Rationality and Conversation:

A Thesis on Grice’s Theory of Conversation

Matthew Schoolfield

MSc (By Research)

The University of Edinburgh

2007

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Gricean Theory...............................................................................1

1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................1

1.2 Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature.........................................2

1.3 Epistemology and Testability of Gricean Theory.....................................9

Chapter 2: Criticisms, Alternatives and Neo-Gricean Theory.........................12

2.1 Kasher and Hintikka: Rationality as the Basis for Conversation...........12

2.2 Pre-Eminent Schools of Thought..........................................................18

2.2.1 Neo-Griceans.................................................................................18

2.2.1.1 Martinich..................................................................................18

2.2.1.2 Levinson..................................................................................20

2.2.1.3 Leech.......................................................................................24

2.2.2 Relevance Theory..........................................................................25

2.3 Davis: The Anti-Gricean........................................................................29

Chapter 3: Conversational Goals...................................................................33

3.1 Explanatory Failures of Gricean Theory................................................33

3.2 Social Norms as Presumed Goals........................................................34

3.3 The Communicative Goal.....................................................................35

3.4 The Suasive Goal.................................................................................40

3.4.1 Seller-Consumer Relationship........................................................40

3.4.2 The Bargainer Relationship............................................................42

3.5 The Epicurean Goal..............................................................................44

3.6 Exclusivity, Exhaustiveness, and Conclusion.......................................45

Chapter 4: Implicature within Goal-Oriented Conversation............................47

4.1 Quantity: Make Your Contribution as Informative as Is Required.........47

4.1.1 Some, Not All.................................................................................47

4.1.2 Tautologies.....................................................................................50

4.1.3 Other Violations..............................................................................51

4.2 Quality:..................................................................................................52

4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not

Express Something False.......................................................................52

4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate Evidence......54

4.3 Relation: Respond Relevantly...............................................................54

4.4 Manner:.................................................................................................56

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4.4.1 Avoid Unnecessary (or Excessive) Obscurity of Expression..........56

4.4.2 Avoid Ambiguity..............................................................................58

4.4.3 Avoid Unnecessary Prolixity...........................................................59

4.4.4 Avoid Unnecessary Disorder..........................................................61

4.5 Conclusion............................................................................................61

Chapter 5: Conclusion....................................................................................63

Works Cited....................................................................................................67

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Chapter 1: Gricean Theory

1.1 Introduction Paul Grice presents a theory of conversation and implicatures in his essay

“Logic and Conversation.” This work was first presented in his William James

Lectures in early 1967 and was discussed at some length before being published1 in

Cole and Morgan’s Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts in 1975 (Chapman

2005, 100). This theory attempts to bridge the gap between what participants in

conversation say, and what they mean. Grice presents this theory within the

framework of the Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contributions

such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction

of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1989, 26). The theory enables

Grice to present an account for the interpretation regarding discourse that would

otherwise be considered irrational. This account, however, has drawn much criticism

from both those who support this theory of conversation, and those who believe that it

is inherently flawed. Neo-Griceans, such as Levinson, have presented updated

models of conversational implicature, streamlining the theory in some ways and

expanding on it in other ways. Revisionists, such as Sperber and Wilson, have

created new theories based on other principles. Detractors to the Gricean account of

conversation include Davis, Kasher, Hintikka, and an interesting sociological work by

Haviland. Davis provides a cornucopia of counterexamples and suggests a theory of

convention in its place. Kasher objects to the idea of the Cooperative Principle

always being apparent in conversation; this is due to his rejection of the idea that

participants in conversation always have a common goal. Hintikka suggests a game-

theoretical approach to conversational implicature, but does not expand on this idea.

Finally, others consider the theory to be either insignificant or susceptible to many

counterexamples. Primarily, if the Cooperative Principle is not necessary for

communication then it has much less force regarding conversation; thus, if the usual

counterexamples presented against the theory are trivialized, as is usually the case, the

applicability of the theory to conversation in general will be undermined.2 Supposing

that Davis, Kasher, and Hintikka are right in their criticism of Grice, one can present a

new version of conversation, taking a more inclusive approach to participant’s goals

in conversation. This would not only expand the framework for conversational 1 Walker (1975) notes that the lectures were not published at the time of his paper on the subject.2 Notably, Bird (1979) has this contention.

1

implicatures, but provide a means to explain concepts that Grice does not include in

his Cooperative principle, such as the way in which one ought to resolve the

criticisms of these maxims. It may also allow more room for phenomena such as

politeness, which Grice does not account for. Once this new theory of

communication, based on both maxims and convention, is fleshed out, it should

provide a significantly more inclusive account of implicature, and one with greater

explanatory power.

1.2 Grice’s Theory of Conversational ImplicatureIt should be helpful to start by discussing Grice’s theory of meaning. When

talking about the meaning of a sentence, Grice notes that the term “to mean” can be

used in some interesting variations. Take the example, “Those three rings on the bell

(of the bus) mean that the bus is full,” this example would be quite different from,

say, “Those spots mean (meant) measles” (Grice 1989, 213-214). This difference

involves the fact that while both statements are, technically, cancellable, only the

former will still be rational when it is cancelled. Thus, if the bus driver mistakenly

rings the bell when the bus is not full, the bell still “means” the bus is full, though it is

not. This is unlike the latter statement, which involves natural meaning. This second

statement becomes contradictory if one adds, “Those spots meant measles, but he

hadn’t got measles” (Grice 1989, 213). Grice writes that the former statement can be

restated as “Those three rings on the bell mean ‘the bus is full’” (Grice 1989, 214).

This Grice refers to as nonnatural meaning. Grice uses the term “meansNN” to refer to

this specific nonnatural usage. Grice gives a definition of meansNN when he states,

“‘A meansNN something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x

to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’”

(Grice 1989, 220). When the bus drive rings the bell, he “meansNN” the bus is full; but

also, if he says “There’s not any room back there” to a potential bus rider, he still

“meansNN” the bus is full. It is this theory of meaning that will lead Grice to study the

implicatures created by the distinction between meaning something and “meaningNN”

something.

Grice, in his essay “Logic and Conversation”, attempts to provide a

framework for the pragmatics of conversation. He does so in this essay by presenting

a theory of implicature. His desire is to answer a debate between what he calls

“formalists” and “informalists” who disagree on the meaning of “~, , , , (x), x,

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x,” and their supposed English counterparts “not, and, or, if, all, some (or at least

one), the” respectively (Grice 1989, 22). Between the formal logic of the formalists

and the natural language logic of the informalists, Grice has this approach:

I wish… to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the

divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that

the mistake arises from inadequate attention to the nature and importance of

the conditions governing conversation. I shall, therefore, inquire into the

general conditions that… apply to conversation as such, irrespective of its

subject matter. I begin with a characterization of the notion of “implicature.”

(Grice 1989, 24)

To define his idea of implicature he explains, “I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the

verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf.

what is implied)” (Grice 1989, 24). With these new terms Grice is able to clearly

approach what would otherwise be very awkward subject.

Conventional implicatures, as opposed to the conversational implicatures that

Grice wishes to explore, are those which contain an implication explicitly within

statements. Grice gives the example, “He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave”;

here, the relationship between the consequence, “being brave,” and the antecedent,

“being an Englishman,” is inherent in the utterance (Grice 1989, 25). The “therefore”

makes this implication explicit; there are other words that are able to do this job as

well, for example: but, therefore, moreover, thus, hence, etc. (Bultinck 2005, 15).

This explicit relationship will not be there, however, for conversational implicatures,

which are non-conventional implicatures.3

Next, Grice classifies conversational implicatures as a subclass of non-

conventional implicatures. These types of implicatures, due to the vague nature of the

implicatum will need some communication tool in order for them to be effective.

Thus, there must be a fundamental rule to guide them. Grice points out,

The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our

talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected

remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to

some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in

3 The terms “conventional” and “non-conventional” do not mean “(not) having to do with social conventions,” which will be discussed in depth later; rather, they refer to whether or not an implicature conjunction is used within the statement itself. The distinction between “conversational” and “conventional” implicatures is not affected by Davis’ theory of implicatures by convention.

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them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a

mutually accepted direction. (Grice 1989, 26)

Here, Grice makes a key step in providing his theory of conversation with the

foundation that there is an implicit shared goal in conversation. There are, however,

objections to this move.

It is important, though, to point out that Grice presents this principle as a

normative definition of conversation. Griceans contend that participants of talk

exchanges will engage in “conversation,” as a general concept, only when following

the Cooperative Principle. Since Grice has presented this principle as a condition for

normatively defined conversation, then is no problem with counterexamples

emerging. Grice would just contend that the action engaged in by the participants is

not conversation. However, this normative definition may be significantly less

interesting as a theory of communication when compared to more general theories

with more explanatory power. Intuitions regarding “conversation” may not be

fulfilled within the Gricean framework.

Because he imposes this requirement for what counts as conversation, Grice is

able to present his “rough general principle which participants will be expected

(ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is

required… One might label this the Cooperative Principle” (Grice 1989, 26). This

Cooperative Principle is the basis for conversational maxims. Grice decides to pay

tribute to Kant by creating four categories “Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner”

(Grice 1989, 26). The categories, along with there maxims, are as follows:

Quantity:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current

purposes of the exchange).

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation:

1. Be relevant

Manner: Be perspicuous

1. Avoid obscurity of expression

2. Avoid ambiguity

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3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)

4. Be orderly (Grice 1989, 26-27)

Under the Category of Quantity Grice presents two maxims Q1 and Q2.4 These

maxims obviously are associated with the amount of information exchanged between

participants engaged in conversation. The Q1-maxim is very strong; there seems to

be an assumption by Grice that the amount of information necessary for participants

to provide will be known through some means, such as context, if it is not made

explicit. Clearly, desiderata in most conversational discourse are made explicit. The

Q2-maxim here is not particularly the source of much controversy. However, Grice

notes that it may be superfluous and, therefore, some may expect it to be worrisome.

On one interpretation of the maxim, though Grice neglects to point out, his Q1-maxim

may indeed implicitly include the Q2-maxim. This reading presumes that one is to

increase the level of information up to the correct amount, the other reading merely

sees it as telling participant not to go beyond the desired amount of information. This

interpretation, however, does not damage the Quantity Maxims; rather, it may simply

be a clarifying distinction, due to some confusion regarding the Q1-maxim.

The second category Grice lays out is that of quality. This, he states, should

be understood under the supermaxim, “Try to make your contribution one that is

true”; but, this is separated into two specific maxims:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (Grice 1989, 27)

These two maxims compose different aspects of this supermaxim, and their specific

characteristics differ drastically. The QL1-maxim maintains strict guidelines for

participants; whereas, the QL2-maxim will require participants to exercise their

judgment as to the adequacy of their responses.

Next there is the Category of Relation. For this, Grice simply gives the single

maxim “Be Relevant” (Grice 1989, 27). This seemingly simple maxim holds that one

is expected to make his or her input to the conversation appropriately relevant. This

maxim, however, has caused significant amounts of criticism. Grice points out that he

even struggles with the problems presented by this extremely vague maxim. Indeed,

4 This essay will use Bultinck’s notation. This is not always the notation of others; therefore, there may occasionally be a [bracket] to insert this notation into other’s quotations.Quantity – Q1 and Q2.Quality – QL1 and QL2.Manner – M1, M2, M3 and M4.

5

Searle, Wilson, and Sperber all reject this maxim. Searle remarks that, though it is

initially intuitive, it is ultimately problematic (Searle 1992, 14).

Finally there are the maxims of manner. These may be insufficient, as Grice

points out, for there may be many other maxims regarding the appropriate way of

engaging in cooperative conversational discourse. Also, Grice comments that these

may be of lesser importance than the maxims of other categories. He writes, “It is

obvious that observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is

the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity

would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said

something he believes to be false” (Grice 1989, 27). Manner seem to be more

aesthetic than the other categories; however, in terms of importance, it seems that the

M2-maxim regarding ambiguity is arguably the most important of the maxims of

manner. This is due to its relationship to equivocation and, therefore, a close

relationship to the QL1-maxim.

After his discussion of these maxims he suggests that these are not the only

maxims employed in conversations. He writes “There are, of course, all sorts of other

maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as “Be polite,” that are also

normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate

nonconventional implicatures” (Grice 1989, 28). It is notable that he decides to

intentionally leave out certain maxims from his categories, though this may be due to

the inherent limits on lectures.

Grice, to explain how these implications are to be understood, presents four

ways in which maxims may be unfulfilled. These four ways are violation, opting out,

being faced with a clash, and flouting. First, there may be a violation; Grice writes

that a person “may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases

he will be liable to mislead” (Grice 30). This could happen in many ways.

Obviously, there is a violation of the QL1-maxim, which would simply be an

occurrence of lying. This, however, is not the only case in which one could mislead.

One could violate the M2-maxim, speaking ambiguously with the intention to

misinform. There also seems to be the ability to do the same with the Q1-maxim,

providing minimal amounts of information with the intention of deception. This is

why courts call for people to tell “the whole truth,” compelling people to include all

the appropriate contents.

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It seems, however, that some of the maxims are not able to be violated for the

purposes of misleading or deception. A violation of the maxim of relevance, for

example, would only cause confusion, rather than deception, so long as all the other

maxims are maintained. The same could be said for a violation of the M3-maxim,

regarding brevity. It does not appear that being excessive with language could

mislead, again supposing that all other maxim are being fulfilled.

Secondly, Grice says that one can opt out. He writes that one “may opt out

from operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle; he may say,

indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the

maxim requires. He may say, for example I cannot say more; my lips are sealed”

(Grice 1989, 30). This principle, as the example suggests, can be directly applied to

Q1-maxim of quantity. He may also, however, opt out of the Q2-maxim by

attempting to filibuster during the conversation. In fact, this opting out may be

applied to all of the maxims as an overt sign of unwillingness to cooperate in the

conversation. However, the fact that Grice allows for individual participants to opt

out at whatever time they like may be problematic to his conception of the

Cooperative Principle and his reasons for its status in conversation, because opting

out is actually semi-cooperative.

The last two reasons for failing to follow maxims will prove most useful to

Grice and his description of conversational implicature. The third reason one may fail

to follow maxims is that they may clash. Grice writes, “He may be faced by a clash:

He may be unable, for example, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as

informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have

adequate evidence for what you say)” (Grice 1989, 30). Grice gives the example of

one person (A) asking another (B) where someone else (C) lives: “A: Where does C

live? / B: Somewhere in the South of France” (Grice 1989, 32). In this example, A

wants to know which city C lives in; however, B may not know this fact, so he might

leave the Q1-maxim unsatisfied in order to fulfill the QL2-maxim. Because of this

clash, however, Grice states that “B implicates that he does not know in which town C

lives” (Grice 1989, 33). Many examples of clashes between various maxims are

possible, each presenting different implications. This is not the primary style in

which people implicate things; rather, most implication will come from flouting

maxims.

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One issue that may concern those critical to Grice’s account of conversation is

the method by which determines which maxim will prevail when involved in a clash.

It seems that whenever there is a direct clash between maxims, one much choose the

most appropriate maxim to follow; however, Grice merely glosses over this as though

it will be obvious. This may be a mistake for Grice. It seems that one must have a

methodology of maxim superiority if one is to understand how implications are

caused by a clash. Suppose, given the previous example, that B were to flout the

QL2-maxim, rather than the Q2-maxim, and just guesses a city. Suppose he or she

responds with “Marseille?”, implying that he or she does not know the city, but

wishes to provide the appropriate amount of desired information. Grice gives no

reason why this should not be the case. He simply asserts that some maxims are more

important than others. Given the number of maxims that may occur under the

Category of Manner, there may be various clashes, forcing some participants to leave

maxims unfulfilled, yet there is no guide as to which maxims are more or less

important in general. Presenting a strategic theory to conversation may provide

answers to dilemmas of this kind.

Flouting, as opposed to resolving a clash, is clearly where Grice is gets most

of his traction regarding conversational implicature. Grice explains, “He may flout a

maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfill it… This situation is one that

characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature; and when a

conversational implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being

exploited” (Grice 1989, 30). Here, the participant is supposed to make it clear that he

is not opting out, there is no reason to suspect that he or she is unable to fulfill

maxims due to a clash, and it is supposed to be clear that there is no intent to mislead;

thus, the other participant, the listener, must be somewhat perplexed if the statement is

taken literally, which will alert him or her to the implication.

Grice presents many examples of flouting. He explains, “A is writing a

testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads

as follows: ‘Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at

tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.’” (Grice 1989, 33). This, according to Grice, is

a case in which A must be flouting the Q1-maxim. He argues that, since A took the

time to write the letter, he must not be opting out. Also, there is no reason to suppose

A is being deceptive, this seems obvious. Finally, because there is no apparent reason

for there to be a clash of maxims, and A ought to be imparting much more information

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regarding the skills the student possesses, then “He must, therefore, be wishing to

impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only

if he thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he is implicating”

(Grice 1989, 33). This structure of flouting of maxims will be the model Grice uses to

explain the disconnects the often occur between what is said and what may be meant

by a speaker.

Finally, Grice lays out his requirements for working out conversational

implicatures. He posits that in order to work out implicatures one must rely on the

following five pieces of information:

(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of

any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its

maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other

items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all

relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both

participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. (Grice

1989, 31)

All of this information allows a participant to work out implicatures that he or she

may be presented with. Most of these points are fairly uncontroversial; however, the

fourth requirement may prove to be contentious, due to its broad nature. Regardless

of this possible controversy, one should be able to work out these conversational

implicatures if this information is present.

Grice does create a decent theory of communication to serve his purposes;

however, as his critics and contemporaries will suggest, this theory is far from

complete. With redundant maxims and potentially significant maxims left out, there

is a lot to be improved upon. Still, as far as creating the framework for a general

theory is concerned, he has done well by providing an intuitive format for

understanding the distinction between what is said and what is meant. After a review

of his followers’ work many of these issues will be resolved. Primarily, there is the

general rejection of the relevance maxim, but also serious reformulations of redundant

maxims. In addition to this, the critics of the Cooperative Principle will provide

theories of implicature based on general principles of reason, rather than this

controversial principle.

1.3 Epistemology and Testability of Gricean Theory

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One particularly interesting work to look at before moving to criticisms of

Gricean Theory is Sadock’s “On Testing for Conversational Implicature.” Here,

Sadock first lays out the claims that Grice states distinguishing conversational

implicature from conventional implicature, then reviews whether these characteristics

are valid in identifying types of implicature. Grice presents six different properties

that Sadock discusses:

(a) Conversational implicata are capable of being “worked out” on the

basis, inter alia, of the Cooperative Principle. That is, they are

CALCULABLE.

(b) Conversational implicata are CANCELLABLE.

(c) Conversational implicata are NONDETACHABLE.

(d) Conversational implicata are not part of the meaning of the uttered

forms. They are NONCONVENTIONAL.

(e) Conversational implicata are not carried by what is said, but by the

saying of it.

(f) Conversational implicata may be INDETERMAINATE. (Sadock 1978,

284)

Sadock primarily concerns himself with the first three of these as “practical tests” for

determining implicature, because he cannot see how the last three could provide any

real test for conversational implicature.

Sadock almost immediately rejects the first quality (a), because the maxims

are “so vague that almost anything can be ‘worked out’ on the basis of almost any

meaning,”; he ultimately determines, not surprisingly, that “Calculability is not a

sufficient condition for conversational implicature” (Sadock 1978, 285-286).

Calculability is certainly a necessary condition for implicature; however, it is not a

sufficient one. Therefore, using calculability in a test for conversational implicature is

not effective. Sadock then turns to detachability. However, because Grice notes that

“conversational implicatures are in fact based on the WAY what is said is said—on

how it is put,” Sadock believes that “nondetachability is not a sufficient test for

conversational implicature… nondetachability is not strict enough to distinguish

between entailment and conversational implicature” (Sadock 1978, 288). Neither of

these two tests work, however, cancellability, as one will see, is better suited as a test

for implicature.

10

Sadock then addresses cancellability, “the best of the tests,” at length5 (Sadock

1978, 292). Cancellability allows an implication to be canceled without making a

statement contradictory. For example, “Gertrude not only just failed to swim the

English Channel, in fact she swam it” is at least somewhat contradictory, but “It’s

cold in here, but I don’t want you to close the door” is perfectly acceptable (Sadock

1978, 292-293). One problem that Sadock makes clear, however, is that “The test

does not distinguish cases of ambiguity from cases of univocality plus possible

conversational implicature. One of the senses of a grammatically ambiguous sentence

may always be contradicted” (Sadock 1978, 293). This point is that if there is an

implicature in an ambiguous sentence, one of the interpretations of the statement is

always cancelable. Sadock explains, “The sad fact is that in the very cases where

argument is likely to arise as to whether something conveyed by an utterance is

conversationally implicated, the competing claim would be that the utterance is

ambiguous” (Sadock 1978, 294). Thus, cancellability ultimately fails as a test for

conversational implicature.

Sadock does propose one more test, however. This is a test of reinforceability

of a conversational implicature. This test looks for redundancy, for example, “It’s

odd that dogs eat cheese, and they do” is redundant; however, “Some grades were

good, but not all” is perfectly informative. Still, Sadock points out, “only assertions

are valid test expressions for the reinforcement test while any expression that

unequivocally indicates that a speaker holds a certain belief… can function properly

in testing for cancellability” (Sadock 1978, 295). So, sadly, “There is no sufficient

tests for conversational implicature and no group of tests that together are sufficient…

Cancellability and reinforceability fail to be sufficient… because, in the very

important case of grammatical ambiguity, any one sense is obviously cancellable or

reinforceable” (Sadock 1978, 295-296). Unfortunately for students of implicature, the

ability of testing for conversational implicature is not foolproof; however, Sadock

provides for a general schema, using cancellability and reinforceability, for

identifying conversational implicata.

5 This opinion is echoed by Grandy (1989); Stalnaker (1989) does not pose any objections.

11

Chapter 2: Criticisms, Alternatives and Neo-Gricean

Theory

2.1 Kasher and Hintikka: Rationality as the Basis for ConversationAsa Kasher presents one of the more obvious criticisms to Grice’s work in his

essay, “Conversational Maxims and Rationality.” Kasher places his emphasis on the

dubiousness of the Cooperative Principle; primarily, he examines whether or not the

Cooperative Principle is actually inherent to conversation. Kasher begins by

elaborating Grice’s position, primarily noting the Cooperative Principle. He then

points to his own objectives, which are to show “(a) that the cooperation principle has

a problematic presumption, (b) that the connection between the cooperation principle

and the principles to be derived from it is a problematic one, and (c) that the latter

four principles follow from more general and more basic principles” (Kasher 1976,

201). He attempts to show these three points by viewing conversation through a goal-

achievement lens. Kasher directly addresses the second of these statements first. He

makes a parallel between the Cooperative Principle and a goal-achievement principle,

which he lays in the following way:

Is the cooperation principle one on which the four principles of quantity,

quality, relation, and manner are well grounded? The general relationship

between the cooperation principle and the other principles is parallel to the

relationship between the general instruction of (5) and the more specific

instructions of (6):

(5) At every stage on a way towards achieving an end of yours, act

as required for the achievement of the aim.

(6) (a) Do not use the means you have for achieving your ends more or

less than is required for their achievement, ceteris paribus;

(b) Try to achieve your ends by the standard use of the means you

have for their achievement, ceteris paribus;

(c) At every stage on the way to achievement of your ends,

consider the means being used by other persons to achieve their

ends, as you come to determine the manner of your progress at

that stage, ceteris paribus; and prefer using your means in a

manner which is likely to help the progress of others on their

12

way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of

these means, ceteris paribus;

(d) Give preference to means which lead you to your ends over

means which lead you to situations wherein achievement of the

ends themselves is just a possible result. (Kasher 1976, 202-

203)

Here, Kasher notes (b)-(d) are parallel to (5) in the same way that quality, relation,

and manner relate to the Cooperative Principle, respectively. The point that Kasher is

making with this long set of parallels is that the Gricean maxims are not derivable

from the Cooperative Principle.6 He begins his argument by showing that (a)-(d)

clearly hinder (5). Condition (a) prevents one from using all the means one has to

achieve goals, (b) prevents one from using nonstandard means, (c) requires one to

consider others goals, etc. The only time when one must follow (a)-(d) is when two

people cannot achieve their goals alone and must depend on each others resources.

Here, one can see the parallel; as Kasher writes, “Can it be that the element of

cooperation may make it possible to derive the accompanying principles from the

cooperation principle? It is quite clear - with one exception – that such is not the

case” (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, the general Cooperative Principle “Make your

conversational contribution such as is required, at the state at which it occurs, by the

accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged,” does

not in necessarily lead one to follow the Gricean maxims (Grice 1989, 26). People

must only follow them in cases where they cannot achieve their conversational goals

without the assistance of others. Kasher also notes, about the exception regarding

mutual necessity, “this exception does not show that cooperation of aims and means is

an essential element in the connection between the cooperation principle and the

accompanying principles” (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, Kasher shows, as he intended,

that “the connection between the cooperation principle and the principles to be

derived from it is a problematic one,” or at least is not a necessary one (Kasher 1976,

201).

Kasher then lays out the rationality principle that he will rely on. He writes,

“(R) Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at

least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus” (Kasher 1976, 205). He then shows how

each of the sub-principles in (6) is achieved by (R). This principle (R) has in it a clear 6 These claims are probably not anything that Grice would disagree with.

13

call for efficiency. Thus, it implies the previous principle (6a) and with it the first

Gricean maxim when considered in regards to conversational goals. Secondly, (6d)

also follows from this (R) principle, because one would want to raise the probability

of achieving one’s goals as much as possible, all things being equal. Kasher also

notes that the first half of (6c) is also implied by (R). The second half of (6c) and

(6b), however, require more explanation. The reason why (6b) is fulfilled by (R)

depends strongly on the ceteris paribus cause. Given that all things are equal (Kasher

uses the example of striking a nail with a hammer as opposed to striking a nail with a

coconut), one ought to opt for the standard hammering implement, due to an inherent

risk that is involved when using a tool for a purpose other than its standard function.

This risk may be negligible in many cases; however, no matter how small the risk, it

is rational to play it safe. In this way, (6b) is fulfilled.

There are some problems, however, in the explanation of the second half of

(6c), that one should “prefer using your means in a manner which is likely to help the

progress of others on their way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of

these means, ceteris paribus”. The first notable problem that Kasher accepts is that of

Hobbesian theory. In certain circumstances in a state of nature, a person might not

want to use means to assist others in achieving their goals, due to a constant mistrust.

Because this state of nature is such a nasty place, it is logical for one to assume the

goals achieved by others may threaten a person, and may ultimately end in harming

him or her. However, as Kasher argues, helping others achieve a goal creates the

possibility of attaining the benefit of two things: future help from the person one

assists and possible benefits from the goal he or she is trying to achieve (Kasher 1976,

208-209). Therefore, if the person one could help has the goal of, say, building a

large weapon that could help him or her injure others, perhaps one should not assist

that person; however, if that goal is something that one doesn’t think can be used to

harm others, all things being equal, the possibility of future benefit should be enough

to make it rational to use means which will also benefit others. Thus, the (R)

principle satisfies all of (6c).

Kasher still believes that the Gricean model is effective; however, there must

be an argument for forming implicatures. Kasher writes, “Since we are not accepting

the cooperation principle – neither as the basis for the accompanying maxims nor

itself – we should try improving the structure of the characteristic argument for

forming implicatures” (Kasher 1976, 210). In order to do this, Kasher suggests the

14

rationalization principle. He writes, “(RP) There is no reason to assume that the

speaker is not a rational agent; his ends and his beliefs regarding his state, in the

context of utterance supply the justifications of his behavior” (Kasher 1976, 210).

This principle, as a premise to Kasher’s argument, seems essential. On occasion

people attempt to converse with non-rational agents: the mentally ill, pets, and even

plants. However, supposing one is communicating with another rational agent, one

must presume that when that agent begins violating (6a-d), there is a purpose. As

Kasher states, “If we replace, in the implicature-forming argument structure, the

cooperation principle (CP) with the rationalization principle (RP), we shall not lose

any power of explanation but rather gain additional power” (Kasher 1976, 211). The

additional power includes certain replies of silence, for example “if I refrain from

answering Morton’s question, at the threshold of my home, ‘Have you stopped

playing the trumpet?’, and I stare at him without opening my mouth, my silence has a

complicated disjunctive implicature” (Kasher 1976, 213).

Here, Kasher has the power to present the implicatures that Grice provides;

however, he does so under the rationality principle (R), rather than the Cooperative

Principle. This argument against Grice is quite effective, since it encompasses the

Gricean implicature model while having greater explanatory power. Kasher

accomplishes his three starting goals, showing that sometimes “there is no full

cooperation, because it is contrary to my interests, to a certain extent… Grice’s

cooperation principle does not permit such an explanation without radical changes in

its content, its justification and the manner of its operation. We have presented such

radical changes in this article” (Kasher 1973, 214-215). It is this view of

communication that must be exploited to have a full comprehension of implicature in

general. However, this view is not widely accepted by philosophers interested in

conversational implicature. It is in expounding on these ideas where the bulk of this

work will be derived.

Another paper that must be explored is “Logic of Conversation as a Logic of

Dialogue,” by Jaakko Hintikka. In this paper Hintikka complements Grice on a body

of work; however, he singles out “Logic and Conversation” to criticize. Hintikka

believes that the Gricean maxims “are not, and cannot be, the rock bottom of a

satisfactory analysis of the logic of conversation” (Hintikka 1986, 273). One of the

reasons Hintikka thinks this, is his belief that, “when the time comes to conceptualize

the results of… discourse-theoretical observations Grice often seems to retreat back to

15

formulations that pertain to utterances taken one by one rather than to the interplay of

different utterances in discourse” (Hintikka 1986, 259). Hintikka is interested in a

“different, more flexible framework in which the dynamics of discourse are spelt out

more explicitly” (Hintikka 1986, 259). First-order predicate logic is clearly not the

logic of dialogue. This point, as Hintikka wants to explore, leads to a fundamental

difference between propositions and the utterances of dialogue. The new strategy for

understanding conversation Hintikka wants to employ is explained as follows:

Grice says that one of his ‘avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or

variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior’ [Grice 1989, 28]. If so, the

bag of conceptual tools one can profitably use in studying conversational logic

should be a special case, or variety, of the conceptual tools one uses in

studying the rationality of human behaviour in general. One such tool is game

theory. (Hintikka 1986, 262)

Thus, Hintikka argues that the framework for studying dialogue needs to be shifted

from formal logic to game theory. Game theory is geared toward better understanding

which appropriate strategies one ought to use in given situations, or games.

Hintikka then sketches a simple schema in which conversations can be viewed

game theoretically. He writes, “Two speakers make ‘moves’ alternately. There are

four different kinds of moves: (a) Assertoric moves. (b) Interrogative moves. (c)

Deductive moves. (d) Definitory moves” (Hintikka 1986, 262). Hintikka then

explains how each of these steps work. First, a “player” must make an assertoric

move, in which he or she “puts forward a new proposition (a new ‘thesis’)” (Hintikka

1986, 262). An interrogative move is a questioning move, the answer (if one can be

given) to which “is then added to the list of the answerer’s theses” (Hintikka 1986,

262). The deductive moves are pretty straightforward, it is comprised of “a logical

conclusion from the totality of his/her opponent’s theses,” and previous conclusions

obtained by the same means (Hintikka 1986, 263). Finally, definitory moves are

when one “introduces a new non-logical symbol by and appropriate explicit

definition” (Hintikka 1986, 263). These four moves are used to prove all the players’

theses, but according to Hintikka the goals can be varied.

Hintikka believes that the Gricean maxims can be incorporated into his model.

In referring to maxim Q2, Hintikka notes, while Grice remarks that one ought not

violate Q2 for fear of confusing the hearer, for Hintikka there “is nevertheless

operative,… in ordinary discourse, a different pressure against extra information.

16

Everything a player of my dialogical games says can be used against him (or her) by

the opponent” (Hintikka 1986, 270). Here, the player will want his discourse to be as

weak as possible; thus, requiring him to prove less by the rules of the game. This is a

fundamentally different reason to act in accordance with the Q2-maxim; however the

end result is the same.

The same result will be found regarding the maxims of quality, QL1, and QL2.

Because one only gets a payoff by proving the maximum amount of statements in the

dialogue, one will only want to propose things that he or she may be able to show to

be true. Surprisingly, QL1 is also satisfied by this game. Hintikka writes, “if my

opponent gives true answers to my question, if the opponent is fairly well-informed,

and if the effects of my own answers can be discounted, then it is ceteris paribus in

my own best interest to put forward true theses” (Hintikka 1986, 272). Manner,

unlike quantity, quality, and relevance, is not of interest to Hintikka. He states that it

“is different in kind from the first three” (Hintikka 1986, 274). This should become

apparent, as arguments to this affect will be made later. Relevance, however, must be

addressed and is actually reworded to state that it is a move within the rules to

increase one’s pay-off. This Hintikka must explain; he states, “For instead of the

relevance of the several utterances in a dialogue I could collectively speak of the

coherence of the dialogue” (Hintikka 1986, 273). Hintikka refers to a Sherlock

Holmes story in which Holmes solves a mystery about a prize race horse by asking a

shepherd an apparently irrelevant question about the recent status of his sheep

(Hintikka 1986, 275). However, this question, as is often the case with the solutions

to intricate puzzles, was the crucial link between a series of facts that ultimately

achieved the goal of solving this mystery.

From all this, one can see that Hintikka has crafted a formal game that models

the Gricean maxims. This game, like Kasher’s work, does not require a Cooperative

Principle; and, in fact, becomes a competition between the players of the game. Still,

there are clearly some problematic results of this account. For example, intuitions of

conversation stray far from this schema. Conversations are certainly not games in

which one must prove, or at least hope to prove, all the propositions that one puts

forward. Still, the idea of conversation as a goal oriented game, with pay-offs and

costs, is certainly an idea which has not been explored, and may have some benefits.

The primary significance of these two works, however, is their alternative approach to

the theory of conversation, which is based on rationality theory.

17

2.2 Pre-Eminent Schools of ThoughtThe dominant theory of conversational implicature has been the Gricean

model, though it should be noted that this subject is quite young. There does not seem

to be much consensus in the philosophical community regarding the way in which

meaning is communicated by these implicatures. However, in the linguistics

literature about conversation, Grice’s seems to be the default theory explaining the

nature and existence of implicature.7 Grice’s theory has been debated, and there have

been three primary schools of thought regarding the subject. Firstly, there are the

Neo-Griceans. This group accepts the general theory that Grice laid out and expands

on it, making minimal changes to the substance of the theory. They tend not to reject

major theses of Grice, such as the Cooperative Principle. Levinson is a prime

example of a Neo-Gricean; Leech is also, but to a lesser extent. The second school of

though are revisionists. This group usually scraps a large section of Gricean theory,

for a simpler model based on fewer principles. Sperber and Wilson are the

quintessential example of this with their own Relevance Theory. This theory uses one

overarching principle, their Relevance Principle, to encapsulate all the ideas within

Gricean theory. Finally, there are those who reject the Gricean theory on the whole

and suggest that implicature is ultimately rooted in social conventions. Wayne Davis

exemplifies this group providing an exhaustive attack on Gricean theory. As one will

see, Davis rejects the ideas presented by Grice and resorts to social conventions as an

explanation for the existence of conversational implicature. The consequences of

these different schools have only recently been discussed in literature.

2.2.1 Neo-Griceans

2.2.1.1 MartinichOne Neo-Gricean is A. P. Martinich. His reformulation of Grice’s maxims is

probably the least different of all the theories. In fact, Martinich has only two major

criticisms to the theory as presented by Grice. The first change Martinich proposes is

to the maxims of quality. Martinich argues that they are faulty because they are too

rigid:

Both are defective because too [sic] narrow. Cast as they are in terms of

“truth”, “falsity” and “evidence”, they apply only to those speech acts that

attempt to say how the world is, that is, to statements, assertions and the like.

7 Such as Wardhaugh (1985).

18

They suffer from the typical philosophical disease of fixating on serious

factual statements when people often do other things with language.

(Martinich 1980, 219)

He suggests, instead, a maxim that is “broad enough to cover the entire spectrum of

speech acts” (Martinich 1980, 219). He settles on his authenticity supermaxim B′:

B′. Be authentic. That is, do not knowingly participate in a speech act for

which the conditions for its successful and non-defective performance

are not satisfied. (Martinich 1980, 220)

This rewording of the Quality Maxim certainly accounts for speech acts, and there is

something to this speech act adjustment; however, it initially strikes one as odd that

this speech-act-sensitive language is needed. It seems that most speech acts, at least

the ones that Martinich lists, such as promising, forgiving, and apologizing all entail

non-natural meanings. Grice clearly had this in mind when he proposed his maxims,

so this dramatic change may be unnecessary to the theory. For those who are

particular about speak act theory it may be notable. Still, it is probably excessive to

edit Grice’s principles in this way. Regardless, Martinich’s authenticity supermaxim

is only one of the two alterations that he makes to Grice’s theory.

The second maxim that Martinich modifies is the maxim of relation. He

divides this maxim into two submaxims, unlike his modification to the QL-maxim.

He calls the first of these two submaxims C1, which is, “Make your contribution one

that moves the discussion towards its goal” (Martinich 1980, 220). This modification

does address two of the major criticisms levied against Grice, those of Kasher and

Hintikka. By addressing the goal-oriented nature of conversation, Martinich points to

one of the major ways to improve the Gricean model. However, Martinich misses one

of the main intuitions that Kasher brings up, that in order to address the goal-oriented

nature of conversation, one cannot simply address aspects of Grice’s theory, because

of its presumption of the Cooperative Principle as its foundation. The only way in

which this submaxim could stand without conflicting with the Cooperative Principle

is if all conversational goals were cooperative; however, this is simply not the case.

Thus, unfortunately, this submaxim cannot even be addressed without an entire

overhaul of the Gricean system.

Martinich refers to the second of the two submaxims of relation as C2. This

maxim is as follows: “Express yourself in terms that will allow your hearer to tie your

contribution into the conversational context” (Martinich 1980, 221). This brings light

19

onto another alternative to Gricean theory, which is that of Relevance Theory.

Without the addition of C1, however, this submaxim does not seem significantly clear

enough to warrant this rewording. Context is important; however, without a general

theory of context, as Martinich only provides a vague quote by Strawson to found his

theory, the difference between contributions being relevant and being able to be tied

into a conversational context cannot be differentiated (Martinich 1980, 221-222).

Thus, Martinich’s reformulations ultimately fail, but they reiterate the criticisms

presented in Hintikka and Kasher.

2.2.1.2 LevinsonContinuing with the modifications of Neo-Gricean theory, one must mention

the theory presented in Levinson’s Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized

Conversational Implicature. It concerns itself with general conversational

implicatures (GCIs) rather than particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs).

Thus, Levinson’s theory of pragmatics is intentionally incomplete, as he points out

when he writes, “a theory of GCIs has to be supplemented with a theory of PCIs that

will have at least as much, and possibly considerably more, importance to a general

theory of communication” (Levinson 2000, 22). One of the problems Levinson sees

in the Gricean theory is that there is no major distinction between the generalized

implicatures and the particular implicatures. Levinson writes:

In the immediate context of a discussion of the distinction, Grice provides

only one, none too clear, example… viz. the inference from the indefinite

article to the assumption that the speaker is not in a position to be specific.

Thus the assertion of (6) might normally carry the GCI inference:

“I saw a woman in my office.”

GCI: ‘I saw someone other than my wife/girlfriend/mother/etc.’

because “the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have

been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be

assumed that he is not in a position to be specific” [Grice 1989, 37-38].

(Levinson 2000, 17)

However, Levinson claims that Grice was particularly interested in these generalized

implicatures; thus, the GCI theory Levinson creates would be of great interest to

philosophers with similar interests to Grice’s.

20

This GCI theory is comprised of three heuristics, upon which all of the

Gricean general implicature should rest. This theory should guide the interpretation

of ambiguous sentences. The three heuristics are the Q-heuristic (regarding quantity),

the I-heuristic (regarding “informativeness”), and the M-heuristic (regarding manner).

Levinson uses they symbol “+>” to mean “implicates, as in ‘p’ +> ‘q’ (uttering ‘p’

implicates ‘q’)” (Levinson 2000, xi). This is differentiated from the symbol “++>”

which, for Levinson means, “communicates (the sum of what is said and what is

implicated)” (Levinson 2000, xi).

The Q-heuristic is supposed to model Grice’s Q1-maxim, “What isn’t said,

isn’t” (Levinson 2000, 35). This is important for his theory of scalar implicature

between words like “all” and “some,” and others like “not all” and “none.” It also can

be used in regards to the simpler aspects of the Q1-maxim such as “‘Three boys came

in’ +> ‘not four’” (Levinson 2000, 36). However, the scalar implicatures presented

by Levinson are particularly interesting, primarily the relation of the Q-heuristic to the

traditional square of opposition. Levinson writes:

Aristotle held that in the case of the modals the I/O relation was logical but

in the case of the quantifiers it was a nonlogical suggestion. Hamilton and

Jespersen held the relation is logical for all the squares, De Morgan and J. S.

Mill that it is nonlogical for all the squares, and so on.

The theory of GCIs helps to explain the confusion. The I (some) corner of

the square carries a generalized scalar implicature to the effect that the O (not

all) corner also holds. It is the generalized nature of the inference that

explains the confusion even among these eminent scholars thinking deep and

hard about the problem. “Some” strongly suggests ‘not all’, and “Some in fact

all” or “Not all, indeed none,” indicating that the suggestion cannot be a

logical relationship. (Levinson 2000, 68)

The significance of the Q-heuristic here is obvious. It allows the square of opposition

to be understood not for just the typical all, some none(not some), not all pairs, but

can be implemented even with the logical connectives and, or neither/nor, not

both (Levinson 2000, 64-67). Still, the real affect that this Q-heuristic produces is

the conditions by which the hearer knows that statements tend to be more efficient

than they technically must be. People will often, as this heuristic allows, disregard

specifier phrases such as in “exactly n things,” and “Possibly, but not definitely X” in

21

casual speech. Thus, the Q-heuristic allows for limits on what one must say, so as not

to exasperate speakers or confuse hearers.

The I-heuristic that Levinson presents is somewhat different. He defines this

heuristic as, “What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified”; here Levinson

mimics Grice’s Q2-maxim “Do not make your contribution more informative than is

required” (Levinson 2000, 37). This heuristic covers things often left unsaid, for

simplicity’s sake. Levinson gives the example, “‘If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you

$5.’ +> ‘Iff you mow the lawn, will I [sic] give you $5’” (Levinson 2000, 37). The I-

heuristic also has particular applicability in explaining why conjunction statements

usually imply temporal order and causal connection, and why conditional statements

almost always imply a causal relation. This is why, for example when one says, “He

got in the car, turned on the engine, and drove away,” typically that person implies

that the actions were done in that order, and that there was a causal connection

between them. This heuristic, however, will need to work with the M-heuristic to

have any serious weight; because, in order for something to be said in the

stereotypical way, there must be a way to say something non-stereotypically, which is

what the M-heuristic marks for hearers.

The M-heuristic is related to Grice’s maxim of Manner. Levinson explains,

“What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal” (Levinson 2000, 38). To explain this

principle Levinson continues, “The underlying idea here is that there is an implicit

opposition or parasitic relationship between our second and third heuristics: what is

said simply… picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked

expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be

avoided” (Levinson 2000, 38). This heuristic is used in order to interpret oddly

worded sentence, which contain superfluous wordage, e.g. excessive phrasing or

double negation. The example Levinson gives are of the following form, “‘Bill

stopped the car’ +> (by I) ‘in the stereotypical manner with the foot pedal’,” which

invokes the I-heuristic due to its simplicity; whereas, “‘Bill caused the car to stop’ +>

(by M) ‘indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by the use of the emergency brake’,”

which relies on the M-heuristic because of the indirect way in with the statement is

made (Levinson 2000, 39). Davis’ criticisms of this theory of implicature, to be

discussed in depth later, will effectively undermine these implicatures; thus, the

relationship between these heuristics may be in jeopardy.

22

One of the main pieces of work Levinson incorporates, that Grice clearly fails

to explicitly provide for, is his guidelines for the resolution of implicature clashes.

Where Grice addresses the fact that clashes may occur, he does not explicate which of

his principles will have precedence over others. This allows for the problematic

situation where one must decide which maxim is most important in any given

situation, and thus, which maxim one ought to follow rather than another. Levinson

sees this problem and addresses it when he writes, “As sentences become complex,

these inferences may arise from different clauses, and traffic rules will need to be

established. In short, we have a projection problem” (Levinson 2000, 157).

Levinson’s “resolution schema” is as follows:

a: Genuine Q-implicature… take precedence over I-implicatures;

b: In all other cases, the I-principle induces stereotypical interpretations,

unless:

c: A marked expression has been used where an unmarked one could

have been employed instead, in which case the M-implicature defeats

the relevant I-implicature, by inducing the inference to the complement

of the I-implicature that would have arisen from the unmarked

expression. (Levinson 2000, 157)

More simply put, “Q-implicatures > M-implicatures > I-implicatures”; yet, even

Levinson admits that this is much too simple of a model, because “This still leaves

much detail unresolved—for example, the resolution of potential implicatures of

different subtypes arising under the same principle, or of inferences coming from

different clauses” (Levinson 2000, 157-158). However, this general schema seems

sufficient for Levinson’s ends, as his theory is about implicature in general, and if

pressed he should be able to provide a more in depth version to suit the needs of

different problems.

This theory of generalize conversational implicature, though much more

cohesively formed, has still been criticized by Davis, as noted, among others. One of

the main issues is that, like Grice’s theory, Levinson must also incorporate the

Cooperative Principle, which many have argued is faulty. Davis argues via

counterexamples that this type of system will ultimately fail.

2.2.1.3 Leech

23

Geoffrey Leech is another example of a Neo-Gricean. He presents a modified

version of Gricean theory as a means to better explain pragmatics in his Principles of

Pragmatics. The theory presented by Leech, however, is unique from the other Neo-

Griceans. Primarily, he separates himself by explicitly stating his acceptance of goal-

oriented framework for pragmatics. The second difference between Leech and other

many of the Neo-Griceans is his attempt to unite the Gricean Cooperative Principle

with other principles he presents, namely his Politeness Principle and Irony Principle.

In relation to his acceptance of a goal-oriented framework for pragmatics,

there are many example to support this from his work. When referring to speech

situations, he states, “I shall often find it useful to talk of a goal or function of an

utterance, in preference to talking about its intended meaning, or [the speaker’s]

intention in uttering it” (Leech 1983, 13). This position is reiterated when Leech

writes, “The principles of pragmatics are fundamentally non-conventional, ie [sic]

motivated in terms of conversational goals” (Leech 1983, 24). The reason Leech

thinks that pragmatics are non-conventional, is that Leech believes that a theory of

motivation, with the additional principles he will add, will provide a general theory of

pragmatics.8

The extra principles related to the Cooperative Principle that Leech adds are

the Politeness Principle, and the Irony Principle. He formulates the Politeness

Principle in a negative way, stating, “Minimize (other things being equal) the

expression of impolite beliefs,” to which “there is a corresponding positive version

(‘Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs’)” (Leech 1983,

81). This Politeness Principle has maxims of tact, generosity, approbation, modesty,

agreement, and sympathy (Leech 1983, 132). The Politeness Principle is coupled

with an Irony Principle that “is parasitic on the other two” (Leech 1983, 142). Leech

explains in the following way:

The [Cooperative Principle] and the [Politeness Principle] can be seen to be

functional by direct reference to their role in promoting effective interpersonal

communication; but the [Irony Principle]’s function can only be explained in

terms of other principles. The [Irony Principle] is a ‘second-order principle’

which enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming polite; it does so by

superficially breaking the [Cooperative Principle], but ultimately upholding it.

(Leech 1983, 142). 8 Contrast this with Searle (1969).

24

Here, the complex relationship of these three principles is laid out. The Politeness

Principle needed by Leech to explain the instances in which apparently cooperative

communication seems to violate the Cooperative Principle, and the Irony Principle to

explain how speakers can violate the Politeness Principle while being cooperative. It

should be noted that Grice mentions both phenomenon; he suggested a politeness

maxim in “Logic and Conversation,” and gives an explanation for irony in “Further

Notes.”

The primary concern of this theory, however, is its insistence that, while

pragmatics is goal-oriented, conversation as a whole is not goal-oriented, and

conversational implicature is caused by a violation of maxims. These principles of

politeness and irony seem quite adequate; however, his theory of conversation in

general will not provide the explanatory power for conversations that are not

cooperatively based.

2.2.2 Relevance TheoryThe next major, new theory of conversational implicature is Relevance

Theory. This theory is presented briefly in Wilson and Sperber’s essay “On Defining

‘Relevance’” and much more clearly in Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance:

Communication and Cognition. This theory, as was briefly touched upon before, is

significantly different from Grice’s and Levinson’s theories, because it relies on one

overarching principle. This principle is that of relevancy.

Sperber and Wilson begin by establishing their definition for ostensive-

inferential communication. This essentially means that one communicates that he or

she is intending to communicate something. One basic example of this is the phrase

“Excuse me, we must inform you that p.” This phrase expresses that one intends to

express something, and conveys this intention. They define this ostensive

communication as such:

Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus

which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the

communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more

manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I. (Sperber and Wilson 1986,

63)

25

This definition will ultimately be essential to their conception of relevance, because

the principle of relevance that Sperber and Wilson create is essentially about these

ostensive communications, and not communication in general.

In order to establish a theory of relevance they must first lay out the conditions

for which relevance can exist. They write, “We are not trying to define the ordinary

English word ‘relevance’… we believe that there is an important psychological

property – a property of mental processes – which the ordinary notion or relevance

roughly approximates… What we are trying to do is to describe this property: that is,

to define relevance as a useful theoretical concept” (S&W9 1986, 119). The

beginnings of this definition they lay out as, “An assumption is relevant in a context if

and only if it has some contextual effect in that context” (S&W 1986, 122). This

definition is clearly lacking; however, Sperber and Wilson provide it to show that

context is a condition of relevance. Something can only be relevant if there is a

context in which it is relevant. Another way in which this definition is lacking is that

it does not show that “relevance is a matter of degree” (S&W 1986, 123).

The authors want to show that relevance is similar to “productivity or yield,

which involve some form of cost-benefit analysis” (S&W 1986, 123). This cost-

benefit analysis ultimately will take the form of processing cost versus contextual

effects. Now, contextual effect plays the prominent rolls in determining relevancy.

The amount a specific context is changed by given assumptions primarily affects

relevance; however, “other things being equal, an assumption requiring a smaller

processing effort is more relevant” (S&W 1986, 125). This yields a comparative

definition which is as follows:

Relevance

Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its

contextual effects in this context are large.

Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the

effort required to process it in this context is small. (S&W 1986, 125)

These extent conditions provide the degree basis by which Sperber and Wilson want

to judge relevance.

Sperber and Wilson also define “Relevance to an individual” by way of a

simple extension of their general principle of relevance. They state, “An assumption

is relevant to an individual at a given time if and only if it is relevant in one or more 9 “S&W” will be used for “Sperber & Wilson” for the sake of brevity.

26

of the contexts accessible to that individual at that time” (S&W 1986, 144). This is

not a significant modification; rather, it is simply a formal move to refer to one of the

common uses of the term “relevance.” Sperber and Wilson provide an extent

condition based definition for relevance to an individual. They also define

“Relevance of a phenomenon” in a similar way, the only main difference is that

phenomena are relevant only if they are relevant to an individual.

Finally, Sperber and Wilson are ready to present their primary claim about

relevance. First, there is their presumption. They write, “an act of ostensive

communication automatically communicates a presumption of relevance”; however,

they want to say something stronger in their principle. Thus, they provide a definition

for a presumption for optimal relevance. This definition is as follows:

Presumption of optimal relevance

(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make

manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the

addressee’s while to process the ostensive stimulus.

(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could

have used to communicate I. (S&W 1986, 158)

Here, if the addressee holds this presumption, then the ostensive stimulus will appear

to be significant to the addressee, regardless of whether or not he or she knows why it

relevant. Next they present their “Principle of relevance”:

Principle of relevance

Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own

optimal relevance. (S&W 1986, 158)

This principle deals with ostensive communications; not, as the authors explicitly

note, with all forms of communication. Ostensive communicators do not always

provide the optimal information to their addressees, however, “they necessarily intend

the addressee to believe that they do” (S&W 1986, 158). In addition to this question,

Sperber and Wilson address the conception of filibuster. This is a situation in which

do not care whether or not their information is relevant or not; it is only a delaying

tactic in arguments or formal proceedings. This, however, is a “rare situation” in

which addressees can assume “that the apparent communicator is not really

addressing them, and perhaps not communicating at all” (S&W 1986, 159). This is

not normally the case in communication, and is a notable exception to the rule.

27

Sperber and Wilson also explain the difference between their work and

Grice’s approach. They note that there are many differences between the two

theories, writing, “One is that the principle of relevance is much more explicit than

Grice’s co-operative principle and maxims” (S&W 1986, 161). This is a quality that

any revisionist theory will want to have. They continue, “Another is that Grice

assumes that communication involves a greater degree of co-operation than we do”

(S&W 1986, 161). This sidesteps a common criticism of the Gricean analysis.

One of the criticisms Sperber and Wilson bring against the Gricean theory is

one of their major differences as well. That is, that Grice’s theory depends on people

knowing, following, and expecting other to follow mutually-constitutive behaviors in

order for them to communicate with each other. Sperber and Wilson expound on this

when the state, “Grice’s principle and maxims are norms which communicators and

audience must know in order to communicate adequately… the audience uses its

knowledge of the norms in interpreting communicative behavior” (S&W 1986, 162).

The main difference here and the authors point out is that the communicating is

second nature, not the result of cultural upbringing, as is shown by the following:

The principle of relevance, by contrast, is a generalization about ostensive-

inferential communication. Communicators and audience need no more know

the principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know about the

principles of genetics to reproduce. Communicators do not ‘follow’ the

principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to.

(S&W 1986, 162).

This difference is quite dramatic and shows that what Sperber and Wilson are dealing

with is fundamentally different than what Grice accomplishes with his theory.

The most important difference, according to the authors, between their’s and

Grice’s theories is the difference in “the explanation of communication” (S&W 1986,

162). They illustrate this difference as follows:

Grice’s account of conversation starts from a distinction between what is

explicitly said and what is implicated. No explanation of explicit

communication is given… Implicatures are explained as assumptions that the

audience must make to preserve the idea that the speaker has obeyed the

maxims, or at least the co-operative principle. The principle of relevance is

intended to explain ostensive communication as whole, both explicit and

implicit. (S&W 1986, 162-163)

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This approach is different from Grice’s in that Sperber and Wilson want to explain

much more than Grice does. Grice’s theory of communication does not differentiate

between different kinds of communication; Sperber and Wilson’s theory depends on

essential differences in the way people communicate in order to explain implicature

through relevance. Bultinck (2005) reiterates this point when he writes, “Relevance

Theory is actually much more than a reformulation of some of Grice’s insights, it is

meant as an outline of ‘the system used by human beings in spontaneous inference,

and in normal utterance comprehension in particular’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 94)

and has specific psychological ambitions, which ultimately lead to the presentation of

a ‘cognitive architecture’” (Bultinck 2005, 27). Here one can see that Sperber and

Wilson have different aims with their work. However, these goals incorporate the

ideas Grice wanted to express in his theory of communication.

2.3 Davis: The Anti-GriceanWayne Davis, in his book Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in

the Failure of Gricean Theory, presents the most pervasive argument against Gricean

theory to date. This work is critical of Grice’s theory as well as the theory of

generalized conversational implicature and Relevance Theory. He begins by

presenting Grice’s theory. One principle he adds, though he argues it is already

presented in the theory, is what he calls “Grice’s Razor.” This principle is as follows:

“Grice’s Razor: Other things being equal, it is preferable to postulate conversational

implicatures rather than senses, conventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions

because conversational implicatures can be derived from independently motivated

psychosocial principles” (Davis 1998, 19). This principle will be essential to most if

not all of Davis’ claims, so he cites a massive number of sources to support it, which

Grandy (1989, 516) supports in addition to this list.

Davis’ first major argument against Grice is in the matter of quantity. He

writes, “The existence of quantity implicatures is undeniable. What is false is the

claim that quantity implicatures are derived from or explained by the Maxim of

Quantity” (Davis 1998, 35). One of the main reasons for this maxim is for weaker

statements to block stronger statements: “The idea is that if the speaker were in a

position to make the stronger statement, he should have” (Davis 1998, 34). However,

Davis produces a myriad of counterexamples to this. In presenting these

counterexample Davis uses a different symbol from Levinson; thus, for the

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propositions Davis puts forward “=>” to be read as “implicates” and “≠>” as “does

not implicate.” Here Davis compares:

“Did anyone die?”

Some did => -(All died).

Yes ≠> -(All died). (Davis 1998, 35)

However, some of Davis’ numerous counterexamples of weaker statements not

implying stronger statements are as follows:

Some died ≠> -(Only some [a few, a minority] died).

Some died ≠> -(Some were killed [murdered, assassinated, executed,…])

Some died ≠> -(35.72% died). (Davis 1998, 35-36)

These arguments, and arguments denying that implicature, as some have considered,

can be “in force” in certain circumstance and not in others arbitrarily, affect Grice’s

and Levinson’s theories (Davis 1998, 37).

Davis next attacks tautology implicatures. The common example for this type

of implicature is “War is war,” and is associated with a violation of the Maxim of

Quantity, as it provides no information. He begins by noting that neither Grice nor

Levinson provide an account for how the Maxim of Quantity generates these

implicatures (Davis 1998, 42). Then he presents some counterexamples of non-

implicating tautologies to undermine the principle in general; for example, “If it rains

then it will rain or snow… The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast,” etc.

(Davis 1998, 45). Additionally, he points out that when one considers statements

similar to tautologies, “War is an armed conflict between groups,” they will typically

appear to him or her as a definition, rather than consider the speaker to be implicating

something (Davis 1998, 46). He writes, “tautology implicatures are far and away the

exception rather than the rule… The fact that most tautologies lack implicatures

undermines the claim that observed tautology implicatures can be derived from

general psychosocial principles” (Davis 1998, 45). Concluding with, “the moral is

clear. Generalized tautology implicatures… are not explained by the Gricean maxims.

Convention seems to be the only answer” (Davis 1998, 46). His attack of the Gricean

account of these implicatures is quite substantial. He follows in the same manner

with a criticism of conjunction implicatures.

Davis continues in this fashion undermining much of the work Griceans have

attempted to settle, including “indeterminate” implicatures, relevance implicatures,

what he calls “close-but” implicatures, etc. (Davis 1998, 70-75). He attacks

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Levinson’s theory when he addresses quantity implicatures more in depth, stating that

scalar implicatures “can easily be extended: <all, nearly all, most, many, a few,

some>,” and that this extension undermines implicatures caused by the Maxim of

Quantity (Davis 1998, 84). He then moves on to the Relevance Theory of Sperber

and Wilson. He writes that beside its connection to the Maxim of Relation, the

Principle of Relevance cannot follow Grice’s model in the following way:

The Principle of Relevance does not imply any of Grice’s other principles…

Cooperative Principle: nothing guarantees that the contribution with the

greatest number of contextual implications per cost must be the contribution

required by the accepted purpose of conversation. Maxim of Quality:

nothing… requires that the conveyed proposition or any of its contextual

implications be true or justified. Maxim of Quantity… more, or less,

informative propositions might be proportionately less costly to process.

Furthermore the Principle of Relevance fails to imply the Maxim of Manner to

the extent that brevity involves sacrificing content and not just eliminating

unnecessary verbiage. (Davis 1998, 100-101)

Thus, according to Davis, many of the typical implicatures Grice’s theory wants to

present, simply cannot be shown via Relevance Theory. In Sperber and Wilson’s

defense though, the premise of their paper is solely to explain relevance.

Conversational implicature through a relevance principle is merely an added benefit.

Still, if the theory is merely about processing cost, there are many types of implicature

that are based on excessively verbose language.

Finally, Davis presents his theory of implicature conventions. Primarily, he

argues that conversational implicature, unlike Grice’s claims, is not necessarily non-

conventional. He writes, “We will see that being conventional does not entail being

part of the meaning of implicature-bearing sentences, and that the distinction Grice

marked with the terms ‘conversational’ and ‘conventional’ is valid even though

convention is involved in both” (Davis 1998, 133). His theory presents implicature as

a taught practice that is perpetuated because it is useful and convenient for the

practice to be perpetuated. The four reasons besides precedence for implicature to be

perpetuated are that one can form a mental association with an idea, that they are

habitual, that they are traditional, and that they are reinforced by social pressure

(Davis 1998, 134-135). From these practices, implicatures arrive, often arbitrarily,

and persist due to perpetuation. However, one thing that Davis does not directly

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address is a point that Sadock makes, “the principles that ORIGINALLY allowed

these expressions to have metaphorical senses are still vital and therefore these

conventionalized implicatures are also causes where the Cooperative Principle could

be invoked, but where it should not be” (Sadock 1978, 287). If an implicature

becomes prominent enough to become a convention, its origins must still be

accounted for. Davis, not considering this fact, presents his theories for the

conventional basis for quantity implicatures, tautology implicatures, disjunction

implicatures, modal implicatures, relevance implicatures, “close-but” implicatures,

manner implicatures, and “interrogative/imperative” implicatures. This theory is

quite dramatic in the way it presents conversational implicature. There is much for

Davis to explain regarding the pervasiveness of some of the common implicature.

Indeed, simply because Davis can provide a genealogy for certain implicatures, does

not mean there is evidence that implicatures did, in fact, arise via these methods; and,

the real strength of his argument relies on what some call “Obviously… overly

harsh,” counterexamples (Bultinck 2005, 29).

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Chapter 3: Conversational GoalsOne of the main issues regarding implicature that may be overlooked is the

purpose of conversation itself. Rather than explicate conversation as a general system

of communication, one may consider viewing conversation as a goal-oriented

preoccupation.10 This will produce different conversational kinds. Holdcroft (1979)

provides a basic framework for discourse kinds.11 These share a similar groundwork

for kinds of conversation. Through the combined lenses of Holdcroft’s kinds and

Kasher’s emphasis on goals, many of the common counterexamples that Gricean

theory has come up against will be alleviated. In addition to this, the conversational

theory will have greater explanatory power than Grice’s theory. One example of this

can be found in sociological works where social conventions of cultures differ in such

a way that violations of Grice’s maxims are an essential part of conversation. These

aberrations in conversational structure can be explained via this alternative theory of

conversation.

One example of this is in regards to the Zinacantan language. John Haviland

writes, “It is notable, parenthetically, that the Zinacantecos also frequently appear to

violate Grice’s maxim of Quality… Zinacantecos do tell premeditated lies, routinely;

it is often a matter of preventing a leak in the carefully patrolled fences of privacy and

domestic confidentiality” (Haviland 1988, 97). Haviland points out that Grice’s

maxims do not prevent people from telling lies to one another; in fact, his theory

specifically allows for this. However, Haviland goes on to say that “there is, in

Zinacantán, almost a tradition, and certainly and interpretive technique, for extracting

a grain of truth from the great boulders of deception that are routinely thrown about”

(Haviland 1988, 98). Here, the cultural norms of a language require people to tell

partial, or whole, untruths with the presumption that the hearers will interpret the

actual facts from these statements. This is tantamount to a culture of mass

exaggeration. This evidence can be explained by a serious reformulation of the

Gricean premises; this will cover more conventions that his ethnocentric theory does.

3.1 Explanatory Failures of Gricean TheoryOne of the primary problems of Gricean theory is that it presumes the

Cooperative Principle. This, as Kasher contends, will not always be the case in 10 This view is held by Gauker (2001).11 Discourse kinds are referred to by Holdcroft (1979); however, he refers to individual types of speech acts, rather than dialogue centered goal-based conversational forms. However, he does provide an interesting study of four types of dialogues employing interests as factors.

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conversation; however, cooperation is often beneficial to participants in achieving

certain goals. The primary goal that cooperation can achieve is reliable information

transfer. When two parties have a mutual interest in transferring information to each

other, they ought to follow a principle of cooperation. However, there are many

instances in which two parties might want to be deceptive in their discourse. These

cases occur any time participants have non-cooperative goals.

An interesting point that emerges to reinforce the idea that Grice’s model is

insufficient is how one would come to use deception in a conversation according to

Grice. Grice allows for violations of maxims; however, if one is engaging in

deception then he or she is not following the “cooperative efforts” that “each

participant recognizes” (Grice 1989, 26). These deceptive moves may cause the talk

exchange to not qualify as conversation. Grice writes, “at each stage, some possible

conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable” (Grice 1989,

26). This would suggest that non-cooperative conversations are not actually

conversations for Grice. For Grice to contend that one can violate maxims, and thus

use deception or other unsuitable moves, within conversation seems self-

contradictory. The only consolation for Grice is that he qualifies this by saying that

conversations “normally” follow the Cooperative Principle, and that the Cooperative

Principle is a “rough” principle (Grice 1989, 26). This leaves non-cooperative

conversations unexplained by the Gricean model. Thus, an alternative model

allowing for non-cooperative goals would have greater explanatory power.

Two non-cooperative goals that can manifest themselves in forms of

conversation are persuasion, and entertainment. The ends of each are different; thus,

their content will also be quite different. However, these other forms of conversation

may reject the Cooperative Principle that communication requires. Participants may

have conflicting goals, in which case communication may break down. These

conflicts illustrate the uncooperative aspects of conversation, which are much more

complicated than Grice allows for.

3.2 Social Norms as Presumed GoalsConforming to social norms, or conventions, must be considered a presumed

goal with regards to conversation. Social norms, like those of the Zinacantecos, will

be followed to some extent, even if only out of habit, whenever people interact with

each other. Grice notes that these norms will be significant when he writes, “There

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are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such

as “Be polite,” that are normally observed by participants in talk exchanges” (Grice

1989, 28). However, these social conventions play a much larger role in conversation

than Grice illustrates here. The conversational kinds that emerge will be dramatically

affected by these conventions, so much so that many Gricean maxims will no longer

hold. For example, the amount of coercion or equivocation that one may use while

attempting to persuade someone of something will often be influenced by

conventions, rather than any maxims. Thus, for a more fundamental understanding of

a maxim’s necessarily one can investigate the balance of these social conventions

with Gricean maxims in different types of conversation.

Participants in conversation will often have to choose between maintaining

conventions and achieving goals. Norms may be broken if the goal achieved by the

conversation is more important than the goal of satisfying the social norm. For

example, suppose a person was being unduly harassed by a friend. He or she may

resort to shouting or profanity, in violation of social norms, in order to dissuade that

friend from pursuing his or her nuisance. Whereas this would be considered highly

uncouth in a normal setting, many situations may prove such that preserving certain

conventions will not outweigh the importance of achieving certain goals. Thus, social

norms must always be weighed against the goals of a specific conversation in order to

determine which is more important.

3.3 The Communicative GoalThe communication of ideas as a goal of conversation is not often considered

separate from the concept of conversation itself. It is the basis and presupposition for

Gricean Theory. It is often taken for granted as the point of conversation, because

diaologue is the primary medium by which overt communication occurs. It is only

when communication is contrasted with other uses of conversation that one is able to

see that conversation can be a tool for achieving the specific goals through utterances.

Here, within the Communicative Goal, conversation is used to transmit information

from one participant to another. The efficiency of this transfer will be determined by

weighing the importance of the communication against various social factors.

Cooperative conversation can be understood in this framework, in contrast to Gricean

theory where it cannot be separated from conversation as a concept.

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Presuming the Communicative Goal, Kasher’s and Grice’s results should

come reasonably well. The Communicative Goal attempts to correctly transmit

information from one individual to another. Though this may seem obvious, there are

many obstacles in conventional conversation to achieving this; issues regarding even

the most common social conventions. Because there are very few conversations in

which social norms will not inhibit communication, an example can help explain the

type of communication represented by this model. One common example is that of a

person communicating with his or her doctor. Here, full discloser about the relevant

information is beneficial for both parties. Almost all, if not all, of the Gricean

maxims will be fulfilled. However, most conversations regarding communication will

fall prey to the influence of the social norms held by the participants. Politeness is

one of the most common of the infringing norms. Honesty in communication will

always suffer to some extent (though often to a negligible degree) when this particular

convention is invoked.

The primary similarity between the Gricean model and conversation with the

Communicative Goal is that they both require the Cooperative Principle as a

prerequisite. The Cooperative Principle is suggested by Grice, but as a principle for

what would define conversation in general. This will not hold when looking at

suasive conversations. Still, when approaching conversations regarding

communication, most of the maxims and the Cooperative Principle will conform. For

example, if one does not express true information in a conversation where one’s goal

is communication, that person cannot be acting in a cooperative way.

The first maxim under the Category of Quantity, “Make your contribution as

informative as is required,” will be necessary (Grice 1989, 26). It is clear that if one

intends to share an idea, that person must provide at least the minimum amount of

information needed to communicate the idea. This point is fairly obvious; however, it

is important to understand that the person speaking must to have the goal of

communication. Clearly, someone can end up being vague or provide insufficient

information in violation of this maxim, but if they intend to communicate fully and

fail in some respect, then they will not accomplish their goal. Thus, in certain

situations, it is often the case that people must perform some ritual, such as swearing

an oath, to assure others that communication is their goal. This usually provides

additional penalties for anyone not fully communicating the needed information, so as

to prevent deception from being advantageous. One example of this is that in

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courtrooms, when one is communicating some events relating to an alleged crime, the

witness must swear to tell the whole truth. This illustrates the importance of

sufficiency in communication. Though one may want to leave some facts undisclosed

for some reason or another, if one has the goal of communication, then the minimum

relevant facts must be included.

The second maxim under the Category of Quantity, “Do not make your

contribution more than is required,” is not necessary in conversations regarding

communication (Grice 1989, 26). Though in English-speaking communities this is

desirable, it is not necessary that only the minimum amount of needed information be

given. So long as the amount of information given is limited, there is no inherent

problem created by providing too much relevant information beyond causing, as Grice

notes, a “waste of time” (Grice 1989, 26). The undesirability of this excessive

information, however, relies on cultural norms. It is not very difficult to suppose a

culture in which excessive verbosity is desirable, and tact is looked upon as

inappropriate. Thus, it seems that, though most may find it desirable, a maxim of a

maximal limit for information is not necessary.

The Communicative Goal will require the first maxim under the Category of

Quality. When Grice notes “do not say what you believe to be false,” he hits upon the

most essential criterion for communicating. There is an essential breakdown in

communication when one is dishonest in the information he or she states. However,

the maxim can be improved if it is reformulated. There are problems of cultures

where people may exaggerate regularly. In fact, a person in this type of culture may

say something literally true, but express something false. In these situations, one

might want to exaggerate some fact in order to express a true idea. Thus, this maxim

should be reformulated as “One should make his or her contribution one that will not

express something false.” Here, “say” is avoided because statements that are literally

false can, within a reinterpreting convention, be understood properly. The

Zinacantecos may communicate cooperatively in this way, even if there is usually a

benefit from deception in their culture. This principle is the most basic need in

cooperative information transmission; the information must not express something

false.

Grice’s second maxim of quality “Do not say that for which you lack adequate

evidence,” unlike the previous maxim, is much more complicated (Grice 1989, 27).

Primarily, the term “say” will be replaced with “express” for the reasons stated

37

earlier. However, regarding the maxim’s content, there will be serious issues. Taken

loosely, this would be a perfectly acceptable rule for communicators to follow;

however, the problem with this maxim is that “adequate” is vague. Depending on

who one communicates with there will be a different level of information one is able

to share, considering the different attitude of “adequate.” To illustrate this, imagine a

philosophical skeptic and a physicist having a conversation about the external world.12

The nature of what counts as evidence will be the deciding factor to what each

considers “adequate.” Obviously, there needs to be a limit on what may be

considered evidence. Unless it is well defined between the two communicating, what

is considered adequate will fall under the category of social norms. Ultimately,

however, there must be at least some basic level of understanding as to what can

count as evidence or they may be very serious breakdowns in communication.

Grice’s third category, the Relevance maxim, is often desirable in

communicative conversations; however, it is not necessary for achieving all

communicative goals and may, itself, be irrelevant occasionally. It is desirable

because when one is obtaining certain chunks of information, communication requires

that responses must regard the desiderata. However, this is only the case when one is

responding to a question. When posing a question, as Hintikka shows using his

Sherlock Holmes example, the relevance principle is not essential to achieving

specific communicative goals (Hintikka 1986, 275). Though others may have

reduced the idea of relevance to efficiency, relevance is an important aspect to

cooperative conversations when applied correctly. Perhaps a better maxim would be

“Respond Relevantly.” A very subtle side note, however, is that this maxim is not

necessary if the communicator can only respond with one unit of binary information,

e.g. if the response can only be affirmative or negative.

Of the fourth category, that of manner, the maxims are necessary for

communication, but only when reformulated. The idea of manner is in relation, as

Grice states, “to how what is said is to be said” (Grice 1989, 27). The first of these

maxims of manner is “Avoid obscurity of expression” (Grice 1989, 27). This maxim

will be required in cooperative communication. The reason for this is that in order for

“obscurity” to be sensible, one must first have some type of principle of clear,

coherent communication. If clarity is not considered desirable in communication,

then the possibility of confusion arises, or is at least increased, for the listening 12 This is one of the central problems brought up in debates regarding epistemological contextualism.

38

participant. This is not cooperative in regards to information transfer. Thus, being

obscure is inherently violating rules of cooperative discourse. One might argue that

there are no maxim based rules whatsoever for cooperative discourse, such as Davis

suggests. However, cooperative discourse demands that one does not use language

that removes clarity where, all things being equal, it would remain. Though societies

might exist where obscurity is desirable, one must assume that only a certain,

maximal level would be allowable, lest the information communicated be

undecipherable. In this case, one might want to reformulate the maxim as “Avoid

unnecessary (or excessive) obscurity of expression.” Still, in cases where obscurity

exists within language, cooperative communication would try to avoid it.

Grice’s second maxim of manner “avoid ambiguity” will be necessary for

cooperative communication (Grice 1989, 27). Ambiguity comes from a situation in

which two interpretations can arise from one statement. Though cases in which

ambiguity is not cleared by context are rare, instances in which ambiguous statements

are not clarified provide more than one interpretation of the given information and,

therefore, will cause confusion. A side note to this is that many formal languages do

not allow for ambiguity. Thus, the avoidance of ambiguity, with regards to

cooperative communication, must only be followed when it can occur.

The next maxim of manner, “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity),” is unlike

the previous two (Grice 1989, 27). Brevity is a cultural norm and may be helpful in

contemporary, English discourse; however, there is no reason to believe that it might

not be a positive attribute in other cultures, even when communicating cooperatively.

The question of being “unnecessarily” prolix is allowable, because in any language an

unnecessarily or excessively diffuse statement is always detrimental to

communication. This is due to necessity and excessiveness being defined within the

scope of social convention. Still, the pure maxim “Be brief” cannot be defended as

anything but a principle based in cultural etiquette. Thus, while a consideration for

avoiding “unnecessary prolixity” is acceptable, any issue of brevity being required for

cooperative communication will be only decided within a conventional framework.

The same will be true for the final maxim “Be orderly” (Grice 1989, 27). The

issue of orderliness would be quite difficult to formally define. It would seem

difficult to find any culture in which being orderly is offensive or unhelpful. Though,

one could imagine a culture in which the speed of giving information is more

important than the orderliness in which it is given. Hence, it does not appear that this

39

is a necessary ingredient to being cooperative, yet there could be the maxim “Do not

be unnecessarily disorderly.”

Thus, in achieving the goal of cooperative communication, many of the

Gricean Maxims are not necessary. Though in contemporary, English-speaking

cultures they will all be helpful; this is due to the cultural norms that most English

speakers follow. The apparent similarities between the Gricean model and the

Communicative Goal model appear so because they both presume the Cooperative

Principle. However, there can be conversations in which one person is trying to

obtain something from another participant, who may be unhelpful. The Gricean

model, with its presumed Cooperative Principle, does not allow for a presumption of

uncooperativeness when looking at conversations. These conversational phenomena

allow the goal-oriented model greater explanatory power.

3.4 The Suasive GoalThe next general, conversational goal discussed here is the suasive goal. This

is where one participant tries to persuade another participant of something through

conversation. The primary distinction between this conversational model and the

communicative or Gricean models is that the Cooperative Principle does not hold with

regards to suasive conversations. The consequences of this distinction are vast.

Primarily, the principle guiding these types of conversation will be almost exclusively

social convention, rather than maxims. The limit to what forms of coercion may be

used depends wholly on weighing the consequences of achieving one’s goal with

violating cultural constructs, including social norms, laws, and ethics. There are two

distinct relationships between participants in suasive conversations: the Seller-

Consumer Relationship, and the Bargainer Relationship.

3.4.1 Seller-Consumer RelationshipThe Seller-Consumer Relationship is the more basic of the two types of

suasive conversation. This relationship involves one participant trying to convince

the other participant of some idea.13 The term “seller-consumer” may be initially

misleading; though the relationship between a vendor selling a product to a consumer

falls clearly under this conversation style, so do many other persuasive relationships.

Some examples are a child asking his or her mother for a treat, or a political pundit

speaking to a voter about why that voter should choose a more conservative or liberal

13 This can be compared to Holdcroft (1979); however, here interests are not necessarily opposed, though they are certainly not identical.

40

position on a specific issue. The Seller-Consumer Relationship deals solely with the

transfer of information with the intention to persuade.

One unique, and possibly damaging, aspect to the Seller-Consumer

Relationship in suasive conversations is that there need not be an actual conversation

at all. As is often the case with advertisements, a simple statement alone may be

made with respect to an idea, which can affect passive participants. No dialogue takes

place, and yet information has been given to a person. It is arguable that these

instances should not be counted as conversation at all, but there are serious, suasive

conversations that do take place. Many suasive dialogues certainly are conversations,

whether they are persons asking advice from others, or people trying to explain their

action to their colleagues. Though one could claim that advertising is a kind of one-

shot conversation between advertisers and consumers, for the purposes of this paper

only dialogue between two or more participants, each with some input, will be

counted as conversation.14 That being said, one may examine the aspects of this type

of conversation.

The seller-consumer form of suasive conversations is not governed by any of

the Gricean maxims. In order for one participant to persuade another, one may violate

each and every maxim Grice formulates. The only factor that must be taken into

account is social norms. Suppose one decides to not be as informative as needed.

This frugalness with information may be an intentional move designed to prevent

unfavorable information from being considered by the consuming participant, thus

affecting opinions. Cultural norms may prevent this from happening; for example, a

used car salesman may be required by law to tell buyers the necessary amount of

information regarding a car’s history (damage, problems, etc.). Now, it is probably in

the salesman’s interests to achieve the goal of selling cars, but only after maintaining

the goal of not going to jail for fraud. Therefore, the salesman may be able to dupe

the consuming participant; however, cultural conventions, or laws, usually prevent

this from being in his or her interest.

This result will not occur in other situations. For example, suppose Bill is

inviting his good friend John to a party. In this situation Bill knows that John’s

nemesis George will be in attendance. Bill may neglect to tell John this information

with hopes that John will attend. There is no egregious social norm in this society

14 Though many of the examples used in this essay may be shortened for the sake of brevity, they can all be reformulated in a conversational framework.

41

that would prevent Bill from taking this route of action. Thus, it is to the advantage of

Bill to take this approach. One may achieve the goal of persuasion through this

method in a suasive conversation and, in this situation, without any serious

consequence.

These results will be the same for the rest of the maxims. Cultural norms may

or may not prevent the persuading participants from providing too much information,

too little information, lying, stating things they do not know, making irrelevant

statements, being obscure or ambiguous, or failing to be brief or orderly. None of the

maxims that guided the previous forms of conversation will apply. Only

consequences will influence whether or not the maxims should be violated. This is

how the most skillful rhetoricians fine tune their craft. Their skill comes from their

ability to understand the cultural norms they can exploit, and to exploit them if

necessary.

3.4.2 The Bargainer RelationshipThe Bargainer Relationship is quite different from the Seller-Consumer

Relationship. This relationship must be semi-cooperative, because of the nature of

bargaining.15 This relationship is under the Suasive Goal, because it occurs when two

participants attempt to persuade each other to come to an agreement. It is semi-

cooperative because in order to have a negotiation, the two parties are subject to

certain rules of negotiation. Offers are made, and when they are, participants must be

able to presume these offers are made without an intention to default. Otherwise, this

would not a bargaining relationship; rather, it would be a Seller-Consumer

Relationship, with one side merely attempting to convince the other to do something.

This negotiating framework will be normative. The distinction between

negotiating and convincing involves a set of agreed upon principles, in order to reach

an arrangement. Thus, there are Gricean maxims that will be affected. The maxims

of quantity do not apply to negotiations in a necessary way; one may provide too

much or too little information if it suites the need of the negotiating parties. The

maxim of relevance will not apply either. One can talk irrelevantly in negotiations,

though it may annoy the other participants. Obscurity, brevity, and orderliness are all

at the discretion of the negotiating participants. However, one maxim of manner that

must be observed is that of ambiguity. For there to be negotiations, both parties must

15 This can also be compared to Holdcroft (1979); again, interests, here, are not necessarily opposed, but they are not identical.

42

know what is on the bargaining table. The rules of deception regarding bargaining are

more complicated than those of pure persuasion. This will be reflected with regards

to maxims of quality.

The maxim of quality will apply differently, however, to each type of suasive

relationship. For bargaining to occur there must be a specific type of statement: an

offer. Offers are different from the rest of the dialogue that occurs. These offers will

behave differently due to the conversation being semi-cooperative. The first revised

maxim of quality, “One should make his or her contribution one that will not express

something false,” will hold only with offers put on the negotiating table. The

participants may use deception with regards to reactions to offers, and rejections of

the negotiations, but offers must always be made honestly. This semi-cooperative

nature of bargaining allows the Gricean maxim to hold, but only limitedly.

The second revised maxim of quality, “Do not express that for which you lack

adequate evidence,” will follow similar rules. When making offers, one must be

honest to then extent that the other participants have a legitimate idea of what they

will be receiving for their offers. If a participant is in doubt of facts, he or she may

want to be careful with what is offered, in order to prevent a situation leading to that

participant defaulting on a transaction. However, all the other input, not falling under

the category of offers, will depend on social norms rather than any normative maxims.

This again shows the semi-cooperative nature of negotiations, as opposed to the

Seller-Consumer Relationship.

The specifics of the two forms of suasive conversations are different; however,

the goals of both are the same. They both are based in persuading participants to do

or believe things. This distinction separates this form of conversation from

communicative conversation, which relies on a strict cooperative structure. These

two conversational goals distinguish themselves from a third conversational goal, the

Epicurean Goal.

3.5 The Epicurean GoalThe last goal discussed here is the Epicurean Goal. This goal is one of simply

achieving pleasure through conversation. This type of conversation is rooted in the

fact that human beings are naturally predisposed to engage in conversation, regardless

of whether or not it has an explicit purpose. Steven Pinker elaborates this point in his

book The Language Instinct. Pinker writes, “Language is not a cultural artifact that

43

we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead,

it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains… some cognitive

scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural

system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term

‘instinct’” (Pinker 1994, 18). For this reason people find themselves chatting

aimlessly, or even talking to themselves. Thus, the only goal that can be established

here is a negative one. People will not continue in aimless conversations which cause

them some sort of pain, broadly speaking, for example, boredom, annoyance, or being

prevented from doing something causing pleasure. From this, one can consider a goal

of pleasure seeking as the goal of engaging this instinctual conversation while

avoiding pain.

The consequences of considering these phenomena as a pleasure-seeking goal-

oriented form of conversation will provide excellent explanatory power for some

dialogues. The Epicurean Goal provides much more leeway for exaggerations and

falsities. Though these types of conversations are usually more or less cooperative,

people entertaining each other through conversation can lead to a wide variety of

flexibility in accomplishing this goal. Like the Seller-Consumer Relationship in the

suasive model of conversation, epicurean goal-oriented conversation will not be

constrained by any of the Gricean maxims. They all may fail because what is

considered entertaining is decided by social norms, and this differs widely by culture.

People can provide too little information in their statements, often referred to as an

“inside jokes,” or they may even quiz each other in various ways, in order to entertain

themselves. Comedians typically find themselves providing more information than is

necessary, in order to exacerbate the effect of a specific joke. Thus, the quantitative

maxims cannot even be considered.

As for the maxims of quality, they will be as easily dispensable as the

quantitative maxims. Most of the tales that people tell are exaggerations if not

complete facsimiles. This will also be the case for storytellers who base their stories

on truth, the specifics of which they do not have adequate evidence to support.

Relevance is irrelevant to achieving the epicurean goal; absurdist comedy is based in

being as far from relevant to a situation, and is entertaining because of this.

Obscurity, disorderliness, and lack of brevity all can contribute to humor; thus, the

status of their corresponding maxims as significant to the epicurean goal is nil.

Finally, the maxim “Avoid ambiguity” is notable because of the fact that a cornucopia

44

of wit and humor are derived precisely from the violation of this maxim.

Misdirection, puns, double entendres, etc. can all be created from the use of ambiguity

in conversation. The interplay between conversational implicatures and such uses

will be explored in the next chapter.

A notable feature of the epicurean goal-based conversational framework is that

it is not necessarily cooperative. Teasing and mocking are forms in which one person

is able to achieve this goal without cooperating with the other participants. Thus, it is

very similar in structure to the Seller-Consumer Relationship in suasive conversation;

however, because the goals driving the conversations are different, the content of the

conversations will differ dramatically.

3.6 Exclusivity, Exhaustiveness, and ConclusionTwo immediate concerns regarding this conversational theory are whether

each of the types of conversation are exclusive, and whether or not the theory is

exhaustive with regards to types of conversation. When considering whether the

types of conversation are exclusive, it is clear that they are not.16 Conversations

frequently bounce between epicurean and communicative goals, and then can move to

include suasive goals. The conversations themselves need not be taken as singular

entities, and may vary in composition. Statements and chunks of conversation can be

examined within certain frameworks with reasonable discretion. Whether or not this

will be problematic to the theory in general remains to be seen; however, there are no

immediate concerns that appear to be significantly detrimental.

As for exhaustiveness, the question seems to be of less importance. If there

are other forms that are not addressed here, they can simply be added to the theory.

These new conversational kinds should not pose any conflicts, presuming they are

making normative claims. Secondly, if the existing conversational types can be

broken down further, into more precise entities, this can only add to the specificity of

the theory. The study here is not expected to be exhaustive; however, it does provide

a general framework for studying conversation in a different way. Conversation is a

complex organism, and may be better suited as a subject of study, rather than a topic

within linguistics.

An example of this is that conversations with the Epicurean Goal are, more

often than not, at least somewhat cooperative, if not very cooperative. Jokes often

play on the maxims of communication to surprise, which creates humor. Here, the 16 This is in contrast to Holdcroft (1979).

45

goal of the conversation is not communicating information; however, the conversation

is still cooperative in nature, because jokes often require some maxims to be

observed. Other types of entertaining conversation do not. Thus, there may be

different types of conversational relationships, like the Bargainer Relationship, that

can be created normatively within these goals. Joke-telling may be one of these

relationships based on the fact that it has semi-cooperative elements.

Finally, this framework for conversation will provide different, more precise

results for theory of conversational implicature than Grice can explore in his lectures.

The goal-oriented structure helps point to where implicatures appear and shows why

implicatures are significant as conversational tools. This structure will provide less

problematic results and greater explanatory power. The goal of this theory of

conversation is to provide a much more intuitive and inclusive framework for the

exploration of conversational implicatures that better reflects conversation as a

phenomenon in nature.

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Chapter 4: Implicature within Goal-Oriented ConversationThe result of this type of conversational theory will be that implicatures are

similar to Davis’ theory; namely, they are conventional. This is due to the inclusion

of non-cooperative kinds of conversation. In cooperative conversation maxims exist

because the rules of cooperation require them. The weight of social convention,

however, influences conversation to a much greater extent. The methods of

communication one employs during conversation, beyond what the maxims require,

will be based in these social norms. Maxims, however, will still be significant in this

theory, unlike Davis’, which does not present a theory of cooperative maxims at all.

Maxims are useful in cooperative conversation, because a violation of a maxim can

act as a cue that a specific conventional use of language has occurred. Thus, maxims

may prevent confusion in discourse, but implicature remains under the realm of

convention.

When evaluating conversational implicature within a goal-oriented theory of

conversation there are a few caveats that must first be established. Many of the social

norms governing interaction between participants within the English-speaking world

may create implicatures not signaled by violations of maxims. This primarily is in

regards to non-cooperative suasive speech. These formal customs and laws often

require those who are attempting to persuade someone of something to act in a more

cooperative manner than is required by communicative theory alone. This, however,

does not mean that these cooperative actions are necessary by default; they are

conventional. Though, certain counterexamples will illustrate that these social

conventions do not cover all suasive interaction.

4.1 Quantity: Make Your Contribution as Informative as Is

Required

4.1.1 Some, Not AllThe most written about implicature is that in which “some” implies “not all.”

This implicature is prominent in regards to communicative conversation. Because the

speaker in a communicative conversation must make his or her contribution as

informative as is required (Grice’s Q1-Maxim), the flouting of this maxim by the use

of “some” rather than “some, but not all” or “some, in fact all” will signal the

implementation of this convention. The problems that Davis poses regarding “some-

all” implications illustrate the difficulty in attempting to show how a rule for

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implication, rather than a conventional system of implication, accounts for how all

statement of lesser informativeness cancel statements of greater informativeness. It is

not merely that weaker statements block stronger statements, as Levinson contends.

In the example, “Did anyone die?”, a cooperative response of “some did” will imply

that “not all” died. This is simply because a cooperative participant would have said

“everyone died,” or “not everyone died,” if he or she was presenting the most

informative statement possible. However, the following counterexamples clearly

illustrate how more informative statements are not always negated by this maxim:

Some died ≠> -(Only some [a few, a minority] died).

Some died ≠> -(Some were killed [murdered, assassinated, executed,…])

Some died ≠> -(35.72% died). (Davis 1998, 35-36)

This presents a problem: should one assume that a general rule follows from a

violation of this maxim? Bird notes that this is the type of counterexample needed to

seriously hinder Grice’s theory on the whole, stating, “it would be necessary to

provide examples… where [the Cooperative Principle] is in operation, but the

implicatures are not present” (Bird 1979, 148). If the violation is a linguistic cue,

however, due to conventional usage, then there is no problem presented by Davis’s

counterexamples.

This is not the end of the story for scalar implications. Depending on the

formulation one has for scalars, there will be other linguistic conventions one must

follow if one is being cooperative, such as “Some < Many.” There are a myriad of

various, conventional scalar implications that one may encounter. This may lead to

confusion; most people do not have identical scalar vocabularies. Though this will

not usually be problematic in cooperative communication, the extent to which scalars

are of varying degree presents serious problems to the principle that weaker

statements always negate stronger statements. Maxims as cues prevents this problem

altogether.

Another example of how, even in cooperative language, the “some-all”

implicature can fail is the case of mathematical facts. Specifically, there is

Goldbach’s Conjecture. Here, the statement is “all evens, greater than 2, are the sum

of two primes.” However, suppose someone were to declare, “I prefer to say ‘some

evens, greater than 2, are the sum of two primes’; because, regardless of the truth of

Goldbach’s Conjecture, I can never be wrong.” The statement is uncontroversial;

however, according to Grice’s theory, this statement might insinuate that Goldbach’s

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Conjecture was false. Obviously, the statement would have to meet the requirements

of flouting. However, this type of statement would not fall into any of the other

failings of fulfilling maxims, including violations, opting out, or facing a clash. There

may be some who consider this a case of a clash of maxims; the lack of knowledge

that all of the evens are the sum of two primes does not mean that one would have to

violate the Q1-maxim. However, one could say, “Some, but perhaps not all, evens

greater than two are the sum of two primes.” Here, the Gricean model fails because

the “some” in this statement does not imply “not all” and there is no other explanation

for why this instance is not flouting.

This solution will be similar to cases within suasive conversations. Suasive

conversations do not necessarily take any of the Gricean maxims, and rely on

weighing social conventions against each other. This fundamental difference changes

the outcome of the implicatures. The lack of maxims is evident through some

examples. First, suppose a businessman is selling his wares and a potential customer

approaches. The potential customer asks, “Are your customers happy with your

service?” The vendor replies “Not everyone.” Because it could be that none of the

customers have been happy with this service, a cautious customer may want to know

more information. The businessman is not breaking any laws or lying by responding

in this way; he is telling the truth, though it is worded in an opportunistic way. The

wording in legal documents, often referred to as legalese, is used to avoid this type of

pitfall in non-cooperative speech. The problem with these types of examples,

however, is that there may be a cue from the presumption of cooperation, instead of

merely advantageous marketing due to cultural laws regarding advertising.

Another example, however, shows when the “some-all” convention may apply

to suasive conversation. This is that of a child trying to use language to his or her

advantage when explaining himself or herself. Children are usually quick to find that

they can tell the parents the truth, yet avoid telling the whole truth. Suppose a mother

catch her son, crumbs covering his mouth and hands, next to a new box of cookies,

freshly emptied. The mother may ask “Did you eat all those cookies?”; to which the

child may respond, “I ate some of them.” Here, the child is telling his mother the

truth, because lying to his mother would be more disadvantageous than admitting he

had eaten all the cookies. However, the reason he uses this example is due to the

conventional aspect of the “some-all” implication. Therefore, he chooses this answer

because it is most advantageous, allowing for the possibility that he did not eat them

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all. Of course, the mother knows that her son is answering in this useful manner, and

will probably follow up with more probing questions to show her son that she is

knows that his cleverness is not effective. Here, this illustrates that conventions can

be used within a suasive framework without maxims cueing them.

The “some-all” implication is often evident in conversations with the

Epicurean Goal. This is due to the Epicurean Goal being usually somewhat

cooperative. Yet, an example of how the implication might fail appears in the

following entertaining tongue twister:

Some sums sum sums some sums sum.

Here, the statement, in the first instance of the word “some”, does not use “some” to

imply “not all”; however, the second instance of “some” does utilize the implication.

Though the mathematical component might be used again here, the primary purpose

of the statement is entertainment through rhyme scheme difficult pronunciation.

Though the statement is true when interpreted loosely, the truth of the statement is

irrelevant; for the statement to achieve its goal in conversation, it need only entertain

to be successful.

4.1.2 TautologiesTautologies are another subject of Q1-maxim violations. The situations in

which a statement providing no new information is presented by a participant will

also act as cues that a social convention is in use. The tautologies usually presented

are of the form “An X’s an X,” or “Xs will be Xs.” These two forms of statements do

present tautologies, and in a cooperative conversation one will recognize that they do

not present any intrinsic information. However, as Davis points out “If it rains then it

will rain or snow” and “The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast” do not

have the implications that “A war’s a war” or “Boys will be boys” do (Davis 1998,

45). This is due to the cultural usage of the two formulas “An X’s an X” and “X’s will

be Xs.” Here, the argument that maxim violations in cooperative communication will

be logical cues is effective. Formalizing how “An X is an X” behaves is not

particularly significant to this essay; rather, pointing out that it is conventional, and

based learned rules, is what must be shown here. If the tautologies are not common

conventional uses, they will be confusing; however, it will make the listening

participant pause to attempt to understand why such a statement has been made. In

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this way, we again see how this type of logical cue theory can inform where the

Gricean theory fails.

In conversation with the epicurean goal, entertainment can be made from

statements providing no new information. The example of tongue twister can be used

here again. Though the common statement that is used is “If Peter Piper picked a

peck of pickled peppers, then how many pickled peppers did Peter Piper pick?”, if this

statement is reformulated to form a tautology then, assuming it is sufficiently

entertaining, then it should be observed for entertainment value without recourse to

implicatures. The reformulation could be as follows:

If Peter Piper picked pickled peppers, then Peter Piper picked pickled peppers

plus plump plums, had he some, or plump plums had he none.

Here, there has been no new information created; rather, a long rhyming tautology is

presented to entertain. This type of absurdness is refreshing to some, though many

may find it less than entertaining. However, there is not any implication intrinsic to

the solution, or reason that the solution should be interpreted in some other way. The

Epicurean Goal removes this necessity from the conversation.

4.1.3 Other ViolationsGrice’s famous example of the professor’s letter must be examined as another

violation of not providing appropriate information. The less than informative nature

of letter implies that the professor thinks that his or her pupil is not good at

philosophy. However, in Grice’s own gloss, the thought process that the reader of the

letter goes through, he basically describes the violation of the maxim as a logical cue,

rather than a direct implication. Here, the social convention of “if one has nothing

good to say, then say nothing at all” is being employed; this is how the reader of the

letter is able to interpret the inappropriately written letter. The cue informs the reader

of the letter that he or she might be able to interpret the writing according to some

convention, rather than being purely straightforward.

The same ignoring of all relevant information can be used suasively. The need

for laws, forcing drug companies to advertise the side effects, or even to state the side

effects of their products at all, is evidence that leaving out relevant information will

help sell certain products. This again can be applied to the rules forcing food

companies to publish the nutritional facts of their food on their products.

Informativeness is clearly not always a priority of those who wish to persuade.

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The use of this maxim with regards to the epicurean goal will provide for

some unique results. The violations of a maxim may provide a cue that the epicurean

goal is being used rather than that of the cooperative goal. One good joke that

incorporates the use of making the conversation less informative than needed is by

Jimmy Carr; he comments, “Say what you want about the deaf…” (Carr & Greeves

197). Here, Carr does not provide the audience with the full amount of information to

clearly understand the statement he makes. To ruin the joke completely, one can

explain it fully. There is a turn of phrase, “Say what you want about Xs,” followed

by, “but (or because) they Y Z.” However, Carr proceeds to stop talking mid-

sentence. Instead of adding “because they can’t hear you,” he allows the lack of

information to lead the audience to figure the rest out, adding to the comic timing.

The audience doesn’t question whether there is some serious implication, beyond the

missing phrase, due to this lack of information. They know that the break was

deliberate, because of the conventions of stand up comedy.

4.2 Quality:

4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not

Express Something FalseThe violation of this maxim will usually cue a sarcastic or humorous

interpretation in cooperative communication. This is not, however, necessarily innate

to all languages. Often, this type of language use causes confusion, rather than the

implications it intends to present. Thus, executing this implication typically requires a

type of finesse that other implications lack, because the extent to which a statement

will be obviously false is quite variable. Therefore, there is usually an accentuation in

pronunciation to illicit the reference to convention. Though this accentuation is often

observed, it is not necessary in order to enact the social conventions. Here,

cooperative communication and suasive conversation diverge greatly. In cooperative

conversation, deception is not profitable for either party, in which case the

cooperative partner may attempt to translate the false statement via a social

construction.

In conversations based on the Seller-Consumer Relationship, however, the

exact opposite is true. The participants may use deception to their advantage, and

making false statements is a key part of this. Though most cultures hold as social

norms the principle that one ought not deceive others, this only inhibits deception

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insofar as maintaining the social norms outweighs achieving a specific goal by the

conversation. Take, for instance, an example of a hostage negotiator. While a

negotiator may assure a hostage taker that his or her demands are being met, the

negotiator may simply be stalling to allow time for the police to prepare to subdue the

criminal. In this instance, the benefits provided by upholding the cultural convention

of honesty are vastly outweighed by the benefits of capturing a criminal.

The previous example of violating the QL1-maxim to achieve some end

requires the listening participant to be ignorant about the veracity of the false

statement. The extent to which a suasive conversation can use false statement to

deceive is significant, even to the point of using statements that are obviously false to

persuade. Politicians, renowned for their sincerity, do occasionally use statements

that are obviously false for political gain, such as the claims by fringe party

candidates that they fully expect to win elections. Thus, the degree to which these

suasive conversations can use statements known to be false to achieve ends is not

limited by participants’ ignorance of the truth of claims.

With regards to conversations based in the Epicurean Goal, expressing what

one believes to be false is not particularly a matter of deceit; rather, the truth of many

statements is irrelevant to the purpose of the conversations. Thus, the participants

often do not even question whether a statement is true or not, nor do they consider the

truth of a statement relevant. Consider the many jokes and stories told by comedians;

their purpose is to entertain, not to be informative for any particular reason. One

example of this is a joke by Demetri Martin, which goes, “I keep a lighter in my

pocket at all times. I’m not a smoker, I just really love certain songs” (Carr &

Greeves 50). The joke has more to do with the common convention of people holding

up lighters during songs they really like. Though no one but Demetri Martin himself

knows the truth of the statement, it is safe to assume that, for all intents and purposes,

it is false. The truth of the statement is, in this case, irrelevant. It adds to the humor

of the statement to personalize the comment rather then put it in a true context, e.g. “I

wonder if some people carry lighters at all times… etc.” Here, the statement could be

made without recourse to false statements, and achieve its purpose; however, because

epicurean conversation is not cooperative, it is irrelevant whether or not the statement

is true. This is not just limited to humor; the whole of story-telling is engaged in

practice of telling something untrue, with truth being irrelevant.

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4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate

EvidenceThe QL2-maxim in cooperative communication is in place to prevent the

QL1-maxim from being violated. In cooperative conversation a violation of this

maxim should cause pause, as it is a cue that some sort of convention might be the

only way to interpret this statement. Grice’s example of this is, “Every nice girl loves

a sailor,” which is an example of hyperbole (Grice 1989, 34). This should caution the

participant listening to this statement. Even if this participant does not know the

convention that Grice is employing, he or she certainly knows that Grice could not

possibly have the evidence to state this confidently. Here, those communicating will

presume things like hyperbole or exaggeration if they reinterpret the statement using

conventions.

A violation of this maxim is probably the most useful to those attempting to

persuade others through conversation. The way in which this is employed will vary,

however, depending on the different cultural norms guiding conversation. A simple

usage of this type of violation appears in the statement “Come to the game; you’ll

have fun.” The facts of whether or not the participant will have fun are clearly not

known to either participant, because it is a predictive statement. This type of

statement is used to entice the other participant to believe, or do, something the

speaking participant wants. Convincing people to think or do things sometimes has

more to do with rhetoric than with logic; thus, this violation can often be exploited.

However, in suasive conversations, it is often the case that participants are on guard

for these kinds of statements.

Like the QL1-maxim, the QL2-maxim will be violated by those with the

epicurean goal. One example of this is the telling of myths. Often the tellers of

historical events do not have evidence that the actions occurred in the way they are

told. However, this is really insignificant, because if the myths are told to entertain

the listening participants will not be concerned about whether the events are factually

true. The hearers of these stories ought not look at any exaggerations as evidence of

truth; this is clearly not the intention of the stories. The Gricean model clearly fails in

these cases due to the non-cooperative kind of conversation.

4.3 Relation: Respond Relevantly

54

With regards to relation, the third of the four categories that Grice puts

forward, there will be implication conventions referred to by irrelevant responses in

cooperative communication. The common example put forward is the convention of

answering a question with another question that is obviously affirmative. Consider

the following example exchange:

Participant A: Are you a football fan?

Participant B: Is the pope catholic?

Here, the second participant is answering the question by using this particular

convention (obviously the answer to “Is the pope catholic?” is affirmative; therefore,

the answer to “Is participant B a football fan?” is also affirmative). However, if the

first participant is not familiar with this convention, then he or she must presume that

either the second participant is not communicating cooperatively or that the second

participant is intending his statement to be understood under some conventional rules.

Supposing that participant A has no reason to suspect that participant B is not

communicating uncooperatively, he or she may have to inquire as to what participant

B means.

Using irrelevant responses to questions is another of the commonly used

rhetorical devices employed in non-cooperative conversation. The usefulness of this

type of convention is that one may, by not responding relevantly, deceive without

saying anything untrue. In this way, the use of the “some-all” distinction in a non-

cooperative sense is closely related to this relevance principle, and is probably a

violation both the category of relevance as well as that of quantity. In fact, whenever

one responds irrelevantly to a question posed, one is violating the Q1-maxim,

requiring participants to be as informative as is necessary. Regardless, there are many

clear examples of this type of implicature being used to persuade.

One method of speaking that is used by those who do not want to reveal their

beliefs, but do not want to lie to the person with which they are speaking, is

responding such that there is no need to definitively answer affirmatively or

negatively. Suppose a wife has finished a terrible piece of what is supposed to be

apple pie, which her husband made especially for her. He asks, “Did you enjoy the

pie?”, to which she responds, “I always enjoy a good piece of apple pie.” Here, the

wife has not lied to her husband, the result of which would be very undesirable should

he ever find out. However, she does not want to disappoint her husband either; thus,

weighing the disappointment she will cause him by being honest about his cooking,

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against the disappointment she would cause him should he find out she has not

answered his question in a relevant manner. She may choose to answer with a

truthful, irrelevant response, saving herself from the trouble of dealing with his

disappointment, if only temporarily.

Epicurean goals need not create maxims regarding relevance. Entertaining

conversations often take their humor or good spirits from their irrelevance. One

illustration of this are witticisms that are entertaining because the solutions to them

are irrelevant. One such witticism is as follows:

What do Alexander the Great and Winnie the Pooh have in common?

Same middle name. (Carr & Greeves 75)

Here, the solution is refreshing (to some) because of the irrelevance of the “the”

connecting the two part of each of their names. Most audience members, when

hearing this question for the first time, will struggle to find some relevant fact

connecting the two before realizing their struggle was in vain when the solution is

revealed to them, unless they understand the joke-telling ritual of question and

punchline. In this case, they will probably not search for the solution knowing it

comes from some clever aspect of the question, or irrelevance in the solution. Many

comedians have been famous for their use of the irrelevant to create humor; notably,

Steven Wright and the comic troupe Stella.

4.4 Manner:

4.4.1 Avoid Unnecessary (or Excessive) Obscurity of ExpressionAvoiding unnecessary obscurity of expression is the first of the types of

maxims based within social conventions. Here one must work within the framework

of the conventions in order to understand the unnecessary or excessive aspects of the

statements in question. Supposing one is in a cooperative conversation and obscurity

is used, then there is always the possibility that some social convention is being

employed. Grice presents the example, “X is meeting a woman this evening”;

implying that the woman X is meeting is not his wife, sister, or other close friend

(Grice 1989, 37). Before presenting this example Grice warns that the generalized

conversational implicature may be controversial “since it is all too easy to treat a

generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature” (Grice

1989, 37). Unfortunately, social conventions must be considered before the

implication could even be interpreted, to understand excessiveness or unnecessarily

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ambiguous statements. The implicatures are, therefore, consumed within a

conventional framework, and if translated to another framework they will need to be

changed to suit the new framework’s limits for excessive or necessary levels of

ambiguity.

In suasive conversations excessive obscurity might be beneficial to selling a

product or convincing someone of some claim, etc. For example, suppose a herbal

supplement is advertised as having “health-giving properties”; the excessively vague

language used within the framework of English-speaking societies does not imply that

the product does not have normal health-giving properties. Placebos and non-medical

products can promote health, even though there is no explicit function they provide.

Thus, this message means exactly what it says; the manufacturers want to inform the

consumers that their product has health giving properties, in order to persuade the

consumer to buy the product. Though the proof for these products’ properties is often

in question (snake oil salesmen have profited off of these types of products for

centuries), there is no implication brought about by this use of excessive ambiguity.

Another reason suasive conversation may use excessive ambiguity is to avoid

liability. Insofar as contracts are created by the buying and selling of goods, there is

an incentive for a vendor to used excessively vague language in his or her marketing

when referring to what his or her product will provide, in order to have some plausible

deniability if services cannot be rendered. This type of language is often used in stark

contrast to the legalese used in contracts. This type of language does not necessarily

imply anything other than what is stated, again, in order to protect from liability. In

other words, using excessively vague language allows marketers to claim that they did

not actually advertise things that a consumer may claim a product did not provide.

Epicurean goal-based conversation will not necessarily produce implicatures,

because it is often the case that excessive vagueness is entertaining. For example, the

verbosity used in creative writing is often viewed as beautiful. Poems by Robert

Frost, or ee cummings, use unnecessary vagueness in an attempt to reveal beauty. Art

often revels in its excessive vagueness. Often, the endings to stories are intentionally

vague so as to leave the audience thinking, such as in the film 25th Hour (2002) or

Made in America (2007), the final episode of The Sopranos television series. The

idea of translating examples of art into conversation is tentative at best. However, the

idea of excessive vagueness in art translating to a type of conversational art, as a form

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of entertainment, should be fairly uncontroversial. This type of conversation will be

non-cooperative, and may be intentionally vague to achieve entertainment.

4.4.2 Avoid AmbiguityIn cooperative conversation, ambiguity should be avoided to prevent potential

confusion of other participants. A classic example of this would be to avoid telling

another participant, when preparing to get money before going to spend the day at the

river, “I will meet you at the bank.” This statement will be confusing because of the

ambiguity of “bank.” Obviously, it could mean river bank or banking institution.

Thus, in cooperative discourse this type of language should be avoided. The example

Grice presents is in regards to the message “I have Sind/sinned” given by a general

who had been ordered to capture the territory of Sind; Grice notes the following:

Whether the straightforward interpretant is also being conveyed seems to

depend on whether such a supposition would conflict with other

conversational requirements, for example, would it be relevant, would it be

something the speaker could be supposed to accept, and so on. If such

requirements are not satisfied, then the straightforward interpretant is not

being conveyed. If they are, it is. (Grice 1989, 36)

Given the Gricean interpretation, one ought to assume the non-straightforward

meaning when statements are intentionally ambiguous. This seems quite strict,

though given the cooperative nature assumed by the Gricean conversations it is not

unreasonable. One must at least see the intentional ambiguity as a cue that either the

participant is not being cooperative or that he is referring to some conventional way of

speaking. The argument for social convention over Grice’s strict non-straightforward

interpretation will allow for more leeway for speakers to accidentally engage in minor

ambiguities without confusing their audience with bizarre interpretations.

Ambiguity in seller-consumer based, suasive conversations can be very

beneficial to those who want to convince. Clearly, ambiguous language can be used

to the advantage of marketers. One example of how ambiguity can used to persuade

is in the case of Nike’s advertising slogan. Though usually non-controversial, Nike’s

marketing statement “Just do it” could be construed by some as having some risqué

connotations. Here, the ambiguity may be used to make the products more appealing

to consumers. Still, cultural norms, more often than not, do not allow for ambiguity

to be used to convince. It is often looked upon as tantamount to deception.

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In epicurean conversations, ambiguity will be the source of the majority of

humorous statements. However, one caveat is that some of the humor that comes

from ambiguous statements is based in cooperative language, e.g. double entendres.

In comedy, there is often the expectation that an ambiguous statement will be used in

order to be funny. Therefore, it is usually assumed that the comedian will use

language that is ambiguous before revealing the punchline, so it must be very subtle.

In this way, the comic conversations are different than those presented by Grice,

which are intentionally ambiguous. In the cooperative conversation the audience

must be aware of the ambiguity when interpreting the statement. Grice states, “We

must remember that we are concerned only with ambiguity that is deliberate, and that

the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer” (Grice 1989, 35). In

comedy, this ambiguity is disguised. A good example of this is a joke by Demetri

Martin, which starts off with an unambiguous sentence, “I ordered a wake up call the

other day,” which one would be hard pressed to interpret in any other way than how it

is presented; however, when the punchline is revealed the second interpretation is

clearly evident: “The phone rang and a woman’s voice said, ‘What the hell are you

doing with your life’” (Carr & Greeves 104). Here, the comedian goes directly

against cooperative conversation, using unrealized ambiguous sentences to entertain,

rather than to create implicatures.

4.4.3 Avoid Unnecessary ProlixityRegarding prolixity, one must again note that in order to interpret an

“unnecessary” level, one is already working within a framework of social convention.

In cooperative conversations, a reasonable amount of brevity is very beneficial to

conversation, because an excess of verbiage could be confusing to other participants.

A fairly common example of this is when someone emphasizes a statement by adding

excessive information. Take, for example, a situation in which a friend of someone

working a store wanted some special discount, which may appear as follows:

Participant A: “Can you give your friends free soda?”

Participant B: “Well, I cannot allow anyone I serve any discounts; however, I

am very forgetful, and might accidentally forget someone has not paid for

something. I do feel very distracted today…”

In this example, the second participant is implying that he will give his friend free

soda, by the excessive reference to his forgetfulness. The first participant is tipped off

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to this by the unexpectedly long answer to his simple question. However, this is not a

strict rule. Suppose the conversation went as follows:

Participant A: “Can you give your friends free soda?”

Participant B: “I can’t allow anyone to have free soda. If I did my boss would

be furious. I wouldn’t have the trust the boss normally grants me around the

register, I certainly wouldn’t get a promotion, and I am not going to risk my

job of three years for something as insignificant as a soda.

Here, the second participant is not implying that he will give his friend free soda. In

fact, he is using the extra verbiage to stress that he cannot. Though one may argue

that the second situation is not an example of excessive prolixity, it is clear that the

excess of verbiage act as cues in both situations. In the first example it acts as a cue

to inform participant A that participant B is using the convention of referring to

forgetfulness to imply that A may get free soda. In the second example, the excessive

prolixity acts as a cue to inform A that B is using the social convention of stressing the

importance of a statement by reemphasizing its points. Thus, while excess does

violate the maxim of not being unnecessarily prolix, it does not have a strict Gricean

style result; rather, it is a cue that an interpretation via social conventions may be

necessary.

In suasive conversation excessive verbiage is often used in order to trick one

of the participants into becoming confused and agreeing to things they might not want

not to agree to. Conmen often employ this technique in order to distract the people

they are taking advantage of whist they commit some act that will end up being

disadvantageous to the victim. Often people, aware that someone is attempting to sell

them something, will simply ignore a person who is attempting to engross them in

obviously excessive language in order to convince them of these things. This type of

conversation is not cooperative and usually fails.

In epicurean conversations excessive use of language is often employed in

order to accentuate the humor of the conversation. Comedian Dennis Miller’s whole

career has been based on his ability to rattle off excessive metaphors and descriptions

of certain events purely to entertain. Comics often use excessive description in order

to intensify the effect of the humor in their conversations without the expectation that

something is being implied by the excessive language; rather, because it is more

entertaining.

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4.4.4 Avoid Unnecessary DisorderGrice presents this maxim and Levinson uses it to explain why statements that

use conjunctions tend to present events in the order in which they occur. He uses the

example, “‘John turned the switch and the motor started.’ +> p and then q, p caused q,

John intended p to cause q, etc.” (Levinson 2000, 38). Generally, the former events

temporally precede, or are the causes of, the latter events in English-speaking

communities. This, however, is clearly by convention, as it would not be hard to

imagine a language in which the opposite were true. However, given the social

convention, unnecessary disorder in cooperative language must be interpreted as a cue

intending to communicate something via abnormal means. Examples of disorder in

cooperative conversation within English-speakers conventions are presented by

Davis: “John set a record and cleared 15 feet” (Davis 1998, 50). Gricean theory

would claim that because the mention of the record comes first, then it is the causal

factor or comes temporally before the second event. Under this interpretation one

must assume that John cleared 15 feet because (or after) he set a record. Obviously,

this is the incorrect interpretation of the statement. Thus, the guidelines for this type

of implicature are not strict, as in the Gricean model; rather, they are loose, and are

only violated when the word disorderliness is employed conventionally.

Suasive conversation may use unnecessary disorder in order to convince

participants of something. By exploiting the conventions or ordered speech, a seller

can offer a guarantee to, for example, “pay for shipping the product to have it repaired

and fix your product for free” if one experiences any problems with a certain product,

though the rebate to offset the cost of shipping may come months after the product

has been fixed. This is just one example, but in non-cooperative conversation, one

can violate certain social norms if it is profitable to do so.

Epicurean conversation also does not require that this maxim be held. If the

participants find it entertaining to start inverting conventional word order, then they

are not necessarily implying something in particular; rather, merely enjoying

themselves. An example of this is when children learn wordplay; they may invert

word order to act silly.

4.5 ConclusionIn this chapter one can see that, in cooperative conversation, violations of

maxims can be logical cues that the statement must be interpreted though the lens of

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some social convention. Examples to the contrary have been given for the other kinds

of conversation. The Gricean model is quite different from this, stating that the

implicatures are “general psychosocial principles” produced by the violation of

maxims (Davis 1998, 45). Implicatures are based in convention, as Davis points out;

however, since different conversations can have different goals, the cue that comes

from violations of these maxims will only necessarily come when the conversation is

cooperative.

One issue that needs to be noted is Grice’s inclusion of “(4) other items of

background knowledge” in his list of the information needed to work out an

implicature (Grice 1989, 31). This is problematic only if one assumes that this “other

knowledge” includes the implicature conventions. This is very unlikely, however,

since Grice is arguing that maxims are causing the implicatures, rather than acting as

a reference tool. This interpretation would also clash with principle (e) that Sadock

brings up, “Conversational implicata are not carried by what is said, but by the

saying of it” (Sadock 1978, 284). Finally, Davis shows that Grice cannot employ this

type of conventional implicature because his theory infers that “implicatures are

derived from or explained by” maxims (Davis 1998, 35). Thus, even if one adheres to

the broadest sense of the principle of charity, Grice cannot allow for his theory to be

based in conventions. “Other items of background knowledge” probably refers to

more banal information, such as in the example:

A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.

B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. (Grice 1989, 32)

The bits of background information Grice believes one needs to know in order to

work out conventions are probably facts like “people usually visit their girlfriends

often,” rather than them needing to know about implicature conventions.

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Chapter 5: ConclusionThis essay is primarily a criticism of Gricean theory. It first illustrates Gricean

theory and its principles, then shows how the topic of implicature and how Gricean

theory have been dealt with through the years. It presents a new theory that attempts

to solve the problems of the Gricean framework as well as those in Kasher’s and

Davis’ theories. What this theory attempts to create is a goal-based framework for

conversation, thus eliminating the priority of cooperation in Gricean theory; also, it

provides maxims within cooperative conversations, thus creating explanatory power

that Davis lacks, showing why one might know to reinterpret apparently irrational

statements when an implicature is being used. Finally, it bases implicatures on

convention, eliminating the copious, internal problems of Gricean theory that Davis

points out.

This theory is primarily centered on two points. First, conversation is a goal-

oriented endeavor and these goals provide different kinds of conversation depending

on the goals involved. Second, implicatures are conventional, but maxims still play a

role in conversation. The goals in conversation presented are the Cooperative Goal,

Suasive Goal, and Epicurean Goal. The Cooperative Goal leads to conversations with

maximized communication. Cooperative conversations have maxims and these

maxims generally follow those set out by Grice. The Suasive Goal is that of

persuasion. Suasive conversations can be broken down into two groups:

conversations with the Seller-Consumer Relationship, and conversations with the

Bargainer Relationship. Seller-consumer based conversations are those in which both

parties know one participant is trying to convince the other to think something or to

do something. Conversations based on the Bargainer Relationship are those in which

two parties are attempting to convince each other of something or to do something.

Finally, the Epicurean Goal is that of pleasure seeking. Epicurean conversations are

those in which both parties are attempting to enjoy themselves, instead of trying to

convince or communicate efficiently. These kinds of conversation may not be

exhaustive; however, they provide a general framework for exploring the implicatures

that occur in conversation.

Implicatures in conversation, presented here, are conventional. This, however,

does not require the theory of maxims from being discarded. The cooperative maxims

provide for ways in which cooperative participants ought to act in order to efficiently

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communicate. Other forms of conversation may be created by designating further

maxims. Within a kind of conversation, a violation of relevant maxims will provide a

cue that a statement may be interpreted through a convention. Supposing that the

kind of conversation is not known, maxim violations may inform participants that

certain kinds of conversation are not being engaged in, that the conversation is not

cooperative. The violation of maxims as logical cues differs greatly from the Gricean

theory, which leads those hearing a violation to a specific translation. This is not the

case here; maxim violations merely inform participants that conventional

interpretations might provide rational interpretations of confusing statements.

This theory is more of an amalgamation of theories rather than a sweeping,

new one. Kasher, Hintikka, and Leech have each, to some extent, presented a theory

of conversation based in goals, rather than presenting them as a purely cooperative

endeavor. Though Grice does not present conversation as purely cooperative, the

Cooperative Principle is required for his theory to be used. Others have tried to

present various versions of his theory, but the Gricean model still does not have the

explanatory power of theories like Kasher’s and the one this essay presents; this is due

to its need for the Cooperative Principle as a foundation.

The Cooperative Principle is not inherently flawed; however, it cannot provide

a general account for conversation, because of its limited nature. A general principle

of acting in a rational manner at all times, as Kasher presents, also seems not to reflect

conversation in general. Therefore, this paper presents a theory of conversational

kinds as a middle ground. While there may be a general overarching principle of

rationality guiding conversation, compartmentalizing kinds of conversation will prove

to be more efficient with regards to practical usage. Therefore, providing the four

general kinds of conversation, based on three goals, will be effective in describing

conversation in general. Only within this framework can a theory for conversational

implicature have the explanatory power needed to be applied to conversation in

general.

The primary distinction between the Gricean theory and the goal-oriented

theory of cooperative conversation is in regards to where implicatures are derived.

Grice presents the implications as the natural result of obviously non-cooperative

speech in conversation. This theory presents the violation of maxims as logical cues;

but, rather than presenting a strict interpretation of each maxim, each cue only

informs the listener to refer to some social norm, or convention, with which to

64

interpret the non-straightforward statement. The listener must refer to his or her

(metaphorical) encyclopedia of conventions in order to find the proper interpretation

for the non-rational statement. Though this may often seem automatic, when Grice

presents implicature as an automatic process without reference to social conventions,

he presumes the proper translation is not derived from these conventions. The

analysis of the example in the previous chapter, the professor’s letter of

recommendation that Grice presents, is an excellent illustration of how Grice does, de

facto, resort to social conventions to explain his theory.

Though many suasive conversations and epicurean conversations follow

cooperative conventions, in addition to the many non-cooperative conventions in

cooperative conversations, the important fact is that they are not necessary. This

makes for a very messy theory, with conventions inundating every aspect of

conversation; however, the efficiency provided by Gricean theory comes with a cost.

If a theory sacrifices explanatory power for neatness, the theory runs the risk of

having a limited accuracy within real-world frameworks. Davis’ counterexamples of

the failure of the Gricean model show its dramatic limitations.

A system of conventional implicature alone is not complete. There are

requirements to cooperative communication that must be followed. The maxims are

required for rational thinkers within a cooperative framework, because of the rules of

cooperation. The need for maxims within cooperation, however, does not mean that

the Grice presents an adequate theory of explaining how an implicature is worked out.

Davis has a theory of conventional implicatures; however, he does not account for the

logical cues presented by cooperative language. Here, this theory provides a way to

interpret how people can use initially irrational language within a cooperative

framework to inform that a reference to a convention is being made. However, these

maxims, unlike Grice’s, are the minimum required for cooperative communication.

The reduction of the maxims in cooperative communication, in contrast to

Leech and others, is done so with necessity in mind. Here, the theory is translatable

into other cultures without issue. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature may

appear natural to those who possess the same social norms of which Grice makes use.

However, since the Zinacantecos’ culture appears bizarre to the Englishman, one can

assume many of the Gricean maxims will appear bizarre to their culture in the same

way. Thus, the emphasis on logical necessity is warranted. There is more work to be

done understanding the social conventions in English-speaking communities;

65

however, this is job of linguists and cultural anthropologists, though the work of

Levinson and Leech is clearly of linguistic interest.

One important issue that will certainly be raised in the philosophical

community is that of formalism against functionalism. If there is a formalist

argument supporting non-necessary maxims that this theory excludes, they may need

to be reconsidered. This theory approaches conversation from a functionalist

perspective; namely, the conversational practices employed by participants are

purposeful goal-oriented endeavors. Though the use of a functionalist perspective

with regards to conversation should not be too controversial, functionalists may

discover counterarguments to the effect of, say, that “some-all” implicatures are

innate. The lack of a “nall,” “not all” type word, may be hardwired; however, until

that can be shown a skeptical approach can, arguably, be adopted.

In conclusion, the theory of conversational implicature that Grice presents is

flawed. The observations by Kasher and Hintikka must be observed, and the

objections presented by Davis must be answered. While Levinson and Leech present

modifications of Grice’s theory, they are formalizing social conventions rather than

providing a general theory of implicature. Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory

places too much attention on efficiency, rather than investigating convention like

Davis. The debate about conversational implicature has usually been about

formalizing conventions, in an attempt to present a simple theory. This work attempts

to forgo simplicity for a more accurate representation of conversation and how

implicature works.

66

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