guerilla warfare & special forces operations

8/22/2019 Guerilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

GUERILLA WARFARE

AND

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

H E A D Q U A R T E R S , D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E A R M Y

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COM


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*FM31-21

F IEL D MANUAL HEADQUARTERS,

D E P ARTME NT OF TH E ARMY

NO. 31-21 WASHINGTON25, D .C., 29September1961

GUERRILLAWARFAREANDSPECIALFORCES

OPERATIONS

Paragraphs Page

P ART ONE . INTRODUCTION

C HAPTER 1. FU ND AME NTALS ----------------------------------1-3 3

2. RE S IS TANC E AND G U E RRI LL A WAR-FAR E -------------------------------------------------4-8 5

P ART TWO. ORG ANIZATION FOR THE SP E CI AL

FORCES EFFORT

C HAP TER 3. J OINT U NC ONVE NTIO NAL WAR-

FARE TASK FOR CE (J U WTF) ------------- 9-12 14

4. AIRB ORNE SP EC IAL FORCES G ROUP

S ect ion I . G enera l ----------------------------------------------13-18 18

I I . The S pecia l Forces opera t iona l ba se -------19-21 26

I I I . Con t rol of oper a t ions-----------------------------22-27 29IV. Control of administra t ive a nd tra ining

Act ivit ies -----------------------------------------28-32 39

C HAP TER 5. TH E ATE R SU P P ORT

S ect ion I . Log ist ics ---------------------------------------------33-43 46

I I . In t elligence -----------------------------------------44-46 54

I I I . Com munica t ion s ----------------------------------47-52 58

IV. In it ia l cont a ct --------------------------------------53-54 63

P ART TH R EE . OPERATIONS

C HAPTER 6. INFILTRATION ----------------------------------55-60 647. ORG ANIZATION AND D E VE LOP MEN T

OF TH E ARE A COMMAND.

S ect ion I . Orga niza t ion a l concept s ------------------------61-66 69

I I . Res ist a nce elem en t s -----------------------------67-72 79

I I I . S ecu r it y ----------------------------------------------73-80 86

IV. In telligence in guerrilla w a rfa re opera tiona l

a rea ------------------------------------------------81-83 93

V. Communica tions in guerril la w a rfa re opera

t ion a l a rea s --------------------------------------84-87 93VI. Logistics in guerrilla wa rfa re opera tiona l

a rea s-----------------------------------------------88-94 95

*ThismanualsupersedesFM31-21,8May1958.

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Paragraphs Page

C HAPTER 8. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT

S ect ion I . In t roduct ion -------------------------------------- 95-100 103

II . Of fen sive comba t oper a t ion s ---------------101-116 107

I I I . In t er dict ion --------------------------------------117-126 130

IV. D efen siv e opera t ions -------------------------127-131 137

V. E mployment of unconvent iona l w a rfa re

forces to assist conventional forces' com-

ba t oper a t ion s -------------------------------132-139 145

VI. E mploym ent of U W forces a ft er link-up 140-147 164

C HAP TER 9. P SYCH OLOGI CAL OP E RATIONS IN

SU P P ORT OF U NCONVE NTIONAL

WARFARE -----------------------------------148-152 169

10. DE MOB ILIZATION --------------------------153-166 177

AP P E N D I XI . RE FE RE NCE S ------------------------------------------- 183

II . CATALOG U E S U P P LY SYS TE M ------------------ 188

I I I . ARE A STU D Y G U ID E --------------------------------- 234

IV. ARE A ASS E S S ME NT---------------------------------- 244

V. G LOS S ARY OF TE RMS ------------------------------ 249

I NDEX --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 252

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PARTONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER1

FUNDAMENTALS

1. PurposeandScope

a. This manual provides guidance in Special Forces and

unconventional warfare operations for commanders and staffs at all

levels. The ba sic concepts of unconvent iona l w a rfa re a re presented in

a manner designed to acquaint the reader with Special Forces

orga niza tion, concepts, a nd meth ods of opera tions t o fulfill the Army 's

responsibility for t he conduct of unconvent iona l w a rfa re.

b. Thorough understanding of the ideas established within this

ma nua l w ill prepare t he comma nder a nd st a ff officers for subsequent

decisions and staff actions which affect special forces planning and

operations.c. Detailed methods and techniques of Special Forces operations

a re discussed below. C lassified informa tion perta ining t o all levels of

Special Forces operations is found in FM 31-21A.

2. DefinitionofUnconventionalWarfare

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of

guerrilla w a rfa re, evasion a nd esca pe, a nd subversion a ga inst h ostile

states (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted

in enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominately indigenous

personnel usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an

external source.

3. DelineationofResponsibilitiesforUnconventionalWarfare

a. The responsibility for certain of these activities has been

delegated to the service having primary concern. Guerrilla warfare is

th e responsibility of the U nited St a tes Army .

b. Within certain designated geographic areascalled guerrillaw a rfa re opera tiona l a reasthe U nited St a tes Army is responsible for

the conduct of all three interrelated fields of activity as they affect

guerrilla w a rfa re operat ions.

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c. The milit a ry opera t ions of resist a nce movement s a re

customa ri ly supported a nd accompanied by polit ica l an d economic

activitiesbot h over t a n d cla n d es tin eof ind iv idua ls and g roups

integrated,oractinginconjunctionwithguerrillas.Theseveraltypes

of ac t iv it ies a re inter locking . The term unconvent iona l wa r fa re is

used in t his m a nua l t o d en ot e a ll of t he U n it ed S t a tes Ar my 'sa ssocia ted responsibi li t ies in the conduct of guerr i lla wa rfare . The

termguerr i l la warfare is used todenote theprimaryovert mil i tary

activitiesoftheguerrillaforces.

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CHAPTER2

RESISTANCEANDGUERRILLAWARFARE

4. Resistance

a.General. R es is t ance is t he cornerst one of guer r illa wa r fa re.

U nderground a nd guerr illa w a rfa re st em from a resist ance

movement.

b.Defi n i ti on. Resista nceisdefineda sth ea ctofoppositionofone

in dividua l or gr oup t o a n ot her . A r esist a nce m ovem en t is t he

or ga n ized elem en t of a disa ffect ed popula t ion w h ich r esist s a

governm entoroccupyingpow erw ithm eans, va ryingfrompassive t o

violent ly a ct ive. Resist ance movement s begin t o form w hen

d is sa t i sf a ct ion occurs among s t rong ly mot iv a t ed ind iv idua l s who

cannotfurthertheircausebypeacefulandlegalmeans.

c. TheN at u r eofResistance.

(1) Resista nce, rebellion or civil w a r begins in a na t ion w here

polit ica l , sociologica l , economic or rel ig ious division ha s

occurred. Divis ionsof this natureare usual ly causedbya

violationofrightsorprivileges,theoppressionofonegroup

bythedominantoroccupyingforce,orthethreattothelife

andfreedomof thepopulace. Resistancealsomaydevelop

inanat ionwheretheoncewelcomedliberatorshavefailed

t o improv e an in t olerab le socia l or economic s it ua t ion .

Resistancecanalsobedeliberately inspiredfromexternal

sources aga ins t an assumed gr ievance. Res is t ance can be

act iveorpassive. Passiveresistancemaybein theformof

smolder ing resentment which needs only leadership or a

meansofexpressiontomaturetoactiveresistance.

(2) Some people join a res is t ance movement because of an

inna t e des ire t o surviv e. Ot hers may join t he res is t ance

forces because of deep ideolog ica l conv ict ions. Bu t a l l,

regardlessof init ial motivat ion, a reboundt ogether to fight

a ga inst a commonenemy.Pa rt ofthepopula t ionassists the

resista ncemovement a sfightersinth eguerrillaforce;some

assistaspart-timeguerrillasorinciviliansupportagencies

know as auxil ia ry unit s ; whi le others a re members of theunderground.

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d . I n fl uencin gFactor s.

(1)Envi ronment.

(a) Ter r ai n . The physica l loca t ion of t he resist a nce

movement has a grea t inf luence upon i t s organiza t ion

a nd ta ct ics .B ecause theyprovidesuitablea reas for the

securityofopera t ions, mounta ins,sw a mps, lar geforestsorjunglesnurtu reovertorguerrilla typeresista nce.Fla t

pla ins a reas and la rge towns or ci t ies a re more ap t to

lead to underground res is t ance ac t iv it ies a l though the

possibili tyoforganizingaguerrilla force in theseareas

shouldnotbeoverlooked.

(b)Cul tu ra l .A peoples' cultura l environment a lso ha s i ts

effectsonresistancemovements.Theurgetobeararms,

escape,andfighttheenemyisdependentonthecultural

background of the people. Men f rom rura l or peasant

en vir on men t, n ot subject ed t o t igh t gover nm en ta l

control, ha ve moreopportunity toshow their ha tred of

theenemyoccupat ionbyovert andviolent meanssuch

as guerr i l la warfare . People froman industr ia l izedand

highlyurbanizedculturewill resist withsuchact ivit ies

assabotage,propaganda,passiveactsandespionage.

(c) Con t r olofpopu l at i on. Whenanoccupyingpowerisable

t o exercise close a nd st r ingent cont rol over t hepopu la t ion , t h e r esist a n ce m ovem en t is con du ct ed

primarilyinsecrecy.Whenthepoliceandmilitaryforces

of t he occupying pow er a re diver ted or ot herw ise

ineffectual, theresistancemovementmaybeconducted

withprimarilyovertguerrillaactions.

(2)Mot ivat ion. B esides t he geogra phica l a nd cult ura l

environment influencing guerrilla w a rfa re, the sociologica l

clima t e produces many mot iv a t ing f a ct or s which hav e a

pr ofou nd effect u pon t h e r es ist a n ce m ovem en t . S t r on gin div id ua l m ot iva t i on is es sen t ia l t o t h e for m a t ion of a

resistanceforce.Althoughsomeindividualmotivesarenot

idealand,ifopenlyexpressed,maydoharmtotheguerrilla

effort , thefollowingareexamplesofwhat someof the true

motivesmaybe.

(a) I deology. I n guerr illa un it s some in dividua ls h a ve

developedst rongideologica lmotivesfort a kingupa rm s.

These ideolog ies t a ke root in two broad areas poli t ics

and religion . The indiv idua l tends to subordina te h is ownpersonalitytotheseideologiesandworksconstantly

a nd solely for the "cause. " In some resista nce f ighters,

thismotiveisextremelystrong.

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(b)Economic. Manyindividuals joinresistancemovements

t o keep fr om st a r vin g or t o keep fr om losin g t h eir

liv elih ood . An or ga n iz ed r esis ta n ce for ce m a y exer t

economic influence on individuals w ho fa i l to support

theirmovement.

(c) Per sonal gai n. P ersona l ga in is the mot iva t ing force of som e volu nt eer s. An in divid ua l, so m ot iva t ed , m a y

cha ngesides if hebelieveshecan ga inmorebyfighting

fortheopposingforce.

(d ) H at e. P eople who hav e los t lov ed ones due t o enemy

a ct ion s m a y figh t a ga in st t ha t en em y a s a r esult of

en gen dered h at red. U n con tr olled h a tred ca n pose

problems for the sponsor beca use i t is di ff icul t to curb

the fana t icism of such indiv idua ls and proper ly d irect

theirefforts.

(e) Secur i ty. I f the resista nce movement is s t rong or g ives

theimpressionofbeingpowerful,manyindividualsjoin

outofafeelingofpersonalsafety.Usually, thissituation

occur s on ly a ft er t he r esist a nce m ovem en t is w ell

organized and the enemy has been weakened by o ther

act ions. Othersjoin inorder toescaperecruitment into

theserviceoftheenemy.

(f ) Ego. P ersona l mot ives such a s pow er, pr ide, a nda d ven t ur e oper a t e t o som e ext en t in a l l in divid ua l s.

Dependingupon them ora l f iberof th e individual, these

motivesmaysustainhimintimesofgreatstress.

(g) Fear .Some individuals becomea part of theresis tance

movementthroughnopersonaldesireoftheirown.They

join t he m ovem en t out of fea r of r epr isa ls a ga in st

themselvesortheirfamilies.

(3)Chance for success. In a ddit ion t o mot iva tion a nd

circumstancesofenvironment, a populat ionmust feel that there isult imatelyachanceforsuccessor therecanbeno

effect ive resist a nce movement developed. Act ive

part icipa t ion in a ny resista nce movement is influenced by

itschanceforsuccess.

(4)Guidance. Resist a nce m ovemen ts st a nd or fa ll on t he

ca liber of t he lea ders a nd ot her individua ls in t he

organ iza t ion. An understa nding of the environmental an d

individual mot ivat ing factors wil l assis t great ly thosewho

desire toobta in theoptimumfroma guerrilla organiza t ion.

An a n a l ysis of t h ese fa ct or s pla y s a n im por t a n t pa r t in

evaluatingpotentialresistanceforces.

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5. GuerrillaWarfare

G u er rilla w a r f a r e com pr is es com ba t oper a t ion s con du ct ed in

en em y h eld t er rit or y by pr ed om in a n tly in digen ou s for ces on a

mili t a ry or para mil it a ry bas is to reduce the combat ef fect iveness,

industrial capacity, an dmoraleof theenemy.Guerilla opera t ionsa re

conducted by rela t ively smal l g roups employ ing of fens ive t a ct ics .Guerrillawarfaresupportsothermilitaryoperations.

6. CharacteristicsofGuerrillaWarfare

a.General. Guerilla warfare ischaracterizedbyoffensiveact ion.

G uerrillasrelyuponmobility,elusivenessan dsurprise.Ina dditionto

thesetraits, thereareothercharacteristicsthatshouldbementioned:

civiliansupport,outsidesponsorship,politicalaspects, legalaspects,

tactics,anddevelopmentaspects.

b. Su ppor tFactor s.

(1)Civ i l ian suppor t. Th e su ccess of gu er rilla m ovem en t s

dependsuponcontinuousmoralandmaterial support from

t he civ ilian popu la t ion . The loca l communit y usua l ly is

un der in ten se pressure fr om a nt i-guerr illa fa ct ion s.

P unit ive mea sures such a s reprisa ls, t errorism,

deporta t ion, restr ict ion of movement a nd seizure of goods

andpropertyareconductedagainst supportersofguerrilla

activity,makingthissupportdangerousanddifficult . If theloca l populace ha s a s t rong wil l to resis t , enemy reprisa ls

ca use a n increa se in underground a ct iv it ies . The civi lian

communit y may a ss is t t he guer r illa force by furn ish ing

supplies, recruits, information; bygivingearlywarning; by

support ing eva sion an d escape; a nd other act ivi t ies . After

theguerrilla forcehasestablisheditself andissufficiently

strong, i t m a y needt oexert forceuponcerta inelement sof

t he civ ilian popu la t ion t o command t heir suppor t , e. g .:

coerce indifferent or unresponsive port ions of t hepopula t ion in to support in g t he guerr illa movement .

C iv ilians pa r t i cipa t ing in such suppor t a ct iv it ies , a s ide

fromundergroundoperat ions, comprisewhat areknownas

theauxiliaryforces.

(2)Outsid e sponsor shi p. G uerr illa opera t ions a re more

ef fect iv e when ou t side sponsorship is presen t . Dur ing a

wa r t ime s itua t ion th is suppor t is poli t ica l , psycholog ica l

a n d log ist ica l a s w ell a s t a ct ica l. A spon sor in g pow er

decides to suppor t guerr ill a forces when it feels tha t theguerr il las can make a s ignif icant cont r ibut ion towa rd the

achievementofnationalobjectives.

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c. Pol i t i cal Aspects.

(1) G uerri lla wa rfare ha s of ten been described a s being more

poli t ica l thanmil i tary innature . I t is certa inly mil i tary in

the ta ct ica l sense, but i t is a lso polit ica l s ince a guerr i lla

mov ement genera l ly s t ems f rom a loca l power s t rugg le.

G u er rilla s u su a lly fig ht for polit ica l g a in s, a l th ou gh in ga in ing the ir own poli t ica l object ives they may ass is t the

sponsoringpowertogainitsmilitaryobjective.

(2) The polit ica l dominance in guerr i lla w arfa re ca n be seen

from a not her poin t of view . G uerrilla lea ders w it h a

commonenemy,but politica llyopposed,ma ydissipat etheir

effor t s by fig ht in g ea ch ot h er . Th e polit ica l ly or ien t ed

gu er rilla lea d er ca n ca u se t r ou ble by w it h hold in g h is

coopera t ion unt il he ext ra ct s promises of polit ica l

s ign if icance f rom h is sponsor . The polit ica l impr in t on guerrilla warfare isbutanotheraspect that mustbeclosely

studied.

d. L egalAspects. G uerr il la wa r fa re is boundby the ru les o f the

G eneva Conventionsasmucha s isconventiona lwa rfa re.Asoutlined

in a ppropria t e in tern a tion al a greem en ts a n d F M 27-10, four

importantfactorsgiveaguerrillalegalstatus:(1)becommandedbya

personresponsiblefortheactionsofhissubordinates;(2)wearafixed

a nddist inctiveinsignia orsignrecogniza blea ta dista nce;(3)conduct

operat ions inaccordancewith the lawsandcustomsof war ; and(4)

car ry a rms openly . I f these four factors ire present , the guerr i lla is

entitledtothesametreatmentfromhiscaptorsastheregularsoldier.

Dur ing World War I I , G enera l E isenhower sent a proclamat ion to

Na zis a n d F ren ch men a like, form a lly recogn izin g t he F ren ch

ResistanceMaquisasmembersof theAlliedForces, andwarnedthe

Germans t ha t a l l guer r illa s were t o be g iv en t he same honorab le

t rea tment a s t he regula r soldiers under h im in t he Allied

ExpeditionaryForce.

e. Tacti cs.

(1)Primar y consid erat i ons. G uerr illa s, beca use t hey a re

irregularsoldiers, generallydonot achieveunityofact ion

in thesa mema nnera s convent iona l units. B ecauseof this

a nd t w o ot her fa ct orst he logist ica l problem a nd

ma npower requirementsguerr ill as in i t ia l ly cannot hope

t o m eet a n d d ecisively d efea t a con ven t ion a l u nit in a

pitchedbatt le . Guerrilla operat ionsare facili tatedbyother

milit a ry a ct ivit ies w hich dist ra ct pot ent ia l enemyreinforcements. Ontheotherhand, i f theenemyis freeof

otherconcerns, hewill combat theguerrillaswithhisbest

troopsinordertoprotectvital installations.Guerrillaunits,

t h er efor e, m ust coor din a t e t h eir a ct ivit ies w it h ot h er

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fr ien dly m ilit a r y for ces a n d a t t a ck t h e en em y a t poin t s

most disadva nta geous to him. These a t ta cks ar e norma lly

conductedduringperiodsof lowvisibili tyandaredirected

against isolatedoutposts, weaklydefendedlocationsor the

m ovin g en em y . B y r ecog niz in g h is ow n lim it a t i on s a n d

w ea kn esses, t he guerr illa ca n h ope for surviva l a ndev en t ua l success. In it ia l ly , he is usua lly in fer ior t o t he

enemy in firepow er, ma npow er, commun ica tions, logist ics,

and organiza t ion . He is equa l , and of ten super ior , to the

enemy in the col lect ion of intel ligence informa t ion, cover

anddeception,andtheuseoftime.

(2)Of fensi vetact i cs.Thebasisofsuccessfulguerrillacombatis

offensive a ct ion combined w ith surprise. Dur ingperiods of

low visibilit y, t he guerr illa a t t acks, t ries t o ga in a

momentaryadvantageoffirepower,executeshismissiontocaptureordestroypersonnelandequipment,andleavesthe

scen e of a ct ion a s r a pidly a s possible. Nor ma lly , t he

g uer rilla d oes n ot con sis ten t ly oper a t e in on e a r ea bu t

va r ies h is oper a tion s so t ha t n o pa t t er n is eviden t. I f

possible, hestrikes twoor threetargetssimultaneously to

dividetheenemypursuitandreinforcementeffort.

(3)Defensi vetact i cs. Protectivesurveillancefortheguerrillais

usua llyverygood;heha scivilia nnon-combat a nt sproviding

him w it h in forma t ion on enemy ga rr isons, t roopmovements, andcounter, guerrilla act ivit ies. Thisadvance

w a rning gives t he guerr illa t ime for proper

count ermeasures . I f, in any count er guer r illa mov e by a

superior enemy, th eguerrillas a re t hrea tenedorencircled,

theydonot meet himona showdownbasis , but withdraw,

disperseorattemptabreakout.

f .Developm ent Aspects. To com plet e t h e pict u re of g uer rilla

wa r fa re, a t ime-and-space f rame of reference must be unders tood .

Th a t is , it is n ot s ufficien t m er ely t o s ta t e cer t a in pr in ciples of

guerrilla warfare, but i t is necessary toqualifystatementsregarding

guerrillaactionstofixthemwithregardtotimeandspace.

(1)Timeelement. Guerrillashaveprovedthemselveseffect ive

duringallstagesofconflictfromtheoutbreakofhostilit ies

unt il the end of f ight ing . However , in the ear ly s t ages of

g uer rilla d ev elopm en t , w h en t h e en em y is s till s tr on g,

res is t ance opera t ions normal ly tend to be conducted less

openly. Duringthisperiod, security isa primeconcern. I f the resista nce movement is to survive a nd developwhile

s ur r ou nd ed by s tr on g en em y for ces s ecu rit y is a pr im e

concern a nd precaut ions must be extensive an d ef fect ive.

Act ivit y is g en er a lly lim it ed t o in for ma t i ongathering,

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recruit ing, t ra in ing, orga niza t ion , a nd sma ll-sca le

operations.

(2)Si tuat ion. On the o ther hand , when the s i tua t ion changes

to favor the guerr i llas e ither through enemy w ea kness or

r es ist a n ce-cr ea t ed fa v or a b le cir cu ms ta n ces, oper a t ion s

become more over t making la rge-sca le ac t ions possible. When the s itua t ion permits , guerr il la forces expand and

tendtoadoptconventionalorganizations.

(3)Location. G u er rilla w a r fa r e t a kes on d iffer en t a spect s

according to i ts geographic loca t ion. In some a reas of the

wor ld guerr il la wa r fa re has preceded the ent ry of regular

t r oops ; w h ile in ot h er a r ea s , g uer r illa m ovem en t s h a v e

comeintoexistencea ftert heforma lent ryofregula rtr oops.

Addit iona l ly , in some areas the complex socia l s t ructure

andeconomicorganizat ionsare cogs ina vast systemthat isrela tivelyea sytodisrupt.Thehigherth edegreetow hich

acountryhasevolvedindustriallythemorevulnerableit is

toactivitiesoftheguerrillas.Inlessindustrializedareasof

the w orld, these complexit ies do not exist . The people a re

les s d epen den t on on e a n ot h er for g ood s a n d s er vices;

d isrupt ion of one community does not necessar i ly cause

extremehardshipinanother. Thus, the impact ofguerrilla

war fa re upon the popula t ion is not as grea t and guerr i l l a

f igh t ing is likely t o be more prev a len t . In judging thepotentia l for, a ndeffectsof,guerrilla w a rfar e loca t ionisa n

importantconsideration.

7. SpecialForcesOperations

The value of coordinat ing guerr i lla act ivi t ies with convent iona l

milita ryoperat ionsa ndth eneedforpea cetimeplan ningandt ra ining

by thepotential sponsorhavebeenrecognizedbytheUnitedStates.

The unit orga nized a nd t ra ined t o implement t he Army's

responsibilityin directinggu errilla opera tionsistheAirborneS pecia l

Forces G roup. Specia l forces unit s may be ca l led upon to opera te

duringageneral, limitedorcoldwar.

a. Genera l War. The doct rine set for t h in t h is ma nua l is

s t ructuredarounda general war s i tuat ion. Ina general war , Specia l

Forces organ ize guer r illa forces t o suppor t convent iona l milit a ry

oper a t ion s u nd er t h e d ir ect ion of t h e t h ea t er com m a n der . Th eir

opera t ions genera l ly a re conduct ed in den ied (enemy con t rolled)

territory.b.L im i tedWar. Limitedwaroperat ionsbySpecialForcescould

beofthegeneraltypewithinfiltrationofSpecialForcesdetachments

or of a t ra in ing na ture conduct ed in a nondenied a rea w it h

infiltrationofindigenousunitsonly.

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c. Col dWar. Specia l forcesunits canassis t in t ra iningmil i tary

person nel in com ba t in g guerr illa a n d t errorist a ct ivit ies a nd

subversion. Inaddit ion, theymaytrain foreignmilitarypersonnel in

t h e t ech n iq u es of g uer rilla w a r f a r e, t h us en h a n cin g t h e d efen se

capabilityofthenationconcerned.Whensoemployed,SpecialForces

u nit s su pplem en t t h e U .S . m ilit a r y a s sist a n ce g rou ps a n d a r my missions.

8. CapabilitiesandLimitations

a. Capab ilit ies . Specia l forces deployment g iv es reach t o t he

th eat ercomm a nder'sopera tions.It permit shimtoinfluenceactivities

fa r in a d va n ce of t h e field for ces a n d bey on d t h e r a n ge of a r m y -

controlled w ea pons systems. Specia l forces directed guerr i lla units

(ca l led U W for ces ) con du ct oper a t ion s w h ich a r e ca t eg or iz ed a s

follows:(1)M issionsi nsupport oftheat er commander .Thesemissions

include

(a)Interdict ion of l ines of communica t ions, key ar ea s a nd

militaryandindustrial installat ions.

(b)Psychologicaloperations.

(c)Special intelligencetaskssuchas target acquisit ionand

damageassessment.

(d )Evasionandescapeoperations.

(e)Coveranddeceptionoperations.

(2) Mission s t o suppor t com ba t oper at ion s of t a ct ica l

commanders . Inaddit ion toan intensi f ica t ionof the tasks

listedin(1)above,UWforcesexecutemissionstodirectly

ass is t convent iona l forces engaged in combat opera t ions .

Suchmissionsmayinclude

(a)S eizure of key t erra in t o fa cilit a t e a irborne a nd

amphibiousoperations.(b)Employmentasareconnaissanceandsecurityforce.

(c)Seizureofkeyinstallationstopreventdestructionbythe

enemy.

(d )Divers ionary a t t a cks aga inst enemy forces to suppor t

coveranddeceptionplans.

(e)Operationswhichisolateselectedport ionsof thebatt le

area,airborneobjectiveareaorbeachhead.

(3) Missions conducted a fter juncturew ith friendly forces. Inth eevent cont rolofguerrillaun itsisreta inedbytheUn ited

States,thefollowingmissionsmaybeassigned:

(a)Reconnaissanceandsecuritymissions.

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(b)When proper ly t r a ined and suppor t ed , convent iona l

combatoperations.

(c)Rearareasecuritymissions.

(d )Counter-guerrillaoperations.

(e)Supportofcivilaffairsoperations.

b. Limit a t ions. I t must be rea lized t ha t t here a re cer t a in

limitationsintheuseofguerrillaforces.Someoftheselimitationsare

(1) L im it ed ca pa bilit ies for st a t ic defen sive or h oldin g

operations.

(2) Init ia lly, la ckof forma l t ra ining, equipment, w eapons, a nd

suppliesprohibitlarge-scalecombatoperations.

(3) Dependence upon t he loca l civ ilian popu la t ion and an

outsidesponsoringpowerforsuppliesandequipment.

(4) Communicationsbetweentheguerrillawarfareoperational

areaandhigherheadquarters in friendly territoryareoften

tenuousandfraughtwithtechnicalproblems.

(5) Decentra l iza t ion of comma nd an d dispersion of forces for

securityimpedesreactiontimetoordersfromtheaterlevel.

(6) Rest rict ion s on fr ien dly support in g fir es in to t he

operationalareabecauseofnecessityforfrequentmovesby

t he guer r illa s a s we ll a s t he necessit y f a r prot ect ing t he

friendlycivilianpopulationsofaraspossible.

(7) From init ia l conta ct unt il an opera t ion is completed, the

en tir e pr oject is depen den t upon pr ecise, t im ely a n d

accurateintelligence.

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PARTTWO

ORGANIZATIONFORTHESPECIALFORCESEFFORT

CHAPTER3

JOINTUNCONVENTIONALWARFARETASKFORCE(JUWTF)

9. General

a. Th e t h ea t er com m a n der is r es pon sible for t h e con du ct of

unconventionalwarfareinhisareaofoperations.b. Asapart of thisresponsibili tyhedesignatesguerrilla warfare

opera t iona l a reas for t he conduct of guer r illa wa r fa re and rela t ed

unconventionalwarfareactivities.

10. OrganizationoftheJointUnconventionalWarfareTaskForce(JUWTF)

a. Th e t h ea t er com m a n der h a s t h e a u t h or it y t o or ga n iz e h is

command for unconvent iona l wa r fa re in the manner bes t sui ted to

accomplishhismission.

b. Thepreferredorganizationisajointsubordinateheadquarters

for u ncon ven t ion a l w a r fa r e on t he sa m e level a s ot h er ser vice

componentcommands(fig.1).

This subordina te headqua rters ,known a sa J oint U nconvent iona l

Wa rfa re Ta sk Force (J U WTF), is composed of representa t ives from

theservicecomponentcommandsandappropriatecivilianpersonnel.

c. *A second possible organ izat ion is a n unconvent iona l w ar fare

plan s sect ion within the J 3 s ta f f d ivision of the unified or specifiedcommand.

d . Theinterna lsta fforga niza tionofth eJ U WTFisjoint ,wit ht he

principalst a ffofficersbeingfroma ny service,a nd consisting ofa J 1,

J 2, J 3, J 4, J 6divisionsa nda ny requiredspecialsta ff officers(fig. 2).

I n t h e J U WTF t h e pla n s a n d policy fu nct ion s of J 5 d ivision a r e

norm a llya ccomplishedbyt heJ 3division.

e. U n it s a nd in dividua ls fr om t he ser vice com pon en ts a re

a ssignedora tt a chedforopera tiona lcont roltoth eJ U WTF.

*Since an unconventional warfare plans section within the JS division performs essentially the same

functions as a separate JUWTF, further discussion is limited to the separate JUWTF.

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f . The a irborne special forces group, the principal a rmy element

oftheJ U WTF,esta blishesa specia lforcesopera tiona lbase(S FOB )to

com m a n d a n d s uppor t oper a t ion a l d et a ch m en t s befor e a n d a f t er

commitmentindesignatedguerrillawarfareoperationalareas.

11. FunctionsoftheJointUnconventionalWarfareTaskForce

a. TheJ U WTF comma ndera nd hissta ff ma keoperat iona lpla ns

foranddirect theconductofunconventionalwarfare. Theprincipal

fun ctionsofth eJ U WTFa re

(1) Recommend geogra phica la reas tobed esignat edguerrilla-

warfareoperat ionalareas.

(2) P rocure a nd ma inta in intel ligencema teria ls in support ofunconventionalwarfare.

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(3) Develop opera t iona l , adminis t ra t ive and log is t ica l plans

a n d r eq uir em en ts for t he support of un con vent ion al

war fa re .

(4) Coordinate w ith other theater agencies in plan ning for a l l

typesofoperations.

(5) Develop communica t ion procedures a nd requirements tosupportunconventionalwarfareplans.

(6) P lan and conduct join t t ra in ing of l and , sea and a i r unit s

d es ig na t ed t o pa r t icipa t e in or su ppor t u ncon ven t ion a l

war fa re .

(7) As directed, coordina te w ith a llied milita ry a uthorit ies for

the prepara t ion and execut ion of unconvent iona l wa r fa re

plans.

(8) Ma in ta in lia ison w it h ot her un con ven tion a l w a r fa r eagenciesorunits.

(9) Recomm end str ength sofind igenous forcest obesupport ed

forunconventionalwarfareoperations.

(10) Ma in t a in lia ison a t st a ff a n d oper a t ion a l level w it h

appropriateintelligenceagencies;coordinaterequirements,

collect ion a n d com m un ica t i on s w i th ot h er a ct ivit ies in

den ied a reas ; plan in t elligence opera t ions in suppor t of

convent iona l forces w hen direct ed by t he t hea ter

commander.

(11) Ma i nt a i n lia i son w i th t h ea t er civil a f fa i rs u nit s w i t h

r espect t o civil a f fa i rs (C A) a s pect s of u ncon ven t ion a l

war fa re .

b. Thesta ff opera t ionsofa J U WTFa rebasica lly t hesam eas for

otherUSmilitarystaffs .

12. OperationalControlofUnconventionalWarfareForces

a. Init ia lly, opera t iona l contr ol of U S sponsored unconventiona lw a r f a r e for ces is r et a i ned by t h e t h ea t er com m a n der . C on t r ol is

exercised t hrough t he J U WTF assign ing missions t o t he Specia l

Forces group, w hich in t urn direct s deployed opera t iona l

detachments.

b. Whenguerr i l la warfare operat ional areas fa l l within thearea

of influence of a dvancing ta ct ica l comma nds, opera t iona l control of

affectedunconventionalwarfareforcesusuallyistransferredfromthe

unifiedorspecifiedcomma ndlevel thr ought heat era rmy to thefield

a rmy concerned . In conjunct ion wi th th is t rans fer , elements of the

S pecia l F or ces gr ou p a r e a t t a ch ed t o t h e a r my h ea d qu a rt er s t o

providecontinuityofsupervision.

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c. The f ield a rmy commander in t u rn may a ss ign opera t iona l

contr olof th eunconventiona lw a rfa re force t oa ny ofhissubordina te

tact icalunits. Delegationofcontrolgenerally isnot madelower than

division.Seechapter8foramoredetaileddiscussionofutilizationof

unconventionalwarfareforcesbytacticalcommands.

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CHAPTER4

AIRBORNESPECIALFORCESGROUP

SectionI.GENERAL

13. General

The Airborne Specia l Forces G roup is the U nited Sta tes Army's

orga n iza t ion t ra in ed t o con duct guerr illa w a rfa re a n d rela t ed

unconventiona lw a rfa rea ct ivit ies. Special forcesa rea str a tegic force

employedunderthedirectionoftheatercommanders.Deploymentof

specia l, for ces u nit s a llow s t h e t h ea t er com ma n der t o con du ct

offensiveoperationsdeepinenemyterritory.

14. MissionandConcept

a.M i ssi on. Themissionofspecialforcesistodevelop,organize,

equip, train, anddirect indigenousforces in theconductofguerrilla

warfare . Specia l forcesmaya lsoadvise , t ra inandassis t indigenous

forcesincounter-insurgencyoperations.

b. Concept. Specia l forces a re responsible for the conduct of a l l

unconvent iona l w a rfa re a ct ivit ies w it hin guerr illa w a rfa re

opera t iona l a reas and may be ca l led upon t o per form ot her t a sks associatedwithorinsupportofguerrillawarfare.

15. AirborneSpecialForcesGroup

a.Or gan i zat i on.TheAirborneSpecialForcesGroupconsistsofa

headquar t er s and headquar t er s company and four Specia l Forces

companies(fig.3).

b. Capabi l i ti es.Thespecialforcesgroupiscapableof

(1) Deploying its opera t iona ldeta chments by a ir , sea or landwhenprovidedwithappropriatetransportation.

(2) Organ izing, tra ining,a nddirectinga numberofvar iedsize

guerrillaunits.

(3) Cont rolling, by long-ra nge commu nica tions, th eopera tions

of U W for ces in en em y or en em y occu pied t er r it or y t o

reduce his combat ef fect iveness, indust r ia l ca pacity , and

morale.

(4) P erformin g specializedin telligencem issions a s directed byh igher commanders and when augmented by in tell igence

specialistsasrequired.

(5) P r ovid in g t r a in in g a n d a s sist a n ce t o fr ien dly for eign

armiesinguerrillaandcounterguerrillaoperations.

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(6) E st a blish in g a S pecia l F or ces oper a t ion a l ba s e w h en

augmentedbysupportandserviceunits.

c. Ad d i ti onal Consid er at i ons.

(1) TheS pecia lForcesgrouprequir esau gmen ta tionbysupport

andserviceunits toconductsustainedoperat ionsfromthe

SpecialF orcesOperat iona lB a se(SF OB ).Fordeta ilsof t he

support required,seepar a gra ph21.

(2) The reac t ion t ime of Specia l Forces deta chments d if fers

from t ha t of convent iona l in fa nt ry unit s beca use of

com mun ica t ion s lim it a t ion s a n d gr ea t er dist a nces t o

operat ionalareas.

16. HeadquartersandHeadquartersCompany(fig.4)

a.M i ssi on. Toprovidecommunications,administrative,training,

in t ellig en ce, a n d log is t ica l s uppor t for a s sig ned S pecia l F or ces

elementspriortoa nda fterdeployment .

b. Capabi l i t i es. Headquar ters and headquar ters company of the

specialforcesgrouphasthefollowingcapabilities:

(1) P r ov id es com m a n d a n d st a f f con t rol a n d pla n n in g for

SpecialForceselementspriortoandafterdeployment.

(2) P rov ides log is t ica l suppor t (except delivery) to Specia l

Forcesoperationalelementsonacontinuingbasis.

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(3) P rovides long-ra ngecommunicationbetweena nS FOB a nd

assignedSpecialForcesoperationalelements.

(4)Providesunitlevelmedicalanddentalservice.

(5) P rov ides t h ird echelon ma in t enance in r ad io and sma l l

arms.

c. Organizat ion. Fordetailedorganizat ion, see thecurrent tables

oforganizationandequipment.

17. SpecialForcesCompany(fig.5)

a.Or gan i zat i on. Th e specia l for ces com pa n y con sist s of a n

admin is t r a t iv e det achment , one opera t iona l det achment C , t h ree

operationaldetachmentsB,and12operationaldetachmentsA.

b.Adm ini str ati veDetachment. The admin is t ra t ive det achment per forms the normal adminis t ra t ive funct ions of a company head

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quar ters. The deta chment commander executes the d irect ives and

orders of the comma nding off icer of the opera t iona l deta chment C,

w h o is t he com ma n der of t he S pecia l F or ces com pa n y. D ur in g

oper a t ion s, t h e a d m in is tr a t iv e d et a ch m en t r ev er t s t o t h e g rou p

commander 's cont rol when i t s opera t iona l deta chments have beendeployed.

c. Oper ati ona l Detachment C(fig . 6). OperationaldetachmentC

is the senior opera t iona l unit of the Specia l Forces company . I t i s

capableof

(1) Conduct ingopera t ionsw ith guerrilla forces.

(2) E xercisingopera tiona lcont roloverd esigna ted subordina te

detachments.

(3) P rovidingt henucleusofalia isondeta chment tofielda rmy or other tact ica l e lements when theoperat ional control of

S pecia l F or ces det a ch men ts is pa ssed t o t a ct ica l un it

com m a n der s. Wh en s o em ploy ed , t h e d et a ch m en t C is

at tachedto thetact icalunit headquarters.

d. Oper ati onal Detachment B(fig.7) . OperationaldetachmentB,

like t he det achment C , conduct s opera t ions w i t h guer r illa forces .

Whenoperat ingw ithotherdeta chments, th eBdeta chment exercises

opera t ion a l con trol over subor din at e det a ch men ts a nd/or is

subordinatedtoaseniordetachment. I t alsocanprovidethenucleusofa liaisondeta chmenta t a ta ct ica lunit hea dqua rters.

e. Oper at i onal DetachmentA(fig.8).Theoperationaldetachment

Aconductsoperat ionswithguerrilla forces, eitherunilaterallyor in

conjunct ion w i t h ot her det achment s . When opera t ing w i t h ot her

detachments, theAdetachment isnormallysubordinatedtoasenior

detachment.

18. AugmentationDetachment

a. The a ugmenta t ion deta chment is ident ica l in composit ion to

theoperationaldetachmentC(fig.6).

b. Theaugmentationdetachmentiscapableof:

(1)Assistingthecommanderinthecontrolofoperations.

(2) Forming t he lia ison det achment a t a t act ica l unit

headqua r ters when opera t iona l cont rol of Specia l Forces

detachmentsispassedtothetacticalunit .

(3) F or min g t h e n ucleu s t o est a blish a n a lt er na t e S F OB

headquarters .

(4) Conduct ing opera t ions in guer r illa wa r fa re opera t iona l

areas .

c. For a det a iled descript ion of t he employment of t he

a ugmenta t iondeta chment, seepara gra ph21.

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SectionII.THESPECIALFORCESOPERATIONALBASE

19. General

a. TheSpecialForcesoperationalbase(SFOB)istheoperational

a nda dministra t ivefoca lpoint forguerrilla wa rfar ea ct ivit ieswithina

U .S . thea ter of opera t ions . I t is loca t ed in te rr itory under f r iendly con t rol, u sua lly w i t h in t he communica t ions zone (CommZ). The

locationoftheSFOBisdesignatedbythetheatercommander.

b. The Specia l Forces group, supported by elements within the

C om mZ, a ct iva t es a n d oper a t es t he S F OB . I dea lly , t h e S F OB is

esta blished a nd act ivat ed prior to the commencement of host i li t ies .

However, sincepreemergencyact ivat ionmaynot beauthorized, the

base of ten is es t ab lished on a s t andby bas is to include long-range

communica tionfacili t ies, intra thea tera ndintra basecommunica tions,

andemergencystockpilesofequipment.c. The SFOB may be physica l ly loca t ed a t one ins t a lla t ion or

dispersedamonga numberof small s i tes , usual ly in thev icini ty of

ot her ins t a lla t ions such a s an a i r base or CommZ depot . Var ious

modifica tionsa readoptedtosuitth eloca lsitua tion.

20. Mission

The mission of the SF'OB is toprepa reoperat iona l deta chments

fordeployment int oguerrilla w a rfa rearea sa nd, aft erdeployment, to

direct , administer, andsupport guerrilla forces in furtheranceof the

theatermission.

ThefunctionsperformedattheSFOBare

a. Planninganddirectionofoperations.

b. Communicationssupport.

c. Intelligencesupport.

d . Logisticalsupport.

e. Briefingandstaging. f . Infil trat ion.

g. Liaisonandcoordination.

h . Training.

i . Administration.

21. Organization

(fig.9)

a.General. TheSF OB isorgan izeda longfunctiona llinesintotw oma jor groups: theopera t iona l e lement . ,; a nd thea dministra t ive a nd

trainingelements.

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b.Oper at i onal E l ements. Theoperat iona l e lements of t heS FOB

consistof

(1)Oper at i ons cen ter. Th e oper a t ion s cen t er is t h e fa cilit y

w it h in w h ich a r e g rou ped r epr esen t a t ives of u nit a n d

specia l s ta f f sect ions a nd other comma nds concernedw ithcurrentoperationsinguerrillawarfareareas.Foradetailed

discussion,seeparagraph23.

(2)Briefingcenter. Thebrief ingcenter is an isola t ionarea or

a r ea s w h er e S pecia l F or ces d et a ch men t s r eceive t h eir

oper a t ion a l m is sion s a n d con du ct fin a l pr epa r a t ion for

infiltra tion.Foradeta ileddiscussion,seepar a gra ph24.

(3)Commun i cati ons compl ex. The communica t ions complex

con sist s of t h e com mu nica t ion s fa cilit ies a v a ila b le t o

support theSFOBandguerr i l la warfare operat ional areas .

I t in clu des t h e S pecia l F or ces g roup com mu nica t ion s

pla t oon , plu s a t t a ch ed or su ppor t in g sig na l u nit s a n d

faci li t ies. The group signal of ficer is the s ta f f supervisor .

Th e com mun ica t ion s pla t oon lea der is n or ma lly t he

oper a t or a n d s uper vises t h e s ig na l in st a lla t i on s. F or a

detaileddiscussion,seeparagraph25.

(4)TheAugmenta ti ondetachment.

(a)Whenactivated, theaugmentat iondetachmentprovidesa ddit ion al flexibilit y t o t he S pecia l F orces group

commander.

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(b)Th e a u gm en t a t ion d et a ch men t m a y be em ploy ed t o

assistthecommanderinthecontrolofoperations.When

s o em ploy ed t h e d et a ch m en t com m a n der becom es a

depu t y for opera t ions and supervises t he opera t iona l

elementsof theSFOB.Otherdetachmentpersonnelare

a ssign ed dut ies t o oper a te t he br iefin g cen ter a n dsupplementstaffelementsofthebase.

(c)The det achment may form t he Specia l Forces lia i son

detachmentwithafieldarmyorothertacticalcommand.

I n t his sit ua t ion t he det a ch men t is a t t a ch ed t o t he

ta ct ica l comma nd a nd exercises opera t iona l control for

t he t a ct ica l comma n der over design a ted guerr illa

warfareoperationareas(ch.8).

(d )Th e det a ch men t ca n est a blish a n a lt ern at e S FOB

h ea d qu a rt er s. I n t h is r ole a d dit ion a l per son nel a n dequipment a re provided from hea dqua rt ers a nd

headquarterscompanyandothersourcesasrequired.

(e)Th e det a ch men t ca n be em ploy ed oper a tion a lly t o

accomplishtasksappropriateforaCdetachment.

(f )More t ha n one a ugment at ion det achment ma y be

activatedforemploymentattheSFOB.

c. Admi n ist ra t i ve and Tr a in ing Elements. The admin is t r a t iv e

andtrainingelementsoftheSFOBconsistof(1)Administrativecenter. Th e a d m in is tr a t ive cen t er is t h e

facil it y wi th in which are grouped representa t ives of unit

a nd specia l s ta f f sect ions a nd other comma nds concerned

w it h cur ren t a d min ist ra t ive suppor t oper a t ion s, ba se

security, andareadamagecontrol. For furtherdiscussions,

seeparagraph29.

(2)L ogi sti cssuppor tel ement. This is a non-TOE grouping of

Special Forces a nd supporting technica lserviceunits from

CommZformedtosupport theSFOBandguerrilla warfare

opera t iona l ar ea s . The group S4 supervises opera t ions of

thelogisticssupportelementwhichincludes

(a)Organic elements of the Specia l Forces group: Supply

Section, MotorSection, ParachuteRiggingPlatoon,and

theMedicalSection.

(b)Supportingelementsasrequired: Transportat ionunits,

E n gin eer U t ilit y P er son nel, Or dn a nce 3d E ch elon

S uppor t, C ivilia n L a bor , QM Aer ia l S upply U n it s,MedicalUnits,andaLiaisonSectionfromCommZ.

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(3)Othersupportingunits. Althoughthegrouphaspersonnel

t o es t ablish t he SFOB, deploy det achment s and prov ide

lim it ed log is t ica l s uppor t , it r eq uir es a u gm en t a t ion t o

conduct support a ct iv it ies on a susta ined basis. CIC, base

secur it y and log is t ica l suppor t element s a re requ ired t o

suppor t in i t ia l opera t ions . As the number of opera t iona l a reas increases wi th the subsequent bui ldup in guerr il la

for ces, t h e a d min ist r a tive su ppor t oper a t ion s expa n d

correspondingly.Units,suchasthoseoutlinedinparagraph

(2) a b ov e, a r e r eq uir ed t o a u gm en t t h e S F OB . Milit a r y

police security units a nd counterintell igence corps teams

a re included a nd opera te under t he hea dqua rt ers

com ma n da nt a nd S 2, respect ively . An a rm y a via t ion

detachment maybea t tached to theSFOBtoprovidearmy

a v ia t ion su ppor t. An Ar my S ecu rit y Agen cy u nit m a y monitor communica t ions for secur ity . In some insta nces

technicalserviceunitsorinstallationsarenotlocatedatthe

SFOB but prov ide genera l or d irect suppor t a s a pa r t of

t h eir m is sion . I n t h is s it u a t ion , t h e S F OB exer cis es n o

operationalcontrolovertheunitsconcernedbutisserviced

as a " cus tomer " of the suppor t ing unit or ins ta l la t ion . An

exampleishigher-echelonordnanceandengineersupport.

(4)H eadquar ter s and headquar ter s com pany . The

headquar t er s and headquar t er s company , augment ed bytechnicalserviceandsecurityunits fromCommZ,handles

housekeeping a ct ivit ies a t t he S FOB . The compa ny

commander is theheadquarterscommandant .

(5)Specia l forces compan ies (uncomm i t ted un i t s). The

uncommit t ed companies and det achment s con t inue un it

prepara t ion and t ra in ing . These deta chments a re br iefed

f requent ly on the s itua t ion in the ir projected opera t iona l

areas .

SectionIII.CONTROLOFOPERATIONS

22. General

Th e S pecia l F or ces gr ou p or ga n izes fu nct ion a lly t o con t rol

opera t ions in guerrilla w a rfar eopera t iona la reas. Theelement sused

inthecontrolofoperationsare

(1)Operationcenter.(2)Briefingcenter.

(3)Communicationscomplex.

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23. OperationsCenter

a.General.TheoperationscenterisafunctionalgroupingofTOE

personnelwhocoordinateandcontroloperat ionsfor thecommander

oftheSFOB.

b. Funct i ons.

(1) Deta i led pla nning for guerr i lla w arfa re opera t iona l a rea s ,

t o in clude pr epa r a t ion of t he oper a tion pla n for ea ch

opera t iona l deta chment . This plan ning is based upon the

UWplansofthetheatercommander.

(2) Conductingbriefingsa ndsu pervisingotherprepara tionby

detachmentsassignedtothebriefingcenter.

(3)Coordinatingwithotherservicesandagenciesasnecessary.

(4) Exercising opera t iona l supervision over guerrilla w a r far e

operat ionalareas.

(5)Ma kin g r ecom men da t ion s con cer nin g em ploy men t of

guer r illa forces in suppor t of milit a ry opera t ions. This

includesreorganizationasnecessary.

(6) Acting a s the contr ola nd coordina ting center for guerrilla

warfareoperat ionalareas.

c. Composit i on(fig.10).

(1) S 3. Th e S 3 exer cises pr im a r y s ta f f r es pon sibilit y for

operationscenterandisthedirector.

(2)Plans element. The opera t ion s cen ter pla n s elem en t

conductsplanningforfutureoperations.Theplanselement

consists of theassis tant S2andassis tant S3plusenlis ted

a ugmenta t ion. The assista nt S3 is the of ficer-in-cha rge of

pla ns element . Once pla ns a re a pproved t hey a re

implementedbytheappropriateareaspecialistteam.

(3)S2operationselement. TheS2operationselementconsists

of t h e S 2, in t ellig en ce ser gea n t , in t elligen ce ed it or s,analysts,andorder-of-battlespecialists.Theyassembleand

eva lua t e in telligen ce in form at ion received fr om t he

opera t iona l a reas ; prepare and d is semina t e in t elligence

repor t s based on ev a lua t ed in forma t ion and in t elligence

reports from other headqua rters ; an d conduct intel ligence

br ief ings and debr ief ings. For a deta iled d iscussion , see

paragraph27.

(4)Assi stan t S4 (plans).Th e Assist a n t .S 4 (P l a ns) is t h elogist ica l coor din at or for t he Opera t ion s C en ter . H e

processes logist ica l requirements from the a rea specia l is t

t ea m s a n d is r es pon sible for log is tica l a ct ivit ies in t h e

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br ief ing center . He prepares the adminis t ra t ive annex totheguerrilla wa rfa rea reaopera t ionplans.

(5)Si gnal offi cer.Thesignalofficerissignalcoordinatorforthe

operationscenter.Hecoordinatessignalrequirementsfrom

a rea specia l is t t eams and is respons ib le for opera t iona l

signa l ma tt ers. H e prepa res t he signa l opera ting

ins t ruct ions and s igna l annex for guer r illa wa r fa re a rea

operationplans.

(6)Ar easpecia l i stteam s(AST s).TheASTsarethefocalpoint

of t he opera t ions cen t er . They a ss is t in precommit ment

pla nning, coordina te a ct ivit ies of t heir a ssigned

detachments in thebrief ingcenter , andact as theparents

ofthecommitteddetachments.TheASTconsistsofthearea

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s pecia l is t officer (a s sis ta n t S 3) a n d a n a r ea s uper vis or

(seniorNC O).Thist ea mm ust becomeexpertonth especific

a rea or count ry i t w i ll superv ise dur ing opera t ions . The

ASTactsasthecommitteddetachment'srearheadquarters,

andisresponsibleforfollowingthroughonalldirectivesto

a nd messa ges from commit ted det achment s. D ur ingpr ein filt r a t ion br iefin gs , a clos e r a ppor t is es ta b lis hed

betweenthedetachmentandtheAST.TheASTkeepsthe

commanderandstaff informedontheoperationalsituation.

(7)Communicat ion center. The communica t ions cent er ,

opera t ed by t he command opera t ions cen t er t eam of t he

communica t ions pla toon, is loca t ed in the v icin i ty of the

opera t ions cen t er s ince it prov ides t he communica t ions

centersupportfortheoperationscenterandotherelementsoftheSFOB.

(8)L iai son off icer s. Alt hough n ot a n int egra l pa r t of t he

opera t ions cen t er , t he lia i son of ficer s f rom t he v a r ious

services,fieldarmies,andalliedcountriesarelocatedthere.

They coord ina t e ma t t e rs of common in t eres t w i t h t heir

serv ices and na t ions and arra nge suppor t when required .

They keep the Specia l Forces group comma nder a nd sta f f

abreast of thesituat ionof theirrespectiveorganizat ionsast hese organ iza t ions in fluence guer r illa wa r fa re a reas of

interest.

24. BriefingCenter

a. Gener al.Thebriefingcenterprovidesforthefollowing:

(1)Housing.

(2)Messing.

(3)Briefinganddebriefing.

(4)Detachmentstudy.

(5) Dispensaryservice.

(6)Specialtraining.

(7)Storageandpackagingofaccompanyingsupplies.

(8)Limitedmoraleservices.

(9)Stagingofdetachmentstodeparturesites.

b. Oper at ion. Theentirea rea (a reas) isa ma ximum-security sitea ccessib le on ly t o t hose personnel who hav e a requ irement t o be

there. The opera t ions of the center a re superv ised by the S3. The

h ea d q ua r t er s com m a n da n t is r es pon sible for t h e a d m in is tr a t iv e

funct ioning a nd securit y of t he a rea . P ersonnel from t he

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a ugment a t ion det a chment a nd S pecia l Forces compa ny

administrativedetachmentoperatethebriefingcenter.

c. Functi on i ng.

(1) The director of the opera t ions center (S3) coordina tes the

brief ingandstagingact iv i t ies of thecenter . Heschedules

briefingsandarrangesforthestagingofthedetachmentsto

thedepa rture insta l la t ion. B rief ing personnel a re thea rea

specialist officersa nd the sta ff officers from theopera t ions

center,augmented,whenrequired,byothermembersofthe

group st a ff a nd a ppropr ia te lia ison officers. Oft en ,

specia l is t s f rom ot her headquar t er s, services and a l lied

governmentsparticipate.

(2) D et a ch m en t s pr epa r e t h eir ow n pla n s ba s ed u pon t h e

operat ionplanfor theguerrilla warfarearea. Detachments

packa getheirownequipment. P a ra chuteriggingsupport is

provideda snecessar y. Deta chmentsa rea ffordedma ximum

timetostudythematerialreceivedatbriefings.Sincemuch

ofthisinformationisclassified,it iscommittedtomemory.

Essent ia ls wh ich do not lend themselves to memoriza t ion

areminiaturized.

(3) Debriefingsa reconductedint hesam ema nn erasbriefings,

with recovered deta chments rema ining in isola t ion in thebriefingcenteruntilthedebriefingiscomplete.

(4) Det a chmentt ra iningconductedw hileint hebriefingcenter

islimitedtotha tessentia lforth eopera tionwh ichcouldnot

be con duct ed elsew h er e. N ew it em s of eq uipm en t or

weapons issued a t the las t minute require fami lia r iza t ion

or test f ir ing . Specif ic techniques rela t ing to in f ilt ra t ion

may hav e t o be t augh t . Iden t if ica t ion and recogn it ion of

n ew or specific it em s of en emy eq uipm en t m ay be a requirement. I f deta chmentsa re isolat edforrelat ively long

per iods of t ime, t ra in ing progra ms a re expa nded t o

maintainbasicskillsandphysicalfitness.

(5) Hospita lizat ion ofsickor injuredmembers ofdeta chments

preparingforcommitment isdonesofar a spossiblewithin

t he briefing cent er . A sma ll dispensa ry fa cilit y is

esta blished tocare for t hosepersonnelw hoseillness isnot

ser ious enough t o preclude pa rt icipa tion in t heir deta chment 's opera t iona l mission . The ser ious ly s ick or

in ju red a r e eva cu a t ed t o C om m Z m ed ica l in st a l la t ion s.

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Arrangementsaremadeto isolatesensit ivepersonnelwho

arehospitalizedoutsidethebriefingcenter.

(6) Thesta gingofdeta chments in t hedepart ure installat ionis

arrangedbytheS3.TheASTsaredirectlyresponsible for

the opera t ion and accompany the ir deta chments f rom the

briefing cent er t o t he depa rt ure inst a lla tion . The

requirementsof thedeliveryagencypertainingtopreflight

or embarka t ion brief ings a re coord ina t ed in adv ance. I f

necessa ry , a r r angement s a re made for secure housing a t

thedeparture installat ion.

25. SFOBCommunicationsComplex

a.Or gan i zat i onoftheCommun i cat i onsPl at oon(figs.11and12).

(1) The communica t ions pla toon headqua r ters prov ides the

group signa l of ficer with thenecessary a dministra t ive a nd

supplypersonnelfortheoperationsoftheplatoon.

(2) Th e com ma n d oper at ion s cen ter t ea m opera t es t he

communica t ions cen t er serving t he SFOB. The forwa rd

opera tionscentertea mprovidesacomma nda ndcont rol

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f a cilit y for t he receiv er and t r ansmit t er s it es . The forwa rd

receiv ing cen t er and t he forwa rd t r ansmit t ing cen t er t eams

opera tethereceivera ndtr a nsmit tersites,respectively.

b. Capabi l i ti es.

(1) Opera te te lephone service within the SFOB . The pla toon

ins t a lls t he t elephones t o be used w i t h in t he SFOB and

operatesatelephoneswitchboard.

(2) Termina t e lines f rom ot her headquar t er s. The pr imary

m ea n s of com mu nica t ion t o J U WTF a n d ot h er t h ea t er

agencieswithinfriendlyterritoryistelephoneandteletype.

Thea t er a rmy s igna l t roops ins ta l l these long wire lines .

Th e com m un ica t ion s pla t oon t er m in a t es t h es e lin es in

teletype,on-linecrypto,crypto,cryptospeechequipment,or

telephone.

(3) Opera t e base receiv er and t r ansmit t er s it es . The SFOB

receiver and t ransmit ter s ites may be separa ted f rom the

ba se by a con sidera ble dist a nce. The ba se pr oper is

connectedtothereceiverandtransmittersitesbylandline,

telephoneandteletype. Suchlinesareprovidedbytheater

signalagencies.

(4) P r ovid e r a dio t elet y pe ba ck-u p. Th e com mu nica t ion spla t oon provides ra dio te letype back-up to the land l ines

betweentheSFOBandthereceiverandtransmittersites.

(5) Operat e the commun ica tions center. The communications

pla t oon , en cr ypt s a n d d ecr ypt s m essa g es a n d a ct s a s a

centra l andclear ingcenter for theremote t ransmit ter and

receiversites.

c. Responsi bi l i t i esofth esi gnal offi cer.Thegroupsignalofficeris

responsiblefor(1) Det ermin ing opera t ing f requencies and communica t ion

secur it y m ea sur es n ecessa r y t o in sur e r elia ble r a dio

communicationswithoperationaldetachments.

(2) Obta in ing f requencies as necessary and coord ina t ing the

useofallfrequencieswiththesupportingsignalofficer.

(3)Signa lpla nningandpublishingnecessar ySOIsandSS Is.

(4) P l a n n in g, r eq u es tin g a n d coor din a t in g t h e en gin eer in g

ass is t ance necessary for the des ign of antenna fa rms and

keyinglines.

(5) R eques t ing ma t e ria l necessa ry t o ins t a ll t hese an t enna

farmsandkeyinglines.

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(6) Request ing s igna l suppor t necessary to ins ta l l long and

loca l w ire lines, e.g., S FOB t o inst a lla t ions of t he

communicationcomplex.

(7) Request ing the te lephone and te letype t runks necessary

fortheoperationoftheSFOB.

(8)AdvisingthegroupS4onsignalsupplymatters.

(9) Supervising tra ining of the group communications section

a ndw hendirectedtra iningofa llcommunicat ionpersonnel

inthegroup.

d . Si gna l Pl ann i ng.

(1) Ad va n ce pla nning is necessa ry t o provide relia ble

communica t ions betw een the SFOB and guerr ill a wa r fa re

opera t iona l a reas. The d is t ances bet ween t he SFOB and

det a ch men ts, t he com munica t ion secur it y problem spresented by opera t ing f rom wi th in enemy terr itory , and

t h e low -pow er com mu nica t ion eq uipm en t u sed by t h e

det a ch men ts a ll presen t t ech nica l problems. P r oper

frequencies must be chosen a rid t he use of t hese

f requencies coord ina ted wi th the thea t er s igna l of ficer if

comm unicat ionsa retobereliable.Forfurth erdiscussionof

communicationsconsiderations,seechapters5and7.

(2) The group s igna l of ficer insures tha t the J UWTF s igna l

officer isawareofall aspectsofhisproblemto includetheextentofsignalsupportrequired.

(3) Theplanning must be donea s far ina dvance a s possible;

t h e r elia b ilit y of t h e com mu nica t ion s w ill be d ir ect ly

proportionaltopriorplanningandsupervision.

26. Plans

P la n nin g, pa rt icula r ly prior t o comm it men t of oper at ion al

detachments,isoneofthemajorfunctionsofthespecialforcesgroup.TheS3plansgroupisthefocalpointofplanningfunctions.TheASTs,

superv ised by the ass is t ant .S3 (plans) and ass is ted by other s t a f f

officers, a ccomplish opera t iona l pla nning. Considering the loca t ion,

the mission and the u lt imate developmenta l object ives , the ASTs

prepare t he opera t ion plans for t he guer r illa wa r fa re opera t iona l

areas.Planningiscontinuousandplansarerevisedasrequired.Wide

la t i tu de for t h e oper a t ion a l d et a ch m en t is t h e r ule for g uer rilla

w a rfa re oper a tion pla n s. Th e select ion of a det a ch men t for a

par t icu lar miss ion is based on severa l factors , chief of which are :t ra iningsta tusof thedetachment and theabi l i ty andexperienceof

the deta chment commander . For secur ity reasons , detachments do

not hav e access t o opera t ion plans un t il a s s igned t o t he b rief ing

cen t er . H ow ev er , t o fa cilit a t e a r ea s t ud ies , g eog ra ph ica l r eg ion s

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(w hichincludethedeta chment s'specificguerrilla wa rfa reopera tiona l

areas)areassignedinadvance.

27. IntelligenceSection

a.General. The intelligencesection oft hespecial forcesg roupis

responsibleforthefollowing:(1) Int elligencetr a ining .

(2) Furnishing intelligence todeta chments prior toa nd a fter

commitment.

(3) Conduct ingint elligencebriefingsa nd debriefings .

(4) Field evalua tion of intelligence informa tion received from

guerrilla warfareoperat ionalareas.

(5) Counterintelligence.

(6) Su pervisory responsibilitiesincoordina tionw ith th eS1for

the exter ior and in terior secur ity of the opera t iona l base

andimplementationofasecurity-educationprogram.

b. Or gan i zati onandFuncti ons.

(1)S2. The S2 supervises t he act iv it ies of t he in t elligence

sect ion , keeps t he commander and s t a ff in formed of t he

in t ellig en ce s it u a t ion , a n d coor din a t es w i th ot h er s ta f f

sectionsandagencies.

(2)Admin is t ra t ionandt ra in ing . In te ll igence adminis t ra t ion andtrainingisunderthesupervisionofthetrainingofficer.

Heplans a ndsupervises intelligencetr a iningan dconducts

rout ineadministra t ion for thesect ionsuchasprocessing

secur it y clea ra nces , hand ling cla ss ified document s, and

distributionofintelligencematerialwithintheSFOB.

(3)Intel l igenceplanning. Th e a s sist a n t S 2 is t h e pr in cipa l

in t elligence planner a t t he SFOB. H e represen t s t he S2

sectionin thetact icaloperat ionscenterplanselement. He

conducts intel ligence pla nning, prepares the intel ligence

annexesfortheoperationplans,andcoordinateswithother

personneloftheintelligencesectionforspecificintelligence

supportrequired.

(4)Intelligenceoperations. TheS2directs theact ivit iesof the

intelligencesergeants, intelligenceeditorandanalystsand

the order of ba t t le specia li st s to prov ide the in tell igence

suppor t t o guer r illa wa r fa re opera t iona l a reas and ot her

headqua r ters . These personnel prepare es t imates , plans , and summaries , rout ine and specia l in te lligence repor t s ,

process informa tion received from a nd furnish intelligence

tocommit teddetachments , prepareandmainta inorder of

battlefiles,coordinateintelligencematterswithotherunits

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and headqua r ters , and prepare and conduct br ief ings a nd

debriefings.

c. Attached or Suppor t i ng I ntel l igence El ements. Th e specia l

forces group opera t ing f rom an SFOB requires addi t iona l mili t a ry

in te lligence suppor t tha n tha t which is organica l ly ava i lab le. The

gr oup h a s n o coun ter in telligen ce ca pa bilit y a n d r eq uir es C IC augmenta t ion . Addit iona l mili t a ry in te lligence specia lis t s may be

attachedtoassistinbriefingdetachments.

SectionIV.CONTROLOFADMINISTRATIVEANDTRAININGACTIVITIES

28. General

a. Thespecial forcesgroupestablishesanadministrat ivecenter

a t theSF OB tocontr ola dministra t iveandtra ininga ct ivit ies.

b. The specia l forces g roup execu t iv e of ficer supervises t he

adminis t ra t ive center and o ther e lements loca ted a t the SFOB tha t

a reengagedina dministra t iveandtra ininga ct ivit ies.

29. AdministrativeCenter

(fig . 13)

a.Composi t i on.Theadministrativecenterconsistsof

(1)Theexecutiveofficerw hoisth edirector .

(2)GroupS1.

(3)GroupS4.

(4) Tra ining officer,S2Section.

(5) Tra ining officer,S3Section.

(6)Enlistedspecialistsasrequired.

b. Funct ion ing. Th e a d m in is tr a t ive cen t er pla n s a n d con t r ols

a d min ist ra t ive a n d t ra in in g a ct ivit y a t t h e ba s e a n d d ir ect s t h e

var ious sect ions, units a r id a t ta ched elements in execut ion of their

suppor t t a sks . Through coord ina t ed plann ing t he admin is t ra t ive

center insures that guerrilla warfareoperat ionalareasandtheSFOB

receive t he a dminist ra tive suppor t t hey require a nd t ha t

uncommittedoperationaldetachmentsaretrainedfortheirmissions.

30. Training

Traininga t theSFOBis accomplishedunder twocondit ions that conductedpriortoisolationinthebriefingcenterandthatconducted

in the br ief ing center. Tra in ing pr ior to receipt of an opera t iona l

missionisintendedtokeepth edeta chm enta titspeak,totea ch

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specific t ech niq ues a pplica ble t o pr oject ed oper a tion s a n d t o

familiarizepersonnelwithnewequipment. Trainingconductedafter

ass ignment to the br ief ing center may include any or a l l of these,

timepermitting.Trainingareasincluderangefacilitiesfortest-firing

andzeroingweaponsand t ra iningwithnewequipment . Inaddit ion,

pla n s a r e pr epa r ed t o t ra in r epla cem en ts a n d/or r epla cem en t

d et a ch m en t s. Tr a in in g s uper vision is a ccom plis hed t h r ou gh t h e

norma l cha in of command . The S3 t r a in ing of ficer exercises s t a f f

supervisionoftraining.

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31. Administration

a . S1. Thefunctionsofanyunit S1areapplicable to thespecial

forcesgroupS1;however,theymustbemodifiedtomeetthesituation

whichexistsafterdeploymentofoperationaldetachments.Obviously

theact ionswhichare normal inother mil i tary units are di f f icul t or

impossibletoaccomplishwhendealingwithcommittedspecialforcespersonnel.TheS1preparesSOP'stocoverforeseeablecontingencies

and t akes s t eps t o accomplish rou t ine personnel ma t t e rs pr ior t o

commitment.Personnelactionsrequiringasoldier'sapprovalafterhe

is in t he opera t iona l a rea shou ld be prepared in brev it y codes t o

reduce r a dio t ra n sm ission s. Th e S 1 con duct s port ion s of t he

predeploymentbriefinginthebriefingcenter.Certainfunctionsofthe

specia l forces group S1 ar e discussed w herein they ar e peculia r to

deployedpersonnel.

(1)Strengths. S t a t us of per son nel is r epor t ed on ly w h en a change t akes place, i.e. wounded , missing , cap t ured , or

killed.

(2)Replacements. Th e pr ovis ion s of r epla cem en t s d epen ds

uponth eca pabilityoftheopera tiona ldeta chm enttoreceive

t h em a n d t h ea t er s er vice com pon en t s t o d eliv er t h em .

Replacementsa reprovidedona nindividua lordeta chment

basis.

(3)Discip l i ne, law and ord er. C om ma n der s of com mit t ed det a chment s a re given a clea r st a tement of t heir

disciplina ry a ut horit y a s delega ted by t he h igher

commander.

(4)POWs. The hand ling of pr isoners w i ll depend upon t he

exigenciesof thesituat ionandisgovernedbythefact that

theU.S. is f irmlycommittedtohumanetreatmentandcare

ofPOWs.

(5)Burialsandgravesregistration. Theater armyprescr ibes

guida n ce for r epor tin g a n d/or m a rkin g gr a ves w it hin guerrilla warfareoperat ionalareas.

(6)M or al eandper sonnel ser vi ces. Detachment comma nders'

r ecommenda t ions for aw ards a re processed prompt ly or

a ut horit y t o a w a rd cert a in decora t ions is given t he

det a chment comma nders. Ma il is ha ndled by a

prees tab lished system; au tomat ic answers a re d ispa t ched

w h en d es ir ed by in divid ua l s; per iod ic d eliver y m a y be

possible w i t h resupply d rops if secur it y cons idera t ions

permit . P er sona l necessit ies a re prov ided au t oma t ica l ly

w it h resupply . These norma lly a re procured from

in digen ou s sou rces or specia lly pa cka g ed t o pr eser ve

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securityandareprovidedforbothdetachmentandguerrilla

personnel.

(7)Per sonn el pr ocedu r es. P r om ot ion r ecom men da t ion s a r e

prepa redinadva ncetobeimplement edw henrecommended

by t he det achment comma nder . D emot ion a ut horit y

delega t ed t o det achment commanders is ou t lined by t hetheaterarmycommander.

(8)M iscel l aneous. P olicies cover in g pa y or r ecogn it ion for

indigenoustroopsareoutlinedbythetheatercommander.

Wh en r eq uir ed, con fiden tia l fun ds a re issued t o t he

deta chment commander. B ar t er i tems, such as medicine,

gold, orotherscarce items,are issuedorheldfordelivery

on or der . C r ed it s ys tem s for ser vices r en der ed m a y be

established.TheS1insures that , prior to thedepartureof

deta chments for guerr il la wa r fa re opera t iona l a reas , eachmanisgivenacompletepersonnelprocessinginaccordance

with theSOP.

b. Di st r ibut i on center. Th e S 1 est a blish es a n d super vises a

dist r ibut ion center for the orderly ha ndling of correspondence into,

withinandoutoftheheadquarters.Thiscentercontrolsallmessages

except those origina ting. from committ ed detachments or TOC. The

com m un ica t ion cen t er oper a t ed by t h e com m un ica t ion s pla t oon

controlsmessagestoandfromcommitteddetachments.

32. Logistics

a.General. Th e logist ica l r espon sibilit ies of t he S FOB a r e

t wofold : f ir st , suppor t of t he guer r illa wa r fa re opera t iona l a reas;

secon d, su ppor t of t h e S F OB a n d ot h er u ncon ven t ion a l w a r fa r e

elem en ts a s design a ted. To t his en d, t he specia l for ces gr oup

organizesalogisticalsupportelement.

The log is t ica l suppor t element includes organic specia l forces

group log is t ics sect ions plus any a t t a ched or suppor t ing log is t ica l unit s f rom other headquar t ers and/or CommZ. The specia l forces

group S4 norma lly controls the opera t ions of the logist ica l support

elem en t . Wh en t h e log is tica l su ppor t of t h e S F OB r ea ch es su ch

magni tude tha t numerous a t t a ched or suppor t ing serv ice elements

a re required , then a separa te commander of the log is t ica l suppor t

elementisa ppoint edfromCommZsourcestoa ssistt hespecialforces

groupS4.

b.Or gan i zati on. F or a t ypica l logist ica l or ga n iza t ion in t he

SFOB,seefigure14.

c. Plann ing. Theassistant S4functionsas the logist icalplanner

for t he S4 sect ion . The a ss is t an t S4 prepares t he admin is t ra t ive

a nnexes for t he guerr illa w a rfa re a rea s opera t ion pla ns. H e

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coor din at es w it h S 3 pla ns group in t he pr epa ra t ion of t heseadministrat iveannexes. Theassistant S4is theS4representat ive in

TOC.

d. L ogist ica l Oper at ions at the SFOB. The log is t ica l suppor t

elementcoordinateslogisticalsupportforallelementsofthebaseand

the guerr i lla wa rfare opera t iona l a rea s . The fol lowing a re provided

for:

(1)Requirements. A con t inu ing rev iew of requ irement s and

submissionoftheserequirementstotheappropriatesupplyagency.

(2)Limitedstorage. The SFOB is prepared t o prov ide shor t

term stora ge for supplies . This s tora ge is only tempora ry

un t il supplies a re packaged and shipped t o t he deliv ery

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agency . Large s tocks of suppl ies a re not des irab le a t the

SFOB ; however , nonstandard or specia l items are s tored

thereforlongerperiodsoftime.

(3)Preparationofsupplies. Normal ly , suppl ies a re specia lly

pa cka ged for a er ia l delivery . P a cka ging is in it ia lly

a ccom plish ed u nd er t h e su per vision of t h e pa r a ch ut e-r igging pla t oon a ssis ted by uncommit ted deta chments . As

soon a s possible, QM a eria l supply unit s a ssume

respons ibilit y for packag ing , t ak ing adv an t age of depot

ca pa bilit ies. C ivilia n la bor ma y be employed in t his

opera t ion . P ackag ing may expand to a s izeable opera t ion

and is accomplished inanarea near theSFOBor adjacent

t o t h e d epa r t ur e in st a lla t ion . Wh en a ir su per ior it y is

achievedandregularsupplyschedulesforbulksuppliesare

esta blished, the emphasis shif ts from small, ma n-porta blebundles to largepackageswhichareheavy-droppedorair-

landed . When the packag ing capabil it y exis t s in CommZ

depots, theSFOBdoesnot requireanextensivepackaging

act ivity.

(4)Coordinat ion. A lia ison sect ion a t ta ch ed t o logist ica l

suppor t elem en t coordin a tes w it h t hea t er logist ica l

a g en cies . Th is s ect ion , com pos ed of C om m Z a n d ot h er

services ' log is t ica l represen t a t ives , exped it es log is t ica l

matters for theSFOB.

(5)Suppor tofoth er unconven t i ona l war fa r eun i tsan dat tached

supportingunits. TheSFOBsupports addit ional units and

elements designat ed in pla ns. This ma y include technica l

ser vice a nd suppor t elem en ts a t t he ba se plus ot her

unconventiona lw a rfa reunitssucha stheJ U WTF.

(6)Shipment of suppl i es to the del i very agency. This is

norma lly t he respons ib ilit y of t he SFOB. Because of t he

pa cka gin g r eq uir ed, it usua lly is n ot fea sible t o sh ipsuppliesdirectlyfromdepotstodepartureinstallations.Ifa

packag ing faci li t y i s loca t ed a t the depar ture point , then

supplies ma y be del ivered direct from depot to departure

insta l la t ion by CommZ. I f packaging ca n be a ccomplished

a t t he depot s, t he flow of supplies t o t he depa rt ur e

installat ionbypasses theSFOB.

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CHAPTER5

THEATERSUPPORT

SectionI.LOGISTICS

33. General

a.Su ppor tAspects. Within a thea t er of opera t ions one or more

specia l for ces gr oups m a y be a va ila ble t o suppor t t he t hea t er

comma nder 's mission. Aside from the organ iza t ion precepts wh ich

wereset forth inchapters3and4, therearecertainsupport aspects

wh icha re discussed fromt hepoint ofv iew of t he theater a ndS FOB

plan ners. These support concepts are discussed under the general

h ea d in gs of log is tics , in t ellig en ce, com m un ica t i on s, a n d in it ia l

contact.

b.L ogisti cs. Oneof theprimarymeansusedbyanoutsidepower

to a ssis t a guerr i lla movement is logist ica l support . While guerr i lla

forces a re expected to be ab le to prov ide a major por t ion of the ir

log ist ica l r eq uir em en t s fr om loca l sour ces, cer ta in specia lized

equipment must be obta ined from the sponsor. Numerous problems

maybeencounteredinprovidingadequatesupport toguerrilla unitsw h ich u su a lly a r e loca t ed g rea t d is ta n ces f rom fr ien dly s uppor t

insta l la t ions. The physical problems of t ra nsport ing a nd del ivering

un det ect ed , r ela t ively la r ge q ua n tit ies of supplies in cr ea se in

proportiontothedistanceintoenemy-dominatedterritory.However,

guer r illa log is t ica l requ irement s a re sma ller in quan t it y and less

complexthanthosefoundinaconventionalforceofcomparablesize.

Thistendstooffsetsomeofthedisadvantages.

34. JUWTFTh e J U WTF is r es pon sible t o t h e t h ea t er com m a n der for t h e

conduct of unconvent iona l wa r fa re, but each component serv ice is

responsib le for the log is t ica l suppor t of i t s own forces ass igned to

J U WTF. The J U WTF prepa res, or a ssist s in prepa ring, t he

unconvent iona l war fa re annex to thea ter war p lans , and p lans and

coor din a tes a ll logist ica l suppor t for un con ven tion a l w a r fa r e

operat ions in thetheater. Servicecomponentcommandersunder the

J U WTFa redesigna tedbut a renotinth echa inofcomma ndun til the

J U WTF becomes opera t iona l . For this rea son, J U WTF ha s to workd ir ect ly w i t h t h e log ist ica l h ea d q ua r t er s of ea ch t h ea t er ser vice

componentandinsurethesupportofArmy,Navy,orAirForceunits

t ha t ma y be a t t a ched t o J U WTF. The specia l forces group

commandingofficer,ascommanderoftheSFOB,isusuallytheArmy

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49/263

component comma nder. J U WTFh eadqua rtersprovides thea tera rmy

communicationszone(CommZ)with logist icalest imates forsupport

of t h e S F OB , t h e com m it t ed specia l for ces d et a ch m en t s a n d t h e

g uer rilla for ces t o be g en er a t ed . Th is t y pe of pla n n in g en t a ils a

myr iad of deta il and is made more complex by the many d if ferent

r eq uir em en t s r es ult in g fr om t h e v a r ied g eog ra p hic loca t ion s ofguerrilla warfareoperat ionalareasandthevaryingsizesofpotential

guerrillaforces.

35. J4

S in ce J U WTF h as no subordina t e h ea dq ua rt ers, t roops, or

log is t ica l suppor t capabili t y unt il opera t ions s t a r t , the J UWTF J 4

usuallydoesnotsupervisethephysicalfunctionsoflogisticalsupport,

but he is theprimarys ta f f plannerandcoordinator who insure that

adequatemeansareprovided.TherecommendationsandrequestsofJ U WTF a re in corpor at ed in to t hea t er h ea dq ua rt ers' pla ns or

direct ives . This s tar ts the physica l process of providing the needed

logisticalsupport.

36. TheaterArmy

The commander of the thea ter a rmy CommZ is responsib le for

providingadministrativeandlogisticalsupporttospecialforcesunits

loca t ed in the thea ter and to other thea ter unconvent iona l wa r fa re

forces as d irected . The ac tua l mechanics of procurement , receipt , s torage , maintenance, d is t r ibut ion of supplies and equipment , and

theprovidingofservicesandfacilitiesthatareneededtosupportthe

Army port ion of unconvent iona l wa rfare opera t ions, dif fer l it t le, i f

a ny, from the mecha nicsofconventiona lunit logist ica lsupport . Any

necessa ry devia t ions a re det ermined by direct p

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