MEANING IN LANGUAGE Dr. Papadopoulou D.

Student’s Name: Karamadouki Stella

We as speakers seem that we try to produce meaningful utterances to contribute to conversation and as listeners we try to assume that our partner in the conversation does the same. There are examples when one is not cooperative, maybe he is being interrogated or hates the person he is talking to, but the majority of the participants in a conversation try to cooperate. Therefore, several errors that may occur during the speech are ignored and we focus on the meaning, instead. We also try to find the meaning of statements that may seem untrue, unrelated, under-informative, over-informative, sarcastic, metaphoric or even ridiculous! We mostly deal with the effects of the context the utterances take place, as we sometimes mean beyond the literal side of the words. Resolution of ambiguity or vagueness can be jeopardized with reference to proper names, indexicals, demonstratives or presupposition but still facts about the utterance can be found beyond these meanings. To facilitate meaning one should sometimes apply something more than just conventional rules. Communication seems to be based on the encoding of the thoughts on behalf of the speaker and the decoding of the listener. This sometimes requires the competent interpretation and implicit mastering to deduce the truth and find meaning.

It is obvious that speakers do not always mean what they literally say or even if they do they also may mean some more besides, something which is altogether another thing of what they say. For example, we can all imagine situations like the following: “I would pay 150 euros for that dress.” Speaker’s meaning: I would not pay more than 150 for such a thing! So, it seems that what the speaker means by an utterance can be cut down into two pieces: what the speaker “says” and what the speaker “implicates” ( Neale 1992, pp.523–524). Saying what someone has in mind though related to the actual meaning of the words, is somewhat technical and refers to “a favoured notion of saying that must be further elucidated.” (Grice 1989, p.86). One should make amends of the notion by linking it to the utterer’s concept. There are also cases in which the utterer obviously says something without meaning it, which can be a “mock saying” or a “play saying” (Neale 1992, p.554). Another point could be the relation of what the speaker says and the expression’s timeless meaning. “In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words he has uttered.” (Grice 1989, p.25).The speaker does not just “say” but actually “implies”. The implicature’ is a blanket word to avoid having to make choices between words like “imply”, “indicate”, “suggest” and “mean”(  Grice 1989, p.86). According to Grice

there is a distinction between what someone says and what someone implies.

Conversational implicatures seem to stem form contextual factors, unlike entailments or presuppositions that are tied to words. Moreover, the additional meaning can also be related to the understanding of the conventions in a conversation. The theory of the Conversational Implicature is attributed to Paul Herbert Grice, who observed that meaning is also inferred and predicted. Consider the following sentence:

(1) Dora ate some of the sweets.

The proposition is that Dora ate a portion of the sweets and it is true as long as it corresponds to the true world. Intuitively, all the sweets can constitute a portion and so, the sentence is true even if she ate all the sweets! However, in a conversation like:

(2) A: “Dora ate some of the sweets”

B: “I knew she would. How many are left?”

It is clear that the conversation is based on the literal meaning conveyed by A – the semantic content- or at least that B infers the following proposition:

(3) Dora didn’t eat all of the sweets.

It can be suspected that the word some means a portion of the sweets, so Dora ate a portion but not all. But this may not be so:

(4) a. Dora ate some of the sweets.

# In fact, she ate none of the sweets

b. Dora ate some of the sweets.

In fact, she ate them all.

In 4a this can not be the case because the second obviously contradicts the first one. In other words, the real world could not correspond to both sentences the same time. Nevertheless, in 4b the two sentences are consistent and true. This proves that No. 1 does not necessarily entail No. 3. While No. 3 is not part of the literal meaning of No. 1, yet it is implicated by No.1. The speaker should intend and encourage the addressee to infer:

(5) Dora ate some of the sweets.

+> Dora didn’t eat all of the sweets.

This inference should include reasoning and should also rely on the cooperation of the participants in the conversation. If this is a fact, then the speaker is as informative as she should be in the exchange of the facts and the addressee believes in her. The latter reasons that if the speaker had known Dora ate all the sweets she would have said so. In other words, the speaker knew that Dora did not eat them all and so the addressee infers that there must be some sweets left!

So, the parts in a conversation seem to undergo an exchange that is guided by principles and determine the way in which language is used with maximum effects in order to achieve the goals. This is what Grice called the Cooperative Principle. This tries to distinguish differences between the semantic meaning and the speaker’s meaning that should be calculated on the basis of communicating. The concept of implicature is attempted to be defined through Maxims. What is of grave importance in this attempt is that the parts in a conversation try to make a contribution as required, when it is needed, by the purpose of the talk in which they are engaged. This Principle stands as an umbrella term for more components of how we communicate. All these components are grouped together under the Maxims.

When engaged in a conversation the Maxim of Quality requires that you make a contribution that is true. You should provide information that is genuine and justified. So, you:

a. Do not say what you believe to be false

b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

According to this Maxim there should be a certain kind of regularity in the behaviour with respect to authenticity provided in the conversation. For example:

A: Nadia, do you know where the Acropolis is?

B: Yes, it is in Greece.

B does not contribute what he believes to be false and lack evidence and so he observes the quality Maxim. He does not reply something like: “It’s in Hong Kong.”

The Maxim of Quantity relates to the amount of the information that someone should provide. So, you:

a. Make your contribution as informative as it is required.

b. B. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

This tries to explain the regularity of the behaviour with respect to the portion of the information needed. For example:

A: what time is it?

B: It’s 12 o’clock.

Given the purpose of the conversation, the man only provides as much information as is required:

– Not excessive like “it’s 12:00 at night, Greenwich Mean Time, 22

, …”

– Not inadequate like, “it’s night”

The Maxims of Relation requires someone to be relevant to the conversation topic:

A: How do you like your steak?

B: I’d like it mid-done.

B contributes something relevant for the purpose of the conversation and not something irrelevant like: “The curtains are of nice colour!” This Maxims tries to explain the regularity of being relevant in a conversation.

The Maxim of Manner requires form someone to be perspicuous. This may include avoiding obscurity, ambiguity, prolixity and a non-orderly manner. For example:

A: What did Tom do when the boat arrived?

B: He jumped and headed for the pier.

B does not answer something like: “He headed for the pier and jumped!”

The important contribution also seems to be the explanation of the regularity with respect to the way the information is offered in a conversation.

There is always the chance that the speaker may not follow the four maxims, at least one of them at a time. So, she may observe them or opt out by refraining from the co-operation. She may violate the maxims by lying or flouting them deliberately so as to create effects. In some level it can be claimed that the spear observes the co-operative principle even if this is literary said but implied. Observing the maxims in a non-literal level can result in conversational implicatures. So, when a speaker appears to violate a maxim by saying something as if it was false, uninformative or over-informative, irrelevant or obscure, the assumption that she is in fact following the maxims as in regularity, leads the interpreter to infer hypothesis about the meaning of the utterances (Kordić 1991, pp.91–92). The fact that the interpreter will do so, may allow the speaker to intentionally flout the maxims to get the implicature across or just rely on the listener’s background knowledge.

Quality Implicatures:

a. - Alexandra has two MAs.

+> I believe that Alexandra has two MAs and I have adequate evidence that she has.

b. – What if Europe blockades Cyprus and all the oil?

_ Oh come one, America rules the seas! [sarcasm]

+> American con not do anything about it.

Quantity Implicatures:

a. – The flag is blue

+> the flag is only blue.

b. – Beauty is beauty!

+> That’s its nature.

Relation Implicatures:

a. – Pass the pepper.

+> Pass the pepper now

b. – How was your date, yesterday?

- Nice weather, isn’t it?

+> the question is irritating to answer.

Manner Implicatures:

a. – How do I get to you shop?

-You cross the park, turn left as far as it goes and cross the street apposite the

museum.

+> Pay particular attention to the instructions I am giving you.

b. – What are you baking?

- A see ay kay ee !

+> Spelling is confusing.

Another case of implicature could appear when the speaker’ desire to fulfill the two maxims results in violating one of them. For example:

A: _ where is Melpo?

B: - Somewhere in the building.

In such a case the speaker tries to be co-operative but she fails to provide for the Maxim of Quantity. She invokes the maxim of Quality which leads to the implicature that the speaker does not have the evidence to give specific information about the location of where Melpo is (Grice 1975, p. 33).

There is of course a way for the speaker to opt out of the maxims using a special phrase or expression which are known as hedges. These suggest that Grice’s maxims are not on the right track! The Maxims are violated and the speaker is aware of that. For instance:

As far as I know…, I’m not sure if this is true but…,I may be wriong, but…. [Quantity]

I can’t say any more…, I don’t really need to say this, but…., As you already know….. [Quality]

Oh, by the way…., I don’t want to change the subject,but…. [Relation]

I’m not sure if this is clear enough,but…, I’m not sure if it makes sense, but… [Manner]

The truth may be that when we speak we all try to be co-operative with on another in order to construct meaningful conversations. The assumption may be that “Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice, 1975). This means that we as speakers try to contribute meaningful and productive utterances to help the conversation. As listeners, we assume that the addresser does the same. But there are also reasons that the case is not so and speakers opt out. What may be explained by this Principle is that we can find meaning in utterances which on the surface seem untrue, unrelated or ridiculous. Rather than inferring that our partner might be crazy or a liar, we assume that she tries to get something across and we can really figure out what she means!

References

Grice, H.P. (1975). "Method in Philosophical Psychology: From the Banal to the Bizarre", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1975), pp. 23–53.

Grice, H.P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.

Kordić, Snježana (1991). "Konverzacijske implikature" [Conversational implicatures]. Suvremena lingvistika (in Serbo-Croatian)17 (31-32): 87–96. ISSN 0586-0296. Archived from the original on 2 September 2012. Retrieved 6 September 2012.

Neale, Stephen (1992). “Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, pp. 509–559.