FINAL REPORT TONATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : GROUND RULES FOR SOVIE TAND AMERICAN INVOLVEMEN TIN REGIONAL CONFLICT S

AUTHOR : Nils H . Wessel l

CONTRACTOR : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Inc .

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Nils H . Wessel l

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 621-1 0

The work leading to this report was supported in whole or inpart from funds provided by the National Council for Sovie tand East European Research .

GROUND RULES FOR SOVIET

AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT I N

REGIONAL CONFLICT S

The author wishes to express his appreciation for the invaluabl eassistance of Joanne S . Gowa, who contributed initial drafts o fseveral sections of the study . He is also indebted to Richard E .Bissell and Harvey Sicherman for their comments on portions o fthe draft . The author requests comments from readers and ask sthat they be sent to : Nils H . Wessel l

Foreign Policy Research Institut e3508 Market Stree tPhiladelphia, PA 19104

CONTENTS

Executive Summary of Chapter 1 (Ground Rules)

i

Executive Summary of Chapter 2 (Horn of Africa)

ii i

Executive Summary of Chapter 3 (Southern Africa)

v

Executive Summary of Chapter 4 (Yugoslavia)

vi i

Chapter 1Ground Rules : Concepts and Approaches

1

Chapter 2The Horn of Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet andAmerican Involvement

5 5

Chapter 3Southern Africa : Ground Rules for Soviet an dAmerican Involvement

9 1

Chapter 4Yugoslavia : Ground Rules for Soviet andAmerican Restraint

12 8

Chapter 5Conclusions : Ground Rules Reassessed

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

GROUND RULES : CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES

The report seeks to devise, and in three subsequent sec-tions apply, ground rules to govern Soviet and American involvemen tin areas of present and prospective regional tension . This sectio nanalyzes the concept and relevance of guidelines and outlines pos-sible approaches .

In recent years, both Soviet and American officials have im -plied that there is or ought to be a "code of detente ." But th emost ambitious bilateral efforts to enact such a code, the 1972 Ba-sic Principles of Relations and the 1973 Agreement on Prevention o fNuclear War, were flawed at the outset by the vagueness of the mu-tual commitment to foreswear "efforts to obtain unilateral advan-tage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly ." Late rmisunderstandings were inevitable .

Although the Soviet-American talks at the working level o nconventional arms transfers (CAT's) and the Indian Ocean have bee nsuspended for some time and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dim sprospects for early bilateral agreements, ground-rules for U .S . -Soviet behavior have immediate relevance in the multilateral con -text of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co -operation in Europe (CSCE) to be held in Madrid in November . More -over, in the intermediate future circumstances may once again be -come more propitious for bilateral negotiations on measures of mu-tual restraint .

Two valid premises underlie the view that formally agree dground rules might ease regional tensions by restraining superpow -er involvement : 1) existing modes of conflict regulation are in -adequate and 2) explicit agreements as opposed to tacit "rules o fthe game" create some autonomous pressure on states toward compli -ance . But the expectation that such accords can radically trans -form the behavior of states is in all probability misplaced .

To avoid the pitfalls of highly generalized commitments t orestraint, a series of specific approaches is needed in four broa dcategories :

1) limitations on conventional arms transfer s

2) confidence-building measures including advanc enotification of and limits on military activi -ties

3) naval limit s

4) mechanisms of joint political consultation .

Controls on CAT's can contain the level of conflict betwee nregional actors while reducing the likelihood that the U .S . andUSSR will get drawn into a conflict between client states . Quanti-tative and qualitative limits, particularly on the transfer of ad-vanced weapon systems, as well as prior U .S .-Soviet consultation son CAT's can be varied by region as appropriate .

Confidence-building measures that might be incorporated in -to a code of detente include : limitation of military maneuvers ,more stringent requirements concerning advance notification of ma-jor military maneuvers, prior notice of small-scale military maneu-vers, limits on the introduction of military personnel and advisers ,prior notice of major military movements, and zones of disengage-ment and limited deployment coupled with assured early warning .

Naval controls could include limits on maneuvers and deploy -ments, but limits on overall ship inventories are of doubtful nego-tiability under the best circumstances and would not deal with th equestion of restraints in particular regions . In some cases ,agreed limits on access to naval support facilities might enhanc emutual confidence .

Finally, some mechanism for the negotiation and monitorin gof any agreements establishing ground rules would contribute to in -stitutionalizing observance of mutual restraints . The StandingConsultative Commission for SALT might provide a rough model .

Although these four approaches might well advance the in-terests of arms control and the containment of regional conflict ,there are important reasons why the Soviet Union might wish t oavoid negotiation of ground rules with the United States . By thei rnature ground rules would seek to limit the freedom of action o fparties to them . Although the principle of mutual advantage sug-gests that the results of such negotiations should confer roughl yequal benefits on both parties, Soviet leaders, no less than thei rAmerican counterparts, may be expected to harbor doubts on thi sscore . The fluidity of regional political dynamics, existing com-mitments to regional actors, and the vicissitudes of Soviet-Ameri - .can relations will inevitably create a solid basis in Moscow fo rarguments favoring a cautious approach to negotiating ground rules .Soviet leaders will undoubtedly be mindful of the fact, moreover ,

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that the initially symmetrical impact of agreed "rules of the game "may, over time and under changing circumstances, give advantage t othe other side . No less importantly, Soviet official's may be reluc -tant, even under conditions of uniformly symmetrical restraints, t osurrender their freedom of action . This may be especially tru ewith respect to the freedom to maintain Soviet influence with al -lied states in Eastern Europe and to provide support for friendl yregimes and revolutionary movements in regions where Soviet an dAmerican interests are in conflict .

Many Soviet officials have in the past, for instance, clear -ly believed that conventional arms transfers enhance Soviet influ-ence with recipients despite occasional examples to the contrary .Moscow might also prove reluctant to limit CAT's in any bilatera lagreement with the United States that left France and Britain fre eto provide arms to pro-Western clients . With respect to confidence -building measures, the Soviets may resist constraints on Sovie tmilitary activities that serve a demonstrative or threatening func-tion, especially in areas like Eastern Europe where Soviet determ-ination to maintain the status quo influences public and elite per-ceptions of the limits of the possible .

Appearances are important in other respects . Merely byagreeing to conduct negotiations so directly affecting the interes tof other international actors, the Soviet Union may convey the im-pression of Soviet-American collaboration at their expense . Thi sdanger itself constitutes a substantial disincentive to agreement .

Sectors of the Soviet national security bureaucracy may be expecte dto raise objections to the negotiation of ground rules impinging o ntheir missions and capabilities . By way of example, officials i nthe Party responsible for forging the maximum degree of unity with -in the international Communist movement, including non-ruling Com-munist parties in the Third World, would likely resist any regim eof mutual restraint that promised to introduce strains in relation swith those parties . Although opposition on ideological grounds t ocollaboration with the chief imperialist power has apparently beenof declining importance under Brezhnev, such sentiments continue t oenjoy considerable support among some officials, who might be mor einclined to advance their objections under a successor regime . Be -cause negotiation of ground rules would inevitably involve the dis-closure of information and attitudes regarded as matters of nation -al security in the Soviet Union, elements of the security apparatu swould almost certainly support those objections . In light of th ekey role arms sales play in generating "hard" currency foreign ex -change earnings, economic and foreign trade officials favoring poli -cies of detente in other areas might well make common cause wit h"hardliners" in this area of ground rules .

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The United States, by its actions and policies, may exer ta degree of influence on the Soviet decision-making process con-cerning ground rules . The United States may do so by creatin geither positive incentives or negative disincentives designed t odevelop Soviet interest in forging rules of the game . As a "re -ward" for Soviet participation in this effort, the United State smight hold out the prospect of a broader and deeper array of coop-erative relationships than heretofore has been realized . Thi sstrategy might lead the United States to extend to Moscow positiv ebenefits in areas of technology transfer, reduced tariffs, credits ,and agricultural exports in the expectation that Moscow woul drespond by agreeing to regulate its involvement in areas of region -al tension . It is unclear, however, whether this broad strategy ,which foundered on human rights and emigration issues in the 1970 sas it sought to moderate Soviet policies in the Third World, woul dbe more successful in the 1980s . As long as Soviet forces remai nin Afghanistan, it will be difficult for any U .S . Administrationin the near future to offer Moscow the benefits of detente .

A variant of this strategy would entail a U .S . policy o flinkage . Also attempted with only limited success in the 1970s ,this policy would deny Moscow specific benefits from the bilatera lrelationship in the absence of agreement on regulating conduct i nvarious regions . Difficult to implement without giving offense t oMoscow or antagonizing politically important constituencies in th eUnited States, this strategy requires the existence of benefit ssufficiently valued by the USSR that the threat of their denia lwould cause Moscow to give higher priority than at present to mod-erating its involvement in regional conflicts . In a more extrem eform of this approach, the Soviet Union might be given to under -stand that the alternative to enactment of ground rules would be amore assertive U .S . foreign policy, buttressed by a substantia llong-term increase in U .S . military programs . But at present, jus tsuch a prospect appears insufficient incentive for Soviet withdraw -al from Afghanistan . Moreover, such a policy is likely to be ill -suited to the task of negotiating a code of detente, which require sa high degree of mutual trust at the outset . The conclusion seem sinescapable that bilateral agreement on ground rules, at least fo rareas outside Europe, will have to await a fundamental change i nSoviet-American relations . At that time the aforementioned strate-gies may play a constructive role in bringing Moscow to the bargain -ing table .

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE HORN OF AFRICA : GROUND RULES FORSOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMEN T

The Horn of Africa, considered here as including Ethiopia ,Somalia and Djibouti, is of strategic interest to the United State sand Soviet Union primarily because of its location . Near key oi lshipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and fronting on the IndianOcean, the countries of the Horn have recently experienced volatil eshifts in both domestic and foreign policies . Once enjoying clos erelations with the United States, Ethiopia since 1977 has aligne ditself closely with the Soviet Union, using 16,000 Cuban troops t ofight Somalia and Eritrean rebels . Somalia, host in the mid-1970 sto military advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union in return fo rSoviet access to naval and air facilities at Berbera, abruptl yterminated the Soviet presence in November 1977 . Soviet-Cuban in-volvement in behalf of the Ethiopian effort to expel Somalia fro mthe disputed Ogaden raises the danger of Soviet-American confronta -tion, particularly in the event Somalia and the United States agre eto military cooperation measures presently under negotiation . Th egrowing U .S . and Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean in re -cent years signals an increase in the security interests at stake .

Efforts by the United States to enact ground rules of mu-tual restraint in the Horn face serious obstacles . The Sovie tUnion may well resist such attempts for several reasons related t othe broad range of its objectives in the Horn and the adjacent wa-ters of the Indian Ocean . Moscow's strategic objectives appear t oinclude maintaining a potential for interdicting oil supply route sfrom the Persian Gulf to the United States, Western Europe and Ja -pan . In addition, Moscow seeks to promote a panoply of regiona lobjectives that include pacification of Afghanistan and maintenanc eof predominant influence in radical Arab states on the Persian Gul fand Arabian Peninsula . Regional objectives may also embrace desta-bilization in Iran and the maintenance of a permanent military pre -sence in Ethiopia . Ground rules that threaten attainment of thes eobjectives will have to surmount formidable hurdles within the So-viet defense and foreign policy bureaucracies .

Thus, limits on naval deployments and access rights ar elikely to be attractive to Moscow only to the extent they preven ta U .S . naval buildup in the region and permit Soviet submarine an dother sea-denial deployments . Similarly, as long as the Sovie tUnion wishes to maintain Ethiopia as the militarily mos t powerfulstate in the Horn capable of threatening pro-Western states in th eregion such as Somalia and the Sudan, Moscow may turn aside propo-sals to limit conventional arms transfers . Soviet leaders, believ-ing that an arms supply relationship confers influence with Ethi-opia, may place a higher priority on CAT's than on efforts t o

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restrain them . This is particularly likely to be true if Moscow i sconvinced that its arms aid strengthens the Mengistu regime agains tits internal opponents . Similar calculations concerning the util-ity of the Cuban troop presence in Ethiopia militate against an yagreement for their withdrawal, especially if such a withdrawal ha dto be forced upon a reluctant Fidel Castro, thereby introducing ne wstrains in Soviet relations with Cuba . Finally, Moscow may prefe rto avoid discussion of any ground rules regime if it perceives tha tU .S . zeal in this regard is a function of a poverty of alternatives .In the event the Soviets conclude that the United States is unpre-pared to mount an independent, unilateral effort in the Horn, the ywill have little incentive to compensate the United States for it sown self-imposed restraint .

Although near-term prospects for Soviet-American agreemen ton ground rules in the Horn are poor, such guidelines might becom erelevant further in the future . Both the United States and USSRshare an interest in blunting the possibility of direct confronta-tion between them and minimizing the cost of maintaining good rela -tions with their "clients ." Prospects for mutually agreed re-straints on conventional arms transfers (CAT's) are enhanced by th erelatively low existing level of transfers to the region . Limit son transfer of offensive and advanced weapon systems would make th egreatest contribution to stability in the region . But Ethiopia' slocal military superiority, buttressed by recent Soviet arms ship-ments, may remove incentive for agreement in the absence of compen -satory U .S . CAT's to Somalia . The result is a paradox . Low level sof existing transfers to the region make agreement possible, bu tlarger U .S . transfers to Somalia may be an indispensable precondi-tion for agreement on reductions . Moreover, such transfers may b erequired for the U .S . to gain access to Somali military facilitie sneeded to implement the Carter Doctrine .

If transfers become part of a broader package of Somali -U .S . military cooperation, however, U .S . flexibility to negotiat eCAT limits with the USSR will be substantially reduced . The pos-sibility that U .S .-provided arms might be used by Somalia for ag -gression against neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, not to mentio nEthiopia, makes necessary a commitment from Mogadishu not to us eAmerican arms for aggressive purposes .

An alternative approach would be for the United States t oimplement the Carter Doctrine by means other than military coopera -tion with Somalia . This approach would avoid the danger represent-ed by Ethiopia's warning that the naval and air facilities in Ber-bera might come under attack if renewed fighting with Somali abreaks out and the United States has sent arms to Somalia . Buteven as this approach offered a conciliatory signal to Moscow i twould fail to create the symmetrical arms supply relationship tha twould give Moscow a tangible incentive to agree to mutual limits .

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Agreed restrictions on the presence of external militar ypersonnel on the ground would clearly serve U .S . interests and con -tribute to a reduction of tensions . But the Soviet Union will hav elittle incentive to negotiate on such a ground rule unless theUnited States provides an incentive, which might take the form o fholding out to Moscow the alternative of a greater U .S . militarypresence in the region . If Moscow came to believe that the Unite dStates was contemplating the introduction of its own, or proxy ,forces into the area, prospects for mutual agreement on the non-in -troduction of external forces, including withdrawal of Cuban force spresently in Ethiopia, would be enhanced . The Soviet Union migh twell be unwilling, however, to trade the removal of 16,000 Cuba nmilitary personnel already on the ground in Ethiopia for a U .S .commitment not to do what it was only contemplating doing . On theother hand, if the U .S . secures access to the Berbera facilities ,the U .S . interest in secure oil supply routes from the Persian Gul fwould argue against sacrificing access to Berbera .

Less ambitiously, the United States might begin by seekingan accord with the Soviet Union on prior notification and consulta -tion concerning either CAT's, the introduction of military person-nel into the area, or major military movements . As the CSCE ex-perience indicates, informational requirements are more readily ne -gotiated than actual limits on military activities .

Moscow's incentive to accept any of the above restraint smight be increased if they were linked to naval ground rules in th eIndian Ocean where the balance of naval power favors the U .S . Nava lrestraint measures might limit deployments and/or access to land -based naval facilities . The failure within the past two years o fSoviet-American talks on arms control in the Indian Ocean does no taugur well for such measures in the near term . The Carter Doc -trine's commitment to repel any external attack on Persian Gul fstates also makes agreement appear unlikely and, perhaps, undesir-able from the standpoint of U .S . security interests . An accord em -bodying these ground rules of mutual restraint may have to await aredefinition by the Soviet Union and United States of their inter-ests in the region .

Other ground rules may find readier acceptance in Moscow .The periodic Soviet proposal to make the Indian Ocean a nuclear -free zone is calculated to enhance the Soviet objective of denyin gthe Indian Ocean to the United States as a launching area for SLBMs .Because denuclearization of the Indian Ocean would be virtually im-possible to verify and would impact asymmetrically on U .S . strate-gic nuclear deployments, it is a measure that probably should re-ceive consideration only as part of a broader regime of restrain tthat would include measures asymmetrically favoring U .S . securityinterests in the region . Here is one area, however, where U .S .policy might offer a positive inducement for Soviet agreement t omutual restraint . Other U .S . policies might also serve to increas eMoscow's interest in ground rules, but their advisability will de-pend on a host of tactical factors not easy to forecast in advance .

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SOUTHERN AFRICA : GROUND RULE SFOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

The political impasse in southern Africa (Namibia and th eRepublic of South Africa) between the white government of the Re -public and black political forces there and in Namibia ultimatel ythreatens, if it is not broken, to involve the United States an dUSSR in a crisis at some point in the future . Despite marginal re -forms, the white minority government shows no intention of initiat -ing sufficiently rapid change to accommodate the black majority .This majority is not strong enough to overthrow the Nationalis tgovernment but may provide fertile ground for intervention by ex-ternal powers in the future . In Namibia, prospects for a settle-ment appear somewhat better but nevertheless uncertain .

The stakes in southern Africa are high : access to strate-gic mineral resources, large-scale foreign investment, control o foil-shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the Unite dStates, and the defense capabilities of sub-Saharan Africa's strong -est power . The Soviet Union has long supplied arms and money t oblack guerrilla movements in South Africa and Namibia . The force sof the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) have bee ngiven access to Soviet and Cuban camps in neighboring Angola .

Ground rules aimed at implementing a peaceful resolution .of the political impasse in southern Africa possess some modest po -tential . To the extent that the United States perceives its over -all interests to be best protected by further distancing itsel ffrom the Nationalist Party government and can persuade the Sovie tUnion that its interests also lie in a strategy to increase th epeaceful pressure on the white regime, potential exists for th econstruction of ground rules whose purpose would be to increase th ewillingness of the opposed parties within South Africa and Namibi ato negotiate a political settlement of their dispute .

To accomplish this end requires the employment of a strate -gy such as that which was employed by the various outside power sinvolved in the recent settlement in Zimbabwe . In that situation ,South Africa used its influence to persuade the Rhodesian regim ethat a settlement could not be avoided, while the Front Line State sapplied their leverage over the Patriotic Front to persuade it t ocome to the same conclusion . By threatening the viability of thei rrespective clients rather than by supporting their irreconciliabl eambitions, the outside powers increased the incentives of the in-digenous actors to negotiate seriously on a political solution o ftheir dispute .

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Translating the Rhodesian strategy to the South Africa ncontext involves ground rules that express a United States willing -ness to exercise leverage on the South African regime in exchang efor Soviet willingness to pressure the guerrilla movements strug-gling against that regime . In practice, the ground rules might re -sult in a reduction of United States economic links with Pretori aand a slowdown in Soviet arms and financial assistance to the in-surgents . By diluting each side's ability to pursue its maximu mgoals, the applied ground rules could encourage the emergence of apolitical compromise between them .

Despite the difficulties inherent in attempting to impos eequivalent restraints on very different types of transfers, ther eis little choice : the arms and financial aid the USSR supplies t othe guerrillas and the economic flows sanctioned by the Unite dStates are perhaps the only potentially effective levers of influ-ence either superpower possesses over the South African situation .The United States might also actively attempt to disrupt the net -work through which Pretoria still obtains Western arms . But, be -cause that network appears to operate independently of Washington' scontrol, it is not within the United States' capacity to deliver a spart of a Soviet-American effort . Likewise, the insurgents woul dstill be able to acquire their arms elsewhere .

Construction of guidelines to induce conciliatory moves bythe Nationalist Party and the insurgent forces is an option whos etheoretical attractiveness confronts problems of negotiability an dimplementation . Cutbacks in American economic links with the Re -public and in Soviet aid to guerrilla forces in the Republic o fNamibia could only be agreed upon if there were prior agreement be -tween Washington and Moscow as to the responsiveness of the Nation -alist Party regime, on the one hand, and the insurgents, on th eother, to such restrictions . The measurement problems involved i nestimating this political elasticity would be severe even in th eabsence of mistrust between the negotiating parties .

The successful resolution of the difficulties besetting th eRhodesian/Zimbabwe dispute might be taken as a harbinger of pos-sible success in the South African context . But even if a Soviet -American bargain were to prove negotiable at some time in the fu-ture, intractable problems would remain at the stage of implementa -tion . Unlike the outside powers engaged in efforts to settle th eRhodesian/Zimbabwe dispute, the Soviet Union and the United State spossess only very limited levers of influence over indigenous poli -

tical forces in South Africa and Namibia . The ability of the guer-rillas to acquire arms elsewhere and of South Africa to adjust t oUnited States economic pressure might well leave the status quo i nthe region essentially intact .

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Given this situation, it may be worthwhile to explore th euse of ground rules aimed less at encouraging a domestic politica lsettlement than at controlling the risks of escalation through th eintroduction of external military forces . Here, too, problems o fnegotiability and implementation arise . The Soviet Union woul dhave little incentive to agree, for instance, to a ban on the in-troduction of outside (Cuban) military forces if there were no cre -dible prospect that American forces might possibly be introduce dinto the area . Such a ban, moreover, would have the political con -sequence of favoring the white minority government that, in the ab -sence of external forces, is now dominant .

Efforts to enact ground rules regulating the introductio nof outside forces would probably stand a better chance of succes sif they were linked to the larger context of Soviet-American rela -tions . A U .S . linkage strategy would offer the U .S . the opportun-ity to extend the range of both carrots and sticks that it migh tutilize to encourage Soviet restraint in the region .

Resort to a linkage strategy will probably be made neces-sary by virtue of the Soviet Union's otherwise stronger interes tin destabilizing southern Africa and assisting black revolutionar ymovements . With little at stake in the status quo in souther nAfrica, Moscow has every incentive to promote violent change . Bydoing so, the Soviets cement their relations with the black force sthey see as the ultimate victors in the class struggle in souther nAfrica . Mutual restraints on arms transfers and on the introduc-tion of external military personnel could substantially diminis hthe political dividends Moscow expects eventually to accrue . So-viet decisionmakers, noting the U .S . effort to distance itself fromPretoria and U .S . policy to date toward Angola, can hardly asses sas high the probability that the United States would d e p loy its ownforces in southern Africa .

Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in the Third World als oprovides a motive for Soviet reluctance to agree with the Unite dStates on measures of restraint . Although that rivalry has recent-ly diminished somewhat in Africa, Soviet policymakers will be re-luctant to cut back on their support for revolutionary groups i fthis opens the way for increased Chinese influence among group sfeeling abandoned by the Soviet Union .

The United States, nevertheless, is not entirely withou tleverage on the Soviet Union with respect to southern Africa . AU .S . Administration more favorably disposed toward Pretoria migh t

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credibly threaten to resume arms shipments to that country, particu -larly if oil shipping routes from the Persian Gulf around the Cap eseemed insecure and South Africa's assistance appeared crucial .Such a scenario, however, involving imperiled oil supplies, is like -ly to occur only in the context of Soviet-American tension so grav ethat negotiation of ground rules would have to take a back seat t oimmediate crisis management .

Short of such a crisis, the United States would probabl yhave to link ground rules in southern Africa to prospective bene -fits to the Soviet Union in other areas . In fields such as agri-cultural exports, technology transfers, and tariff and credit con -cessions, the United States possesses potential, if limited, lev-erage over the Soviet Union. To date, with the exception of partia luse with respect to Afghanistan, these levers have largely been ap -plied for purposes other than restraining Soviet policy in th eThird World . In these other respects they have not been entirel yunsuccessful . Although propitious timing, tactical flexibilit yand avoidance of undue publicity are preconditions for their effec -tiveness, the threat to withhold trade-related benefits from th eSoviet Union in 1973 was accompanied by an easing of emigration re -strictions in the Soviet Union . If prospects for expanded economi ccooperation with the United States were capable in that context o feffecting a change in Soviet policy in an area as sensitive domes-tically as emigration, it would hardly seem inconceivable tha tsimilar levers might yield corresponding benefits in the effort t orestrain conflict in southern Africa .

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EXECUTIV E SUMMARY

YUGOSLAVIA : GROUND RULES FORSOVIET AND AMERICAN RESTRAIN T

Tito's death commences the long-awaited succession era i nYugoslavia at a time when the country also confronts problems o fthe economy, nationality relations, and external relations with th eSoviet Union and the West . The collective leaderships in the Part yand government that have succeeded Tito may prove politically un-stable . His successors are generally not well-known outside thei rown republics, and the principle by which the top spots in Part yand government rotate annually by republic may hamstring effectiveleadership . The exercise by each republic of a veto power in th efederal parliament may also impede new initiatives to solve press-ing problems .

The Yugoslav economy is beset with high inflation and de-clining, although still high, living standards . Chronic trade de-ficits and dependence on the Soviet Union for a large proportion o fenergy imports complicate the situation . Growing differentials i nper capita income between the wealthier northern republics and th epoorer south provide the basis for potentially divisive ethnic con -flict . For many years the Soviet Union has sought to encourag eethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia as a means of extending its owninfluence in the region, particularly in the south and along th eDalmatian coast where the Soviet Union has sought greater acces sto naval support facilities . Although Yugoslav-U .S . relations maynow be as good as they have ever been, Belgrade continues to playa balancing role as leader of the non-aligned movement .

Among the broad array of U .S . policies that might enhanc eYugoslav independence and reduce East-West rivalry over Yugoslavia ,ground rules have a potential role to play . Limits on conventiona larms transfers, however, might be destabilizing since Yugoslav wil land ability to defend the country militarily constitute the great-est deterrent to foreign invasion . Although the Soviet Union ha sbeen Yugoslavia's chief arms supplier in recent years, Yugoslavi ais now interested in purchasing sophisticated early warning, anti -tank and anti-aircraft systems from the United States .

In any event Moscow may well resist CAT limits with respec tto Yugoslavia since its arms supply relationship gives it entre einto the Yugoslav army command and provides tangible evidence o fSoviet interest in Yugoslavia and internal developments there . Inlight of Yugoslav defense needs and its own interest in a simila rentree, the United States would gain little or nothing from CA Tlimits applied to Yugoslavia, which could be expected to oppose vig -orously any such measures .

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Confidence-building measures modeled after those in th eHelsinki Final Act offer greater promise and are favored by Yugo-slavia itself . The mutilateral forum of the CSCE follow-up meetin gin Madrid in November will permit active Yugoslav participation i nformulating such ground rules and avoid the impression of a Soviet -American negotiation behind Belgrade's back . Requirements in theFinal Act of prior notification of major military maneuvers migh tbe strengthened by expanding forewarning times and requiring prio rnotice of smaller-scale maneuvers . Multiple simultaneous or con-secutive maneuvers might also be made subject to prior notification ,and fuller information might be required, Mandatory notificatio nof major military movements would further enhance confidence .

Beyond notification regimes, actual constraints on militar yactivities would limit the political utility of Soviet militaryforces . Maneuvers might be limited in size, duration, and proxim-ity to national (Yugoslav) borders . Qualitative limits on offen-sive weapon systems used in maneuvers near borders, especiall ytanks, would strengthen Yugoslav security . Most effective woul dbe limits on major military movements, particularly in border areas .Creation of zones where deployment of foreign offensive force swould be constrained would heighten the effect, but their negotia-tion, if on a Europe-wide basis, would have to proceed from an as-sessment of their impact on the security of NATO, especially Wes tGermany . To forestall advantaging the offense, disengagementschemes would have to include measures of assured early warning .

Although the Soviet Union has been willing to limit it smilitary prerogatives in Europe to the extent of agreeing to giv e21-days advance notice of major military maneuvers, Moscow has beenless than eager to extend this regime, a reluctance born out by it sdiffidence in implementing voluntary CBMs in the Final Act . Whe-ther from habit, preoccupation with security, or paranoia, Sovie tofficials will probably continue to resist proposals for greate rsharing of information . They are even more likely to be incline dto avoid agreement on ground rules that limit their freedom of ac-tion (and, therefore, leverage) in Eastern Europe and, specifical-ly, with respect to Yugoslavia . In light of recurrent instabilit yin Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders are undoubtedly aware that eve nthe perception of their having lost some freedom of action coul ddestabilize the region by undermining the public conviction ther ethat a sense of realism requires deference to Soviet sensitivities .

While these considerations are not inconsequential, th ewillingness of the Soviet Union to bow to Western insistence on in -cluding CBMs in the Helsinki process suggests that somewhat mor efarreaching CBM's would be negotiable if proper incentives for So-viet acceptance could be devised . The multilateral forum of th eCSCE itself is an incentive to agreement since the USSR will b eeager to avoid the diplomatic isolation that might follow from un-qualified rejection of proposals to extend the CBM regime . Pres-sure on the Soviet Union will be greatest if Western states coor-dinate their proposals in advance of CSCE review conferences, suc h

xiv

as the Madrid meeting, both among themselves and with the neutra land non-aligned . Since Soviet acceptance of the CBMs in the Fina lAct was substantially motivated by the expectation of increase deconomic cooperation, including technology transfer provided fo rin Basket Two, the United States and its allies should in principl ebe able to encourage accord on further CBM's by linking expande deconomic cooperation to agreement on these security-related mea-sures . In practice, U .S . economic sanctions against the Sovie tUnion for its invasion of Afghanistan, and Allied agreement i nprinciple not to undercut them, make this linkage strategy dubiou suntil the situation in Afghanistan permits lifting of the sanctions .

With respect to specific CBM's proposed here, the Sovie tUnion will probably have fewest reservations concerning "classic "CBM's that impose more stringent notification requirements rathe rthan actual limits on operations . Since Moscow has embraced theprinciple of prior notice and has fulfilled its commitments in thi sregard, it appears the Soviet Union could be persuaded to accept alonger, perhaps 45-day, forewarning period in lieu of the presen t21-day requirement . Similarly, incremental progress in lowerin gthe troop level requiring prior notice from the present 25,000 fig-ure to perhaps 12-18,000 would also seem feasible at some point i nview of Soviet acceptance of the somewhat higher number at Helsinki .Tightening existing provisions to include greater detail on unit sengaged in maneuvers would also not require new decisions in prin-ciple on Moscow's part . Expansion of reporting requirements, how -ever, to include mandatory advance notification of major militar ymovements may run into greater resistance since it would diminis hthe Soviet Union's ability clandestinely to mount military opera-tions aimed at suppressing instability in Eastern Europe .

Although strengthened reporting requirements enhancing Yu-goslavia's sense of security would make minimal demands on Sovie tdecisionmaking processes, the same cannot be said of measures t olimit military activities in proximity to Yugoslavia's borders .Even here, however, there have been modest signs in the past of aflexible Soviet attitude . Constraints on the size of military man-euvers near borders might seem likely to raise serious problem sfrom the Soviet standpoint . But the USSR proposed a ceiling of 50 -60,000 troops at the Belgrade Review Conference . While the Sovie toffer was undoubtedly motivated by the fact that NATO and not th eWTO has usually held larger exercises than this, the Soviet propo-sal opens the door to discussion of a lower limit that might impac tmore symmetrically on the force readiness of the two alliances . I nfact, Moscow's willingness to discuss limiting the size of maneuver sopens the way to consideration of such other constraints as fixin ga time-limit on maneuvers, barring flights by fighter-bomber air -craft along borders, and limiting the number of tanks and armore dpersonnel carriers engaged in border exercises .

xv

More ambitious measures than these are likely to encounte rcorrespondingly greater resistance in Moscow . A ban on all mili-tary movements in border areas except for normal redeployment andreplenishment, a thinning out of foreign offensive forces near bor -ders, and the presence of ground listening posts and on-site observ -ers to monitor observance of these constraints might impinge direct -ly on Moscow's ability to threaten the use of force to maintain in -ternal security in Eastern Europe . To make such constraints mor ereadily negotiable, the United States and its NATO allies migh tconsider ways of framing such measures to limit their impact on in -trabloc relations . Along this line the provisions might be mad eapplicable only to frontier areas bordering on states not holdin g

membership in the given alliance . This approach would not direct-ly benefit Rumania, for instance, but it would contribute to th esecurity of Yugoslavia .

Naval activities in the Adriatic are another area wher eground rules might be applied . Measures including prior notifica-tion of naval exercises, naval deployments and amphibious exercise swould help to prevent surprise and restrict the use of naval force sfor political purposes . Actual limits on Soviet and American nava lactivities might theoretically include agreement to ban all foreignships from the Adriatic or restrict their number or type . A supple-mentary effort might be made to reduce or restrict to present lev-els foreign naval access to ports along the Yugoslav coast .

The Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Inci-dents on and over the High Seas, concluded in 1972, furnishes a noptimistic precedent for bilateral agreement on limiting naval ac-tivities of a tactical nature . But measures in that accord to lim-it chances of collision, harrassment, and simulated attack have on -ly marginal relevance to the task of preventing either a naval con -frontation over Yugoslavia or a political-military confrontationover access to naval facilities on Yugoslavia's Adriatic Coast .Nevertheless, by requiring at least 3-days notice of naval activi-ties that might create a hazard to navigation, the accord testifie sto the potential negotiability of the more far-reaching naval re-straints described above .

From a Western standpoint, however, it is less than clea rwhether such restraints, even if confined to the Adriatic, woul dreduce potential threats to Yugoslavia's independence . The geogra -phic and force asymmetries that exist on the ground along Yugosla-via's borders militate in favor, from NATO's standpoint, of the re-straint imposed by prior notification of ground troop exercises .But the naval superiority of the U .S . Sixth Fleet over the Sovie tMediterranean squadron suggests that a naval notification regim eparallel that for ground force maneuvers would be to NATO's disad-vantage . Delays in shows of naval force occasioned by a prior no-tification requirement would asymmetrically hamper the applicatio nof NATO leverage in response to any hypothetical Soviet threat o n

the ground . One might be justified in speculating that Soviet re-sistance to more restrictive CBM's applicable to ground forces stem s

xvi

in part from the same calculations of relative advantage . Althoug hthis line of analysis leads to a somewhat pessimistic prognosis fo rthe negotiability of further CBM's in Europe, quite aside from th eimpact of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on all East-West ne -gotiations, a wide range of factors apparently remains at work fur -thering Moscow's interest in maintaining and strengthening detent ein Europe . The asymmetries in naval and ground forces in the re-gion also suggest the possibility of a trade-off in which the So-viet Union and Warsaw Pact might surrender some greater degree o ffreedom of action on the ground in return for greater NATO an dAmerican restraint, de facto, at sea . Since the chief threat t oYugoslavia's security is from Soviet ground forces, the trade-of fwould appreciably enhance stability in the region .

xvii

Chapter 1

Ground Rules : Concepts and Approache s

I . THE CONCEPT OF GROUND RULES AND THEIR RELEVANCE

While the outcome of the Soviet invasion of Afghanista n

and the stalled SALT II ratification process will establish th e

overall climate within which other aspects of Soviet-America n

relations will develop in the foreseeable future, this stud y

seeks to move beyond the contentious issue of Afghanistan an d

the exhuastively studied questions of strategic arms limitatio n

in order to deal with general problems of regional conflict .

The timeliness of such an approach has only apparently bee n

diminished by the recent exacerbation of Soviet-American re-

lations . In fact, its relevance has been underscored by th e

evidence that many of the cooperative and mutually beneficia l

aspects of Soviet-American relations cannot easily withstan d

large-scale shifts in public sentiment brought about by Soviet -

American misunderstanding in areas of regional conflict .

Although regional conflicts are most likely to giv e

rise to nuclear confrontations between the two superpowers ,

they have received insufficient attention from the standpoin t

of regularizing Soviet-American competition .

- 2 -

This study, therefore, focuses on possible groun d

rules governing U .S .-Soviet involvement in areas of presen t

and prospective regional tension . It remains an open questio n

whether Soviet interest in such "rules of the game" extend s

beyond high-minded generalizations concerning superpower be-

havior to embrace the possibility of concrete and mutuall y

agreed measures to enhance regional stability . Of paramount

importance in this respect are the Soviet Union's estimate s

of the costs and benefits of such measures to both the Unite d

States and itself . Accordingly, the study not only will in-

vestigate possible ground rules but also will make a modes t

attempt to examine the means whereby they might be brough t

into effect .

At least since the full flowering of detente in 1972 ,

both government officials and scholars in the United State s

have periodically stated or implied that there existed, o r

ought to exist, certain (generally unspecified) ground rule s

governing Soviet and American behavior . Such "rules" hav e

even been conceptualized as a kind of "code" of conduct th e

violation of which constitutes a departure from a detent e

relationship . Calls for the elaboration of such a "code o f

detente" have tended to multiply at times of low-level frustra -

tion over Soviet actions abroad seen as upsetting the interna-

tional status quo . They have diminished during periods of

- 3 -

greater frustration when detente itself has become the object o f

attack from the skeptical and of disillusion from the once sympa -

thetic .

Statements by high officials of the U .S . Government con -

cerning alleged Soviet violations of an (unwritten) "code of de-

tente" in Southwest Asia and Africa reinforce the case for devis -

ing more explicit and systematic ground rules . Indeed, so lon g

as the code of detente is vague, each party to it will have maxi -

mum leeway in construing those strictures applicable to itself a s

permissively as rhetorical self-justification permits . Perhap s

in partial recognition of this, Soviet-American working groups ,

as a result of Secretary of State Vance's visit to Moscow in Marc h

1977, considered areas of possible cooperation in such relate d

areas as controlling conventional arms transfers and demilitariz-

ing the Indian Ocean . The failure of these talks underscores bot h

the difficulty of developing and agreeing to ground rules and th e

importance of the effort .

Although less publicly and less urgently, Soviet official s

and scholars have hinted at a similar interest in developing great -

er mutual agreement on the ground rules of detente . Speaking t o

a joint session of the Central Committee and Supreme Soviet in No-

vember 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev pointed to the importanc e

of "recognizing and enacting in international documents a kind o f

code of rules" for relations between the Soviet Union and Western

- 4 -

states . While the Soviet leader's purpose, in part, was to stres s

achievements already recorded in such agreements as the 1975 Hel-

sinki Final Act, he appeared to suggest the possibility of codify -

ing principles aimed-at reducing superpower tensions and prevent-

ing military confrontations with the United States in variou s

areas of the world, including southern Africa, the Indian Ocea n

and the Mideast . Soviet scholars visiting the United States from

the USA and Canada Institute and the Institute of World Econom y

and International Relations (IMEMO) have periodically broache d

the same possibility .

Because formally and informally, both the United State s

and the Soviet Union have expressed some interest in developin g

guidelines for the conduct of their relations, this section o f

the study will briefly assess the assumptions that appear to un-

derlie interest in such guidelines, tentative and episodic as i t

has been .

1 . The General Premises of Support for Ground Rules of Detent e

Soviet and American expressions of support for developin g

informal rules of detente apparently derive from three beliefs :

that present methods of restraining superpower conflicts are in -

adequate to the task of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war ;

that international agreements can transform the general nature o f

international politics ; and that the conclusion of agreements can

- 5 -

influence the specific behavior of nations acceding to thos e

agreements . An analysis of each of these three premises in suc-

cession will confirm the validity of the first, reject the secon d

as conceptually unsound, and offer qualified support to the third .

a . Modes of Conflict Regulatio n

To regulate their relationship in the post-World War I I

period, the Soviet Union and the United States have relied large -

ly upon tacit rules of the game, the careful management of crises ,

and incentive or linkage strategies, each of which has weaknesse s

that might be remedied by the construction of guidelines .

Tacit rules of the game, the most important of the mode s

of superpower conflict control, are simply expectations about per -

missible actions and reactions that have developed as a result o f

discernible patterns in superpower behavior in the post-wa r

period . The failure of the United States to respond actively t o

the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the simi-

larly low-keyed Soviet response to United States interventions in

Guatemala and the Dominican Republic established and then confirm -

ed the existence of a tacit rule permitting each superpower li-

cense to behave at will in its own sphere of influence withou t

fear of direct military counteraction from the other . The assert-

ive United States response to the emplacement of Soviet missile s

in Cuba in 1962 reinforced a tacit understanding observed by the

- 6 -

West during the communist takeover in Eastern Europe forbiddin g

direct intrusions into the other's long acknowledged sphere o f

influence . The restriction on the introduction of ground comba t

troops into the Middle East is also the product of inference s

from behavior observed over some period of time .

Tacit rules of the game have yielded several significan t

dividends . Most compelling is that in conjunction with other fac-

tors, they have contributed to preventing the outbreak of a

nuclear war, although the correspondence between the tacit guide -

lines and the absence of war may be coincidental rather tha n

causal . They have, moreover, come into existence without th e

plague of prolonged and acerbic negotiations and the concomitant

consumption of vast amounts of bureaucratic time and energy . Un-

like explicit rules, in addition, tacit rules of the game leav e

players some room for flexibility in strategy and tactics and ca n

be readily adjusted to changing circumstances .

On closer scrutiny each of these ostensible advantages ,

however, loses some of its lustre . The apparent contributio n

of tacit rules of the game to the prevention of nuclear wa r

in the past, for instance, is no guarantee they will be equall y

effective in the future when each superpower may possess a t

least a theoretical first-strike capability against the fixed -

coordinate, land-based nuclear deterrent of the other . More -

over, the flexibility of tacit guidelines may seem consider -

ably less appealing from the United States perspective if the

- 7 -

next leadership transition in the Soviet Union produces a

Politburo consensus in favor of probing more aggressively th e

gray areas or ambiguous boundaries of existing implicit behav -

ioral standards, an adventurousness that could precipitate a

superpower confrontation, especially if it were to coincid e

with a period of mixed signals from the United States .

Many of the same considerations argue for and agains t

reliance on crisis management techniques to contain superpowe r

involvement in regional disputes . A uniquely crippling dis-

advantage of crisis management techniques is that their failure

poses an extraordinarily high risk of eventuating in nuclea r

war . Given the intensity of threat to vital interests and th e

abbreviated response time that a crisis by definition imposes ,

escalation is dismayingly probable should crisis managemen t

break down . The presumption of failure to control superpowe r

involvement in regional disputes inherent in reliance on crisi s

management techniques argues strongly in favor of erecting bar -

riers to the development of crises .

The inadequacy of linkage in its recent uses as a

reliable mode of conflict control has become apparent t o

both the Soviet Union and the United States . From the U .S .

perspective, the policy of linkage has thus far failed t o

work consistently both because of a poverty of means an d

because of foreign policy priorities and domestic pressures

- 8 -

vitiating the strategy itself . The Soviet inability to wiel d

equivalent carrots guarantees, moreover, that, on the othe r

hand, the USSR itself will not be willing to rely upon linkag e

either as a viable alternative to explicit rules of the game

or as an important supplement to extant modes of regional com -

petition .

From the United States perspective, the theoretica l

advantages of linkage are obvious : it permits the use of the

country's most powerful levers of influence outside th e

specific sphere in which their relevance is immediately apparent .

Access to United States export credits, for example, can b e

linked to Soviet political and/or military activities in a

particularly tense region of the world . Leverage over certai n

areas could be enhanced if greater leverage from other area s

could be brought to bear successfully on them .

The problems that complicated the United States' pur-

suit of linkage, however, sufficiently degrades these advan-

tages in practice to justify detailed examination of groun d

rules as a separate but supplemental approach . The argument s

that have been advanced against the utility of economic sanc-

tions are equally persuasive when marshalled against a linkag e

strategy . Unless the entire international community is unite d

in support of such a strategy, the opportunity to gain acces s

to the embargoed resource elsewhere than from the sanctionin g

state always exists . Only very infrequently does one state,

- 9 -

even a superpower, exercise monopolistic control over th e

supply of a valued resource . As in the case of Rhodesia, fo r

example, even effective denial of significant resources can

serve to reinforce rather than weaken the will of the sanc-

tioned state to pursue the prohibited course of conduct . Nor

in democratic countries is the executive guaranteed that th e

domestic political process will approve its particular defini-

tion of linkage . That the Congress could impose on the Admini-

stration a linkage between Jewish emigration from the Sovie t

Union and most favored nation status for that country sugges t

that the theoretical advantages of linkage may not prevail i n

practice .

To the extent that Soviet interest in ground rules rest s

upon shortfalls in existing modes of conflict control, therefore ,

it is well-founded . While regional conflict has been containe d

below the level of direct superpower confrontation in the postwa r

period to date, the palpable inadequacies of these techniques ar gue

persuasively in favor of their reinforcement by any reasonabl e means

available .

b . International Agreements and International Politic s

Implicit in unofficial Soviet feelers concerning a cod e

of detente is the assumption that somewhat more explicit agree-

ment on the rules of the game might make a significant contri-

bution to enhancing the dividends of detente . This assumptio n

raises the issue of the nexus between explicit inter-state

- 1 0 -

agreements and patterns of international politics that has lon g

beguiled international relations specialists .

Most sophisticated observers maintain that internationa l

agreements and international law generally are reflections an d

instruments of the political order and that their independen t

capacity to affect that order is minimal . As E . H . Carr note d

some 40 years ago, "the law is not an abstraction . It canno t

be understood independent of the political foundations on whic h

it rests and the political interests which it serves ." 1 Con-

curring, Louis Henkin reflected more recently tha t

much of law, and the most successful part, i sa codification of existing mores, of how peopl ebehave and feel they ought to behave . To tha textent law reflects, rather than imposes, ex-isting order . If there were no law agains thomocide, most individuals in contemporary so-ciety would still refrain from murder . Wer ethat not so, the law could hardly survive an dbe effective . To say that nations act pursu-ant to law only as they would act anyhow ma yindicate not that the law is irrelevant, bu trather that it is sound and viable, reflectin gthe true interests and attitudes of nations ,and that it is likely to be maintained . 2

Advancing the frontiers of political cooperation is no t

within the power of international agreements themselves . As en-

thusiastic a proponent of world order reform as Richard A . Fal k

maintains that " . . . it is not realistic to rely upon law as an

independent instrument of order and change . For law provide s

only the method and ritual by which deeply held values and pol-

icies can be preserved and protected . Law is an integral aspect

- 1 1 -

of a functioning social system . It is not an autonomous forc e

able to overlook the dominant expectations that guide action i n

the relevant community ." 3

The dependence of international agreements on the under -

lying pattern of international politics is even more marked wit h

respect to the enforcement of those agreements, a point of obvio us

relevance to the consideration of the merits of the constructio n

of explicit rules of detente . While in domestic society th e ability

of a victim to gain redress for the illegal acts against him i s

only occasionally a function of his personal command of certain

resources, in international society a victim i s characteristically

in a position in which his legal rights can be enforced only t o

the extent his own power permits .

As a consequence of the absence of any collective enforc e

ment mechanism that is not itself a hostage to the great powe r

politics that frequently give rise to violations, self-help i s

viable only for certain actors under certain condition . Hedley

Bull observes, " .

. there exists an intimate connection betwee n

the effectiveness of international law in international society

and the functioning of the balance of power . It is only if powe r

and the will to use it, are distributed in international societ y

in such a way that states can uphold at least certain rights when

they are infringed, that respect for rules of international law

can be maintained ." 4

- 1 2 -

Because international agreements largely reflect rathe r

than shape international politics, any rules of the game tha t

are concluded between the Soviet Union and the United State s

are likely to strengthen rather than precipitate changes i n

superpower behavior with respect to the deepening of detent e

and the containment of regional conflicts . A genuine commit-

ment to restraint has to precede agreement on guidelines, there -

fore, if the guidelines are to be other than what Henkin call s

"paper laws" :

'gimmicks' that will not be adopted, . . .

agreements which nations will not invoke, . . . tribunals they

will not use ." 5

c . The Influence of Agreements on State Behavio r

That international agreements per se create some pressure

for compliance with their provisions independently of the sig-

natories' original interests in concluding the agreements i s

the third premise underpinning any interest in rules of detente .

The Soviet predilection for the representation of its interests

in the form of concrete international agreements is long-standing .

A review of 40 years of Soviet theory and practice with respec t

to international treaties led American scholars Jan Triska an d

Robert Slusser to conclude that "all of the Soviet leaders from

- 1 3 -

Lenin to Khrushchev, have relied more on international treatie s

than on all other foundations of international order combined .

By both words and deeds they have made clear their view tha t

treaties constitute the ideal vehicle for, relations betwee n

the Soviet state and the outside world ." 6 Between 1917 an d

1957, the Soviet Union concluded more than 2100 agreement s

with other states, almost 25 per cent of which were of a

political rather than of a solely economic or functiona l nature.7

Their reliance on formal international agreements suggest s

that successive Soviet leaders have assumed that formal agree-

ments compel a stricter adherence than does the tacit expres-

sions of such principles in implicitly acknowledged rules of th e

game . The record also suggests that the process of foreig n

policy formation is not impervious to the influence of relevan t

international agreements .

Both careful reflection and empirical evidence sugges t

that international agreements do exert some autonomous pressur e

on states toward compliance . Probably the most compelling reason

states observe international agreements is that they contribut e

to the maintenance of a stable and predictable network of re-

lationships among the constituent units of the international

- 1 4 -

political system . International agreements provide one of th e

primary means by which an anarchic international system can reg-

ulate contacts between and among nations . By distinguishing

acceptable from unacceptable behavior, they enable each stat e

to identify the range of behavior within which it can operat e

safely as well as that within which it can expect others t o

operate . As Carr observes, "the peculiar quality of law whic h

makes it a necessity in every political society resides not i n

its subject-matter, nor in its ethical content, but in its sta-

bility . Law gives to society that element of fixity and reg-

ularity and continuity without which no coherent life is possi-

ble ." 8 Thus, in principle, states have an interest in observing

international agreements to the extent that they have an interes t

in preserving the state system .

A markedly less abstract impetus to compliance with in-

ternational agreements than the state system's viability is th e

norm of reciprocity that prevails in the operation of the inter -

national legal order . The decentralized character of that orde r

not only means that enforcement is the province of eac h constituent

unit individually, it also means that law creation is a haphazar d

process that is heavily contingent on reciprocity . In the inter -

national legal system, Falk observes, " . . . a violation of rule

- 1 5 -

A by X tends to create a legal basis for states Y, Z . . . n t o

violate in similar proportionate fashion . . . . [T]he optio n

of states to reciprocate noncompliance creates a marginal in-

centive to comply, especially as the noncomplying response i s

often not readily predictable . A violation of internationa l

law may itself become the efficient cause of an escalation of

tension and conflict, bringing an underlying conflict close t o

the threshold of violence ." 9

Moreover, a violation of an explicit international agree-

ment can result in the imposition of sanctions upon the stat e

committing the offense . While the international community a s

such generally has no military forces at its ready disposal t o

deploy against the violator, neither it nor the state agains t

which the violation was directed is powerless to act to defen d

its interests . The sanction of community opprobrium, while ad-

mittedly weak and not infrequently ephemeral, does exist, it s

influence evidenced by the attempts of states to cas t defenses

of their actions in legalistic terms .

Undoubtedly, a more compelling deterrent to the ab-

rogation of international agreements is a reasonable prob-

ability that the victim or target will be able to respond

- 1 6 -

effectively to it . In every case, of course, a violation en-

ables a state to assume an equivalent right to transgress th e

boundaries of the agreement, but a reciprocal transgressio n

may not be as daunting a prospect as a response that threaten s

the imposition of sanctions not directly related to the pro -

visions of the agreement itself .

There is, moreover, substantial bureaucratic momentu m

behind the observance of international agreements . As Fal k

notes, "the effectiveness of international law arises [in part ]

. . . from the habits of compliance that government official s

develop . The observance of international law is routinized i n

the standard bureaucratic operations of most states ." 10 Th e

play of bureaucratic politics also ensures that the foreign

policy process remains permeable to influence by existing in-

ternational agreements, since the latter can be used to buttres s

the arguments of participants in that process . Because of the

diverse interests of decision-makers, observes one analyst, i t

is "almost impossible that legal considerations should not ente r

the process of decision . They will always tend to favor one o r

more of the players in the game, who will see that they ar e

brought to bear."11

17

Even situations of intense threat that exclude mos t

bureaucratic players and mobilize high-level decision-maker s

are not immune to the influence of existing pertinent inter -

national agreements . Although there is a relative paucity o f

evidence regarding crisis decision-making in the Soviet Union ,

evidence from the United States decision-making process durin g

the course of the Cuban missile crisis, perhaps the most threat -

ening situation confronting United States policymakers in the

nuclear era, suggests that even crisis choices are influence d

by formal international commitments . In the Cuban missile case ,

for example, Abram Chayes, in 1962 the Legal Advisor to th e

Department of State, believes that the perceived need to justif y

its action in the light of existing international agreement s

affected the government's decision-making during the missil e

crisis . He noted, "comparative justifiability -- which i s

another way of saying the comparative case of generating polit -

ical support or acquiescence -- is necessarily an important fac -

tor differentiating among alternatives in the intra-governmenta l

process of choice . The perhaps disproportionate significance o f

law for public justification feeds back on this internal proces s

to enhance the weight of legal considerations there ." 12 Chaye s

attributes to international law a "significant" role in the

- 1 8 -

Kennedy administration's decision to reject a surgical air strik e

against the Cuban-based Soviet missiles . 1 3

An important caveat with respect to the proposition tha t

international agreements tend to compel compliance on their ow n

accord is the existence of state interests other than the pre-

servation of the international political system and the avoidanc e

of the opprobrium of the international community . Even in the

nuclear era, when the preservation of a framework of implici t

rules of behavior is of necessity a preeminent concern of bot h

superpowers, violations of international agreements have bee n

sufficiently frequent to make clear the existence of other, oc-

casionally more compelling national interests . The Soviet in-

vasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghani-

stan in 1979 are indisputable evidence of the priority rankin g

the Soviet leadership assigns to the maintenance of "compatible "

Communist regimes over the observance of the United Nation s

Charter . Despite glaring exceptions, however, Soviet behavio r

has generally conformed to the premise that international agree-

ments increase the probability that state interests in restrain t

will be expressed in concrete foreign policy decisions when thos e

interests have themselves been codified in inter-state instru-

ments .

- 1 9 -

Among those objecting to this conclusion are Trisk a

and Slusser, who are critical of the Soviet record to 195 7

of compliance with international agreements . Asking whethe r

" . . . Soviet leaders [can] be trusted to honor the commitment s

they voluntarily assume in international treaties," they reply :

"basing one's answer to this question on the past behavior o f

the Soviet leaders, one would have to say that the chances tha t

they can be trusted are distinctly poor . Furthermore, the mor e

important the subject of a given treaty and the more directl y

it is related to Soviet long-term objectives, the poorer ar e

the chances of the Soviet Union's honoring the treaty ." 14 As

a consequence, they conclude, political agreements are more like -

ly to be violated than are economic or functional agreements .

The relevance to this study of Triska's and Slusser' s

pessimistic conclusions is marginal, however . Their work ,

-published in 1962, is based on an analysis of Soviet treaty

law and practice only until 1957 . In addition, almost all o f

the cited violations of political agreements by the Soviet Unio n

occurred in connection with the advent and course of the Secon d

World War . For several reasons their conclusions do not provid e

today a basis for predicting future Soviet behavior .

- 2 0 -

Few states at that time regarded international agreement s

as sacrosanct . As Arie E . David observed after a review of prac -

tice in the interwar period, "while legal theory during the 1930 s

gave a simple 'no' answer to the question of unilateral termina -

tion of [treaties], the general practice was that of considerin g

treaties as scraps of paper ." 15 The Soviets and others exten-

sively violated political agreements during a period of intens e

security fears and gathering war clouds largely because th e

agreements were distantly removed from the facts of interna-

tional politics and, so, were doomed to become irrelevant t o

state behavior .

Much the same is true of several more international ac-

cords . 16 The United States and the Soviet Union in the agreemen t

on "Basic Principles of Relations," signed during the Soviet -

American summit meeting of 1972, asserted :

The USA and the USSR attach major importance t opreventing the development of situations capabl eof causing a dangerous exacerbation of their re -lations . Therefore, they will do their utmos tto avoid military confrontations and to preven tthe outbreak of nuclear war . They will alway sexercise restraint in their mutual relations ,and will be prepared to negotiate and settle dif -ferences by peaceful means . Discussions and ne-gotiations on outstanding issues will be conduct -ed in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommoda-tion, and mutual benefit .Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain uni -lateral advantage at the expense of the other ,directly or indirectly, are inconsistent wit hthese objectives .

- 2 1 -

A year later in the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War ,

the two parties slightly refined their commitment to mutual re-

straint but still left much room for interpretation :

the Parties agree that they will act in suc ha manner as to prevent the development o fsituations capable of causing a dangerous ex -acerbation of their relations, as to avoi dmilitary confrontations, and as to exclud ethe outbreak of nuclear war between them an dbetween either of the Parties and other coun -tries .The Parties agree . . . to proceed from th epremise that each Party will refrain fro mthe threat or use of force against the othe rparty, against the allies of the other Part yand against other countries, in circumstance swhich may endanger international peace andsecurity . The Parties agree that they wil lbe guided by these considerations in th eformulation of their foreign policies and i ntheir actions in the field of internationa lrelations .

Such general language commits the signatories to almost no signi-

ficant substantive action . The accords thereby could hardly b e

expected to restrain the parties in any particular manner although

they simultaneously opened the way for the allegations, necessar-

ily unsusceptible to substantiation, that their provisions wer e

being violated . It is questionable whether either superpower' s

compliance with the agreements should have been reasonably expect -

ed .

More successful in terms of Soviet compliance have bee n

agreements expressing concrete interests of the USSR . While cri-

ticisms have been leveled against alleged Soviet violations o f

the 1972 SALT treaty, the charges have not been substantial enoug h

to persuade either Congress or three Administrations that inten-

tional serious violations have been committed . The willingness

- 2 2 -

of the Soviet Union to rectify practices that United States repre -

sentatives charged violated the terms of the arms accord 17 sug-

gests that formal agreements can moderate Soviet behavior .

d . Conclusion : Validity of Premises Underlying th e

Ground Rules Approac h

The three premises that underlie interest in rules to re -

strain superpower involvement in regional disputes exhibit vary-

ing degrees of analytic rigor and empirical support . Least the-

oretically and empirically justifiable is the premise that th e

conclusion of international agreements to restrain superpower in-

volvement in regional conflicts will, in and of itself, transform

the nature of Soviet foreign policy . On the contrary, the avail -

able evidence suggests that international agreements only moder-

ately advance the frontiers of international politics . To sug-

gest that the guidelines themselves will create a mutual super -

power interest in controlling outside involvement in third part y

disputes is to create an illusion of cooperation whose inevitabl e

undoing would only wreak havoc on an already unravelling detente .

If, however, a genuine reciprocal interest exists in re-

ducing tensions and the possibility of nuclear conflagration stem -

ming from conflicts in the third world, the expression of this in -

terest in specific international agreements may well increase th e

probability of restraint . By delineating clearly the boundarie s

between acceptable and unacceptable involvement, international

- 2 3 -

agreements create some pressure upon states to observe thos e

boundaries that would not exist were states relying only on vague ,

tacit rules of the game . That states have an interest in preserv -

ing a framework of international accords, that violations creat e

a reciprocal right to violation, that the community of nation s

expects agreements to be respected, and that sanctions are mor e

easily justified when a clear-cut violation occurs argue persuas -

ively that behavior could be positively influenced if rules o f

detente were more explicit .

The strongest argument, however, that can be mustered i n

favor of the construction of rules to regulate superpower

involvement in regional conflicts stems from the shortcomings o f

existing modes of conflict control .

2 . Soviet Interests and Possible Guidelines : Caveat s

Apart from that of forestalling the outbreak of nuclea r

war, a number of Soviet interests might be realized by the nego -

tiation of rules to regulate superpower involvement in regiona l

conflict .

As has been true of other Soviet foreign policy initiative s

in the past, the Soviet leadership's suggestion that guideline s

would be useful stems from its drive for international recognition

of the USSR's achievement of equal global status with the Unite d

States . United States agreement even to negotiate on guidelines

- 2 4 -

would confer a legitimacy upon the USSR's participation in th e

politics of the given region . It would also imply recognitio n

that the long inferiority in the Soviet ability to project conven -

tional military power had been substantially overcome . Both de-

velopments might have the unintended consequence of deepenin g

Soviet involvement in regional conflicts, possibly leading, i n

the event of failure to agree on rules of restraint, to more dan-

gerous Soviet-American clashes .

Among indirect benefits the Soviet region might deriv e

from this enhanced legitimacy would be a modest reinforcement o f

its domestic position as well as of its influence in Easter n

Europe . To the extent, however, that ground rules might limit So-

viet freedom of action in Eastern Europe or be perceived there as

doing so, a regime of restraint might give encouragement to loca l

forces favoring greater domestic experimentation and a larger de-

gree of autonomy from Moscow . On the other hand, the more inde-

pendent East European states like Yugoslavia, reluctant to become

the object of Soviet-American agreement over their heads, will no t

easily accommodate themselves to any arrangement they perceive a s

placing limits on their freedom of action .

Should the Chinese leadership perceive the specter of a

U .S .-USSR condominum in such talks, the Soviets might succeed i n

disturbing relations between the United States and China . More -

over, they might succeed in exacerbating relations within the At-

lantic Alliance, should the United States disregard West European

- 2 5 -

interests in the Third World in the course of bilateral talks re -

garding guidelines . If discussions on guidelines did not culmin-

ate in agreement on actual guidelines, the Soviets might succee d

in realizing some measure of these gains without incurring corre -

sponding costs .

In the event certain guidelines were actually to be agree d

upon, the Soviets might well succeed in constraining the Unite d

States from involvement in the Third World in ways that have bene -

fited the United States in the past . A very likely component o f

explicit rules of the game with respect to the containment of re-

gional conflicts would be specific limits on the deployment o f

military forces to any arena of tension . The United States, how -

ever, has frequently utilized non-violent deployments of militar y

force in an attempt to influence the outcome of events in foreig n

countries . Although not always successful in the long run, suc h

political uses of the armed forces by the United States have "a t

times . . . been a useful step in shoring up situations enough t o

avoid dramatic setbacks, to mitigate domestic and internationa l

pressures for more forceful and perhaps counterproductive actions ,

and to gain time for sounder policies to be formulated and imple -

mented ." 18 United States' discretion in the use of its forces '

for political purposes would undoubtedly be curtailed, to Sovie t

advantage, were some conceivable guidelines actually ratified .

On a markedly more defensive and conservative note, th e

timing of the Soviet expression of interest in the construction

- 2 6 -

of guidelines of detente may hold a clue to a rather differen t

source of Soviet interest in them . Generally, internationa l

agreement, and international law more broadly defined, serve th e

interests of the status quo, primarily because their revision t o

accommodate changes in the international environment remains a

very unsettled area of international law . As a consequence, form -

al agreements tend to legitimize existing situations and incumben t

governments to a greater extent than they recognize the flux pre-

valent in most political situations . The provision of stability

is the special province of formal agreements .

An appreciation of the conservative nature of internation-

al agreements is evident in Soviet practice with respect to th e

observance of those agreements . When, immediately after the Bol-

shevik Revolution, the Soviet leadership repudiated all treaty ob-

ligations incurred by the pre-revolutionary leadership, it did s o

on the grounds that those obligations served the interests of a

now impotent bourgeois class . The inevitable progress of history

invalidated for early Soviet leaders the principle of pacta sunt

servanda -- international agreements must be observed . Over time ,

however, as the Soviet Union became a power in the established or -

der, it embraced this same principle and denied other states wid e

latitude to determine independently whether their situations ha d

changed sufficiently to justify the abrogation of commitments as-

sumed in international agreements . 19 As the USSR acquired a stake

- 2 7 -

in the stable operation of the international political system an d

particularly as it relied on treaties as an instrument of its for -

eign policy, its leadership has come to value the role interna-

tional agreements play in the defense of established interests .

Thus, one might speculate, on the basis of the organiza-

tional process model of foreign policymaking, that even while som e

Soviet officials might find ground rules attractive as a means o f

extending Soviet (and their) interests in an offensive mode, othe r

organizational representatives might find value in a code o f

detente as a means of merely preserving existing Soviet positions .

Accordingly, some Soviet leaders might embrace the idea of rule s

of detente if they were to conclude that in particular areas o f

the world certain guidelines might protect Soviet interests .

Brezhnev's favorable reference to a code of detente i n

1977 was introduced during a period of quiescence in American for -

eign policy . Persuaded that the country's involvement in Vietna m

had been a disastrous mistake, the population at large and the ma -

jority of Congress also perceived the danger of another Vietna m

lurking behind every prospective active engagement of Unite d

States policy . It was in this spirit that the United States re-

sponded passively to intense Soviet and Cuban involvement in th e

Angolan civil war and in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somali a

in the strategic Horn of Africa .

If the Soviet Union could succeed in codifying this uni-

lateral United States restraint in instances of regional conflict,

- 2 8 -

it might succeed in protecting and enhancing its interests in the

Third World, a potentially attractive possibility during any

period of instability within the USSR after Brezhnev's disappear-

ance from the scene . Given the unpredictable nature of America n

politics and the prospect that a period of resurgent American ac-

tivism abroad might coincide with a leadership struggle or intern -

al consolidation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership ma y

yet be induced to negotiate a series of ground rules of restraint .

II . APPROACHES TO GROUND RULE S

To avoid the limitations and dangers inherent in highl y

general commitments to restraint such as those in the 1972 Basi c

Principles of Relations, there is need for a series of rathe r

more specific measures . For purposes of this study, the follow-

ing broad categories of measures will be examined : 1) limit s

on conventional arms transfers, 2) confidence-building measures ,

including limits on, and advance notification of, military man-

euvers and movements, 3) limits on naval deployments and facili-

ties, and 4) mechanisms of joint political consultation .

While concrete measures such as these, if negotiated ,

would offer the realistic possibility of constraining Soviet an d

American involvement in regional conflicts and of verifying thei r

observance, this more "realistic" approach necessarily suffers th e

common shortcomings of specifity . Specific restraints will vary

in their applicability from one region to another . As superpower

- 2 9 -

relations fluctuate and regional dynamics change with the passag e

of time, some measures will lose relevance while others ma y

acquire enhanced attractiveness . At the same time

, the negotiability of specific commitme