green ambivalence about science yearley

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Green Ambivalence about Science: Legal-Rational Authority and the Scientific Legitimation ofa Social MovementAuthor(s): Steven YearleySource: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 511-532Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591338 .

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Steven Yearley

Green ambivalence bout science:legal-rational uthorityand the scientificlegltlmatlonof a soclalmovementABS'I'RAGI'Unlikemanysocialmovements, he environmentalmovementhas aprofound dependence on scientificevidence and scientificexper-tise. Withoutmodern science no-one would know about the ozonelayer, much less about the well publicizedsholes' n it. Yet, at thesame time, many within the green movement are distrustful ofscientific authority and of the fruits of technology. This paperexaminesthe way this incipientparadoxaffects the environmentalmovementand analyses, hrough case-studymaterial, he practicalimplications f the movement'sdependenceon science.

IN'l'RODUC'l'XON:I'HE SCIENCEOF SAVING 'I'HE PLANE'I'At the start of the l990s the arguments of the greens appear allpervasive.Green garb has been adopted by politicalpartiesof rightand left, by advertisingagencies,by publishers,by supermarkets ndby the media. Reasonably nough, many of the characteristics f thegreen movement and of green politics have been subjectto system-atic analysis.lYet it is curiousthat littleattentionhas been paid to theparticularrole of the scientificcredentialsof green arguments de-spite the fact that, unlike many preceding social movements, theenvironmentalmovement claims a scientificbasis. It is not entirelyalone in claimingsuch a foundation. Movements or the adoption ofscientificmedicine and for public hygiene, for example, shared it.And, of course, the label 'scientific' s itself open to negotiationandextension, so that movementsdedicatedto preparinga welcome forvisitors from outer space or to the promotion of a biblicallybasedCreation Science might be heralded as scientific, at least by theirsupporters.2But the green argument is very profoundlya scientificone.Amongst its strongest planks is the assertionthat disasterfor thehumanrace s a natural nevitabilityf certainpractices ontinue. f wePsJsS VoSme no. 43 I.ssue ts. 4 I)e.cernber992


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512 Steven Yearleypersist n allowingCFCs o escape nto the atmosphereor if we do notreduce the emissionof greenhouse gases. Other argumentsconcernthe damage to the world's other inhabitants: he need to protectwildlife by not bleaching nappies with chlorine, by conservingendangered habitatsand by not using detergents which are rich inphosphaticwatersofteners.Whileeach of these arguments s now beginningto commandpub-lic attention, t is important o appreciate he extent to whichthey areall based n a distinctively cientificperceptionof the world. Thus, totake the most dramaticexample, the ozone layer is only availableasan objectof knowledgebecauseof our scientificculture. At groundlevel, ozone is uncommonand remote from experience. The strato-sphere, where it is prevalent, s probably ven more remote. Know-ledge about the hole in the ozone layer is only availablethroughhigh-technologyventures into the atmospherehigh over the poles.Equally,our everyday upposition s that detergentshave done theirjob once they have leftOUI washingmachinesor sinks.We would notreadily hink of the damage they might be doing in riversand estua-ries. It is biological scientists who detail the connection betweenwater-softening gents and the algal blooms which choke life out ofthe watercourses.Thus, the environmentalists' ase is tied to science. It states thatnatural realities constrain our options in various ways. Moreover,these constraints re relatively ndependentof people'smoralstand-point. By this I mean to contrast the greens' arguments with themotivating oncernsof other socialmovements uch as those involvedin the disputeaboutabortionand the rightto life. Whilst life' tself hasthe appearance f a scientificnotion,and scientific vidence s broughtto bear in the debate (for example, when claimsare made about thetimes at which variousbodilyorgans in the foetus stal to function),scientistsare generallyreluctant o pronounceon the point at whichlife begins.They commonlypresent his as a metaphysical ather hana scientific ssue. Additionalmoralargumentsare also brought o bearin this case; for example, it is often argued that, if 'pro-lifers'areserious in their convictions, hen they should be campaigningwithequalvigourfor more help for AIDS sufferers.To take another example, we can turn to the case of campaignsagainst too much' sex and violence on television.The claims aboutexposureto too much sex are typicallymade n moral erms.Freedomof artisticexpression is weighed againstmoral propriety.Of coursethere is an empiricalaspect to this dispute. Campaignersmay assertthat- as a matterof fact- 'over-exposure'o licentiousmaterial eadsto moral degeneracy.But such claims have proved very resistant oempirical est; degeneracy,for example, is itself a morallychargednotion and thus hard to measure in an agreed way. Furthermore,participantsn the debate often call on their personalexperiencesto


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Green mbivalencebout cience 513assess hevalidity f the competing factual' laimsand are reluctant ohandthematterover to those,suchas psychologists r mediaanalysts,who purportto havedisinterested xpertise.By contrast with these social problem issues, environmentalistswould see their case as unanswerableby virtue of its scientificcredentials.The ozone layer sdisappearing nd theconsequencewillbe greater amounts of damaging radiation;greenhouse gases areaccumulatingand a consequencewill be the expansion of oceanicwatersand associated looding.These are held to be mattersof factand thereis littleroom for moraldisputeaboutthem.Accordingly,manyenvironmentalistsee theircaseas motivated,nMoore'swords,by 'objective easoning'.3Moore,who wasa leadingscientificauthority in the Nature ConservancyCouncil until hisretirement n the mid-1980s,relateshow he was ableto establish hattoxicpesticidesaccumulatedn the food chain.4 t wasnot a questionof opinion; he had demonstratedthat through unexpected butrelentlessnatural processes,farmingpracticeswere threateningtopoison people. The scientific demonstrabilityof the connectionbetween the use of agrochemicals nd the presenceof toxins in foodwasdecisive. MaxNicholson,a leadingenvironmentalistnd formerDirector-Ceneralf the NatureConservancy,makesthe samepoint.Againspeakingof the organochlorinensecticides,houghthistimeinrelation oattempts o persuade he agrochemicalsndustry o changeits policy, he states, 'had not the scientific base of ecology andconservation een already o sound,thesuccessful greementwiththeindustrycouldnothavebeen concluded'.='Mooreand Nicholsonsuggest that the scientificcredentialsof theconservationmovement ent it considerable uthority.Thisclaimcanusefullybe understoodin relation to Weber's amed analysisof thethreebasicforms of socialauthority: he traditional, he charismaticandthe legal-rational.6The testimonyof scientificconservationists uch as Moore andNicholsoncan berecastasa claim hattheenvironmentalmovement speculiarlycommittedto, and uniquely favoured by, legal-rationalauthority.Othercontemporary ocialand politicalmovementscom-monly draw on traditionalauthority (for example, nationalism),charismatic uthority(newspiritualmovements)or on some combi-nationof these.

Moreover,as both Nicholsonand Mooreacknowledge,he environ-mentalmovement's ies to scienceextend from the presentinto thepast.Manyof themore establishment'atureconservationocietiesnthe UK have a background n naturalhistory:the RoyalSocietyforNature Conservation, he BritishTrust for Ornithology, he variousNaturalistsField Clubs and so on.7 Scientific views and scientificauthorityhave been central to the movement'sorganizationalde-velopment,as Nicholsonremarks:8


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514 Steven YearleyWhile parallelmovementssuch as those for developmentand thereliefof poverty n the Third World,or for peaceand disarmament,have had to create their own often sketchyfoundations,environ-mental conservationdiffers in resting upon a comprehensiveandprofound set prepared for it in advance by the natural historymovement.

On this view the green movement is doubly bound to science, byepistemological ffinityand commondescent.My aim in this paper is to examine the sociological mplications fenvironmentalists' se of, and dependence on, scientificreasoningand scientific uthority. shallarguethatsomegreens havemisgivingsabout this close relationshipto science. More surprisingly,I shallsuggest that those greens who embrace the authority offered byscience ind thatscience s a lessgood allythanthey mighthavewished.Let us startby examiningenvironmentalists'misgivings boutscience.IS SCIENCEAN IDEOLOGICALFRIEND OF I HE EARI H?Despite the benefitswhich, according o Moore and Nicholson,flowfrom scientificconservation,many greens are uneasy about aligningthemselves oo closely with science. Such ambivalenceabout sciencestems in part from the role science and technology have played inbringing about our ecological problems. In some instances thisconnection s clear and direct. Humans nventedthe CFCswhicharethreatening he ozone layer.Technologicaladvanceallowedhumansto develop nuclear power, which in turn has brought us persistentenvironmentalproblems, uch as those associatedwiththe calamitousexplosion at Chernobyl n 1986. It was scientistswho developed thepesticideswhich n the lastthreedecadeshavecontaminated ur foodand our wildlife.In such cases we can traceenvironmentalproblemsdirectly o specificproductsof scienceand technology.There is also amore diffuse connection:present-day ndustrial ociety s inseparablefrom the pollutioncaused by motor vehicles, power generationandwaste disposal. Manyenvironmentalists re thus criticalof technicalprogress and, at least, equivocal about science. Scientists may beviewed as active collaborators n our society's ecological destruc-tiveness.

Additionally, reens may distrustsciencebecauseof the particularactivitiesof sections of the scientificestablishment: n account, forexample, of scientists' nvolvement n the development of nuclearpower and weaponryor in the genetic engineeringof foodcropsanddomesticated nimals.Equally, reens may ust be repelledby casesofthe deliberateharmingor mistreatment f laboratory nimals.In the face of these inherent problems with the scientific egiti-mationof environmentalisIIl,omeof the ideologistsof the movexsent


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Greenambivalencebout cience 515have been attracted to versions of the green argument which areprincipally ounded on non-scientific orms of authority.9For ex-ample, it is possible to seek to underpinan ecologicalworldview nconventionally eligious or other spiritualways. Peoplecan claim togain a knowledgeof nature'spurposesand needs throughthis sortofinquiry.l' In early 1991 David Icke, a former Green Party spokes-person, created much mirthas well as embarrassmentor the greenswith his very public, divinelynspired'predictionsaboutearthquakesand sundry calamitiessuch as the disappearanceof Cuba. But insecular Westernsocietiesthese appeals can exerciseonly a limitedattractionand the principal form of legitimationin the leadingenvlronmentaorganlzatlons emalns nat ot sclentlhcexpertlse.Indeed both of the most prominent radical and campaigningenvironmentalgroups in the UK (and indeed Western Europe),Greenpeaceand Friends of the Earth,are increasing their use ofscience and their relianceon scientificauthority.Thus, Greenpeaceappointedan academic cientistas its directorof science n London n1989; its authorized historiansnow announce that it has equippeditself withthe 'most sophisticatedmobilelaboratoryn Europe'." Inthe late 1980s Friendsof the Earth (FOE) increasedthe technicalsophistication f its campaigning taffand now boastsof its 'enhanced... standingin academic and institutionalcircles'.l2Both organiz-ations now supply scientificreferences n support of their campaignmaterial.Their campaigners nsist on the importanceof getting thescienceright. 3LEGAL-RA'I'XONALU'I'HORI'I'YAND 'I'HESOG,XOLOGYF S()XENCE

Up to this point I have claimed that 'establishment' reen groupsembracedscience earlyon and that there is evidence that - despitesome ideologicalmisgivings the more radicalgroupsare followingsuit. However,I wish to argue that the turn to sciencehas been lessstraightforwardlybeneficial than had been anticipated;in somerespects he movementhas even been confoundedbyscience.To understand he sociologicalmplications f embracing cience,we need to examine the special authorityenjoyed by legal-rationalforms of argument, an authority which has often been taken forgrantedbysocialscientists. ndeed, since socialscience tself appearsto reston this form of authority,o throw t into questionmightseemaself destructivepursuit.But in the lasttwo decades there has been are-assessmentof this kind of authority among sociologists andphilosophersof science who have studieddecisionmaking in whatmight be taken to be the temple of legal-rationalhinking,naturalscience.What they have suggested is that the authoritycommonlyassociated with scientificbeliefs is not as straightforwardor as


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516 Steven Yearleyunequivocalas many people, includingWeber,appear to have as-sumed.'4These sociologistsand philosophershave arguedthat thepublic,policy makersand more traditionalphilosophersof sciencehaveexaggerated heauthorityof science.Characteristically,hese analystsacceptedan uncontentiousdefi-nition of science. For example, most would concur with WallisinacceptingNewton-Smith'suggestion hatscience s the undertakingwhose'point . . is to discover general]explanatory ruthsabouttheworld'.l='Whatis radical s not their definitionof sciencebut theirinsistencehatscientists' ractical uthoritys limitedbytwofactors.'6First, hey argue thatscientists'udgmentsinevitablygo beyondtheevidenceon which heyarebased,sothatscientific uthority annotbejustified ya simpleappealto itsfactual oundations.Inotherwords,scientific acts undermine the conclusionswhich are drawn fromthem.l7Second,theseanalystsof sciencearguethateven factsthem-selvesare provisional.Factualclaimscannot be legitimatedby anunquestionableppealtoobservation. Observationsmaythemselvesbeaffected by scientists'assumptionsor by their prior theoreticalcommitments.n short,evenitsfactualbasisdoesnotgrantscienceanindubitableuthority.These pointscan be briefly llustratedusing one of the examplesgiven bove.The factswhichsupplyevidencefor globalwarmingareofvital practical mportancebut, despite that, are very difficulttoestablish. ll mannerof causesmayaffectthe world'sclimateor theseaevel;thus tishardtoknowwhetheranychangesmeasured anbeput ownto a warming rendor whethertheyshouldbe ascribed osometherfactor.In somecasestheevidencemayevenbe subject odistortionshichare acknowledgedbut for whichthere can be nosimpleompensation.Thus, in order to establishclimatictrends,seriesf temperaturemeasurementsneed to be compiledover dec-ades. ntilrecently uchmeasurements avecommonlybeenmadeatrecordingtationssitedin urbanareas,areaswhichhavethemselvesgotwarmerpreciselybecauseof urbanization.For such reasonsasthese,hereisno indisputablewayof establishingwhatthefactsof thematterre.Moreover, venif thefactsof warmingwereunanimouslyaccepted,here stillneed not be agreementaboutthe implications.Warmingight have causesother than the greenhouseeffect: forexample,heremightbe astronomical easonsfor temperaturevari-ationsn theearth'satmosphere. 9Atthispointitis importantoemphasize hatI havenotintroducedthesergumentsasa criticism f scienceorof scientists.Rather, haveintroducedhembecausethey indicatethe waysin whichthe acqui-sitionf scientificknowledge s far more complexthan is normallysupposed.cientificknowledgedependsonjudgmentand interpre-tation;hereforethe environmentalmovement'sdependenceon sci-encesitselfnot likely oofferstraightforwardccess o authority.


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Green mbivalencebc)utcience 517On the basis of this re-assessmentof scientificauthoritywe havegood reasonfor thinkingtheremay be sociological nterest n seeing

whathappenswhen environmentalistsry to enlistscienceasa 'friendof the earth'.We can approachthis issue by examiningthe waysinwhich green groups seek to 'cashin' on their scientificskills. Theevidencepresentedin the followingpagescomes from two sources:from my two-year observation and interview study of non-governmental roups n NorthernIrelandandfroman analysis f thepublished literature on issues tackled by leading environmentalgroups.20Data from the formerpermitme to examinehow scientificexpertiseis used on a day-to-daybasiswhile material romthe latterallowsan analysisof the role of scientificknowledgein the moretechnically omplexdebates, or exampleoverglobalwarmingor acidrain. In both cases I shall examinethe difficulties n 'cashing n' onscientificauthorityand ask howgood a friend scienceis to the greenmovement.SCIENCEAS AN UNRELIABLEFRIEND-EMPIRICALLY

The firstway n whichscience san unreliableally s asimplyempiricalone. Compared o socialmovementswhichappealto an orthodoxyorto a charismaticeader,avowedly cientificmovements ace a numberof pragmaticdisadvantages.Scientistsmay not have an answertoevery question.Similarly, hey accept in principlethat their know-ledge is revocableand incomplete.Thisincompletenessmaymanifestitself in a numberof ways. For example, membersof the scientificcommitteeof one of the groups studied, the Ulster WildlifeTrust(UWT),were concernedto learn of proposals o use a quarrysometwenty miles north of Belfast for dumping domestic refuse. Atpresent,the principal ite for domesticwastedumpingin the Belfastareais the northforeshoreof BelfastLoughand thereis considerableanxietyabout the impactof this practice.It may be damagingto themarine ife in the loughand to visitingbirds;the site is alsoflat, openandclearlyvisible.Thus, the prospectof havingan alternative ite fordumping was initiallyattractive.However, there were also reser-vationsaboutthe controlwhichmight be exercisedover the leachatefrom the proposedquarry ite,especially ince the quarrywasclosetoLarne Lough,anothershelteredmarine ough whichis the site of anRSPB (Royal Society for the Protectionof Birds) reserve. Thecommittee members had no special expertise on the matter ofleachingand didnot wishto appearoppositionalorthe sakeof it, buttheywere uneasyaboutbeing seen to consent to the quarry-fill.Thescientific ommittee ounditself in a rather counter-factual'osition:whiletheyassumed hattherewasan answer othe question which iteis better', hey hadto acknowledge heydid not knowwhat twas.


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518 StevenYearleyThe same problemcan be even more acutely felt if there is somepublic pressure to announce an answer. In a recent case the same

organizationwas nvitedto commenton a proposedholidaydevelop-ment. In this case the scientific ommitteeof the UWT wasgratified ofind that they had been consulted about plans to extend a seweragesystemfor a caravanparkand amenitycentre which happened to beclose to a nature reserve of theirs. However, they had no specificexpertiseon this subjectand, at least n the short term, no precisewayof findingout whateffects wouldbe. They were embarrassed y theirlack of knowledge in the light of the unusual invitation.To havenothing to say when specifically asked to comment seemed tocontradict heirclaim o speak or nature'sneeds;but therewereequaldangersto speakingwithoutauthoritative nowledge.Although he explicit nvitation o commentmadethiscaseunusual,this difficulty n responding o planningproposals s not uncommon.There is a clear feeling in the UWT, as in other of the UK'sWildlifeTrusts, that there is a need to be 'reasonable'and not oppose alldevelopment, yet the very rigours of scientificevidence and proofrender 'reasonability' ery difficult.The situation s further compli-cated since the conservationists ave an additional easonfor wantingto oppose potentiallyharmfulmeasures: heyconsider hat t is harderto stop something from continuing once it has been set up than toprevent it altogether.For instance,once jobs have been created by afish-farmingproject t is harder o close the operationdown,even if itseffects are shown to be harmful o wildlife,than not to have hadjobscreated n the firstplace.The limited and provisionalnature of scientificknowledge thusmakes it hard to respond satisfactorily o innovativeproposals.But'not knowing' an alsobe disadvantageous ecauseof the impact t hason the public. Membersof the public may look for authoritativejudgmentsand maybe dismayedby factlessness.They may ook to thescientificexperts in conservationorganizations or the answers toquestionswhich concern them personallyand be frustratedbecausethe 'experts'do not know. Birdwatchers, nd even shooters, may beconcerned about the reasons for fluctuations n bird populations.They see this as the kind of question which conservation cientistsshould be able to settle,but the scientistsmay well not knownor evenbe sure how to find out.

Science may thus be a poor ally to environmentalistsbecausescientists ind their lack of knowledgeexposed. Sometimes hey maylack he abilityor expertise o determinesomethingwhich hey wishtoknow;at other times they may know ess than the publicwould like toknow. Unlike a traditionalor charismatic uthority hey do not havethe ability o respondto everycontingency.In some measure,such 'shortcomings'may well be common to allforms of the public use of scientific expertise but conservation


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Green mbivalencebc)utcience 519scientists acetheseproblems n a particularlyoncentratedway. Forone thing,scientistsworking n environmentalpressuregroupsoftencannotcommissionor carryout the researchwhich heywould deallyliketo see performed.According o Cramer, uch scientists hereforeface 'pragmaticuncertainty'.2' he argues that they are commonlycalled on to make recommendationsat short notice, often usingreadily-availableesearchmaterialwhich may be very variableinquality.Theyarefrequentlywithout he time or resources o conductresearchof theirown. Studiesof theenvironmental ffects of minutequantitiesof contaminants,or example,demanda greatdeal of timesince the substancesonly build up in the environmentvery slowly.Scientificequipmentand researchcan also be very expensive. En-vironmentalgroups simplydo not have the financialresourcestocommitfunds to majorresearchprojects.Even those organizationswith big budgets face many conflictingdemands. For example,Greenpeace'scampaign boats continuallyrequire high levels offunding.For its part,the RSPB Europe'sargestnatureconservationand environmentalorganization)uses much of its income for thepurchaseof reservesfor the direct protectionof birds. To spendmoney on researchis to divert funds from direct environmentalaction. In many cases environmentalgroups are not even able tomonitor all the potentiallyuseful scientificinformationwhich ispublished n journals;afterall, even university ibraries ubscribe oonlya fractionof the available cientificournals.22Furthermore,whentheydo turnto the academiciterature nviron-mentalists typically find that research reports are directed toansweringthe theoreticalproblemsposed by the developmentofscientific disciplines rather than to meeting their own practicalqueries. As sociologistsof science have long pointed out, mostacademicscientificresearch is principallyaddressed to problemswhicharisewithinthe matrixof thediscipline.2$t is not intendedforimmediateuse by 'customers' ndthe researchobjectives f academicecologistsare unlikely to coincide with those of practicalconser-vationists.This distancebetweenthe partiesis reflectedin the styleand contentof scientificpublications.24In addition,Cramerpointsout that environmentalscientistsarehandicappedby 'the low level of theoreticaldevelopmentof (eco-systems-) cology'.25 here is lessconsensus n ecological ciencethanin manyother areas of naturalscienceso that the interpretationofecologicalinformation s likelyto be disputed. Finally, n Cramer'sview, environmentalists ace a further form of uncertaintywhichstemsfrom the factthat theyaredealingwithlarge-scalephenomenatakingplace nopen systems.The empiricalmaterialwhichecologicalsciencesets out to describe s inherentlymore complicated han thephenomenaaddressedbymanyotherpartsof naturalscience.There is, however,at least one sense in whichCramer'saccount


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520Stevenearley

understateshe extent of uncertaintywhichconservationscientists

face.he ncertaintieswhich derive from the complexityof the

systemsithwhichconservationists ealand fromthe sheerbulkof

materialvailable o them can be augmentedby anotherconsider-ation:hereare some matterswhichareon the marginsof observa-

bility.ronically, he significanceof this factoris attestedto - in a

roundaboutanner- byNicholson n thecourseofthedevelopment

of hisrgumentfor the importanceof scientificknowledgein the

progressf the conservationists'ase. He summarizesarlyconflicts

betweennvironmentalists nd variousestablishedgroups such as

oil-shippingoncerns(whichwerenot regulatingdischarges),pesti-

cideanufacturerswhowerenotawareor carelessof the entryof

toxinsntothe food chain)andfarmers whowereaimingto increaseproductivityt the cost of wildlifeand of habitatdestruction).He

documentsoweachof thesecaseswasfoughtoutthroughargument,

publicityndlobbying,andconcludesbysayingTheecordshowsthatenvironmental onservationooner

or latersucceedsn dealing with offences of a tangible

characterbutrecentlyhe trend has been towardsmuch more

disturbingin-tangableamageo the environment,either through

chemicals etloose o roam through different layers of the

atmosphere,orthrough uclearradiation.The resultingproblemsareparticularlydisturbing ecausethey strikeso widelyat the roots

of globallifesupportsystems,becausetheiragentsare technically

o difficult omonitor,speciallywhen they combine spontaneously

with oneanother after release, and because of their ability

to becometransported apidlyoverlongdistancesandatvarying

altitudesbyair currents,whosemovementsre imperfectlynderstood

emphasesadded).26Environmentalistsaceaparticular ifficultywhentheyhave

todecidehowo respondto 'intangible amage'andtoagents

whicharealmostimpossibleo monitor.The role of scienceas an empiricalfriend to the

environmentalmovementecomesalmostparadoxicaln suchcases.

Wereit not forscience,greens could hardly campaignabout ozone

depletion orglobalwarmingat all. Yet the scientificevidence

may disappointcampaigners y its uncertaintyand ambiguity.For

instance,some

predictions uggest thatthe greenhouseeffect will lead to greater

variationn the weatherso thatcoolingas wellas warmingcouldbe

seenas evidencefor the existenceof the effect. In any case, as wasmentionedearlier, t is hardto getreliable eriesof dataon climateor

on the temperatureof the seaswhichcould demonstrateong-term

warming. t is alsodifficult o compileinformationaboutthe carbon

dioxidecontentof the atmosphere n pastdecadesinorderto prove

thatwarmingollowed, ndthuscouldplausiblyhavebeencausedby,


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Green mbivalencebout cience521increases in this greenhouse gas.27Similar points arose in theinternationaldispute over acid rain which raged betweenenviron-

mental campaignersand the Britishelectricity upplyservice.Whilethere was no doubt that power stationsemitted acidic gases, theauthoritieswould not accept responsibility or acidificationof theenvironment. t waspossible o argue that the geographicalpatternofacidificationdid not correspond with what was known about thedispersalof waste gases,that the chemicalscausing acidificationdidnot appear o be identical o the rangeof gasesemitted rom the powerstations,and that there were other, more local, causeswhich couldlead to acidificationof rivers and lakes.28Scientificauthority wasneeded to authenticatea campaignaboutacid rain but the scientificevidencewas refractoryand ambiguous.Becausethe issues involvedstrained against the outer limits of scientific knowledge and ofscientists'power to makeobservations, cience was only a grudgingfriend to the greens.Even the interpretationof less esotericecological issues, such asfluctuationsn the numbersof migratorybirds, s subject o the samesortsof problems.29Hugeflocksof birdsare very difficult o monitorin detail; f the numbersat a particularite fall for one seasonthis maybe because hat localhabitats declining n quality,or it maybe due toany number of other factors: harsh conditions during migration,unusualpredationduring breedingandso on.Admittedly,these may be extreme cases (althoughit should benoted thatthey includethree of the mostpressingglobal ssues:ozonedepletion, acid precipitation nd greenhousewarming).But theydoserve to make clear one central point: the empirical fallibilityofscience, most pronounced when phenomena are at the limits ofobservability,means that social problemclaims founded on sciencemust offer hostages o fortune.SCIENCE AS AN UNRELIABLEFRIEND-EPIS I EMOLOGYUp to thispointwe haveexaminedways n whichnfact sciencemaybealess good friend than conservationistsmight anticipate.It may notprovide heanswerson occasionswhenit wouldbe politic o havethemimpatientof factlessness;t is seldom possible or environmentalistsoget the research arriedout which heywould ike o seedone;andsomeof the factswhichconservationistsmight iketo marshalmaybe elusive.By and large, these problemsstem from the characterof ecologicalscienceandfrom the sociologyof the scientificprofession.But in somecases these deficienciescome close to endemic problemsof scientificknowledge to do withsciencesas a wayof knowingatall. Mostnatureconservationistswould defend science as a form of knowledgebypointingto its observational asisand itsmethodicdevelopment.But,


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522 StevenYearleyas we have seen and as Nicholson made clear, the observational basis isopen to discrepant interpretations. As soon as there arise competingand plausible accounts of what the observational facts are, then thebasis which appears so secure becomes itself problematic. Theempirical and provisional basis of scientific knowledge - its apparentstrength - can readily be re-formulated as an uncertainasis.

4 his argument achieves its most spectacular form when it is posed asthe philosophical problem of 'induction'. For centuries philosophershave pointed out that although, for example, we may believe that thesun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every day so far, this canonly be an assumption. We cannot know such things for certain. In thepast, traditionalists tended to use such arguments to contrast scienceunfavorably with other canonical forms of knowledge, such as religionor logic. Logical deduction appears much more certain than empirical. . .Inductlon.In recent years these arguments have not been regarded as havingmuch practical importance. People have not worried about thelikelihood of there being a sunrise tomorrow. But this line of thoughtdoes show up the Achilles heel of science, a weakness which can beused in a practical ways to evade scientific authority. Those opposed toa scientific udgment can always say that science is not fully certain andthat, for this reason, they do not recognize expert scientific opinion inthis matter as ultimately authoritative.As one might expect, environmentalists tend to play down this issuein many public contexts. Thus, in a recent issue of the BBC WildlifeMagazine,onathon Porritt, former director of Friends of the Earth,wrote

the scientists are now with us rather than against us. On occasions... they actually seem to be out in front of the activists of theEnvironment Movement. In the early seventies, the protagonists ofthe 'limits to growth' scenario relied primarily on an inadequatelyprogrammed computer model. Politicians had little difficultydismissing it as sensationalist speculation. Today, there's nothingspeculative about the depletion of the ozone layer, the deforestationof the Amazon, the build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere,or the pesticide residues in our water and food. Hard scientificevidence counts for a lot in a hard materialistic world.30It is interesting to note that scientific proof is associated with hardmaterialism, almost as though scientific support for environmentalpolicies would not be needed in a more compassionate society. Nonethe less, this embrace of the 'hardness' of scientific evidence displaysthe kind of strategy which can be adopted in chasing off the horrors ofdoubt.However, other strategies may be adopted. As an example, in 1989Greenpeace ran a newspaper advertisement campaign in the UK


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Green mbivalencebc)utcience 523opposing claimsby then EnvironmentMinister,NicholasRidley, hatincreased nvestment n nuclear powergenerationwould help solvethe greenhouse problem.The minister was picturedwith his pro-nuclear assertionprintedacross his mouth, beneathit was written:'scientificallypeaking,it'sjust a lot of hot air'.3'Greenpeace thenprinted a declarationdisagreeing with Mr Ridley, a declarationapparently igned by '100of the country's eading scientists,doctors,and engineers'.Now, thereis somethingcuriousabout he logicof thismove: althoughGreenpeace eems tobe invokingscientificauthority,there is a majoritarian ppealalso. Their argumentseems to be notjust that scientific pinion' is withthem,but thata lotof scientists hinkthis way.Yet, one couldjust as easilyarguethat in the context of theUK, one hundred 'scientists,doctors and engineers'is actuallyveryfew. I suggestthatGreenpeaceare forced nto this roundaboutappealbecause heyare confrontedby an interpretative ifficulty.They wishto claim to be in the rightepistemologically- to saythat Mr Ridley ssimplywrong.Yet, whilethe epistemological ight may n principlebestraightforwardand unambiguous,in practice both sides in anydispute can usually count on some scientificsupporters.Both sidesmay try to claim the epistemologicalhighground.An appeal to largenumbers of qualified supporters is perhaps the simplest way torespondto this difficulty n a masspublicmedium.Such an appeal to the majority cientificopinionhas also recentlybeen employedby Friendsof the Earth.Campaign taff workingonglobalwarmingwere disturbedby a programmen theEquinoxseriesbroadcast n UK'sChannelFour on 12 August 1990whichsought toquestion the scientific evidence for the greenhouse effect. Theprogrammeeven impliedthat scientistsmight be attracted o makeextreme and sensational laimsaboutthe urgencyof the problem norder to maximize their chances of receiving funding. The pro-grammewas criticized n the 'campaignnews' section of the FOEmagazine,EarthMatters.32 n unfavourablecomparisonwas drawnbetween the sceptical views expressed in the programme and theconclusions of the recent IntergovernmentalPanel on ClimateChange(IPCC),whichhad warnedof therealityof impendingclimatechanges and with whose scientific analysis FOE is generally inagreement.FOE nvoked he weightof

over 300 scientists [who] prepared the IPCC's Science Reportcompared o abouta dozen who wereinterviewedor Equinox.33Whenscientists re seento disagree t is verydifficult o claimsimplythatone is in the right.Anattractive, ndin manyrespectsreasonable,alternatives to invoke the power of the majority.But of course thiscannot alwaysbe done. For many years,as the earlierquote fromPorrittmadeplain, environmentalistswere in the scientificminority.


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524 StevenYearleyAppeals of this kind therefore fall a long way short of the authorityone might expect from science.

Whatever the complexities of enlisting scientific authority in apositive fashion, from the conservationists' oint of view the diffi-culty is most acutelyfelt when it goes the other way- when they areconfronted with the barrier scientific proof. As Richard North,scienceand environmentwriterfor The ndependent,as notedEven now, scientific exactitude can debilitate conservation byinsisting (as governments rejoice to notice) that the evidence ofdamagecaused mtlstbe total:which it almostnever will be.34

This argumentative strategy is probably best known in the UKthrough its use in relation o acid rain. As was mentionedearlier,theauthoritiesused the lack of certain knowledge hat acid rain (and inparticularBritish acid rain) was responsiblefor the death of treesand the acidification f lakes n Europe as a justification or continu-ing with power stationemissions.33Different groups adopt a different kind of response to thisproblem. Greenpeace,whom North was criticizing n his article inTheIndependent,end to be impatientof the limitationsof scientificproof. North accepts hat Greenpeacemay be correct o suppose thatit 'wouldget little [media]coveragewere it to stick to the facts'.But,he charges, 'In any case, it does not'.36He goes on to list ways inwhich Greenpeace's public statements have been, as he puts it,'economicalwith the truth'. His contention seems to be that Green-peace has often bent the scientific ruth to make issues appear moregrave than they truly are in order to stir people into action. Itremains unclear what strategy North would endorse, given theuncertaintieswhich inevitablyaccompany good' scientificpractice.Moreover, it should be appreciatedthat activistorganizationscanpoint to a number of occasionson which their gloomy expectationshave been vindicated when further spills or leaks have followedassurances hat the 'problem'has been overcome.With some plausi-bility they could argue that there is a practicalasymmetrybetweendoing nothing (the situation will worsen) and doing something (itmay bring unnecessary cost but no permanent damage to theenvironment).The specific epistemologicalcharacter of science thus leads todifficultieswhen groups try to 'cash n' on scientificauthority.If youare relentlesslycommitted to scientific proprieties,you will not beable to make instant, unequivocal udgments. But if you are notpublicly committed in this way, you are open to criticism. Theresultingpracticaldifficultiesmay become apparentduring scientificdisputes or in public controversies.But they can also surface in avirulent form in specialized forums of debate. In particular,theconventions of legal cross-examination nd the standardsof legal


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Green mbivalencebout cience 525proof maynot meshwell withthecharacter f scientific rgumentandexpertise.LEGALIN'I'ERPRE'I'A'I'IONSF SCIEN'I'IFICJER'I'AIN'I'YA numberof case studieshaveshown that scientificargumentsoftendo not stand up in court or in publicinquiriesas well as might beexpectedfrom the generalpublic authorityenjoyedby science.37npart this may be explainedby circumstantialactors.After all, themajorityof scientistsare unaccustomedo the kind of questioning owhichtheyare subjected n court.Further,skilledexaminerscan usethe fact thatthe discussion s not free- that the questionerhas greatcontrol over the topic- to weakenthe scientists'presentation.Butscientists also fare badly because legal procedure can focus onapparentweaknessesn scienceas a formof knowledge.To illustrate hispointwe canturn tothe caseof a public nquiryntoplans to develop a Northern Irish peat bog for horticulturalpeatextraction.38n the late 1980s governmentecologistshad conductedasurveyand evaluationof Northern Irishbogs,held to be an increas-ingly endangeredhabitat.But a peat-cuttingcompanyhad alreadytakenstepsto develop one of the bogs whichhad comeout as highlyrated in thissurvey.A public nquirywascalledto determinewhetherdevelopmentshould be allowedto proceed. The developerswererepresentedby a seniorbarristerwhile the conservationistselied onscientifically rained representatives.Although the barristermighthavebeenexpectedto tryto circumvent he witnesses' cientific kills(for example, by concentratingon the trade-off betweeneconomicdevelopmentand conservationor by highlightingdetails of legalprocedure),he chose to confrontthe scientificwitnessesdirectly.Indoing so he calledattention to importantcharacteristicsf scientificexpertise.In essence the barristeradopted two lines of argument.First, hequestionedthe scoringsystemby meansof which the surveyedbogshadbeen assessed.For example,bogsmaybe valuedbecause hey arevirtually ntactor becausethey are home to a wide varietyof plantspecies. To some extent the the rankingsof the variousbogs in thesurveywilldepend on howthese, andother,attributesareweighted.The barristerhussuggested hatthe scoresweremerelya conventionand could, in fact, havebeen verydifferent. In effect the scores arejust a construct,an artefact.Yet,he claimed, hescientists behavedasthoughthe scoreswere"written n tabletsof stone"'.39 he scientistscould notshowfor certain hatthetechniqueadoptedwasthe bestwayof scoringbogs; therefore,it could be implied,their scoringsystemwasof littleworth.It is important o note an asymmetryhere.40The barristerdid not


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526Stevenearley

haveoemonstratehattherewasagoodscoring ystemaccordingo

whichhe bog in questioncouldsafelybe developed.He onlyhadto

castoubtn thescoring ystemwhichhadbeenusedinthiscase.The

developer'srgument traded on the scientists'lack of absoluteauthority,n otherwordson theepistemologicalharacterf science.

Hisecondargumentoperatedto similareffect. Noteveryfeature

of aog which might be important to conservationcould be

representedn the scoringsystem.Forexample, inthe case of the

disputedog, there were two striking additionalfeatures, one

favouringhebog,theothercompromisingtslikelyvalue.Ontheone

handt supporteda rare butterflybut, on the other,the bog was

elongatedatherthan circularandthus unusuallyprone to drying

out.eitherf thesefeatureswasrepresented n the scoringsystem

yetothwerealludedto by witnesses.The legal representativewas

ableousethisfacttoarguethattheassessment f thebogwasactually

adosatherthan methodic.As wasdescribedearlieron, scientific

expertiseustdepend on elementsof judgmentandinterpretative

skill.hese informalaspectsof sciencecan be highlightedto make

scientificvidenceappear ikeopinion.I o not wishto givethe impression hatlegalrulesand reasoning

necessarilyinder the environmentalists'ase. In some instances

campaigningroupssuchasGreenpeace rFOEhavebeenabletouse

legalules nplaceof scientific vidence.Forexample,f therearelaws

orfficialuidelinesaboutthe permitted evelsof, say,aluminiumor

nitraten drinkingwaterand if environmentalgroupscan demon-

stratehatthese evelshavebeenexceeded,theyareabletocriticizehe

governmentithouthavingto provethatthe watercontaining hose

levelsf contaminantss actuallyharmful.The existenceof official

rulesllowsscienceto be sidestepped.But, of course,this potential

advantageocampaigning roupsdoesnotoftencomeintoplaysince,

ateastup to the present,these groupshavetypicallybeen arguing

thathe 'safe' imitsshouldbe mademorerestrictive.o succeedin

suchases,one eitherhasto havescientific videncethatthe present

limits too relaxed or, as a second best, proof thatlaws in other

comparableountriesarestricter.

SCIENCEAS AN INSUFFICIEN FRIEND

Thegreen movement'sdependenceon sciencemaynot bringit the

cognitiveauthority t seekseitherin practiceor principle.But therearesomeenvironmental rgumentswhere tsinsufficiencyeemstobe

of anothersort.Takethecaseof the basking hark.According o the

MarineConservationSociety(MCS),baskingsharksareendangered

by our fishing practices.Even assumingthe MCSis scientifically

correct, tmightstillbe possible oarguethatthesharksarenotworth


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527reenambivalence b()ut ciencethe loss of fishingwhich would be entailed in conserving hem. Whatthis suggests is that the argumentsfor the green movement are farfrom solely scientific; indeed they look rather similar to thosesurroundingabortionand artistic reedom.To put this another way, the scientificcorrectnessof the greens'analysis even when that correctness s undisputed- still does notcarrymanyclear mplications or practical ction.If it is believedthatthe destructionof the ozone layer will result in many human deathsthen possibly here is a commonpractical eed to takestepsto remedythe problem. But in the case of the majorityof other environmentalproblems he practical mplications re more disputable.There maybe manyreasons or trying o conserve he rainforests: or the sakeofthe tribespeoplewho live there, for the sakeof the plantsand animalsthemselves, on account of the likely medicinal value of rain forestplantsand so on. The same s true for speciesconservation: lephantscan be valued in their own right as well as for the possibleeconomicbenefitsof managedherds.When mounting campaigns,environmentalists end to invoke asmany of these reasons as they can in order to attract the greatestnumberof supporters.Thus, the RSPBappealsto naturalists, o birdenthusiasts and those with a diffuse concern for the countryside.Greenpeace attractsanimal lovers as well as those opposed to thenuclear ndustry.Although, herefore,science s used in making ocialproblem claims, science itself does not dictate which claims will bemade. For instance, he RSPBdrawson considerable cientific kills nconservingbirdsbut it is not scientific easoningwhich eadsthe groupto work for birds rather than field mice and voles. Science is not asufficient guide to what conservation groups should provide themembers' easons or engaging in conservation ctivities. n a narrowsense, sciencedoes not seem to compel people to conserveparticularbits of their environment nor tell them what the conservation

. . .prlorltlesare.RE-MORALIZING CIENCE:GAIAUp to this point I have suggested that science seems not to offer amoralbasisfor the green movement.However, he 1980switnessedagreat growth in popularity or an idea which ties the science of theenvironment to moral concern for the planet, the Gaia hypothesis.This hypothesis an bestbe explained hroughan example.Commen-tatorsdescribing he greenhouse effect commonlypoint out that thecarbon dioxide in the atmosphere seems to regulate the earth'stemperature.4l Without the greenhouse effect the earth wouldprobablybe too cold to support life; it would resemble Mars.Thatmany life forms have persisted for hundreds of millions of years


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528Stevenearley

implieshattheearth's emperaturehaslongbeenregulated.To talk

in thisay about 'regulation'might seem suspectand anthropo-

morphic.fterall,therewasno-onethere,no guiding ntelligence, o

dotheegulating.However,mostpeoplearehappytotalk nthisway,regardinghedescriptionasa metaphor.Buthe Gaiahypothesisproposesthat it is notjust ametaphor;

accordingo thishypothesis he earthtrulyis regulated.Lifeon the

planets somehowco-ordinated n a waywhichworksto keep the

planetabitable.Onthisview, heplanetshouldproperlyberegarded

as auperorganism.im Lovelockwho proposedthisidea gave the

nameaia o theworkingsof thissuperorganism.Clearly,f theearth

canedescribed n thiswayit mightchangeour expectationof the

globe'sesponseto human meddlingand alter our attitudeto theplanetwe mightnowseeourselvesashavinga moralobligationnot

justohumansandanimalsbuttoGaia.Scientificupportersof the Gaian idea would claimthat it has

helpedhemunderstandheecologyof theearth hroughtsemphasis

onheontributionwhich ivingorganismsmaketo themaintenance

ofheworld. Gaianideas stress the extent to whichthe planet is

suffusedith ife.Surprisinglyewphysicalprocessesoperatewithout

thenterventionof livingorganisms.Forexample,it is arguedthat

organismsn the sea play a centralrole in determiningthe earth'stemperaturey controllingthe amount of carbondioxide in the

atmosphere.42hus, a demythologized Gaia hypothesismight

amountoa beliefamongstscientistshat ivingthingsareempirically

moremportant o the physicsand chemistryof the earththan has

hithertoeenrecognized.However, this demythologizedversion is not the onlyone in

circulation.oreovertlyholisticGaian deashaveprovedattractiveo

somecientists ndto many n theenvironmentalmovement.43 tthe

sameime other scientistshave perceived these ideas asdeeply

disturbing.ceptical cientists aisebothempiricalandlogicaldoubts.

At an empirical evel, for example,one might seek toquerythe

hypothesisycitingthecontributionwhichorganismsappear o have

madeo the intensification f globalcoolingat the startof ice ages.

Surely,t mightbesaid,Gaiawouldcounteract ather hanassistsuch

cooling? utmostargumentshavebeenaddressed othe logicof the

Gaia ypothesis argumentswhichbeara strongresemblanceo those

mobilizedagainst functionalisttheories in sociology).Thus, it is

arguedhatthereareproblems bout heideaof ascribingpurposes o

Gaia. f it is to be morethana metaphor,Gaiawouldseemto need to

havepurposesin the waythatonly humansand (conceivably)few

animalsdo. Scientistsdo not treatplantsor bacteriaasthoughthey

haddeliberatententions;howthencantheplantpossesshem?Even,

scepticsargue, if one acceptsthat it mightbe possibleto talkof the

planet'spurpose,it is impossible o knowwhatthatpurposeis. We


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Creenambivalenceb()ut cience 529cannot communicatewith the planet. Moreover, rom time to timethere are ice ages and other catastrophes which result in massfatalities.How can thesebe reconciledwith Gaia's ssumedpurposes?Of course, one could say that the purpose is not to retain anyparticularife form but an aggregate life force but, since we do notknowto count this aggregate,we couldnever test such a theory.Manyscientists elt indignantabout Lovelock's laims;for severalyearshis paperswere routinely urneddown by leadingjournals.44na recentdenunciationn TheGuardianHorsfalldismissesLovelockas a'scientist f sorts'and claims hat his ideas appealonlyto 'scientificallyilliterategreens'.45

The pragmatic trengthof the Gaia hypothesis s that it offers tocombine environmentalscience with morality. It thus seems toprovidethe kind of authoritywhich,aswe have seen, a more routinedependence on science fails to deliver. But it has strong scientificopponents and is disadvantagedby its unorthodox character; tsprospectsook poor. In any case,evenwere it accepted, he hypothesisoperatesat such a high level of abstractionhat it would be hardtoderiveagreedpractical uidelines romit.

CONCLUSIONTo regard the green movementas profoundlyanchored n science ssurelycorrect.But, in practicalerms,green campaignershave foundit far harderto cash in on that scientificauthoritythan might havebeen anticipated. n thispaper I havesought to explainwhy science sless of a cognitiveally to greens than theymighthope.

In part, the explanationis philosophical.Scientificknowledgeisinherentlyopen to revision; t is intrinsically rovisional.Particularlyat the forefrontof science, t is alwayspossible hat thetruth s at oddswith scientists'currentbeliefs. Despite science'scognitive power, itcannotoffer transcendentalupport orparticular ubstantive ropo-sitions. Moreover, he green movement s dependenton extra-scien-tific, moralconsiderations. cientific tudies ndicating hat the whalepopulations are declining to non-sustainableevels may well offergood groundsfor not whaling.But when(as now maybe the case forminkewhales)46opulationsbegin to recover,sciencedoes not sufficeto saywhetherhunting shouldbe resumed.The explanation s also sociological.The professionand practiceofsciencemeanthatthe researchwhichgreensdesireorneed maynot bedone. The social compositionof green groups maynot afford themthe scientificexpertisethey require.Governments, irms, unions-even campaigners maybe far from disinterested n the uses theymake of scientific nformation.Finally,philosophical nd sociological


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530 Steven Yearleyfactot may overlapand interact.The socialcorltextof legal inquiriesencouragesthe tendentiousexploitationof science'sepistemologicalweaknesses; media conventions about 'fairness'encourage broad-casters to give 'equal time' to competing views evMenf the scientificcredentials f those viewsare far from equal.Together, these sociological nd philosophical actorshelp explainwhy even a socialmovementwith profound scientific upportexperi-ences difficulty n winning over the authoritiesand bringing aboutpolicychanges. In turn, this experienceof frustration when sciencefails to deliver the expected benefits - is likely to reinforce greens'attitudeof ideologicalambivalence owardsscience and to stimulatedemandfor alternative ourcesof legitimation.The tensionbetweenascientific professionalizationof movement organizations and thepursuitof more comprehensive egitimations s set to continue.(Date accepted: May 1991 ) Steven YearleyDepartment of SociologyUniversity of Ulster atJordanstownNO I ES

1. See for example A. Dobson, (;eenPolitical Th7ught, London, Un winHyman, 1990; P. Lowe and A. Flynn,'Environmental politics and policy in the19230s',n J. Moran, T/lePoliticalGe7gralphyof Contemporary ritain, London, Mac-millan, 1989, pp.255-79; and P. Loweand W. Rudig, 'Review article: politicalecology and the social sciences - the stateof the art', British J(lurnal of PoliticalScience,vol. 16,1986, pp. 513-50.2. For an exploration of these issuessee R. Wallis, 'Science and pseudo-science', SocialScience nformati7n,ol. 24,1985, pp. 585-601.3. N. W. Moore, TheBirct f Time:TheScienceand P(llitic.slf Nature C'(m.servati(ln,(ambridge, (>ambridgeUniversity Press,1987, p. xviii.4. Ibid., pp. l5746.5. M. Nicholson, The New Envir(m-mentalAge, (ambridge, (ambridge Uni-versity Press,19237,p.49.6. M. Weber, The Theory lf S(lcialanctEc(m(lmicOrganizati(m,New York, FreePress,1964, pp.328-9.7. This is documented in P. Lowe,'Values and institutions in the history ofBritish nature conservation in A. War-ren and F. B. (Joldsmith, Con.servationn

Per.spective,hichester, John Wiley,1983,pp.329-=)2 as well as in two books by 1.Sheail: Natu-e n Trust: heHi.story7f atureCon.senvationn Britain, (^lasgow, Blackie,1976, pp. 48-53 and Selwenty-Fiveear.snEcology:TheBritishEcologicalSociety,Lon-don, Blackwell,1987.8. Nicholson, 7p.it., pp. 91-2.9. See J. B. (allicott, 'TraditionalAmerican lndian and traditional West-ern European attitudes towards nature:an overview', in R. Elliot and A. Gare,Environmental hilo.sophy,Milton Keynes,Open University Press, 1983, pp.231-59.10. Discussed in (j. Spretnak and F.(apra, Green Politic.s: he Global Promi.se,London Paladin,1985, pp.230-58.11. Respectively, Time.s Higher Eslu-cationSupplement, April 1989, p. 8 andM. Brown and J. May, The GreenpeaceStory,London, Dorling Kindersley,1989,p. 150.12. Friends of the Earth, AnnualReportansl Account.s 1989190, London FOE,1990, P. 6.13. This comment reflects the actualwords used by campaigners as well as theethos of these groups' campaigning work;for information on my data collection and


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Creenambivalenceb()ut cience 531interpretative methods see below andnote 2().

14. For one good account see B.Barnes, AboutScience,Oxf'ord,Blackwell,1985, pp. 72-239-15. M/t. H. Newton-Smith, T/le Ratiotl-lity of Science, London, Routledge andKegan Paul, 1981, p.14, cited in Wallis,7t' it., p. 591.16. Among many helpf'ul comments,one of the ref'erees of this paper sug-gested that Popper's demarcationcriterion - an intended method f'or. . . .separatlng sclence trom non-sclence -should be discussed. I have not includedsuch a discussion in the main text, largelybecause the issue of demarcation is itself'so open to dispute (f'or an empirical -rather than conceptual - analysis of'demarcation-making see Wallis, op. cit.).In any case - and I suspect this was thereferee's point- the problems of' udge-ment and interpretation which I come onto illustratewould bejust as likely to dog a

pseudo-scientific environmentalism asthe mainstream, scientific one.17. M. Mulkay,Scienceand theSociologyof Knowledge,London, Allen and Unwin,1979, pp. 2942.18. A. F. (halmers, What .sthi.sThingC'alled Science?, Milton Keynes, OpenUniversity Press,1982, pp. 22-37.19. For a recent twist here see S.Baliunas and R. Jastrow 'Evidence forlong-term brightness changes of solar-type stars',Nature, vol. 348, 6 December1990, pp. 52W3.20. The research from which the dataderive was supported by the UK ESR(,grant A0925 0006, under programme onthe Public Understanding of' Science.The fieldwork, using interview and par-ticipant observation, ran from 1987 to1989.21. J. (ramer, Mission-OrientationnEcology: the Case of Dutch Fre.sh-WaterEcology,Amsterdam, Rodopi,1987, p. 50.22. As mentioned at the start of thisparagraph, and as I was forcefully re-minded by Keith Pavitt and Erik Mill-stone of the Science Policy ResearchUnit,Sussex, I am not claiming that thesefeatures are unique to the use of scienceby greens. For example, I(I faces thesame problem as the RSPB in knowing

how much money to put into research asagainst acquiring new plant; engineerst:acepragmatic uncertainty too. The con-trast I am drawing is between environ-mentalists'hopes (or fears) of science andthe practicalitiesthey experience.23. For a systematicelaboration of thisview see (J. BOhme, W. van den Daele andW. Krohn, 'Finali7ationin science', SocialScience Inprmati(m, vol. 15, 1976,pp. 307-30.'=>4. ee (J. N. (^ilbertand M. Mulkay,()peNing Pandora'.sB(lx. A SociologzcalAnaly.si.s Scienti.st.s'i.scour.se,ambridge,(Jambridge University Pres, 1984,pp. 3942 and B. Latour, '(^ive me alaboratoryand I will raisethe world', in K.D. Knorr-(etina and M. Mulkay, ScienceOb.senwed:er.spective.sn the Social StudyofScience,London Sage, 1983, pp. 141-70.25. (ramer, ()1). it.,p. 50.26. Nicholson o1).cit., pp. 44-53 andp. 54.27. ]. Silvertown and P. Sarre, Environ-metltand Society, London, Hodder andStoughtons 1990, pp. 834.28. A. Irwin, 'Acid pollution and pub-lic policy: the changing climate of en-vironmental decision-making', in M. Rad-ojevic and R. Harrison, Atmo.sphericAcidity: Source.s, Con.sequenGe.sandAbatement,Amsterdam, Elsevier, forth-coming.29. The RSPB is increasingly inter-ested in the places to which British birdsmigrate and in preserving crucial sitesalong migration routes. For this, scientifictrackingis needed.The issue of multi-caused fatalitieswasrecently illustrated by the case of racingpigeons which, apparently, suffer highrates of attrition, particularlyon popularcross-(hannel races. This was blamed bymanyon peregrines which, although pro-tected by law, were being shot by fanciersand, in one spectacular instance, evenkilled by 'kamikazee' pigeons (ageingbirded fitted with explosive charges).30. J. Porritt, '(^reen shoots, rottenroots', BBC Wildlife,vol. 7, no. 6, 1989,pp. 353-3.31. For example, it was printed in Thelndependent, July 1989, p. 9.32. Earth Matter.s, Autumn/Winter1990,p.4.


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532 StevenYearley33. Ibi(l.,p. 4.34. R. North, '(^reenpeace: still cred-

ible?', T11e tldel)erl(letlts 1 September19237, . 15.35. See Irwin, o1). it.36. North ol). cit., p. 15; he also ad-dressed this argument in his Radio 4programme about (^reenpeace broadcaston 6 December 19239and entitled 'TheZero Option'.37. SeeJ. S. Oteri, M. J. Weinberg andM. S. Pinales, '(ross-examination ofchemists in drug cases', in B. Barnes andD. Edge, Scietlce tl (,lmtext,Milton Keynes,Open University Press, 19232,pp. 250-259 as well as B. Wynne, Rationality n(lRitllal. The WitlsSscalenquiryatld NlzclearDeci.sion.sn Britain, (halfont St. (^iles,British Society for the History of Science,

19232 and S. Yearley, 'Bog standards:science and conversation at a public in-4uiry', SocialStudie.s f KScience,ol. 19,19239, p. 421-323.3X. Yearley, op. cit.39. Ibid.,p. 431.40. See Oteri, Weinberg and Pinales,o).cit.,p. 2523.41. F. Pearce, Turningup the Heat,London, Paladin, 19039, p. 3S9.42. Ibid., p. 143-50.43. See J. Porritt and D. Winner, TheComing f the (,reen.s, ondon, Fontana,192323,p. 249-53.44. Pearce, op.cit.,p. 37.45. ] . Horsf all, 'The hijack of reason',TheCuardiatl,0 April 1990, p. 25.46. Thus, see The Cuarctian,0 May1991, p. 29.

green ambivalence about science yearley

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