Anita. Behav., 1973, 21, 387--412

BOOK REVIEW

The following set of multiple reviews is the second in the series (see Volume 19, p. 791 and Volume 20, p. 196). By agreement with author and publisher, copies of Mind in Evolution by Gregory Razran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971, price $16.50) were distributed for review. The following people responded with reviews: S. Anthony Barnett, V. K. Fyodorov, Robert A. Hinde, Joseph K. Kovach, James H. Reynierse, Delbert D. Thiessen and Nicholas S. Thompson. Printed below are the author's prrcis followed by the reviews and a reply from the author.

Mind in Evolution. By GREGORY RAZRAN* Boston: Houghton Mifflin (1971). Price $16.50

Author's Prrds1 Common sense, general science and logic may well be amenable to a view that the evolutionary story of learning is in essence the ever-expanding emergence of new evolutionary levels, each of which subordinates but does not abrogate the level preceding it. Not so, however, the pro- fessionals of the field. The vast majority of them have for years based all learning on the elabor- ation of one or two levels. True, a minority has begun bowing, rather hyperbolically, to the evolution of the learner (ethology's fine hand, I presume). Yet only very few and far between are chancing the notion that the learning process itself has evolved in the course of its billion or so years of existence. (Can it be that Big Brother Brain has in its sibling rivalry with Mind kept it plebianly effete?)

Mind in Evolution was intended~ to do just that: (a) compare the learnability of pairs of reasonably equivalent tasks among animals varying widely, and varyingly, in evolutionary ascent; (b) rule out failures that might be at- tributed to insufficient training, faulty design, *Present address: 555 Gulf Way, St Petersburg Beach, Florida 33706, U.S.A.

tResearch done under Grant MH2196 of the National Institute of Mental Health, National Institutes of Health, Public Health Service, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The author is now at Eckerd College, St Petersburg, Florida.

~'Was intended' instead of 'is intended' is used designed- ly. For personal reasons, the book contains only about one-fifth of what was accumulated and prepared for it in 40 years. The shorn lamb is, in the main, the second half, particularly Chapter 10 and the discussion of avoid- ante learning. And, this is, unfortunately, even more discommoding since, for personal reasons, again I am not likely to write a revised edition. And may I also be forgiven for asking the reader to make a major correction: insert 'relatively' before 'per cent' in the last line of page 279, and in the first, second, sixth and thirteenth lines of page 280. Moreover, I beg forgiveness and feel regret that several intended paragraphs on 'classical conditioning and natural selection' were not included.

in appropriate techniques, and reactions beyond the subject's unlearned repertory; (c) consider learning task B evolutionarily higher than task A if group B masters both tasks and group A only A; (d) probe the specificities of each level and ascertain which is (are) the lowest, and so on.

The last query will be answered first. Habitu- ation and punishment (named here 'inhibitory aversive conditioning') so clearly evident in both protozoa and spinal mammals are the lowest. Sensitization, common in amphioxi and ascid- ians, is rather uncommon in spinal mammals and extremely rare in protozoa and hydraw Nature's way of ordering preconditioned learn- ing is not without logic: teach what should not be done before teaching how to do better what should be done. Interestingly, in spinal and very low animals, the habituation-sensitization divide is a function of stimulus intensity, but in rela- tively higher animals (earthworms, for instance) it is mainly a function of the locale of stimu- lation (caudocepbalad axis, in the main).

A more systematic disclosure is the evidence: (a) that both negative and positive reinforce- ments (respectively, termination of aversive and activation of appetitive stimuh) are more recent and more effective evolutionary acquisitions than appetitive classical conditioning; and (b) that, contrary to prior claims, in the wake of poor experiments and possibly moral-bound thinking, punishment is not only the most universal, but also the most effective, of all types of learning. Moreover, while in reinforce- ment conditioning, the efficacy of negative re- inforcers is basically similar to that of their positive counterparts, in classical CR situations, aversive stimuh not only exceed greatly the efficacy of appetitive ones: faster formation,

w & Polikarpov's report of Conditioned Reflexes in Coelenterates is a misnomer: the learning was punish- ment.

387

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longer retention, greater resistance to extinction and greater overconditioning, but the stimuli themselves quickly fission into an ineluctable antinomy. The CSs which evoke the CR begin to punish it when it is evoked. A sentence from the book will clear this antinomy and cognate 'conundrumness' of avoidance conditioning. 'After initial CS-US pairings, the effect of the omitted shock stems not from what it does but from what it misses--punishment and overcondit- ioning--and the effect of the delivered shock relates not to contingency on what the organism does but to reconditioning an extinguished (or weakened) classical CR' (p. 147 italics in original). Finally, there is the temptation to make mani- fest that I am maverick enough: (a) to eschew the putative validity of the difference between 'stimulus-contingent' and 'response-contingent' conditioning; (b) to replace 'operant-instru- mental' by 'reinforcement' conditioning to stress that it differs from Pavlov's type in results ob- tained and not in methods used, or nativity of coupled reactions; that is, in strengthening existing reactions versus forming new ones (Skinner's 'third reflex' 1938, p. 18); and even (c) to contend that operants are conditioned respondents, conditioned 'naturally' and 'tem- porally'.

In large measure, the animal experiments which goaded me most to wide 'inductive leaps' and philosophic spurts have been those on 'sensory preconditioning' (Soviet/American pro- duction ratio four to one) and 'conditioned configuring' (several hundred Russian, only several American). The results of these experi- ments show consistently that: (a) such con- ditioning obtains to any significant degree only in relatively mature birds and mammals; (b) it is abolished upon ablation of the association cortex and not the sensory cortex (East and West evidence concur with respect to sensory pre- conditioning; no equivalent American study in configuring); (c) a number of its parameters differ from, even contrast with, those of simple conditioning; and (d) the differences and con- trasts are the wider, the higher the evolutionary position of the experimental subjects. All of which suggest strongly that higher animals have evolved a basically non-conditioned (more exactly, superconditioned) multiplex of learning. Nine short propositions will attempt to delineate its quale.

(1) It is a perceptual superstructure of con- ditioning and not just a parameter of it.

(2) It operates mainly in two modes: (a) the

formation of suprasummative configures, whose components in course of training become more and more inactivated while the configures acquire more and more independent reactivity (cf. Wundt's "creative synthesis' and Ehrenfels' 'Gestaltqualit/it'); and (b) the formation of perceptual relations in which two perceived relata become integrated with a common re- lation (compare Selz's "Sachverhaltniss: unified knowledge of a thing-in-relation-to-another and not the thing in itself [things in themselves, G.R.] or the relation by itself').

(3) There is a striking resemblance in the genesis and essence of configures, Gestalten, images and percepts, and consequent ready pro- neness to consider the first a slow-motion object- ive revelation of the last three.

(4) The loss of component information in con- figuring (and perceiving) is countervailed and even excelled by the vastness of formed con- figures (or percepts). Organisms which do not configure respond to N stimuli in N ways, those who do configure, in factorial - -N ways. And consider also the all-over adaptive advan- tage of responding to wholes and not, LSD-like to each of its components.

(5) Perception integrates not the primary stimulus information which an organism receives but the proprioceptive and interoceptive sequels of its sensory-orienting reactions and is thus in essence a recode of information, or a second- signal system, Pavlov's second being really a third. (Compare and contrast traditional 'motor theories of consciousness' and Guthrie.)

(6) East and West experiments of liminal con- sciousness in adult humans suggests the ex- istence of a distinct realm of relatively unor- ganized consciousness that might best be named sensation, disputing thereby its total abro- gation by Gestaltists and its total severance from perception by Gibson, let alone the traditional creeds that perception is merely a complex of essences of sensation. Perception is auto- nomous functionally but not genetically.

(7) The relative evolutionary recency of the neural basis of the posited perceptual super- structure of learning suggests that this learning may well be no preponderant rival of inveterate simple conditioning in lower or higher animals, perhaps in all subprimates. A distinction must be drawn between the existence of a mechanism and its relative pragmatic role.

(8) Recent laboratory experiments, from both East and West, disclose, contrary to earlier beliefs, that man's learning is quantitatively and

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qualitatively superior to that of other primates, right after birth.

(9) Little will be said here about symbolic human cognition, except to note that, while I concur with Pavlov that 'with it a new neural principle is introduced,' I dissent from Chomsky and Lenneberg that 'it is species-specific.' More- over, I definitely discern between 'conditioned control ' subject to extinction and related disruptions, and 'voluntary control by symbols' which is relatively permanent. Pavlov who originally attempted to co-ordinate voluntary reactions with type II (operant-instrumental) conditioning changed later to aver that 'in- voluntary reaction become voluntary only with the aid of the second signal system' (Wednesdays, 1949, Vol. I, p. 337; original date, 24 May 1933.) At 84, Pavlov was evidently less ather- osclerotic than American theorists of my and the present generation. I myself humbly stated in 1935 'All voluntary behavior is symbolic but not all symbolic behavior is voluntary or will controlling' (Razran 1935, p. 121).

Reviews Mind in Evolution presents an unusual selection of material with a distinctively original point of view. I discuss the book as a teacher of ethology: to what extent does it help me to understand, and so to expound, the behaviour described ?

The book has two major components. One consists of accounts of a great range of experi- ments, on the ways in which species, from Protozoa to man, adapt their behaviour to experience: that is, it is concerned with 'learned behaviour' , 'conditioned' behaviour, habit form- ation, or whatever general term is preferred. Some of these descriptions (often clear and in- cisive) are of work published in Russian and little known outside the U.S.S.R. They are accompanied by well-designed text-figures.

Many of the experiments are on classical con- ditioning or have developed f rom Pavlov's work. Except among specialists, there is still much misunderstanding of the conditional reflex: it continues to be described in some texts as if it were a simple association of two stimuli, of which the second comes to evoke the same response as the first. But probably even special- ists who follow Professor Razran's narrative will appreciate more clearly than before the true complexities of the conditional reflex. The account, especially of Russian work, includes an interesting historical element, and a review

of fascinating, imaginative and harmless experi- ments on human beings.

The other major component of Mind in Evolution is reflected in its title. The author 's intention is to do much more than review the literature, f rom all countries, on 'conditioning'. He writes:

while I fully share the neo-behaviorist guidepost that psychology must be built yon Unten herauf . . . , I am not content to let it dwell only in Unten. Neo-behavior- ists' total neglect of the emergent evolutionary novelty of patterned and symbolic learning, and their exclusive concern with the laws of modificatory conditioning well developed in fish and octopuses, have long been stumbling blocks to my joining the club (p. 289).

Professor Razran is accordingly concerned both with the neurophysiological basis of behaviour and also with, as he puts it , 'the return of in- destructible consciousness'. He writes:

The experimental fundamentals of mind--learning, perception, and thinking--could be studied at three levels: the neural, the behavioral, and the conscious, and their mutual interactions. The neural level admit- tedly is the basis of both the behavioral and conscious levels . . . [but] so far the main burden of mind un- covery necessarily falls on behavioral and conscious analyses (p. 14).

(By the last two words I think Professor Razran means 'analyses of consciousness'.)

This programme raises fundamental questions on the strategy of scientific research. Should we try to make statements in which each term is clearly related to observable phenomena, and make only testable hypotheses? Or should we be content with a substantial c o m p o n e n t of indefinables, that is, should we disregard the modern revolution in thought on which the solid achievements of the natural sciences are based? Professor Razran states his preference for the second policy, but I could not find that he argues in its favour or even clearly recognizes the need for discussion, as distinct from bare assertion. Similarly, he makes causal use of question-begging terms such as 'innate" and 'learnt', and fails to acknowledge the con- troversies which have been aroused by these usages. One consequence is that the book presents more difficulties than are imposed by the subject matter alone.

Something must also be said about the style of writing. Despite strenuous efforts by a few, most accounts of behavioural research are still written either in contorted jargon or in flat, plastic Scientific American. It is agreeable to read a book in which the strong personality and enthusiasm of the author emerge through the prose. Nevertheless, in this case, the reader

390 A N I M A L B E I - I A V I O I J R , 21 , 2

has to pay for it. Professor Razran's English is his own, and this leads to difficulties.

Here is an example, printed in italics in the original to emphasize its importance.

�9 . . he thus proved specifically that classical con- ditioning is a higher-evolutionary level of learning than is aversive inhibitory conditioning, i.e. punish- ment (p. 116).

In this sentence 'specifically' is misused, and 'punishment' is equated with a kind of train- ing. Moreover, the proposition is said to be proved on the basis of observations on Stom- phia which at most suggest this conclusion. Finally, the term 'higher-evolutionary level' requires critical analysis, but does not receive it. On page 126 there is another italicized statement:

Punishment is not an equal symmetrical opposite of reinforcement but a different and primitive contrary of all learning (p. 126).

Here 'different' seems redundant, 'primitive' questionable, and 'contrary' used for (perhaps) 'antithesis'. It is not only emphasized sentences that cause the reader to stumble. As early as page 13 1 was stopped short by this:

And on the other hand, exclusive operational com- mitment extrudes unnecessarily the known subjective quale of the conscious categories (p. 13).

I think the impact of this book will be much reduced by these stylistic obstacles, which is a pity.

Let Professor Razran have the last word: A somewhat philosophical evolutionary attribute of all learning is its general beneficence---that despite reversals it tends on the whole to be self-correcting and to improve in the life of the individual and the history of the race . . . . contrary to pessimists, the human race is advancing not only technologically but also in welfare and morality (p. 327).

S. A. BARNETT Department of Zoology, The Australian National University, Canberra

Professor G. Razran's book covers a wide range of problems connected with the evolution of mind during its development, from the primitive forms in protozoa and other lower animals to the higher forms of psychic activity in man.

This book is one of the happiest attempts to throw light on this very complicated problem�9 It is mainly based on the Soviet and American research works published in the last two decades.

Assuming that learning is the groundwork of mind in evolution and taking into account the experimental data obtained by means of the

conditional reflexes method in the Soviet Union, as well as the data found by American be- haviorists and West European cognitionists, Professor Razran has drawn an elaborate classi- fication of the levels of learning, grouping eleven levels into four principal ones as follows:

1. Reactive--habituation and sensitization�9 2. Connective--inhibitory, classical and

reinforcement (three kinds of condit- ioning).

3. Integrative - - sensory preconditioning, configuring and eductive learning.

4. Symbolicmthree thinkings (symbolic, sememic and logisemic).

These levels differ essentially from one an- other. A level can develop in its pure form at different stages of onto- and phylo-genesis and it can interact with any of the others in a number of ways. The degree of complexity of every level is determined by means of compared physio- logical data and is confirmed by those of onto- genesis. Professor Razran's principle of evolu- tion, which is the basis of his classification, is in full accord with L. A. Orbeli's three main ap- proaches to studying higher nervous activity in animals, i.e. ontogenetic, phylogenetic and experimental/clinical, which are the leading methods of Soviet research workers in physi- ology.

In writing his book Professor Razran met with difficulties of language, of terminology and of theory, the overcoming of which is a great credit to him, though these barriers separated physiologists of many countries for many years. Having mastered Russian, Professor Razran has studied in detail 'tons' of Russian scientific literature. Differences in terminology of various schools of physiologists and a lot of new words introduced by Pavlov's school had no un- favourable influence on Professor Razran's synthesis of experimental works. Having care- fully compared Russian and American termin- ology, Professor Razran gives a brief and very precise characterization of both of them in his resumr.

The author also suggests that differences in theoretical deductions of these schools are mainly due to the terminology and are more often met in the least studied fields of their science, where knowledge is still vague and the mechanisms under study are open to doubts and allow different interpretations.

B O O K R E V I E W 391

The central problem that Professor Razran's monograph attempts to solve is the drawing of a rational classification of the evolution of animal learning. The lowest level, according to Professor Razran, is habituation and sensitization, the former being defined as 'learning not to do any- thing'. Its main characteristic is the extinction of the reaction when repeated stimuli are applied. 'Sensitization', on the contrary, is characterized by an increase in the force of the reaction with each application of the stimulus, and even by the development of the new reactions.

These two reactions, so different in their course, arise at the earliest stages of animal evolution, do not show any change in the pro- cess of phylogenesis and can be found in lower animals (Protozoa) as well as in higher animal forms. While sensitization is based on the 'summation' reflex (Pavlov) and is revealed in the decrement of the threshold of excitability on a repeated stimulus, habituation is due to extinction inhibition. Yet, from the point of view of evolution, internal inhibition (con- ditional inhibition) results from a higher level of the nervous system than the level at which the inborn inhibition only is observed. Conse- quently, habituation cannot be the most prim- itive form of learning.

If we assume that all kinds of internal in- hibition including extinction inhibition, develop on the base of the external (unconditional) one, particularly on the base of the protective in- hibition (V. K. Fyodorov 1949), and the latter is involved in the first stage of the extinction reaction, then we may agree that habituation in protozoa is based mainly on external in- hibition, while habituation in higher animals is mainly due to internal extinction inhibition. This conclusion, though in full accord with Pro- fessor Razran's opinion that it is not easy to draw a line between lower forms of learning and a higher form in highly organized animals (e.g. to discern habituation and sensitization from classical conditioning), is, nevertheless, in contradiction with his statement on the stabil- ity and lack of evolution in these primitive forms of learning during phylo- and onto-genesis.

According to Pavlov's and Orbeli's theory of evolution, phylogenesis reveals a natural devel- opment and change of the ratio of inherent mechanisms to conditional reflectory ones, the latter providing for adaptive behaviour of the animal. In early phylogenesis and in early onto- genesis, too, unconditional reflectory activity predominates, reaching its highest perfection

in insects. But in mammals, development is accompanied by a general predominance of conditional reflectory activity.

Each level of learning recognized by Pro- fessor Razran comprises a definite range of reactions. But it is not easy to distinguish some of the levels if we turn to the mechanism of their origin. Professor Razran places Pavlov's classical and instrumental reflexes into separate classes, though extensive research carried out by E. A. Asratyan showed convincingly that these re- actions are quite alike in their physiology.

A rational classification of various forms of learning leads not only to a rational arrange- ment of accumulated facts but also allows the classification of all animals according to their nervous system level. Yet, in spite of the seeming simplicity of the problem and the convincing amount of facts accumulated in that field, the classification offered by Professor Razran is open to discussion. Let us take, for instance, the data on the development of associations in animals of phylogenetically different levels in Chapter IX of Professor Razran's book. In the investigations carried out in Pavlov's life- time to solve the problem of association form- ation in animals, two indifferent stimuli were combined, after which one of them was com- bined with an unconditional reaction like feed- ing reaction. If the second stimulus also evoked a feeding reaction, the answer was considered to be positive. To confirm this point, a third in- different stimulus was introduced, and if it did not induce a feeding reaction, there was no doubt left about the two first stimuli being associated with one another. But these facts can be inter- preted in a different way, for instance, that the second signal might induce a feeding reaction not because it was associated with the first, but by having a direct connection with the 'feeding centre', while the third indifferent signal pro- duced no feeding reflex due to the orienting reflex. To elucidate this point a new experiment was carried out: after checking the second signal, the first reflex was changed from a feeding to a defensive reflex. If the second signal in this case also changed its meaning and turned into a defensive signal, too, a possibility of an association formed between the two was considered a certainty. But here a new doubt arose: the two combined signals might turn their feeding reflex into a defensive one only because the animal developed a special reflex, on this experiment, an 'environmental' reflex so to speak.

392 A N I M A L B E H A V I O U R , 21, 2

It became clear that some new tests were necessary to clarify this problem. They were carried out by two sientists: by Khekht on rats (1957) and N. P. Drozdenko on dogs (1950). But neither of these experiments gave any conclusive resuIts.

The above facts show how complicated the experiments must be if they are to prove that an animal of a definite species possesses a definite level of learning. And they also show that investigations on the possibility of association formation cannot solve this problem. It is quite possible, and that does not contradict the principle of evolutionnthat some animals, while developing associations, form the so-called direct signal links with unconditioned reactions, i.e. with common conditional reflexes; whereas other more highly organized animals can form associations along with developing conditional reflexes.

Professor Razran's classification, though open to discussion, logically results, to my mind, from numerous data cited by the author. But one point in it is rather strange to me--the author's opinion that all kinds of conditioning learning do not involve the activity of the ence- phalon, and that cortical mechanisms participate only in integrative and higher levels of learning. I do not see any facts confirming this statement at present.

Professor Razran's monograph is based mainly on learning data, with attention paid to electrophysiological and morphological cor- relates. The author conscientiously leaves out of the scope of his book biochemical data, which, probably, would make great contri- butions to the understanding of mechanisms of learning in the future.

Professor Razran addresses just criticisms to the scientists who undervalue the importance of Pavlov's theory. After a period of world-wide enthusiasm excited by cybernetic and mathe- matical models of brain activity, it becomes clear now, as never before, that Pavlov's ap- proach to the investigation of brain activity is far from being outmoded. It still offers much that is instructive and important to many kinds of biologists attempting to understand nature's most complicated creation: man's brain.

In the foreword, Professor J. E. Horrocks points out that Professor Razran's book is a contribution to the world's psychology, I would

add that it is also a contribution to the world's physiology of the higher nervous activity.

PROFESSOR V. K. FYODOROV deceased, 22 November 1972 Parlor Institute of Physiology, The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Leningrad.

There is probably no one else who could have emulated Professor Razran's achievement. This synthesis of the literature on learning from American and Russian sources could have been achieved only by one who had mastered the field for many years, and that in itself implies linguistic as well as academic skills.

Ethologists will find themselves in sympathy with many aspects of Professor Razran's ap- proach, Thus like Lorenz and Tinbergen he emphasizes that learning is adapted within each species according to its mode of life. Like Schnierla, he emphasizes how the quality of learning differs at different phyletic levels, though he seems to misunderstand Schneirla's distinction between experience and learning. Razran rejects 'the American learning enterprise' for reasons that will appeal to biologists: 'basic "laws" derived from a restricted area of subjects and methods, top-heavy and wide-open logical deductions or descriptive extrapolations, stress on similarities and disregard of differences, in- stitutionalized reification of verbal definitions, etc.', (though biologists may be left wondering whether Ukhtomsky's principle of dominance does not fall into some of the same snares). In keeping with his awareness of differences in quality between animals of different complexity, he does not insist on trying to reduce learning to one or two basic types: rather he classifies his material under eleven headings, grouped into non-associative, conditioning, perceiving and thinking levels. And as will be apparent from this list, like recent students of imprinting (e.g. Bateson, Sluckin, Salzen) he does not under-estimate the importance of sensory- sensory learning.

Just because the book contains so much that will appeal to ethologists, it is the more a pity that ethological data have been almost totally neglected. Ethological material on species differ- ences, imprinting, song learning, habituation, priming and various other topics are extremely cogent to many of his themes, but have appar- ently been over-looked. Professor Razran's treatment of perception is similar in many ways

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to that of Thorpe (e.g. Learning and Instinct in Animals, 1963, Methuen, London), but the latter is hardly mentioned. Some of the few references to ethological work imply an ex- tremely dated view of what ethologists are up to.

One of Professor Razran's chief themes is the manner in which the different types of learning are distributed through the animal kingdom, a kingdom which, incidentally, remarks such as 'this thirteenth evolutionary phylum (of which there are only seventeen)' imply that he pictm'es as a ladder rather than a tree. It is a pity that, in pursuing this interest, he sometimes forgets his earlier emphasis on the manner in which species' learning abilities are adapted to their mode of life, allowing paucity of evidence to force him into generalizations, based on laboratory ex- periments, that a particular type of learning does or does not occur at this or that evolu- tionary level. But his emphasis on the increasing complexity of learning carries an important message for those who are tempted to draw parallels between animals and man without proper regard for the differences between them. In Professor Razran's view the learning processes which occur at different phyletic levels differ in quality, and 'human learning rests on associative learning of behavioural symbols to communi- cate what is thought and on referential symbolic meanings as con ten t . . . ' . Since 'Even the highest primates do not acquire behavioural symbols'. 'The man-ape divide is very special'.

The book itself is not easy to read; there are many words not in common use which should have been paraphrased, such as horm6, apothegm, prolegomenon, nolprossing, con- naturalness and ontologic: other examples are to be found in the pr&is which precedes this review. However the chapters have excellent summaries, and I would recommend reading them before tackling the chapters themselves.

Of course the title is a deliberate challenge. Since it is easy for comparative psychologists to deny the existence of phenomena with which their methods cannot cope, the challenge should be welcome. Philosophers will have something to say about Professor Razran's desire that 'the science of mind as behaviour (should, not un- church altogether "raw" phenomenal feels' and should 'make the most of its progenitor, the science of neural actions' though the book is in fact nothing like so mystical as these quo- tations might make it seem. But some of the allies he marshalls to his aid must surely feel a little uncomfortable. I would love to know

Neal Miller's first response when he found himself cited in an argument for 'the return of indestructible consciousness' with the words 'Miller (1959) is all for stimulus-response liberal- ization!'

ROBERT A. HINDE Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, The University of Cambridge

Let There Be Mind! This book is a fitting climax to a life-long effort to keep western psychology informed of the achievements and potentialities of behaviour analysis by the inferential methods of classical conditioning. In it Professor Gregory Razran has once again demonstrated his unsurpassed mastery of the Pavlovian literature of East and West. The book will serve as an indispensable source of information for those who adhere to this system, and for those who strive to under- stand it.

This reviewer is much impressed by the ease with which Professor Razran reaches through the span of a century into the most varied depths of conditioning research and across the barriers of several languages. A multilingual list of references and indices takes up nearly a fourth of the book. However, the task here is to render unto Razran (and Pavlov) the things that are Razrart's (and Pavlov's) and unto the evolving bar of science the things that are science's. The reader will need no exhortations on the positive and unique in bringing together so much information. It is the place of Professor Razran's conceptual scheme within the shared endeavours of modern evolutionary thought and psychology that needs to be examined. Under the searchlight of such examination the title of this book appears, to this reviewer, singularly inappropriate: It does not deal with evolution, nor with mind in evolution, and it is not an East-West synthesis of current con- ceptions on learning and cognition.

In reply to the question, 'What then is this book about ?' this reviewer is tempted to propose a substitute title. It would read: A Vertical Comparative Psychoanatomy of Associations. Within it the term vertical would be defined as a time accrued dimension of progressive development, projected on a single phyletic line, and anchored hierarchically in the be- haviour of protozoa, fish, frogs, turtles, birds, rats, rabbits, dogs, baboons and college students;