Guatemala’s Marlin Gold Mine:

Suggestions to rectify its most serious errors

Revised: 17 September 2012

Comments & corrections please to: Rbtgoodland@gmail.com

Table of Contents Page

1. Introduction 22. The Marlin Mine and its Issues 22.1 The Questionable Role of IFC 42.2 Indigenous Peoples 72.3 The Sustainability Issue 102.4 The Cyanide Issue 112.5 Benefits to Guatemala 172.6 The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 113. Remedies and Accountability 183.1 Environmental and Social Corrective Action Plan 18

Acknowledgements 21Chronology 21Guide to further information and sources cited 30 Abbreviations and Acronyms 39

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1. Introduction

Mining in remote, weakly governed, and conflict-prone sites is inherently risky (Goodland, 2012). The two most controversial mines in Latin America are Guatemala’s Marlin mine and Peru’s Conga mine. Minewatch predicts that the August 2012 Peruvian Government’s suspension of the $5 billion Conga copper and gold mine means the project is effectively dead. Despite the widespread violence, shootings, martial law, and state-of-emergency, the World Bank Group is financing both Conga and Latin America’s largest gold mine, the controversial Yanacocha mine nearby.1

The Marlin gold mine, Guatemala’s largest, is similar to the Conga gold mine in many ways. Both Peru and Guatemala lack effective governance in the remote areas where these mines are located; both mines are in conflict-prone regions. Despite shootings, killings and severe injuries at the hands of the military, both mines received approbation of high project quality from the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). Both mines are owned by foreign companies: Conga’s owner, Newmont Mining Corp., is based in Denver, Colorado; Marlin’s owner, Goldcorp Inc., is in Vancouver, Canada. Both corporations are among the wealthiest gold producers on the planet; both have long track records of wreaking massive environmental and social impacts. The impacts of both mines on the local communities (shootings, beatings) have been so terrifying to the protestors that they are willing to face armed military in order to protect their families and livelihoods. This paper briefly outlines the issues of the Marlin mine and proposes how Goldcorp could take six steps to adopt best practices of responsible mining to reduce its social and environmental impact while continuing to make a profit.

2. The Marlin Mine and its Issues

The chronology of events surrounding the Marlin mine is listed at the end of this paper. Marlin obtained its operating permit from Guatemala’s Ministry of Mines (MEM) in 2003 soon after its environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) was approved. Local protests against Marlin began in 2003, intensified in 2004, and continue to this day. Marlin’s feasibility study was completed in June 2004, the same month that impacted people sent a formal complaint to the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

1 Mineweb, mineweb.com/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page34?oid=157590&sn=Detail&pid=110649. In addition, the World Bank Group/IFC owns about $15 million shares in Lonmin, the operator of the Marikana platinum mine in South Africa, where at least 34 mine workers were shot in the back and 77 wounded in mid-August 2012 by armed forces. The government charged protesters with murder; but the charges were subsequently withdrawn. Civil society urges the WBG to revise its investment in this project, and its approach to supporting extractive industries (e.g., Guatemala Marlin, Peru Conga and South Africa Marikana mines), as strongly advocated by the independent Extractive Industry Review of the World Bank Group’s oil, gas and mining portfolio.

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Comments by IFC board members at their June 23, 2004 meeting reportedly included a warning to IFC staff about the mine’s stiff popular opposition, especially by very poor and vulnerable ethnic Mayan Indigenous Peoples, and about seemingly meager development benefits for Guatemala, with a caution to IFC staff that the region was simmering in a fraught post-conflict stage, and that the World Bank/IFC sponsored Extractive Industry Review had urged the Bank Group not to finance extractive projects under these circumstances. Other groups inside Guatemala and elsewhere reinforced these warnings. However, IFC rejected the warnings and judged the project to be “excellent,” stating, “We believe that the company has been a good corporate citizen,” (IFC, 2004). IFC financed Marlin in November 2004.

IFC’s support for the project was partly based on three key decisions, all of which are questionable: (a) an assessment that an impermeable liner to reduce the risks of leakage of cyanide tailings was not necessary, although eliminating the liner was contrary to standard practice, (b) agreement with Glamis Gold, Marlin’s owner at the time, that the company’s consultations with the Indigenous People had been adequate, and (c) a judgment that Glamis’s ESIA was adequate.

These rulings led to a 40-day strike by impacted Indigenous Peoples who blockaded the main highway to the mine from December 2004 and January 2005. Hundreds of military police and soldiers shot into the crowd at Los Encuentros, killing some and wounding many. Between January and February 2005, three or more formal complaints were sent to the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the IFC’s Office of Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO). In a referendum in the impacted community of Sipacapa with 98 percent of voters participating, voted against Marlin. By December 2005, concern had intensified so much that a delegation of impacted Indigenous Peoples and others met with the World Bank Group president. Less than a year later, IFC decided that its “excellent” project was actually so risky that it irreversibly severed all ties with Marlin. Goldcorp bought out Glamis in 2006.

Goldcorp must have been aware of Marlin’s troubled history before the purchase. Once the trust of impacted people has been shattered, such as by shootings, beatings, and death threats, it is difficult to restore. The only way a new owner could restore a relationship with local peoples is to foster dialog and rectify or compensate all errors of the previous corporation. Commendably, Goldcorp agreed to supply potable water to impacted communities, whose water sources were polluted by the mine. Unfortunately, there has been no discussion of the cyanide liner, no move to rectify the grossly deficient ESIA, no move to comply with UN ILO’s Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People, under which the Guatemalan government agreed to consult Indigenous People ahead of any mining exploration or exploitation activities. Nor has Goldcorp stated a goal to achieve free, prior and informed consultation -- or even better, consent -- as later mandated by UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007, and now adopted by IFC.

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2.1 The Questionable Role of IFC

IFC is said to be part of the “Knowledge Bank”; its financing is claimed to be akin to a seal of good housekeeping or a token of reasonable design and quality. Yet IFC’s financial relationships between Peru’s Yanacocha and Conga mines, South Africa’s Marikana Mine massacre, and, as will be clarified below, with Guatemala’s Marlin mine suggests that IFC is involved in highly questionable mining projects.2 Comments from IFC board members reportedly included warnings to IFC3 staff of the major risks and deficiencies of the Marlin mine project before its approval in 2004. Similarly, many other entities alerted IFC to the potential for grave damages to the Indigenous Peoples surrounding the mine site, as well as the enormous environmental impacts. Although IFC officially adopted free prior informed consent (FPIC) (Swiderska et al. 2012) much later, it could have urged Marlin to follow ILO’s Convention 169 on indigenous consultations. Instead, IFC let Glamis, the borrower, get away with inadequate consultation, which IFC financing made mandatory, in the face of widespread local opposition to the mine. It was questionable, or perhaps even illegal, for IFC to have submitted this project for board approval before the environmental and social assessment (ESIA) was received.

When the ESIA finally arrived, IFC judged it to be “excellent,” although it was clearly flawed. It should have been judged unacceptable and rejected until a reliable ESIA could be prepared.

As this was IFC’s first project since the 2001-2004 independent World Bank Group’s Extractive Industry Review (EIR),4 IFC should have used the EIR report to scrutinize the

2 IFC proposes to finance Mongolia’s controversial Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold mine, with Rio Tinto and the Canadian Ivanhoe Mines as proponents. Construction began in 2010; production is scheduled for 2013-4. The environmental and social impact assessment seems to have had no role in project design as it was produced when construction was almost complete -- in mid-2012. IFC has ruled that most impacted people, nomadic sheep-herders, are not a vulnerable minority, so their consent to the project need not be sought. Their removal or treatment will not need their consent as required under UNDRIP and ILO’s Convention 169. If any nomads are in the way of the mine, force will be used to clear the way. This suggests that IFC is undermining the ESIA process and other UN requirements, which is far from best practice.

3 IFC is the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. The CAO addresses only IFC work. Moran (2005) and Holt-Gimenez (2005a,b) minutely analyze the deficiencies of CAO’s 2005 Marlin report.

4 See the World Bank, Extractive Industries Review Reports: “Striking a Better Balance”, web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/0,contentMDK:20306686~menuPK:592071~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:336930~isCURL:Y,00.html, 6 vols + Annexes. Also see: go.worldbank.org/T1VB5JCV61. The 2000-2004 independent “Extractive Industry Review” of the World Bank Group’s oil, gas and mining portfolio was led by H.E. Minister Emil Salim. In the interest of fair disclosure, I was honored to serve as his technical director.

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mine. EIR emphasizes that extractive industries should not be sited in conflict zones. IFC’s first major mining project, Peru’s Yanacocha gold mine, the biggest in Latin America, said by IFC to be a new green breed of successful mining projects, had led to killings, violence, strikes, and recently to the imposition of martial law.

What is the Marlin Mine?

Marlin is Guatemala’s biggest gold mine. The mine spans the boundary of two municipalities – San Miguel Ixtahuacan (SMI) and Sipacapa, both within the San Marcos Department. About 87 percent of the mine property is currently in San Miguel, with about 13 percent in Sipacapa, some 300 km by road from Guatemala City. The elevation of the site ranges from 1,800 to 2,300 m above sea level.

Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A, of Guatemala City, discovered the Marlin deposit in 1998. Francisco Gold Corporation of British Colombia, Canada purchased Montana Exploradora in 2000, and then merged with Glamis Gold, another Canadian company, in 2002. Glamis brought the mine into production in 2005. Goldcorp, also Canadian, acquired Glamis the following year. Goldcorp is the world’s second-largest gold producer by market value. Montana Exploradora, now a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldcorp, continues to operate the mine.

The project consists of two open pits (1+ km wide and several hundred feet deep) plus an underground mine. The mining operations have removed a mountaintop. The main product is gold, with silver as a by-product. The mine facilities also include an ore processing facility using cyanide vat-leaching, a smelter, a tailings storage facility (TSP) including a dam and pond, and a waste rock facility.

Open pit mining will cease production in 2012, but tunnel mining is expected to continue until about 2018. Marlin produced 382,400 ounces of gold in 2011, generating $900 million in revenue. The gold price now exceeds $1,600 per ounce.

Later, in 2005, IFC’s CAO commendably judged Marlin’s ESIA to be deficient in certain aspects, but by then it was too late. CAO found that Glamis had "interacted extensively" with local communities. However, "public disclosures prepared by the company – including the environmental and social assessment were highly technical and did not at the time have sufficient information to allow for an informed view of the likely adverse impacts of the project." Goldcorp did not seek to upgrade the ESIA. By the time the United Nations ILO (February 2010), InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights (May, 2010) and the Guatemalan government (June, 2010) all officially called for suspension of the Marlin mine, IFC and CAO had severed all ties with Goldcorp, hence no longer had the leverage of a major financier to prevent violence and other adverse impacts.

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The Marlin Mine Controversy is Polarized:Goldcorp’s side of the story

Goldcorp denies most of the social and environmental grievances of the surrounding communities on which this paper focuses. In “Dispelling the Myths of Marlin,”5 a long press release issued July 13, 2012, Goldcorp responds to 11 allegations and presents its side of the issues outlined here. Gradually – through the years – Goldcorp is starting to remedy some of its shortcomings, but it is still a long way from meeting the standards of a good-practice corporation. For example, it was not until 2012 that Goldcorp said it will – at an unspecified date in the future – design and publish mine closure plans and back them up with realizable, financial surety bonds big enough to cover closure and reclamation. Similarly, after protesters were shot, killed, and injured in 2005, it took Goldcorp five years to publish a Human Rights Assessment,6 which still fails to mention the most important step of complying with UNDRIP’s free prior informed consent (FPIC) requirement. The World Bank Group’s IFC now complies with FPIC.

CAO’s 2005 evaluation identifies a series of faults and flaws in social and environmental procedures on the part of both Goldcorp and the IFC. It also notes the Guatemalan government’s lack of regulatory capacity to control the mining sector (Holt-Gimenez & Spang, 2005). The CAO’s strongest criticisms were reserved for the IFC, which the CAO claimed has not been rigorous in its evaluation or supervision of the project: 5 Dispelling the Myths of Marlin, http://www.goldcorp.com/default.aspx?SectionId=10c11b86-a3a4-41d5-a716-0796f2fbd6ea&LanguageId=1&PressReleaseId=9364a16c-fa20-42a1-b5ca-88f9435f2746. See also: Goldcorp president Chuck Jeannes defending Goldcorp’s mining practices at its Marlin mine at the annual general meeting on 5 September 2012, saying it is applying the same environmental and human rights standards in Guatemala as it does in mines in Canada and the United States, at http://potomodel.com/goldcorp-president-defends-mining-practices.htm. See also: “We are proud of Goldcorp's record of safe, responsible operations at Marlin, and of the positive contributions it has brought to the area and to the country. We welcome this opportunity to demonstrate once again our commitment to operating responsibly and with complete transparency on behalf of all stakeholders…… Goldcorp and its employees have continued to operate Marlin mine to the highest standards, with an abiding commitment to the responsible stewardship of the environment and to the human rights of the people in communities near Marlin.” Chuck Jeannes, Goldcorp President and Chief Executive Officer, 06/09/10.

6 Goldcorp, June 30, 2012, “Goldcorp to Implement Human Rights Assessment Recommendations;

Commits to Integrate Human Rights in Business Process,” press release. goldcorp.com/default.aspx?SectionId=10c11b86-a3a4-41d5-a7160796f2fbd6ea&LanguageId= 1&Press ReleaseId =32de7bce-a7ab-4806-942c-95a67e13687e

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The basis on which the IFC determined that the ESIA was adequate is not clear. At the time of this assessment no documentation was made available that reflects that any detailed and specific consideration had been given to how the IFC has and will ensure that the project complies with each of the applicable IFC polices and other basic procedural requirements—such as the requirements for dam safety plans. IFC documentation does not systematically define how concerns are raised in early reviews of the ESIA, or even during the appraisal itself, are monitored to insure implementation. The situation is not helpful in the context of the current conflict, because many of the external observers look to IFC to demonstrate a high level of scrutiny to ensure that IFC requirements for ESIA are met. (p. 20, emphasis added.)

The 2005 CAO report emphasized that the IFC waived the requirement to have a finalized plan for management of dangerous materials and for emergency cases completed before the Bank disbursed the first loan tranche in 2004. The IFC also failed to establish criteria for, or recognize the necessity of, performing new EIAs for the cumulative impacts associated with widely known plans for the expansion of the Marlin mine beyond the scope of the original project. Additionally, the IFC did not specify how it would regulate the closure of the mine (Holt-Gimenez & Spang 2005). Moran (2005) notes that the “The CAO has also discounted the chances for development of acid rock drainage (ARD) from the 43 million tons of waste rock.”

2.2 Indigenous Peoples

Goldcorp is familiar with Indigenous Peoples living around its mines. Goldcorp’s first mine in Canada, Red Lake mine in Ontario – Canada’s biggest – opened in 1949. The impacted stakeholders, almost all Indigenous Peoples, had no agreement with Goldcorp at the time and claim to have received minimal net economic benefits from the mine. Rather than expecting economic benefits, Sheikh (2012) notes that native Canadians fear the mining boom, as do Indigenous Peoples impacted by Goldcorp’s overseas mines (e.g., Bacon, 2012).

In 2010, severe economic and racial inequality ranked Guatemala 116th out of 169 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010). Guatemala ranks 120 th

out of 182 nations on Transparency International’s Corruption Index.7 Most of Guatemala’s population lives in poverty, which is rising with recent economic crises. From 1960 to 1996, Guatemala’s 36-year civil war claimed the lives of more than 250,000 Indigenous People. The United Nations-sponsored Truth Commission found that the government of Guatemala committed acts of genocide. The Altiplano, including San Marcos, suffered the most intense violence. “Is it proper to benefit from over half a

7 Transparency International Corruption Index, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/

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century of repression, violence, destruction, and elimination of democracy?" Noam Chomsky asks in the video “Extraction.”8

Related to the UN-brokered 1996 Peace Accords between the government of Guatemala, the country’s armed forces, and the protesters was the signing and ratification of the ILO’s Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People. ILO Convention 169 grants Guatemala’s Indigenous Peoples rights to decide their own development priorities and specifically safeguards their rights to the “use, management and conservation” of natural resources pertaining to their lands. When subsurface resources are owned by the state, as in Guatemala, ILO 169 calls for the government to consult Indigenous People ahead of any mining exploration or exploitation activities. IFC’s own policies mandated that Indigenous Peoples be consulted in a free, prior and informed manner. Commendably, this was later strengthened to free prior informed consent (FPIC). In the case of Marlin mine, the consultation with local people was a charade devoid of detailed information according to the local Indigenous People which riled the Indigenous Peoples. Goldcorp doesn’t even mention adopting FPIC, although it is now mandated by IFC as part of the official UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), ratified by Canada and Guatemala. UNDRIP was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, strengthens and reaffirms ILO Convention 169.

The Marlin mine straddles the towns of San Miguel Ixtahuacan (SMI) and Sipacapa. Mayan-Mams and Mayan-Sipacapense Indigenous Peoples populate SMI. SMI consists of a municipal capital, 17 villages and 43 communities for a total population of about 37,000; Sipacapa has about 14,000 residents in 12 villages and 19 communities. The people in the bordering communities live literally on or near the edge of the mine. A primary school overlooks the mine’s tailings pond.

Poverty rates in SMI and Sipacapa are very high: 97.5 percent of the population lives in poverty and 80 percent in absolute poverty (Van de Sandt, 2009). The major industry is subsistence farming: inhabitants grow corn and beans and keep livestock on land held by individual families but that forms part of the collective property of the community. Infertile soils and little irrigation infrastructure, mean that agricultural income is very low and is supplemented by seasonal labor in coastal sugar cane and coffee plantations.

As a condition of its loan, the IFC commendably required Glamis to hold consultations with local communities in SMI and Sipacapa.9 About 3,000 people participated in a series 8 See Beth Geglia and Cyril Mychalejko, “Goldcorp on Trial: First ever peoples health tribunal shows commonalities throughout MesoAmerica,” September 5, 2012, Toward Freedom, www.towardfreedom.com/home/americas/2963-goldcorp-on-trial-first-ever-peoples-health-tribunal shows -commonalities-throughout-mesoamerica. See also www.gprojectfilm.org/video/.

9 Moran (2005) notes the unavailability of key information to the impacted stakeholders: The dates on essentially all of these (ESIA) documents are in 2004 and 2005, well after the Marlin ESIA was accepted by the Guatemalan government. Thus, none of this information was available to the public during the public discussion period. Hence, the public and Guatemalan government were required to make their decisions

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of informational workshops, which the company interpreted as signaling a high level of popular endorsement. Many residents, however, had deep objections to the mine and perceived the workshops as unilaterally informing them about a “done deal,” rather than seeking consultation or providing an assessment of potential environmental and social impacts. Tensions erupted in January 2005 when a group of mine protestors made up of indigenous, environmental, religious and farmer groups confronted trucks carrying equipment to the mine. One protestor was killed and 16 wounded (Stevenson, 2005).

In March 2005, communities in Sipacapa filed a complaint with IFC’s CAO raising concerns that the Marlin mine would reduce access to and contaminate local water supplies. The complaint also alleged that the project was being developed without adequate consultation. As of late 2012, relations between the impacted Indigenous Peoples and the mining corporation were few and fraught. When, at the July 2012 tribunal, impacted people in Sipacapa and SMI were asked if there were open lines of communication with Goldcorp, the answer was negative.

Although Goldcorp managed it, the 2010 shareholder-requested human rights review of Marlin highlighted the gap between Goldcorp’s public commitment to international corporate and social responsibility (CSR) standards and its incorporation of those standards into company policies. Goldcorp says it ‘‘implements’’ international standards at the mine without formally adopting them, which limits board of directors’ accountability and oversight, and avoids the requirements for external auditing that come with formal adoption of international standards. (On Common Ground Consultants Inc., 2010, p. 214; Slack, 2012).

Apart from those already mentioned, some of the most severe social impacts10 of the mine include:

1. Conflict both in the communities and within families between those in favor and those against the mine; the type of ‘divide-and-conquer’ strategy of low quality mining companies worldwide. For example, families with commonly one son employed by the mine may be riven. 2. A huge increase in alcohol consumption since mine opening. The number of cantinas has risen from one to 50 today. This is accompanied by an increase in violence against women. 3. Rampant prostitution, which didn't exist before mine opening. The rise in prostitution and HIV/AIDS is closely related to the arrival of male and paid employees from elsewhere who are single or who come to the mine without their families.

to approve, reject or modify this project without the benefit of some of the most relevant data. Hence the public review process was severely biased.

10 Fide: Morna Macleod, personal communication, September 2012.

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Normally, good-practice mines worldwide have a grievance system, often with toll-free hotlines, e-mail addresses, letter drop boxes, information centers, regular meetings between the company and the impacted people, and an annual report of dialog, grievances, and remedies. Good-practice corporations ensure that grievance mechanisms conform fully to principles outlined in the United Nation’s “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework to ensure that that they are legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent and compatible with internationally recognized human rights standards.11 This is amplified in the UN Special Rapporteur’s August 16, 2012 report on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and in the July 16, 2012 UN Expert Mechanism statement on the rights of Indigenous Peoples relating to extractive industries.12

Marlin’s seven information centers will be useful when trust has been regained so that impacted people start to use them. Goldcorp notes that a single grievance was reported in 2009, the most recent year I can find as reported. There are few meaningful “town hall” meetings, no “round tables,” no football matches, no joint facilities. In its Red Lake mine in Ontario, Goldcorp now offers a joint recreational facility with health clinics, swimming pools, curling, and bowling facilities. Such double standards between domestic and overseas practice are far from good practice. True, Marlin’s impacted stakeholders are terrified of Goldcorp’s security guards and there are accounts of intimidation, rape, and shootings of Indigenous Peoples. Commendably, Goldcorp’s website states: “To send a question or to report a suspected violation of Goldcorp's Code of Conduct, please use the following contact information: Email: ethics.help@goldcorp.com.” But much more proactivity is needed so that impacted Indigenous Peoples without access to e-mail can avail themselves of such opportunities.

Part of the remedy, if Goldcorp wants to repair hostile relationships with impacted communities, is clear and low cost with potentially enormous benefits to both parties: appoint a sympathetic and permanent official, possibly an anthropologist, or human rights professional to foster mutual relationships with impacted stakeholders and stop further intimidation, repression, beatings or shootings of impacted stakeholders. Avoid double standards between Canada and Guatemala. The liaison official should implement systematic, regular, respectful and meaningful dialog with impacted Indigenous Peoples. The company should implement standard processes such as annual

11 United Nations, Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.www.unglobalcompact.org/issues/human_rights/The_UN_SRSG_and_the_UN_Global_Compact.html

12 www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-47_en.pdf; 20 pp. www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-55_en.pdf : 24 pp.

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grievance reports, letter-boxes, hotlines, info centers, joint facilities and joint recreation events.

2.3 The Sustainability Issue

As an extractive industry, mining inherently depletes a stock resource. Metal recycling and efficiency can postpone exhaustion, but cannot make mining sustainable. Utilizing the concept of “weak or quasi-sustainability” (El Serafy, 1996), however, mining can be considered broadly to contribute to sustainable development if economic benefits outweigh social and environmental costs, and if mining revenues are invested in building sustainable industries, enterprises, and productive capacities (e.g., education).

The “weak sustainability” principle, however, posits that different forms of capital (natural, human, physical) are substitutable. In fact, there is some substitutability between the various forms of capital, but not much. Activities can be considered “sustainable” if the overall stock of capital is at least not diminished and preferably augmented. This broader definition suggests that mining can contribute to sustainable development if “it gives rise to long-term net benefits (environmental, social or economic) that equal or exceed the values that existed prior to exploitation” (Amezaga et al, 2011, p. 21). The “net” is important as the social and environmental costs and all the external costs must be subtracted from the benefits. In addition, the “trickle down theory” that some fraction of the benefits accrued by the rich (e.g., recipients of most royalties, profits, and taxes) may eventually trickle down to the impacted people is aspirational.

In the Marlin case, Guatemala’s Asociacion de Investigacion y Estudios Sociales (ASIES) (ASIS, 2010) calculated that the costs of the mine exceed the benefits. Zarsky and Stanley (2012) came to the conclusion that “due primarily to weak governance, the Marlin mine has a poor performance on all five counts (FPIC, government of Guatemala’s share of benefits, local benefits, investment of benefits in development, and mitigation of environmental risks) so that net benefits are likely to be negative.” Even the stated benefits to Guatemala are much lower than normal. The impacts or costs are likely to soar once the ore is depleted yet environmental impacts from the mining continue. Furthermore, the impacted people received little in the way of compensation for the repression and killings.

2.6 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

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Partly because for nearly every impact, there are at least two reports: a positive or defensive one from Goldcorp, and a critical or negative one from the impacted people or their advocates. As expected, most such pairs of reports disagree with each other, with Goldcorp-sponsored reports defending the mine; the others criticizing it (cf: Box 2). It is not the purpose of this paper to adjudicate between conflicting reports. However, the existence of the conflicting reports and strong conflicting opinions, is evidence of the polarization over the Marlin mine.

Water Contamination and Health Effects

Water is the mining sector’s commonest casualty worldwide. The Marlin mine consumes about 2.2 billion liters of water annually. As Guatemala is a severely water deficit nation, the assessment of water should have been the ESIAs central issue. IFC’s CAO found that the ESIA prepared by SRK Consulting for Glamis and judged adequate by the IFC failed to:

• Identify all water users downstream from the mine

• Fully assess the potential for acid mine drainage

• Fully assess the potential for other water contaminants

• Establish water quality standards for beneficial uses.

Responding to the CAO report, the IFC emphasized that a technical annex to the report stated “the fact” that Marlin was unlikely to have a significant environmental impact or pose risks that could not be mitigated in either of the two local communities (World Bank/IFC, 2005).

In 2010, Oxfam America financed E-Tech International to evaluate water quality around the mine and reported that the ESIA “provided limited information on the baseline environmental setting in and around the Marlin Mine” and should have included more information about “water quality, water quantity and levels, and the abundance and health of aquatic biota” (E-Tech, 2010, p. 5). The review also found that the ESIA provided no evidence to support its claim that the “acid generation and contaminant leaching potential of the rocks are low.”

The Pastoral Commission for Peace and Ecology (COPAE), the University of San Carlos, and the Centre for Ocean and Aquaculture (CEMA), in conjunction with the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, has been monitoring water quality around the mine for the past five years. Its fourth report noted high concentration levels of copper, aluminum, manganese, and, in particular, arsenic and nitrates in the Quivichil and Tzalá rivers

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downstream of the mine’s wastewater reservoir, and concluded that such waters are unfit for human consumption.

The Minister of Health and Welfare noted in 2010 that skin diseases were the third most common medical complaint in both SMI and Sipacapa, whereas in the rest of the country they rank tenth. Van de Wauw, Evens and Machiels (2010) of the University of Ghent also found that concentrations of arsenic in some of the groundwater layers serving people living near the mine were above the standard levels for safe drinking water.

Elevated arsenic concentrations were found in the urine of people living close to the mine and the scattered reports of arsenic related diseases [e.g. serious skin problems], as mentioned by the Global Development and Environment Institute. Zarsky & Stanley (2012, 2011) suggest that this aspect was neglected during the ESIA.

E-Tech’s (2010) report warned that “the mine wastes have a moderate to high potential to generate acid and leach contaminants ... into water resources and aquatic ecosystems .. . and tailings seepage may be migrating to the drainage downstream of the tailings dam.”

Broader independent research is necessary prior to further groundwater extraction. The causes and extent of arsenic in groundwater should be further investigated in the region in a participatory manner.

2.4 The Cyanide Issue

Cyanide, a severely toxic chemical used in the gold mining process, can survive in anaerobic conditions for up to 40 years. Cyanide liberates heavy metals such as mercury, arsenic, lead, and cadmium from gold-bearing rocks.

The International Cyanide Management Institute’s "International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, Transport and Use of Cyanide in the Production of Gold" (ICMI Cyanide Code) is a voluntary industry program for the gold mining industry. The ICMI offers gold mining companies a certification process to determine whether they are in compliance with the code, which is renewed every three years. Goldcorp received a certification for Marlin mine in 2009.13

In its comprehensive study, E-Tech International (2010) found evidence that tailings seepage may be migrating cyanide and heavy metals downstream of Marlin’s tailings dam; and that water in the tailings pond exceeds standards. Four other independent studies to date have found evidence that cyanide and/or heavy metals may be seeping 13 Cyanide Code website, Goldcorp, www.cyanidecode.org/signatory_goldcorp.php, see Marline mine, www.cyanidecode.org/pdf/GoldcorpMarlinSumm.pdf.

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into the ground and surface waters surrounding the Marlin mine. Although Goldcorp plans to treat tailings water before discharging it to the environment, the treatment will not address leakage of cyanide and heavy metals into the groundwater (E-Tech, 2010).

Goldcorp dismisses these studies, claiming that its own studies, as well as studies by the Guatemalan government, show that there is no cause for environmental concern (Goldcorp, 2011e). The Guatemalan government has also refused to consider these independent studies as a part of its administrative process to determine whether to implement the IACHR’s precautionary measures.

Lining Tailings Impoundments

The Cyanide Code specifically excludes tailings impoundments, as well as the design and construction of tailings impoundments, as well as the long-term closure and rehabilitation of mining operations. The code is silent on the need for lining the mill tailings or waste lagoons.

Marlin uses only compacted clay in its dams and tailings ponds. Its tailings impoundment will be unlined -- it will have no underseal or liner. 14 According to both the IFC and Montana Exploradora, selected areas in the underlying rock have been pressure grouted, down-gradient of the tailings dam and along the sides, in an attempt to minimize tailings leakage. This is considered an outmoded, cheaper but riskier, technology. The IFC states in its Summary of the Marlin Project (2004) that “Lining the tailings dams is not an option at Marlin due to the mountainous setting of the region.”15 In fact, most modern tailings impoundments constructed in developed countries include some form of liner as standard practice, and they are often constructed in mountainous terrain. Who developed the argument that an unlined tailings impoundment would be acceptable – the mining company or IFC?

All engineered structures, lined or unlined, can leak to some degree. Single layer liners, whether of 6” – 12” of compacted clay/bentonite, asphalt, or synthetic/geofabric/geomembrane sheeting (e.g.: 40-mil HDPE: High density polyethylene) leak sooner than double liners. French drains between the soil subbase and the leach pad are prudent for early detection of the inevitable cyanide leaks. Liners are especially needed in active seismic regions such as the Marlin region, and where the substrate geology is porous (e.g., karst, limestone, or other carbonate rock) and subject to caves, sink-holes, cenotes, fissures, seepage, and underground rivers. In fact, in some

14 According to IFC’s J. M. Swetye, to R.E. Moran, Jan. 7, 2005; See Moran, 2005.

15ifcln001.worldbank.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/60b8beb20d6bdc7285256e610054690a?OpenDocument.

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karstic landscapes, there may be no surface drainage, but only underground drainage channels in which volcanically heated acidic water plays a role.

A major concern that has not been adequately addressed by Goldcorp is the capacity and stability of the tailings dam and pond. A November 2009 technical review by a geo-consultant retained by Marlin’s owners found that “the Marlin tailings dam is approaching the end of its design life” and that “maximum capacity for [the mine’s] crest height will be achieved by about mid-2011” (Robertson, 2009, p. 8). Pond waters that breach the dam will spill into surrounding waters. Robertson listed three options as being “under consideration,” (1) raising the dam to add storage; (2) developing a second tailings impoundment east of the current dam; and (3) dewatering the existing tailings pond (ibid): “the final dam height of 82 meters is a concern since it is an active seismic area” (KP Consulting, 2010, p. 11). During the July 2012 visit, the author saw an apparently new, major cement canal possibly part of a new tailings impoundment, but we were denied entry to the mine site to confirm its purpose.

Earthquakes pose a risk not only to the operation, but also in the post closure phases of the mine. According to geoconsultant Andrew Robertson, “Post closure, the Marlin tailings dam will continue to contain tailings that would liquefy under seismic loadings or a dam breach. It will therefore remain classified as a high hazard dam,” (Robertson, 2009, p. 10).

In addition, it is not clear whether and how Goldcorp is managing the potential for overtopping of the tailings impoundment due to extreme weather events such as floods and cyclones, especially in the context of climate change. The water treatment plant is designed to contain and control water in a “one-in-a-hundred-year” rainfall event over 24 hours (KP Consulting, 2010). According to the UN, Guatemala is one of 10 countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and will become both drier—precipitation is projected to fall by 11-28 percent—and more vulnerable to extreme weather events such as “one hundred year storms” (ECLAC, 2010).

The number of extreme weather events in Guatemala increased dramatically between 1970-1989 and 1990-2008: there were twice as many floods and the number of tropical storms and hurricanes rose from zero to seven. In 2010, Guatemala had the wettest rainy season of the last 60 years, including its deadliest tropical storm, Agatha, in May 2010 (IDB, 2010). An April, 2011 assessment by the World Bank’s Climate Change Team and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery concluded that “overall, the trend over the last 40 years suggests a strengthening of the hydrological and climate cycles, with more intense rain occurring across shorter periods of time that produces greater average precipitation per episode. This trend may continue in the future due to climate change, possibly resulting in a greater frequency or intensity of both floods and droughts” (Climate Change Team, 2011).

Mine Closure Planning

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Goldcorp’s own Human Rights Assessment (HRA) found that Goldcorp’s plans for mine closure was “the weakest aspect” of the management of the Marlin mine and “has the potential to leave the community vulnerable to long-term impacts on human rights” (On Common Ground Consultants, 2010, p. 82).

According to the HRA environmental review (KP Consulting, 2010), the major defects of Goldcorp’s closure plan are:

Short closure period: The closure period is 18 months, when a period of 2-3 years is standard practice. No long-term monitoring and maintenance: The time period for post-closure monitoring and management is very short when there should be “a provision for continued care and maintenance of the facilities for a very long time, often defined as 100+ years” (p.13). Such activities include annual dam inspections, monitoring and treatment of impacted waters until they meet discharge criteria, monitoring and maintenance of tailings pond and waste rock piles, etc. Low cost estimate: The full estimated closure cost of $13.6 million is very low. Besides the absence of long-term monitoring and maintenance costs, the costs of revegetation are low compared to norms. No financial assurance: The only resources available to close the mine in the event of failure for any reason is a $1 million fund voluntarily established by Goldcorp. Financial assurance vehicles such as security bonds, performance bonds, industrial insurance or letters of credit are the standard of good practice for international companies.

Climate change will likely make the post-closure phase of the mine riskier than the operating phase for the communities surrounding Marlin. The combination of increasing aridity and extreme weather events is likely to change local water hydrology in unanticipated ways, increasing the potential for more severe and widespread contamination from acid mine drainage. The western highlands of Guatemala are already at the highest level of risk in terms of three hazards: cyclone mortality, flood mortality, and economic loss from drought (Climate Change Team, 2011). Climate risk is exacerbated by Guatemala’s poor capacities for risk reduction and disaster management.

In every case, Goldcorp seems to have denied or belittled the risk detailed by professionals and has adopted the least-cost response, namely to do nothing in many cases. This suggests that Goldcorp may be socializing the costs and privatizing the profits. As risks burgeon after mine closure, they likely will cause problems for the surrounding Mayan communities for decades or longer – long after Goldcorp has vanished.

ESIA Team

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The choice of the team to undertake the ESIA is critical, in view of the potential for conflict of interest (the team may find it difficult to be critical of its employer, the company). The standard method to avoid or reduce conflict of interest is to create a Panel of Social and Environmental Experts (PoE) of senior professionals more interested in preserving their scientific reputations than in obtaining more consultancies. The PoE helps the company select a reliable ESIA team and helps ensure that the critical scoping stage is reliably completed. This process does not seem to have been followed in the Marlin case.

The ESIA team that Glamis selected, SRK Consulting of Colorado, USA, is a mining engineering consultancy.16 A search of SRK’s site for “Guatemala Marlin” yielded no results so it is difficult to know how proud it is of its Marlin ESIA. SRK’s ESIA for a bauxite mine in Suriname was found woeful by an independent assessment (Goodland, 2009). Despite the fact that that mine was almost surrounded by Indigenous Peoples, SRK denied their existence for many months into the ESIA process, then admitted there were some forest tribes, but insisted that they would not be impacted. It took several years of pressure for SRK admit that the local Amerindians would indeed be impacted and that they should be included in the ESIA.

Goldcorp Banned from Two Sustainability Lists

Goldcorp has positioned itself as a socially responsible mining company (Goldcorp, 2011c). Commendably, the company’s website has a portal for “corporate responsibility” containing the company’s corporate social responsibility, human rights, environmental and sustainability, and health and safety policies, as well as annual sustainability reports and an annual monitoring report prepared specifically for Goldcorp. In addition, Goldcorp commendably supports the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

However, the fact that it has been removed from two industry sustainability lists -- in Toronto and New York – suggests that it does not live up to the principles stated on its website.

In 2008, the Toronto Stock Exchange’s Jantzi Social Index recommended that Goldcorp be declared ineligible for “socially responsible investment” portfolios, citing three concerns:

16 Moran (2005) uncovered some of the provenance of the ESIA. Much of the technical and environmental work presented in the original ESIA document (MEG, 2003) was performed by members of SRK Consulting of Colorado, USA. The most prominent SRK staff on the ESIA team were listed as Patty Acker and Robert Dorey (MEG, 2003, Equipo Consultor Del EIA). The Environmental Audit and Review, (Dorey and Associates, 2005) of the Marlin Project was performed by Dorey’s firm after he left SRK. The audit was reviewed by Patricia Acker, formerly with SRK, under the name Patricia Acker Consulting, L.L.C.

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1. Robust and growing opposition by Indigenous Peoples to the Marlin mine based inter alia on the mine’s environmental impacts.

2. The company’s failure to adequately address health concerns associated with its Honduras operations.

3. The fact that it had the highest level of environmental fines among mining companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

In addition, in September 2011, Goldcorp was removed from the Dow Jones North America Sustainability Index, amidst ongoing allegations of human rights violations and evidence of environmental contamination in communities affected by Goldcorp’s mining activities.

2.5 Benefits to Guatemala

The Marlin mine is Goldcorp’s cheapest operations site,17 partly because mitigation and prudentiary measures are not being adequately implemented. At $192 per ounce, cash costs of production at the Marlin mine in 2009 were 35 percent below Goldcorp’s 2009 average of $295 per ounce. The Marlin mine is contributing little to sustainable development in Guatemala. Although it is currently the largest single taxpayer in Guatemala, Marlin’s fiscal contribution will terminate when the mine closes; the same time as when the impacts may burgeon. Marlin’s lack of transparency and accountability suggests that little of the royalty and tax revenue has been invested in public goods such as education, health, infrastructure and especially agriculture that build sustainable productive capacities. Goldcorp’s social investment seems to be low and stagnant, meaning that even weak or quasi sustainability will not be achieved. A substantial portion of the mine’s procurement of supplies and equipment is sourced within Guatemala, mostly for electricity and other forms of energy, though little is sourced locally.

There seems to be little support from Goldcorp to foster local procurement for Marlin. Many mines contract with surrounding communities to supply food (e.g., maize, beans, cassava, potatoes, chickens, eggs, and fruits such as bananas and plantains) to the mine’s canteens, together with agricultural extension to boost productivity. Some governments mandate that a certain fraction of such procurement must be local.

Adding all economic benefits – royalties, taxes, wages, procurement and social investment – Guatemala receives about 42 percent of total mine revenues, substantially below best-practice in global mining operations. Local communities receive only about 5

17 This important topic is not detailed here because it is outside the professional capacity of the author. Goldcorp’s 2007 profits were $460 million. Zarsky and Stanley’s (2011, 2012) excellent publications are the sources of this summary and can be consulted for details.

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percent of total mine revenues. Commendably, Goldcorp is updating this to 50 percent of total royalties to bring it more in line with international practice as of 2012. Goldcorp is also financing a new health clinic this year.

ASIES (2010) addressed the range of environmental and social costs, including deforestation, medical care, and purchased water, as well as lost output due to mine protests and the value of “lost royalties,” calculated on a baseline royalty rate of 12 percent. ASIES (2010) found that costs were 3.5 times greater than benefits, even without accounting for long-term environmental liabilities in the post-closure phase. Goldcorp’s shareholders benefit handsomely, but Guatemala’s high rate of poverty keeps financial assets far out of reach for practically all impacted stakeholders.

The long-term economic contribution of the mine to local communities is low for four reasons:

1. Guatemala has a weak royalty and tax regime, setting a maximum of 1 percent royalty on mine revenues.

2. Local municipalities receive a very small share—only 0.5 percent—of total mine revenues.

3. Local poverty is high; wages for most workers are low. 4. There is little local procurement of supplies and materials.

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3. Remedies and Accountability:3.1 Suggestions for an Environmental and Social Corrective Action Plan To follow good practice in filling the gaps between applicable standards and the present environmental and social performance of the Marlin mine, corrective actions should be taken, and progress on completing those actions reported to local communities. However, on Goldcorp’s webpage as of August 17, 2012, no corrective actions were reported. A June 9, 2010 Goldcorp press release actually suggests that no environmental or social issues exist.18 However, that suggestion is belied by a subsequent posting of its 2010 Annual Monitoring Report covering 2009, in which the Marlin mine reports numerous instances of noncompliance, including exceedances of applicable World Bank Group standards (Goldcorp 2010b). Beyond the 2009 report, Marlin’s website offered no comprehensive environmental and social reporting as of August 17, 2012.

 1. Suspend Marlin’s Operations The first step and the strongest action that has been called for by GoG, OAS, UN ILO, UN CERD, IACHR, the People’s Tribunal,19 Madre Selva and others is to suspend mining

18 Goldcorp Inc., June 9, 2010, “Goldcorp Reports Action Regarding Marlin Mine,”.www.goldcorp.com/default.aspx?SectionId=10c11b86-a3a4-41d5-a7160796f2fbd6ea& LanguageI d= 1&PressReleaseId=a38967d9-88e8-43d7-956e-0bfb15b75042, accessed August 17, 2012. "The existing scientific data and analysis clearly demonstrate no pollution or ill effects to health and the environment as a result of the mine's presence…..We are proud of Goldcorp's record of safe, responsible operations at Marlin, and of the positive contributions it has brought to the area and to the country…..Goldcorp and its employees have continued to operate Marlin mine to the highest standards, with an abiding commitment to the responsible stewardship of the environment and to the human rights of the people in communities near Marlin.”

19 http://healthtribunal.org/the-final-verdict/ On May 20, 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) requested that the Government adopt precautionary measures, including suspension of the Marlin Mine, to prevent irreparable harm to the life, physical integrity and environment of Indigenous Peoples in communities in San Miguel Ixtahuacán and Sipacapa, in connection with alleged environmental contamination resulting from activities at the Marlin Mine. On June 23, 2010, the Government of Guatemala advised the IACHR that the Government would initiate the applicable administrative process under the laws of Guatemala to determine if suspension of Marlin operations was warranted. After extensive review of the available data and reports from the responsible governmental ministries, the Government issued a resolution on July 8, 2011 declaring that Marlin Mine is operating in compliance with the law and there is no basis for suspending operation of the mine. The Government’s investigations demonstrate that the Marlin Mine has not damaged the environment or health of the communities in the vicinity of the mine. Subsequently, on July 11, 2011, the Government of Guatemala petitioned the IACHR to declare the precautionary measures to be without further effect. In December 2011, the IACHR requested an amendment to the precautionary measures and the request to suspend operations at Marlin was lifted.” From press release: www.goldcorp.com/default.aspx?SectionId=03e2f983-fbc3-4751-9893-7741103ceab1&LanguageId=1

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operations at Marlin until a corrective action plan to remedy the most severe impacts is developed and ready to implement. 2. Engage and Compensate the Local Community The second step is to ensure easy-to-use channels of communication, with mutual dialogue, and a grievance mechanism for remediation of local concerns, and annual environmental and social progress reports. A trusting and respectful relationship with the impacted stakeholders is the goal. While this should have started long ago, it is never too late. Becoming proactive as soon as possible is essential.20 Reparations to impacted people and compensation to impacted communities would go far in engaging the local community. 3. Develop in-House Social and Environmental Expertise Goldcorp’s creation in 2007 of a senior vice-presidency for people and safety was a good start in developing social and environmental expertise for the Marlin mine. But a significant gap remains. A robust and experienced in-house team of environmental and social professionals needs to be developed; and thereafter, continuous improvement should be sought. Marlin’s social and environmental team should be charged with ensuring that all Indigenous Peoples are protected, that UN ILO Convention 169, and that UN DRIP’s FPIC are achieved as soon as possible. As these steps will take time, Goldcorp should as soon as possible appoint a reliable independent Panel of Social and Environmental Experts (Greenspan 2011; Goodland et al. 2011).

4. Commission a Reliable ESIA As documented, the ESIA for Marlin did not meet standards deemed necessary by local community members. Significant gaps remain – and it is not too late to fill them. Indeed, it is essential to fill them. Goldcorp should commission a state-of-the art ESIA21 to address especially concerns regarding water and air pollution. It should convert the old environmental action/mitigation plan chapter into a justiciable impact/compensation contract (ICC), or impact/benefit agreement (IBA) with impacted stakeholders.22 Revenue management or impact/compensation contracts in other mines 20 Details at: Herbertson et al. 2009, and at: Herbertson et al. 2010.

21 For example: Goodland, 2008.

22 “A new wave of co-operation between Aboriginal peoples and the mineral industry can be felt across Canada. It is evidenced by the growing number of impact and benefit agreements that are created every month. Gone are most of the adversarial relationships between mining and Aboriginals in favour of participation and sharing”, according to the Canadian Mining Journal’s Daily News March, 28 2010. Benefits/impact agreements are becoming the norm.

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usefully take the form of “community agreements.” The goal would be to achieve major benefits for both Goldcorp and local community members.

5. Set Up a System of Realistic Financial Assurance Goldcorp should contract with reputable independent financial assurance companies to set up a robust system of realistic performance bonds, industrial insurance, and escrow accounts to guarantee beneficial results, together with meaningful penalties, to improve accountability. Mine closure financial assurances, perpetual treatment of acid rock drainage,23 and remediation of damages on the Indigenous Peoples should be central. Justiciability, meaning that any eventually unresolved dispute could be settled in a court of law. This should be guaranteed. The ultimate recourse should be an independent court or arbiter agreed upon in advance between the impacted people and the mining proponent, with the support of the Government of Guatemala.

6. Institute Third Party Monitoring Third party monitoring by independent entities 24 is highly advisable at this juncture. In the absence of trust, transparency, and joint monitoring, successive reports tend to cast doubts on previous reports.

Acknowledgements

I thank Jeff Anhang, Amanda Fulmer, Morna Macleod, Robert Moran, Magali Rey Rosa, Grahame Russell, and Lyuba Zarsky, for their most useful comments on earlier drafts. I appreciate the trust put in me by the July 2012 Peoples Tribunal in San Miguel Ixtahuacan by appointing me as their lead judge. My fellow jurists and judges helped greatly. This paper is compiled from the literature, discussions with impacted stakeholders in Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtuahacan and attendees of the July 2012 Peoples Tribunal, combined with a brief visit around the outside of the mine as entry was not permitted.

23 The Canadian Mining Journal estimates the current cost of mine water treatment technologies is $1 billion each year, with demand expected to increase by 30 percent in 2012.

24 For example: Global Witness (www.globalwitness.org), the Environmental Investigation Agency (www.eia-international.org), the Environmental Law Institute (www.eli.org), SGS of Geneva, Switzerland, (www.sgs.com), and Bureau Veritas.

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Brief Chronology

[Complied from: 2003 EIA; AMR, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008; CAO, 2009 and from Maest 2010; Table 1.]

1996: MEM invites mining corporations to explore for minerals; Montana Exploradora de Guatemala, S.A. begins exploration.

1996: Montana Gold Corp., of Canada began exploration in the Marlin region.

1997: World Bank US$66 million loan financed construction of a highway through Sipacapa and SMI facilitating access to Marlin.

1998: Marlin deposit discovered (December); Land acquisition begins.

2002: Marlin baseline studies begin (July).

2002: Glamis Gold bought the Marlin Mine from Montana Exploradora de Guatemala.

2003 January: SRK audit of baseline sampling.

2003 February: Montana acquires rights to more than 2,200 ha.

2003 March: Baseline studies end.

2003 June: ESIA report submitted.

2003 September: ESIA approved by MARN.

2003 November: MEM issues license for development and operation of Marlin.

2003: Community opposition to Marlin, led by the Municipality of Sipacapa

2003 November: Government of Guatemala issued mining permit to Glamis Gold.

2004 January: Underground mine development begins.

2004 February 20: Marlin engineer Rolando Garcia: “Protesters are ill-informed because Marlin is the only thing that will bring development to the communities.”

2004 May: Tailings dam construction begins.

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2004 June: Feasibility study completed.

2004 June: IFC received a letter from a Guatemalan NGO requesting a three-month postponement of Marlin in view of deep social and environmental concerns; IFC refuted all allegations.

2004 June 23: IFC’s board discussed the Marlin mine, and reportedly asserted that Marlin was an “excellent” project and that it would promote socially responsible mining. Yet the mandated EIA was not received on time. Very few jobs (c.160) were projected to be created by this big investment. The mine might be productive, but the development impacts for the impacted communities and for Guatemala appeared small. It was unclear why well-capitalized Glamis Ltd., wanted IFC’s loan. The board questioned the adequacy of the revenue management arrangements (royalties were projected to be a very low – 1percent after a lengthy tax holiday). Reportedly, in the discussion of the project by IFC’s board, concern was expressed that the opposition of the National Council of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) had surprised IFC. IFC had not heard of NCIP until a few days before the board meeting.

2004 November 4: World Bank Group’s IFC approves a US$45 million loan to Montana Exploradora/Glamis for the 10-15 year Marlin Mine. “Lining the (cyanide) tailings dams is not an option at Marlin due to the mountainous setting of the region.” This is Guatemala’s first mine investment in 20 years. (Since INCO in the 1960-1980s).

2004 December: Ministry of Mines and Energy organized the First Forum on Mining.

2004 December – January 2005: 40-day protest by impacted peoples

2005 January: An estimated 750 to 1,500 riot police and 300 soldiers shot into the crowd killing one or two Mayan Indigenous Peoples and wounding a dozen others; 16 police are injured.

2005 January 20: The Syndicated Union of Guatemalan Workers (UNSITRAGUA) filed an official complaint with UN ILO stating that the government, via its support of the Marlin mine, has violated Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous groups, specifically article 4, which states that no actions should be taken in indigenous communities that are not explicitly desired by the communities themselves, and article 6, which states that public consultations must take place each time legislative or administrative actions might directly affect them. "These mining permits were granted without previous consultation with the departments' population, which is mainly indigenous,”

2005 January 28: Annual Episcopal Conference: Guatemalan Bishops reaffirmed their stance against open-pit mining.

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2005: Colectivo Madre Selva and Sipacapa impacted communities file complaint against Marlin to IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman’s (CAO) Office

2005 February: President Oscar Berger ordered a High Commission on Mining to discuss legislation to regulate mining.

2005 March/April: First Regional Conference of Indigenous Authorities rejected metal mining. “Memorial de la I Conferencia Regional de Autoridades Indígenas del Altiplano Occidental”, 5 April 2005, Prensa Libre

2005: Construction of process facilities, offices, and ancillary buildings.

2005 June 18: Sipacapa’s referendum; 98% voted against Marlin; Glamis obtained an injunction from the 7th District Court; later revoked by the Constitutional Court.

2005 July: Waste stripping in open pit mine begins.

2005 August 9: Regional Mayan legislative meeting demanded compliance with the law.

2005 August - December: Marlin’s ore production begins

2005 September 7: CAO Complaint assessment report completed.

2005 October: Tailings deposition into the tailings storage facility begins

2005 (Late): AMAC (Asociación de Monitoreo Ambiental Comunitario) established by Goldcorp.

2005, December 21: Guatemalans present demands to World Bank President about Marlin Mine. On December 9, 2005, World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz met with Mario Tema, an indigenous Maya leader from Sipacapa, Guatemala, and Magali Rey Rosa of the Guatemalan environmental organization MadreSelva, with Friends of the Earth Canada, Oxfam America, and the Bank Information Center.

2006 March: Third party Environmental Audit and Review (Audit) by MFG.

2006: Construction of Phase II of tailings facility continues.

2006 May: IFC loan repaid; CAO complaint closed, thus absolving IFC and its CAO from all responsibility in Marlin.

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2006: Citizens complain about threats, strong pressures to sell their lands, lack of transparency and fairness in land pricing, cracks in houses.

2006: AMAC collected water samples in February, May, August, and November

2006 May: Montana states there will be no exploration without consent.

2006: Four long-term column tests (drum tests) started.

2006 November: Goldcorp Inc., bought out Glamis Gold Ltd.

2006: Marlin claims never to have discharged any water to the rivers or water courses.

2007: UN CERD formally requested Canada to regulate its mining corporations in Indigenous Peoples territories.

2007 January: COPAE formed.

2007: Exploration continued with new core holes in Agel and Cancil areas.

2007 January: Bianchini report issued; claimed pollution in the Tzalá River.

2007: Three new monitoring wells installed.

2007: Additional surface water monitoring point added.

2007 November: Seepage from Area 5 waste dump first documented.

2007: Additional leaching tank added to increase gold and silver recovery; new cyanide destruction tank installed.

2008: Expansion of TSF continues.

2008: Secondary water treatment plant constructed to treat TSF discharge.

2008: Exploration on Goldcorp’s land in the Cancil and Agel area continues.

2008: MARN and MEM staff visit Marlin mine to collect water samples.

2008 April/May: Community officials from SMI and Sipacapa visit Marlin.

2008 May: Mine and plant shut down for 30 hours due to power loss from sabotage.

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2008 May: Ambassadors from Canada, Holland, and United Nations Development Program visit Marlin.

2008 June 11 – July 26: Gold production halted because electricity plant was sabotaged.

2008 July: Two Marlin mine workers kidnapped

2008: Seven internal spills in 2008 – four in process plant, three petroleum spills.

2008 September: AMAC samples quarterly and conducts surprise visit to mine.

2008 Goldcorp issues corporate Environmental and Sustainability Policy.

2008 May and August: Nine more long-term field column tests (drum tests) added.

2008 September: Latin American Water Tribunal accuses the Government of Guatemala and Goldcorp of violating the UN’s ILO Convention 169 and causing environmental damage.

2009 November: Extraordinary Report on Marlin mine.

2009 November: MEM and Goldcorp sign monitoring cooperation agreement with AMAC.

2009: Marlin becomes the first mine in Central America to be certified under the International Cyanide Management Code.

2010 March 6: Denis Kemp’s human rights report.

2010 February: UN ILO calls for the suspension of Marlin.

2010 May 20: Organization of American States (OAS) InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights calls for “precautionary measures” to 18 Mayan communities around the Marlin mine, urging the government to suspend the mine. Goldcorp, however, dismissed the Interamerican Commission’s call for a suspension of operations as based on allegations that were ‘‘entirely without merit’’ and stated that the company has ‘‘continued to operate Marlin to the highest standards, with an abiding commitment to the responsible stewardship of the environment and to the human rights of the people in communities near Marlin.’’ (Goldcorp, 2010. Fide: Slack, 2012)

2010 June: Government arranges OAS inspection of Marlin to investigate environmental and health hazard claims.

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2010 June 23: Government begins proceedings to suspend Marlin.

2010 September: The Minister of Environment accused Goldcorp of a secret night time discharge from the pond swollen due to heavy rains (IKN, 2010). Goldcorp claimed that it had notified MARN of the discharge. Goldcorp has since announced other discharges. Dr. Luis Ferraté, Minister of the Environment, presented a criminal accusation to the Public Ministry against Montana/Goldcorp, insisting on an investigation into the discharge of residual waters from the tailings pond because it may contaminate the Quivichil River. The accusation, received by the Ministry on September 28, states that on September 23, the Marlin mine discharged water from its tailings pond and that this water may cause heavy metal pollution.

2011, February 28: Impacted stakeholders who had been harmed and damaged since 2004 by Goldcorp's mine, gathered for a “Permanent Assembly” coordinated by ADISMI (the Association for the Integral Development of San Miguel Ixtahuacan) and FREDEMI (San Miguel Ixtahuacan Defense Front), to draw critical attention to the fact that the government of Guatemala and Goldcorp had not complied with a May 2010 order from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights to suspend Goldcorp's mining operation. Ten months had gone by, and neither the Guatemalan government, nor Goldcorp have complied. Their protests were violently broken up by Goldcorp mineworkers and other unidentified people.

A local community member and human rights defender, Miguel Bámaca, was seriously beaten.

* Aniseto López (a member of ADISMI and FREDEMI) was illegally detained by Goldcorp mineworkers, threatened and beaten.

* As a busload of protesters traveled along a public road, they were illegally detained and threatened by Goldcorp mineworkers.

* As many as 17 protesters have been injured and one person hospitalized.

* Phones, cameras and videos-cameras were stolen from people in the protests.

2011 December: IACHR revised its suspension ruling if all 18 communities receive potable water supplies.

2012 February (aprox.): Canada’s Houses of Parliament contemplate Bill C-323; the International Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Act, to compensate all persons including foreign citizens for a broad range of human rights violations committed by Canadian and non-Canadian corporations.

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2012 July: People’s International Health Tribunal was held: Jointly organized by the Coalition for the Defense of San Miguel Ixtahuacán, the Toronto-based grassroots organization Mining Injustice Solidarity Network, and M4 – The MesoAmerican Movement against Extractive Mining Model: Communities affected by Gold Corp’s mining in Guatemala, Mexico and Honduras.

2012 July 29-31: Goldcorp Chairman Ian Telfer will host “a fascinating visit” to Guatemala. This Canadian Parliamentary delegation was announced by Hill & Knowlton lobbyist, the Honourable Don Boudria, P.C., a former Liberal MP, who confirmed that parliamentarians travelling were Conservative MP from Niagara-West Glanbrook, Dean Allison, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Conservative MP from Chatam Kent-Essex, and Mr. Dave Van Kesteren, a member of the same committee. Labelled a junket: www.comppa.org/wordpress/?p=1434.

2012 September 3: At a press conference, the Consejo de Pueblos Mayas de Occidente asks why impacted people are excluded from meeting the parliamentarians and why they also are excluded from a closed-door meeting with the Minister of Energy and Mines. Goldcorp stressed that in no way would the meeting seek to influence the draft Mining Law now under active discussion. www.prensalibre.com/san_ marcos/Cuestionan-visita-parlamentarios_0_767323299.html.

2012 September 12: Official questions raised in Canada’s Parliament about Goldcorp’s double standards between Canada and Guatemala.

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Guide to further information and sources cited

Accion Ciudadana, 2010. Evaluacion de los derechos humanos de la Mina Marlin de Goldcorp. Guatemala: Acción Ciudadana, 252 pp.

Amezaga, J., Tobias M., Rotting S., Younger, P., Nairn R.W., Noles, A., Oyarzun R. & Quintanilla J. 2011. A rich vein? Mining and the pursuit of sustainability. Environmental Science and Technology 45: 21-26.

Amnesty International, 2011. Guatemala: Mine activists beaten, threatened, www.amnesty.org, March 3.

Anaya, S. James. 2011. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, James Anaya: addendum: observations on the situation of the rights of the indigenous people of Guatemala with relation to the extraction projects, and other types of projects, in their traditional territories. [Geneva]: United Nations.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMR: Annual Monitoring Report

ASIES: Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (Research and Social Studies Association)

ASOREMA: Asociación Nacional de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales de los Recursos Naturales y el Medio Ambiente (National Association of NGOs for Protecting the Environment and Natural Resources)

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BIC: Bank Information Center

WB: World Bank

MDB: Multilateral Development Bank

CALAS: Centro de Acción Legal Ambiental y Social de Guatemala (Center for Legal, Environmental and Social Action of Guatemala)

CAO: Compliance Adviser and Ombudsman’s Office of the IFC.

CCBG: Conference of Catholic Bishops in Guatemala

CEPREDENAC: Centro de Coordinación para la Prevención de los Desastres Naturales en América Central (Coordination Center for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America)’

CERD: UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination

CERIGUA: Center of Informational Reports on Guatemala

CFI: International Finance Corporation (IFC)

CHRLA: Center for Human Rights Legal Action

CIEDEG: Conferencia de Iglesias Evangélicas de Guatemala (Conference of Evangelical Churches in Guatemala)

COSAM: Colectivo de Organizaciones Sociales de San Marcos (Association of Social Organizations of San Marcos)

IFC: International Finance Corporation (of the World Bank Group)

IHRC: Inter-American Human Rights Commission

ESIA: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

ELI: Environmental Law Institute

FIAN: FoodFirst Information and Action Network

FIDH: International Human Rights Federation

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FLACSO: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences)

FNRMM: Frente Nacional de Resistencia contra la Minería de Metales (National Front Against Metal Mining

FUNDAMAYA: Fundación Maya (Mayan Foundation)

GoG: Government of Guatemala

IIES: Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales de la Universidad de San Carlos (University of San Carlos Institute for Economic and Social Research)

ILO: International Labor Organization

INCO: International Nickel Company

MEM: Ministry of Energy and Mines

WOAT: World Organization Against Torture

UNOPS: United Nations Office for Project Services

PDH: Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office)

PIDEC: Programa de Desarrollo Integral Comunitario (Integral Community Development Program)

PoE: Panel of social and environmental experts

REMHI: Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (Recovery of Historical Memory)

SAAS: Secretaría de Asuntos de Seguridad de la Presidencia (Secretary to the Presidency for Security Matters)

USAC: University of San Carlos

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