held in awe as apowerful opponent at any time. If the one is to be left un-opposed as negligible, while we treat the other with universaldeference as a danger, what enemies are there for us to confront ?

There is a class of people in Athens, gentlemen, who excel atvoicing the rights of others in this assembly. To them myrecommendation would be simply this; they should make ittheir aim to do justice to Athens when speaking to others.Then they will begin by doing their own duty. It is paradoxicalto assert the rights of others when one has failed to stand forone's own. And it is not right for a citizen to consider argumentsagainst his own country and not for it. Why, I ask you, is thereno one in Byzantium to speak against their appropriation ofChalcedon; which is the properfy of Persia, though it was inour hands, and has no connexion with Byzantium ? Or again,to forbid the transference of Selymbria, previously an Athenianally, to becorne a tributary of theirs, and the appropriation ofthis district in contravention of the sworn agreement whichlaid down the autonomy of these cities I Again, there was noone to point out to Mausolus in his life-time, and after hisdeath to Artemisia, that they should not appropriate Cos andRhodes and other Greek states from which Persia, their previousmaster, withdrew in favour of Greece by agreement, and whichrvere the subject of many armed conflicts of distinction on thepart of the Greeks. Or if there is anyone to point this out tothese two, there is apparently no response to it. Personally Iregard it as right to restore the Rhodian democracy. Nonethe-less, even if it were not the right course, when I consider theconduct of the others I have mentioned, I think it expedient to

7. Clearchus was the Spartan leader of the Ten Thousand. See the sectionalintroduction and note 3o to Isocrates' Panegyriczs. The reserved reference toPhilip here is somewhat surprising in the same year as Philippic I.

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D E M O S T H E N E S lz8-srldo so. Why I If the world set its face rowards right it would bea dishonour that Athens alone should stand apart. But whenthe rest of the world is preparing for iniquity, that Athens aloneshould lay claim to right without any positive action, seems tome not exemplary, but cowardly, because it is men's actualeffectiveness which determines the validity of their claims. I canoffer you an example known to everyone. There exists anagreement between Greece and Persia made by this countryand universally commended, and a later one made by Spartawhich met with condemnation.8 The two pacts did not laydown the same rights. Private rights were defined by law forseparate communities on a basis of equal participation for weakor strong alike. But now the rights of Greek cities are laid downfor the weaker by the stronger.

Since; then, you are primed already with the rights of thecase, consider how it is in your power to put them into practice.It is so, if we are understood as accepted champions of thefreedom of mankind. But it is reasonable to suppose that ourduty is very hard to achieve. other countries have in all casesa single issue to settle, between themselves and their obviousadversaries, whose defeat leaves no obstacle to the attainmentof their ends. For us in this country there are two, of whichone is the same as for others, but there is an additional andgreater issue. We need by our deliberations to get the betterof the party q which has set out to oppose our interests. Whenthey make it impossible to do what is our duty without astruggle, it is natural that we may fail where we might succeed.The ease with which many take up this political position maybe due to the assistance of corrupt supporters, though someblame may with justification be laid at your door. You oughtto adopt the same view of political as of military loyalty. Whatview ? A man who abandons the post in which his commanderplaces him is declared to be a citizen no longer, nor have anyof a citizen's rights. The same view should be held of the man

8. The so-called Peace of callias in 448 n.c. (see note on Isocrates, pane-gyricus, r r8),'and the King's Peace in 387-6, when Greek states were dictatedto by Persia and Sparta.

g. i.e. the party of Eubulus.

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who betrays the duty bequeathed to him by past example, andjoins the ranks of oligarchy. He should be deprived of the rightto join your deliberations. As it is, in dealing with allies you findthe highest loyalty where the oath has been sworn to hold tothe same friends and the same foes, but in home politics it isthe very men who are known to rank themselves with ourgreatest enemies on whom is conferred the assumption ofloyalty.

Nonetheless, grounds for accusation of such people, or forreprimanding the rest of the country, are not hard to find.What is hard is to devise words or actions to put right what iswrong. Perhaps this is not the moment to refer to everythingthat is relevant. But if you can set the seal on previous decisionsby some action of value, there may well be a thorough advance.My own view is that a strong grip on the situation is needed,and action worthy of Athens. Remember how you enjoy praiseof her past greatness and the distinction and military achieve-ments of previous generations. Reflect that these were achievedand dedicated not mereiy for your admiring contemplation, butfor the imitation of the virtues they enshrine.

['-s]

D E M O S T H E I \ T E S : P H I L I P P I C I

Wnnn it a new question, gentlemen, which lay before us, Ishould wait until most of the regular speakers had made theircontribution, and if I were satisfied with the views expressed,I should add nothing; if not, I should try to voice my own. Butas it is the reconsideration of a subject frequently discussed byspeakers before, I hope I may be pardoned for speaking first.Had my opponents urged the right policy in the past, thisdiscussion would be superfluous.

First, then, we must not be downhearted at the presentsituation, however regrettable it seems. The worst feature of itin the past is the best hope for the future. What feature I Thefact that it is plain dereliction of dufy on our part which hasbrought us to this position. If it followed on a period of exemp-lary conduct by the people of Athens, there would be no hopeof improvement. Next we should reflect upon what history orour own memory can tell us of the greatness of Sparta not solong ago, and of the glorious and honourable part played byAthens in maintaining the war against them in the cause ofright.'Why mention thisl To set this fact firmly before yourminds, gentlemen, that if you are awake, you have nothing tofear, if you close your eyes, nothing to hope for. To prove thisI point to two things, the past power of Sparta, which wedefeated by sheer attention to business, and the present aggres-sion of Macedon,2 which alarms us because our attitude iswrong. If the belief is held that Philip is-an enemy hard to facein view of the extent of his present strength and the loss toAthens of strategic points, it is a correct belief. But it must beremembered that at one time we had Pydna, Potidaea, Methoneand the whole surrounding district on friendly terms, and thata number of communities now on his side were then autono-mous and unfettered, and would have preferred our friendshipto his. If Philip had then adopted this belief in the invincibility

r. i.e. in the Corinthian War, 394187.z. i.e. after the defeat of Onomarchus in the Sacred War.

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of Athens in view of her control of points commanding Mace-donian territory, while he himself lacked support, he could nothave achieved any of his present successes nor acquired thestrength he has. As it was, he observed with insight that thesestrategic points were the prizes of war, that they were open tothe contestants, and it is a natural law that ownership passesfrom the absentee to the first comer, from the negligent to theenergetic and enterprising. This is the spirit which has wonhim the control of what he holds, in some cases by the methodsof military conquest, in others by those of friendship and alli-ance. Indeed alliance and universal attention are the rewardsto be won by obvious preparedness and the will to take action.If, then, this country is prepared to adopt a similar outlookand to break with the past, if every man is ready to take the postwhich his duty and his abilities demand in service to the state,and set pretences aside, if financial contribution is forthcomingfrom the well-to'do, and personal service from the appropriategroup, in a word, if we are prepared to be ourselves, to abandonthe hope to evade our duty and get it done by our neighbours,we shall recover what is our own with God's will, we shallregain what inertia has lost us, and we shall inflict retributionupon Philip. You must not imagine that he is a super-humanbeing whose success is unalterably fixed. He has enemies tohate, fear and envy him, even in places very friendly to him.His associates, one must suppose, have the same human feelingsas anyone else. But now all this is beneath the surface. It hasnowhere to turn because of the slowness, the inactivity ofAthens.It is this that I urge you to lay aside. Consider the facts, gentle-men) consider the outrageous lengths to which Philip has gone.He does not offer us a choice between action and inaction. Heutters threats, according to my information, in overbearingterms. He is not content to rest on his laurels, but is continuallyadding to the haul he collects in the net in which he ensnaresour hesitant, inactive country. When are we to act ? What is tobe the signal ? When compulsion drives, I suppose. Then whatare we to say of the present ? In my view the greatest compulsionthat can be laid upon free men is their shame at the circum-stances in which they find themselves. Do you need to go round

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D E M O S T H E N E S Iro-r6]and ask each other whether there is any startling news ? Whatcould be more startling than a Macedonian fighting a successfulwar against Athens, and dictating the affairs of Greece ? 'Philip

is dead', comes one report.3 'No, he is only ill', from another.What difference does it make I Should anything happen toPhilip, Athens, in her present frame of mind, will soon createanother Philip. This one's rise was due less to his own powerthan to Athenian apathy. But I might add that if anything didhappen, if chance, which is always the best friend we have,could give us this added service, you may be certain that bybeing close at hand in a position to control a disordered situationwe could turn it to our advantage. As it is, even if circumstanceoffered it, we could not take over Amphipolis, detached as weare both materially and mentally.

As regards the need to be ready and willing to act I thinkmy point is clear, and I pass on from it. I shall now try to saysomething on the nature of the expedition which I thinkwould rid us of our troubles, its size and how its financialrequirements and other needs could best and most quickly beorganized in my view. But I have one initial request to make.Wait to criticize till you have heard it all. Make no assumptionsin advance. And if it appears an unusual force from the outset,do not suppose that I am attempting to delay it. 'Here and now'is not always the best advice. What is done cannot be undoneeven by immediate measures. The best expedient is a preciseaccount of the nature and size of the force needed to hold theposition until we can end the war by arbitration or by thedefeat of our opponents. That is the only means of ending ourdisasters. I consider myself able to offer this, though withoutprejudice to any other proposals suggested. My undertaking isas big as that. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating, andof that you shall yourselves be the judges.

First, then, gentlemen, I declare the need to provide fiftytriremes, and secondly to arouse a spirit in the men of thiscountry which will recognize that, if need be, they must servein them in person. Further, transports and sufficient smallercraft for half the cavalry must be provided. This I maintain

3. This report of Philip's death was current in 352.

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should be a standing force to use for immediate moves awayfrom home, to Thermopylae, the Chersonese, Olynthus orwhere you will. The idea must be implanted in Philip's mindthat Athens has abandoned inaction, and may make a suddenrnove, as she did to Euboea and earlier, we learn, to Haliartusand finally the other day to Thermopylae.+ The idea is notaltogether a matter for contempt, even if it were improbablethat my proposal would be carried out. He will either be toounnen'ed to take action in the knowledge of our readiness (andhe rn ill know of it well enough - there are plenty to inform him,unfortunately) or if he ncglects to act, he exposes himself tosurprise attack, with nothing to withstand an Athenian landingin his territory, if he gives us the chance. This, then, is thedecision which I maintain should be taken by the people ofAthens, and this is the provision which is needed. But beforethat a further force needs to be equipped for continuous servicein attacks on Macedonian territory. I am not asking for mercen-ary forces running into five figures, nor for the forces of diplo-matic correspondence. I demand an establishment which shallbe the possession of Athens and obey the orders of whatevercommander is appointed, be there one or many, be he this manor that. I demand also the funds to maintain it. What, then, isto be the nature and the size of this force, its means of subsis-tence and the will to do its work I Let me take each of thesepoints separately. I mean a mercenary force, but I do not makethe mistake repeated in the past, when nothing has seemedlarge enough, and enormous figures have been voted which inpractice have gone completely unimplemented. We shouldbegin on a small scale and then increase it, if it seems inadequate.My proposal is a matter of two thousand men in all, but itshould include five hundred Athenians, of whatever age groupyou decide. They should serve a stated term, not a long one,

4. An Athenian expedition regained Euboea from Thebes in 357. Athenshad previously helped Thebes at Haliartus in Boeotia ir 395, the occasionof the death of Lysander. The expedition to Thermopylae was in 352, whenPhilip threatened a descent through the pass into southern Greece, in con-nexion with his Thessalian campaign. But it does not seem sufficiendy clearat what point Athens took action and how on this occasion alone they wereable t0 do it effectivelv.

I 9 I

DEMOSTHENES [zz-6]

but 'rvhatever is decided, and on a basis of successive shifts.The rest should be mercenaries. They should be supported bytwo hundred cavalry, again including fifty Athenians at least,and on the same system of service. They must have transportprovided. What else ? Ten warships. Philip has a war fleer,so Athens must match it, to ensure the safety of this force.And the source of supplies for them ? I will pass to the eluci-dation of this point when I have made clear my reasons foradvocating a force of this size and a citizen contingent as partof it.

As regards numbers, the reason for what I propose is that itis not open to us now to provide a field force to stand up toPhilip's. We must be content with a raiding force, and that inthe first place must be our strategy. It must not be of excessivesize, for which we lack the funds, nor entirely contemptible.There must be a citizen contingent to accompany the force forthis reason. In the past I believe Athens maintained a mercen-ary force at Corinth under the command of Polystratus, Iphi-crates, Chabrias and others, and accompanied by citizen troops.I understand that a defeat was inflicted on Sparta by this forcetogether with its Athenian units.s But since our mercenaryfoices have been self-subsisting, it is our friends and allies whbhave suffered defeat while our enemies have regrettably in-creased. These forces take a passing glance at the task Athenshas for them, and then are offoverseas to Artabazus or anywhereelse, with their commander after them. This is not unnatural.You cannot command without pay to offer. My demandtherefore is to remove such pretexts from commander and menalike, by issuing pay and providing the surveillance of a parallelcitizen force, our present conduct of affairs being ridiculous.Suppose you were asked the question, 'Are you at peace ?','No,'you would reply, 'lve are at war with Philip.' But surelyten Athenians were appointed to command divisions of variouskinds, and two to command cavalry. What are they all doing ?

5. This appears to have been the first instance of the use of mercenaries inGreece (see Isocrates, Philip, 96). Polystratus is little known. Iphicratesearned distinction in 3go n.c. against Spartan hoplites, and Chabrias was hissuccessor, and won a naval victory at Naxos against a Spartan fleet in 376.

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Except the individual you actually send to the theatre of war,

they are conducting the ceremonial processions with the Festival

Committee. They are like clay figures voted for civilian appear-ance,6 not for war. Shouldn't we have had our own commandersof infantry and cavalrY, orl Athenian staff, to make it, our ownforce ? But our own cavalry commander has to sail to Lemnos,zwhile the cavalry engaged in the fight for Athenian possessionsare under Menelaus. I intend nothing against him personally,but his post, rvhoever was to hold it, should be occupied by anAthenian appointment.

This may appear true enough, but what you want to hear isthe extent and the source of the money needed. Let me go onto this. First, finances. Maintenance, in the form of suppliesalone, for this force will amount to upwards of ninety talents.Ten warships account for forty talents' at twenty minae pership per month. Two thousand men need the same amountagJi", to allow ten drach,ma'e a month each ration money, andtwo hundred cavalry at thirty d,rochmae a month makes twelvetalents.s If this is thought a very small staft, to provide rationsfor the men serving, it is an incorrect view. I am quite sure that,given this, the force will provide itself with the rest in the field,without inflicting damage on other Greek states' and make upits pay in that way. I am prepared to sail as a volunteer, and toaccept any penalty if this does not prove true. Next, the sourceof the funds I propose to raise.

(A Bill of TVaYs and' Means is read')

That, gentlemen, is the extent of the money wes have beenable to raise. When you vote it, if you decide to do so, you will

6. Literally'in the market place', through which processions passed. They

were in the charge of army officers, who, Demosthenes suggests, were like

terrn cltta figures, intended for ornament rather than use.

7. A special officer was always appointed to command cavalry in Lemnos.

8. roo drachmae : r tnin&, 6o minae: r talent. These figures give z

obols per day as the estimated pay for each man, which was normally

doubled to provide ration money in addition, and may be compared with a

figure of 3 or 4 obols as the pay of an unskilled labourer. Demosthenes

expects pay to be supplemented by raids on the enemy country.

9. ffre plural indicates some kind of assistance in drawing up the details.

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DEMOSTHENES lso-:+lbe giving your vote for action against Philip, and. action notconfined to the words of manifestos and despatches.

It seems to me that your deliberations on the subject of warand its entire equipment would be rendered more effective byconsideration of the country in which it is to take place. Youmust recognize that it is by careful attention to winds andseasons that Philip gains considerable advantage. He waits forthe Etesianslo or for winter before making moves by thembeyond our reach. With this in mind we should avoid a war ofsingle expeditions, which will always be too late for their effect,and resort to a standing force. We can command winter harbour-age at Lemnos, Thasos and Sciathos and other islands in theneighbourhood. There are harbours there and ready suppliesand all necessities for an army. And at the right time of year,when coastal operations are safe and winds not dangerous,there will be easy access to trading ports.

The use that will be made of this force, and the moment tochoose, will be settled as opportunity arises by the commanderappointed. What we need to provide is the subject of myproposal. Make this available, first the finances I have proposed,then the rest, men, ships and cavalry, the whole force completeand clamped down to the business of war, with the control ofthis assembly over finance, and a general required to submit areport, and you will be at an end of continuous debates onthe same subject, unsupported by action.rr And in addition,Philip's greatest asset will be lost to him. What is this asset IThe fact that he makes use of our own allies in the war againstus by piratical raids on sea transport. What else ? Athens willbe clear of damage. It will not be like past occasions, when hemade descents on Lemnos and Imbros and went off withAthenian citizens as prisoners, when he cut off Athenianshipping and appropriated untold wealth, when finally he madea hnaing at Marathon and possessed himself of the state galley,I2

ro. North-easterly winds regular in the Aegean in July and August (see

On the Chersonese, r4).rr. Demosthenes' tone does not yet suggest immediate urgency.lz. This was called the Paralus. Among official functions it conducted the

sacred mission to the sanctuary of Apollo at Delos, in the course of which ittouched at Marathon.

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ll+-81 P H I L I P P I C I

which he removed from her station. It proved impossible forAthens to prevent these depredations, or to bring force to bearat the proposed moment. Yet why is it, do you suppose, thatthe festivals of the Panathenaea and the Dionysia always takeplace at the correct time, whether the task of managing them isallotted to experts or laymen - and these are things which runinto greater expense than any military expedition, and probablydemand greater trouble and preparation than anything else atall - whereas our expeditions are invariably too late, like theones to Methone or Pagasae or Potidaea?'s The reason is thatthe festivals are regulated by laiv. Everyone knows long before-hand who is to head the tribe in the theatre or the gaines, andwhen he is to receive what from whom, and what he is to do.Nothing is left vague and unspecified there.ra But in the militaryfield and in preparation for it there is no order, no organization,no precise control. The result is this. It is not till the news ofthe actual emergency comes that we appoint commanders. Wethen proceed to property exchanges,'s consideration of ways andmeans) later on to a decision to use alien troops, later still tochange to citizen troops, then to adopt others after all. And inthe time all this takes, the object of our expedition is lostbefore it is begun. The time for action is squandered in pre-paration, and opportunities for action will not wait for pro-crastination and pretence. Then resources which we imaginewe possess throughout are proved inadequate at the criticalmoment. Meanwhile Philip's insolence goes to the length ota despatch of this sort to Euboea.

(The text of a despatch is now read,\

Most of what has just been read, gentlemen, is unfortunately

13. See sectional introduction, p. r7o.r4. The Panathenaea were in charge of special officials, chosen by lot, the

Dionysia in the first place were under the archon, who had a staffof ten forthe purpose.

r5. The trierarchy (see glossary s.v. Leitourgia) was one of the publicservices undertaken by individuals. But if anyone nominated for one of themthought that a wealthier man had been passed over, he could claim to ex-change property with him or else demand that the other should take over thetask.

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D E M O S T H E N E S lr8-+:ltrue. Yet it does not, perhaps, make pleasant hearing. Norv if theomissions made by speakers to avoid unpleasantness are goingto be repeated in the actual course of events, there is a case forpolitical ingratiation. If, on the other hand, ingratiation out ofseason brings actual loss, then it is despicable to pursue self-deception and postpone unpleasantness at the expense ofsacrificing realities. It is a failure to realize that the properpursuit of warfare does not mean following in the trail of events,but being in front of them. One would claim that a commandershould be ahead of his men, and so should statesmen be aheadof events, and not be compelled to follow them. The citizensof Athens, however, possessed as they are of the greatest po\yerof all in ships, fighting men, cavalry and monetary resources,have never to this day made a right use of any of them. Thewar against Philip exactly resembles the methods of an untaughtforeigner in the boxing ring. If he is hit, he hugs the place, andif you hit him somewhere else, there go his hands again. Hehas not learnt, and is not prepared, to defend himself or lookto his front. So it is with the policy of Athens. If news comes ofPhilip in the Chersonese, an expedition there is voted, if it isThermopylae, it is sent there. Wherever he goes, lve hurry upand dou,n at his instance, controlled by his strategy withoutany constructive military plan of our own, without foresight toanticipate news of what is happening or has happened. If thisrvas, perhaps, a possible course in the past, that tirne is now at anend. There is no longer room for it. It must be some divineprovidence, gentlemen, rvhich is ashamed of the conduct of thiscountry and has implanted this busy spirit in Philip. Had hebeen content with his initial captures and gone no further, somepeople here would probably have been satisfiecl with circum-stances which brought the stigma of shame and disgrace onthe rvhole nation. But his continual attempts to add to hisgains may stir us to action, unless all spirit is lost to us. It isastonishing that there is not a man in Athens to reflect withindignation that a war which opened with the aim of bringingdeserved retribution upon Philip of Macedon should now beending in an effort to escape disaster at his hands. Yet it iscertainly clear that he will not stand still unless his advance is

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impeded. Is this what we are to wait for ? Are some unmannedships and a few optimistic ideas enough to satisfy us that ourends are secured I Can we stop short of manning our own fleet,sending out a force of Athenians, at least in part, now that thetime has almost run out ? Can we stop short of an expeditionoverseas I The question is asked where we are to anchor. Thewar will of itself find out his weak points, if we press on withit. If we stay at home and listen to abuse and recriminationbetween speakers, never shall we enjoy any success. I assureyou, where part of our citizen army is sent overseas, even if notall of it, the favour of providence and of fortune goes with it.But when the expedition consists only of a commander, anunimplemented decision and the hopes which are expressedfrom this platform, nothing is achieved, our enemies deride us,while our allies are frightened to death of such expeditions.It is impossible, quite impossible, for one man to accomplishour every hope. Promises and statements and accusations againstthis person or that are only too possible, and the ruin of ouraffairs. When the commander is given a few miserable menwithout pay, when his every action can be misrepresented withease at home and random decisions are made on a basis ofhearsay, what can be expected?

How is this state of things to be ended I It will end when thiscountry gives its citizens a triple function, to serve in her armies,to witness the conduct of the campaign, and, on their return,to judge the report, so that it is not a rnatter of hearing news ofit, but of eyewitness knowledge. In our present shameful stateevery commander risks his life two or three times in court, butthey none of them dare risk it in battle. They prefer to risk thelives of slavers and privateers than perform their proper func-tion. A criminal's true death is a sentence executed, a general'sis in battle against the enemy. But as for us, we go about sayingthat Philip is plotting with Sparta for the break-up of the Thebanconfederacl,t6 or that he has sent representatives to Persia, orthat he is engaged on fortifications in Illyria, or any otherinvention that anyone likes to disseminate. I do not think thisis likely. I think he may well be intoxicated with what he has

16. On the Theban confederacy see fsocrates, Philip, 43, and note Z.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [+s-s']achieved, he may have many such dreams in the manifestabsence of any opposition and in the exaltation of success, butI do not think it likely that he chooses to act so that the merestfools in Athens know his intentions. And the merest fools arethe purveyors of rumours. If we can say good-bye to all thatand realize one thing, that this is our enemy, who is stealingfrom us our possessions and has long defied all right, if we seethat every hope we have indulged of help from others has beenproved to be the reverse, and that the future lies in our handsalone, if we realize that to refuse to fight him on his own territoryis perhaps to be compelled to do so on ours, then we shall havereached a proper decision, and be emancipated from emptywords. What we need is not speculation on the future, but thecertainty that it will be disastrous if we lack the proper outlookand the will to action.

I have never elected to seek public favour by policies which Idid not believe expedient. On this occasion too I have spokensimply and bluntly without reservation. I wish I were sure itwould benefit me to speak the truth as much as you to be told it.I should feel much happier if I were. As it is, I must rest in un-certainty of the effect it will bring on me, but the certainty thatthese cnnvictions are to the benefit of the nation, if they arecarried out, is the basis upon which I choose to speak. May thedecision be one which will prove the best for us all.

['-6]

D E M O S T H E N E S : O L Y N T H I A C I

You would give a great deal, I fancy, gentlemen, for a clearunderstanding where your interest is likely to lie in the affairsunder consideration. This being so, you should be ready to paykeen attention to such proposals as are made. Not only can yousecure the advantage of hearing any considered *gg"riionwhich may be offered here, but it may be your good fortune, Iimagine, to find that valuable ideas occur impromptu to speakers,which may make it easy, from the lvhole range open to you, rochoose the wisest path.

Gentlemen, this moment of history cries out to declare thatit is time to take a positive grip of affairs, if we have any thoughtfor their security. Bur our attitude is one which I can scarcllydescribe. My own view calls for an immediate vote for an expedi-tionary force, for the speediest possible provision of the meansto implement it (to avoid a reperition of the past), for thedespatch of representatives to announce it and to maintainliaison on the spot. The greatest danger is that concessions orthreats which may carry conviction, or misrepresentation ofour absence, may enable an unscrupulous and clever opportunistIike Philip to secure important advantages for himself. None-theless, it is reasonably true that the hardest feature to contendwith in Philip's position is also our greatest asset. His personalcontrol of all activities, open or secret, his combined positionin command of the army, state and exchequer, his invariablepresence with his forces, give him a real superiority in militaryspeed and efficiency. But in regard to the exchanges he wouldlike_with Olynthus the reverse is true. It is clear to the peopleof Olynthus that it is no longer their own credit, no longei aterritorial matter which is at issue in this war, but the destructionand enslavement of their country. They know what was the fateof the betrayers of the state at Amphipolis, of Philip's sponsorsat Pydna. It is a general truth that autocracy is suspect amongfree states, especially if it appears on their boundaries.

with this linowledge at hiart, and with orher considerations

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in mind, we should in my submission set our will and stir ourspirit at this eleventh hour to war, rvith a readiness for financialcontribution and personal service without stint. We have nosort of excuse now for reluctance. Yesterday it was commontalk that Olynthus must be set to war against Macedon. Toclaythis has come about of itself, and in a most advantageousmanner for this country. Had it been at our instance thatOlynthus entered the war, she might have been an uncertain,not a whole-hearted ally. But as her own complaints are thebasis of her enmity, it should be a lasting hostility based onher own fears and grievances. An opportunity has fallen to us,and we must not let it slip, we must not succumb to the samefate as so often before. On the occasion of the aid we senr roEuboea,I when Hierax and Stratocles stood on this platformand urged us to move overseas and take over their city, had rveshown the same enthusiasm in our own interest as we did forthe safety of Euboea, we should have been in possession ofAmphipolis and have been saved all subsequent trouble aboutit. Again, when news came of the siege of Pyclna, Potidaea,Methone, Pagasaez and the rest, to cut a long list short, had wethen in one single instance taken the field with proper spiritr,lve should now have a far humbler and easier Philip to meet.As it is, our refusal to seize the fleeting moment, and our assump-tion that the future will look after itself, have effectively turnedPhilip into the greatest monarch lvho has ever appeared in Mace-donia. Now at last we have our opportunity in Olynthus. It hascome to us unsought, and it is the greatest in our history.Indeed I think a faft reckoning of the favours of forrune roAthens, even though much is not as it might be, should inspiredeep feelings of gratitude. The many losses war has broughtmay properly be attributed to our olvn neglect. Their occurrcncerecently instead of long ago, and the appearance of an allianceto balance them, if rve are ready to make use of it, can only beput down to her favour. This has a parallel in finance. Keepwhat you gain and you will feel a de'bt to fortune. Bur let itevaporate, and the gratitude disappears with it. And in politics

r. In 357. See Philippic I 17 and note.z. See sectional introduction.

[r r-r6] O L Y N T H I A C I

failure to make good use of opportunity means that fortune'sfavours too are forgotten. It is by the ultimate result that theinitial assets are estimated.

It is therefore vitally necessary to think of the future, toenable us to set our wayS straight and wipe out the discredit ofpast conduct. If we are to abandon Olynthus too, and Philip isto become its master, what is to prevent him, I should like toknow, from moving wherever he chooses ? Do any of us reckonand fully realize the methods which have brought Philip frominitial weakness to his present stature I First the capture ofAmphipolis, then of Pydna, next Potidaea, then Methone, thenthe move into Thessaly. Next came Pherae, Pagasae andMagnesia, and after securing the whole position as he wantedit, he was away to Thrace, where he expelled or established theprinces of the district. Then came his illness, but when herecovered, there was no decline into inactivity. He at onceattacked Olynthus. I say nothing of his excursions into Illyriaand Paeonia, or against Arybbasa and the rest.

Why point this out now ? It is to bring to your knowledgeand rcalization two things: first the disaster of squanderingyour interests one by one, and secondly the restless activitywhich is Philip's life and which never allows him to rest on hislaurels. If it is to be his motto that every move must be anadvance, and ours that we are never to take a grip of reality, Iurge you to contemplate what is the likely result. Indeed whocould remain in blind ignorance, or fail to rcalize that the warat Olynthus will be on our own territory if we neglect it ? Ifthat is to happen, I am afraid we shall find ourselves in theposition of the easy borrower at high rates, who after a fleetingmoment of prosperity has to surrender principal as well asinterest. We may find that our inertia has been bought at highcost, that the unvaried quest for pleasure may bring us to thenecessity of much that is the opposite, to the jeopardy of ourvery possessions at home.

Destructive criticism, I shall be told, is easy and anyone canmake it. It is particular and positive proposals which demand the

3. Arybbas was a king in Epirus, defeated probably in 352 at the time ofPhilip's third expedition against the Illyrians.

20r

D E M O S T H E N E S Ir6-zo]statesman. I am perfectly aware, gentlemen, that it is often onthe last speaker that your anger descends, and not rvhere theresponsibility lies for what you find unsatisfactory. But I donot think one should allow consideration of personal safety tomake one hesitate to speak out. My declared view is in favourof intervention to preserve the members of the Olynthianconfederation by sending a force for that purpose, and byinflicting damage on Macedonian territory with a second navaland military force. Neglect either of these, and I am afraid thecampaign will be ineffective. Confine it to attacks on Macedonia,and Philip will reduce Olynthus and then have no difficulty indefending his own territory. Confine it to assistance to Olynthus,and he will realize that there is no threat to Macedon, and laysiege to Olynthus and maintain his threar ro the position till intime he gains control of the besieged cities. Our force must beconsiderable and must be in two sections.

That is my view about the expedition. As regards the financesof it, you are in possession, gentlemen, of a source of revenueunparalleled in the world.+ You receive it in the form you like.If you are prepared to use this for the expeditionary force, youhave no need to look further. But if not, you do need resources,indeed you have none at all. Is ir, then, my proposal that thisfund should be appropriated to military purposes ? No,s it isnot. My view is that a force must be equipped, and that a singleorganization ought to cover payments received and expenditurerequired. The normal view favours money to spend at thefestivals without any trouble in acquiring it. The only alternativeis a universal subscription, the amount depending on the need.But the money is needed, and is indispensable to the perform-ance of the smallest part of our duty. There are various sugges-tions for the means to raise this fund. Choose which you like,

4. This refers to the so-called Theoric Fund, a subject which Demosthenesclearly treats with some uneasiness. It had been created to provide the poorwith the means of attending the festivals, and had gradually appropriated allthe surplus revenue. It was jealously preserved by popular opinion, and anattempt made shortly before this speech to secure some of the fund for warpurposes had been met by an indictment for illegality.

5. Demosthenes is caref'ul not to call this a proposal, but merely a statementof opinion.

lzvz5f O L Y N T H I A C I

so that while the opportunity is there, you keep your grip on thesituation.

It is worth while to make a considered judgement of Philip'spresent position. It is not what it appears, it is not, as a casualglance might suggest, an easy or ideal situation for him. Hewould never have provoked this war, had he thought that actualfighting would be neceSsary. FIis hope was that he had only toapproach, to be master of every situation. But his hope has beenvain. This is his first anxiety. It was unexpected and is a greatdisappointment. His second is Thessaly.o It is by narure un-reliable and it has proved so to everyone. Philip is no exception.Thessaly has passed a resolution to demand the return ofPagasae and prevented the fortification of Magnesia. I have evenheard mentioned the proposal to deny him the benefit of openmarkets and ports, which should supply the general needs ofThessaly, and not be appropriated to Macedon. And if he is tobe kept from this source of supply, he will be in dire straits forthe provisioning of his forces. One must indeed suppose tharthe peoples of Paeonia and Illyria and the rest would preferautonomy and freedom to servitude. They are in no habit ofsubmission, and Philip is a harsh master, it is understood,and it is not hard to believe. Undeserved success is the road tofolly in unbalanced minds, which makes it harder to keep thanto win prosperity. For us then, gentlemen, his inopportune actsmust be our opportunities to join in the contest, by representa-tions where necessary, by personal service, by incitement ofothers. If Philip had such a chance against Athens, rememberhow ready he would be to attack us, if war came to Attica.Should we not then feel ashamed to lack the courage, whenthe opportunity is there, to do to him what he would do to usif he could I

One point more. You must not forget that your choice mustbe made now between a war conducted by you on his territory

6. Philip occupied Magnesia, a district of Thessaly, in 352, after which hewas granted the right to levy market dues there. But it was later restored toMagnesia (see Olynthiac II,7,and Philippic II, zz).It must be admitted thatthis section and the last show an inclination to wishfui thinking on the |art ofDemosthenes, which is perhaps a regular characteristic of democratic com-munities in their dealing with autocracy.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [rs-8]and one conducted by him on yours. If Olynthus holds, yourvill be engaged on Macedonian territory and do damage to itwhile enjoying the fruits of your own in security. But if Philipcaptures Olynthus, what will stand in the way of his advanceagainst ourselves ? Thebes ? It may seem harsh to say it, butThebes will join the invasion. Phocis then I She cannot prorecther own territory without help from us. Some other champion ?No one will be prepared to do it. For Philip, on the other hand,it would be astonishing if the threats he gives vent to at theexpense of his reputation for sanity are not put into action whenhe has the power. Indeed, the difference between fighting hereand fighting there hardly needs emphasis. If an Athenian forcehad to spend a mere month in the field, and live on the countryfor all the needs of an army, without an enemy at all, yourfarmers would lose more than the expense of the whole of thelast war. If war comes here, what must be the extent of theirlosses t Add to that the violence, and last but not least the ig-nominy of our position, as great a loss as any on a balancedview.

These are the facts we must focus, and so advance to theattack and thrust the scene of war into the territory of Macedon.We have our motives. The wealthy must seek to spend a littleof the wealth they are lucky enough to possess so as to enjoythe rest in security. The young and strong should seek militaryexperience on the soil of Macedon, and so make formidableprotectors of their own. The politicians should hope to makeit easy to face investigation of their political careers so that theexperience of the nation may colour its criticism of their conductof office. And for every reason may it be for the best.

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GnNrrnunx, there have been many indications of the good-ness of Providence towards Athens, and our present position isone of the clearest. Potential enemies of Macedon have ap-peared, neighbours possessed of some power and, most import-ant of all, an attitude towards war which makes them feel thattheir relations with Macedon have been first unreliable, thendisastrous to themselves.I This has all the appearance of anintervention of Providence on our behalf. So it is for us ourselvesto ensure that we do not lag behind circumstance in supportof our own position. It is to our discredit, indeed to our deepestdiscredit, to surrender our hold not merely on states or districtsrvhich were once ours, but on the assistance and the opportuni-ties which fortune provides.

A long account of the power of Macedon as a means to urgeAthenians to their duty I regard as a mistake, for this reason.Anything that can be said to this effect increases Macedonianprestige and damages this country. The more Philip's successesexceed his deserts, the greater his reputation as a world'srvonder. The more Athenian statesmanship falls short, thelower stands Athenian credit. I will say no more of this. A properestimate will show that here lies the reason for his rise topower, not in any resource of his own. The debt he owed tohis collaborators, for which Athens should demand justice, Iam not disposed to discuss now. But there are subjects apartfrom this which are of greater value to put before this assembly,and which on a true reckoning constitute a damaging chargeagainst him. These I shall try to present.

Merely to decry his perfidious breaches of faith withoutfactual evidence may rightly be r,vritten down as empty abuse.But an account of his actions up to the present, with a detailedexamination of the points against him, needs no great lengthand appears desirable for two purposes: to display his true weak-ness and'o o'ou:

Trt':r*:lH:,:':il1;*.at his invincibre

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D E M O S T H E N E S ls-rolstrength that he has exhausted the whole catalogue of falsehoodwhich has made him great and that his position is on the vergeof ruin. I should emphatically agree that Philip was an objectfor our fear and our wonder, if what I saw were a power basedupon right. But long and full consideration shows the truth.His first success was at the expense of our own folly, when theOlynthian representatives were denied the negotiation theywanted by the tale of Philip's intended transfer of Amphipolis,and the much discussed secret pact.z He next secured the ad-herence of Olynthus by unjustifiable treatment of a former ally,in seizing Potidaea from us and transferring it to Olynthus.Finally Thessaly was persuaded by a promise to surrenderMagnesia and undertake a Phocian war for her own benefit.:There is not a state which has tried to make use of him withoutfalling victim to his duplicity. In every case he deceived rhem,and exploited their folly and ignorance for his own advancement.He has risen on their shoulders, each time they have seen inhim a means to their own advantage. He should owe his des-truction to the same forces, now that his invariable selGinteresthas been proved against him. This is the point to which Philip'sfortunes have been brought, and I challenge any speaker toprove to me, or rather to this assembly, either that my conten-tion is false, or that anyone who has once been trapped is likelyto trust him again, or that anyone once reduced to slavery wilinot delight in the hope of freedom.

If you suppose this is true, yer believe that the King ofMacedon, by his capture of strategic points and harbours, willhave power to dominate the world, it is an unsound belief.Unity based upon good will and common interest gives menthe spirit to toil, to endure and to stand. But the power whichlike his is rooted in greed and violence will fall in ruin at a word,at the first false step. Never, gentlemen, never can a lastingpower be founded on broken promises and lying words. Such

z. Amphipolis was to be restored to Athens.in exchange for Pydna.3. On Thessaly see Olynthiac Irzz. Therc seems to be no inconsistency,

such as has been suggeJted, between this and [h" pr.r.nt passage and, i4below. The uncertainty of rhessalian politics is looked upon as a potentialdanger to Philip's position, and so an advantage to Athens.

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empires stand for one short hour. They may blossom with fairhopes, but time finds them out, and they fade and die. In ahouse, in a ship, in any sructure, it is the foundation whichmost needs strength. So it is too with the actions of men's lives,which must be founded on truth and justice. And this is nottrue of the achievements of Macedon.

My view is that we must assist Olynthus. The better and thespeedier the help that is suggested, the better I shall be pleased.Secondly we must send to Thessaly to provide information anda spur to action. The present decision there is to demand therestoration of Pagasae and negotiations about Magnesia. But itis essential that our representatives shall not be confined towords, but shall have some action to point to in the shape of anexpeditionary force in keeping with Athenian prestige, and toshow that we mean business. Words without actions are vainand empty, especially from Athens. The readier we seem touse them, the more we are distrusted. Great is the change, thealtered attitude we need to show, by contributions of moneyand of service, and by general readiness, if we are to commandattention. lf you are prepared to carry your obligations intoactual reality, it will not only expose the frailty and uncertaintyof Philip's alliances. It will find out the weakness of his wholepower.and position at home.

Broadly speaking, the power and the empire of Macedon, asa supplementary force, is no small asset, as indeed it was toAthens against Olynthus at the time of Timotheus,4 or againto Olynthus against Potidaea as an addition to their strength;or recently when they assisted a decadent and divided Thessalyagainst the royal house. Even a small added power is always ofvalue. But in itself it is weak and fraught with troubles. In factall the activities in which Philip's greatness might be thoughtto lie, his rvars and expeditions, have made his position stillmore precarious than nature made it. Do not imagine for amoment, that one and the same set of circumstances bringssatisfaction both to Philip and to his subjects. His aim andambition is glory. His way is the way of action and acceptedrisk, his goal the greatest renown in the history of the kings of

4. Timotheus took Torone and Potidaea for Athens in 364.

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D E M O S T H E N E S ft5-zzlMacedon. He prefers that to safety. But they do not share theseambitions. They are torn by marching from end to end of thecountry, and reduced to misery and continuous hardship. Theyare kept from their own pursuits, their personal affairs, andeven what opportunities chance allows cannot be organized,because ports in the country are closed by the war. This affordsclear indication of the relation of most of Macedonia towardsPhilip.

As to his paid soldiers and his corps d,'dlite, who have thereputation of being a superbly welded military force, I have itfrom an irreproachable informant, who has been in that country,that they are no more than ordinary. Men of military experience,I was told, are discarded by a selfish leader who wants all thecredit himself, because his ambition is as outstanding as any-thing else about him. On the other hand men of restraint andintegrity in other fields, who cannot endure a life of drunkennessand debauchery and indecent dancing, are rejected and passedover by a man like Philip. The rest of his entourage are banditsand flatterers, capable of taking part in drunken revelry whichI hesitate to describe. This is clearly true, because the outcastsof our society, who were thought lower than mere street-entertainers, creatures like the slave, Callias, who do comicperformances and write low songs at the expense of others toget a laugh, these are the people he likes and keeps around him.This may seem little, but it is in fact a great proof of this con-temptible character on a right estimate. At present, no doubt,this is obscured by success. There is nothing like success toconceal dishonour. But at any moment of failure it will be putto the test. And it will not be long, in my view, granted theconsent of heaven and the determination of this country, beforeit begins to show signs. In physical health a man who is strongmay go for a time without noticing anything amiss, but in timeof illness troubles extend everywhere, to any past fracture orstrain or underlying weakness. It is the same with a state,whether democratic or monarchical. In time of external warweaknesses are not commonly apparent. But war on its frontierbrings them to light.

If anyone here observes Philip's prosperity and supposes him

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a formidable opponent, it is the view of good sense. Fortune isa powerful force, indeecl it is everything, in all human affairs.Nonetheless, given the choice, I would prefer the fortune ofAthens, granted her will to follow the call of duty in detail, tothat of Philip. There are many more ways open ro her than tohim to command the favour of heaven. Yet here we sit inactive.He could not remain inactive and still demand the assistance ofhis own friends, let alone the good will of heaven. No wonderthat with his expeditions, his energy, his personal control ofdetail, his opportunism at every juncture, he gets the better ofdemocratic hesitation, deliberation and inquiry. I am not sur-prised. The opposite would be surprising, if neglect of our dutyin rvar brought success against his complete fulfilment of ii.What does surprise me is this. In the past, against Sparta, thiscountry went to war for the rights of Greek states,s declinednumerous opportunities of self-seeking and for the rights ofothers sacrificed her wealth in war expense and her security inwar service. Now she is slow to offer money and slow to servein defence of her own possessions. We saved others on manyoccasions collectively and singly, but the loss of our ownpossessions is something we do not stir a finger to prevent. Thisis what surprises me, this and one other fact, that there is nota man gapable of reckoning the length of the war against philip,and. asking what this country has been doing in all this lengthof time. You know the answer. she has passed it in procrasti-nation, in optimism, in recrimination, condemnation and yetmore optimism. Is this assembly senseless enough to hope thatthe proceedings which turned the scale in the country's affairsfor the worse will now have exactly the opposite effect I It isnot in reason, it is not in nature. it is natural that it shouldbe easier to preserve than to acquire possessions. Now how-ever the war has left us nothing to preserve, and acquire wemust.

And this is for our own initiative to achieve. The essential isenthusiastic contribution to war funds, and war service, and atruce frorrl recrimination until control is ours. Then we canjudge by realities, give honour where honour is due, and demand

5. In the Corinthian Wa4 3g4 s.c. See philippic 1,3.209

DEMOSTHENES bz-solretribution for misconduct and an end to excuses and deficien-cies. You cannot make bitter criticism of the part played byothers except on the basis of unfailing integrity in your own.After all, if you want realities in connexion with your com-manders, what do you suppose is the reason why all those yousend overseas hurry to abandon their country's war, and discoverprivate wars of their own I It is that in that field the prizes ofwar belong to the country (if Amphipolis falls, it will soon returnto Athens) while the risks are personal and rest on the com-manders, and pay is non-existent. In their field the risks areless, while captured booty falls to the commanders and theirmen. Lampsacus,6 Sigeum and the ships they capture areinstances. They go where it pays them to go. fu for ourselves,when we take a look at the disastrous state of our affairs, weput our commanders on trial. Then, when we invite theircomments and appreciate their overriding difdculties, we acquitthem. Ultimately the result for us is dispute and divisionbetween this view and that, in a deteriorating situation. Sometime ago the committees were the basis of war contributions.Now public affairs are on a committee basis.z Each party hasits leader in the orator, a military commander to support him,and their claqueurs, who correspond to the rest of the threehundred. The rest have been distributed to one party or another.We must abandon this method, we must be ourselves againnow at this eleventh hour, and unite for organization, speechand action alike. If you assign to one set of men an almosttyrannical control of the state, to another the compulsory taskof naval commands, financial support and military service,while to a third is allotted merely that of criticism without

6. Occupied by Chares in 356, perhaps with the consent of the satrap,Artabazus.

7. One of Demosthenes' earliest public speeches (f S+ e.c.) had been con-cerned with the organization (initiated in 378) of syndicates of 3oo for thepayment of war tax and later the financing of ship building. Here he comparesthe divisions and disunity between political parties with the disputes betweenthese committees. Each committee had a chairman, the wealthiest ofthem, and a manager, who organized the raising of the money in theinterest of the committee, as did the political parties with their orator, thegeneral they favoured, and their supporters.

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participation, you will never have the efficient control you need.Any section that is slighted will fail to play its part, and thenyou will have the satisfaction of punishing them instead of theenemy.

Let me summarize ciur requirements: universal money con-tribution according to means, universal service in detachmentstill all have served, universal freedom to speak and a choice ofpolicy not confined to that of one or two particular politicians.Carry this out, and instead of immediate applause for the lastspeaker, bestow it on yourselves for a general improvement inthe whole position.

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I eu moved by different feelings, gentlemen, when I turn tothe actual course of events, from those which arise from whatI hear said here. Speakers, I observe, are concerned with re-taliation on Philip, but the march of events has created the priorneed to forestall danger to our own country. Speeches of thiskind appear to me to make the mistake of suggesting the wrongsubject for your deliberations. There was a time when thiscountry had it in her power to combine her own safety withretaliation on Philip. I know that well enough. Both possibilitiesexisted within my own experience here. But I am now con-vinced that it is enough to hope initially to secure the preserva-tion of our allies. Once that is assured, we can begin to considerretaliation, and ways and means to it. But until a sound begin-ning has been laid down, cliscussion of the end is useless.

This present moment) beyond all others, demands deepconsideration. It is not present policy that I regard as the maindifficulty. My problem is how to address this meeting. T'heevidence of my orvn eyes and ears convinces me that this lackof grip upon affairs is more a failure of rvill than of intelligence.I beg you therefore to tolerate directness on my part. Youmust consider the truth of rvhat I say with the aim of irnprove-ment in the future. You must realize that it is the ingratiatingmethod of certain speakers rvhich has brought our rvhole positionto so low an ebb.

I must first, I believe, go back a little over the past. Youremember rvhen the nervs came three or four years ago thatPhilip was besieging Heraeon Teichos in Thrace.r It was themonth of November. Amid an outburst of speeches and excite-ment the decision was taken to launch eighty ships manned bya citizen force of the under-forty-fives and raise a sum of sixtytalents. The year ended.' July came, August and September,

r. The occasion cannot be exactly determined. Presumably in 352, when

the rumour of Philip's death was current.z. The Atheirian year began in June. The mysteries took place in early

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and then at long last ten ships were despatched under Chari-demus, unmanned, and the sum of five talents was voted. Newshad come of Philip's illness or death (both were reported) andtherefore it was thought that there was no occasion for anexpedition, and it was abandoned. Yet that was the decisivemoment for it. Had we then carried out with energy the opera-tion which was voted, Philip would not have survived totrouble us now.

That occasion is now beyond recall. The present war hasoffered another opportunity, which has led me to mention thefirst, so as to avoid a repetition of it. What are we to make of it iIf we are not to go into action 'to the utmost of our strength'and 'with all power',a observe how our tactics will all haveplayed into Philip's hands. There stood Olynthus with acertain strength, and the position was that neither she norPhilip viewed the other with confidence. Peace was negotiatedbetween us and Olynthus.+ Here was a troublesome obstacle toPhilip, to have a considerable state threatening his interests, anda state in good relations with this country. It seemed desirableon all scores to engineer a war berween them, and what was sooften talked of before has now come about by one means oranother. What course is therefore open but to take strongand enthusiastic action in support of Olynthus I I see no alterna-tive. Even apart from the dishonour of any compromise, thedanger of it is considerable, in the present position of Thebes,the bankruptcy of Phocis, and with Philip, once he has controlof the present situation, unhindered by any obstacle fromturning in this direction. If anyone here desires to postpone theaction we need, then it is his desire to witness calamity at homewhen he might hear of it elsewhere, to crave aid when he mightoffer it. That it will come to this if we neglect the present wemust surely all realize.

I hear the rejoinder, 'Yes, the need for action is accepted,and it will be taken.' But how ? Do not be surprised if myanswer is an unexpected one. Establish a legislative committee.But pass no new enactment. You have plenty. Repeal what

3. The phrases belong to a formula used in treaties.

4. 352 B.c.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [ro-r6]you have that are detrimental. I refer specifically to that regard-ing the Theoric Funds and to some military enactments, whicheither appropriate military funds to unmilitary purposes orestablish immunity for indiscipline, and so turn all patrioticfeeling to despondency. It is by breaking this barrier, by makingthe way safe for public-spirited proposals, that you really initiatethe quest for the universally acknowledged benefit of the narion.Meanwhile do not keep looking for men who will court destruc-tion by making such proposals. None will be forthcoming,especially as the only likely outcome of doing so is undeservedinjury without any valuable result, and an increased premiumon public spirit. The repeal of such enactments tnust be de-manded of the very men who passed them. It is unrvarrantablethat their proposers should win popularity to the public detri-ment, while the unpopularity which can herald better thingsstands as an obstacle to the public-spirited proposer. Till youhave set this position right, gentlemen, you musr not demandfrom anyone the character to break the law with impunity, orthe insensibility to put himself into manifest danger.

Nor must it escape you that a vote is valueless without thewill to carry it out whole-heartedly. If measures passed hadpower in themselves to compel us to action, or to bring thesubstance of them into reality, we should not have a history ofnumerous enactments and little or no action, nor would Philipso long have defied restraint. If enactments alone were enough,he would have been penalized long since. No, in the order ofevents action follows speech and decision, but in effect it hasthe priority and the greater validity. We need this addition towhat is already available. We have in plenty the capacity tospeak, the perspicacity to judge the spoken word. We shall beable to add action to these, if we play our true part. There canbe no time, no moment better than the present. When can weact as we should, if not now I Has not this Macedonian stolena march on us and captured our possessions ? 6 We are facedwith the greatest ignominy, if he proceeds to seize power alsoover this territory of Chalcidice. The friends we promised to

5. On the Theoric Fund see on Olynthiac I, rg.6. Contrast the way in which Isocrates refers to Philip in Philipr 3, p. r39.

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preserve in case of war are at war now. He is our enemy, inpossession of our property. He is an uncivilized intruder, hedeserves any appellation you give him. And yer we let it allpaslt we virtually assist the process, and then, I suppose, weshall demand to affix ihe responsibility. We shall not-lay it atour own door, I am sure. It is not only during the perils of warthat runaways fail to accuse themselves, but prefer to arraignthe High Command, or their neighbours, or anyone else. Butthe failure has been due to the army which has run awav. Theaccuser could have stood firm, and if all had done so, ui"torywould have been theirs.

Our case is the same. If one proposal is unsatisfactory,another can be offered without attacking the first. If a second ispreferable, put it into action and good luck to it. But perhaps thisis an unattractive proposal. If so, it is not the fault of theproposer, unless he has omitted the obligatory prayer. Prayeris easy, gentlemen. We can summarize in it our every wish.But choice, when we have political questions before us, is notso easily made. It must be the choice of right policy, and notthe easy road, if the two cannot be combined. Yes, comes thereply, but if it is possible to leave the Theoric Fund and provideanother source for military expenses, surely that is better. Iagree, if it is possible. But I doubt if it has ever been or will bethe fortune of anyone to spend his all unjustifiably, and thenbe financed out of th. deficit to do his duty. This'is wishfulthinking, and self-deception is the easiest of pitfalls. Where thewish is father to the thought, rhe truth is often different. Youmust consider the problem in terms of an expedition that ispractical, manageable and financially viable. Good sense andright feeling forbid us to make some financial shortage affectingthe war an excuse for lightly accepting a position of disgrace,forbid us to fly to arms against Corinth and Megara,T and, forlack of moncy to transport our forces, allow Philip to enslaveGreek cities.

7. There is no need to look for a particular reference here. Demosthenesis contrasting the quick resentmenr which may be roused by immediatedifferences at home with reluctance to take an honourable path at a greaterdistance.

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D E M O S T H E N E S lzr_6lI do not speak from an irresponsible desire to give offence. I

am not so senseless or ineffectual as to seek offence rvithoutbenefit. But I think the true citizen must put the reality ofsurvival above the gratification of rhetoric. This was- themethod, this was the character of political dealing, I understand,as perhaps you all do, practised by the speakers of the past, whoare extolled by members of this assembly, but not imitated bythem; the method of the great Aristides, of Nicias, of my name-sakes and of Pericles. Since the appearance of our modernspeakers, who ask 'What are your wishesl What proposalwould you like ? What can I do for your gratification ?', Athenianstrength has been squandered for immediate popularity. Thisis what happens, and as their stock rises, that of the nationsinks. Think, gentlemen, what summary could be given ofaffairs in the past and in your own time. The account will beshort. You know it well enough. The examples which couldlead us in the path ofsuccess are not taken from foreign history,but your own. Your predecessors had no flattery from speakers,and no love from them, as you do. But for forty-five years theywere the accepted leaders of the Greek states.e They amassedover ten thousand talents on the Acropolis. Thc king of thisdistrict of Thrace was their subordinate, and stood in the rightrelation for a non-Greek to a Greek state. Many and great werethe victories they won by land and sea as citizen fighters, andthey were alone of mankind in leaving by their achievements areputation high above carping envy. Such they proved in thesphere of Hellenic affairs. Look nolv at the character they borein our city itself, in public and private relations alike. In thefirst the architectural beauty they created in sacred buildingsand their adornment was of a quality and at1 extent unsurpass-able by later generations. Their private lives were of suchrestraint, and so well in keeping with the character of thecommunity, that if the type of house lived in by Aristides orMiltiades'o or any of the great men of that day is known nowa-

8. Presumably the Demosthenes rvho commanded in the north-west in the

Peloponnesian War and was executed at Syracuse after the retreat.

9. i.e. between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, though it seems

doubtful how the reckoning is made.ro. Leaders of Athens during the period of the Persian Wars.

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days, it can be seen to be no grander than its neighbours. I.[oone then made capital out of public affairs. It was felt that thecommunity should be the gainer. But their integrity in theconduct of Hellenic affairs, their devotion in that of religion,their equity in that of private concerns, gained them the highesthappiness. So stood the state in the past under the leaders Ihave mentioned. What is the position now under our presentsplendid administrators I Is there any similarity, any comparisonrvith the past I I cut short a long list of instances. You can allsee the degree of helplessness to which we have come. Spartais finished. Thebes is fully occupied. No other state is'strongenough to bid for the supremacy. We could retain our positionin saf'ety and hold the scales of justice for the rest of the Hellenicworld. And yet rve have lost territory of our own, we have spentover fifteen hundred talents to no purpor., the allies rve maclein the war have brought us down in the peace,Il and we havebrought an adversary of such magnitude on the stage against us.I invite any man present to tell me here and now, what othersource there is of Philip's power than ourselves. 'Well,' I amtold, 'that may be very unfortunate, but at home, at least, weare better off.' What is the evidence of this ? Plaster on thebattlements, new streets, water supplies. These are trivialities.Turn your eyes on the pursuers of these political ends. They haverisen from beggary to riches, from obscurity to prominence, andin some cases have houses which outshine the public buiidingsthernselves, rvhile their consequence rises lvith the decline ofthe nation.

What is the reason for all this ? Why rvas Athenian historythen so glorious I And nolv why is so much amiss I Becausethen the people of Athens had the courage to act and to servein person, the people were the rnaster of the politicians ancl thecontroller of all its assets. Then it was a matter of satisfactionto every man elsewhere to be admitted by the people to shareits honour, its power and some of its benefits. Norv the reverseis true. It is the politicians who control assets, and throughwhose agency all action is taken. We, the people, are enervated

"rjrt;

t... in the period 378-362 n.c., during which the new Confecleracy

2 r7

D E M O S T H E N E S lsr-sland our revenues and our allies whittled away. We are incidental,subsidiary, content to be allowed a little from the Theoric Fundand a procession at the Boedromia,rz and, our finest moment ofall, to feel gratitude for what is our own. It is these men of ourown city who keep us down to this level, who cosset us till weeat out of their hands. But never, I am sure, was a high andvirile spirit attained through petty and contemptible practices.The character of men's habits is reflected inevitably in theirspirit. These are words which may well bring down greaterdetriment on my head for saying this than on others for Causingit. Free speaking is not permitted here on all subjects, and I amsurprised that it has been allowed now.

This is our last chance to rid ourselves of such habits, toserve the nation, to act like Athenians, to use what is superfluousat home as a stepping-stone to gains abroad. If we can do this,perhaps, perhaps, gentlemen, we may make some finished, somegreat achievement, and say goodbye to these petty doles. Theyresemble the diets imposed by doctors, which neither bringstrength to the sick man nor let him die. The distributions wereceive are not enough to bring any satisfying benefit, norallow us to turn our back on them and look elsewhere. Theymerely serve to encourage individual inaction. Do I imply theirappropriation to the army ? Yes, I do, and at once on a singleorganization for all, so that every individual may have his shareof public support and provide the services needed by the state.If the situation permits inactivity, a man is best at home wherehe is not driven by want to illicit action. Suppose a situationlike the present. Then he can serve in person and draw his payfrom the same source, as is only right for public service. Ortake the case of a man outside military age. The unorganizedand unearned payments he now receives he will get under thenew system for work of superintendence and organization. Ina word, without any more than slight addition or subtractionI bring Athens from a lack of system to a systematic arrangementof universal application, under which are included payment,military and judicial service, the performance of public tasksof all kinds according to capacity and circumstance. In no in-

re. It is doubtful which festival is here meant.

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stance do I advocate passing the earnings of the active to theinactive. In no case would I have citizens in idleness and leisurereceiving news of the successes of some general's mercenaries,as happens now. I make no criticism of any who are engaged inthe necessary service of the state. I merely demand ihat thenation perform for itself the tasks for which it now commendsothers, and not abandon the lofty post secured and left for herby your predecessors in the ranks of nbbility and danger.

I have attempted to speak as I think desirable. Let your choicebe made in accordance with the best interests of our countrvand all her citizens.

DEMOSTHENES [ I I ]


The interaal between. the foll of Ollnthus in j4B s.c. and the lastspeeclt. whiclt, appears in this book, Philippic III, in tlte summero/'34r, includes tpo main sets of eaents, tltose centring rountl thePea,ce of Philocrates in j46, and, th,ose of the periotl of indecisionafter it, phich, ended wlten Ph.ilip finally attacketl Athens in jj8.

Q) After the fall of Ollnthus Demostlrenes' aierps were ffictiuein senrling a delegation to Peloponnesian states to stimulate ffirtsagainst Pltilip. But Eubulus and ltis associates knerp tlrat peacewas fnancially necessary. Philip also pas readl for it, but-could,offord to insist on tpo demands, tlrat he should be free to deal witlt

Halus in Tlressaly, whose dispute with Pharsalus Philip had beeninaited to settle, and witlt Phocis. These lt)ere nnt mentioned in theactual terms negotiated. Atltenians trietl to pretend that thelt knewof a'gentlemen's agreement' to let Phocis li.ae. But Phitip-had nosuclt. idea, and at once tlestrajted it ; antl followed, this bjt realizinghis other great desire, to presicle ot tlte Pjtthian. gatnes at Detpti.Tltere was much, dispute and, recrinnination between Atheiianrepresentatit-es 0n tlte peace tlelegation wltich is the subject of Demos-thenes' long speeclt ogainst Aescltines, which is not inclucled, in thisaolunte. TJte circumstances of the negotiations os a whole, coupledwith tlte feeling arousetl bjt Demosthenes oaer ofunth.us, olmostcaused Atltens to repud'iute the Peace, and, Demosthenes in thespeeclt. On the Peace in j46 had to adaise ocquiescence in it.

() After tlte Peace, despite ltrofessions offriendll feeting towardsAtltens, Plti,lip's diplomatic airns pere infatsour of rhebis againstAthens ond Sparta, and alreadl in 344, in Philippic II, Demos-tlrenes points ou.t that this is merell an interaal before afinal struggte.

Meanwltile Euboea had been establish,ed as ind,ependent ifterthe reuolt in j48, and Pltilip did little to encnurage hopes thit heintended t0 return it to Athens. He expelled the democrats fi.omEretria, forcing them frorn the nearby Porthmus, and triatedOreus similarfit, as Demostltenes describes in Philippic III.

D E M O S T H E N E S [ r r ]

Btrt the nelct scene of Philip's operations was Tltrace, whether topreaent attacks on his territoryt bjt Th,racion princes,, or to gaingreoter control of the Bosporus andHellespont. It wa,s an area ofgreilt importance to Athenian trade, and, was lorgell in tlte handsof princes like tke undependable Cersobleptes, rnith wltom Atlrenshad, conducted some inffictual negotiations in j56 for ilte controlof the Chersonese. In j5z Cersoltleptes had been subjected, to thepower of Maced,on' but reaolted trpr Jears later, and Philip wasagain engaged against lrim in j46 during and after the pea,cenegotiations. In the Chersonese (tlte tongue of land, in Tltrace morerecentlJ called the Gallipoli peninsu,la), Athens had, claimed souer-eWtJ and set out cleruclties (see fsocrates, Panegyricus ro7p. no). These mere under the cornmand of Diopeithes, and the aen-ture pes fnirU successful apart frorn tlae town of Cardia, wh.ich.had, always been anti-Atkenion and, was claimed, as an ally and,garrisoned, bjt Philip. Diopeithes retoliated, bjt aarious irregularproceedings against Maced,onian plssessions on the Proponti,s, buthe wos not proaided witlt enough men or mlne1 to maintainffictixe hostilities. Philip mrote a protest in threatening terms, andthis was the situation in which Demosthenes' speech On theChersonese wo.s deliztered i,n. 34r. It was /bllowed, after a shortinteraal by Philippic III, with, war imminent once again. We haaeno actual eaid,ence of the tfttt of this fine speeclt., but from diplo-rnatic actiuities 0,m0ng the Greek states it appears tltat the d,angerfro* Macedon Das nzw fulll realized, and the policy phiclt.Demosthenes represented regained tlte ascendancl in Athens. In34o &n alli.ance of Athens, Corinth, Megara and otlter states Dasformed, and the Dar wa,s resumed. Denl,osthenef fnal diplomatictriumph rDa,s to win oaer Thebes in 339. But by nop it was too late.

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I nnellzE, gentlemen, the degree of ill will and confusionaroused by the present situation, not merely from the extentof our losses, which oratory has nothing to offset, but from thelack of a generally agreed policy in regard to what remains tous, about which there is varying opinion. The framing ofpolicy is always a tiresome and difficult business, but thecitizens of Athens have rendered it still more difficult. In thenormal course deliberation comes before action, but with us itcomes after it. Hence the commendation and appiause invariablybestowed, in my experience, upon criticism of past mistakes,which fails to secure the real aim of debate. Yet despite this Istand here in the firm conviction that we have only to abandonpartisan demonstrations, as is demanded by the needs of thecountry and the importance of the issues before us, to find theability to frame and advocate policies to improve the presentand redeem the past.

I am perfectly aware that it is an outsrandingly profitablepractice, if one has the face, to make oneself and one's previousutterances the main theme. But I regard it as so contemptibleand tiresome a habit, that I hesitate to use it, even when Irealize the need. But I think it will give you a better under-standing of what I am going to say, if I remind you a little ofwhat I have said in the past. First, then, at the time when, inview of disorders in Euboea, this country was induced to followPlutarchusl in raising a war that was as expensive as it wasinglorious, I was the first and the only speaker to oppose the pro-ject. I was almost torn in pieces by the party which .rtg.d otthe country a number of serious losses in return for diminutiveprofit. After a very short interval, at the cost also of disrepute andof treatment of their benefactors unparalleled for a generation,

r. Philip's intrigues in Euboea, which distracted Athens from aidingOlynthus, are referred to in the sectional introduction , p, 17r. Plutarchus ofEretria appealed for Athenian aid, and was assisted by Eubulus and his party,but proved to be a turncoat.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [6-ro]the lesson was learnt that the advocates of this expeditionwere unprincipled, and that mine had been the right policy.Again, there was the case of the actor, Neoptolemus. I becameaware that under the pretext of official protection afforded byhis art he was gravely damaging the interests of Athens, byfavouring Macedon in his conduct of proceedings as yourrepresentative. I therefore raised the subject in this assembly,without a semblance of personal or other propaganda, as wasproved by the result. I am not intending any reflection on thesupporters of Neoptolemus. There were none. It is this assemblyI blame. If it had been a performance in the Theatre which wasunder consideration instead of the position and security ofAthens, he would not have met with so lenient a reception, norI with such hostility. Yet I think this is universally realized,that,while his journey into enemy territory was nominally designedto secure payment of debts in that country, in order to honourhis public obligations here, actually he made a great deal of theclaim that it was outrageous to be blamed for bringing wealthfrom Macedon to Athens; yet no sooner did the Peace securehis immunity, than he realized the property he had acquiredhere and absconded to Macedon with it.

These are two of the predictions I made, which are evidenceof honest accuracy in the facts. There is one third example, andthen I really will embark on my subject. After those of us whoformed the delegation returned from the ratification of thePeace, there were numerous promises in the wind, of a newfoundation for Thespiae and Plataea,2 of Philip's intention topreserve Phocis, if he secured control, and to disestablishThebes;; that Oropus was to be awarded to Athens and Euboeaexchanged for Amphipolis, and other chimerical hopes, whichled you to disregard both interest and equity by abandoningPhocis. But it will be clear that I did not mislead the counrryeither positively or negatively. I said what I thought, as I amsure you remember, namely that I had neither knowledge nor

z. Thespiae and Plataea had been dispossessed or destroyed by Thebes in

J / J .

3. See Isocrates, Philip,43.On Oropus see Demosthenes, For Megalopolis,rr, and sectional introduction.

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expectation of anything of the kind, and I thought such srate-ments were nonsense.

These instances, in which I clearly showed better foresightthan others, are not to be put down to any superior ability that Ican boast. I shall not claim that intelligent prediction is due toanything but the two causes I have put forward. The first,gentlemen, is good luck, which I realize has more power thanall the ingenuity and wisdom of men. The second is that myjudgement and my reckoning are free of self-interest. No onecan point to any gain to me attaching to any policy or anyutterance of mine. I can therefore take an unbiased view of thenational interest, based solely on the facts. Once financial profitis put in the scale, the balance is upset and intelligence out-weighed, and there is no further hope of right or sound judge-ment about anything.

The first prerequisite, in my view, is that any alliance orcontribution which anyone wishes to secure for Athens shall besecured without brealing the peace. Not that it is anythingremarkable, or in any way worthy of Athens. But whatever canbe said of it, better for our position that it had never been made,than made and then broken by this country. We have lost manyassets whose retention would have made war safer and easierthen than it is now. Our second need is to avoid giving theassembly of the so-called Amphictyonic Council+ the need, ora common pretext for, war against us. Personally, in the eventof a fresh war between us and Philip over Amphipolis or onany other private ground not shared by Thessaly, Argos orThebes, I do not believe any of them would take part againstAthens, least of all - please keep your protests till you hearwhat I have to say - least of all Thebes, not from any friendlyfeeling towards us, or from anti-Macedonian views, but becausethey fully rcalize, for all their reputation for slowness of wit,that in a war against Athens they will get all the kicks and noneof the halfpence, which will be kept under someone else's closecontrol. They will not let themselves in for this without a generalcause and occasion for war. Again, in the event of a further warwith Thebes on the score of Oropus or any other private bone

4. See fsocrates, Philip,74 and note.

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DEMOSTHENES ftGzzlof contention, I do not think that Athens would have anythingto lose. Supporters of either side would go to arms in defenceagainst an attack on their own territory, but would not supporteither in aggression. This is the way of alliances of any signifi-cance, ,ttd it is a natural way. Theie is no one whose relationswith Athens and Thebes are equally poised between defence andoffence. All would share a defensive aim to maintain the integrityof both, but not an offensive aim to secure the success of onewhich involved a threat to themselves. What then do I regard asthe danger we should guard against ? The danger that a futurewar may provoke a general pretext and a comrnon complaintagainst us. Suppose Argos, Messene, Megalopolis and otherPeloponnesian states which share their view, take exception toan entente between Sparta and ourselves and the idea of ourmaking some capital out of Spartan activity.s Suppose Thebesincreases the hostility she normally shows, on the ground of ouroffering asylum to Theban fugitives and our general ill feeling to-wards her, and Thessaly for our rescue of Phocian refugees, andPhilip for our exclusion of him from the Amphictyonic League,then I am afraid that individual resentments may give occasionfor a general war, on the claim of the Amphictyonic decrees.These may lead everyone beyond their own best interests, as hap-pened in the Phocian war. You must realize that Thebes, Philipand Thessaly did not share common aims, though their course ofaction was in accord. Take the case of Thebes. Philip's appear-ance and his control of the pass was something they could notprevent, any more than his coming last in the field and stealingthe credit of their labours. At the present time Thebes hasmade some territorial gains, but her prestige, her credit, is low,since but for Philip's arrival the gain would never have beenmade. This was not at all what she wanted, but her desire toacquire Orchomenus and Coronea, which she could not secure,compelled her to submit to it. As to Philip, there are peoplewho go so far as to say that he was against ceding Orchomenusand Coronea to Thebes, but was compelled to. They can enjoythis notion if they like, but of one thing I am sure, that he was

5. See in general the speech on Megalopolis (p. r73 seqq.) seven yearsearlier.

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not so concerned with this as with his desire to control the pass,to secure the prestige of making it appear that the decision ofthe war had lain in his hands, and to put the Pythian games athis disposal. This was his particular aim. Finally, Thessaly hadno wish for an increase of power on the part of either Thebesor Philip, either of which they regarded as damaging to them-selves. They wanted a place at the Council and in the controlof Delphi, two considerable assets. This aim meant furtheringthe other activities. You can see therefore that in each case itwas the pursuit of private gains which led on to the acceptanceof losses. And that, exactly, is rvhat this country needs to fore-stall.

'So we must do as we are told in a dangerous situation. Isthat your contention i' I am asked. Not at all. My contention isthat we should avoid reaching a position unworrhy of Athens,and also avoid the onset of war, that we should cultivate areputation for good sense and a right view. But the unthinkingacceptance of every loss without any thought of war is theattitude I wish to consider. We are allowing Thebes to holdOropus. And if we are asked what is our real and genuine reasonfor this, the answer is, to avoid war. And the reason why wehave ceded Amphipolis to Philip by the agreemenr, why weallow Cardia6 to stand apaftfrom the rest of the Chersonese, andCardia to include the islands of Chios, Cos and Rhodes,z andByzantium to enforce customs dues,8 is clearly our belief thatwe can expect greater benefit from peace and tranquillity thanfrom conflict and self-interest in the fields I have mentioned. Itis therefore an act of folly and downright perversity, when ourrelations with individual states as they bear on our closest in-terests are what they are, to try conclusions with them all forthe sake of the shadow show at Delphi.

6. Cardia had remained detached even afrer the Chersonese, at thenorthern end of which it stood, had been secured for Athens in 353, and in346 Philip gained recognition of it as an ally.

7. On Chios and the other cities of the Social War see Demosthenes'speech On the Liberty of Rhodes, p. r8o. These srates were still dependent onCair, now under Idrieus (see Isocrates, Philip, rc3).

8, i.e. on Athenian corn ships from the Euxine.

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GnNrI-nunx, when debates are held on Philip's intrigues anddeliberate breaches of the Peace, the Athenian point of view isconspicuous for its correct and humane attitude. Attacks madeon Philip are invariably commendable, but there is nothing tocommend in the action taken, nothing to justify the argumentsused. Indeed the whole position for this country has reached apoint at which the more strongly and openly Philip is convictedof breaches of the treaty with Athens, and of designs againstthe Greek states in general, the harder it becomes to advise onpolicy. The reason is twofold. At a time when practical measures,not words, are essential to curb aggression, we, your advisers,avoid action, legislation and practical proposals, because weare aftaid of public resentment, and prefer tirades on Philip'sunjustifiable proceedings. Our audience here on the other handis better equipped than Philip to impart and listen to justifiableargument, yet against his present course of action oflers com-plete inertia. The result is inevitable, I suppose, and perhapsright. We each succeed best in the field of our greatest activityand interest, Philip in the field of action, Athens in that ofwords. If you are still content merely to have right on your side,there is no difficulty. It will cost you no exertion. But if meansare to be taken to improve the position, to prevent a still furtherunsuspected deterioration, and the rise of a force against uswhich we cannot begin to match, then our old approach needsto be entirely changed. There must be a movement on the partof speakers and audience alike towards effective practicalmeasures, and away from the path of ease and complacency.

First, then, if any feeling of confidence exists in the face ofPhilip's present power and the extent of his influence, anybelief that this represents no danger to Athens and does notconstitute a general menace to this country, I am astonished,and I want first to ask everyone here to listen to a brief accountof the reasoning which leads me to take the opposite view andregard Philip as our enemy. After that, you can adhere to

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[Gr r ] P H I L I P P I C I I

whichever view you prefer, the forecast which I offer, or thepolicy of confidence and trust in Macedon. My inferences arethese. What was the first gain made by Philip after the Peace ?The control of Thermopylae and Phocis. What use did he makeof it? He preferred the interests of Thebes to those of Athens.'Why t It was his own advantage and the control of all Greecewhich was the aim of his calculations, not peace and quiet, andcertainly not justice. He realized quite rightly that he couldoffer no inducement to the city of Athens or to men of yourcharacter which could tempt you to secure your own benefitat the cost of the betrayal of other states to him, that you wouldtake thought for right and shun the dishonour such a courseinvolves, that you would take all proper regard for the futureand oppose any attempt of his of this sort as strongly as if youwere at war with him. His view of Thebes, on the other hand,which was borne out by events, was that in return for theirown advantage they would leave him a clear field for the rest,and not merely refrain from interference or opposition, but joinin hostilities, if he gave the word. It is on the same assumptionthat he is now giving assistance to Messene and Argos. Thisindeed is a high compliment to this country, which is judgedon this basis to be the only one which would accept no profitfor herself to betray the common interests of Greece, no privatesatisfaction or gain in exchange for the good will of the Greekstates. This was a reasonable assumption in your case, as theopposite was in the case of Argos and Thebes, in the light ofpresent and past history alike. His observation and his researchestell him that a previous generation of Athenians had the powerto be rulers of the rest of Greece on condition of being them-selves subservient to the King of Persia. Not merely did theyrefuse to tolerate such an idea, on the occasion when Alexander,the ancestor of these kings of Macedon, came to offer terms,2but preferred to evacuate their territory and face any fate, andultimately achieved glories which are the envy and the despairof every orator - and I will myself omit what is beyond words to

r. i.e. in destroying Phocis, which was at enmity with Thebes and friendlyto Athens.

z. i.e. in 48o n.c., after the battle of Salamis.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [r r-r 5]express. He knows, too, that that generation in Thebes andArgos either joined forces with the invader or did nothing toresist him. Hence he realizes that both these states will pursuetheir own advantage without any regard for the commoninterests of Greece. He therefore supposed that if he chose toturn to Athens, he would secure her friendship on termsconsistent with justice, but if he joined the others, he would beacquiring accomplices in his own self-seeking. That is why heset, and will set, his choice on them rather than on us. It is notthat he can look to a stronger navy there than here, or that hehas discovered a land power that enables him to turn awayfrom navies and harbours. Nor has he forgotten the terms andthe promises which gained the peace for him.

Perhaps I shall be told, on supposed inside knowledge, thathis motive was not one of self-interest or anything of the kindI have criticized, but simply that he thought Thebes had abetter case than Athens. This is the one argument which it isimpossible for him to use. The man who orders Sparta torelinquish Messene, can hardly surrender Orchomenus andCoronea to Thebes and pretend that his motive was equity.s

The only plea that remains to him is that he was undercompulsion, that he acted against his own wishes, but foundhimself caught between the Thessalian cavalry and the infantryof Thebes, and was therefore led to make concessions. Excellent.So we are told he is likely to be suspicious of Thebes, and thestory is going round that he intends to fortify Elatea.+ Thismay be his intention, and an intention it will remain in myopinion. But there is no question of intention about his linkwith Argos and Messene against Sparta.s He is sending troopsand money now, and is expected in person with a large force.

3. For Sparta to relinquish Messene would be division of territoryanciently undivided; to incorporate Orchomenus and Coronea would meancreating a united Boeotia. Compare, however, Demosthenes, For Megalo-polis, and fsocrates, Philip, 43.

4. Elatea was a town in Phocis, whose walls had been pulled down in

346. It commanded the road between Phocis and Thebes, and if its wallswere restored could block a Theban move into Phocis. Similarly its captureby Philip in :99 opened for him the way to the south.

5. See back On the Peace, 18.

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Is it to be supposed that he is out to undermine Thebes' actualenemy, Sparta, and at the same time preserve his own victimsin Phocis t This is quite beyond belief. I scarcely imagine thateven if Philip had been compelled in the first instance to actagainst his wishes, or if he were now set on abandoning Thebes,he would be in constant opposition to her enemies. To judge byhis present course, his previous actions were obviously just asmuch a matter of policy, and a true estimate of them showsthat every movement has been directed against Athens. Justconsider. His aim is empire, and he sees Athens as the onlyobstacle to this aim. He has been in the wrong for a long time,as he is perfectly aware. It is his seizure of our possessionswhich has won him the safety of his other gains. Had he givenup Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would never, he imagines,have been safe at home. He fully realizes both that his designsare aimed at Athens, and that Athens knows they are. He seesus as intelligent people whose hatred of him is justified, and heis on tenterhooks for fear of damage in the event of a move onour part, if he fails to anticipate it. This is why he is somuch on the alert, so much on the spot, why he cultivates anti-Athenian support from Thebes or his Peloponnesian adherents,whose self-interest is expected to make them favour the present,while their stupidity prevents them from foreseeing the future.Yet on a sensible view there are fairly obvious indications to beseen, which it fell to me to point out to Messene and Argos.6But perhaps it is as well that they should be indicated hereagain.

'With what resentment,' I said to Messenian representatives,'do you suppose Olynthus would have received any criticismof Philip in the period when he let them hold Anthemus, whichevery former king of Macedon laid claim to, when he presentedthem with Potidaea and expelled its Athenian colonists, makinghimself responsible for our hostility while he had given themthe benefits of possession ? Do you suppose they foresaw theirultimate fate, or would have believed any prediction of it ?Yet,' I pointed out, 'after a short spell of prosperity at others'expense they have had a long run of deprivation themselves;

6. i.e. on a mission of propaganda against Philip.

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D E M O S T H E N E S Itt-tl

they have been ignominiously expelled, not merely overwhelmed,but betrayed and sold by each other. There is no safety for freestates in such over-familiarity with dictators. And what aboutThessaly I' I went on. 'Do you suppose they imagined that thePhilip who abolished their tyrannies and presented them withNicaea and MagnesiaT was the man to impose their presentpartition, and that the leader who gave them their seat on theAmphictyonic Council would be likely to curtail their ownrevenues ? Of course not. Yet this is what happened and isthere for all to see. And you yourselves,' I warned them, 'as

you observe Philip's presents and promises, should pray, if youare wise, that you may not come to see him as a liar and adeceiver. There are numerous contrivances for the safety andprotection of states, there are palisades, fortifications, fieldworks and the rest. They are all the work of men's hands, anda drain on wealth. There is one safeguard alone which is affordedby the nature of human wisdom, and brings safety and protec-tion to all. What is this I Distrust. Keep it secure and clasp itto your hearts. For its preservation is your defence against allharm. What,'I asked them,'is your greatest desirel Freedom?Then is it not obvious that Philip's very titles are diametricallyopposed to it ? Every king and every tyrant is an enemy to free-dom and an opponent of law. Take good care that in youreagerness to avoid war you do not acquire a despot.'

They heard my speech and applauded it, as well as a numberof other speeches from representatives, both in my presence and,apparently, afterwards. But they are no more inclined to resistPhilip's offer of friendship and his promises. Indeed, it is notsurprising that Messenian and Peloponnesian states shouldabandon in practice what reason tells them is in their interest.You are Athenians, who have your own intelligence besidesthe warnings of speakers to convince you that you are the victimsof deception and strategy, that inactivity now will betray youinto disaster. So true it is that immediate ease and complacency

7. Magnesia: a district of Thessaly, not to be confused with either of thetwo well-known towns of the same name in Asia Minor. The translation(' partition ') neglects a reading (.6erca6apXiay - government by a board of ten)which is not precisely accountable, and may be wrong. See back on OI. I zz.

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present a stronger inducement than thoughts of future advan-tage.

Our best course for the future is a thing you will discussfurther by yourselves, if you are wise. But the reply that willprovide your best immediate decision, I will now suggest toyou.

(Th,e reply is read)

It would be right, gentlemen, to call in evidence the bearers ofPhilip's promises which induced you to accept the Peace. Irnyself would never have agreed to serve on the delegation, andI am quite sure your countrymen would never have put an endto the war, if they had supposed Philip would act as he did aftersecuring peace. There was a wide discrepancy berween hisrvord and his actions. There is also a second class of witnesseswe should call. Who are these ? The party who after the Peaceand my return from the second delegation sent to ratif-y it,rvhen I rcalized how Athens had been misled and was loud indenunciation of the betrayal of Thermopylae and Phocis, thendeclared that I was a man who drank water instead of wine,Bbound to be awkward and difficult, whereas Philip, once pastThermopylae, would do everything we wanted, fortify Thespiaeand Plataea, check Theban misdemeanours, dig a canal throughthe Chersonese at his own expense, and grant us Euboea andOropus in exchange for Amphipolis. These were all statementsmade on the platform, as I am sure you remember, reluctantthough you are to recall your own injuries. The most shamefulthing of all was that in your optimism you voted that the sameterms should be binding on a future generation. To such adegree was this country led astray. Why do I choose thismoment to introduce this fact and demand testimony of it ? Irvill tell you the absolutely candid truth without concealment.I have no wish to embark on abuse and acquire notoriefy inthis assembly at the price of giving my original opponentsfresh scope for earning their fee from the enemy.e Nor is itidle talk. No, it seems to me that this country will have greater

8. See Demosthenes, De Fals . Leg., 46.9. i.e. for their services in replying.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [tz-t]cause to regret Philip than it has now. This is the thin end ofthe wedge. I hope my guess is wrong, but I am afraid we arealready regrettably close to the point of danger. When, therefore,it is no longer open to you to disregard the trend of events, whenit is no longer a matter of hearing from me or someone else ofthe perils of Athens, but they are there for all to see and know,I suspect that you may incline to be angry and violent. I fearthat members of that delegation may fail to reveal the corruptpractices of which they are themselves conscious, and then anyattempt to set right what has been their responsibility may bevisited by recrimination on your parr. For I realize that thereare often critics who vent their antagonism, not on thoseresponsible, but on the nearest victims. So while we are facedby a period of hesitation and delay, and listening ro speeches, Iwant to remind every one of you, however well he may know it,who it was who urged the abandonment of Phocis and Thermo-pylae, the command of which set Philip on the road to Atticaand the Peloponnese, and made the issues before this assemblynot those of abstract justice and of foreign affairs,, but of ourown safety and of war on Attic soil, which will bring misery toeach of us when it comes, and is indeed upon us today. Hadthis country not been led astray, there would have been noproblem. Philip would have secured no naval success or pene-trated into Attica, nor passed Thermopylae ancl Phocis by land.Either he would have kept to his legal rights, and adhered tothe terms of peace and remained inactive, or else he would atonce have been involved in a similar war to that which madehim then desire peace. I have said enough to give a reminder.That this reminder should be put to the ultimate test, I praymay be avoided. I have no wish that anyone's penalty, howeverdeserved, should be exacted at the price of the peril of thecommunity.

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D E M O S T H E N E S : O N T H E C H E , R S O N E S E

Oun situation, gentlemen, ought to ensure that speakers discardall bias for or against any party, and each urge merely the viewhe regards as soundest, particularly in a debate on public issuesof the highest importance. But as some speeches are inspiredby the spirit of competition, or other motives of whatever kind,members of this assembly in general should set everything elseaside, and vote and act as the national interest demands. Thesubject of greatest concern is the position in the Chersonese andthe campaign which Philip has now been conducting for tenmonths in Thrace. But most of the speeches deal with theactivities and intentions of Diopeithes.I As regards any accusa-tions against members of this force, who can be legally broughtto book at any time, I regard this as open either now or later,and there is no need for me or anyone else to make statementsabout it. But it is Philip's hostility to this country, his presencein the neighbourhood of the Hellespont with a considerableforce, and his attempts to gain advantages at our expense(advantages which we shall lose the chance to recover if we aretoo late) that is the subject, in my view, which requires instantdiscussion and action, and which must not be sidetracked byirrelevant disputes and accusations.

I am often surprised at the choice of topics in this assembly,but one of the most astonishing was the claim I heard made afew days ago, that the dury of a statesman was to make a clear-cut choice either of war or peace. But the fact is this. If Philip'sproceedings are peaceable, if he is not in possession of ourproperty in contravention of the peace, if he is not engaged inwholesale propaganda against us, then there is nothing to besaid. We should maintain peace, and it is clear that Atheniansare quite ready to do so. But if the terms of peace to which weare sworn lie before us in black and white, and it has beenmanifest from the very beginning, before the expedition ofDiopeithe'

""0,.'l;,:::;Ti,';,Jl:r":: .::: charged with

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D E M O S T H E N E S lGr:lresponsibility for war, that Philip has without justification appro-priated a number of our possessions, which are the subject ofresolutions of protest passed by this assembly, that he has beencontinually guilty of depredations from other Greek and foreignstates and of anti-Athenian activity, then what is the meaningof talk about clear distinction between war and peace ? Wehave no choice. We are left with the one most just and unavoid-able course, which speakers like this deliberately overlook.What is that ? Resistance to aggression. Unless it is meant thatif Philip holds off Attica and the Peiraeus, no wrong is beingdone, no act of war committed. If this is the boundary wherebyrights are laid down and peace defined, it is universally clearhow wrong, how intolerable, how dangerous an idea this is. Atthe same time it stands in direct opposition to the accusationsmade against Diopeithes. What is the logic of giving Philip afree hand outside Attica, and refusing Diopeithes even assistanceto Thrace on pain of calling it an act of war I Or it is admittedthat the case here is disproved, but the action of the mercenaryarmy in ravaging the district of the Hellespont, and of Dio-peithes in imposing dues, was still unjustifiable and ought notto be tblerated. Very well. I won't dispute it. But I do thinkthat if this opinion is really given in all good faith, the demandto disband the existini4 force of Athens, which is sustained bypropaganda against its commander and his provision of supplies,ought to be balanced by a proof that Philip's armaments willbe disbanded, if it is allowed. Otherwise it amounts, it shouldbe observed, to a return for Athens to the position whichproved so disastrous before. You are fully aware that nothinghas done more to make Philip's successes possible than hiscommand of the initiative. With his standing army on the spotand his anticipation of his aims, he can attack where he likes ina moment. We have to get our information, and it is not tillthen that agitation and preparation begin. The result is that heachieves his objects without trouble, while we are too late andfind that our expense has been wasted. We present a display ofhostility and the desire to obstruct him, but we have the addedsense of failure to act in time.

It must not escape you, then, that now at this very time all

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else is empty words and mere pretence, but this aim is real andis actually being put into operation, the aim that Athens shallremain inactive at home and undefended abroad, while Philipsecures his every object without hindrance. Look first at thepresent. At this moment he has a considerable force in waitingin Thrace, besides sending for large reinforcements accordingto opinion there. Suppose he waits for the winds and then movesagainst Byzantium, first of all, do you imagine that the sameabsurd attitude will prevail in Byzantium as before, and thatthey will not expect either to call us in or to maintain their owndefence ? Not they. They will introduce even troops they mis-trust more than ours rather than surrender to Philip, unlesshe can steal a march on them. Then, if we cannot sail a forceout, and there is none in readiness out there, there will benothing between them and disaster. It may be that they areinsanely improvident. All the same they must be preserved,because it is in the interest of Athens. Again, it is not certainthat he will not attack the Chersonese. To judge by the despatchsent to this country, he intends operations against the district.In that case, if a standing force is in existence, it can eitheroperate in defence of the district or in attack on the Macedonianposition. But once it is disbanded, what can we do in face ofan attack on the Chersonese I File a suit against Diopeithes !What good would that do ? Is it suggested that we should sendan expedition from here ? Suppose the windsz prevent it. 'Well,'

I am told,'it won't happen.'Who will give a guarantee of that?Do you gentlemen rcalize and reflect upon the time of year thatis approaching, during which it is thought reasonable to leavethe Chersonese undefended and hand it to Philip ? Then again,suppose he leaves Thrace without moving against the Chersoneseor Byzantium - you must reckon with this possibility too - andadvances on Chalcis and Megara in the same way as he didpreviously against Oreus,s rvhich is our best policy then ? To

z. See Philippic I,3t.3. Chalcis and Oreus in Euboea had been among towns which were the

object of Philip's intrigues, which distracted Athenian attention fromactivity in defence of Olynthus. See sectional introduction to Demosthenes(t), p. r7r. There was similar activity in connexion with Megara at the same

time. See also 36 below, and Philippic III, tz, 17,27,74.

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D E M O S T H E N E S Ir8-23]defend ourselves against him here and allow the war to come toAttica, or to create a diversion for him at home I Surely thelatter.

We should all realize this, reckon with it and reverse ourjudgement, and instead of depreciating and seeking to disbandthe force Diopeithes is trying to raise for Athens, we shouldmake a spontaneous effort to add our own force to his, to helphis financial stability and co-operate readily in other activities.If Philip were asked whether he would prefer that the rroopsunder Diopeithes, poor though they may admittedly be, shouldbe in good trim and in good standing in Athens, and should beincreased by the collaboration of the state, or be decimated andruined by disparagement and accusation, his answer, surely,would be the latter. So Philip's most heartfelt prayers are beinggranted by the actions of some of us. If so, you cannot havefar to seek for the cause of Athenian disasters.

I now wish to make a candid appraisal of the present situationof the country and our activities and our conduct of affairs. Weare not willing to pay money contributions, not prepared toserve in the forces, unable to keep from public spending.a Werefuse either to grant Diopeithes the League's assessments orto approve his own financial arrangements. We merely run himdown and ask how and when he is going to act, and so on. Andholding the attitude we do, we do not even cafty out our ownduties. In debate we applaud eulogies on Athenian prestige,while in practice we assist the opposite view. Periodicallyspeakers are asked the question, what policy ought to be adopted.My question of members of the Assembly is what languageought to be adopted. If everything alike, contributions, service,spending restrictions, the assessment, Diopeithes' finances andcitizen duties are to be refused. there is nothinE left to sav. Whenit comes to a free hand for adverse prop"guida, to th; extentthat even his supposed intentions are condemned in advanceamid public agreement, what can one say I

4. i.e. the Theoric Fund, on which see Oll,pll1iac I, rgand note.

5. The Greek word is used elsewhere in Demosthenes of the contributionsof the allies under the second Delian League, and it seems to be set in contrastto what Diopeithes raised unofficially.

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What this policy amounts to is a thing some members needto realize. I shall give a candid account of it. There is no otheralternative. Every commander who has ever led an expeditionfrom Athens - I will stake anything on this - exrracts moneyfrom Chios or Erythrde or anywhere he can on the Asiaticseaboard. It is exacted in different amounts according to thescale of the expedition. Whatever the amount, states that grantit are not so insane as to do so for nothing. They buy immunityfor their traders, safe conduct, exemption from harbour duesand so on, under the heading of goodwill, rvhich is the wordused to cover these exactions. It is the same in the case ofDiopeithes. He has an army, so obviously he will be paid by allthese people. Where else can it be supposed that troops can befinanced from, by a commander who gets nothing from Athensand has no resources of his own to provide pay ? From the sky ?No, he subsists on lvhat he can collect, beg or borrorv. So allthat is achieved by his accusers here is a general warning nor togive him anything, because he will be punished for his mereintentions, without reference to any activity or exaction. Whatis asserted is that he is intending a siege, or that he is betrayingGreek citizens. Is anyone so interested in the Asiatic Greeks ?If so, they evidently take better care of others than of their owncountry. The proposal to send a second commander to theHellespont amounts to just this. If Diopeithes is acting un-justifiably and exacting dues, it needs no rnore than the shortestof despatches to prevent it. The law allows for indictment ofsuch offenders, not for an expensive expedition with triremesto keep watch on them ourselves, which is sheer madness. It isagainst our enemies, who are not touched by law, that we canand must maintain troops, despatch triremes and contributemoney, while against ourselves we employ decrees or indictmentor the official warship.6 This is the method of sensible dealing,the other, now in vogue, of ruinous perversity. That examplesof such an attitude should appear here is bad, but not the worst.You yourselves, members of this assembly, adopt an attitudewhich means that speakers have only to declare that Diopeithes

6. This ship, called the Paralus, was sent to bring back criminals fromAthens.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [:o-s6]is the cause of all our ills - or Chares or Aristophonz or anyonemembers may mention, and there is a clamour of agreement.But if you are truthfully told, 'Nonsense, gentlemen, all ourfailures and troubles are due to Philip. If he were inactive, weshould have none,'yor cannot dispute the truth of the statement,but you appear resentful and you feel deprived. The reason is -and I urge you most strongly that I must be allowed freedom tosay rvhat I want in defence of our best interests - the reason isthis. A certain section of the nation has rendered this assemblyintimidating and intractable in debate, but in military prepara-tion inert and contemptible. Consequently, if a culprit is namedlvhom you know you will have power to indict, you agree andacquiesce. But if it is one whose punishment depends onarmed power alone, you have no answer, and are annoyed thatyour position is exposed. The exact opposite ought to be thecase. In political life it is in debate that a kindly forbearanceshould be shown. There you are dealing with yourseh'es andyour allies. But military preparation is the field in which to in-spire fear or stubbornness, where the issue lies between youand your enemies and opponents. But the process of popularoratory, with its excessive ingratiation, has brought a spirit ofself-satisfaction and complacency in debate, where we are toldnothing but what we want to hear, while the active world ofpublic affairs has brought us to the extreme of peril. Imaginesome of the Greek states whose interest our passiviry hasneglected, demanding an account of our activities. 'Gentlemen

of Athens,' they might say, 'you are always sending us mani-festos to the effect that Philip has designs against us and the restof Greece, and is a person to guard against, and so forth.' Weshould have to agree. That es what we do. 'Then you are themost contemptible of supporters. Philip has been kept awayfor ten months by war or illness or winter, and cut off fromhome, and you have done nothing either to liberate Euboea orto recover your own possessions. He has been active, while youwere at home in idleness, though in perfect health (if such an

7. Chares, a vigorous Athenian admiral, first became noteworthy itt 352by his capture of Sestos. He was supported by Aristophon, the orator, in acharge of bribery against his colleagues in the Social War in 355.

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attitude of mind can be called healthy), he has established twotyrants in Euboea,s one to provide a fortified post against Attica,the other against Sciathus, while you have made no attempt toabolish these, if nothing else, but have simply acquiesced. Youhave obviously stood aside for him and made it perfectly clearthat even if he dies ten times over, you will never stir a muscle.In that case why bother us with delegations and accusations I'What answer shall we give to that, gentlemen I I see none at all.

Now there are certain people who think they can refute aspeaker by the question, 'What is our right course I' I will givethem the best answer both in justice and in truth, when Ireply, 'Not your present one.'However, I will speak in furtherdetail. And I urge such claimants to be prepared to act on thereply with as much vigour as they ask the question. First, then,my recommendation is that you take full cognizance of the factthat Philip is at war with this country, that he has broken thepeace - you may as well put an end to recrimination on thispoint - that he is an ill-wisher and an enemy to our whole city,to the ground on which it stands, and to every man in it, eventhose individuals who most imagine they gratify him. Look atEuthycrates and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who appeared hisfirmest friends when they betrayed their country to him, butcame to the worst end of all. This free country is the supremeobject of his enmity and his designs, and its destruction is hisdearest wish. This is not unnatural. He knows very well thateven with complete control of all the rest he can have nosecurity while democracy remains in Athens, that in the eventof a single setback, which can often occur in human affairs,every element under the sway of force will come to Athens forrefuge. You who are her people are not a people naturally givento the selfish pursuit of power, but strong to prevent it in othersor wrest it from them, a thorn in the flesh of despotism, andwilling champions for the liberation of mankind, Therefore hedoes not by any means desire the freedom of Athens to mountguard over his interests. Nor is he guilty of false or carelessthinking. Our first need is to assume that he is an irreconcilable

8. See 18 above. The tyrants here referred to are the tyrants of Eretria andOreus.

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D E M O S T H E N E S [+r-s]enemy to free and democratic institutions. If we are not con-vinced in our hearts of this, we shall not be prepared to takeaction on it in reality. Secondly, we must clearly understandthat his every practice and manipulation is a design upon thiscountry, that every act of defence against him is a defence ofthis country. No one is naive enough to suppose that dismalholes in Thrace - what else could one call them ? - like Drongilusand Cabyle and Masteira, which he is now engaged in reducing,form an attraction whose capture is worth the effort, the wintercampaigns and the hardships which he undergoes, while theharbours and dockyards and warships of Athens, her silverworks and her income, are nothing to him; and that he willleave all this to us, while he winters in the trenches to securethe millet and spelt in Thracian grain-pits. Of course not. Thatand everything else is aimed at the control of what is ours.What then is the reaction of sensible people I To realize thisand make up our minds to it, and to abandon our excessive,our irreparable inactivity, to contribute funds and expect ourallies to do the same, to ensure in actual practice that thisstanding army remains in being, so that his force, which isheld in readiness for the injury and enslavement of all Greece,may be countered by ours in equal readiness to preserve andassist her at every turn. Emergency armaments never succeed.It is essential to organize a force and provision it, to appointcommissariat and subsidiary staff who can take whatever stepsare possible for accurate financial organization, and to exactresponsibility for the finances from them, and for the actionfrom the commander. If you do so, if you are really prepared todo so, you will compel Philip to maintain peace with justiceand to keep to his own territory, which would be an inestimablebenefit, or else you will meet him in warfare on equal terms.

If this appears to anyone to be a matter of great expense andconsiderable labour and perseverance, he is entirely right. Butlet him reflect on the future of Athens without it, and he willsee the benefit of a ready acceptance of the way of duty. If thereexists some divine guarantee - no human one could givesufficient security - that inactivity and general drift will not befollowed eventually by a Macedonian attack on Athens itself, I

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most solemnly declare that it is a disgrace and dishonour to ourpeople, their traditions and the achievements of the past, to letour personal inertia betray and enslave the peoples of Greece.I myself would rather forfeit life than so much as speak of it.Yet if there is anyone who does advocate such conduit and canpersuade you to it, so be it, abandon resistance and let all ourgreatness go. But if there is not, if, on the contrary, every manof us can tell that the more we allow Philip to control, the moreintractable and the stronger we shall find him, then why holdback, wlry wait ? When shall we be ready to do what is requiredof us ? I suppose, when necessity compels us. What free menwould call necessity is not merely upon us now, it is long past.And the necessity of slaves we must hope may not come to us.What is the difference ? The free man's greatest necessity ishis shame at what takes place around him. Greater than thatprobably does not exist. The slave's necessity is the whip, andphysical torture, which I hope may be as remote from ourexperience as it is intolerable in imagination.

I should have been glad to enlarge on the whole subject anddemonstrate the way in which certain people are pursuing thepolitical ruin of the country. But I will omit the bulk of it. When,however, the question of relations with Philip arises, the cry isat once heard of the benefits of peace and the difficulry ofmaintaining a large force. 'The revenues are being plundered,'we are told, with arguments calculated to produce delays athome and freedom of action for Philip. In consequence we gainleisure and inaction, rvhich I fear you may think has been wonat great cost, and our objectors win the resulting popularityand profit. In my view, first it is not in our competence to urgepeace. Here we sit, convinced already. It is in that of the authorof acts of war. Once he is convinced of it, your agreement issecured. Secondly, .what we ought to find intolerable is not thenecessary measures for protection, but the results of failure totake them, and the plunder of the revenues should be halted bythe provision of a safeguard to preserve them, not by abstainingfrom the duty of a citizen. Nonetheless I also feel resentmentthat such concern is felt at plunder of the revenues, when it isin your own power to preserve them and punish malversation,

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D E M O S T H E N E S lss-6'lwhile none is aroused at Philip's wholesale plundering of allGreece, which is done at your expense.

What is the reason, then, why a leader who is openly in armsin contravention of right, and seizing towns, is never stated tobe at war, while statesmen who urge that he should not be givenliberty to do so are accused of making war I I will give it you.The object is that the resentment which Athenian citizens arelikely to feel, if they are injured by the war, may be turned againstspeakers whose desire is for her good, to cause indictment ofthem instead of resistance to Philip, while the culprits stand asaccusers instead of submitting to justice. This is what is meantby their statement that there is a party in the Assembly whichwants war, and that this is the subject of their counter-claim.But I am fully aware that without any proposal of war froman Athenian citizen Philip holds numerous other possessions ofours, and has just sent an expedition to Cardia. Yet, if we areanxious to pretend that he is not atwar,, he must be the greatestfool in the world, if he proves it untrue. What shall we say whenhe actually attacks us I He will say he is not at war, as he declaredto Oreus, when his men were actually in her territory, or earlierto Pherae,s rvhen he was engaged in an attack on their walls, orto Olynthus in the first place, until his army was there onOlynthian soil. Shall we go on even then with our claim thatthe policy of resistance to him is a policy of war ? The onlyother policy is slavery. There is no other alternative, if self-defence and peace are both denied us. Indeed the issue is notthe same for us as it is for others. It is not the reduction ofAthens that he desires, but its total destruction. He knows weshall refuse slavery, and even if we accept it we shall be incapableof it because we are accustomed to supremacy, whereas weshall have greater power than anyone to cause him trouble, ifwe have the chance.

We must take it that the ultimate issues of our destiny are atstake, that men who have sold themselves to Macedon deserveof us every degree of hatred and of violence. It is impossible toovercome our enemies outside the state, till we have exacted

9. Pherae was the Thessalian city whose tyrants included Jason (seeIsocrates, Philip, rrg, p. r6r).

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punishment from those who are here among us. What do yousuppose is the reason of his insolence to us (I can call it nothingelse), the reason why he treats other states with consideration,even if it ends in deceit, while to us he offers plain threats ? Inthe case of Thessaly,

'for instance, his many friendly actions

ended by betraying them into their present enslavement. Themiseries into which Olynthus was deluded after being presentedwith Potidaea and a good deal more, are beyond description.IVow Thebes is being led astray by being accorded the controlof Boeotia'o and freed of a troublesome rvar. Thel' have all beenoffered a bait for their personal satisfaction, and have suflereda {ate which is cornmon knowledge, or will be faced with it inclue course. In our instance I say nothing of losses in the lvar,but in the actual course of the peace consider the extent to whichwe have been hoodwinked and deprived. Think of Phocis,Thermopylae, Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, even Cersobleptes.rrWhy did Philip choose one treatment for the others and adifferent one for ourselves I Because this is the only state inrvhich licence is given to speak on his behalf, in which it issafe to accept bribes from him and still address you, even afteryour many cleprivations. It would have been unsafe in Olynthusto speak on Fhilip's behalf except when the bulk of the popula-tion had enjoyed the benefits of the possession of Potidaea. Itwould have been unsafe in Thessaly, except when the majorityhad enjoyed the benefit of Philip's expulsion of the tyrants andhis arvard of membership of the Council.', It would have beenunsafe in Thebes, until he handed over Boeotia and destroyedPhocis. But at Athens, despite Philip's rape of Amphipolis andCardia, despite the armed strong point he has establishedagainst her in Euboea, despite his immediate move against

ro. See Isocrates, Philip,43, note 7, etc.rr. See sectional introduction. These are instances of Athenian setbacks

due to dilatory methods, after the Peace of Philocrates. The position ofcersobleptes at that time is not clear. His loyalty to Athens had never beendependable, and whether his reduction to a vassal state of Macedon in 346could have been prevented does not seem certain.

rz. The tyrants of Pherae are meant. on the Ampbictyonic council seeIsocrates, Philip, 74, and note there. Also sectional introduction to thisspeech.

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D E M O S T H E N E S 166-7olByzantium, it is still safe to speak for Philip. Some who havedone so have risen from poverty to riches, from remote obscurityto fame and reputation, while this country herself has turnedhonour into dishonour and wealth into bankruptcy. For Imaintain that a city's wealth lies in its allies, its credit, its goodwill, of all of which we are bankrupt. As a result of our fecklessdisregard of all these it is he who wins the envy, respect and fearof Greek and non-Greek alike, while Athens is deprived andhumiliated, outstanding in all that monev will buy, but, in theproper realm of wealth, contemptible. And some speakers, Inotice, hardly adopt the same attitude towards fellow-citizensas towards themselves.ts They urge you to rest inactive, even atthe cost of injury. But they are unable to accept inaction them-selves, though far from suffering injury.

Then I am told by the next speaker, 'You won't take the riskof positive proposals, you haven't the courage to stand up to it.'A daredevil without shame or principle I sincerely hope I amnot, but I credit myself with greater courage in this assemblythan many of our action-party politicians. Gentlemen, when aman carries on the process of judgements, confiscations, grants,indictments, without an eye to the probable benefit of the coun-try, such action is not a display of courage. He holds a guaranteeof indemnity in the popularity he secures by his politics andhis expression of them. He can be violent without danger. Butthe genuine pursuit of good policy, which may oppose thegeneral desire, which involves no quest for popularity, butalways for the highest ends, yet holds itself responsible forboth, that is where real courage lies. This is the true citizenof his country, not the gentlemen who will forfeit the highestinterests of the state for the sake of a momentary popularity.So far am I from any admiration of such people or any beliefin their worth as Athenians that if I r,vere asked the questionwhat benefit I had ever conferred on the country, I wouldforgo the many claims I could make, from the financing oftriremes and theatrical products, the furnishing of money forrevenues or ransom, and other acts of public spirit, in favourof the statement that I pursue no such policy as that. I could do

r3. i.e. they are active supporters of Philip.

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as others do, I could bring accusations, court popularity, secureconfiscations and the rest, but I have never lent myself to anysuch pursuits, nor been led to them by profit or ambition. Ihave persisted in a policy which has lessened my standing inthe public eye, but would raise that of the state itself. So muchI can perhaps say without offence. And I do not regard it asconsistent with true citizenship to seek a policy which mightlead me straight to the highest place in the state, while itbrought her to the lowest among her neighbours. The stateshould grow to success with the wisdom of her best citizens,while all uphold the highest, not the easiest ends. This will bethe path of Nature herself, and along this path the words oftrue statesmanship should lead.

I have even heard this said, that my speeches are indeedalways admirable, but I offer nothing but words, while whatthe country needs is positive action. I will state my position onthis without reservation. I did not consider that the statesman iscalled upon for any action except the advocacy of good policy.The truth of this can easily be demonstrated. You know, nodoubt, that Timotheus,Ia of recent fame, made an oration in thisassembly, urging us to arms to save Euboea from enslavementby Thebes. Words were his means of expression, and to thiseffect. 'Are you holding a debate, when Theban ffoops are inEuboea, wondering how to deal with them, and what action totake ? Will not your action be to fill the sea with your warships,to rise and march to the Peiraeus, to get the troopships afloat ?'Timotheus produced the words, and the citizens of Athens theactions. Both took part in the completed achievement. If hehad spoken to the greatest possible effect, as he did, and theyhad been inert and unresponsive, nothing of what Athensachieved on that occasion could have taken place. It is the samenow, in regard to the words which I or anyone else utters. Theactions must be expected from yourselves, the right policy, andthe knowledge to urge it from the speakers.

Before I sit down, let me summarize my position. I contend

14. Timotheus, son of Conon, a leader in establishing the second AthenianLeague. This episode belongs to 357, when Thebes was trying to securepower in Euboea. Demosthenes had himself served on that occasion.

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D E M O S T H E N E S lzGzlthat money must be raised, our existing force maintained andany faulty details rectified, but without injury to the whole onthe score of chance accusations. We should send representativesto all states for information, exhortation and action. At the sametime corruption in the state's affairs should be punished anduniversally condemned, to make it possible for moderates ofproved integrity to have the wisdom of their ideas approved tothemselves and others. Pursue this policy and put an end togeneral neglect, and perhaps, perhaps there might be a changefor the better. But if you merely sit in this assembly and letvalour go no further than shouting and applause, while youshrink from necessary action, I see no suggestion which withoutthe performance of duty can ever save this country.

It-:]

D E M O S T H E N E S : P H I L I P P I C I I I

In Philippic III thereare several passages which do not appear in the text ofthe best manuscripts, but in the margin only. It is uncertain whether theyindicate an alternative version ofthe speech or are later additions to it. Allthese passages can be cut without damage to the sense, and most, but perhapsnot all, weaken rather than strengthen the urgency of a fine piece of oratory.But they are included here, because the additions, if they are not genuine,are at least early, and may actually have been in Demosthenes' text. Thesepassages are marked with the symbol [ ].

A NunasnR of speeches have been delivered, gentlemen, atalmost every meeting, about Philip's proceedings since thepeace, and his illegal actions not only against this country, butagainst others. And everyone would join, if they are not alreadydoing so, in the statement that words and action are alikeneeded to put an end to his unjustifiable conduct and inflictpenalties. But, as I see it, the whole situation has been taken sofar and left so uncontrolled, that, unpleasant as it may be tosay so, I fear it is true that, had every speech and every proposalbeen aimed to secure the worst possible result for Athens, itcould not have been arranged to less advantage. This mayperhaps be assigned to a variety of causes. It is more than afew isolated reasons that have brought things to this pass. Inparticular a proper investigation will show that it is due to apreference for popular over true values among speakers, insome cases to the protection by individuals of their own fieldsof distinction and power to the exclusion of forethought,fwhich they prefer the country to avoid.] In other cases un-justified attacks are made on responsible officials, which resultsmerely in Athens penalizing herself and being occupied indoing so, while Philip has a free hand to do what he likes. Thissort of government is in our bones, but it is also the cause ofour troubles. And I do ask you, gentlemen, not to loose youranger on me at the truth which my candour may reveal. Lookat it in this way. Free speaking is something which in mostfields is so generally expected in Athens, that it is allowed toforeigners and slaves, and one can often find servants here

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DEMOSTHENES ll-81speaking their mind with more licence than citizens in someother countries. But in politics it has been completely extirpated.The consequence is complacency and flattery in this assembly,where gratification is all we are offered, while in the actualworld of affairs we are driven to desperate danger. Now if thisattirude persists, I have no more to say. But if you are preparedto listen to sound policy without wishful thinking, I am readyto offer it. However desperate a condition affairs are in, whateveropportunities have been wasted, it is still possible, given thewill to do our duty, to remedy it. One thing I can say, whichmay seem contradictory but it is true. The worst feature of thepast is the best basis for future hope.'What feature I The factthat it is complete and total dereliction of dury on our partwhich has brought us to this position. If it followed a periodof exemplary conduct by the people of Athens, there would beno hope of improvement. But in fact it is the neglect and inertiaof Athens which Philip has worsted. She has'not been defeated.She has never stirred a finger.

[If it were universally admitted that Philip is at war withAthens and has contravened the terms of peace, the only coursefor speakers to urge or advise would be to take the easiest andmost certain method of defence against him. But as the strangeattitude exists which, despite his action in capturing towns, inholding Athenian possessions and in wholesale unwarrantableconduct, yet tolerates frequent statements at meetings of theAssembly that it is a section of this country which is responsiblefor the war, it is necessary to take precautions and correct thisposition. The danger exists that proposals and recommendationsof defence may lead to an accusation of provoking war.r . . . ]

If, then, it is open to this country to remain at peace, and thisalternative is in our power (to begin at this point) then I main-tain that we should so do, and the author of such a proposalshould promote legislation and act in this sense without decep-tion. But if someone else is under arms, if there is someoneelse with a strong force at his command.who offers the pretenceof peace to this country, while his actions are those of war,what is left us but resistance to him t If a pretence of peace is

r. A further sentence is omitted bv the Oxford text.

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what you want, as he does, I will not argue with you. But any ideathat peace is a situation in which Philip holds the resr of theGreek world with the intention of proceeding against Athens isfirst of all insane and secondly means peace enjoyed by philipand not by Athens. And this is the situation purchased with allthe money he has spent, the situation in which he makes rvaron Athens, but not Athens on him.

Indeed, if we are going to wait for the moment when he admitshe is at war, we must be the greatest optimists in existence. Ifhe marches on Attica or the Peiraeus, he will never make suchan admission, to judge by his rrearment of others. When hewas forty stad,es from Olynthus, he proclaimed to her peoplethe alternative that either they must abandon olynthus or heMacedonia, when up till then any such accusation against himhad been greeted with indignation and protesrations of inno-cence. Again he marched to Phocis ostensibly as to an alliedpower, and Phocian representatives joined the march, while themajority here contended that his advance through the passwould do no good to Thebes.z Yet again there wal the cas^e ofPherae the other day. Philip entered Thessaly in the guise of afriend and ally, and seized Pherae, which he now holds. Thelast instance is that of the unfortunate city of Oreus.: Philipstated that he had sent his force as a benevolent measure ofsurveillance. He had heard that thel'were in a state of troubleand dissension, and it was a mattei of genuine friendship onthe part of an ally to assist at such a time. Can we then supposethat in the case of people who would never have taken theoffensive against him, but defensive measures at the most, hepreferred deception to open force, and yet in ours he is likelyto make an open declaration of war, particularly while wecontinue to invite deception I It is unthinkable. It would beunparalleled folly on his part if without any complaint fromhis victims, but an actual tendency to blame some bf our ownnumber, he were to dissolve internal differences and rivalries

z' rn 946. Though Philip never agreed to any mercy towards her, phocisapparently expected it, even when Philip passed Thermopylae.

3. on oreus see the speech on the chersonese, and sectional introductionto this speech, p. 2zr.

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DEMOSTHENES [r4-r8]of ours and warn us against himself, and remove all pretext forhis employees ro mislead us with the argument thai he is notat war.

But I ask you, could anyone in his senses judge of war andpeace on a basis of words and not of actions I of course not.Very well, then, from the first days after the signing of peace,abefore the appointment of Diopeithes or the despatch

-of the

force now in the Chersonese, Philip was engaged in the caprureof Serrium and Doriscus, and the expulsion of the garrisonplaced by the Athenian commander in serrium and the sacredMount.s What did this action amounr to ? Peace had been hissworn undertaking. Don't say, 'What cioes that matterl, or'How does that affect us?'Whether tlris was a minor marreror one which did not concern us is perhaps a different question.But right and justice, be the breach of them small or great, areone and the same. Think of the Chersorrese, agreed as ours byPersia and all the Greek states.6 when he sends a force thereand admits to running an expedition and gives orders for it,what is he doing I He asserts that he is not at war. But I cannotfor a moment agree that such actions on his part are in accord-ance with the peace made with Athens. tr declare that even ininterference with Megara, in the manipulation of a tyranny inEuboea, in his recent movement into Thrace and his intriguesagainst the position in the Peloponnese,T in all the designs whichhis power activates, he is breaking the peace and is at war withAthens - unless you are prepared to say that to erect siegeartillery is a peaceful occupation, until it is set in action againstthe walls. No, no. A man whose actions and calculations aredesigned for my capture, is at war with me before he everdischarges a weapon. What events are there whose occurrencewould be a danger to this country ? The alienation of theHellespont, the control of Megara and Euboea by an enemy, or

4. strictly speaking these attacks of Philip's did not occur afrer the signingof peace, but during the negotiations for it, a period, however, during whichhe had undertaken not to attack the Chersonese. But he took characteristicadvantage of sorhe uncertainty as to what was included in the Chersonese.

5. These were places in Thrace, but hardly in the Chersonese itself.6. This statement is not supported by any known authority.7. See On the Chersonese, 18 (Megara! 36 (Euboea), etc.

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a tendency in the Peloponnese to side with Philip. This is theartillery aimed against Athens, and how can the man whoerects it be said to be at peace ? The day of his destruction ofPhocis is the day I lay down as the first of his war againstAthens. Defend yourselves against him, and I say you willshow your good sense. Leave him alone, and you will be unableto do so when you want to. I am so far removed from your otheradvisers, gentlemen, that I do not advocate consideration ofthe Chersonese and Byzantium. I advocate assistance and pre-vention of harm to them, [and a vote of all necessaries to thetroops now there]. Your deliberations should be about all theGreek states. They are in dire danger. But I want to make clearto you the cause of these fears about the present, to enableyou, if I am right, to share my reasoning and exercise someforethought for yourselves, if for no one else, and if you thinkit is nonsense and moonshine) never again credit me with asingle sound idea.

Philip's rise to power from small and humble beginnings, thedistrust and division within the Greek states, the fact that sucha rise on his part was much more extraordinary then than thecontrol of all the rest would be now that he has so much already,and all else of this kind which I could enlarge upon, I pass over.But I can see that everyone, beginning with this country, has con-ceded to him what has throughout the past been the bone ofcontention in all Greek wars. What is this ? The power to dowhat he likes, to encroach on and pillage the Greek statespiecemeal, and to attack and enslave their cities. We have beenthe leaders of the Greeks for seventy-three years, and Spartafor twenty-nine.8 Some power has also lain with Thebes recentlyafter the battle of Leuctra. But never yet, gentlemen, has thiscountry or Thebes or Sparta been granted this power by thecities of Greece, to do what they choose, never by a long way.In our case, or rather that of the Athenians of that day, whenthere was an opinion in some quarters that their conduct wasbeyond toleration, everyone, even states with no ground ofcomplaint, thought it right to join in the war against them.There is no need to multiply instances. Athens and Sparta,

8. i.e. Athens 477 to 4o5, Sparta 4o4to 376 n.c. (battle of Naxos).

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D E M O S T H E N E S [rs-g]without needing any initial injustice of each other's to comp'rlainof, always felt an obligation to take arms in support of a victimof injustice. Yet all the offences committed by Sparta in thosethirty years, or by our ancestors in their seventy, are less thanthe acts of injustice against Greek states committed by Philipin less than thirteen years of his power. They are not a fractionof these, as it takes only a short time to demonstrate. I omitOlynthus, Methone, Apollonia and thirty-two towns in Thraceewhich he destroyed with such virulence thar it is hard for avisitor there to be sure rhey were ever inhabited. I say nothingof the destruction of the large population of Phocis.But what about the people of Thessaly ? They have had theirconstitution and their units of government taken from themand tetrarchies established, to make their slavery extend notmerely to cities, but to whole regions.ro The cities of Euboeaare under a tyranny, a tyranny in an island close to Thebes andAthens. In his letters he says in so many words, 'I am at peacewith all who are prepared to accept what I say.' And he doesnot write this without carrying it out. He has marched to theHellespont, as he did previously against Ambracia,Il he is inpossession of the considerable city of Elis in the Peloponnese,there has been a recent plot against Megara; neither the Greeknor the non-Greek world is big enough for his rapacity. All theGreek states can see and hear this, and yet there are no deputa-tions of protest sent out between us, no indignation. Ourmorale has been so undermined in individual cities, that to thismoment we are incapable of any action for our advantage orour prestige, we cannot combine, we cannot do anything byway of support or mutual assistance. We look on, indifferent tohis rise. Each of us has the idea of making a profit out of themoment of another's destruction, as far as I can see, instead oftaking thought or action to secure the survival of the Greeks. It

9. The 32 arc the cities of the Confederacy of Olynthus. But Apolloniawas not one of them, nor is it certain in what circumstances it fell to Philip.

ro. See Philippic II,zz.rr. See below, 34, 72. Ambracia in the north west of Greece was one

district in which Athens checked Philip's advance from Epirus in 343. InElis an oligarchic faction declared for Philip.

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is like the periodic onset of fever or some other epidemic, andattacks even the apparently remote, as everyone knows. Thereis another thing which is common knowledge: that any troublesinflicted on the Greek states by Sparta or by ourselves were atleast injuries inflicted by genuine inhabitants of Greece, andone would look upon them in the same way as on a true-bornson, who had come into considerable property, but made somemistake or injustice in the administration of it. In itself thismight deserve criticism or accusation, but it would be impossibleto deny that it was a relative and the heir to the property whohad done it. But had it been a slave or an illegitimate claimantwho had lost or damaged what did not belong to him, goodnessknows how much more heinous, how much more resented hisaction would have been. There is no such feeling about Philipand his present proceedings. He not merely does not belongand is not so much as related to the Greeks, but is not even of re-spectable foreign descent; he comes of that Macedonian riff-raffwhich could not even offer a good slave for sale in days gone by.

There is no limit to our degradation. He caps his destructionof towns by celebrating the Pythian Games,Iz the festival ofthe Greeks alone, and if he is not there himself, he sends hisslaves to organize the celebrations. [He commands Thermopylaeand the gate to Greece, and his garrisons and mercenariescontrol these places. He holds the right of first access to theoracle of Apollo,r3 and has brushed us aside as well as theThessalian and Dorian peoples and the rest of the Amphictyonicstates, and debarred us from a right which is not even open toall Greek states.] He dictates to Thessaly her form of govern-ment. He sends mercenaries to Porthmus to expel the democracyof Eretria, and to Oreus to establish Philistides as tyrant. Andthe Greeks see all this and put up with it. They seem to meto regard it like a hailstorm, which everyone prays to be spared,but no one takes steps to prevent. It is not only the insults toGreece which are left unrequited, it is the injuries to them-selves, and this is the final humiliation. He has encroached on

rz. Philip was President in 346 and 342.r3. This privilege was conferred on Philip at Delphi by the Amphictyons

in place of Athens for his vigour against Phocis.

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DEMOSTHENES [s+-+'1Corinthian preserves at Ambracia and Leucas. The Achaeanpost at Naupactus he has sworn to deliver to Aetolia. Thebesowned Echinus, which he has now captured, and Byzantium,against which he is marching, is his own ally. This countryitself has lost (to omit other places) the principal city of theChersonese, Cardia. The same thing happens to us all, but wehesitate, we are benumbed, and turn our eyes on our neighbours inmutual disffust, instead of on the author of all our injuries. Yet,when he has treated the whole body of us so outrageously, whatcan we expect from himrwhen he has separate control ofeach one ?

What is the cause of this I It is not withour any basis, notwithout good reason, that the Greeks had in the past a naturaltendency towards freedom, or now towards servitude. There thenexisted something, an element in the spirit of the people, whichtoday is there no more, but which in those days overcame thewealth of Persia and led Greece to freedom, which was neverdefeated in battle by land or sea, but whose loss now hasbrought everything to ruin, and turned the affairs of Greeceupside down. What is this ? [Nothing subtle or remore but thesheer fact that] bribery in the desire ro rule or destroy Greecemet with universal hatred, that a conviction for bribery was amatter for intense feeling and attended by the most severepunishment, [without any appeal or any lenience]. Never wasthe critical decision, which chance often puts in the hands ofthe neglectful instead of the conscientious, open to a priceoffered by speakers or commanders, nor was their feeling ofsolidarity or their distrust of tyrants and foreigners, or indeedanything of that sort. But the present provides a marker for thesale and export of everything, and the corresponding importslead to the decay or contamination of Greece. What are these IEnvy of gain, ridicule of openness fsympathy with wrong laidbare,] resentment of criticism, and all the apparatus of corrup-tion. Yet warships and men and supplies of money and materials,and everything which would be judged tg contribure to thepower of cities, are present in greater numbers and abundancenow than then. But it is all rendered useless, ineffective andwithout value by venality.

That this is true you can presumably see for yourselves, and

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have no need of any evidence of mine. That the past was theopposite I will demonstrate, not by means of any words of myown, but by the written records of your own ancestors, inscribedby them on a bronze tablet on the Acropolis, [not for their ownbenefit -. their true spirit was there without any inscription - butto provide you, their descendants, with a reminder and anexample of the need to set the same values in your hearts. Thewords are these] 'Arthmiuq son of Pythonax, of Zelea is withoutrights and declared an enemy of the people of Athens and theirallies, together with his dependants."+ There follows thereason: 'because he carried Persian money to the Peloponnese'.This is the inscription. And I beg you mosr earnesrly to considerthe attitude of the Athenians of that time in doing this, and theclaim they were making. Here was a man from Zelea calledArthmius, an underling of Persia (Zelea is in Asia), and becausein the service of his master he carried money, not to Athens,but to the Peloponnese, the city of Athens declared him anenemy to themselves and their allies, together with his depen-dants, and without rights. This is not the ordinary way ofdisfranchisement. It has no application to our citizenof Zelea,if he was to have no part in Athenian affairs. There is, however,a clause in the laws of homicide, that where a man is not per-mitted trial for homicide [and his killer is indemnified againstpenalty] he shall die without rights. T'he meaning of it is this,that the killer of such a man is free of guilt. The authors of thisenactment thus took the view that they had a duty to protectall Greeks. Only on this assumption would they have beenconcerned with a case of bribery and corruption in the Pelopon-nese. But they imposed punishment and retribution on anysuch instances they knew, to the extent of inscribing their names.The result is naturally that the Greek world inspired respectoutside it, and not the other way about. It is not so now. Ourpresent outlook is not the same in these or any other respects.What is this outlook? ["Yo,r know well enough yourselves.

r4. The date and occasion of this decree, which is mentioned again byDemosthenes elsewhere, are not known. Nor can we be sure that his inter-pretation of it is correct, though presumably his hearers accepted it.

r5. Some editors would exclude this passage, which at best must be avariant version.

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D E M O S T H E N E S I+6-srlThere is no point in general accusation. And similarly the restof the Greeks know it equally well, which is my reason for theclaim that the present situation demands both eager activityand sound advice. What advice ?] Do you want to be tolddetails i And will you accept them without resentment I

(A list is read,)

There exists a naive argument intended to offer consolation toAthens by urging that Philip is not yet what Sparta was whenshe held comrnand of the sea as well as all the land area, whilePersia was in alliance with her, and there was no power to standagainst her. Nonetheless, this country stood up to her thenlvithout being torn to pieces. In my view, while there has beenconsiderable and virtually universal advance, so that nothingremains as it was in the past, there has been no advance, norevolution greater than that in rvarfare. First of all I learn thatin those days Sparta, and the rest equally, for the four or fivernonths of full summer would invade ancl ravage the countrywith heavy--armed troops in a citizen army, and then returnhome. So old-fashioned were proceedings, or rather so muchon a citizen basis, that there was no bribery at ali, but warfarewas regular and open. Nowadays you can see, of course, theextensive ruin caused by treachery, and the absence of organiza-tion or set battles, and you learn that it is no close formationwhose leadership enables Philip to go where he will, but lighttroops, cavalry, archers and mercenaries, and this is the kindof army he puts together. But when on these lines he attacks astate which is rotten at the core and whose power of resistanceis sapped by distrust, he brings up his artillery and besieges it.I say nothing about summer and winter, and the fact that nodifference is made b.t*."r, them, ,ro ,.rron set aside for aninterval. But we should know all this and reckon on it, and notadmit war into the counffy, nor be brought crashing by a regardfor naive ideas of the Peloponnesian War in the old days. It isessential to maintain a watch on affairs and on armaments at aslong a range as possible, to prevent his leaving his own territory,and not to be involved in a war at close quarters. When it comesto warfare, gentlemen, we have many advantages, assuming

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that we are prepared to play our part, such as the nature of thecountry with its wide possibilities for raiding and guerrillatactics, and many more. F or a pitched battle he is better trainedthan we are.

But the decisions you need are not confined to this, nor toactive measures of military defence. Your thoughts, yourfeelings should be feelings of detestation towards speakers inthis assembly who take Philip's side. You must understandthat it is impossible to overcome the enemies of Athens till youhave brought his supporters in your own city to book. And Imost solemnly declare that you will never ichieve it. Theinsensibility, the insanity of this assembly - I don't know whatto call it, I am sometimes led to believe we are under the maligninfluence of some evil power - is capable of allowing abuse,jealousy, satire or any other motive to make us demand a hearingfrom men in the pay of the enemy, some of whom would noteven deny this description, and show amusement at any abusewe may give vent to. Bad as it is, this is not the worst. Youhave made politics a safer thing for men like that than for truesupporters of Athens. Observe the disastrous results of listeningto such ideas. T'hey are events well known to you.

Political circles in Olynthus contained one party of supportfor Philip and subservience to him in every instance, and oneof genuine support for their country and concern to avoid itsenslavement. Which party was it that caused the fall of Olyn-thus ? Which betrayed the cavalry whose loss led to the fall ?Philip's supporters, whose misrepresentations of the patrioticparty, while the city still stood, even induced the Olynthianpeople to banish Apollonides.I6 And this is not a single isolatedinstance in which this practice has done endless damage. InEretria after the eviction of Plutarchustz and his mercenariesand during the democratic control of the city itself and ofPorthmus, there were two parties, one favouring Athenianinfluence, the other Macedonian. It was largely, if not solely,the latter who gained the ear of that wretched, unlucky people,

16. Democratic leader in Olynthus, later made a citizen of Athens.r7. On Plutarchus see back on The Peace, 5 and note, and sectional

introduction here.

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D E M O S T H E N E S Ist-6slwho were eventually induced to expel their own best advisers.Philip, their supposed ally, sent a thousand mercenaries underHipponicus, pulled down the walls of Porthmus, and establishedan autocratic council of three, Hipponicus, Automedon andCleitarchus. He has since twice suppressed attempts by Eretriato secure freedom, [first by sending the force under Eurylochus,then that commanded by Parmenio].

It is hardly necessary to go into all the instances. But at Oreus,as everyone knew, Philip's supporters were Philistides, Menip-pus, Socrates, Thoas and Agapaeus, who control the city now,while one individual named Euphraeus, who had lived here inAthens, stood for freedom and against subjection to anyone. Inhis case the abusive and insulting treatment he received fromthe people throughout would make a long story. But a yearbefore the capture of the town he exposed the treachery ofPhilistides and his associates, whose activities he discovered.Whereupon a large gang under the production and generaldirection of Philip rushed Euphraeus off to prison as a sub-versive influence. At this the democrats of Oreus, instead ofrescuing Euphraeus and forcibly expelling the others, showedno resentment towards them, and stated with satisfaction thatEuphraeus had deserved what he got. After which the conspira-tors enjoyed complete freedom to secure the capture of the town,and proceeded to set the plan on foot. Any of the populace whorealized the truth were terrified into silence by their memoryof the fate of Euphraeus. They were reduced to such an abjectcondition that despite the impending calamity not a man daredspeak a word before the enemy had completed their designsa4d were at the gates. At that point there was some attempt atresistance, and also a movement towards surrender. After theshameful and disastrous capture of the town these conspiratorsexercised despotic control over it, turned upon their previouspreservers, who had been prepared for any measures againstEuphraeus, and exiled or executed them. Euphraeus himselfcommitted suicide, and so gave active proof of the honesty andunselfishness of the stand he took against Philip.

You may wonder what is the reason why the people ofOlynthus, Eretria and Oreus were more favourably inclined to

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speakers in Philip's interest than in in their own. It is the samereason as arises in our own case. Speakers in the genuine interestof Athens, even if they lvish it, sometimes find it impossible tosay a word to gratify popular opinion, because it is inconsistentwith care for the city's welfare. For the others popularity isitself co-operation with Macedon. On those occasions the firstparty kept asking for money, the others denied the necessity;the first demanded war and distrust, the second peace, untilthe trap closed. Everything else, to omit furthqr details, seemsto have run on the same lines. One party argued with an eye topopularity, the other as the means of survival. But eventuallyfor the most part it was not due to ingratiation nor in ignorancethat the majority were led that way. They subsided, becausethey thought they had altogether the worst of the struggle.And I declare most emphatically my apprehension that thismay happen to our own country, when there comes the calcula-tion and the rcalization of being at the end of her resources.Heaven send that things may never reach this point. Death ismany times more to be desired than subservience to Philip [andthe betrayal of some of your best advisers]. It was a fine sort ofreward the people of Oreus enjoyed when they entrusted them-selves to Philip's friends and rejected Euphraeus, and the peopleof Eretria when they discarded Athenian representatives andsurrendered to Cleitarchus: to be subjected to slavery, violenceand massacre. It was a fine sort of forbearance that was shownto Olynthus on the appointment of Lasthenes to the cavalrycommand and the expulsion of Apollonides. It rvas criminalstupidity to indulge such hopes, to pursue false policies andrefuse the path of duty, to listen to the suggestions of enemyagents and imagine that the importance of the city they livedin preserved them from any kind of misadventure. 'fhis isrvhat is abject, to say'Who would have thought it? Of coursewe ought to have done this and not that.' There is a greatdeal that could be said in Olynthus now which it would havesaved them to foresee, a great deai in Oreus or Phocis, and inall the states which have been lost. But that is no consolationto them. While the ship is still afloat, be she big or small, isthe time for sailors, steersmen and every member of the crew

z6t

D E M O S T H E N E S I6g-tslto do his utmost to prevent any design or any accident fromcapsizing her. Once the sea closes over her, the effort is vain.So it is now, gentlemen, with this country. While we are stillourselves preserved, while we still possess a great city withenormous resources and the highest honour, what action arewe to take ? Perhaps this is a question many of this audiencehave long wanted to ask. I will answer it, and add a proposalwhich you can further if you like it. You must make your owndefence, take your own measures. I mean this in terms of ships,money and men. Even if the whole world submits to slavery,Athens must fight for freedorn. This is what we must in ourown persons bring to reality and to clear vision, and then wecan call upon others, and send our representatives to point itout [everywhere, to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios and Iwould add to Persia, whose interests are also concerned withrefusing to allow Philip to subdue the worldl. If they areconvinced, there may be more to share any danger or expensethat is needed, if not, at least events may be delayed. Since itis a single individual and not the combined strength of acommunity against which this war is being fought, even delayhas its value, as had last year's talks conducted by my goodfriend, Polyeuctus, Hegesippus and the others as well asmyself, in our canvass of the Greek states, which caused Philipto hesitate instead of moving against Ambracia or towards thePeloponnese. I do not ask that we should call on others, if weare not prepared to do what is vital for ourselves. It would benaive to neglect ourselves and claim concern for others, or toforget the present and rouse alarm about the future. This is notwhat tr want. I call for supplies for the force on the Chersoneseand the fulfilment of their other requirements, for personalpreparation on our own part and a summons to all Greeks fortheir unification, instruction and incitement. This is the part acity with our reputation should play. The idea that Greece willbe rescued by Chalcis or Megara, while Athens eludes theissue, is wholly wrong. It will be enough if these cities them-selves survive. It is we who must do it, we whose ancestorsgained the glory and bequeathed it in the course of great perils.And if each of us is to sit idle and press for his own require-

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ments and his own exemption from duty, first of all he willnever find anyone to do it for him, and secondly, I fear that allthat we seek to avoid will be forced upon us.

That is my declaration and my proposal, which, in my belief,might yet set our house in order. If any speaker can offer abetter, let him urge it, and may the decision of this assembly,I most earnestly pray, secure our best interest.

GLOSSARY OF ' TE,CHNICAL TERMS

L, A, I, D refer to the speeches, in this selection, oflysias, Andocides,fsocrates, Demosthenes. Numbers refer to sections.

AccouNrs. (A ZZ) All holders of office had at the end of their yearof duty to submit an account of their tenure of office, which wasexamined by auditors chosen by lot from the Council and subject toa legal case in the event of any question.

Acone. The market place. Most frequently mentioned is that atAthens, where it was the centre both of business and of generalintercourse.

ANerrIoN. (A +S) The temple of the Dioscuri on the north side ofthe Acropolis at Athens.

Aparuntl. (A l:6) The festival celebrated by the members of'phratries' (brotherhoods) in Athens, at which the young wereenrolled into the phratry.

AncnoNs. (D, Philippic I, 36, note) In the earliest times theprincipal magistrates of Athens. There were originally three, theBasileus dealing with religious matters, the Polemarch with war andthe Archon with administration. Later six iunior archons wereadded, called Thesmothetae.They had wide judicial and executiveduties, but never dominated politics after the rise of the Srategi in

487 u.c. with the decree enacting the appointment of the archons bylot.

Anropacus. (L 69) The oldest council in Athens, associated with theearly powers, both political and judicial, of an aristocratic constitu-tion, together with the archons (q.v.) who continued throughoutto be members of it. But its importance declined with theirs from

487 v.c., and its general functions of supervision were formallyremoved n 462-46r. (But see A 83 and note.) It remained a highlyvenerated body connected with jurisdiction for homicide, whosename and fame remained to the days of St Paul ('Mars'Hill') andof Milton's AreoPagitica.

Asssrrnr.v. (passim) The Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia) was themeeting of all citizens to which were addressed discussions of majorissues introduced by the Council (Boule). Any citizen could attendand speak. The total number of citizens may have been as much as

4o,ooo in about 43o 8.c., but the oligarchs in 4r r claimed that the

264

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAI - TERMS

attendaqce on the Pnyx hill, where the Assembly was held, neverreached more than 5ooo.

Bestrrus. (A n) See Archons. The Basileus presided over theAreopagus and had charge of religious ceremonies, his jurisdictionincluding cases of impiety and homicide.

Ceouate. (I Panegyrical, 55) The citadel of Thebes.ClnnucrrtEs. (I Panegyricu.s, ro7) See note on p. r2o.Correcrons. (A 77) Officiils in charge of collecting money due to

the State treasury.ConutssroNERs on' INqutny. (A 36) Members of a commission

established for the special investigation of an incident or incidents(e.9. the case of the Hermae).

CouNcIt-. (passim) The Council (Boule) at Athens consisted of 5oomembers, fifty from each tribe, elected by lot and serving for ayear,which formed an executive body of wide scope for day-to-day pur-poses. All citizens over thirty were eligible, but none could servemore than twice, and not in successive years. It provided its ownpresidents and also those of the Assembly, for whom it preparedbusiness. See also Prytaneis.

Cyt.ioseRcns. (A 6r) A gymnasium, i.e. t sports ground, east ofAthens, sacred to Heracles.

Dentc. (L rr) Persian gold coin equivalent in value to twenty Atticd,rachrnae.

Dncencuv. See sectional introduction to I, Panegyricas p. roo.DrlpntxIutvt. (A 77) Temple of Apollo and Artemis in S.E.

Athens. Used for certain cases of homicide.DroNysre. (D Philippic I, 3) Athenian festival in honour of

Dionysus held about April, and particularly associated with thedramatic competitions. Visitors attended it in large numbers.

THr Er-nvrN. The body of police commissioners instituted by theThirty Tyrants.

EpHprer. ( Zil A commission of the Areopagus for the judgementof minor cases of homicide. Though the name remained, regularmembers of the law-courts (dicasts) were substituted for them inthe fifth century.

EpHons. (L Z6) The leading magistrates at Sparta, five in number.They held the highest power in the state.

ErnsreNs. (D) North-east winds regular in the Aegean in July andAugust.

Eurror.ptoar. (I Panegjtricus, r57) Ancient clan in which the officeof the hierophant at the mysteries was hereditary.

GyuNeslARcH. (A r3z) Official in charge of a gymnasium, or sporrs

z6s


ground, who employed professional trainers, etc., and prepared therunners for the torch race.

Henlrosr. (I, Panegyricus, rr7) A garrison commander, of thekind sent out by Sparta after 4o4B.c. to govern states which she hadtaken over. See sectional introduction to I Panegyricas.

HnnMes. (A) Images of Hermes which stood in front of doors andelsewhere throughout Athens, and were regarded as symbols of thegod's protection. Their mutilation was thought an act of terribleimpiety and an omen of disaster.

Junv. (A 18) The organization of Athenian citizens as juries wascalled the Heliaea (originally a particular court of appeal). In thefifth century 6ooo iurors (dicastae, dicasts) were chosen by lot, but inthe fourth all eligible citizens (i.e. over thirty years old) who offeredwere enrolled and divided into ten sections' and the sectionsallotted to the courts as required, two or more sections beingcombined, if the case warranted it (see note on A r8). Large num-bers and the use of the lot in allocation made it hard to browbeator bribe a iury, though it may have led to unfair decisions. On theballot Panegyricu.r see note on L 9r.

KnnyrEs. (A, rz8 I, Panegyricus,r5T) An ancient clan in which theoffice of torch-bearer at the mysteries was hereditary.

LrrrouRcre. (liturgy, public service) See nore 15 on D philippic I.Public services carried out at Athens by the richer citizens andmetics, who were compulsorily nominated for the service. The mostirnportant of these were the trierarchia (equipment of a ship) andthe choregia (equipment of a chorus for the dramatic oi othercompetitions).

Mnrrcs. (Metoeci) (L introduction and 6) Aliens, especialry inAthens, more or less permanently resident and given restrictedrights and duties in the state.

MoNny. (Athenian) (A 28, D, Philippic I, z8) Six obols wenrto oned,rachma, too d,rachma,e to one mina (mna), and 6o ninae to onetalent.

Penerus. (D, Philippic 1.,34, note) The Athenian state galley usedfor official missions, e.g. for a summons to return to Athens for trial.

PaNernrxaee. (D, Philippic /,:s) An annual Athenian festival heldnear the end of July on the official birthday of Athena, to whom anembroidered robe was offered

PR_vreNErs, PRvrrNpulr. In the council (q.v.) the fifty membersfrom each tribe in turn served as a working committee for one tenthof the year, the order in which tribes served being chosen by lot,and the chairman again chosen by lot. Members ofsuch a committee

266

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

were called prytaneis (presidents or chairmen), i.e. of the presidingcommittee for the month.

The Prytaneum, on the north side of the Acropolis, may havebeen the headquarters of the prytaneis before the Tholos was builtfor them. It was later.used for some homicide cases, but also forsome public occasions, e.g. when a dinner was given to a benefactor.Cf. A a6.

Srepr. (I, Panegjtricus,ST) A unit of distance, just over zoo yards, thelength of the stadium at Olympia.

SrerBn. (L rr) A gold coin from Cyzicus equivalent in value totwenty-eight Attic drachmae.

Sto.t, or Sroe PoIrtrr. (A 8S) A colonnade in Athens decoratedwith paintings. Inscribed announcements were posted in it.

Srnernct. (L 6S, A :8) The highest military officers in Athens, afterthe Polemarch ceased to command the arm5 the Strategi becamealso the leading magistrates, military and political power beingcommonly combined. Outstanding Strategi like Pericles were some-times elected many times in successive years. They could sit withthe Council, but had no special powers in either Council orAssembly.

Svrtinonlrs. (Committees.) See note 7 on D, Olynthiac II, zg.Tnnsnult. (A +S) A temple east of the Agora and north of the

Acropolis (not that now known as the Hephestiaeum but often stillreferred to as the Theseum).

THnsuorHErAE. (A z8) The six junior members of the executivebody of the nine Archons (q.v.). Their duties were mainly judicial.

Tnr Tulnrv. See sectional introduction to Lysias' Eratosthenes.Tnlsrs (L U) were not normal tribal units, but artificially con-

structed by the constitution of Cleisthenes at the end of the sixthcentury r.c. for purposes of administration and to prevent thedisunion rvhich had persisted in Athens between the ancientdivisions of the Coast, the Hill and the Plain.

TnInnnr. (D, Philippic I, fi) The normal Greek warship.

267

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF ' EVENTSBE TWEEN 5 r o AND 336 B . c .

B.C.

5ro Fall of the tyrants (sons of Peisistratus) in Athens.

507-6 Expulsion from Athens of Spartans u,nder Cleomenes. Demo-cratic reforms of Cleisthenes begun.

4go First Persian invasion of Greece. Battle of Marathon.

48o Second Persian invasion, under Xerxes. Battles of Thermopylaeand Artemisium. Athens abandoned. Battle of Salamis. Retreatof Xerxes, leaving a Persian force under Mardonius.

47g Battles of Plataea and Mycale. Retreat of Persians. Ionian revoltfrom Persia

477 Confederacy of Delos founded. Fortification of Athens.

468 Defeat of Persian navy at battle of the Eurymedon.

462 Democratic predominance of Ephialtes and Pericles at Athensbegins.

459-445 FirSt Peloponnesian War.

454 Treasury of Delos transferred to Athens.

448 Peace of Callias regulates relations of Athens and Persia.

438 Completion of the Parthenon.

43r Outbreak of second Peloponnesian War. Pericles' FuneralSpeech.

42g Death of Pericles.

42r Peace of Nicias. Athenian recapture of Scione.

4r8 ' Greek states again at war. Battle of Mantinea.

416 Athenian destruction of Melos.

4rS Athenian expedition to Syracuse. Mutilation of the Hermae.

4r3 Defeat and destruction of the Syracusan expedition.

4rz Treaty of Miletus between Sparta and Persia. Revolt ofAthenian allies.

4rr Oligarchic coup d,'itat at Athens, constitution of the 4oo.Democracy restored within the year.

4o6 and 4o5 Athenian naval defeats at Arginusae and Aegospotami.

4oS-4 Athens blockaded.

4o4 Surrender of Athens. The LongWalls pulled do'wn. Rule of theThirty. Thrasybulus at Phyle.

4o3 Thrasybulus seizes Peiraeus. Fall of the Thirty. Lysias'Against Eratosthenes.

4oo Andocides'trial and speech On the Mysteries.

270

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

3199 Death of Socrates.397 Conon commander of Persian fleet.3gS Agesilaus of Sparta at war in Persia. Death of Lysander.

Athens rebuilding the Long Walls.394 Confederation of Athens, Thebes, Corinth against Sparta.

Corinthian War. Battles of Cnidus and Coronea.18Z-6 The King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas).l8+ Formation of the Chalcidian Confederacy.382 Spartan provocation of Thebes and Athens.38o Isocrates' Panegltricus.379 Spartan suppression of the Chalcidian Confederacy.378 Alliance of Athens and Thebes.377 Second Athenian Confederacy founded.374 and 37r Peace negotiations, both abortive.37r Battle of Leucffa. Foundation of Arcadian league and of Mega-

lopolis.S6g Theban operations against Sparta. Messene refounded.

Alliance of Athens and Sparta.366 Thebes seizes Oropus.16+ Orchomenus destroyed by Thebes.362 Battle of Mantinea. Death of Epaminondas.359 Death of Perdiccas of Macedon. Philip secures the succes-

sion.358 First victories of Philip over lllyrians, etc.357 Athens recovers the Chersonese. Philip takes Amphipolis.

Revolt of Chios, Cos, Rhodes and Byzantium from Athens(Social War),

356 Phocians seize Delphi. The Sacred War. Philip captur€s Pydnaand Potidaea.;

355-4 Social War ended.353 Philip takes Methone. Demosthenes' For Megalopolis and, On

the Liberty of Rhodes.35r Demosthenes' Pltilippic L349 Philip reduces Chalcidice. Alliance of Athens with Olynthus.

Demosthenes' Ofunthiacs.348 Philip captures Olynthus.346 Peace of Philocrates. Philip destroys Phocis and presides over

the Pythian Games at Delphi. Isocrates' Philip. Demosthenes'On the Peace.

344 Demosthenes' Philippic II.

342-r Philip in Thrace. Diopeithes sent to the Chersonese. Demos-thenes' On the Chersonese and Philippic III.

27t

1b?oG R E E K P O L I T I C A L O R A T O R Y

34o Philip besieges Perinthus and Byzantium. Naval reforms urgedby Demosthenes at Athens.

339 Amphictyonic Council makes war on Amphissa at the instanceof Athens.

338 Philip invited into Greece by Amphictyons. Battle ofChaeronea.

337 Pan-Hellenic Council at Corinth.$6 Assassination of Philip. Accession of Alexander.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

History of Greece,J. B. Bury (London, Macmillan).A History of the Greek World, 479-323, M. L. W. Laistner (London,

Methuen).A History of Greece, N. G. L. Hammond (Oxford).Tlte Cambriilge Ancient History, esp. Vol. VI.Athenion Democracy, A.H.M. Jones (Oxford, Blackwell).The Art o/'Persuasian inGreece, George Kennedy (London, Routledge).A History of Ed,ucationin Anti.qaity,H.I. Marrou, translator G. Lamb

(London, Sheed and Ward).Paideia, Werner Jaeger (Oxford, Blackwell).Demo st ltenes, Pickard Cambridge (Putnam).Demosthenes, Werner Jaeger (University of California Press, Sather

Classical Lectures).Lysias and, the Corpus Lysiacum (forthcoming), K.J. Dover (University

of California Press, Sather Classical Lectures).

greek political oratory (penguin classics)

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