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G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,vs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her

capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years,but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed tocontinue in the service to complete the15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of anold-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act

of 1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, aRegistrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 asLegal Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) yearsuntil his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First Districtof Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, asSupervising Staff Officer.

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, MetroManila, the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested theSecretary of Justice, through Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land RegistrationAuthority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the 15-year servicerequirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11,par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commissionwhether or not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by CivilService Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990,the LRA Administrator observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extendedto 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request forextension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shallbe considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reachthe compulsory retirement age ofsixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of officeunder Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.

Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil ServiceCommission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-



year extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSCMemorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:

1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to completethe fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only

to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members ofthe Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for aperiod not exceeding one (1) year .

On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSCResolution No. 91-101.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commissioncommitted a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the extension of petitioner's serviceas Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant toCSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3)

months to complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits asprovided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as theRevised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.

Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No.27 allowing an extension of service of a compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one(1) year is both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" ofSection 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 doesnot limit nor specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the15 years of service.

The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provisionbeing generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thusrespondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 theprivilege under said section to government employees who lack just one year to completethe 15-year service requirement.

The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is thecentral personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the power and authority,among others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant toSection 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292(Administrative Code of 1987). In interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, publicrespondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years ofservice, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years", isqualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," whichmeans that the extension of service must be first authorized by the Commission, as theappropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of acompulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years ofservice) can be extended.

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commissionto limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said



limitation his no relation to or connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carriedinto effect.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of1987 provides thus:

Sec. 12. Powers and Functions . — The Commission shall have the followingpowers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel mattersin the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;

As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize themodification of an express provision of a special law (Revised Government Service

Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement andpension of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would berendered nugatory and meaningless.

Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977expressly provides, thus:

Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension . — (a) Old-age pension shall bepaid to a member who:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shallbe compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteenyears of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, heshall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.(Emphasis supplied)

Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement planshould be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to bebenefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of thelaw in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be

enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).

The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakesof the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competentmen and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire from theservice with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more sofor those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident.

We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishingretirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and servicerequirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case ofordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who hasreached 65 but opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146



to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.

In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No.5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled

that Justice Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked afew months to meet the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to fullretirement benefits under R.A. 910 because his accrued leave credits would have entitledhim to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.

The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep.Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court,Adm. Matter No. 6484 — Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910,as amended, in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court alsoallowed the conversion of the application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martinunder said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime

annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under Section 1(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement wasapproved on January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910.Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he hadreceived was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year lumpsum, to which he was entitled, and of his monthly pensions for the next five years.

However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allowsseeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are amplereasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make upfor lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on caseto case basis.

There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the ExecutiveBranch on a case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete the 15-year servicerequirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting theextension of service to only one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of theretirement provisions of P.D. 1146.

In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in theservice to complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential factor before anapplication under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer orgovernment office concerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows amaking up or compensating for lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the careerof the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re:Gregorio Pineda, supra ). It must be so in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service tocomplete the fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of thephrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended,otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14,1936. There is nothing in the original text as well as in the revised version which would serveas the basis for providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is

likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderlinesituation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but



less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-yearrequirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.

While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commissionthe authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in

the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provisioncannot be extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government ServiceInsurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what thespecial law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law beinginvoked provides. It cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of anadministrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulationsadopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with theprovisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general

provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450;Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585;Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v.Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil ServiceCommission, et al. , G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely applies in the instantcase. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons fromemployment, reinstatement, orre-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the CivilService Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity,because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the lawitself which it was meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with anyspecific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thruJustice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:

The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the lawor put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, notto supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, ofcourse, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend anact of Congress." (Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santosv. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine VeteransAffairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).

The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of theinvalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of saidsection, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation onthe part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to orconnection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode ofcarrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the

"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1)year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement



age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service MemorandumCircular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relation to orconnection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule wasan addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The CivilService Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.

As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2)recent cases where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have reached the ageof 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-year service requirement tobe entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs.Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the timeshe reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of governmentservice, to continue her services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5years, to complete the

15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par.(b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties withoutany adverse complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report ofthe Medical Clinic.

The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request forthe extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco,Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the SupremeCourt to continue her services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years,10 months and 13 days because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 daysof government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 inorder that she be entitled to the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.

It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 daysof government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member whohas rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time ofseparation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% ofhis average monthly compensation for every year of service."

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his11 years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with thebeneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of thegovernment office concerned.

Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because heopted to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement pursuant toSection 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement underSection 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reachedthe compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If saidemployee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension.On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsoryretirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to thebenefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e . a cash equivalent to 100% of hisaverage monthly compensation for every year of service.



The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does notoffend the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd orinequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond theretirement age. If he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who isseparated from the service at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would

have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides, hisentitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the serviceis not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit under Section12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for everyyear of service.

Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146,petitioner Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by thenExecutive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons"should apply only to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement ageof 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service requirement forretirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who have reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age pension underpar. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the discretion of theagency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of theDepartment of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11years, 9 months and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so thathe may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Noconand Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Heentered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of DavaoCity, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had alreadyreached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years andone (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a"Certificate of Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS")and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewrittenstatement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." Thisstatement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."



Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the RegionalDirector of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing thelatter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on thismatter."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao CityMayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary toM.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which ishereunder quoted:

Officials and employees who have reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service,except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case theretention shall not exceed six (6) months.

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr.Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3

Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter ofDirector Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16,1991." 4

Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991,asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed

the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail ofthe benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension hewas asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and veryable to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought"extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office ofthe President." 5 This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.

Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seekingreconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the Presidentreferred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March1992.

In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissedthe appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter'sletter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:

In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue renderingservices as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year servicerequirement under P.D. 1146.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:

1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retireesto complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirementshall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career



service who are regular members of the Government ServiceInsurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period ofnot exceeding one (1) year .

Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for

retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given duecourse. 6 (Emphasis in the original)

On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the CivilService Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil ServiceCommission . 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits,having been separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor'smotion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission.

Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, DavaoCity, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City

Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirementunder P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter topetitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that,under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the part of the City Mayor,but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part,read:

The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the CivilService Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court inthe Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legalopinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil ServiceCommission are one in these opinion that extending you an appointment inorder that you may be able to complete the fifteen-year service requirement isdiscretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor .

Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are thatwe can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may nolonger be able to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, theposition you had vacated was already filled up .

We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on yourrequest. 8 (Emphases supplied)

At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of10 May 1993.

The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting aspecial civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil ServiceCommission. In turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner'sLetter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993relating to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk ofCourt to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal assistancefrom the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10



Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA)and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner GaudencioCena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to completethe fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinarymeaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension . — (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paidto a member who

(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and

(3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shallbe compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at leastfifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15)years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completedthe fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often beeninvoked in respect of retirement statutes:

Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor ofpersons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims toachieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, securityand well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citationsomitted)

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are)two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service thatmay be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.

The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:

TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THENATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNEDAND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete theFifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes .

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the CivilService Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policiesand guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to completethe fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:



1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsoryretirees to complete the fifteen (15) years servicerequirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanentappointees in the career service who are regular members ofthe Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall

be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year .

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsoryretiree to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirementfor retirement who entered the government service at 57 yearsof age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him orher, shall no longer be granted.

3. Any request for the extension of service to complete thefifteen (15) years service requirement of retirement shall befilled not later than three (3) years prior to the date of

compulsory retirement.

4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsoryretiree who meets the minimum number of years of service forretirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months onlywith no further extension.

This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphasessupplied)

The second administrative issuance — Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of thePresident, dated 14 June 1988 — provides:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/orretention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 years , despite the strict conditions provided for inMemorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.

WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere morestrictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, inextremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 yearsto six (6) months only.

WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or onthe retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached thecompulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Officials or employees who have reached the compulsoryretirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in theservice, except for extremely meritorious reasons in whichcase the retention shall not exceed six (6) months .

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of thegovernment including government-owned or controlled corporations, are



hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with thiscircular.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

ByauthorityofthePresident

(Sg

d.)

CATALINOMACARAIG,JR.ExecutiveSecretary

Manila, June 14, 1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Medialdea, J . resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulationsby, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly,by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable tothe case of Gaudencio T. Cena.

We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27.Medialdea, J. wrote:

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in thenature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle thatadministrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particulardepartment must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should befor the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v.Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v.Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42



SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . .. The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an employeewho has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, buthas less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service MemorandumCircular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has

no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to becarried into effect . The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, notmerely a mode of carrying it into effect . The Civil Service Commission has nopower to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that Cena , in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27,took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by anadministrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted withthis Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde , 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-

delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, thelatter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules andregulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for thereason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) toanticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may bemet in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulationshould be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulationbe not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the lawprescribes . 18 (Emphasis supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez , 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order whichestablished passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test(NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines,said:

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule makingauthority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Educationare necessarily broad and highly abstract . As explained by then Mr. JusticeFernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]) —

The standards may be either expressed or implied . If theformer, the non-delegation objection is easily met. TheStandard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. Itcould be implied from the policy and purpose of the actconsidered as a whole . In the Reflector Law, clearly thelegislative objective is public safety . What is sought to beattained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads."

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section1 of the 1959 Medical Act: " the standardization and regulation of medicaleducation " and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statuteitself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with therequirements of the non-delegation principle . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasispartly in the original and partly supplied)



In Edu v. Ericta , 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general natureof the standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes ofcompliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making:

This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public

welfare," (Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547[1917]); "necessary in the interest of law and order," (Rubi v. ProvincialBoard, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of thecase," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602[1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statuteto be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing orenabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need(or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the

inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respectof any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making byadministrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably;demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulationsare germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This isthe test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the presentCivil Service law — found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 — and not alone P.D. No.1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For thematter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is anarea that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This iscrystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides,in relevant part, as follows:

Sec. 12 Powers and Functions . — The [Civil Service] Commission shall havethe following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effectthe provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws ;

(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the CivilService and adopt plans and programs to promote economical,efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative tothe development and retention of a qualified and competent work force inthe public service;



xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel mattersin the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age ;

xxx xxx xxx

(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials andemployees , and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications forretirement ;

xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnelagency and such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasissupplied)

It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that theCivil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, theCommission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered topromulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effectivepersonnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its function of"administering the retirement program for government officials and employees" and of"evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement ."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code withproviding leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and

efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the " enforcement of theconstitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation forthe effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees "(Section 16 [14]).

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of serviceafter an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship oris not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. Thephysiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are infact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individualpersons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting themaximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized byGriño-Aquino, J . in her dissenting opinion in Cena :

Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commissionthat extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) yearwould: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and ineffect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age ;(2)delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees ; and(3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil serviceapplicants who have already passed the various government examination butmust wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed themandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their governmentservice to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-agepension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).



Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, initself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there shouldbe countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other governmentemployees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitationestablished in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and

inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. Anemployee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65)can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement atage sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.

The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administrationand management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered togetherwith the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission . 25 Toledo involved the provisions ofRule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP)which prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above ingovernment service without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil ServiceMemorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years ofage may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the governmentservice so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications notpossessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannotbe filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledowas appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the Commission onElections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointmenthad been obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil ServiceCommission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid down in Section 22 ofRule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III onthe same exceedingly restrictive view of permissible administrative legislationthat Cena relied on. 26

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena , very strange resultsfollow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may beappointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of hisservice for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79) . The neteffect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65)years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policymay be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in thegovernment service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed asbroadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our populationis below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy ofour people which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people inNorthern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent:that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph(1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must,accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, theholding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested withdiscretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employeewho has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of

government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with theprovisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.



We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of theOffice of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp.11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that ofMemorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age

of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of government service. Wenoted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officersand employees who have both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) andcompleted the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted thisMemorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employeeswho have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years ofgovernment service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed tocomplete fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No.65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to thatMemorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today reached in the instant case,this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter .

We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service MemorandumCircular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No.65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.

Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and sohold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal ofpetitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991,must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED forlack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of thePresident of the Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision of the Office of thePresident, dated 23 October 1991, declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15October 1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying petitioner's motion forreconsideration of said decision.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal TechnologicalColleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October 1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979,petitioner was the appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion toPresident of the same college on 1 May 1979.



After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy resignationas President of the Rizal Technological Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March1986. A day before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied for sickleave.

On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang"Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and wasthereafter appointed its President on 29 March 1989.

After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from theGovernment Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extendher services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65)years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146(Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner wasadvised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) yearsservice requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension

retirement plan. The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number of years of service on the date of hersupposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was only twelve (12)years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only claim one hundred percent(100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or to arefund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. 1

On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through DeputyExecutive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President ofEARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service afterreaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. 2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaintagainst petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointmentand for graft and corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the Office ofthe President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an answerthereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigationof the charges against petitioner. Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner wasplaced under preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. 3 After serving theperiod of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President ofEARIST.

In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cariño recommended the compulsoryretirement of petitioner. 4

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, 5 an Ad-HocCommittee was created by President Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed theirrespective pleadings and hearings in the case were conducted by the committee.

Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was detailed with theDECS Central Office pursuant to a memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by DeputyExecutive Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibitionand mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her



reinstatement as EARIST President. After trial, said petition was dismissed. On appeal, theCourt of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2 April 1991. 6

Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office, before the CivilService Commission (CSC). On 30 July 1991, the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She

moved for reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3 December 1991,which prompted petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R.No. 103271. On 3 March 1992, this Court dismissed said petition.

After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision 7 dated23 October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint againstpetitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of the Presidentalso declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October1991, holding that:

... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months)

were to be added to the respondent's creditable service, together with theperiod of two (2) weeks which the respondent's counsel admits in hisMemorandum the respondent had served as Professorial Lecturer, therespondent should be considered as compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15, 1991,having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about the saiddate after reaching the age of 65.

Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for heralleged "irregular appointment and graft and corrupt practices" are herebydismissed. However, Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorilyretired from the service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with theprovisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1146, havingcompleted fifteen (15) years in the government service on or about he saiddate after reaching the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989. 8

In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact dateof her retirement. On 5 November 1991, petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exactdate of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992. 9

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President,assailing the portion of its decision declaring her as compulsorily retired from the service asof 15 October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of hercompulsory retirement from the government service.

In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was deniedby the Office of the President. In the same resolution, the Office of the President clarifiedthat there was an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the government byfailure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working days during which petitioner went on sickleave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986) and the period of two (2) weeks during whichpetitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner as compulsory retired asof 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held that it merely resolved motu proprio toshorten by three-and-a-half (3-1/2) months the extension granted to petitioner to completethe required fifteen (15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It further declared that itis for the President to determine whether or not petitioner could still continue as EARISTPresident despite her exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.



Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one ofthe benefits provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. Amember who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at least sixty (60)years old when separated from the service, is entitled to a basic monthly pension for life butfor not less than five (5) years. On the other hand, a member who has rendered less than

fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of service and is sixty (60) yearsof age when separated from the service is entitled to a cash payment equivalent to onehundred percent (100%) of the average monthly compensation for every year of service.

However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five (65)years with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years ofservice, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15) years, 11 toavail of the old-age pension benefit.

To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensationfor services performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his entry into the

retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of allconditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by publicemployees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation inpublic office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective inestablishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employmentand render faithful and efficient service while so employed. 12 Retirement laws are liberallyinterpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance andhopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning hislivelihood. 13 The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law inorder that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees maybeenhanced. 14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five(65) years, she had rendered less than the required fifteen (15) years of service underSection 11 of P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension benefit, she wasallowed to continue in the service and her term as President of EARIST was extended untilshe shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement, or for an additional two(2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days, as determined by the Office of thePresident.

This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the Office of thePresident. In resolving the administrative complaint against petitioner, the Office of thePresident, ruled not only on the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner and ofgraft and corrupt practices, but went further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension ofservice granted to petitioner on the ground that the latter had already completed the fifteen(15) years service requirement under P.D. 1146, and declared petitioner as compulsorilyretired as of 15 October 1991.

In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. However, theOffice of the President made a new computation of petitioner's period of service with thegovernment, the Office of the President included as part of her service the sixty-two (62)days sick leave applied for by petitioner covering the period between 20 March to 17 June1988 and her service as a lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new computation, petitioner's extension of service

which was supposed to end in January 1992 was reduced by the Office of the President bythree-and-a-half (3 1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.



On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement ofpetitioner fell on 14 August 1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner bythe Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days whichbrought her services only up to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to completethe fifteen (15) years service requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the Office of

the President to shorten the extension of service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2)months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service as lecturer, would further reducepetitioner's service with the government. Such reduction from petitioner's service woulddeprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension plan, based on thecomputation of the GSIS.

We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determinewhether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. 16 Thecomputation of a member's service includes not only full time but also part time and otherservices with compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations prescribedby the System. 17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986and her part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be consideredas part of her service with the government and it is only but proper that her service record beamended to reflect said period of service.

We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirementfailed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which wasnot reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2)months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30April 1992.

The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15October 1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in the service until shehas completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of 16 October1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to beable to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was prepared to renderservices for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should, therefore, the entitled to allher salaries, benefits and other emoluments during said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April1992). However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her former position to enable her tocomplete the fifteen (15) year service requirement for retirement purposes is no longerpossible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service requirement asof 30 April 1992.

WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated 23 October1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE.Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in the service as President of EARIST from 16October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and otheremoluments of said office from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she isdeclared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for having reached age 65 years while inthe service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to her compliance with allapplicable regulations and requirements of the GSIS.

SO ORDERED.



JESUS D. AGUJA , petitioner,vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., respondents.

Ariel F. Aguirre, Roberto Y. Mabulay and Cesar R. Vidal for GSIS.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioner, as a pauper litigant, seeks the review of the Employees' CompensationCommission (ECC) decision dated November 10, 1987 denying his claim for additionalbenefits under P.D. 626, as amended on account of his eye injury.

Jesus D. Aguja worked as a janitor in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer in Libmanan,Camarines Sur. While he was cleaning the office toilet sometime in April, 1979, the bottle of

muriatic acid he was using suddenly fell to the floor, causing the contents to splash all over.Some of the acid hit the petitioner's right eye which caused gradual loss of vision, finallyculminating in blindness. The petitioner's left eye was not blinded, but it contracted pterygiumnasal side with visions of 20/40", per certification of Dr. Delfin M. Rosales, an eye, ear, noseand throat (EENT) specialist in Naga City causing a disturbance of vision. Notwithstandinghis blindness on the right eye, the petitioner continued to work but retired finally from serviceon February 26, 1982.

On the basis of the accident in 1979, the petitioner claimed for compensation benefit with theGSIS. He was awarded temporary total disability benefits from September 5 to 29, 1979 andwas thereafter granted permanent partial disability benefit for a period of twenty five (25)

months.

After receipt of the corresponding monetary benefits from the System, the petitioner askedfor additional benefits on the ground of permanent total disability under PD 626, claiming thathe was also gradually losing vision of his left eye. This was denied by the GSIS on theground that he had already previously received the maximum which could be awarded tohim under the law. Furthermore, the condition of his left eye which allegedly had normalvision did not satisfy the criteria for a grant of permanent total disability benefits.

The petitioner then elevated his case to the ECC which later affirmed the decision of theGSIS on November 10, 1988. (The petitioner was however notified of such decision only onJanuary 8. 1989).

Unaware of the denial of his claim, the petitioner sought the help of this Court praying for theadditional benefits.

Consequently, in a resolution dated February 10, 1988, the Court denied the petition forbeing premature but at the same time directed the ECC to act speedily on the claim pendingwith it.

Later, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Court's resolution attaching to it thedecision of the ECC.

Thus, on June 15, 1988, the Court resolved to reconsider its February 10, 1988 resolutionand revived the case. The respondents, ECC and GSIS were required to file their comments.



On September 15, 1990, the Court issued another resolution, the pertinent portion of whichreads as follows:

Considering the foregoing, the Court Resolved to require petitioner Aguja tosubmit satisfactory medical proof on the condition of his left eye and whether

the same is still capable of treatment and to what extent. Since he is a pauperlitigant who cannot even afford the services of a lawyer, he may go to thenearest government hospital which has a competent eye doctor, present acopy of this Court's resolution, and request for the necessary medicalcertificate. (Rollo, p. 95)

In a later resolution dated November 26, 1990, the Court directed the Public Attorney'sOffice (PAO) to assist the petitioner in this case specifically in obtaining the required medicalcertificate with respect to the condition of the petitioner's left eye necessary for the resolutionof the claim.

The issue now before the Court is whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the additionalcompensation prayed for.

Petitioner Aguja is claiming for additional benefits because "his left eye with PTERYGIUM isslowly and gradually losing sight. As of now, he can not recognize people beyond one (1)meter. It is possible he may also totally lose his vision."

To be entitled to an income benefit for permanent total disability, the following conditionsmust be satisfied:

Section 1. Condition of entitlement . (a) An employee shall be entitled to an

income benefit for permanent total disability if all of the following conditionsare satisfied:

1) He has been duly reported to the System;

2) He sustains the permanent total disability as a result of the injury orsickness; and

3) The System has been duly notified of the injury or sickness which causedhis disability. (Sec. l(a) Rule XI, Amended Rules on Employees'Compensation)

The public respondents denied the petitioner's claim on the basis of the 1985 finding thatonly the right eye was blind at the time while the left eye was not. The respondents ruled thatthe petitioner is not qualified for permanent total disability benefits but only permanent partialdisability which the petitioner has already received.

It must be stressed that the petitioner is claiming for additional benefits because of thegradual loss of vision of his left eye which the public respondents never considered anymorein evaluating his claim.

From the records of the case, there is sufficient basis for granting the petition.

The medical certificate submitted to this Court with respect to the condition of the petitioner'sleft eye reveals the following results:



- CATARACT IMMATURE O.S.

- OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE O.D. WITH IRIDODIALYSIS

O.D. SECONDARY CHEMICAL BURNS

- PTERYGIUM (Rollo, p. 115)

Medical authorities disclose that:

CATARACT IMMATURE - is an opacity of the crystalline eye lens or of itscapsule.

(DORLAND, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Edition, 1965)

- any cataract in the beginning stages, or one which affects only a part of the

lens or its covering.

(MALOY, Medical Dictionary for Lawyers, 2nd edition, 1951).

OCCLUSIO-PUPILLAE - is the closure of the opening in the iris of the eye byformation of an opaque membrane.

IRIDODIALYSIS - is the separation or loosening of the iris from itsattachment.

PTERYGIUM - a triangular fleshy mass of thickened conjunctiva occurring

usually at the inner side of the eyeball, covering part of the cornea andcausing a disturbance of vision. (Dorland, Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24thedition, 1965)

Clearly, from the above findings, the petitioner's left eye is indeed gradually losing vision.The left eye was found to be burned which only goes to show that the present condition canbe traced back to the accident which occurred in April, 1979 and no other. There is noshowing that there was any supervening event which may have caused the blindness of theleft eye. Undeniably, the injury was caused by the splashing of muriatic acid while the janitorwas cleaning the government building's toilet. This accident not only blinded the right eye butalso "compromised" the left eye. According to the medical certificate issued in 1985, a

pterygium was already growing on the nasal side of the left eye. In such a case, the injurycaused on the left eye is considered as work-connected; hence, compensable.

The fact that the aggravation occurred after the petitioner's retirement does not militateagainst his claim for additional benefits. There is no question that the proximate cause of theapparent but gradual loss of vision of the left eye was the accidental fall of the bottle ofmuriatic acid. The presence of secondary chemical burns on the left eye as stated in themedical certificate buttresses the assumption that the injury of the left eye was also causedby the accident in 1979. The causal connection between the resulting disability and thepetitioner's work is beyond civil. In Belarmino v. ECC , 185 SCRA 304 [1990], we stated that:

... Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course ofemployment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewisearises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent



intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct (ILarson Workmen's Compensation Law 3279 [1972]. Simply stated, all themedical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury arecompensable. ( Ibid .)

A person's disability might not emerge at one precise moment in time but rather over aperiod of time (See Jimenez v. ECC, G.R. No. 79193, November 28, 1989, En Banc MinuteResolution). It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary maylater on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally andpermanently disabled from the same cause as in the case at bar. Unfortunately, thepetitioner's permanent disability has further deteriorated affecting also the vision of his lefteye. The aggravation of petitioner's condition arose from the same injury or disability. Thepetitioner was compelled to retire from work on account of the blindness of his right eye.With the gradual loss of vision of his left eye, it would even be more difficult, if not impossiblefor the petitioner to be gainfully employed now. As stated in numerous cases, "total disabilitydoes not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earnwages in the same kind of work or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for oraccustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attachmentscould do. (Abaya v. ECC, 176 SCRA 507 [1989]; Orlino v. ECC, G.R. No. 85015, March29,1990 En Banc Minute Resolution, Marcelino v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 47 SCRA 343[1972]; Landicho v. WCC and Canlubang Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA 147 [1979]) To deny thepetitioner, the benefits prayed for would certainly be contrary to the liberal andcompassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code (Lazo v.ECC, 186 SCRA 569 [1990].

We hold, therefore, that the petitioner is entitled to a conversion of his disability benefits frompermanent partial to permanent total. The compensation benefits shall be determined inaccordance with Section 5, of Rule XI of the Amended Rules on Employment'sCompensation providing as follows:

For contingencies which occurred before May 1, 1979, the limitation ofP12,000 or 5 years, whichever comes first, shall be enforced.

Since the petitioner has already received income benefits under permanent partial disabilitythe public respondent shall pay only the difference between the two.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Employees' Compensation Commissiondecision dated November 10, 1988 is SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The respondents areordered to pay compensation benefits as stated above.

SO ORDERED,

]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs .MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent .



D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] dated 13 December 2000 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed theDecision [2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City (“trial court”), which held thatMilagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.

The Facts

Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (“Nicolas”) married Milagros Orbiso(“Milagros”) on 10 July 1983. [3] Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he marriedMilagros who was then 43 years old.

On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System(“GSIS”) an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under PresidentialDecree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (“PD1146”). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his solebeneficiary. [4] Nicolas’ last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985. [5] On 31 January1986, GSIS approved Nicolas’ application for retirement “ effective 17 February 1984 ,”granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuitythereafter. [6] Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship

pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spousecontracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualifiedfor the pension. [7] According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than oneyear from his date of retirement on “ 17 February 1984 .”

On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratoryrelief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receivingsurvivorship pension.

On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible forsurvivorship pension. The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including

interest. Citing Articles 115[8]

and 117[9]

of the Family Code, the trial court held thatretirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which thepensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions.Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner acquired through labor, such benefitsare conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 isdeemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Codehas retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.

GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trialcourt. Hence, this petition for review.

In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she

has accepted GSIS’ decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that



she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. [10] Commenting on Milagros’ letter, GSISasserts that the Court must decide the case on the merits. [11]

The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issueinvolves not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who aresimilarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social

justice and public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerousand conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner’s salarydeductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not gratuitous since it is adeferred compensation for services rendered.

The Issues

GSIS raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;

2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;

3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD1146. [12]

The Court’s Ruling

The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:

SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits . When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall beentitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen hereunder.The survivorship pension shall consist of:

(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and

(2) dependent’s pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable inaccordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.

SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiariesshall be entitled to:

(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided , That, at theoption of the beneficiaries, it may be paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided,further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of his death; or

(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and thedependent’s pension; Provided, That, the deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly



support on the member , and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member forsupport. [15]

The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146,which proviso prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if suchdependent spouse married the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualifiedfor the pension (“the proviso”).

We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros’claim, is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is alsodiscriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.

Retirement Benefits as Property Interest

Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to paymonthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annualappropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory onthe government employer to take off and withhold from the employees’ monthly salaries theircontributions and to remit the same to GSIS. [16] The government employer must also remit itscorresponding share to GSIS. [17] Considering the mandatory salary deductions from thegovernment employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but formpart of compensation.

In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is thatemployees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of theterms of employment. [18] The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensateservice to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of

emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service.Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of theirlives in the service of their country. [19]

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires avested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. [20] Retirees enjoy aprotected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. [21] Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become dueas provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. [22] No law can deprivesuch person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice andopportunity to be heard. [23]

In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits tosurvivors of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, thedependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widow’s right toreceive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband’scontractual compensation. [24]

Denial of Due Process

The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that“[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” The proviso is unduly oppressive inoutrightly denying a dependent spouse’s claim for survivorship pension if the dependent



· introducing sickness income benefits

· extending compulsory membership to allgovernment employees irrespective of status [25]

The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the

deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economiceffects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner. [26]

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor’s benefitsunder a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should havemarried the employee for a certain period before the employee’s death to prevent shammarriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code whichrestricts survivor’s annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a stateemployee for at least one year before the employee’s death. TheIllinois pension systemclassifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member’s death and thosemarried one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse riskselection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension systemmarries another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The StateEmployee’s Retirement System of Illinois, [27] the Appellate Court of Illinois held that suchclassification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relationto the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guaranteesof due process and equal protection.

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty

of the equal protection of the law.[28]

The requirements for a valid and reasonableclassification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to thepurpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must applyequally to all members of the same class. [29] Thus, the law may treat and regulate one classdifferently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences todistinguish one class from another. [30]

The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminatesagainst the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three yearsbefore the pensioner qualified for the pension. [31] Under the proviso, even if the dependentspouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner’s death, thedependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place

within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition isvague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purposeintended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. Ifthe purpose of the proviso is to prevent “ deathbed marriages ,” then we do not see why theproviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pensionand not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantialdistinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within threeyears before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily forfinancial convenience to avail of pension benefits.

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reasonCongress deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (“RA 8291”), [32] otherwise known asthe “Government Service Insurance Act of 1997,” the law revising the old charter of GSIS(PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the



member immediately before the member’s death is still qualified to receive survivorshippension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely toreceive the benefit. [33]

Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within threeyears before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail ofsurvivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorshippension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within threeyears before the member’s retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether thesurviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matterof evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudicesthe legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted thesocial legislation.

WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for beingviolative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law theproviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that “thedependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner iscontracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.” TheGovernment Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclarosfor survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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