This article was downloaded by: [The Aga Khan University]On: 10 October 2014, At: 23:54Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

African Security ReviewPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscriptioninformation:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20

GUINEA-BISSAUPATRÍCIA MAGALHÃES FERREIRA aa Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI—Institute for Strategicand International Studies) and Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas(ISCSP—Institute of Social and Political Sciences) , LisbonPublished online: 21 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: PATRÍCIA MAGALHÃES FERREIRA (2004) GUINEA-BISSAU, African Security Review, 13:4, 44-56,DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2004.9627317

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2004.9627317

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”)contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitabilityfor any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinionsand views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy ofthe Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arisingdirectly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distributionin any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

GUINEA-BISSAUBetween conflict and democracy

PATRÍCIA MAGALHÃES FERREIRA

SOMALIAPlus ça change...?RICHARD CORNWELL

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY REFORM PROCESS INTHE DRC

HENRI BOSHOFF

TRENDS AND MARKERSRecent data, statistics and indicators

A F R I C A WA T C H

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 43

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Introduction

Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974,after a 13-year liberation struggle againstPortuguese colonial rule by the Partido Africanoda Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (AfricanParty for the Independence of Guinea andCape Verde - PAIGC), which had been formedin 1956 and was led by Amílcar Cabral until hewas assassinated in 1973. One of the poorestcountries in the world, Guinea-Bissau’s socialindicators are well below the sub-Saharan aver-age. Two-thirds of its inhabitants live below thepoverty line.

Although Guinea-Bissau is a small country(only 36 120 square kilometres) its 1,5 millionpeople are among Africa's most diverse in termsof ethnic and religious affiliations. Guineansociety comprises some 40 ethnic groups,which are generally classified under five head-ings: the Balante (30%), the Fula (20%), the

Mandingo (13%), the Papel (13%) and theManjaco (14%). Some 45% of the populationpractise traditional religion, 40% (mainly theFula and the Mandingo) are Muslim, and 13%are Christian. This diversity is also evident atlinguistic level. Although Portuguese is the offi-cial language and French has increasingly beenused in recent times, various local languages arealso spoken.

Between 1974 and 1980 Guinea-Bissau andCape Verde were ruled as separate countries bythe PAIGC under the presidency of LuísCabral, Amílcar Cabral's brother. The originalintention was that the two territories wouldsoon unite, although the reconciliation of thedisparate interests of the two was not particu-larly easy. A major reason was that the party,public administration and armed forces ofGuinea-Bissau were dominated by the mestizointellectual minority that represented only 2%of the Guinean population. On 14 November

GUINEA-BISSAU Between conflict and democracy

PATRÍCIA MAGALHÃES FERREIRA

PATRÍCIA MAGALHÃES FERREIRA is a Researcher at the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI - Institutefor Strategic and International Studies) and guest assistant lecturer at the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas(ISCSP - Institute of Social and Political Sciences), Lisbon.

AFRICA WATCH

Guinea-Bissau is currently living through a decisive period in its political history. Marked bygovernmental instability, particularly since 1998, the country suffered another coup d’état inSeptember 2003. Since then a transitional period has led up to the March 2004 legislative elec-tions. It is hoped this transitional arrangement will end after the presidential elections scheduledfor March 2005. This commentary analyses recent political developments and current political and military dynam-ics in the context of the many political and economic challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. It also dis-cusses the possible outcomes of the transition and outlines the main challenges facing thecountry’s government in the near future.

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 45

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

1980 Major João Bernardo (‘Nino’) Vieiramounted a successful coup in Bissau after dis-agreements with Luís Cabral over proposedconstitutional amendments. The coup endedall thought of union with Cape Verde.Relations were severed, and a few months laterthe Cape Verdean wing of the PAIGCrenamed itself and formed a new governmentfor the islands.

The first decade of the regime in Guinea-Bissau was marked by power struggles withinthe party, the abolition of the post of primeminister, and the emergence of a personalitycult through a concentration of presidentialpowers. In 1985 Vice-President Paulo Correiawas among six leading political figures whowere executed for attempting a coup.

Under pressure from the internationalcommunity, especially France and Portugal,Nino Vieira allowed a gradual internal liberal-isation of the political regime, with a view toimplementing full democracy. In 1990 heaccepted the principles of a multiparty politi-cal system. The years that followed represent-ed a period of transition during which newpolitical parties were formed, the freedom ofthe press was established, trade union activitywas permitted, and the death penalty wasabolished. Though the first multiparty elec-tions, in July/August 1994, did not lead to anychange in the allocation of power,1 theymarked the beginning of an increase in politi-cal activity on the part of the opposition.

The 1998–1999 conflict

Despite the economic progress from the mid-1990s onwards, Nino Vieira’s regime was weak-ened by its ingrained authoritarianism, whichfostered discontent among the political opposi-tion and the military. Attempts to modernisethe armed forces by promoting younger sol-diers and demobilising the veterans of the lib-eration struggle who had constituted the armedwing of the PAIGC, delays in the payment ofsalaries, and political interference in the man-agement of the military all contributed to theemergence of violent conflict. The trigger forrevolt was the forced retirement of the Chief ofthe Armed Forces, Brigadier Ansumane Mané,

because of his alleged assistance to the sepa-ratist rebel movement in Casamance provincein neighbouring Senegal.

The military uprising of 7 June 1998 led tonine months of civil war during which 2 000people died, economic and social activitieswere paralysed, and most of the existing infra-structure was destroyed. Despite the interven-tion of the troops of Guinea-Bissau’sneighbours, Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, insupport of the president, and prompt expres-sions of international disapproval of therevolt against the democratically elected gov-ernment, the military junta leading the insur-rection had the support of the population andof most of the armed forces.2

After various negotiation attempts andfailed agreements,3 the armed conflict endedwith the signing of the Peace Agreement ofAbuja in November 1998, following the com-bined mediation efforts of the Comunidade dosPaíses de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP –Community of Portuguese-Speaking Coun-tries)4 and the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS). The agreementenvisaged a sharing of power between the bel-ligerent forces; the creation of a government ofnational unity that would facilitate the holdingof elections; the withdrawal of foreign troopsfrom Guinea-Bissau; and the establishment ofa small ECOMOG (ECOWAS Cease-FireMonitoring Group) peace-keeping force to sup-port the implementation of these terms.

However, the creation of the new govern-ment of national unity in February 1999 failedto prevent the escalation of tensions betweenthe president and the military, especially overdisarming the presidential guard. After severalceasefire violations and meetings betweenNino Vieira and Ansumane Mané, NinoVieira was deposed in May and was grantedpolitical asylum by Portugal. In the meantime,the military junta announced that it had nointention of assuming power, and expressedits confidence in the leader of the transitionalgovernment, Francisco Fadul. A steadyimprovement in political and security condi-tions in Guinea-Bissau culminated in thewithdrawal of the last ECOMOG peacekeep-ing forces in July 1999.

46 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 46

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

General Ansumane Mané in November 2000in the course of an unsuccessful attempt bythe government to reassert control over thearmy. This introduced new dynamics to thesituation and instantly produced a new martyrin the eyes of the population. It brought theissue of religious identity into the publicdomain, as the Muslim leaders of the wholeregion went to Bissau to pay homage to thebrigadier and mourn his death. But the incidentcontributed to the creation of new ‘Ansumanes’within the heart of the military. These wereindividuals capable of exercising a great deal ofinfluence over the political situation.

At governmental level the relationshipbetween the two parties that formed the baseof the elected government – the PRS and theRGB-Movimento Bafatá (RGB-MB) – becameproblematic. A particular source of dissatisfac-tion was the president’s constant replacementof ministers and rotation of high-ranking offi-cials,6 chosen mainly according to politicalcriteria rather than on merit, which weakenedthe stability and legitimacy of the newlyformed government, and culminated in thecollapse of the coalition. The dissolution ofthe alliance occurred in January 2001, afteranother unexpected ministerial reshuffle thathad been ordered by the president led to themass resignation from the government of allRGB-MB members. This aggravated theatmosphere of political instability (given thatthe PRS lacked the parliamentary majoritynecessary to govern), and exacerbated the ten-sions between the rival political forces, as noconsolidation of a democratic culture hadbeen achieved within the country’s publicinstitutions.

Between April and May 2001 the countryin effect operated without a governmentbecause of continual friction between the leg-islative and executive sectors of the adminis-tration. The dismissal of senior judges of theSupreme Court on political grounds – a clearviolation of the Guinean constitution andinternational law – illustrated the threats tothe independence of the judiciary and to therule of law posed by Ialá’s regime.7 The occur-rence of various unsuccessful coups d’état in2001 reflected the fragility of the democratisa-

But the positive internal political signsfrom the transitional government – includingtransparency in the management of stateresources, the introduction of human rightsmonitoring mechanisms, a reduction in mili-tary interference in the political sphere and theinvolvement of civil society in the reconstruc-tion of the country – were not complementedby international support, either financially orpolitically. Of the US$220 million pledged atthe May 1999 donors’ Round TableConference for Guinea-Bissau in Geneva, onlyUS$6 million was transferred to the countrybetween the end of the conflict and the hold-ing of elections. This led to a general feeling offrustration and disappointment in Guinea-Bissau: the international community wasregarded as having reneged on its commit-ments. The delays in the allocation of interna-tional funds, allegedly because of the departureof President Nino Vieira (which was regardedby the donors as a ‘new political fact’), made itimpossible for the government of nationalunity to carry out its programmes, thus delay-ing important development measures.

The multiparty elections of 1999 andKumba Ialá’s government

Kumba Ialá and the Partido da RenovaçãoSocial (PRS – Social Renewal Party) won thelegislative and presidential elections at the endof 1999,5 thanks largely to the Balante vote.This ethnic group, which made up AmílcarCabral's main fighting force during thenational liberation struggle, had subsequentlybeen marginalised by the Nino Vieira regime.

The internal disagreements that were toimpede the normalisation of Guinean politi-cal life demonstrate that just as formal peacedoes not necessarily imply stability, so the for-mal holding of elections does not guarantee asuccessful democratic transition. After theelections, the contest for legitimacy between ademocratically elected government and a mil-itary junta whose leader continued to have sta-tus equal to that of the president of therepublic led to the deterioration of an alreadyvery fragile political balance. The problem was‘resolved’ by the assassination of Brigadier-

Africa Watch 47

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 47

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

tion process in Guinea-Bissau and the govern-ment’s lack of internal and external credibili-ty. The competence of the PRS to manage thetransition effectively came increasingly intoquestion, and the incapacity and inexperienceof the various members of the administrationaffected its ability to satisfy the most basicneeds of the population.

In 2002 the criticism levelled againstKumba Ialá’s rule increased. Social dissatisfac-tion manifested itself in constant protests andstrikes throughout a capital city in which noteven the provision of water and light wasassured. At the external level, the apparentlyunconditional support of the internationalbodies that had welcomed the formation of ademocratically elected government started towane from 2002 in response to the low levelof efficient internal governance. For example,the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sus-pended budgetary assistance to the Guineangovernment and abandoned all attempts toimplement its Poverty Reduction and GrowthFacility (PRSP), an essential component in thepartnership between the Guinean governmentand the donor community.

As the president’s political base narrowedhe became increasingly reliant on ethnic sup-port. In effect, the 1998 conflict and theuneasy post-electoral balance of power led toan increase in the importance given to ethnicidentity. At that time the Balante held theoverwhelming majority of high-ranking andintermediate posts in the public administra-tion; so much so that various commentatorsspoke of the ‘Balantasation’ of Guineanpolitical life.

The constant violations of human rightsthat were perpetrated in this period con-tributed to the deterioration of internal stabil-ity. The limitation of access to newspapersexperienced by some of the opposition par-ties, the closing of radio stations and the pro-hibition of television transmissions reflectedthe constraints that were placed on the mediain Bissau. Moreover, the dissolution of theNational Assembly by Kumba Ialá on 14November 2002 illustrated the dominance ofthe executive over the legislature and judici-ary, and the weakness of the country’s public

institutions. The government’s collapse in thesame month plunged the country into a situ-ation of total paralysis, for which the newexecutive named by the president seemedunable to offer a viable alternative.

The constant replacements of prime minis-ters and other members of the government onpresidential whim, coupled with his unstruc-tured speeches and irrational publicannouncements (such as his intention of mov-ing the capital to Buba, a small city 200 kilo-metres away from Bissau, or his threat toinvade Gambia) raised doubts about PresidentIalá’s mental health, particularly from 2002onwards.

The holding of early elections was seen asthe only way out of the profound crisis inwhich Guinean society found itself.Nevertheless, the elections set for 20 April2003 were delayed several times – to 6 Julyand then to 12 October – allegedly because ofthe lack of an accurate voters’ roll. The delaysthreatened to compromise the legality of thedeadlines stipulated by the country’s electorallaw. Moreover, accusations by opposition par-ties of fraud perpetrated during voter registra-tion, which were confirmed after investigationby the National Electoral Commission,threatened the validity of the voting process,which might have led to a complete break-down of order. In the light of these consider-ations, the United Nations (UN) SecurityCouncil warned in June 2003 that there was astrong possibility that the country would slideinto renewed conflict.8

At the beginning of September variousevents combined to exacerbate the crisis ofinstability in Guinea-Bissau. The prime min-ister, Mário Pires, publicly declared that anelectoral victory for the opposition wouldresult in civil war. Observers interpreted thisas proof that the government and at least apart of the PRS would refuse to relinquishpower if the vote went against them. It wasalso rumoured that weapons were being dis-tributed among the population by the govern-ment, and that Balante youths were beingrecruited into the armed forces should thePRS be defeated in the legislative elections.9

Kumba Ialá’s decision to confer higher rank

48 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 48

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

islative elections. The PAIGC and thePlataforma Unida immediately announcedtheir willingness to participate in the transi-tional government. The Partido Unido SocialDemocrata (PUSD) was the only party to open-ly refuse, on the grounds that it disagreed withthe manner in which the negotiation processhad been conducted.

On 17 September Kumba Ialá declared thathe was resigning to allow for the nominationof a civilian government. He appealed to theinternational community to provide materialand financial support for the electoral process.Similar calls for assistance were issued by theUN Peace-Building Support Office (UNOG-BIS) and the ECOSOC Ad Hoc AdvisoryGroup on Guinea-Bissau.11

General Veríssimo Seabra's intention ofrapidly transferring the interim presidency toa civilian government, combined with thealmost immediate return of the military dissi-dents to their barracks, contributed to thespeed with which negotiations were conduct-ed. The Charter of Political Transition, whichenvisaged the holding of legislative electionswithin six months (by 28 March 2004) andpresidential elections one year later (by 28March 2005), was signed on 28 November2003. Nevertheless, dialogue between thepolitical and military factions became strainedwhen those who had taken part in the militarycoup appointed Artur Sanhá, who had beenthe secretary-general of the deposed presi-dent’s party, to the post of interim prime min-ister, a choice that gave rise to a wave ofprotest.12 Some interpreted this nominationas an attempt by the military to guarantee, tosome extent, the retention of power by theBalante, and the right to project this powerduring the transition period. Given that themilitary is largely composed of Balante, thiscaused serious concern.

After intense negotiations, and under pres-sure exerted by the CPLP and ECOWAS –acting on a mandate from the leadership ofthe African Union – the charter was acceptedby 23 of the 24 registered political parties inGuinea-Bissau. The nomination of business-man Henrique Rosa for the presidency wascarried by consensus, mainly because of his

on the members of the military command wasinterpreted as an attempt to regain the sup-port of the military, who had long since lostconfidence in him. It is thought that the wayin which Kumba Ialá was able to guaranteeincreased salaries and benefits for the militarycommanders, using funds obtained duringvisits to Libya and Nigeria, contributed to thepostponement of the pending coup d’état.

The coup d’état of 2003

When one considers the deteriorating standardof living of the population and the erraticbehaviour of President Kumba Ialá, the coupd’état carried out by General Veríssimo CorreiaSeabra was not only foreseeable, but alsodesired. Various political actors were informedof the intended coup and although the inter-national community officially deplored theunconstitutional seizure of power, this seemeda lesser evil than the endless postponement ofelections and the resulting increase in instabili-ty. The UN Secretary-General himself recog-nised that the coup d’état, reprehensible assuch actions are in legal terms, had occurredafter a series of democratic norms had beenviolated, and represented the outcome of anunbearable situation. However, he warned thatthere was a need to prevent democraticallyelected governments in post-conflict situationsfrom overstepping the basic practices of goodgovernance.10

Immediately after the coup d’état, politicalparties, trade unions, representatives of thereligious communities (Catholic and Muslim)and of the armed forces created an ad hoccommission, comprising 12 civilians and fourmembers from the military, to define theterms of reference for a transitional govern-ment and a consultative council. With thesupport of the Brazilian ambassador inGuinea-Bissau (representing the CPLP) andUN representatives, an ECOWAS ministerialdelegation visited Bissau, where it had meet-ings with the leaders of the military and thedeposed president. As a result of these consul-tations it was agreed to form a broad-basedtransitional government, which would preparefor the holding of credible, free and fair leg-

Africa Watch 49

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 49

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

impartiality and lack of party affiliations. Thenew president was installed on the day thatthe Charter of Political Transition was signed.The charter established the Conselho Nacionalde Transição (CNT – National TransitionCouncil) as the supreme organ of state admin-istration until the legislative elections hadbeen held. The governmental team, whichtook office on 3 October 2003, did notinclude any well-known Guinean politicians,a clear consequence of sub-section 4 of article11 of the Charter of Transition, which stipu-lated that all those who had served in the tran-sitional government were barred fromparticipating in the legislative elections.

The transitional government immediatelyundertook measures to re-establish the normalfunctioning of democratic institutions. Theseincluded prompt efforts to straighten out thefunctioning of the media; the nomination (on27 November) of a new attorney-general; theelection (on 16 December) of a chief justiceand deputy chief justice of the Supreme Courtof Justice; the payment of part of the salariesowed to civil servants; and a clear focus on thestrict management of state resources throughthe preparation of a general state budget for2004. The payment of salary arrears, whichhad reached unsustainable levels during theregime of Kumba Ialá (with about tenmonths’ salaries owing), turned out to be par-ticularly problematic. The reasons includedthe existence of thousands of ‘ghost’ civil ser-vants, and the reluctance of internationalinstitutions to release funds for this purpose.Another issue that remained unresolved wasthe regularisation of accounts between suppli-ers and the state. This was in large part attrib-utable to the inability of the state to generatethe internal resources to pay for certain basicrequirements, such as food for the armedforces and fuel for the Bissau power station.

The PAIGC returns to power

At the end of the six-month period providedfor in the Charter of Political Transition, theminimum internal conditions for the holdingof elections had been met. The voter registra-tion process (earlier thought to have been

manipulated by Kumba Ialá) had been com-pleted. However, in the meantime variouspolitical parties had expressed their concernsthat foreign election observation (with overallco-ordination by the UN, in conjunction withthe UNDP) would occur only during the elec-tion itself. They believed it was requiredthroughout the voter registration process,when fraud was most likely to take place. TheNational Electoral Commission admitted thatcertain flaws had occurred in the registrationprocess: some voters had acquired double reg-istration; others had been transferred to con-stituencies outside their areas of residence;and some had been omitted from the roll.However, the commission believed that theseirregularities had not occurred at a level thatwould jeopardise the holding of the electionon the due date. Internal financial problemsalso created controversy because the transi-tional government declared that it lacked themeans to finance the election campaigns ofthe various political parties. This problem wasrelated to the successive postponements of theelections, which had been variously scheduledfor 20 April, 6 July and 12 October 2003. Thishad resulted in high financial overload for theparties. As for the arrears in the payment ofcivil servants' salaries (an issue that had to beaddressed to avoid corruption during the elec-tion campaign), the UNDP announced a fewdays before the start of the elections thatfunds had been made available to settle theamounts owed for January and February.13

The election, which began on 6 March,took place without any political violence.Various incidents in the north, however,which were allegedly perpetrated by dissidentgroups of the MFDC, were interpreted bysome as an attempt to destabilise the countryand postpone the elections. There wereunconfirmed reports that the Guinean armedforces had failed to oppose the activities ofthese groups.14

With regard to the conduct of the elec-tions, there is evidence that some irregularitiesoccurred, despite declarations by observersthat they had been free, just and transparent.15

Individuals reported having received threatssuch as the ‘evil eye’ if they voted for a certain

50 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 50

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

tions with the strongest support were thePAIGC and the PUSD. (As it happened, themost popular parties turned out to be thePAIGC and the PRS.)

The PAIGC conducted a sober electioncampaign and did not respond to provoca-tions or accusations from other political par-ties. In addition to the traditional promisesmade to improve infrastructure and healthand education systems (which are common tothe electoral programmes of all parties),Carlos Gomes Junior stressed the need for far-reaching reform of the public administrationof the country. The possibility that this partywould win the elections increased with thereturn of many former leaders of the PAIGCwho had earlier defected to other politicalgroups. The PAIGC won, but its victory mar-gin was not as wide as had been predicted.Lacking a parliamentary majority, the partywas forced to establish alliances with otherparties after the elections.

The results recorded for the PUSD also fellbelow expectations. Its main platform in theelection campaign had been what its leaderlabelled ‘the culture of work’, which would berewarded by ‘fair salaries paid on time’. Hepromised the eradication of ghost workers andcorruption. Indeed, the PUSD’s leader,Francisco Fadul, who had led the party’s exec-utive from December 1998 to February 2000,managed to guarantee the salaries of the civilservants during this period. He exploited thisachievement to boost his popular credibility.However, during the campaign manyGuineans believed that the PRS might win theelections because of its support from theBalante. This reasoning might have led somesectors of the population to vote for thePAIGC instead of the PUSD, to avert a PRSvictory.

The political party that won the second-highest number of votes was the PRS. In somedistricts (Cacheu, Oio and Tombali) the PRSachieved first place in the voting results. Theethnic issue, though not a deciding factor,played a significant role in the PRS campaign,which benefited from the Balante vote. Inpart, the PRS campaign was influenced by theshadowy omnipresence of Kumba Ialá, who

political party. The prime minister and thechief of police were seen to be transportingvoting ballots, in clear violation of the elec-tion rules. In some areas, several partiesbought votes in exchange for bags of rice, apractice common in former elections. Therewere also rumours that several cards that hadbeen issued during the census might havebeen used for voting more than once.Moreover, technical difficulties that preventedthe opening of several voting stations, mainlyin the capital, made it necessary to extend thevoting period by a few days. These irregulari-ties were considered of minor importancewhen compared with the positive overall eval-uation of the election by external observers.The results were not followed by majorprotests from any of the parties and coalitionsinvolved.

The same cannot be said for the publica-tion of the results, which was delayed, causinga political hiatus and consequent tensionsamong the parties. Even after the officialproclamation of victory by the PAIGC, thetardiness in the announcement of the actualresults eventually caused the PRS to threatento form a parallel government. The officialreason for the delay given by the NationalElectoral Commission was the need to inves-tigate the claims of irregularity that had beenreceived after the closing of the polls.However, some sources indicate that the delaywas caused by negotiations between thePAIGC and a military wing linked to the PRS.If it is true, this information would confirmthat the leaders of the military were apprehen-sive about the possibility of being pushedaside by a PAIGC government. It would alsounderscore the influence of the military overpolitical life in Guinea-Bissau.

Seventy-six per cent of the total number ofregistered voters participated in the election.Of the 15 political parties listed on the ballotpapers, only three parties and two coalitionssucceeded in having members elected asdeputies to the National Assembly. (See thetable below.) At first sight, the way in whichthe election campaign and the socio-politicalsituation in Guinea-Bissau developed suggest-ed that the parties emerging from the elec-

Africa Watch 51

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 51

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

continued to determine most of the politicaldecisions taken by the party. Although he hadbeen legally prevented from participating inthe country’s political life until 2008, Ialáannounced just a few days after the beginningof the election campaign that his house arresthad been lifted and he was returning to poli-tics. He was also seen in Gabu and Bafatá(cities that are represented by a great numberof deputies), where the PRS held political ral-lies.16

Only two of the other parties contestingthe election were able to elect deputies: theUnião Eleitoral (UE), a coalition of four minorparties led by Joaquim Baldé; and the AliançaPopular Unida (APU) of the former presiden-tial candidate Fernando Gomes. Therefore,the former Bafatá Movement no longer hasany parliamentary representation. In the firsthalf of the nineties it had tried to present itselfas a political alternative to Nino Vieira’sregime. More recently, it had been dividedinto two wings, one led by Savador Tchongóand the other by Helder Vaz. Despite being awell-respected member of the Guinean elite

who maintained a solid opposition to KumbaIalá, Helder Vaz had little standing among thepopulation. His credibility was also affectedby his public support of the appointment ofArtur Sanhá as interim prime minister withouthaving consulted his party’s main supporters(the Guinean diaspora).

Without an absolute majority, and havingfailed to negotiate successfully with thePUSD,17 the PAIGC finally entered a parlia-mentary alliance with the PRS, thus ensuringthe necessary conditions and support forCarlos Gomes Júnior’s government and leg-islative programme.18 This agreement wasreached in exchange for two senior positionsin parliament’s governing body and a numberof high-ranking appointments in governmentdepartments and parastatal organisations. Thisarrangement led to protests and accusations ofclientelism from the other political parties.The hard wing of the former liberation move-ment expressed its concerns about thePAIGC’s dependence on the PRS, arguingthat it would limit the government’s ability toact – for instance, to conduct criminal investi-

52 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

28-30 March 2004 – Election results

PARTIES VOTES %

Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) 145.316 33,88

Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) 113.656 26,50

Partido Unido Social Democrata (PUSD) 75.485 17,60

Plataforma Unida (PU) 20.700 4,83

União Eleitoral (UE) 18.354 4,28

Partido Democrático Socialista Guineense (PDS) 8.789 2,05

União para a Mudança (UM) 8.621 2,01

Resistência da Guiné-Bissau (RGB) 7.918 1,85

Partido da Unidade Nacional (PUN) 6.260 1,46

Aliança Popular Unida (APU) 5.817 1,36

União Nacional para o Desenvolvimento e Progresso (UNDP) 5.042 1,18

Movimento Democrático Guineense (MDG) 4.209 0,98

Fórum Cívico Guineense/Social Democrata (FCG/SD) 4.202 0,98

MANIFESTO 3.402 0,79

PS-GB 1.166 0,27

Total 428.937 100.00

Source: www.guine-bissau.com

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 52

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

duce profound reforms at the level of gover-nance.

The institutional capacity of the country isweak at present, even when compared withother countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for sev-eral reasons. First, the public sector experiencedconsiderable expansion and centralisation afterindependence, yet few incentives and littletraining were offered to the civil servants.19

Their salaries were frequently not paid, a situa-tion that has become endemic. Second, thefunctioning of the legal system is severely ham-pered by a shortage of resources. At present itcannot provide either adequate legal assis-tance to those accused or ensure completeimpartiality when cases come to trial. Third,the role of the police service as a purely repres-sive agent rather than an impartial body actingto protect the community’s interests andrights is still encouraged by the legal frame-work that guides the structures and actions ofthe police. Fourth, the weakness of the judici-ary and legislative authorities that has fol-lowed the abuse of their functions by theexecutive powers is evident. Fifth, the salarystructure that is currently applicable cannotprovide adequate remuneration to magis-trates, lawyers, members of the police and cor-rectional services employees. This has createdan environment conducive to corruption,which in turn undermines the credibility ofthe legal system.

Within this framework, if Guinea-Bissau isto make a convincing transition to democra-cy, the government must undertake far-reach-ing political reforms. It should also promotethe generation of skills at all levels; strengthenthe independence and the powers of thecountry’s democratic institutions (such as par-liament and the courts), invest in the trainingof public administration officials, support theimpartiality of the media, and restructure thepolice service (in terms of recruitment, train-ing and practices of accountability and socialresponsibility). In short, the administrationneeds to guarantee the normal functioning ofgovernmental institutions. To this end, it isnecessary not only to have a strong internalpolitical will, but also to elicit considerablecommitment from the donors. Until now all

gations into the diversion of funds during theperiod the PRS was in power.

The elected government led by CarlosGomes Júnior comprises highly placed mem-bers of the PAIGC who have been selected fortheir advanced technical skills. Soares Sambu,an engineer, who is a member of the politicalbureau and was the director of the party’scampaign in the legislative elections, occupiesthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs, InternationalCooperation and Communities. DanielGomes, the PAIGC’s spokesman, who wasnotable in Kumba Ialá’s regime for his harshand critical questions, has entered a govern-ment post for the first time as Minister ofDefence. Lássana Seidi, a lawyer and formerpresident of the Superior Inspection againstCorruption, now takes on the role of Ministerof the Interior. Two well-known Guineaneconomists, João Aladje Fadiah and IssufoSanhá, have been allocated the Ministry ofEconomy and Finance and the Ministry ofCommerce, Industry and Tourism respective-ly. These examples demonstrate the technicalexpertise and skills represented by ministers inthe new government, such proficiency havingbeen considered negligible or a handicap dur-ing Kumba Ialá’s regime.

The PAIGC’s return to power after fiveyears could not only be a result of general dis-content with the catastrophic economic situa-tion brought about by Kumba Ialá’sgovernment, but also represent a vote fornational unity. Unlike the PRS, the PAIGChas revealed itself to be capable of risingabove ethnic affiliations.

Conclusion

Any Guinea-Bissau government will facenumerous pitfalls in attempting to build a sta-ble and efficient administration. The persist-ent violation of human and civil rights underthe Kumba Ialá regime demonstrated that themere holding of multiparty elections is insuf-ficient to overcome an institutional culturethat has long followed undemocratic prac-tices, and decades of authoritarian gover-nance. The new government will be requiredto show the political determination to intro-

Africa Watch 53

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 53

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

cooperation programmes between donors andgovernment that have been directed towardsissues of governance have been interrupted bythe volatile political situation, or underminedby a lack of coordination among donors.However, even when their efforts have beenunsuccessful or divided, the donors have beenmotivated by a common aim – to assist infinding alternative solutions to the lack ofinstitutional capacity in Guinea-Bissau with-out weakening the state itself.

As regards the armed forces, the army mustbe restructured and its duties redefined. Atpresent it is disproportionately large, anddependent on the state for resources. The gov-ernment needs to initiate a process of demo-bilisation, reintegration and social reinsertionfor former combatants. This is essential if thecountry’s internal stability and security are tobe maintained. Although a restructuringprocess for the army was agreed in principleduring Kumba Ialá’s regime of, its implemen-tation was delayed by various factors. Theseincluded border security problems; an escala-tion in the tensions between the military (as aresult of the detention of several officialsallegedly involved in the events of November2000); delays in the payment of salaries; anddivision within the armed forces along ethnic,religious and political lines. The critical short-age of financial resources to provide thearmed forces with training that would enablethem to transform into a professional republi-can force has also been identified as a reasonfor the delay in the reform process.

The incidents of 6 October 2004 corrobo-rate the need for restructuring of the armedforces. There is currently a disagreement overthe amnesty granted in the recentMemorandum of Understanding signed bythe government and the mutineers. Forinstance, the PRS called for an immediate par-don for the soldiers involved, but stronglyrejected an amnesty that went back as far as1980, mainly because it included NinoVieira’s regime, during which several Balantemilitary officers were executed after an unsuc-cessful coup attempt in October 1986. On theother hand, an amnesty dated only from 1998to the present would absolve other actors in

the internal crises that led to the death ofAnsumane Mané (the former leader of themilitary junta) in 2000, during Kumba Ialá’spresidency.

In essence, there is consensus in Guineanpolitical circles and civil society that the con-solidation of democracy requires a reductionin the number of soldiers and a re-definitionof the military's role. Only by these meanscan the army become an agent of democracyand not of oppression or destabilisation, as inthe past. However, there is no agreement onthe contents of this restructuring process. Thevarious political and social actors have differ-ent opinions about what should be done.Also, unless reconciliation is achievedbetween the different factions in the military,any reform process will be regarded as a polit-ical instrument for excluding some militarygroups and favouring others, ultimately lead-ing to renewed instability.

Guinea-Bissau is an example of an Africanstate that is dysfunctional and weak. The rootsof the political and social crises that havecharacterised the country’s recent history canbe found in a number of structural condi-tions. These are poor and inefficient gover-nance; a small but fractured political elite; ahighly divided and interventionist military;public institutions that are incapable of pro-viding basic social services; widespreadbureaucratic corruption; high poverty levels;and dependence on foreign aid. It is clearly apolitically fragile state in which wealth isunevenly distributed and where the country’sother resources are shared via a network ofclientelism within the political group inpower. These mutually reinforcing evils havecreated an explosive environment in whichalmost any grievance can trigger an eruptionof violence, as recent events clearly illustrate.

In the last few years, there has been anincreased polarisation of Guinean society,both in terms of the military and political elite(between and within parties) and in ethnicterms, between the Balante and non-Balante.Therefore it is of the utmost importance thatthe government should act. Its short-termresponsibility is to respond to immediateneeds (such as meeting the public expenditure

54 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 54

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Notes

1 João Bernardo Vieira of the PAIGC legitimised hispower by winning 52% of the votes in the secondround of the presidential elections, as against the48% obtained by Kumba Ialá of the Partido daRenovação Social (PRS). The PAIGC won 62 of the100 seats in the National Assembly.

2 It is estimated that 90% of the armed forces joinedthe rebels in 1998.

3 The first ceasefire was signed on 26 August 1998,but renewed fighting broke out in October. Thepeace accord signed in November 1998 also failedto prevent violent incidents between January andFebruary 1999. For a detailed analysis of the con-flict, see Amnesty International, Guinea-Bissau:human rights in war and peace, July 1999.

4 The CPLP was formed in 1996. Its members areAngola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe,and East Timor.

5 In the legislative elections held on 28 November1999, the PRS won 38 seats in parliament, fol-lowed by the RGB-Movimento Bafatá and thePAIGC, with 28 and 24 seats respectively. In thepresidential elections, Kumba Ialá contested thesecond round on 16 January 2000, winning 72%of the vote.

6 From January 2000 to September 2003, KumbaIalá dismissed five prime ministers and replacedmore than fifty ministers and secretaries of state.

7 Amnesty International, Guiné-Bissau: attack onthe independence of the judiciary, November2001.

8 Ibid.9 Coup d’état in a country that had nothing to lose,

Público, 15 September 2003.10 Speech made by Kofi Annan in the United

Nations on 18 December 2003, presenting areport on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

11 The ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Group wasformed in 2002. It comprises permanent represen-tatives from Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, theNetherlands and Portugal, under the chairperson-ship of ECOSOC (representative of Guatemala),the Chairman do Group of Friends of Guinea-Bissau (representative of the Gambia), and theChairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group of theSecurity Council on Conflict Prevention andResolution in Africa (representative of Angola). Itsobjective is to analyse the humanitarian and eco-nomic needs of Guinea-Bissau, review its supportprogrammes, and issue recommendations for amore effective, coherent and co-ordinated inter-national aid effort.

12 The passage of Artur Sanhá through the ministriesof Internal Administration and Fishing is seen asan example of the bad governance practised byKumba Ialá’s team. Moreover, many of theprotests were based on the fact that Sanhá hadbeen accused of homicide in a case yet to be

budget and managing the day-to-day businessof government). But its most important duty isto devise measures that can address the struc-tural aspects of the country’s crisis, which areessential if long-term stability is to be assured.

The disruptive aspects of Guinean societyrepresent major dangers that threaten the con-solidation of peace and democracy. Theyinclude the need for comprehensive econom-ic development; reconciliation at social andpolitical levels; the management of internalsources of tension such as the ethnic issue;and the creation of an endogenous democrat-ic culture that goes beyond the holding ofelections. One of the most urgent tasks for thegovernment that is essential to democratic sta-bility is the restructuring of the armed forces.This will involve the social reintegration ofsurplus soldiers; the training of the new armyaccording to the principles of democracy andthe rights and duties of citizenship; the cre-ation of incentives to persuade suitable candi-dates of the advantages of a military career;and a balanced recruitment policy thatacknowledges the need for social and ethnicrepresentivity.

Another pressing responsibility is to rein-force the country’s democratic institutions,such as parliament and courts. The interna-tional community can play an important sup-portive role if it can overcome itsprogramming and coordination problems.

Finally, the government should promotenew ways of opening dialogues between thevarious Guinean social and political actors,using constructive and inclusive approaches(such as involving them in common projects)so that the conflict prevention capacities ofGuinean society can be strengthened. Theintroduction of a national reconciliationprocess, which would create a space withinwhich Guineans could acknowledge the errorsof the past and exorcise the trauma of theseevents through transitional justice approaches,could be helpful. It could assist in building asense of moral justice, and in allowing thecountry to break with the culture of impunitythat has reigned unchecked in Guinea-Bissauin recent decades.

Africa Watch 55

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 55

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

explained (that had never come to court?). Público,29 September 2003.

13 This amount was collected from contributionsmade by the Netherlands, Sweden and France.The salaries for the previous months were paid inpart by the European Union, after intense negoti-ations and pressures had been exerted by thePortuguese and Guinean governments, and also inpart by contributions from the West AfricanEconomic and Monetary Union.

14 It is still strange that the rebels attacked from themagazine; it is rumoured that the army allowedthem entry into the barracks.

15 The elections were monitored by almost 100 for-eign observers, some of them representing a widerange of organisations - the Community ofPortuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), La Francophonie, the African Union,UEMOA. Countries that sent observers werePortugal, the United States, the Gambia, Russia,Brazil and Mauritania. Four internationalobservers were also invited individually.

16 Kumba Ialá was under house arrest, but he wasfreed on 8 March. He immediately announced hisintention to return to active politics, stating toRDP-Africa that ‘now it would be the atombomb’.Even under house arrest, the voice of theex-president was to be heard accusing GeneralVeríssimo Seabra of having diverted US$6 million

in donations from partner countries. In October2003, pamphlets with similar accusations againstthe members of the Military Committee were cir-culated in Bissau, limiting the visits to KumbaIalá. No current Guinean government structurehas assumed responsibility for releasing Ialá fromhouse arrest, which the National TransitionalCouncil considered ‘a mistake’. The proclaimedreturn of Ialá to politics is illegal according to thetext of the Charter of Political Transition, whichprevents him from running in any election until2008.

17 The PUSD demanded four provincial governors,one of whom would be governor of Bissau. It wasalso interested in the first vice-presidency, in thepost of Minister for Foreign Affairs (to be occu-pied by Francisco Fadul) and in other posts in sev-eral state bodies (such as the National ElectionsCommission, the National Media Council andthe General Inspection against Corruption).

18 Besides the PRS, the União Eleitoral, which electedtwo deputies, signed a parliamentary agreementwith the ruling party.

19 In the West African sub-region, Guinea-Bissau isone of the least populous countries, with 1,5 mil-lion inhabitants. It also has the highest number ofcivil servants, at a ratio of 20 for every 100 inhab-itants. In neighbouring Senegal (with a populationof 14 million), the civil service represents only 7%.

56 African Security Review 13(4) • 2004

ISS ASR V13N4 3/11/05 11:53 am Page 56

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

The

Aga

Kha

n U

nive

rsity

] at

23:

54 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014