handbook for joint task force domestic consequence
TRANSCRIPT
HandbookFor
Joint Task ForceDomestic
Consequence ManagementOperations
Final DraftJuly 2000
PREFACE1
2
This handbook is a guide for joint task force and response task force3
commanders, their staffs, and subordinate units who may be tasked to4
provide support to a lead Federal agency during consequence5
management operations.6
7
This document is not a doctrinal publication, but in the absence of8
such a joint publication, is meant to be a resource tool; and should be9
supplemented, when practicable, with the United States Joint Forces10
Command Joint Warfighting Center Consequence Management Database11
maintained as a part of the Joint Electronic Library. However, it does12
support joint and Service doctrinal concepts and principles and is a13
focused collection of consequence management information already14
published from Federal, state, and local sources, as well as lessons15
learned from past exercises.16
17
The proponent for this handbook is the United States Joint Forces18
Command, Joint Warfighting Center. Corrections or suggestions for19
improvement of this handbook are welcome. They should be addressed20
to: Commander, USJFCOM JWFC, Code JW100, 116 Lake View21
Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. The telephone number is (757) 686-22
6116 and the fax extension is X-6198.23
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Intentionally Blank11
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TABLE OF CONTENTS1
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PAGE3
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Executive Summary................................................................................. vii5
6
CHAPTER I7
INTRODUCTION8
• General ............................................................................................ I-19
• Consequence Management ............................................................... I-410
• Legislation and Executive Documents............................................... I-611
• Types of incidents............................................................................. I-1412
• Concept of Operational Support........................................................ I-1913
• Summary ......................................................................................... I-2314
15
CHAPTER II16
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES17
• General ............................................................................................ II-118
• National Command Authorities......................................................... II-219
• Federal Agencies Other Than Department of Defense........................ II-320
• Department of Defense ..................................................................... II-921
• State and Local Government............................................................. II-2022
• Summary ......................................................................................... II-2123
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CHAPTER III1
COMMAND AND CONTROL2
• General ............................................................................................ III-13
• Joint Task Force-Civil Support ......................................................... III-54
• Response Task Force ........................................................................ III-75
• Authorities ....................................................................................... III-96
• Summary ......................................................................................... III-137
8
CHAPTER IV9
PLANNING10
• General ............................................................................................ IV-111
• Planning Considerations................................................................... IV-212
• Force Protection ............................................................................... IV-813
• Contamination Control ..................................................................... IV-1014
• Summary ......................................................................................... IV-1815
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CHAPTER V17
SUPPORT Functions18
• General ............................................................................................ V-119
• Communications .............................................................................. V-120
• Logistics........................................................................................... V-321
• Medical and Health Services............................................................. V-1022
• Legal ................................................................................................ V-1423
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• Public Affairs.................................................................................... V-151
• Religious Ministry Support ............................................................... V-172
• Funding ........................................................................................... V-183
• Summary ......................................................................................... V-194
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CHAPTER VI6
TRAINING7
• General ............................................................................................ VI-18
• Individual Training ........................................................................... VI-49
• Unit Training.................................................................................... VI-510
• Training Courses.............................................................................. VI-511
• Summary ......................................................................................... VI-712
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APPENDIXES14
A Notional Consequence Management Annex to an Operation Plan...... A-115
B Emergency Support Functions......................................................... B-116
C Organization Capabilities................................................................. C-117
D Points of Contact ............................................................................. D-118
Annex A Emergency Management State and Territory Offices........ A-D-119
E References ....................................................................................... E-120
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GLOSSARY22
Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms...................................................... GL-123
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Part II Definitions................................................................................. GL-81
2
FIGURES3
4
I-1 Tiered Disaster/Emergency Response ............................................. I-45
I-2 Support Request Channels ............................................................. I-76
I-3 The Federal Response Plan ............................................................. I-117
I-4 Crisis and Consequence Management .............................................. I-138
I-5 Weapons of Mass Destruction ......................................................... I-159
I-6 Biological Categories ....................................................................... I-1810
I-7 Types of Chemical Agents ............................................................... I-1811
12
II-1 Major Participants ......................................................................... II-213
II-2 Standard Federal Regions .............................................................. II-514
II-3 Response Task Force By Region ..................................................... II-1515
II-4 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team.......................... II-1916
17
III-1 Command Relationships ............................................................... III-318
III-2 Headquarters, Joint Task Force-Civil Support............................... III-619
III-3 Headquarters, Response Task Force ............................................. III-820
III-4 Notional Consequence Management Joint Task Force ................... III-921
22
IV-1 Planning Considerations............................................................... IV-223
v
IV-2 Reach Back Capability.................................................................. IV-51
IV-3 Force Protection Considerations.................................................... IV-82
IV-4 The Three Don’ts .......................................................................... IV-103
IV-5 Decontamination Methods ............................................................ IV-124
IV-6 Personnel Contamination Control Station ..................................... IV-155
IV-7 Vehicle Contamination Control Station ......................................... IV-176
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V-1 Logistic Functional Areas............................................................... V-48
9
VI-1 Department of Defense First Responder Training Cities................. VI-310
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C-1 Chemical Biological Incident Response Force ................................. C-212
C-2 Chemical Biological Response Team............................................... C-713
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Intentionally Blank11
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW4
•••• Provides an introduction of consequence management, applicable5
legislative acts, the types of incidents, and the concept of6
operational support7
8
•••• Explains roles and responsibilities of Federal, state, and local9
agencies10
11
•••• Discusses command relationships and organizational structures12
13
•••• Highlights planning considerations14
15
•••• Discusses functional support areas to include communications,16
logistics, legal, public affairs, and funding17
18
•••• Covers training considerations19
“We no longer face a single, powerful enemy, as we did during the ColdWar. We don’t live with a balance of terror. But we do face terrorists,and we do face the terrorizing possibility some nation or group will try touse a deadly chemical or biological weapon against our forces or ourhomeland.”
Secretary of Defense William CohenOctober 1998
viii
1
Chapter I--Introduction2
3
The ability of the United States Government to prevent and manage4
the consequences of incidents involving weapons of mass destruction5
(WMD) is one of the most challenging priorities facing our nation today.6
The Department of Defense provides support to the lead Federal7
agency (LFA) for domestic consequence management (CM)8
operations in response to terrorist incidents within the continental9
United States (CONUS); the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; the US Virgin10
Islands; Alaska; Hawaii; Guam; American Samoa; the former trust11
Territory of the Pacific Islands; the Micronesia; the Republic of the12
Marshall Islands; or any political subdivision.13
14
CM responses occur under the primary authority and control of the15
affected state and local governments. When situations escalate16
beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request Federal17
assistance from the President. The Federal Government may then be18
directed to provide supplemental assistance to state and local19
governments to alleviate suffering and damage. The Federal Emergency20
Management Agency (FEMA) is the LFA to coordinate all Federal21
assistance to state and local governments for CM operations.22
23
ix
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance1
Act provides the authority for the Federal Government to respond to2
disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance to save lives3
and protect public health, safety, and property.4
5
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996,6
also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, mandates the7
enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability for8
terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical9
weapons.10
11
Presidential Decision Directive 39, United States Policy on12
Counterterrorism, directed a number of measures to reduce the13
Nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, deter and respond to terrorists acts,14
and strengthen capabilities to prevent and manage the consequence of15
terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons16
including WMD.17
18
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) outlines Federal, including19
Department of Defense, responsibilities and provides the framework for20
coordinating civil-military requirements.21
22
x
All four classes of WMD--nuclear, radiological, biological, and1
chemcial--and high yield explosives are available to terrorists. Although2
nuclear weapons are expensive, chemical and biological weapons,3
sometimes referred to as the “poor man’s nuclear weapons,” pose a4
significant threat in the post-Cold War environment.5
6
The concept of operational support is:7
8
•••• Phase I--Initial DOD Response9
10
•••• Phase II--Subsequent DOD Response11
12
•••• Phase III--Follow-on DOD Assistance13
14
•••• Phase IV--Transition of Support Operations15
16
•••• Phase V--Redeployment17
18
Chapter II--Roles and Responsibilities19
20
The National Command Authorities authorize the use of Federal21
resources in response to domestic terrorist incidents and exercise22
authority and control of the Armed Forces. Major Federal participants23
xi
include FEMA, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,1
Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health2
and Human Services, Environmental Protection Agency, and American3
Red Cross.4
5
Within the Department of Defense, there are a number of6
organizations that may be called on to respond to a terrorist incident.7
The United States Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Joint Task8
Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) is responsible for planning and9
executing military support to civil authorities (MSCA) for10
consequence management of incidents relating to weapons of mass11
destruction within the United States, its territories, and12
possessions. Additionally, there are two response tasks forces (east and13
west) that provide support within designated geographic areas. Other14
organizations with specific missions to support WMD incidents include15
the US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and16
the US Army’s Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team.17
18
Chapter III--Command and Control Relationships19
20
Once FEMA has requested Department of Defense support and the21
Secretary of Defense has authorized such support, a number of22
organizations belonging directly to Department of Defense, the Services,23
xii
to include the United States Coast Guard, and the combatant commands1
can be directed to provide such assistance. The Assistant to the2
Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD-CS) exercises policy3
oversight for all domestic CM support. The ATSD-CS will coordinate with4
the Joint Staff and supporting combatant commands to develop plans5
and orders for all CM support. Within CONUS, USJFCOM could direct6
the JTF-CS to respond. The JTF-CS will take operational control of7
all assigned DOD forces, less joint special operations task force and8
United States Army Corps of Engineer elements, responding to WMD9
incidents in support of the LFA. For Alaska and Hawaii, and US10
territories and possessions, JTF-CS will provide support as requested by11
the supported combatant commander (Commander in Chief United12
States Pacific Command and Commander in Chief United States13
Southern Command).14
15
Chapter IV--Planning16
17Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to CM operations.18
Planning considerations include: Damage and Injury Profile; Information19
Planning including public affairs and media functions; Site Containment;20
Decontamination; Evacuation; Medical Requirements; Identify Assets and21
Augmentation Requirements; NBC Reconnaissance; WMD Disposition;22
Mass Care; Force Protection; and Termination.23
24
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Contamination control is absolutely critical to minimize the1
spread of the contamination. It is imperative to personnel safety that2
contamination control stations (CCSs) be established and operating while3
personnel are in the contaminated area. One CCS should be established4
for personnel and another CCS for vehicles and equipment.5
6
Chapter V--Support Functions7
8
Support functions performed during CM operations are just as9
important as they are in any other military operation. Communications10
need to be fast, accurate, and reliable not only between military forces11
but also with other Federal, state, and local agencies at an incident site.12
Careful attention must be afforded to ensure mutual support and13
eliminate interference.14
15
The US military has unique logistics capabilities that are relevant16
to CM operations. These include the rapid capability to deploy, employ,17
and redeploy a sustained logistics capability to provide assistance and18
mission support to the LFA and support the infrastructure of the19
response organizations. Transportation is essential to move the forces20
to the incident site as rapidly as possible. Once at the site,21
transportation support should be provided in accordance with state and22
local emergency response plans. This could include movement of23
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support forces, personnel and equipment from other agencies, and1
supplies, and the evacuation of casualties by either ground or air assets.2
Engineering support includes technical advice and evaluations,3
engineering services, construction management and inspection,4
emergency contracting, emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste5
facilities, and real estate support. An effective maintenance program,6
especially of major end-items and testing and diagnostic equipment, is7
vital to ensure that the required support is provided. All classes of8
supply need to be considered based on support requirements. The9
preponderance of these supplies will be the distribution of food and10
water. Other services that may be provided include bath and laundry,11
sanitation, and mortuary affairs.12
13
Medical and Health Services will most likely be required. In the14
aftermath of a WMD incident, local health service support and medical15
treatment facilities (MTF) may be strained beyond capacities. The16
success of a MTF in treating casualties in NBC environments depends on17
prior planning and adaptability. Specific medical responses will include18
triage, trauma, preventive medicine, stress management, and NBC19
patient decontamination.20
21
Legal issues during CM operations involve statutory, regulatory, and22
policy considerations. The commander and the Staff Judge Advocate23
xv
must be knowledgeable concerning the authority and responsibility1
of Department of Defense as well as that of the various other2
Federal, state, and local agencies. These legal issues range from3
complex questions regarding jurisdiction and authority to exclude the4
general public from specific areas, to payment of simple personal5
property claims.6
7
Public Affairs need to be proactive and comprehensive to expedite the8
flow of information to the public and internal audiences. Timely,9
accurate information and frequent updates are essential to keep the10
public and news media informed, consistent with national and11
operations security.12
13
Funding. Each Federal agency that participates in the response to14
and recovery from terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist15
operations bears the cost of their own participation, unless otherwise16
directed by the President. If the President directs FEMA to use Stafford17
Act authorities, FEMA will issue mission assignments through the FRP to18
support CM operations. Expenses incurred from the performance of19
these mission assignments are reimbursable.20
21
22
23
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CONCLUSION1
2
This Handbook will assist JTF commanders and their staffs with3
preparing for CM operations. It is based on policy and procedures4
already established by Department of Defense and other Federal5
agencies. It is not the intent of this Handbook to provide a detailed6
account of every aspect of a CM operation, but instead provide some7
initial guidance that can be used by JTF commanders and their staffs8
until joint doctrine on CM operations is published.9
10
I-1
CHAPTER I1
INTRODUCTION2
34
1. General5
6
a. The ability of the United States Government (USG) to prevent and7
manage the consequences of incidents involving weapons of mass8
destruction (WMD) is one of the most challenging priorities facing our9
nation today. WMD are a potent addition to the terrorist’s arsenal. They10
provide an inexpensive means to carry out the true purpose of terrorism,11
which is to terrorize. The Chinese have an ancient saying, “kill one,12
frighten ten thousand.” The world saw the truth of that concept during13
the Tokyo Subway sarin gas attack when many victims seeking help at14
hospitals had no actual sarin effects. Even though many of those15
seeking care did not need treatment, they still required evaluation. This16
onslaught of people who perceived they needed treatment (also known as17
the “worried well”) stressed the medical system’s availability to treat18
those who were true victims. Chemical, biological, radiological, and19
“I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents thegreatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more andmore countries who are acquiring technology -- not only missile technology-- and are developing chemical weapons and biological weaponscapabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So Ithink that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in thecoming years.”
Secretary of Defense William CohenJanuary 1999
I-2
nuclear weapons have a psychological impact that expands their value to1
a terrorist. They add a new element of terror to terrorism, which will2
continue to exist.3
4
b. The 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York5
City, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma6
City, and the 1996 Centennial Park bombing in Atlanta demonstrated7
the tremendous response necessary to respond to a terrorist incident in8
the United States. Currently, in the event of the use of WMD, few9
communities, including military installations and facilities, have the full10
array of assets (personnel and equipment) and expertise required to11
adequately deal with the effects of WMD or the necessary depth to12
sustain these response operations.13
14
c. The above-related recent terrorist acts, coupled with the use of15
sarin agent in the Tokyo subway and reports of Middle Eastern terrorist16
groups’ interest in chemical and biological (CB) agents, have brought17
recognition to the threat of the potential use of WMD here at home.18
Hence, all three levels of government, local, state, and Federal, have19
taken steps to prepare for such consequences.20
21
d. The intent of this handbook is to address Department of Defense22
(DOD) support to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for consequence23
I-3
management (CM) response operations within the continental1
United States (CONUS); the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; the US2
Virgin Islands; Alaska; Hawaii; Guam; American Samoa; the former3
trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; the Micronesia; the Republic of4
the Marshall Islands; or any political subdivision. When a CM5
response operation occurs, the supported commander, i.e., Commander6
in Chief United States Joint Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM),7
Commander in Chief United States Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), or8
Commander in Chief United States Southern Command (USCINCSO),9
will be responsible to lead the Department of Defense’s support to the10
LFA.11
12
e. There are a number of different definitions for CM. Although they13
are all similar, there are differences between many of them. In some14
cases, the definition is even different within the same agency, depending15
on the document and how the term is used. For the purposes of this16
handbook, CM is defined as: “United States Government interagency17
assistance to protect public health and safety, restore essential18
government services, and provide emergency relief to governments,19
businesses, and individuals affected by the results of an incident involving20
weapons of mass destruction.”21
22
23
I-4
2. Consequence Management1
2
a. CM responses occur under the primary authority and control of3
the affected state and local governments. When situations escalate4
beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request Federal5
assistance from the President. The National Command Authorities (NCA)6
may direct the Federal Government to provide supplemental assistance7
to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage8
resulting from disasters or emergencies. The three tiers of CM response9
are depicted in Figure I-1.10
11
TIERED DISASTER/EMERGENCYRESPONSE
FederalResponse
StateResponse
LocalResponse
Incident may require Local, State, and Federal assetsState response includes National GuardDOD may be requested once Local, State, and Federalcapabilities are overwhelmed
Weaponsof Mass
Destruction
12
Figure I-1. Tiered Disaster/Emergency Response13
I-5
b. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the LFA1
to coordinate all Federal assistance to state and local governments for2
CM response operations. The Department of Defense provides support3
to FEMA when requested and directed by the NCA. After the President4
declares a major disaster or emergency, the resources of the Federal5
government needed to support the state and local response are managed6
through a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), designated by FEMA.7
8
c. For the military, CM is one form of domestic support operations. It9
involves planning actions and preparations taken to identify, organize,10
equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop and execute11
plans implemented in response to incidents involving WMD; and, the12
actions following the incident to mitigate and recover from the effects of13
the incident.14
15
d. While Department of Defense is not the LFA for domestic CM, the16
military is in many ways uniquely qualified to assist the on-scene17
commander (OSC) as well as local and state authorities following a WMD18
attack. The military is trained, equipped, and organized to fight in a19
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment while maintaining a20
significant logistics and mobility capability.21
22
23
I-6
3. Legislation and Executive Documents. There are several legislative1
and statutory laws that apply to domestic support and specifically to CM2
operations.3
4
a. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency5
Assistance Act, 42 USC Section 5121 as amended.6
7
• This act provides the authority for the Federal Government to8
respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide9
assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and10
property.11
12
• It provides for an orderly and continuing means of assistance by13
the Federal Government to state and local governments in carrying14
out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that15
result from disasters.16
17
•• The President, in response to a state governor’s request, may18
declare an “emergency” or “major disaster,” in order to provide19
Federal assistance under the Act. Figure I-2 illustrates the request20
channels to obtain DOD support.21
22
I-7
•• In addition, upon the request of the affected governor, the Act1
authorizes the President to direct the Department of Defense to2
provide “emergency work” (a maximum of 10 days in duration)3
before declaring either an emergency or major disaster.4
5
• The Act provides for the appointment of a FCO who will operate in6
the designated area with a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) for the7
purpose of coordinating state and local disaster assistance efforts8
with those of the Federal Government.9
10
SUPPORT REQUEST CHANNELS
Disaster Site
Federal Emergency Management Agency -Director of Military Support Coordination
Local Community Resources
CombatantCommandJoint Task
Force/DefenseCoordinating
Officer
Assistantto the Secretary
of Defense-Civil Support
Joint Staff
State Office ofEmergency Services
11
Figure I-2. Support Request Channels12
I-8
b. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 19961
(Public Law 104-201), also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici2
Amendment, mandates the enhancement of domestic preparedness and3
response capabilities for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological,4
biological, and chemical weapons. It requires the Secretary of Defense,5
in coordination with FEMA and the Department of Energy, to establish a6
training program and advice to Federal, state, and local officials7
responsible for crisis and CM. It also requires the Secretary of Defense8
to maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response team capable9
of providing assistance to Federal, state, and local officials in locating,10
neutralizing and dismantling, and disposing of nuclear, radiological,11
chemical and biological weapons and related materials.12
13
c. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC 1385, severely restricts the14
use of Federal military forces to perform civilian law enforcement15
functions within the United States. It prescribes criminal penalties for16
the use of the Army or Air Force to perform civilian law enforcement17
within the United States, unless otherwise authorized by law or18
Presidential decree. DOD policy has extended this prohibition to the US19
Navy and the Marine Corps. However, this act does not apply to20
members of the National Guard (NG) when not in Federal service;21
members of a Reserve Component (RC) when not on active duty or active22
duty for training; DOD civilians, unless under the direct command and23
I-9
control (C2) of an active duty officer; or a soldier when off duty and1
acting only in a private capacity; or the US Coast Guard. The US Coast2
Guard can provide assistance and military support without the prior3
approval of the Governor.4
5
6
7
8
9
10
d. Public Law 93-288, The Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides11
the authority for the Federal Government to respond to disasters and12
emergencies as defined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and13
Emergency Act. The FRP outlines Federal, including Department of14
Defense, responsibilities and provides the framework for coordinating15
military support to civil authorities. The plan describes the Federal16
Government’s role in providing immediate action to save lives and17
mitigate property damage. Figure I-3 illustrates a Federal response in18
accordance with the FRP. The FRP groups the types of assistance19
needed into 12 specific Emergency Support Functions (ESF). The20
responsibility for each ESF is assigned to a primary agency.21
22
"The United States shall give the highest priority todeveloping capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat andmanage the consequences of nuclear, biological orchemical materials or weapons used by terrorists."
PDD-39, US Policy on Counterterrorism
I-10
• The primary agency serves as a Federal executive agent under the1
FCO to accomplish the ESF mission. The primary agency’s2
responsibilities include, but are not limited to: orchestrating the3
Federal agency support within the functional area for an affected4
State; providing an appropriate level of staffing for operations at5
FEMA Headquarters (HQ); activating and subtasking support6
agencies; and managing mission assignments and coordinating7
tasks with support agencies, as well as appropriate State agencies.8
(A complete listing of all the responsibilities can be found in the9
FRP.)10
11
• Several support agencies may be assigned for each ESF. A support12
agency for a ESF has operational responsibility for: Supporting the13
ESF primary agency when requested by conducting operations14
using its authorities, cognizant expertise, capabilities, or15
resources; supporting the primary agency mission assignments;16
and providing status and resource information to the primary17
agency, and others. (A complete listing of all responsibilities can18
be found in the FRP.) The Department of Defense is the primary19
LFA for ESF 3, “Public Works and Engineering,” and has20
supporting responsibilities for the other 11 ESFs. (A listing of all21
12 ESFs and which departments and agencies have primary or22
I-11
supporting roles is provided at Appendix B, “Emergency Support1
Functions.”)2
3
• In February 1997, a Terrorism Incident Annex was added, and4
amended in April 1999, to the FRP, which was used to5
implement PDD 39.6
7
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN
ResponseTask
Force
LocalIncident Commander
StateCoordinating Officer
29 Federal Agenciesin
12 Emergency Support Functions
DefenseCoordinating
Officer
FederalCoordinating Officer
8
Figure I-3. The Federal Response Plan9
I-12
e. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), United States1
Policy on Counterterrorism, signed in June 1995, directed a number of2
measures to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, deter and3
respond to terrorists acts, and strengthen capabilities to prevent and4
manage the consequence of terrorist use of NBC weapons including5
WMD. This PDD was revalidated in May 1998 by PDD-62, Protection6
Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans7
Overseas. Both of these PDDs discuss crisis management and8
consequence management responses. Figure I-4 illustrates that crisis9
management and consequence management may occur concurrently10
and not necessarily consecutively.11
12
• Crisis management focuses on law enforcement efforts to resolve13
the terrorist incident itself. It also can include special events that14
do not necessarily have a significant threat identified but are15
deemed potential targets for a WMD incident. During crisis16
management, the Department of Justice (DOJ), more specifically,17
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is the LFA. The crisis18
management process also may incorporate consequence19
management planning.20
21
• Consequence management focuses on mitigating suffering,22
containing to prevent additional consequences and suffering,23
I-13
restoring services, and recovering from the effects of the WMD1
incident. During domestic CM, FEMA is the LFA.2
3
CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
WMD SpecializedTechnical
Assistance
EmergencyConsultation
ThreatAssessment
Additional Assets as NeededFederal And Private Sector
Response Resources
CrisisMa
nage
ment
Consequence
Managem
ent
4
Figure I-4. Crisis and Consequence Management5
6
f. The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP)7
provides authority for the Federal Government to respond to radiological8
incidents and accidents to provide assistance to save lives and protect9
public health, safety, and property. The Department of Defense is to10
provide medical, logistic, communications, and other radiological11
response resources to DOE and other Federal response organizations12
that support non DOD radiological accidents.13
I-14
1
Nuclear/Radiological Biological Chemical2
Nuclear/Radiological, Biological, and Chemical Identification Signs3
44. Types of Incidents5
6
All four classes of WMD--nuclear, radiological, biological, and7
chemical--and high yield explosives (HYE) are available to terrorists.8
The descriptions in Figure I-5 identify significant characteristics and9
effects of WMD. Without state sponsorship, nuclear weapons are10
probably the least likely of the five. However, chemical and biological11
weapons, sometimes referred to as the “poor man’s nuclear weapons,”12
pose a significant threat in the post-Cold War environment. The13
relative low cost and simplicity of their design and technology, in14
comparison to nuclear weapons, make them a choice WMD for a15
variety of rogue states and terrorist organizations. This threat has16
been made all the more credible by the use of a chemical agent in the17
Tokyo subway, and through allegations over Iraq’s development of18
chemical and biological weapons, and that country’s actual use of19
chemical weapons in combat operations. In addition to the physical20
I-15
effects, common to any adversary use or threat of these weapons is1
the psychological effect, both in the immediate target area and in2
other vulnerable areas.3
4
WEAPONS OF MASSDESTRUCTION
NUCLEAR:
BIOLOGICAL:
CHEMICAL:
Produces damaging effects throughblast, thermal energy, and radiation
Includes pathogens and toxins thatproduce illness and death in humansand other life forms
Have effects that can be immediateor delayed, can be persistent ornonpersistent, and have significantphysiological effects
Produces damage effects tohumans through radioactivity,without blast effects of nuclearweapons
RADIOLOGICAL:
5
Figure I-5. Weapons of Mass Destruction6
I-16
a. Nuclear. A nuclear device requires considerable technology,1
infrastructure, and scientific knowledge to build. A nuclear2
detonation produces its damaging effects through blast, thermal3
energy, and radiation. Radiation includes initial radiation that4
directly injures humans and other life forms, electromagnetic pulse5
that directly damages a variety of electrical and electronic equipment,6
and residual radiation directly induced and spread by fallout that may7
remain at lethal levels for extended periods of time. The purpose is to8
kill and terrorize people, and even more importantly, to contaminate9
terrain and material for an indefinite period.10
11
b. Radiological. Devices that are able to disperse radioactive12
material over a large area require less technological knowledge and13
capability, and are a more feasible weapon to be used by terrorists.14
Many technical items of equipment have high-energy or radiological15
sources that may accidentally or deliberately become radiation hazards.16
For example, communications and surveillance sites may have known17
hazard areas around their equipment that result from high-energy18
transmissions. These transmissions can injure personnel, damage19
equipment, and cause avionics malfunctions. Additionally, medical20
radiation sources require precautions to avoid accidental or deliberate21
exposures. Terrorists, assassins, individuals sympathetic to a specific22
country’s views, or opposing forces can disperse radioactive material or23
I-17
employ radiological weapons. This use of radioactive material or1
radiological weapons poses a new threat. These weapons or2
contaminates can create areas of radioactivity without causing the blast3
effects of nuclear weapons. Personnel can be exposed to potentially4
hazardous levels of radiation in an otherwise conventional environment.5
6
c. Biological. The technology to develop biological weapons is7
available at very little cost to terrorists. Figure I-6 lists the different8
categories of biological weapons. The ingredients to produce most of9
these weapons are simple to obtain and do not require elaborate10
laboratories. Nor do terrorists need a large amount to achieve their11
purpose. Long-term contamination of an area, through the resiliency12
of some types of spores, can allow terrorists to depart undetected13
prior to symptoms becoming evident. Without proper vaccination and14
effective medical intervention, the biological agent could inflict heavy15
casualties over a large area. A biological threat consists of biological16
material planned to be deployed to produce casualties in17
personnel or animals, or to damage plants or crops, or other material.18
Biological contamination of crops or livestock could significantly affect19
the food supply of a targeted population of area.20
21
I-18
BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES
BacteriaVirusToxins
1
Figure I-6. Biological Categories2
3d. Chemical. A chemical agent is a chemical that is intended to4
kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through its5
physiological effects. Figure I-7 lists the different types of chemical6
agents. Chemical agents can be absorbed through the skin or lungs.7
For example, sarin is a particularly potent chemical agent that can8
cause death within minutes if a fatal dose is inhaled.9
10
TYPES OF CHEMICAL AGENTS
NerveIncapacitatingBloodChoking
11
Figure I-7. Types of Chemical Agents12
13
e. High Yield Explosive. A HYE is any conventional weapon or14
device that is capable of a high order of destruction and used in such a15
manner as to kill large numbers of people. HYE’s, while conventional in16
I-19
nature, are capable of producing catastrophic loss of life and property.1
They are easy and cheap to produce, requiring only a fundamental2
knowledge of explosives. Terrorists also may use explosives to deliver3
other WMD, or as a secondary device to inflict casualties on first4
responders and bystanders.5
6
5. Concept of Operational Support. When requested, support to civil7
authorities in response to the threat of or actual terrorist incident will8
occur in five phases--Initial DOD Response, Subsequent DOD9
Response, Follow-on DOD Assistance, Transition of Support10
Operations, and Redeployment. As history has shown, terrorist11
organizations have been able to act without being detected. When an12
incident occurs without warning, that produces catastrophic or major13
consequences and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, FEMA14
and the FBI will initiate crisis management and CM actions concurrently.15
FEMA immediately consults with the appropriate Governor’s office and16
the White House to determine if Federal assistance is required, and if17
FEMA will be permitted to act under the authorities of the Stafford Act to18
task Federal agencies to support a CM response.19
20
a. Phase I--Initial DOD Response.21
22
I-20
• To respond to a WMD threat or incident, the US requires a rapid1
and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest2
terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to3
the victims of terrorists. The goal during the initial response phase4
of an incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the terrorists5
do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, while6
seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency7
assistance. When the FBI determines a credible threat exists, they8
may request deployment of an interagency Domestic Emergency9
Support Team (DEST) in order to assess the situation, to advise the10
FBI on capabilities of the DEST members agencies, and to11
coordinate the deployment of follow-on assets. A DEST is provided12
for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those13
agencies required to respond to the specific incident.14
15
• The Department of Defense has significant capabilities to provide16
technical assistance to the on-scene tactical commander in17
resolving a terrorist threat upon decision by the NCA. DOD18
personnel may participate as members of the DEST. If directed,19
the Department of Defense provides assets with which to support20
CM efforts in any type of terrorist incident.21
22
I-21
• The first military CM responders to a WMD incident will most likely1
be the NG, in state status under the control of the affected2
Governor. These forces include the WMD-Civil Support Teams that3
provide support in each of the FEMA regions, discussed in Chapter4
II, “Roles and Responsibilities.”5
6
• Immediate Response Authority. When extremely serious7
conditions resulting from a WMD terrorist incident exist, and time8
does not permit prior approval from higher HQ, local military9
commanders and responsible officials of other DOD components10
are authorized to take all necessary actions to respond to requests11
of civil authorities. Any commander or official acting under12
immediate response authority shall advise the DOD executive13
agent through command channels, by the most expeditions14
means available, and shall seek approval or additional15
authorization as needed. Upon activation of the Presidential16
approved Federal response, the local military commander will fall17
into the Federal response.18
19
b. Phase II--Subsequent DOD Response. The level and type of20
subsequent DOD assistance will be determined by the type, severity, and21
location of the incident as well as local/state capabilities and requests for22
assistance. Depending on NCA guidance, the supported combatant23
I-22
commander must be prepared to deploy assigned and available assets to1
an incident site to provide assistance. USCINCJFCOM will mange many2
of these assets.3
4
c. Phase III--Follow-on DOD Assistance. Depending on NCA5
guidance, and consistent with the tasking in the joint Strategic6
Capabilities Plan, USCINCJFCOM will provide specialized CONUS based7
forces to augment the supported geographic combatant commander’s8
committed resources. These forces will include CONUS active duty units9
and reserve chemical and decontamination units in addition to the units10
listed in Appendix C, “Organization Capabilities.”11
12
d. Phase IV--Transition of Support Operations. Planning for13
transition of support operations begins as soon as possible following the14
commencement of the initial response. The purpose is to set up the15
conditions for termination of military support and transferring of support16
responsibilities to another Federal Agency, the State or local government17
authorities. Transfer is subject to approval by the appropriate LFA,18
either the FBI for crisis management or FEMA for CM. End state19
conditions are objective criteria and can be defined by a functional task20
or geographic responsibility. Transfer of support responsibilities should21
be completed as soon as the end state conditions are met. The transition22
I-23
contract should establish “not later than” times with officials, that are1
keyed to major events.2
3
e. Phase V--Redeployment. Following the transition of support4
operations, DOD CM forces will be redeployed in accordance with5
supported commander guidance. Redeployment may be incremental in6
nature.7
8
6. Summary9
10
CM operations raise many issues. The Constitution, statutes, and11
regulations strictly govern the relationship of the military to civilian12
authorities. The basic rule is that the military plays a subordinate and13
supporting role to civilian authority, which is different from the wartime14
role they would have in a foreign theater of operations. Questions of15
posse comitatus, use of force, disaster assistance, and federalization of16
state-NG troops raise issues that require timely legal advice.17
Commanders must be aware of the legal implications of CM operations,18
ensure that they are appropriately advised by competent legal counsel,19
and act accordingly.20
21
22
23
I-24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Intentionally Blank11
II-1
CHAPTER II1
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES2
3
45
6
7
8
1. General9
10
Since the Department of Defense will always be in a supporting role to a11
LFA, military forces may conduct CM operations under different command12
arrangements than in other operations. In most cases, the forces involved13
respond to direction and guidance from The Assistant to the Secretary of14
Defense for Civil Support (ATSD[CS]) has policy oversight for all domestic15
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive16
consequence management (CBRNE-CM) incident support, through the17
Joint Staff, to the supporting combatant command and the Joint Task18
Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). However, specific approval authority and19
procedures in DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities, apply in the20
case of sensitive support requests, acts or threats of terrorism, and requests for21
support from civilian law enforcement authorities or when forces involved are22
assigned to unified combatant commands. An illustration of the major Federal23
“The threat of terrorism is an evolving national and global issue that alsohas implications at the state and local levels. The nation as well as ourstates and communities must be better prepared to deter, respond to, andrecover from an act of terrorism.”
Governor James GilmoreHead, DOD WMD Advisory Panel (5 Apr 99)
II-2
departments and agencies that participate in CM operations is provided at1
Figure II-1.2
3
MAJOR PARTICIPANTS
4
Figure II-1. Major Participants5
6
2. National Command Authorities7
8
The NCA exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces, and authorize9
the use of Federal resources in response to domestic terrorist incidents.10
During such incidents the President provides this support by declaring a11
disaster or emergency, usually after a request from a governor.12
II-3
1
2
3
4
5
6
3. Federal Agencies Other Than Department of Defense7
8
a. Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation. In9
accordance with PDD-39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism, DOJ is the10
LFA for counterterrorism and for threats or acts of terrorism within the United11
States. This authority has been delegated to the FBI. The FBI’s lead role in12
these situations stem from the fact that such incidents will have law13
enforcement implications, and they have the requisite capability to manage an14
event from the Federal law enforcement perspective. As such, it is the FBI’s15
policy that crisis management will involve only those Federal agencies16
requested by the FBI to provide expert guidance and assistance. Within the17
FBI is the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO), which is18
responsible for coordinating all Federal efforts, including other Federal19
departments and agencies, to assist state and local first responders with20
planning, training, equipment, and exercises necessary to respond to a21
conventional or WMD incident.22
23
“We are especially concerned about the spread of biological and toxinweapons falling into the hands of terrorists. … To date we have noevidence that any known terrorist organization has the capability to employsuch weapons. However, we cannot dismiss the possibilities. It may beonly a matter of time before terrorists do acquire and use these weapons.
Under Secretary of State BartholomewTestimony Before the House Armed Services Committee 1993
II-4
For additional information on the DOJ and the FBI see JP 3-08, Interagency1
Coordination During Joint Operations, and their World Wide Web sites listed in2
Appendix D, “Points of Contact.”3
4
b. Federal Emergency Management Agency. As the LFA for CM, FEMA5
must be prepared to deal with the consequences of a terrorist incident. The6
Director of FEMA is tasked in PDD-39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism,7
to ensure that the FRP is adequate for CM activities in response to terrorist8
attacks against US populations including those where WMD are involved.9
FEMA is organized into ten Federal, geographic regions, as illustrated in Figure10
II-2, that provide support on a national basis. If the terrorist incident is11
beyond the capability of the local and state governments then FEMA12
coordinates the activities of Federal, state, and local agencies at the national13
level through the use of its Emergency Support Team and in the affected area14
with its Emergency Response Team (ERT). These activities include mitigating15
damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident; to protect16
public health and safety; to restore essential government services; and to17
provide emergency assistance. After a Presidential declaration, the Director18
of FEMA, on behalf of the President, appoints a FCO, who is responsible for19
coordinating all Federal disaster relief assistance programs, in the declared20
area(s), to ensure the maximum effectiveness of federal assistance.21
22
II-5
For additional information on FEMA refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination1
During Joint Operations, and their World Wide Web site listed in Appendix D,2
“Points of Contact.”3
4
STANDARD FEDERAL REGIONS
X
IX
VIIV
I
II
IIIVII
VVIII
5
Figure II-2. Standard Federal Regions6
7
c. Department of Energy (DOE). DOE owns and operates a variety of8
radiological activities throughout the United States. With specialized9
deployable assets, DOE assists other federal agencies responding to nuclear10
emergencies, incidents involving nuclear weapons not under DOE custody,11
incidents involving satellites containing radioactive sources, and other12
radiological incidents. Specifically, DOE provides scientific and technical13
assistance regarding threat assessments; search operations; access operations;14
II-6
diagnostic and device assessments; disablement and render safe operations;1
hazard assessment; containment, relocations, and storage of special nuclear2
material evidence; and post-incident cleanup. The DOE Nevada Operations3
Office (DOE/NV) is the central point of coordination for the support of all4
CM operations for DOE. DOE’s concept is that their CM official will deploy5
within 4-hours of notification to support the LFA. This official will work6
directly for the DOE Senior Energy Official, but is to provide technical advice7
and recommendations on all radiological issues to the primary agency.8
DOE/NV is responsible for coordinating and directing DOE organizations listed9
in Appendix C, “Organization Capabilities,” during a CM incident.10
11
For additional information on DOE, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination12
During Joint Operations, and its World Wide Web site listed in Appendix D,13
“Points of Contact.”14
15
d. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS is the16
primary agency for ESF 8, “Health and Medical Services,” under the FRP.17
The Public Health Service (PHS), an agency of the DHHS, leads this effort by18
directing the activation of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). In19
accordance with PDD 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the20
Homeland and Americans Overseas, DHHS is the lead agency to plan and to21
prepare for a national response to medical emergencies arising from the22
II-7
terrorist use of WMD. This department, with the support of other Federal1
agencies will:2
3
• Provide enhanced local response capabilities through the development of4
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) systems.5
• Develop and maintain the NDMS; including the National Medical6
Response Teams (NMRT).7
8
• Coordinate with the Department of Defense to ensure deployability of9
NDMS response teams, supplies, and equipment.10
11
• Coordinate with the Department of Veteran Affairs to ensure adequate12
stockpiles of antidotes and other necessary pharmaceuticals nationwide13
and the training of medical personnel in NDMS hospitals.14
15
For additional information on the DHHS, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency16
Coordination during Joint Operations, and its World Wide Web site listed17
in Appendix D, “Points of Contact.”18
19
e. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA will activate20
environmental response capabilities to support the Federal response to acts of21
WMD terrorism. The EPA establishes a coordinated response by Federal22
departments and agencies, state and local agencies, and private organizations23
II-8
to control oil and hazardous substance discharges or substantial threats of1
discharges. For chemical incidents, EPA’s National Response Team can2
identify, contain, clean-up, and dispose of chemical agents. For nuclear3
incidents, EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Teams, Radiation4
Environmental Laboratories, and Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring5
system will monitor and assess radiation sources and provide guidance.6
7
For additional information on the EPA, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination8
during Joint Operations, and their World Wide Web site listed in Appendix D,9
“Points of Contact.”10
11
f. The American Red Cross (ARC). Although not an entity of the12
government, the ARC operates under a charter from Congress as America’s13
official volunteer relief agency. In that capacity, the ARC has a major role in14
disaster assistance operations, and is designated in the FRP as the primary15
agency for ESF 6, “Mass Care.” Due to the general nature of its charter, ARC16
also can provide support in environmental assistance, law enforcement, and17
selected community assistance operations.18
19
For additional information on the ARC, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency20
Coordination during Joint Operations, and its World Wide Web site listed in21
Appendix D, “Points of Contact.”22
23
II-9
4. Department of Defense1
2
a. Secretary of Defense. When authorized by executive order of the3
President, the Secretary of Defense directs the employment of active Federal4
forces to support CM operations. The Secretary of Defense also establishes5
the standards of conduct.6
7
b. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. The8
ATSD(CS) provides civilian oversight on, behalf of the Secretary of Defense,9
for the development and implementation of planning guidance, policies, and10
procedures for the newly established JTF-CS; a HQ element subordinate to11
United States Joint Forces Command. This official also is the focal point for12
the coordination of DOD efforts in preparation for requests from civilian13
agencies on WMD-CM. All departmental efforts related to WMD-CM must be14
coordinated through this office.15
16
c. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA is designed to17
ensure US readiness and ability to respond to WMD threats. It provides18
emergency response for matters involving WMD incidents. DTRA operates the19
DOD Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center (JNACC) in cooperation with20
DOE. The JNACC maintains current records reflecting the location and21
capability of specialized units and teams that can be used for a nuclear22
accident/attack response. It also can assist the DOD OSC at the incident site23
II-10
and the National Military Command Center in locating and dispatching1
required technical resources. DTRA maintains a deployable advisory team2
called the consequence management advisory team (CMAT). It is composed of3
CB Officers, legal, planners, public affairs, plume modelers, and detection4
equipment. The CMAT assists the OSC in the management of nuclear related5
issues. This team is on-call 24 hours a day and can deploy within 4 hours of6
notification.7
8
d. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman is responsible9
for ensuring that plans are developed to support and execute military10
operations to manage and mitigate the consequences of the use of WMD. Also,11
the Chairman is responsible to ensure there is a broad spectrum of US military12
capabilities to conduct domestic CM operations as part of a larger USG13
interagency effort to manage and mitigate consequences of a WMD incident.14
15
e. Joint Staff (JS). Most of the Joint Staff directors have specific domestic16
CM responsibilities within their functional area of expertise; however, the JS17
J-3 is the JS office of primary responsibility.18
19
f. The Service Chiefs will organize and train forces to conduct CM20
operations.21
22
II-11
g. Director of Military Support. DOMS is the DOD primary point of1
contact for all Federal departments and agencies during DOD’s involvement2
in providing military support to civil authorities. In most cases, the forces3
involved respond to direction and guidance through DOMS. The DOMS4
ensures the planning, coordination, and execution of the military support for5
domestic emergency disaster DOD support. However, responsibilities in6
dealing with combating terrorism, both crisis management as well as7
consequence management, are handled by the Joint Staff. Maintaining8
DOMS as the DOD primary point of contact alleviates confusion with other9
Federal departments and agencies as to which DOD agency they should10
contact in support of any domestic emergency. If the response is in support of11
a CBRNE-CM incident, DOMS will forward the request to ATSD(CS) for action.12
13
h. USCINCJFCOM. USCINCJFCOM serves as the DOD principal planning14
agent and supported commander for CM operations for the 48 contiguous15
states, the District of Columbia, and US territorial waters within US Joint16
Forces Command’s (USJFCOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR) and validates all17
requests for military assistance during CM operations in CONUS.18
19
i. Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command. USCINCSO20
serves as DOD principal planning agent and supported commander for CM21
operations in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and22
II-12
US territorial waters in the Gulf of Mexico, and validates all requests for1
military resources during CM in US South Command’s (USSOUTHCOM’s) AOR.2
3
j. Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command. USCINCPAC serves as4
DOD principal planning agent and supported commander for CM5
operations in Alaska, Hawaii, Territory of Guam, Territory of American Samoa,6
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, US administrative entities,7
and US territorial waters within the Pacific Command, and validates all8
requests for military resources during CM in US Pacific Command’s9
(USPACOM’s) AOR.10
11
k. Joint Task Force-Civil Support. USJFCOM is responsible to resource12
and train the JTF-CS, to support the LFA in CM response operations as the13
follow-on DOD force behind local first responders and state assets. JTF-CS will14
deploy when the President has approved a Federal emergency declaration or15
the proper execution orders have directed DOD support to the LFA. The JTF-16
CS is a standing JTF HQ with an operational level focus. It is organized and17
trained for a flexible response, and forces will be tailored based on the type of18
WMD incident (i.e., nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical) and support19
requested by the LFA. It will provide DOD C2 and have operational control20
(OPCON) of all DOD assets, less special operations forces (SOF) and the US21
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), in support of the LFA. The JTF-CS will22
initially focus its efforts on incident assessment and rapid deployment of DOD23
II-13
capabilities to ensure efficient and synchronized support to LFA efforts. Once1
forces have arrived to the incident site, the focus will shift to fulfilling requests2
for assistance from the LFA and OSC. The JTF-CS, co-located with USJFCOM3
in Norfolk, VA, is composed of personnel from the active components, RC,4
government civilians, and contractors. Additionally, a battle-rostered staff from5
USJFCOM and its components augments the JTF-CS.6
7
• Subordinate to the JTF-CS could be two Response Task Forces (RTF),8
also C2 elements. RTF-East (RTF-E) is responsible for Federal Regions9
I, II, III, IV, and V. RTF-West (RTF-W) is responsible for Federal Regions10
VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X. Figure II-3 illustrates these two different regions.11
If one of the RTFs is already committed and there is another WMD12
incident in that RTFs area of operations (AO) the other RTF may be13
activated to support the second incident.14
15
•• RTF-E is made up of approximately 80 personnel from HQ, 1st Army,16
stationed at Fort Gillem, GA, and Fort Meade, MD. If deployed alone,17
the commander, RTF-E assumes OPCON of all committed DOD18
elements (less SOF AND USACE), coordinates military support of crisis19
and consequence management operations, and redeploys when DOD20
disengagement criteria are met. The initial response team can be21
enroute within 4-hours of notification, and establishes initial liaison with22
the supported civil agencies and coordinates support for the follow-on23
II-14
personnel. RTF-E will establish a fully functional command post in the1
vicinity of the incident within 24 hours of notification. It should provide2
liaison officers (LNOs) to appropriate civil agencies and receive LNOs from3
appropriate military commands and agencies. The RTF can be deployed4
by one C-5 or two C-141 aircraft. It does not have any field capabilities5
to either billet or feed itself. The HQ requires office space for6
approximately 50 personnel. It will most likely be collocated or in close7
proximity to the location of the FEMA, ERT or Disaster Field Office (DFO).8
9
•• RTF-W is composed of approximately 105 personnel from HQ, 5th10
Army located at Ft Sam Houston, TX. If deployed alone, the11
commander, RTF-W assumes OPCON of all committed DOD elements12
(less SOF AND USACE), coordinates military support of crisis and13
consequence management operations, and redeploys when DOD14
disengagement criteria are met. On receipt of a warning order or15
execution order an Immediate Response Team will immediately establish16
a command post at the Fifth Army emergency operations center. The17
RTF-W Assessment Element must be able to assemble for movement no18
later than 5-hours after notification. The main body must be able to19
deploy no later than 12-hours after notification. RTF-W can deploy from20
either Kelly Air Force Base (AFB) or Randolph AFB, both in San Antonio,21
TX, via one C-5 aircraft. It does not have any field capabilities to either22
billet or feed itself. The HQ requires office space, and will most likely be23
II-15
collocated or in close proximity to the location of the FEMA, ERT, or1
DFO.2
3
RESPONSE TASK FORCES BY REGION
Puerto RicoVirgin Islands
Federal Emergency Management AgencyRegions , I, II, III, IV, V
Federal Emergency Management AgencyRegions VI, VII, VIII, IX, X
FIRST U.S. ARMY
FIFTH U.S. ARMY
4
Figure II-3. Response Task Forces By Region5
6
• The Chemical Biological-Rapid Response Team is a C2 element from7
the Soldier, Biological, and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) that, on8
order, deploys, in support of the LFA, and assists in the detection,9
neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of WMD10
articles containing chemical and/or related hazardous materials11
(HAZMAT) and assists first responders in dealing with potential WMD12
II-16
consequences. Additionally, it provides medical advice and support for1
patient decontamination, triage, transport and treatment; and technical2
CB medical and non-medical advice. It will be OPCON to the supported3
combatant commander, joint special operations task force, JTF-CS, or4
RTF, as directed.5
6
• The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and Defense Coordinating7
Element (DCE). The DCO is the DOD representative appointed by the8
supported combatant commander to coordinate on the scene activities9
with the FCO. The DCO is the focal point for all DOD response and is10
the DOD on-scene interface with FEMA, other Federal providers and the11
SCO representative located in the DFO. FEMA and other federal agency12
requests for support from DOD go through the DCO for validation and13
resourcing from appropriate military organizations. Although the DCO14
will be OPCON to the JTF-CS or the RTF during a WMD incident, the15
officer, normally an 0-6 or above, will operate in the DFO in close16
coordination with the FCO. A multifunctional staff of military officers17
referred to as the DCE assist the DCO.18
19
• US Joint Forces Command has other deployable assets that can be made20
available to USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM for CM responses to WMD21
threats or incidents within US territories or possessions within their22
respective AORs.23
II-17
l. National Guard. The NG, in state status, is the governor’s primary1
response organization for WMD incidents. When necessary, governors may2
borrow NG forces from other governors. The NG forces respond under the3
governor’s control, rather than Department of Defense, and do so in4
accordance with state laws and applicable interstate compacts. However, when5
NG units are federalized by order of the President, they then fall under the6
same limitations and C2 arrangements as active component military7
organizations. Specific NG units that are being trained to respond to WMD8
incidents are the WMD Civil Support Teams.9
10
m. WMD Civil Support Teams.11
12
• WMD Civil Support Teams are the first military responders. They consist13
of 22 full-time (Title 32) soldiers and airmen sub-organized into six14
sections. See Figure II-4 for a description of the organization. The15
mission of the WMD Civil Support team is to rapidly deploy to an16
incident site to assess a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, or17
radiological incident in support of a local incident commander (e.g.,18
fire chief, police chief). Also, these teams advise civilian responders19
regarding appropriate response actions and facilitate requests for20
assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and Federal assets to21
help save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate greater property22
II-18
damage. The teams are geographically and strategically located within1
the 10 FEMA regions.2
3
• When responding to a domestic support request, the WMD Civil4
Support team will remain under state military control unless5
federalized. The teams, as NG assets, have a state mission, and based6
on their capability to be called to Federal service, also have a Federal7
mission. The WMD Civil Support team is designed for domestic CM and8
may be deployed as a state asset, along with other state NG units,9
without DOD authorization. If responding in a Title 32 status, the team10
will remain under the control of their State Adjutant General. Each state11
has laws and regulations regarding the deployment of soldiers in a “State12
Active Duty” status. WMD Civil Support commanders are required to13
coordinate with their respective state’s Plans, Operations, and Military14
Support Officer for information regarding the aspects of “State Active15
Duty.” Once federalized, these teams may be deployed under DOD16
control in support of a LFA during a WMD terrorist incident.17
18
II-19
Assistant Ops Officer (O-3)Senior Ops NCO (E-8)Ops NCO-Modeling (E-7)Assistant Ops NCO (E-6)
Survey Team Leader (O-3)NBC Reconnaissance NCO (E-7)2 - Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs (E-6)4 )- Assistant NBC Reconnaissance NCOs (E-5
Logistics NCO (E-7)Administrative NCO (E-5)
Communications Team Chief (E-7)Information Systems Operator (E-6)
Unit Commander (O-5)Deputy Cdr/Operations Officer (O-4)
Physicians Assistant (O-3)Medical Ops Officer (O-3)NMSO (O-3)Medical NCO (E-7)
OperationsTeam
CommunicationsTeam
MedicalTeam
Legend
Cdr CommanderNBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCO noncommisioned officerNMSO Nuclear Medical Science OfficerOps operations
SurveyTeams
Commander&
Deputy
Administration &Logistics Team
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONCIVIL SUPPORT TEAM
1
Figure II-4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team2
3
n. There are numerous other units and organizations within the4
Department of Defense, and more specifically within each of the Services, to5
include the US Coast Guard, that can provide technical support and assistance6
for WMD incidents.7
8
II-20
Appendix B, “Organization Capabilities,” provides a list of those organizations1
and their baseline capability trained to respond to WMD incidents.2
3
5. State and Local Government4
5
a. Each state has an emergency management state office that coordinates6
emergency preparedness planning, conducts emergency preparedness training7
and exercises, and serves as the coordinating agency for the Governor in an8
emergency. Generally, these state offices are either organized as an9
independent officer under the Governor or aligned under The Adjutant General10
(TAG) or the state police. As such, the senior official in charge of emergency11
services varies by state. In some states the TAG is the senior official, while in12
other states the TAG is the director of their emergency management state13
office.14
15
A list of the offices is provided at Annex A, “Emergency Management State and16
Territory Offices,” to Appendix D, “Points of Contact.”17
18
b. The local communities provide the first responders. These local19
responders are the primary source of help and hope for victims of a WMD20
incident. These first responders include fire, police, emergency medical21
services, and HAZMAT units. In most cases it will most likely be the local fire22
chief, police chief, or some other local official who will be the OSC. Effective23
II-21
local response depends on the coordinated efforts of various departments and1
agencies, and may involve assets from surrounding communities. The local2
government has the responsibility to:3
4
• Provide first response (911 dispatch of police, fire, Emergency Medical5
Services, or others).6
7
• Establish an incident command.8
9
• Warn and evacuate citizens.10
11
• Assess situation to identify operational requirements.12
13
• Determine if requirement’s exceed local capabilities.14
15
• Request mutual support and/or State assistance.16
17
6. Summary18
19
Almost all CM operations will be conducted in a joint and interagency20
environment. The Department of Defense may support or coordinate with21
many Federal, state, and local governmental departments and agencies as it22
conducts CM operations. Although the Department of Defense is not the lead23
II-22
agency in CM operations, it is a supporting agency for all of the FRP's1
emergency support functions. Throughout our history, the military has2
provided community support at the national level and support to its3
surrounding communities, and will continue to provide that assistance in the4
future.5
6
III-1
CHAPTER III1
COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS23456
7
1. General8
9
a. C2 relationships in CM operations may be tailored to a particular10
situation. Command relationships always begin with the NCA. As11
stated in Chapter I, “Introduction,” the DOJ (and delegated to the FBI) is12
the LFA for crisis management. To ensure there is one overall LFA, PDD13
39, United States Policy on counterterrorism, directs FEMA to support14
DOJ (as delegated to the FBI) until the Attorney General transfers LFA15
CM responsibility to FEMA.16
17
b. Once the NCA has authorized Federal support and the Department18
of Defense is in support of CM operations, FEMA requests emergency19
support through DOMS to the ATSD-CS for the appropriate action. The20
ATSD-CS will coordinate with the Joint Staff and supporting combatant21
commands to develop plans and orders. To alleviate confusion, FEMA22
will continue to coordinate for all military emergency support through23
DOMS during the CM operations. DOMS, in turn, will coordinate with24
ATSD-CM. The JTF-CS, or RTF, deploys as directed by the supported25
“For every objective, seek unity of command and unit of effort.”
FM 100-5, Operations
III-2
combatant commander and operates under the supported commander’s1
or Commander, JTF-CS, control until termination of CM operations. The2
supported unified combatant commander deploys the DCO to3
coordinate military support and to respond to the FCO’s requests.4
The supported combatant command approves requests for resources5
within its capabilities but forwards requests not involving unified6
combatant command assets through the Joint Staff to the ATSD-CM for7
approval.8
9
c. Command Relationships10
11
• For CONUS WMD incidents, USJFCOM’s JTF-CS normally will12
report through the USCINCJFCOM to the NCA. The Chairman of13
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the principal military advisor to14
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of15
Defense, also may be involved in matters relating to the JTF-CS.16
An illustration of this command relationship, and the interagency17
support relationships with other Federal assets, is provided at18
Figure III-1.19
20
III-3
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
FederalState
Weaponsof Mass
Destruction-Civil Support
Team
OtherUnits
The AdjutantGeneral
Governor DirectorFEMA
FEMARegional
Disaster Field Office
SCO FCO DCO
CBRRT EODTEU
National Command AuthoritiesSecretary of Defense
CBIRF Other Units
USJFCOM
Chain of CommandCoordination
SecArmyDOMS
CJCSJoint Staff
LegendCBIRF Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USMC)CBRRT Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (USA)CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffDCO Defense Coordinating OfficerDOMS Director of Military SupportEPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison OfficerFCO Federal Coordinating OfficerFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyFORSCOM Forces Command (USA)
JSOTF joint special operations task forceJTC-CS Joint Task Force-Civil SupportSCO State Coordinating OfficerSecArmy Secretary of the ArmyTEU Technical Escort UnitUSA United States ArmyUSJFCOM United States Joint Forces CommandUSMC United States Marine Corps
AttorneyGeneral
Figure III-1. Command Relationships
Federal Bureau of InvestigationOn-Scene Commander
EPLO FORSCOM
JTF-CS
SpecialMission Unit
JSOTF
1
III-4
• For all CM operations conducted in CONUS, USCINCJFCOM will1
act as the supported combatant commander for all DOD forces,2
less JSOTF and USACE units supporting the LFA. The JTF-CS3
will operate under the OPCON of USCINCJFCOM.4
5
• For all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin6
Islands, USCINCSO will act as the supported combatant7
commander. If the JTF-CS is employed for CM operations in these8
areas, it will operate under the OPCON of USCINCSO.9
10
• For all CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam,11
American Samoa, or any of the other US possessions in the Pacific12
AOR, USCINCPAC will act as the supported combatant13
commander. If the JTF-CS is employed for CM operations in these14
areas, it will operate under the OPCON of USCINCPAC.15
16
d. Incident Command System. The US Coast Guard, along with a17
wide variety of local, state, and national emergency management18
and law enforcement organizations, have adopted the Incident19
Command System (ICS) for all response operations. The ICS is a20
management system that can be used for any type of contingency21
or planned non-emergency event. There are five primary22
management functions:23
III-5
• Command--Sets priorities and objectives and is responsible for1
overall command of the incident.2
3
• Operations--Has responsibility for all tactical operations4
necessary to carry out the plan.5
6
• Planning--Responsible for the collection, evaluation, and7
dissemination of information concerning incident development8
as well as the status of all ava8ible resources.9
10
• Logistics--Responsible for proving the necessary support11
(facilities, services, and materials) to meet incident needs.12
13
• Finance--Responsible for monitoring and documenting all costs.14
Provides the necessary financial support related to the incident.15
16
2. Joint Task Force-Civil Support17
18
a. The JTF-CS is established and organized on a functional basis.19
The USCINCJFCOM will exercise combatant command over the JTF-CS.20
An example of the HQ for JTF-CS is provided at Figure III-2.21
22
23
III-6
HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE -CIVIL SUPPORT
Command Group
J-1 J-2 J-3 J-4 J-6
Legal
Medical
PublicAffairs
LiaisonOfficer
1
Figure III-2. Headquarters Joint Task Force-Civil Support2
3
b. Once approval has been granted, the JTF-CS may send a small4
advance party to the incident to conduct a site survey to facilitate the5
deployment of JTF-CS and make initial recommendations on follow-on6
DOD forces in support of the LFA. Depending on the size of the WMD7
incident and the site survey the JTF-CS may:8
9
• Stay at its home station and provide support to the on-scene JTF10
as required.11
12
III-7
• Augment the on-scene JTF with personnel and equipment as1
required.2
3
• Deploy forward to the incident site and with the full staff and, if4
necessary, receive pre-identified augmentation.5
6
3. Response Task Force7
8
a. The RTFs were briefly described in Chapter II, “Roles and9
Responsibilities.” They are not force providers, but rather receive10
OPCON of DOD forces and exercise C2 of these assets in support of the11
LFA as it responds to a WMD incident. The combination of the HQ and12
the OPCON assets form the Response Task Force. An example of a HQ13
for a RTF is shown at Figure III-3.14
15
III-8
HEADQUARTERS RESPONSE TASK FORCE
Command Group
HeadquartersCommandant
Safety
Staff JudgeAdvocate
PublicAffairs Office
Chaplain
ExecutiveServices
SpecialStaff
Defense Coordinating Officer/defense coordinating element
cell
PersonnelStaff
IntelligenceStaff
CommunicationsStaff
LogisticsStaff
Comptroller
CoordinationCommand
OperationsStaff
1
Figure III-3. Headquarters Response Task Force2
3
b. Structure of Subordinate Units. The type and size of the WMD4
incident will dictate what type of forces will be necessary. The RTF5
commander will task organize elements to best accomplish the mission.6
Figure III-1 illustrates the command relationships. One of the blocks is7
“other units.” These other units will most likely include engineer,8
III-9
communications, transportation, and medical units, to name a few.1
Provided at Figure III-4 is a notional JTF for CM operations.2
3
LegendCMO Civil-Military OperationsDecon decontaminationNBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalRECON Reconnaissance
NOTIONAL CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENTJOINT TASK FORCE
CMO
Decon
Personnel
Construction Utilities
NBC
CivilAffairs
Contracting
Engineers
Ground
RotaryWing
FixedWing
Transportation
Communications Security
Monitoring
Recon
EquipmentWater
Power
Camp
Road
Buildings
DemolitionRemoval
Triage
Trauma
PatientDecon
Medical
MortuaryAffairs
InternalSupport
Joint Task Force
4
Figure III-4. Notional Consequence Management Joint Task Force5
6
For additional information on establishing JTFs, refer to JP 5-00.2,7
Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, or CJCSM8
3500.05, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide.9
10
4. Authorities11
12
a. As introduced in Chapter I, “Introduction,” the Director of FEMA13
has the authority to establish policies for, and coordinate federal14
III-10
executive agencies for consequence management. The Associate1
Director for Response and Recovery coordinates federal assistance under2
the Stafford Act at the national level. To assist, there are several3
coordinating officers:4
5
• State Coordinating Officer. As the governor’s representative,6
the SCO is responsible for emergency management, disaster7
response, and recovery activities. The SCO is the primary point8
of contact for the FCO in facilitating disaster assistance. The state9
area commands (STARC) of the National Guard develop disaster10
emergency plans in coordination with other state and local11
agencies. The STARC and the DCO establish necessary liaison to12
coordinate and effectively manage local, state, and Federal13
activities. The STARC can assist Federal forces with contracting14
support as well as logistic support from NG resources not15
otherwise committed.16
17
• Federal Coordinating Officer. An affected state or area receives18
federal assistance through FEMA and the FCO. The FCO is the19
focal point for DOD liaison with FEMA during a disaster. The20
FCO, as the FEMA director’s personal on-scene representative,21
coordinates all federal resources supporting local and state22
authorities in the assistance effort, works with the SCO to23
III-11
determine state requirements, and coordinates national-level1
issues with the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, the2
national-level centralized coordinating group of3
representatives from the federal departments and agencies4
under the FRP. The FCO Operates from a forward-deployed DFO5
collocated with or in close proximity to the state operations center.6
The FCO is responsible for lateral coordination and support7
between ESF participants, as well as integration of the support of8
agencies that are not part of the FRP.9
10
• Defense Coordinating Officer. The DCO is the focal point for11
the DOD response to a particular disaster. The supported12
combatant commander appoints a military officer--DCO--who13
normally is in the grade of O-6 or higher. Jointly, the ATSD-CM,14
and the supported combatant commander, defines the authority of15
each DCO for all CM operations. Authority is limited either to the16
requirements or to a specified geographical area or emergency. In17
CM operations the DCO will be OPCON to the JTF-CS or RTF as18
determined in appropriate orders. The DCO is the DOD on-19
scene interface with FEMA, through the FCO, other Federal20
providers (ESF managers), and the SCO representative located in21
the DFO. A multifunctional staff of military officers referred to as22
the DCE may be established to assist the DCO. The DCO23
III-12
validates requirements requested by the FCO, SCO, or ESF1
representatives before passing them to the JTF-CS. Requests for2
assistance are based on mission requirements, not requests for3
specific assets. The DCO’s expertise and constant liaison with the4
FCO, local officials, other ESF managers, and the supporting JTF5
are critical to the effective coordination and integration of the6
Federal and state disaster assistance efforts.7
8
•• Activation. DCOs are activated for each disaster for which the9
President declares military assistance is required (or under special10
circumstances, prior to declaration). DCOs are predesignated for11
each state, territory, and possession. DCOs are better prepared12
for duty when they are familiar with the region; facilities; policies,13
procedures, capabilities, and training levels of military units; and14
personnel and civilian organizations in the region. After15
appropriate approvals, DOMS notifies a supported combatant16
commander to activate a DCO. Without a Presidential disaster17
declaration and appropriate approvals, the DCO lacks authority to18
coordinate or commit military assets. A DCO should not be19
activated before a disaster declaration and coordination with20
DOMS. The DCE may be activated along with the DCO. For21
cases involving Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, USCINCSO22
III-13
may designate a commander JTF to provide C2 over DOD assets1
beyond the DCO’s operational span of control.2
3
5. Summary4
5
The Department of Defense will most likely provide military support to6
civil authorities in CM operations. The Department of Defense is a7
supporting agency, providing military support to the LFA. In most cases,8
military forces will participate in CM operations as part of a DOD effort9
with oversight by the ATSD-CM and commanded by a supported10
combatant commander. The Department of Defense is committed to11
providing timely and effective assistance support to other Federal12
agencies and the American people. Coordinating officers are established13
at the Federal and state levels and the Department of Defense will14
activate a DCO to coordinate all DOD support requests from the FCO15
and SCO.16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
III-14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Intentionally Blank11
IV-1
CHAPTER IV1
PLANNING2345
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
1. General14
15
No single agency at the local, state, Federal or private level possesses16
the authority and expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues17
that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism where WMD are18
involved. An act of terrorism involving WMD, particularly an act directed19
against a large population center within the United States, may produce20
major consequences that could almost immediately overwhelm the21
capabilities of many local and state governments. Planning and22
coordination by all three levels of government needs to be proactive and23
should be accomplished prior to an incident in order to mitigate suffering24
and restore essential government services.25
“Planning can be conceived in a broader perspective, as a socialprocess. It is a process that includes the establishment of viablechannels for communication and interaction between the facility, local,state, and federal agencies prior to the development of plans. Planninginvolves the interface of various units in the development, testing, andupdating of written plans. Furthermore, it involves educating the publicand developing a public understanding of potential hazards andappropriate protection action. In addition, emergency planning . . .should not be divorced from the day-to-day planning activities of thecommunity, i.e., made a part of daily life and organizational activity,then an emergency is not a disjointed, abrupt departure from everydaylife.”
Report of the Emergency Preparedness andResponse Task Force of the President’s Commissionon the Accident at Three Mile Island
IV-2
1
2
3
2. Planning Considerations4
5
Planners must identify critical or key issues unique to CM operations.6
Special planning considerations are shown in Figure IV-1.7
8
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Damage and Injury Profile
Site Containment
Evacuation
Identify Assets & Augmentation
Weapons of Mass DestructionDisposition
Force Protection
Information and Planning
Decontamination
Medical Requirements
Nuclear, Biological, andChemical Reconnaissance
Mass Care
Termination
9
Figure IV-1. Planning Considerations10
11
a. Damage and Injury Profile. Assess what the damage is and what12
the casualty estimates are.13
14
b. Information and Planning. Coordinate the overall information15
activities by collecting, processing, and disseminating information about16
“Plans are nothing; planning is everything.”
President Dwight D. Eisenhower
IV-3
the WMD incident to facilitate the overall response activities. One team1
or section should provide an initial assessment of disaster impacts2
including the identification of boundaries of the affected area and3
distribution, type and severity of damages, including the status of critical4
facilities. Also, how the public affairs (PA) and media will be handled.5
The PA and media will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V,6
“Support Functions.”7
8
c. Site Containment. Establish or know where perimeters have9
already been set up. The contaminated site should be clearly marked to10
prevent personnel not properly protected from inadvertently wandering11
into the area and becoming casualties themselves. Likewise, personnel12
who are contaminated should be prevented from leaving the13
contaminated area in order to prevent the spread of contamination. This14
will be further discussed later in this chapter.15
16
d. Decontamination. At every incident involving hazardous17
materials, there is the possibility that personnel, their equipment, and18
members of the general public will become contaminated. The entire19
process of decontamination should be directed toward confinement of the20
contaminant within the containment area, sometimes called the “hot21
zone,” and the decontamination corridor to maintain the safety and22
health of response personnel and the general public. The determination23
IV-4
of proper decontamination methods and procedures needs to be1
considered prior to any response personnel entering the contaminated2
site.3
4
e. Evacuation. There are three basic modes of evacuating casualties5
(personnel, ground vehicles, and aircraft.) If working in a contaminated6
area, personnel will need to wear cumbersome individual protective7
equipment (IPE) under mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP)8
conditions. This additional clothing and equipment, combined with the9
climate, increased workloads, and fatigue will greatly reduce personnel10
effectiveness and consequently hamper casualty evacuation. Such11
conditions will most likely necessitate increased personnel requirements.12
13
f. Medical Requirements. The use of WMD can result in a large14
number of causalities and also require special handling that can drain15
medical resources. Health service support and medical requirements will16
be addressed in detail in Chapter V, “Support Functions.”17
18
g. Identify Assets to Include Augmentation. Once on-scene, the19
C2 elements can better assess the situation and identify the type of20
organizations that will be necessary. They must have a “reach back”21
capability to contact specific units to provide the required support.22
This is illustrated in Figure IV-2.23
IV-5
REACH BACK CAPABILITY
JTF-CSNCA
SBCCOM
CBIRF
Laboratories
Continuous Connectivity to the Subject Matter Experts
Legend
CBIRF Chemical, Biological Incident Response ForceJTF-CS Joint Task Force - Civil SupportNCA National Command AuthoritiesSBCCOM Soldier, Biological, Chemical Command
UC OMS J F
UNITED STATESJOINT FORCES
COMMAND
1
Figure IV-2. Reach Back Capability2
3
h. NBC Reconnaissance. Provide NBC reconnaissance, which4
includes search, survey, surveillance, and samplings. A team should:5
6
• Conduct searches to obtain significant information about the NBC7
condition of routes, areas, and zones.8
9
• Conduct surveys to collect detailed information of NBC10
contamination hazards and determine the type of contamination,11
and the boundaries of the affected area.12
IV-6
• Conduct surveillance to provide an early warning. This also1
includes sampling to provide physical evidence of WMD attacks2
and technical intelligence concerning WMD weapons systems.3
4
i. WMD Disposition. Determine what type of weapon is involved. If5
the military has been tasked, be prepared to dispose of the weapon, or6
provide assistance as required to the agency that has been tasked to7
dispose of the weapon. If tasked, determine what type of unit is best8
capable of accomplishing that task.9
10
j. Mass Care. While the primary responsibility of the ARC, the11
Department of Defense may be tasked to assist with providing shelter,12
feeding, emergency first aid, and bulk distribution of emergency relief13
supplies. Specific tasks and capabilities should include:14
15
• Shelter. The use of emergency shelter for disaster victims include16
the pre-identified shelter sites in existing structures, creation of17
temporary facilities such as tent cities, or the temporary18
construction of shelters, and use of similar facilities outside the19
disaster-affected area, should evacuation be necessary. Or, the20
military may just be tasked to provide tentage, cots, linen, and21
blankets.22
IV-7
• Feeding. Feeding will most likely include both emergency workers1
and disaster victims through a combination of fixed sites, mobile2
feeding units and bulk food distribution. Considerations should be3
made for meeting dietary requirements of disaster victims with4
special dietary needs. Sufficient potable water is necessary for5
drinking and food preparation. The ARC, other Federal agencies,6
or nongovernmental organizations may provide or assist in this7
requirement.8
9
• Emergency First Aid. Plan to provide emergency first aid to10
disaster victims as well as to emergency workers. This could be at11
designated sites within the disaster area and at mass care12
facilities.13
14
k. Termination. The termination of MSCA during a CM operation is15
a sensitive phase that requires detailed planning. The “end state” that16
defines the point at which military forces disengage from the CM17
operation is based on the policy that the Department of Defense will18
withdraw from the operation after eliminating the immediate danger of19
WMD effects, saving lives, and restoring critical services. DOD will not20
remain to conduct recovery operations. When it is agreed that local21
authorities are capable of assuming responsibilities for the remainder of22
the operation, DOD forces will disengage. This could be phased either by23
IV-8
function or area. However, it must be understood that DOD assets1
will not disengage from the operation until the local, state, and2
FEMA authorities feel comfortable that they have the incident3
under control, and directed to do so by the Secretary of Defense and4
the supported combatant commander.5
6
3. Force Protection7
8
Force protection must be a top priority during CM operations. It9
commences from the time units are alerted to move until redeployment.10
The force protection considerations listed in Figure IV-3 are provided as a11
guide.12
Force ProtectionConsiderations
Protection from Potential ThreatsSafetyTechnologySecurityIndividual AwarenessHealth
13
Figure IV-3. Force Protection Considerations14
15a. Protection from potential threats. In CM operations a16
mechanism should be established to identify potential threats.17
18
IV-9
b. Safety. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to1
successful operations.2
3
c. Technology. Every means of force protection must be examined.4
Special units listed in Chapter II, “Roles and Responsibilities,” and Annex5
C, “Organization Capabilities,” should be considered for specific tasks6
and missions.7
8
d. Security. These are measures taken to protect against all acts9
designed to, or which may, impair the effectiveness of the military forces.10
This includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage.11
Communications and information security also should be given a great12
deal of thought in order to deny critical information to any potential13
adversary looking to take advantage of the chaotic situation following a14
WMD incident.15
16
e. Individual Awareness. All commanders and supervisors must17
stress the significance of security and the importance of being aware of18
what is going on around them. The “Three Don’ts” listed in Figure IV-419
are paramount in CM operations to prevent additional casualties. Do not20
become a casualty yourself. This reduces the number of “helping hands”21
and material resources provided to accomplish the mission and adds a22
burden to your co-workers. Do not hurry in until you know the23
IV-10
situation. Finally, do not take for granted anything that could cause you1
to rush in and become a victim.2
3
The Three Don'ts
Don't Become a VictimDon't Rush InDon't Assume Anything
4
Figure IV-4. The Three Don’ts5
6
f. Health. Take measures to protect personnel from contaminants.7
This may require establishing a “hot zone” which are contaminated areas8
personnel can not enter without proper authority and the proper MOPP9
posture. Additional precautions may include ensuring the proper10
inoculations of respondents in the event of a biological incident.11
12
4. Contamination Control13
14
a. Because this is a WMD incident, prior planning needs to be done15
on how contamination control will be established to minimize the spread16
of contamination. Procedures to be considered include:17
18
IV-11
• Initial monitoring upon arrival to determine the preliminary site1
characterization and personnel contamination.2
3
• Anti-contamination procedures to minimize the spread of4
contamination.5
6
• Strict contamination control line procedures to control7
contamination spread during response/recovery/remediation8
operations.9
10
• A contamination control capability must be available on site from11
the beginning through final recovery operations. It is imperative to12
personnel safety that a contamination control station (CCS) be13
established and operating while personnel are in the contaminated14
area.15
16
b. Methods of Decontamination. There are two methods of17
decontamination--physical and chemical. Figure IV-5 depicts these18
methods.19
20
For additional guidance on decontamination refer to JP 3-11, Joint21
Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC)22
Environments.23
IV-12
• Physical Methods. This is the physical removal of the contaminant1
from the contaminated person or object and containment of the2
contaminant for appropriate disposal.3
4
• Chemical Methods. This method is used on equipment, not people,5
and generally involves decontamination by changing the6
contaminant through some type of chemical reaction in an effort to7
render the contaminant less harmful.8
9
DECONTAMINATION METHODS
Absorption
Brushing and Scraping
Isolation and Disposal
Vacuuming
Washing
Adsorption
Chemical Degradation
Disinfection or Sterilization
Neutralization
Solidification
Physical Chemical
10
Figure IV-5. Decontamination Methods11
12
c. Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination. Personnel who13
were potentially exposed during the incident, subsequent cloud passage,14
or post-incident entry into the contaminated area should be given a high15
priority in response actions. People to be considered include casualties,16
bystanders and sightseers, military and civilian response personnel, and17
residents, business employees, and customers in the contaminated area.18
IV-13
Early definition of the perimeter is important so that potentially1
contaminated people may be identified and measures taken to prevent2
the contamination of additional people. Initially, the military may have3
the only effective radiation detection instruments at the scene and may4
monitor potentially contaminated civilians. Responsibility for monitoring5
civilians will shift to DOE, state radiation control personnel, or civilian6
authorities/representatives as they arrive on scene with appropriate7
instruments. Monitoring of personnel is normally done at a CCS;8
however, during the initial response when the number of radiation9
detection instruments and monitoring personnel is limited, alternative10
procedures must be devised if large numbers of people are involved.11
Establishing more than one CCS should be considered in this case. If12
sufficient resources exist to support multiple stations, processing13
contaminated or potentially contaminated civilian residents may be14
desirable through a station separate from that used for response force15
personnel.16
17
• Monitoring and Decontaminating Potentially Exposed Medical18
Treatment Facilities. Immediately following an incident, injured19
personnel may be removed for medical treatment, or fatalities may20
be moved to a hospital or morgue without being monitored for21
contamination. The potential contamination of medical treatment22
IV-14
facilities and transportation assets could present a health problem1
for the staff and other patients.2
3
• Contamination Control Station. The CCS is used to ensure4
contamination is not transferred from an area that is already5
contaminated to an area that is not contaminated through the6
orderly processing of personnel, equipment, and vehicles entering7
and leaving the contaminated area. The actual amounts of8
material used and physical location of a CCS will depend upon9
conditions at the incident site. An example of a Personnel CCS is10
shown at Figure IV-6.11
IV-15
PERSONNEL CONTAMINATIONCONTROL STATION
ACCIDENTSITE
CLEAN AREA
WindDirection
DecontaminationStation
EquipmentDrop
Chair
ChairShoe
Covers
Clothing
Masks
Air SamplerStretchers
Contaminated
Chair
Chair
Washing Station
Contaminated Waste
TowelsSoap
Water
Buffer Zone
Sump
Tape
(Temporary Hot Line)
(Hot Line)
(Contamination Control Line)
Disaster Cordon
610
Met
ers
1-
2M
eter
s
20
Me
ters
600-
1000
Met
ers
(200
0’-
3000
’
Am
bula
nce
Lane
Ent
ryLa
ne
InstrumentRepair
MedicalStation
Thermo-LuminescentDosimeter Station
1
Figure IV-6. Personnel Contamination Control Station2
IV-16
d. Vehicle Monitoring. Vehicles used by the response force in the1
contaminated area will remain there for future use and probably not2
require immediate monitoring or decontamination. If members of the3
public in the contaminated area are sent, or go, to the CCS or other4
processing points using their own vehicles, that vehicle should be5
monitored before being moved away from the area. An example of a6
vehicle CCS is shown in Figure IV-7. All outer surfaces and the air filter7
may have been contaminated by airborne contamination, while wheel8
wells, tires, and the rear end, and the entire undercarriage and drive9
train of a vehicle may be contaminated from driving across contaminated10
areas. Unless the windows were down, or ventilators open, detectable11
contamination of the interior is most likely on those surfaces in contact12
with the vehicle occupants, for example, floorboards and seats. If only13
external surfaces of a vehicle are contaminated, decontamination should14
be relatively easy to perform, if done before bonding between the15
contaminant and the vehicle paint occurs. Also, rapid decontamination16
and return of private vehicles may reassure the public that consideration17
is being given to their interests and property.18
19
IV-17
VEHICLE CONTAMINATIONCONTROL STATION
ACCIDENTSITE
CLEAN AREA
WindDirection
Vehicle Exit
C iontam nation Area Line ParkingArea
InitialMonitoring
WashingArea
Sump
FinalMonitoring
ParkingArea
Hot Line
Contamination Control Line
1
Figure IV-7. Vehicle Contamination Control Station2
3
IV-18
5. Summary1
2
Basic planning guidelines include carefully assessing the mission,3
tailoring the force for the mission, maintaining accountability for4
resources expended, and transitioning support operations to local5
authorities as soon as possible. Force protection is a primary6
consideration and is implemented by identifying and eliminating7
unnecessary risks to the force and public. Contamination control is of8
vital importance to ensure personnel, equipment, and vehicles are not9
contaminated and spread the contaminate outside of the incident site.10
V-1
CHAPTER V1
SUPPORT FUNCTIONS2
345
6
7
8
9
10
1. General11
12
Support functions performed during CM operations are just as13
important as they are in other military operations. US military forces14
and other DOD agencies are organized with personnel and equipment to15
perform specific functions, but also to support themselves. For instance,16
the C2 system inherent in military units provides a significant advantage17
when deployed in the potentially bare base environment created by a18
catastrophic WMD incident. This chapter will discuss specific support19
functions and how they apply to CM operations.20
21
2. Communications22
23
a. Fast, reliable, and accurate communications, both secure and24
unsecure, are essential for CM operations. Moreover, securing adequate25
"For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief anddevelopment business do not have the capacity to deal with suchlarge-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military isnot something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon inall cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call forresponses--manpower, equipment, expertise, transport andcommunication capacity--that only the military can deploy."
Philip Johnston,President & Chief Executive Officer, CARE
V-2
internal communications to support activities at the incident site is a1
time-sensitive operation. Equally critical to effective C2 is the timely2
establishment of external communications to higher echelons. Therefore,3
communications officers must take immediate action to ensure that4
appropriate communications equipment is identified and requested early5
in response operations. This could include government furnished6
telecommunications, commercially leased communications, and existing7
available telecommunications.8
9
b. An effective response to a WMD incident and the use of nonsecure10
tactical, strategic, and commercial communications systems will rely on11
the application of both routine and innovative methods to ensure that12
required communications are available.13
14
c. In addition to military communications at the incident site, DOE,15
FEMA, state, and civilian officials will be establishing their own16
communications. Careful attention must be afforded to ensure mutual17
support, connectivity, and the minimization of interference.18
19
d. Prompt action should be taken to obtain frequency clearances.20
Other agency communications personnel will be coordinating frequency21
requirements through their own channels. It is important that the22
military communications coordinate with these other communications23
V-3
officer on a continuos basis. Failure to obtain valid frequency1
authorizations could result in interference with other critical2
communications.3
4
3. Logistics5
6
a. The US military has unique logistic capabilities that are relevant to7
CM operations. These include the rapid capability to deploy, employ,8
and redeploy a sustained logistic capability to provide assistance and9
mission support to the LFA and support the infrastructure of the10
response organizations. These resources include transportation,11
medical, supplies and services, maintenance, engineering, bath and12
laundry, and mortuary affairs.13
14
b. Commanders and logistic officers of forces responding to a WMD15
incident should determine the availability of assets and facilities at or16
near the scene of the incident and initiate actions to obtain support to17
satisfy the logistic functional areas listed in Figure V-1 and described18
below. Because medical support is such a large function performed19
during CM operations it will be addressed separately in paragraph 4.20
21
V-4
Individual Services define logistic functional areas differently. Theabove functional areas from JP 4-0,
, are used for standardization.Doctrine for Logistic Support
of Joint Operations1
Figure V-1. Logistic Functional Areas2
3
• Transportation. Transportation is the “linchpin” of the operation.4
It is the logistic function that moves the applicable forces from5
their station to the incident site in order to perform the mission.6
These forces may be from other agencies such as the EPA, and7
coordinated with US Transportation Command. All modes of8
transportation should be considered but the two most widely used9
will be ground and air. Transportation support should be provided10
to the OSC, through the DCO, in accordance with state and local11
emergency response plans. This transportation will probably12
include air, both fixed and rotary wing, and ground.13
14
V-5
•• Air (fixed wing). The US Transportation Command will be1
tasked to transport both civil and military reponse assets and2
elements to the incident site. These air assets may be tasked3
under the NDMS to provide transport of patients (post-4
decontamination) to medical facilites around the nation.5
6
•• Air (rotary wing). Military rotary wing assets will likey be7
critical to the operation. Helicopters should not be used within a8
contaminated area because their rotors tend to spread the9
agent/contamination. Potential missions include: (1) Movement10
of the WMD Civil Support teams to the incident site within the 411
hour response window. (2) Aeromedical Evacuation of patients.12
(3) Survey/Reconnaissance. Helicopters may be used to conduct13
an aerial redconnaissance of a radiologically contaminated area to14
determine the spread and level of contamination.15
16
•• Ground. Military vehicles such as busses, high mobility17
multipurpose wheeled vehicles, and trucks can be useful. Also,18
military assets may be used to evacuate casualties from the19
contaminated area. It is important that these rescue personnel20
wear the appropriate IPE so they do not become casualties21
themselves.22
23
V-6
For additional guidance concerning transportation, refer to1
JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Tranportation System.2
3
• Engineering. Public works and engineering support includes4
technical advice and evaluations, engineering services,5
construction management and inspection, emergency contracting,6
emergency repair of wastewater and sold waste facilities, and real7
estate support. The United States Army Corps of Engineers is8
the primary agency for the FRP Emergency Support Function9
# 3, “Public Works and Engineering.” Heavy equipment and10
electrical power for base camp construction will most likely be11
required. Specific tasks include:12
13
•• Emergency clearance of debris for reconnaissance of the14
damage area and passage of emergency personnel and equipment15
for lifesaving, life protecting, health, and safety purposes.16
17
•• Temporary construction of emergency access routes which18
include damaged streets, roads, bridges, ports, waterways,19
airfields, and other facilities necessary for passage of rescue20
personnel.21
22
V-7
•• Emergency restoration of critical public services and facilities1
including supply of adequate amounts of potable water, temporary2
restoration of water supply systems, and the provision of water for3
fire-fighting. Also, the re-establishment of other services such as4
electricity and gas.5
6
•• Technical assistance and damage assessment, including7
structual inspection.8
9
•• Emergency demolition or stabilization of damaged structures10
and facilities.11
12
For additional guidance concerning engineering support, refer to13
JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.14
15
• Maintenance. An effective maintenance program, especially of16
major end-items and testing and diagnostic equipment, is vital to17
ensure that the required support is provided. Monitoring18
equipment must be calibrated and a system established to19
repair/calibrate on site or to return and replace with a like item.20
21
• Supply Systems. All classes of supply will need to be considered.22
However, some classes, such as Class I (subsistence), Class II23
V-8
(clothing, tools, and administrative supplies), Class IV1
(construction materiel), Class VI (personal demand items), and2
Class VII (medical materials) will more than likely require3
particularly close attention.4
5
•• Food and Water. Maintaining safe food and water is vital in6
such an environment. Following an incident, all food except7
canned or otherwise protected items should be thoroughly8
inspected for contamination. Foods determined to be safe must be9
protected against secondary contamination. Even the best10
methods of sanitizing water, purification or boiling, is not effective11
against certain chemical or radiological contaminants, as well as12
biological agents such as viruses, spores, or toxins. The reverse13
osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU) can remove most14
chemical and radiological agents, as well as most biological agents.15
However, it is imperative that designated medical authorities16
approve all water supplies before distribution and17
consumption.18
19
•• Bulk distribution of supplies such as personal protective and20
other specialized clothing (climate dependent).21
22
V-9
• Other Services. Plan to provide other logistic services. These1
services could possibly include:2
3
•• Laundry facilities for contaminated and uncontaminated4
clothing.5
6
•• Sanitation facilities for all personnel.7
8
For additional guidance concerning logistic support, refer to9
JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.10
11
•• Mortuary Affairs. Because WMD incidents can occur without12
warning, they can create considerable confusion as well as a13
shortage of personnel to handle the sensitive task of caring for the14
dead--a job that must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.15
Military mortuary affairs units can provide valuable assistance.16
Mortuary support could include: (1) Assistance in providing victim17
identification and mortuary services. (2) Assistance in18
establishing temporary morgue facilities. (3) Assistance in victim19
identification using latent fingerprint, forensic dental and forensic20
pathology/anthropology methods. (4) Processing, preparing, and21
disposing of remains. However, like most support functions, the22
Department of Defense must operate within state and local23
V-10
jurisdictions and in most cases will not be able to certify any1
civilian deaths. The coroner’s office must accomplish this service.2
3
For additional guidance concerning mortuary affairs, refer to4
JP 4-06, JTTP for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.5
6
4. Medical and Health Services7
8
a. Effects of NBC Weapons Employment. The employment of WMD9
can cause large numbers of military and civilian casualties, and10
widespread disruption and destruction that require special handling and11
challenge medical capabilities and resources. In view of these effects,12
adequate medical support requires timely and accurate intelligence in13
order to provide needed preventive medicine, and prepare for immediate14
and long-term treatment in advance of the commitment of forces to CM15
operations. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center is responsible16
for intelligence products to support health service support aspects. The17
damage caused by biological and chemical agents will vary according to18
geographical and climatic conditions and the agent used. Nevertheless,19
rigorous and disciplined adherence to public health standards can limit20
and mitigate the effects of WMD incidents. Preventive medicine21
specialists can assist the OSC by identifying health hazards and22
providing assessments of the susceptibility of the force to these hazards.23
V-11
They also identify hazards associated with contamination; identify safe1
food and water sources; and recommend when to use prophylaxis,2
immunizations, quarantines, insect and rodent control, destruction of3
livestock and other preventive measures associated with NBC defense.4
5
• In the aftermath of a WMD incident, health service support and6
medical treatment facilities (MTF) may be strained beyond7
capacities. The success of a MTF in treating casualties in WMD8
environments depends on prior planning and adaptability.9
10
• MTFs should possess collective protective shelters to enable them11
to operate in contaminated environments and to ensure12
contamination-free areas are available to treat casualties after their13
decontamination.14
15
• Use of a single MTF for contaminated casualties should be16
considered if a facility has sufficient capacity.17
18
b. Medical Responses. Specific medical responses include:19
20
• Triage. Providing triage support to the OSC including the sorting21
and assignment of treatment priorities to various categories of22
wounded. Triage of contaminated casualties should take place23
V-12
with due regard to the type of WMD that is likely (or known) to1
have caused the contamination. The triage officer takes account of2
the significant differences between and among nuclear,3
radiological, biological, and chemical hazards. When casualties4
arrive at the MTF, the triage officer should determine if patients5
have surgical or medical conditions that require treatment priority6
over decontamination. Patients requiring emergency medical7
treatment before decontamination are to be treated in the8
decontamination area.9
10
• Trauma. Providing expertise in triage, resuscitation, and damage11
control medicine near the incident site. This also may include the12
performance of damage control surgery and augmentation to the13
community hospital systems that are overwhelmed by WMD14
casualties.15
16
• Preventive Medicine. Providing initial disease and environmental17
health threat assessments during early or continuing assistance18
stages of a disaster. More specifically:19
20
•• Providing medical threat information and characterize the21
health risks to civilian and military populations.22
23
V-13
•• Preparing preventive medicine estimates, conduct rapid hazard1
sampling, monitoring and analysis.2
3
•• Providing initial disease and environmental health threat4
assessments in the initial stages of the incident.5
6
• Stress Management. Providing limited neuropsychiatric triage7
and stabilization of clinical cases in order to reduce the disabling8
effects associated with the post traumatic stress disorder. Also, to9
help alleviate stress from those personnel who theoretically do not10
require any medical attention, but because of the hysteria11
surrounding the incident, still believe they need to be evaluated12
(called the “worried well”).13
14
• WMD Patient Decontamination. Be prepared to perform casualty15
decontamination near the incident site, prior to evacuation, or16
establish decontamination/detection stations at the local17
hospitals. Decontamination of non-ambulatory casualties is18
normally performed prior to evacuation. However, in a terrorist19
incident, many ambulatory casualties will self evacuate, arriving at20
the MTF or hospital still contaminated. MTFs and hospitals must21
have the capability to detect contamination, and22
decontaminate when necessary.23
V-14
5. Legal. CM operations involve numerous statutory, regulatory, and1
policy considerations. The commander and the Staff Judge Advocate2
must be knowledgeable concerning the authority and responsibility of3
Department of Defense as well as that of the various other Federal4
agencies. Inherent in this event are the relationships between local,5
state, and Federal authorities, as well as jurisdictional principles,6
security requirements, environmental requirements, and claims7
administration. The occurrence of a WMD incident will present complex8
legal problems. Legal issues range from complex questions regarding9
jurisdiction and authority to exclude the general public from specific10
areas, to payment of simple personal property claims. The response11
force organization should include a legal element to advise and assist in12
resolving these and other local legal issues. Specific tasks include:13
14
a. Advising the commander and functional staff elements on any15
matters related to the incident.16
17
b. Organizing and supervise the legal functional element at the site of18
the accident, this may include establishing and operating a claims19
processing facility.20
21
c. Coordinating technical legal matters with a higher authority, when22
required.23
V-15
d. Coordinating legal issues with the principal legal advisors of other1
participating departments or agencies, as required.2
3
e. Providing legal advice and assistance to other Federal officials,4
upon request, as permitted by the appropriate interagency service5
agreements.6
7
f. Reviewing proposed public statements for legal sufficiency and8
implications.9
10
6. Public Affairs11
12
a. Dissemination of information to the public is now, more than ever13
before, a media event. The relationship developed between the14
Federal responders and the media will be critical to both the15
operations as well as the story being accurately told. A WMD16
incident will have immediate public impact. PA activities during the17
initial incident response are perhaps among the most critical aspects of18
the entire response and site remediation process. Within minutes of the19
incident, news media could be at the scene. Local citizens will seek20
information about how the incident affects them. A proactive,21
comprehensive PA program must be conducted to expedite the flow of22
information to the public and internal audiences. Timely, accurate23
V-16
information and frequent updates are essential to keep the public and1
news media informed, consistent with national and operations security.2
3
b. In a WMD incident the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for4
Public Affairs and the OSC are required to confirm to the general public5
the presence or absence of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear6
components in the interest of public safety or to reduce or prevent7
widespread public alarm. Notification of public authorities is also8
required if the public is, or may be, in danger of radiation exposure or9
other danger posed by the weapon.10
11
c. When notified of an incident, the response force should establish12
communications with the public affairs office (PAO) of the LFA and other13
supporting Federal agencies. Make sure there is DOD PAO14
representation in the joint information center established by the LFA. It15
can not be over emphasized that there should be one “Federal16
Story,” coordinated with all agencies involved.17
18
d. State and Local. PAOs from state and local response19
organizations, especially fire, police, and emergency management, are20
key to a successful response. They will probably arrive at the accident21
scene before Federal response forces. State and local representatives22
should be encouraged to become co-equal partners in PA operations.23
V-17
Shared Federal/state/local leadership of PA operations should ensure a1
timely, accurate, and coordinated response. If that is not possible, plans2
and information must be closely coordinated with state and local PA3
personnel and they should be encouraged to send representatives to help4
set up and participate in the media briefing area.5
6
For additional guidance concerning PA refer to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public7
Affairs in Joint Operations.8
9
7. Religious Ministry Support. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-10
understanding of many people and has a significant effect on the goals,11
objectives, and structure of society.12
13
a. Early deployment of religious ministry support teams (chaplains14
and their assistants) puts caregivers on the scene to deal with trauma.15
Particularly at risk are military personnel who are confronted with the16
emotional impact of the disaster as they arrive on the scene. The17
chaplain’s key role is to provide spiritual care and perspective to military18
personnel to deal with the situation as they find it. The additional and19
often extensive involvement with civilians imposes additional stress on20
personnel. Military chaplains can provide a variety of counseling and21
assistance services. However, the Establishment Clause of the22
Constitution prohibits chaplains from providing religious services to23
V-18
the civilian population. If their counseling skills are requested through1
FEMA, military forces can lawfully provide these services to disaster2
victims, but in a supporting role to civil entities. In such cases, religious3
ministry teams may work with local governments and religious4
authorities to identify local resources, facilities, and support available for5
counseling to the civilian population.6
7
b. Commanders and chaplains should be aware of customs followed8
by various religions and ethnic groups. The different religions and ethnic9
groups have various customs for care of the dead.10
11
For additional guidance concerning religious ministry support, refer to12
JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.13
14
8. Funding. As stated in PDD-39, United States Policy on15
Counterterrorism, each Federal agency that participates in the resolution16
of terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations bears the17
cost of their own participation, unless otherwise directed by the18
President. However, if the President directs FEMA to use Stafford Act19
authorities, FEMA will issue mission assignments through the FRP to20
support CM. These mission assignments are reimbursable. As such,21
the support combatant commander through the DCO and the JTF-22
V-19
CS/RTF will need to capture incremental costs for reimbursement from1
the LFA.2
3
4
56
7
9. Summary8
9
Most CM operations are logistical in nature. Commanders must10
understand the basic considerations and concerns necessary to11
accomplish those missions. In addition, there are other functions such12
as communications, legal, PA, ministry support, and funding that need13
to be carefully considered.14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
“Commanders who perform disaster assistance missions nottasked by FEMA risk the Department of Defense not beingreimbursed for its cost.”
FM 100-19,Domestic Support
V-20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Intentionally Blank11
VI-1
CHAPTER VI1
TRAINING234
5
6
7
8
1. General9
10
a. While many military units possess basic skills and capabilities that11
may be applied to WMD response requirements, few have been12
specifically trained on the precise tasks or equipped with the appropriate13
assets to immediately respond to WMD incidents. Many times in supply14
or transportation units the tasks to be trained have the same standards15
as for conventional warfighting, but the conditions under which they are16
executed are different. Training can be divided into two main categories:17
18
• That required for individuals serving in designated CM related19
positions.20
21
• That required for units and staffs tasked for CM as a contingency22
or for an actual operation.23
“Defense of the homeland always will be the ultimate ‘reason for being’ ofthe Department of Defense. Military support to civil authorities will be anancillary role, regardless of ‘the threat.’"
Maxwell Alsten, Director for Emergency PlanningOffice of the Secretary of Defense, July 1993
VI-2
b. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, briefly1
discussed in Chapter I, “Introduction,” directs the Secretary of Defense to2
establish a program that provides training to civilian personnel of3
Federal, state, and local agencies in incidents involving NBC terrorism--4
First Responder City Training. In the year 2000, the FBI became the lead5
agency for this training. Training and exercises are the two key6
components of the overall training program. Achieving a level of7
enhanced readiness is directly linked to both. Training must be8
conducted to ensure an efficient and effective response. Exercises offer9
an opportunity to practice response operations and to validate training.10
11
c. A Federal interagency team comprised of representatives from the12
Department of Defense, FBI, FEMA, DOE, EPA, and PHS arranges13
training. Initially, team representatives explain their role and capabilities14
to the city. The city then schedules training and determines which15
classes are best suited for the community’s emergency responders.16
Initially, 120 cities are to receive this training. An additional number are17
planned for future years. These cities are depicted in Figure VI-1. These18
cities are trained in a team approach that combines subject matter19
experts with experienced emergency responders. After initial training, an20
interagency tabletop exercise provides opportunities for emergency21
responders and city leaders to demonstrate practical decisionmaking.22
These courses are designed to “train-the-trainer,” supplying emergency23
VI-3
Alaska
Anchorage
Honolulu
Pacific Ocean
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FIRST RESPONDERTRAINING CITIES
Figure VI-1. Department of Defense First Responder Training Cities
Anaheim
New York
Yonkers
Norfolk
Cleveland
AkronToledo
Dayton
Pittsburgh
DetroitWarren
Grand Rapids
St. Louis
Greensboro
Birmingham
Metairie
Huntsville
Memphis
Chicago
Milwaukee
HialeahFt. Lauderdale
Miami
Tampa
Orlando
St. Petersburg
Jacksonville
Corpus Christi
HoustonNew Orleans
Dallas
IrvingGarlandFt. Worth
Arlington
Lubbock
Tulsa
San Antonio
El Paso
AmarilloAlbuquerque
Kansas City
Omaha
Minneapolis
Tucson
Glendale MesaSan Diego
Los Angeles
SanFrancisco
Riverside
Portland
Seattle
Spokane
Tacoma
Philadelphia
Boston
Worchester
Springfield ProvidenceAlbany
Rochester
Buffalo
TrentonNewark
Jersey City
Columbus
CincinnatiIndianapolis
Fort Wayne
Louisville
Lexington
Richmond
Newport NewsVirginia Beach
Chesapeake
Raleigh
Charlotte
Columbus
Atlanta
Nashville
Knoxville
Chattanooga
Baton Rouge
ShreveportJackson
Montgomery
Mobile
Austin
Oklahoma City
Little Rock
Springfield
Madison
Lincoln
Kansas City
Witchata
Des Moines
St. Paul
Sacramento
Las Vegas
Salt Lake City
Denver
Aurora
ColoradoSprings
Phoenix
BaltimoreWashington D.C.
Arlington
California
Nevada
Oregon
Idaho
MontanaNorth Dakota
South Dakota
Wyoming
Washington
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Kansas
Nebraska
Texas
Oklahoma
Louisiana
Mississippi
Arkansas
Missouri
Iowa
Minnesota
WisconsinMichigan
Illinois Indiana
Ohio
Kentucky
Tennessee
Virginia
WestVirginia
AlabamaGeorgia
Florida
NC
SC
Delaware
Pennsylvania
New YorkMA
VT
CT RI
NJMD
NH
Maine
StocktonOakland
ModestoSan Jose/Freemont
Long Beach
SanBernardino
Glendale
Fresno
Santa Ana
Bakersfield
HuntingtonBeach
1
VI-4
responders with the knowledge and experience needed to conduct1
their own training program with specialized NBC training materials.2
3
2. Individual Training. By virtue of their position and responsibilities4
for CM, DCOs, and Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, as well as5
all DOD personnel, who respond to a terrorist incident, require individual6
training. At a minimum, training should include the following subjects:7
8
a. FRP and other plans at the national level.9
10
b. Regional disaster assistance plans.11
12
c. Standards of conduct and legal aspects of providing MACA.13
14
d. Military capabilities appropriate to DCO’s requirements.15
16
e. Validation procedures for requests from the FCO.17
18
f. The role of the executive agent, LFAs, primary agencies, and19
supporting agencies.20
21
g. C2 structures.22
23
VI-5
h. Support requirements.1
2
i. The role and function of the DCE.3
4
3. Unit Training5
6
The JTF-CS, RTFs, and other units that may respond to WMD7
incidents, require specific training to understand the requirements and8
limitations peculiar to CM. This includes training in the organization9
and processes of supporting civilian agencies. However, many JTF10
planning and execution processes that occur during CM are no different11
from those occurring during conventional combat operations.12
13
4. Training Courses14
15
a. There are programs and courses, available through the16
Department of Defense, DOJ, FEMA, DOE, and DHHS, and other Federal17
agencies to train the first responders. An example, offered to civilian18
personnel in government agencies from all three levels of government, is19
a four-day course “Chemical-Biological Countermeasures for First20
Responders” that is offered at the US Army Chemical School. Under the21
auspices of SBCCOM, six specific courses have been developed to22
VI-6
enhance existing metropolitan response capabilities to WMD incidents.1
These courses are:2
3
• Awareness.4
5
• Operations.6
7
• Technician-Hazardous Material.8
9
• Technician-Emergency Medical Service.10
11
• Hospital Provider.12
13
• Incident Command.14
15
b. DOD Emergency Preparedness Course. The DOD Emergency16
Preparedness Course currently taught at the FEMA Weather Emergency17
Assistance Center, Round Hill, VA, provides instruction in civil-18
military operations under all hazards. Representatives from DOD19
components and agencies, such as FEMA, that are directly associated20
with Department of Defense during emergencies, may attend.21
22
VI-7
c. All state WMD Civil Support team members attend a two phase1
training course; institutional and collective (unit) training.2
3
• The Institutional training consists of:4
5
•• Individual core military skills.6
7
•• Response procedures.8
9
•• Equipment training.10
11
• Collective training consists of:12
13
•• Collective mission essential task training and exercises.14
15
•• State and region specific training.16
17
5. Summary18
19
Wartime mission training is the basis of the DOD’s capability to20
provide support to CM operations. Specialized training, when directed by21
the respective combatant commander, will be conducted for selected22
operations. Leader, individual, and unit training culminating with joint23
VI-8
and interagency exercises are vital to provide unit responsiveness in the1
event of a terrorist incident.2
3
4
5
6
A-1
APPENDIX A1
NOTIONAL CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT2
APPENDIX to an Operation Plan3
4
HEADQUARTERS, US JOINT FORCES COMMAND5
NORFOLK, VA 23551-24886
(date)7
ANNEX T TO USJFCOM OPLAN (FUNCPLAN) ( )8
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT9
U) REFERENCES: a. PDD-39, United States Policy on Counter-10
terrorism, 21 June 1995 (S)11
b. Defense Against Weapons of Mass12
Destruction Act of 1996 (U)13
c. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Federal14
Response Plan Terrorist Incident Annex, April 199915
d. Federal Emergency Management Agency:16
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan,17
April 199618
e. National Oil and Hazardous Substances19
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), 20 December20
199321
f. DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities22
(MSCA), 15 January 1993 (U)23
A-2
g. DoDD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil1
Authorities, 18 February 1997 (U)2
h. CJCS CONPLAN 0400-96 (S)3
i. CJCS CONPLAN 0300-97 (S)4
5
(U) TASK ORGANIZATION. Annex A.6
7
1. (U) Situation8
9
a. (U) General. This annex supports taskings outlined in references10
(a) through (h) by providing USCINCJFCOM support under the11
Federal Response Plan (FRP), Federal Radiological Emergency12
Response Plan (FRERP) and other National documents (e.g., PDD 39,13
NCP, Distant Shore, etc.) within the 48 contiguous United States and14
the District of Columbia.15
16
b. (U) Enemy Forces. The threat of a terrorist incident involving a17
nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical or other explosive weapon of18
mass destruction (WMD) in the USCINCJFCOM area of responsibility19
(AOR) is considered a low probability, high-risk event. WMD and20
related materials are increasingly available from worldwide sources.21
The acquisition or the development and use of WMD is well within the22
A-3
capability of many extremist and terrorist movements, acting1
independently or as proxies for foreign states. The potential for the2
national security of the United States to be threatened by WMD3
terrorism must be taken seriously.4
5
c. (U) Friendly Forces. Local and state emergency response6
personnel. Federal agencies and departments to include, but not7
limited to: Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of8
Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),9
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy,10
Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Transportation.11
12
(1) (U) Consequence Management. Consequence management13
(CM) includes measures to protect public health and safety,14
restore essential government services, and provide emergency15
relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by16
the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the US assign17
primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences18
of terrorism. The Federal Government provides assistance as19
required.20
21
A-4
(2) (U) Lead Federal Agency. Federal response to a terrorist1
incident is executed using the Federal Lead Agency structure2
described in the PDD-39 and FRP. Overall responsibility for3
crisis management and counterterrorism is assigned to the DOJ4
delegated to the FBI for threats or acts of terrorism within the5
United States. FEMA, the lead Federal Agency for CM, with the6
support of all agencies identified in the FRP, shall act in7
support of the FBI until such time as the Attorney General shall8
transfer the lead agency role to FEMA for CM.9
10
d. (U) Assumptions11
12
(1) (U) An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against13
a large population center within the United States involving14
WMD, may produce catastrophic or major consequences that15
would overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state16
governments almost immediately. Major consequences17
involving WMD may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as18
well.19
20
(2) (U) A nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist21
incident may occur without warning.22
A-5
(3) (U) Air Mobility Command assets are not available until1
N+___.2
3
2. (U) Mission. When directed by the National Command Authorities4
(NCA), USCINCJFCOM establishes and deploys the CJTF-CS to the5
designated joint operations area (JOA) to support the designated lead6
federal agency (LFA) in CM operations as a result of a WMD incident.7
8
3. (U) Execution9
10
a. (U) Concept of Operations. USCINCJFCOM’S Joint Task Force-11
CM (JTF-CM) for CONUS is referred to as the JTF-CS.12
USCINCJFCOM establishes and deploys the JTF-CS to the joint13
operations area (JOA). The JTF-CS, upon arrival, assumes OPCON of14
all DOD responding forces, less joint special operations task force15
(JSOTF) and US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) forces, establishes16
communications with USCINCJFCOM. The JTF-CS provides liaison17
to the JSOTF and other government agencies as required. The RTF,18
or other assigned headquarters element, will be prepared to support19
the LFA as required. Upon completion of required support, the JTF-20
CS executes transition and redeploys.21
22
A-6
(1) (U) General. The JTF-CS may be activated under a variety1
of scenarios. These range from no-notice, to short-notice, to a2
planned activation for a designated special event. If CM is3
required, the JTF-CS may render support in a variety of4
contaminated environments including nuclear, radiological,5
chemical, and biological. The JTF-CS must be employed in a6
manner designed to maximize support while minimizing the risk7
to USCINCJFCOM forces. If the President declares a national8
emergency and implements 10 USC 12302(a) or 10 USC9
12303(b), reserve component units may be available for the10
JTF-CS. Operational duration will be determined by the11
requirements established by the LFA, not an established12
timetable. Withdrawal of USCINCJFCOM forces should occur at13
the earliest opportunity commensurate with the ability of local14
authorities to conduct required operations.15
16
(2) (U) Employment. This is a five phased operational mission.17
18
(a) (U) Phase I (Initial DOD Response). The goal is to19
terminate terrorist attacks so that the terrorists do not20
accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, while21
seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide22
A-7
emergency assistance. During this phase, actions are1
undertaken to ensure maximum readiness for operation2
execution. USCINCJFCOM augments its joint operations3
center (JOC) and requests designation of a JOA from CJCS.4
USCINCJFCOM, CDRFORSCOM, other component5
headquarters (HQ) as required, and the JTF-CS begin crisis6
action planning and predictive analysis. The CDRFORSCOM7
will nominate a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).8
9
(b) (U) Phase II (Subsequent DOD Response). During this10
phase the JTF-CS, along with the Response Task Force (East11
or West as applicable), any battle staff augmentation, and12
other forces will be alerted and prepared to deploy. The13
USJFCOM Crisis Response Team will form and assist the14
USJFCOM crisis action team in establishing operational level15
interagency links with applicable Federal, state, and local16
agencies. Coordination will be made with the lead federal17
agency (LFA) operations center to assess the situation,18
advise the commander, JTF-CS, and provide an initial19
assessment of the severity of the weapons of mass20
destruction (WMD) effects. The JTF-CS will modify standing21
plans based on the incident and develop appropriate public22
A-8
affairs themes. The DCO is appointed and deployed by1
USCINCJFCOM along with the JTF-CS Advance Survey Party2
to establish communications with the LFA and assess the3
requirements for follow-on DOD forces. This phase ends4
with the issuance of USCINCJFCOM deployment order.5
6
(c) (U) Phase III (Follow-on DOD Assistance). Phase III7
commences upon release of the USCINCJFCOM deployment8
order. Initial operations begin on the first day of deployment9
(C-day). During this phase the JTF-CS HQ deploys via10
commercial or military assets and establishes mission11
capability within 24 hours. JTF-CS will accept OPCON and12
establish C2 of forces less JSOTF and USACE. JTF-CS will13
coordinate movement of DOD forces and supplies into the14
JOA and establish liaison with the LFA and other15
government agencies as required.16
17
(d) (U) Phase IV (Transition Support Operations). This18
phase commences when the JTF-CS is mission capable.19
The major operation during this phase is the coordination of20
and action on requests for assistance from the LFA . The21
JTF-CS develops, for USCINCJFCOM approval, a transition22
A-9
plan and redeployment plan for DOD forces. This phase1
ends when civil authorities or other designated agencies are2
capable of relieving the DOD forces of selected consequence3
management tasks.4
5
(e) (U) Phase V (Redeployment). This phase commences6
when civil authorities or other designated agencies relieve7
the JTF-CS of selected CM tasks. The JTF-CS, continues to8
support the LFA as required. The transition plan is9
implemented and CM tasks are transferred from the JTF-CS10
to civil authorities at a tempo reflecting current civil11
authority or other designated agency capabilities. JTF-CS12
and DOD forces commence a phased redeployment. This13
phase ends when the JTF-CS is no longer required for CM14
support of the LFA and can transition military support15
operations to the designated DCO or to a follow-on16
headquarters or agency.17
18
b. (U) Tasks19
20
21
(1) (U) Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command22
A-10
(a) (U) Assist USCINCJFCOM as required for deployment1
planning and execution.2
3
(b) (U) Assist USCINCJFCOM in TPFDD development.4
5
(c) (U) Provide LNOs to USCINCJFCOM and to the JTF-CS6
as required.7
8
(d) (U) Commence JTF-CS, and other designated forces,9
deployment from designated aerial port of embarkation NLT10
N+____.11
12
(2) (U) Commander, Forces Command (CDRFORSCOM)13
14
(a) (U) Identify and be prepared to provide available forces15
which can respond with necessary capabilities to support16
civil agencies during WMD CM contingencies.17
18
(b) (U) Nominate the DCOs for USCINCJFCOM approval.19
20
(c) (U) Resource the (applicable) RTF with required forces,21
equipment, and technical support personnel.22
A-11
(3) (U) Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC)1
2
(a) (U) Be prepared to provide personnel and equipment3
augmentation to the CJTF-CS.4
5
(b) (U) Be prepared to provide tactical communications and6
equipment support to CJTF-CS.7
8
(4) (U) Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet9
(CINCLANTFLT). Be prepared to provide personnel and10
equipment augmentation to the CJTF-CS.11
12
(5) (U) Commander, US Marine Corps Forces Atlantic13
(COMMARFORLANT)14
15
(a) (U) Be prepared to identify and provide required forces16
upon implementation of this plan.17
18
(b) (U) Be prepared to provide Chemical Biological Incident19
Response Force (CBIRF) OPCON to CJTF-CS.20
21
(6) (U) Commander, Joint Task Force-Civil Support22
A-12
(a) (U) Conduct CM operations in support of the LFA.1
2
(b) (U) Establish LNOs with the LFA, and other government3
agencies as required.4
5
(c) (U) Be prepared to coordinate and arrange to transport6
the WMD device to an appropriate designated location.7
Coordinate turnover of WMD device with CDR JSOTF.8
9
(d) (U) Assume OPCON of all responding DOD forces, less10
JSOTF and USACE.11
12
(e) (U) Establish mission capability NLT N+24.13
14
(f) (U) Accept LNOs from responding DOD forces and other15
agencies.16
17
(g) (U) Recommend plans to USCINCJFCOM for the18
transition to follow-on missions and disengagement and19
redeployment.20
21
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions22
A-13
(1) (U) This plan is effective for planning on receipt.1
2
(2) (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON, keep USCINCJFCOM informed.3
4
(3) (U) All supporting commands and components will coordinate5
TPFDD requirements with USTRANSCOM.6
7
(4) (U) Units will deploy with _____ set(s) of Individual Protective8
Equipment (IPE) gear.9
10
(5) (U) N-HR begins upon transmission of USCINCJFCOM11
Warning Order, verbal or written.12
13
(6) (U) Daily SITREPs, as of ________ hours due by 0700Z. JTF-14
CS will submit first report due within 24 hours of reporting15
mission capable.16
17
(7) (U) DOD forces, facilities, and installations will take18
appropriate force protection measures, based upon the threat, to19
protect their personnel, dependents, and property.20
21
A-14
(9) (U) All operational costs will be identified for possible1
reimbursement. Per PDD-39, units participating in the resolution2
of terrorist incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations shall3
bear the costs.4
5
(10) (U) Public Affairs guidance. Queries regarding DOD support6
to actual CM operations will be referred without comment to the7
LFA, keeping the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,8
Public Affairs (ASD[PA]) informed. JTF-CS PAO will support LFA9
PA activities as appropriate.10
11
4. (U) Administration and Logistics12
13
a. (U) Concept of Support14
15
(1) (U) Logistic support requirements will vary depending on the16
magnitude of the operation and type and amount of DOD support17
requested by the LFA. USCINCJFCOM J4/Logistics Readiness18
Center (LRC) is the point of contact for implementing a timely and19
flexible response for USCINCJFCOM. This includes alerting key20
logistic agencies, locating and releasing required supplies, and21
delivery of supplies to the required area.22
A-15
(2) (U) USCINCJFCOM’s role in supporting the designated LFA1
must end as soon as practicable. The objective of the response2
effort is to provide required support to the designated LFA’s to3
mitigate property damage and maintain public health and safety.4
5
5. (U) Command and Control6
7
a. (U) Command Relationships. When military assistance is8
requested by the LFA and directed by the Secretary of Defense,9
through the Joint Staff as the action agent will specifically direct the10
use of US military forces.11
12
(1) (U) USCINCJFCOM exercises combatant command (COCOM)13
over the JTF-CS. The JTF-CS exercises OPCON of all responding14
DOD forces, less JSOTF and USACE.15
16
(2) (U) The JTF-CS is in support of the designated LFA.17
18
b. (U) Command, Control, and Communications Systems19
20
(1) (U) General. Reliable communications links are vital to the21
conduct of JTF-CS missions. Existing communications facilities in22
A-16
the designated JOA will be used to the maximum extent feasible1
and will be augmented, as required, to provide the necessary2
capability.3
4
(2) (U) Minimum Requirements. The JTF-CS will require secure5
and non-secure voice and facsimile to communicate with6
USCINCJFCOM.7
8
9
10
11
H.W. GEHMAN, JR.12
Admiral, U.S. Navy13
Commander-in-Chief,14
US Joint Forces Command15
16
OFFICIAL:17
Name18
Rank, Service19
Director for Operations20
APPENDIX BEMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
B-1
APPENDIX BEMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
B-2
C-1
APPENDIX C1
ORGANIZATION CAPABILITIES2
31. General4
5
This appendix describes the missions, capabilities, deployment6
requirements, and support requirements of selected units from the7
Federal agencies capable of supporting CM operations.8
9
2. US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force10
(CBIRF)11
12
a. Mission. When directed, respond to terrorist incidents involving13
the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear WMD in order to14
assist local, state, or Federal agencies in the conduct of post-incident15
mitigation actions by providing capabilities for agent detection and16
identification; casualty extraction, extrication, and decontamination; and17
emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel.18
Further, deploy task-organized forces to support national level security19
events, first responder training programs, and enhanced chemical,20
biological, radiological, and nuclear training for military organizations as21
may be required.22
23
C-2
b. Capability. As a CM incident response force, the CBIRF is1
tailored for short-notice response to CB incidents. It also maintains an2
information “reach-back” capability to a cadre of subject matter and3
disaster response experts for consulting purposes.4
5
c. Components6
7
• The CBIRF, illustrated in Figure C-1, provides a self-contained response8
in five areas: command (HQ); force protection (CB detection/9
identification and decontamination, and explosive ordnance disposal;10
medical; security; and service support.11
12
CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTRESPONSE FORCE
Command Element
ForceProtectionElement
ServiceSupportElement
MedicalElement
SecuritySearch Rescue
Element
13
Figure C-1. Chemical Biological Incident Response Force14
15
C-3
• The CBIRF is structured in two parts, the Initial Response1
Force that is capable of providing initial incident assessment2
and limited CM, and a follow-on force. The Initial Response3
Force, comprised of 81 Marines and Navy personnel, is capable of4
providing initial incident assessment and support to the incident5
commander. The follow-on force is comprised of approximately 2506
Marines and Navy Personnel.7
8
• The CBIRF, comprised of both the Initial Response Force and the9
follow-on force, has the capability to process 50-100 non-10
ambulatory chemical and trauma patients per hour, and11
approximately 100 ambulatory patients per hour for a total of 20012
patients. These quantities and rates are highly dependent on the13
incident circumstances such as, but not limited to agent(s)14
encountered, water availability, and amount and severity of15
trauma encountered.16
17
• The Initial Response force is tailored to the threat/mission and18
deploys with the following CBIRF capability (as shown below):19
20
•• External and internal communications.21
22
•• Protective equipment.23
C-4
•• Detection and identification equipment.1
2
•• Personal decontamination equipment.3
4
•• Medical treatment.5
6
•• Explosive ordnance disposal.7
8
•• Casualty airway protection.9
10
•• Casualty search and extract.11
12
• Additional equipment and personnel comprise the follow-on force.13
CBIRF’s service support element provides contracting support and14
is capable of procuring logistical support from government and15
non-government sources within the local community near the16
affected site.17
18
d. Deployment19
20
• Resources. The Initial Response Force is comprised of 81 Marines21
and Navy personnel and the follow-on force is comprised of 25022
Marines and Navy personnel. It takes the equivalent of two C-523
C-5
aircraft to airlift the Initial Response Force and three C-5 and one1
passenger aircraft to airlift the follow-on force.2
3
• Time requirements. The CBIRF Initial Response Force maintains a4
24-hour, on-call status and has a goal of being deployed, (“wheels-5
up”) within 6 hours with prior indication and warning and provided6
an aircraft is available. CBIRF’s follow-on force can be ready to7
deploy within 18 to 24 hours of notification.8
9
• Location. The CBIRF is located at Camp Lejeune, NC, and has10
access to air transport, located at Cherry Point, NC.11
12
e. Support requirements13
14
• Aircraft. Five C-5 equivalents and one passenger aircraft.15
16
• Lodging. Required.17
18
• Messing. Required.19
20
• Water. CBIRF and can use local fire hydrants and other water21
sources.22
23
C-6
• Electrical. CBIRF deploys with generators for electrical power1
usage but will contract for fuel on scene.2
3
• Footprint. Requires a staging area of approximately 100 yards by4
50 yards.5
6
3. US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU)7
8
a. Mission. Provide worldwide, no-notice capability to conduct field9
sampling, identification and verification; monitoring, recovery,10
decontamination, escort and mitigation of hazards associated with CB11
materials in compliance with international, Federal, state, and local laws.12
13
b. Capability. The capabilities of the TEU are multifaceted to14
include: technical escort of CB agents material, and munitions; render15
safe and/or dispose of weaponized CB munitions and material; conduct16
technical intelligence exploitation of foreign CB munitions and material;17
provide CB response teams to government agencies as required to18
support National/International Counterproliferation Policy; and operate19
in hazardous environments.20
21
c. Components. TEU’s basic operational element is the Chemical-Biological22
Response Team (CBRT) illustrated in Figure C-2. The unit can deploy CBRTs from23
C-7
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, Dugway Proving Ground, UT, and Pine Bluff1
Arsenal, AR. In general, each CBRT is comprised of 12 CB and explosive ordnance2
disposal (EOD) specialists, but the team composition can be tailored to the3
mission. The CBRT can be deployed to suspect or actual incidents involving CB4
agents, munitions, and other HAZMATs. The TEU’s CBRTs maintain a rapid5
response capability in detection, decontamination (neutralization),6
containment (packaging), dismantlement (render safe), and disposal (transport7
and escort only) of WMD containing CB agents or related materials. The CBRT8
also maintains an information “reach-back” capability to TEU’s emergency9
operations center for communications with CB agent, explosive ordnance, and10
disaster response subject matter experts. The TEU’s CBRTs maintain specialized11
equipment to accomplish their assigned mission.12
13
CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL RESPONSE TEAM
CBRT
LegendCBRT chemical biological response teamEOD explosive ordnance disposalLNO liaison officerNCO noncommissioned officerNCOIC noncommissioned officer-in-charge
4 Chemical Ops NCOs (E5-E7)
1 Team NCOIC (E8)
1 Team Chief (O3)
2 LNOs (E7-O2)
4 EOD Ops NCOs (E5-E7)
14
Figure C-2. Chemical Biological Response Team15
C-8
d. Deployment1
2
• Resources. Each CBRT consists of 12 personnel, two vehicles3
(M1008s or Suburban), and two 463L pallets worth of equipment.4
• Time requirements. The TEU maintains one CBRT on a 24-hour5
on-call status and can be ready to deploy within 4 hours.6
7
• Location. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Dugway Proving Ground,8
UT; and Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR.9
10
e. Support Requirements11
12
• Aircraft. One C-141 required for deployment to incident site. The13
Aberdeen Proving Ground team can deploy from Aberdeen Proving14
Ground, MD; Andrews AFB, MD; or Dover AFB, DE. The Dugway15
Proving Ground team can deploy from Dugway Proving Ground or16
Hill AFB, UT. The Pine Bluff Arsenal team can deploy from Little17
Rock, AR.18
19
• Lodging. Required.20
21
• Messing. Required.22
23
C-9
4. 52d Ordnance Group (EOD)1
2
a. Mission. Provides military EOD/bomb squad units to defeat or3
mitigate the hazards from conventional, nuclear, or chemical military4
munitions and WMD (the EOD uses the term special improvised5
explosive device [SIED]) throughout CONUS as requested by local, state,6
and Federal law enforcement or military authorities.7
8
b. Capability. The capabilities of the 52d Group are multifaceted to9
include: identification and render safe of foreign and US military10
munitions (chemical, conventional, and nuclear); disposal of munitions11
encountered; response and render safe of terrorist improvised explosive12
devices (IED) (i.e., pipe bombs, booby traps); response for WMD13
incidents; conduct training in military munitions and IED to law14
enforcement agencies; and provide continuous support to the US Secret15
Service and State Department for very important person protection16
details. Each unit has a variety of bomb disposal tools and detailed17
classified procedures for handling US, foreign, and terrorist munitions.18
Their procedures are often classified and not releasable outside of the19
DOD EOD channels. Included in their equipment are robots for remote20
operations, special cannons and explosive shape charges, and a variety21
of EOD tool sets for specific munitions.22
23
C-10
• Existing agreements with the TEU outline interoperational support1
between the 52d Group and TEU for missions involving2
nonstockpile US chemical munitions and for terrorist WMD devices3
with chemical or biological fillers. Agreements between4
Department of Defense and DOE outline roles for the 52d Group5
for responding to a US or foreign nuclear military weapon incident6
or to a terrorist WMD with nuclear or radiological components.7
8
• The 52d Group has four Ordnance Battalions (BNs) with 379
companies (COs) stationed throughout CONUS.10
11
c. Components. Each EOD Ordnance BN has designated one EOD12
CO to respond to a WMD incident. These designated COs receive specific13
training on chemical and nuclear SIED. They possess unique counter14
booby trap equipment and are trained to operate specialized equipment15
(provided by DOE) used for diagnostics and for render safe/mitigate a16
WMD nuclear initiation. Similar equipment also is used with TEU for CB17
WMD scenarios. The SIED COs provide the full spectrum of conventional18
EOD support to law enforcement and military commanders in their19
geographic AO in addition to the SIED response mission. The first EOD20
responder to a WMD incident could be from any of the EOD units21
based on location; based on assessment of the EOD team of the situation22
C-11
they can contact their higher HQ for reinforcement with more EOD1
assets including a SIED unit for the level of the emergency.2
3
d. Deployment4
5
• Resources. Each SIED CO consists of 22 EOD soldiers and has6
equipment weighing approximately 1800 pounds (lbs), boxed and7
pre-staged that could fit on one 463L pallet.8
9
• Time requirements. All EOD response teams can be dispatched10
within ½ hour (duty hours) or 1 hour (non-duty hours). The11
designated SIED COs are capable of departing home station within12
4 hours for WMD operations.13
14
• Location. A total of 37 Ordnance CO (EOD) are stationed15
throughout CONUS. The four designated SIED CO are:16
710th EOD CO, located at the Naval Submarine Base, San Diego,17
CA.18
749th EOD CO, located at Andrew AFB, MD.19
766th EOD CO, located at Cape Canaveral AFS, FL.20
797th EOD CO, located at Ft Sam Houston, TX.21
22
e. Support Requirements23
C-12
• Aircraft. Any commercial or military aircraft.1
2
• Lodging. Required. EOD has basic tentage but normally deploys3
within CONUS with no field capabilities.4
5
• Messing. Required.6
7
• Communications. Supporting activity must provide external8
communications. EOD internal team communications are capable9
of linking with the Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio10
System (SINCGARS).11
12
• Transportation. Once on site, EOD assets require one cargo truck13
to transport equipment and two 15 passenger vans. SIED COs can14
deploy with organic transportation assets if required (up to 8 x15
high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs], 2 x M10916
2½ ton trucks, and associated trailers).17
18
5. Army Materiel Command Treaty Laboratory, SBCCOM19
20
a. Mission. Support the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention,21
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and the Wyoming Memorandum of22
C-13
Understanding. All of these treaties include provisions for sampling and1
analysis to verify compliance.2
3
b. Capability. The Treaty Laboratory provides an on-site analytical4
laboratory capability. The laboratory is capable of analyzing chemical5
surety materials, foreign chemical warfare agents, and all precursors and6
degradation by-products. The lab maintains an analytical spectra7
database that provides the capability for analyzing other hazardous8
industrial chemicals. The lab is comprised of a series of transportable9
modules, which contain analytical instruments such as flame10
photometric/mass selective detectors, fume hood, and all supporting11
equipment such as electrical generators for short-term power12
requirements.13
14
c. Deployment15
16
• Resources. The laboratory is accompanied by up to five personnel17
who include: one Ph.D. chemist, two chemists, and two sampling18
technicians. Equipment weight may vary from 1-3 short tons19
(S/T), depending on mission requirements.20
21
• Time requirements. The Laboratory can be ready to deploy from22
home base within four hours of notification.23
C-14
• Location. Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.1
2
d. Support Requirements3
4
• Aircraft. The modules can be transported via commercial or5
military aircraft or by land transportation.6
7
• Lodging. Required.8
9
• Messing. Required.10
11
• Communications. Supported activity must provide external12
communications.13
14
• Electrical. The laboratory can deploy with organic generators.15
16
• Transportation. A 14 foot utility truck is required.17
18
• Miscellaneous. The laboratory requires 400-500 square feet of19
workspace, environmental controls, and dedicated electrical power20
for longer operations.21
22
C-15
6. 310th Chemical CO (Biological Integrated Detection System1
[BIDS])2
3
a. Mission. To limit the effects of large-area-coverage biological agent4
attacks that have the potential for catastrophic effects to US forces at the5
operational level of war. It provides a basis for medical personnel to6
determine effective preventive measures and the appropriate treatment if7
exposure occurs. Also, it provides the basis for warning and confirming8
that a biological attack has occurred. (Primarily designed for use in a9
rural environment. Capabilities are severely degraded/limited in an10
urban environment.)11
12
b. Capability. BIDS was developed in response to the biological13
warfare (BW) agent vulnerability of US Forces during Operation DESERT14
STORM. The BIDS is a multi-component system that provides15
monitoring, sampling, detection, and presumptive identification of BW16
agents.17
18
c. Components19
20
• The BIDS consists of an S-788/G lightweight multipurpose shelter21
mounted on a dedicated M1097 HMMWV. The shelter is equipped22
with a Biological Detection Suite composed of commercial Non23
C-16
Developmental Item sampling and detection equipment. It1
includes other military and commercial equipment to provide2
collective protection, environmental control, meteorological data,3
communications, navigation and power distribution. A trailer4
mounted 15-kilowatt (kw) generator supplies electrical power.5
6
• The Biological-Detection CO is a Corps level or higher asset and is7
organized with a HQ Platoon (PLT) and five BIDS PLTs. There are8
seven BIDS Teams assigned to each PLT. A BIDS team consists of9
two vehicles and four soldiers. Two soldiers perform analytical10
duties within the Biological Detection Suite and the other two11
soldiers package and evacuate collected samples, resupply, and12
provide security for the BIDS. The team is capable of13
conducting 24-hour biological surveillance operations. Each14
BIDS team is equipped with navigational, strategic, tactical, and15
relay global positioning systems, capable of very high frequency16
and secured high frequency (HF) communications and17
meteorological stations that provides automated continuous18
weather information. The meteorological stations will provide local19
wind direction, wind speed, temperature, relative humidity, and20
dew point.21
22
d. Deployment23
C-17
• Resources. A deployed BIDS PLT consists of 38 personnel and1
approximately 150 S/T of equipment and supplies (7 BIDS2
vehicles, 7 M1097 HMMWV, 7 15 kw generators, and 7 high3
mobility trailers).4
5
• Time requirements. A BIDS PLT is capable of deploying for a no-6
notice deployment in approximately 5 days.7
8
• Location. The 310th Chemical CO is located at Ft McClellan, Al.9
10
e. Support Requirements (for one BIDS PLT)11
12
• Aircraft. Requires two C-5 and a C-141 to deploy.13
14
• Lodging. Required.15
16
• Messing. Required.17
18
• Communications. Requesting activity must get frequency19
approval/clearance for HF communications.20
21
C-18
• Miscellaneous. Depending on mission and situation, a “package”1
(additional units and/or personnel) may be required to support the2
BIDS’ mission, e.g., TEU, Theater Lab, C2, and maintenance.3
4
7. Madigan Army Medical Center Disaster Assistance Response5
Team (DART)6
7
a. Mission. Provides a rapid deployment unit with triage,8
ambulatory/litter and advanced medical/trauma stabilization9
capabilities for the US Army needs related to NBC incidents in the10
Western United States.11
12
b. Capability. The DART capabilities include triage,13
decontamination, and stabilization of contaminated/multiple injured14
casualties. DART serves as the medical augmentation team for Umatillia15
Army Chemical Depot, OR, where they conduct quarterly training. The16
team has 24-hour access to a board-certified toxicologist. DART has17
received training in medical management of chemical casualties and18
medical effects of nuclear weapons. Team members have received19
substantial training in basic/advanced life support, trauma life support,20
HAZMAT, confined space medicine, crush injury medicine and21
emergency medical response to terrorism. The DART operates at the22
transition line/hot line not in the “hot zone”. They set up 3 tents,23
C-19
dedicated to litter decontamination, ambulatory decontamination, and1
emergency medical stabilization/staging. The ambulatory2
decontamination tent has 2 showers and is divided in the middle to3
segregate men and women. DART can decontaminate 2 non-ambulatory4
victims in 10 minutes and 2 ambulatory victims in 5 minutes.5
6
c. Components. The DART is composed of personnel from Madigan7
Army Medical Center with an Army captain in charge of the team.8
9
d. Deployment10
11
• Resources. The DART is composed of 20 personnel. It consists of12
the team leader, physicians, nurses, medics, and lab technicians.13
Augmentation with additional board certified emergency medicine14
physicians as well as nuclear science personnel is available to meet15
mission needs. It consists of 4 tons of equipment. (Entire packing16
list can be provided upon request).17
18
• Time requirements. The DART is on-call 24-hours a day, 7 days a19
week and can be ready to deploy within 2 hours with an 8 hour20
response time in the western United States.21
22
C-20
• Location. DART personnel are located at Madigan Army Medical1
Center, Ft Lewis, WA. Personnel and equipment can deploy via2
aircraft from McChord Air Force Base, WA or Gray Army Airfield,3
WA.4
5
e. Support Requirements6
7
• Aircraft. C-141, CH-47 (mission dependent).8
9
• Lodging. Required for extended operations. Weather permitting,10
DART has the capability to lodge in their tents.11
12
• Messing. Required.13
14
• Communications. The DART has 5 Motorola Saber 1’s (nonsecure)15
and 3 laptop computers with the capability to receive/transmit16
faxes via cell phone.17
18
• Transportation. 20 foot, 8 ton truck required for road19
transportation.20
21
• Electrical. Electrical power provided by three, 8 kw generators.22
23
C-21
8. Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI)1
2
Note: The NMRI has multiple missions in the areas of infectious3
diseases, combat casualty care, and military operational medicine. This4
section will focus on the mission of the Biological Defense Research5
Program (BDRP) one of the five Infectious Diseases Research Divisions.6
7
a. Mission. To defend members of the Armed Forces of the United8
States against a biological threat in a theater of operations. Rapid9
biological detection methods are essential for prompt medical10
intervention and successful mission accomplishment. To provide for11
such needs, the NMRI, BDRP has formed a scientific research program12
for the development of rapid detection and identification methods for BW13
agents.14
15
b. Capability. The BDRP has developed a capability that consists of16
a transportable biological field laboratory, expressly for identification of17
BW agents. The field laboratory can process approximately 50 samples18
(four to five samples a day for a period of approximately two weeks)19
before replenishment of supplies is required. However, if enough20
advance notice is given, additional supplies can be deployed. In addition21
to the capabilities of the NMRI field laboratory, the United States Army22
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) laboratories23
C-22
provide a confirmatory and reference capability. This support would be1
required if the results from the NMRI field laboratory assays were all2
negative and a suspicion of BW agent contamination still existed.3
4
c. Components. The field laboratory is comprised of four basic5
parts: Basic microbiological techniques and bacterial culture6
identification; Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay capability; hand-7
held chromatographic assays also referred to as “tickets;” and8
Polymerase chain reaction capability.9
10
d. Deployment11
12
• Resources. Two or three operators with specialized training are13
required to operate the field laboratory. It can be packaged into six14
to seven boxes with a total weight of 350 to 400 lbs.15
16
• Time requirements. The field laboratory can be ready to deploy17
within 4 hours of notification.18
19
• Location. The field laboratory is located at NMRI, Bethesda, MD.20
21
e. Support Requirements22
23
C-23
• Aircraft. Commercial or military aircraft.1
2
• Lodging. Required.3
4
• Messing. Required.5
6
• Electrical. A minimum of four 110/220 volt, alternating current7
outlets are required.8
9
• Communications. Laboratory personnel deploy with cellular10
telephones.11
12
• Miscellaneous. Designated personnel, such as TEU or CBIRF,13
gather samples for the field laboratory, not by the field lab14
operators. The field laboratory can be set up anywhere, however it15
is normally located in a “clean” area. It requires a capability for16
freezing and refrigeration. Once on site, the requesting activity17
must provide shelter to protect the laboratory from sun and18
inclement weather.19
20
9. US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense21
(USAMRICD) Medical Chemical Biological Advisory Team (MCBAT)22
23
C-24
a. Mission. Provides input in the development of operating1
procedures and training in the management of chemical agent casualties.2
The MCBAT also provides clinical advice and consultation in matters3
related to the initial and long-term management of chemical casualties at4
the incident site. The experts on this team are from the USAMRICD and5
the USAMRIID. They provide essential medical information during the6
recovery phase of the operation for the safe return to normal activities.7
The MCBAT also provides on-site training to medical professionals on the8
management of CB casualties.9
10
b. Capability. The MCBAT is the primary source of medical11
information dealing with the management of chemical warfare agent12
casualties for the Federal Government. Through the FBI or agencies13
within the DHHS, the MCBAT may provide consultation to state or local14
agencies. The MCBAT will provide requisite consulting information to the15
OSC by identifying the medical implications to affected military and16
civilian personnel. As necessitated, the MCBAT supervises the collection17
of biological samples (bodily fluids) for subsequent verification of18
chemical agent exposure that can be used to facilitate the confirmation,19
diagnosis, and treatment.20
21
C-25
c. Components. The MCBAT is in contact with other subject matter1
experts (SMEs) at USAMRICD and USAMRIID for additional information.2
Team members are on call 24 hours a day by either telephone or pager.3
4
d. Deployment5
6
• Resources. The MCBAT is led by a physician and will be comprised7
of two or more individuals, depending on situational requirements.8
Each team member is equipped with personal protection9
equipment to perform its intended mission and related general-10
purpose equipment supplies, but does not include supplies or11
equipment for detection,decontamination, or treatment.12
• Time requirements. The MCBAT is capable of deploying within 413
hours of notification.14
15
• Location. The USAMRICD is located at Aberdeen Proving Ground,16
MD, and the USAMRIID is located at Fort Detrick, MD.17
18
e. Support Requirements19
20
• Aircraft. MCBAT can deploy on a commercial or military aircraft21
from Andrews AFB, MD.22
23
C-26
• Lodging. Required.1
2
• Messing. Required.3
4
• Communications. Requesting activity must provide phone lines,5
secure communications, and secure internet.6
7
• Miscellaneous. Once on scene, the MCBAT will require one general8
purpose medium tent or equivalent facility with eight standard9
110V outlets to set up operations. The MCBAT can operate10
indefinitely but must be supplied by the unit they support.11
12
10. US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases13
14
a. Mission. Conduct research to develop strategies, products,15
information, procedures and training programs for medical defense16
against BW threats and infectious diseases. Develop products, such as17
vaccines, drugs, diagnostic tests, and medical management procedures,18
to protect military personnel against biological attack or against endemic19
infectious diseases. Provide medical and scientific SMEs, and their20
technical expertise and guidance concerning prevention and treatment of21
hazardous diseases and management of biological casualties. Serve as22
C-27
the DOD reference center for identification of biological agents from1
clinical specimens and other sources.2
3
b. Capability. USAMRIID has many capabilities that can be4
employed for assessing and evaluating a biological terrorist incident,5
from initial communication of the threat through incident resolution.6
The primary capabilities provided by USAMRIID are intellectual7
capability (consulting), extensive fixed confirmatory and reference8
laboratory facilities, and the Aeromedical Isolation Team (AIT).9
10
c. Components. USAMRIID can provide two personnel, a medical11
doctor with expertise in management of casualties caused by BW agents,12
and a scientist with laboratory and scientific expertise on BW agents to13
participate in the initial response to a potential or known biological14
incident. The intent of providing the SMEs is to aid in evaluating the15
threat, aid in characterizing BW agents, assessing impacts resulting from16
dissemination, identifying protection and treatment strategies, and17
formulating medical and operational plans for CM and diagnostic18
support. USAMRIID’s extensive laboratory facilities offer confirmatory19
and reference capabilities, for use by NMRI’s mobile laboratory and any20
other agency requiring such services. In addition to the laboratory and21
BW agent expertise, a limited capability exists to transport one or two22
biological casualties, requiring specialized containment, to a medical23
C-28
containment care facility located at USAMRIID with the support of the1
AIT. The facility, located at Fort Detrick, MD, has a 16-bed ward with a2
capability of isolating up to biocontainment level (BL) 3, infectious3
diseases in a contingency situation. The facility also has a special BL 44
containment care facility with a maximum capacity of two beds and5
offers additional specialized care capabilities, to include limited intensive6
care.7
8
11. Aeromedical Isolation Team9
10
a. Mission. To maintain the personnel, skills and equipment11
necessary to transport and provide patient care under high containment12
for a limited number of individuals exposed to or infected with highly13
contagious and dangerous diseases that are a result of naturally14
occurring organisms, BW agents, terrorism, and possibly exposure of15
field researchers.16
17
b. Capability. The AIT is a rapid response unit that can deploy to18
any area of the world to transport and provide patient care under high19
containment. Currently, there are no personnel assigned directly to the20
AIT. The AIT is comprised of two teams, each capable of transporting a21
single patient. The AIT maintains specialized equipment and required22
medical supplies to accomplish its assigned mission.23
C-29
c. Deployment. (AIT only)1
2
• Resources. AIT personnel: 4 Physicians, 2 Nurses, 6 combat3
Medics, 1 NCO, and 2 Lab Technicians. The Team uses two4
Vickers air transportation isolation units (87 X 27 X 60 inches)5
and two Vickers isolation stretchers (87 X 27 X 34 inches) for6
transportation of highly contagious patients. These Vickers are7
negative pressure and filtered air containment units used to house8
and examine the patient while in flight.9
10
• Time requirements. The AIT’s goal is to deploy in 4 hours.11
12
• Location. The AIT is located at USAMRIID, Ft Detrick, MD. The13
team deploys from Andrews Air Force Base, MD, or uses the West14
Virginia National Guard assets at Martinsburg, WV.15
16
12. Other DOD Assets17
18
a. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). This is19
DOD's sole laboratory for conducting biomedical research to address20
military medical operational requirements for dealing with the prompt21
and delayed effects of radiation exposure. AFRRI is currently assigned to22
the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.23
C-30
b. Defense Technical Response Group (DTGR). A deployable DOD1
Civilian Scientist Response Team to assist EOD operators in access and2
distribution of a WMD device. One 8 person team is on 4 hour notice.3
Messing and lodging are required for the team. The DTGR is located at4
Indianhead, MD.5
6
c. Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT). A deployable7
team of health physicists, technicians, and equipment, AFRAT provides8
bioenvironmental support, radioisotope analysis, radiation protection,9
and consulting support. Located at Brooks AFB, TX, AFRAT is10
deployable within 5 hours of notification.11
12
d. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). AFTAC,13
located at Patrick AFB, FL, provides post-detonation plume trajectory14
prediction, meteorological modeling, complete plume analysis/15
characterization, and leading edge technology development for16
monitoring of CB activities. AFTAC deploys a dedicated C-135 collection17
platform aircraft stationed in Omaha, NE.18
19
e. US Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team. Specially trained20
in radiological health matters, this team can provide assistance and21
guidance to the OSC and local medical authorities. The team is located22
at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Washington, DC.23
C-31
f. US Army Radiological Control Team. This team is organized to1
provide radiological monitoring support and advice to the OSC. The2
team is capable of deploying within hours from Ft. Monmouth, NJ.3
4
g. Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).5
CSEPP is a joint FEMA-Army program in which local assets are6
supplemented to respond to accidents/incidents at each of the eight7
chemical agent stockpile locations. Through this program, the Army8
provides technical assistance and required resources in developing and9
implementing emergency response plans and related preparedness10
capabilities, integrating the on- and off-post planning process.11
12
h. US Army Forensic Analytical Center. Provides an on-site13
analytical laboratory capability. It is capable of analyzing chemical14
surety materials, foreign chemical warfare agents, and all precursors and15
degradation by-products. The team consists of five personnel. The16
laboratory is comprised of a series of transportable modules that can be17
deployed from Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD within 4 hours of18
notification.19
20
i. The US Army Medical Command, Regional Medical Commands.21
Provides special medical augmentation response teams (SMART)22
C-32
necessary for the medical response to CB incidents. There are several1
types of SMART teams.2
3
• Medical Command, Control, and Communications (C3)4
Telemedicine Team. This team provides the C3 for any of the5
deployed SMARTs and provides telemedicine augmentation to local6
medical authorities in disaster/mass casualty incidents. They can7
call forward additional tailored teams, supplies, and equipment,8
and can install, operate, and maintain a rudimentary, emergency9
telemedicine capability from remote sites.10
11
• Trama Care Team. This team provides medical augmentation12
(technical advice and support) to local medical authorities in13
disaster/mass casualty incidents.14
15
• CB Augmentation Team. This team provides medical augmentation16
to local authorities in the detection, neutralization and17
containment of CB or associated HAZMATs WMD incidents. It also18
provides patient treatment and handling assistance to local19
authorities during CM operations.20
21
• Stress Management Team. This team provides medical22
augmentation to local medical authorities in the management of23
C-33
stress related casualties associated disaster/mass casualty1
incidents.2
3
j. The Naval Research Laboratory. Provides microbiologists4
specifically trained to augment the NMRI.5
6
k. Naval Environmental Health Center (NEHC). The NEHC7
provides C2 for the Naval Environmental and Preventative Medical Units8
(NEPMU). These NEPMUs are located regionally, and are capable of9
providing doctors, industrial hygienists, environmental health officers,10
microbiologists, epidemiologists and preventive medical technicians. The11
five NEPMU’s deployable teams-Chemical, Biological, Radiological,12
Environmental Defense (CBRED) Response Teams-are tasked organized13
for each incident. The CBREDs provide assessment, identification, and14
mitigation capabilities for the long-term effects of disease from a public15
health aspect. Principally, they provide the occupational medicine16
technical expertise and assessment skills necessary to mitigate the long17
term effects of an incident, not individual patient medical treatment.18
19
l. US Coast Guard National Strike Force (NSF). The NSF is20
composed of three strategically located strike teams and a coordination21
center.22
23
C-34
• The strike teams have specially trained active duty and reserve1
military personnel who can deploy on short notice anywhere in the2
United States to respond to chemical incidents. Their response3
equipment is configured to allow rapid loading on military aircraft4
or on tractor-trailers. The Strike Teams are trained to operate in5
level “A” gear and are experienced in responding to and supervising6
hazardous material response operations. The Strike Teams are7
recognized as national response assets in the event of a chemical8
WMD incident. NSF capabilities are especially suited to incidents9
occurring in the marine environment, but also include site10
assessments, safety, action plan development and documentation11
for both inland and coastal zone incidents.12
13
• The coordination center maintains a national inventory listing of14
spill response equipment and assists with the development and15
implementation of an exercise and training program for the16
National Response System.17
18
m. US Coast Guard Public Information Assist Team (PIAT). The19
PIAT is a highly skilled unit of PA specialists prepared to complement the20
existing public information capabilities of the Federal OSC.21
22
23
C-35
13. Federal Emergency Management Agency1
2
a. Urban Search and Rescue Team (USRT). The USRTs save lives3
and protect property from both natural and manmade catastrophic4
urban disasters. USRTs have a limited HAZMAT capability.5
6
b. Rapid Response Information System. This is a database7
containing information on Federal NBC response capabilities, NBC8
agents and munitions characteristics, and safety precautions.9
10
14. Department of Health and Human Services11
12
a. Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST). The MMSTs operate13
as a specially organized team. Their capabilities include agent detection14
and identification, patient decontamination, triage and medical15
treatment, patient transportation to hospitals, and coordination with16
local law enforcement activities. Twenty-seven teams have been17
initiated. The Federal government's goal is to develop MMSTs for the 10018
most populous cities in the United States.19
20
b. National Medical Response Team (NMRT). The NMRTs are21
comprised of medical personnel. These teams are capable of agent22
C-36
identification, patient decontamination, triage, and medical treatment in1
support of local health systems. There are three NMRTs.2
3
• Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC4
capabilities are epidemiological surveillance, biological agent5
identification, and public health consultation and response.6
7
• Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry. Provides8
consultation and advice on issues relating to the release, or9
threatened release of hazardous substances.10
11
• Federal Drug Administration. Provides regional laboratory12
support and surveillance assistance in support of public health.13
14
c. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.15
Provides mental health support and crisis counseling during16
emergencies.17
18
15. Federal Bureau of Investigation19
20
a. Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU). The HMRU has21
specialized sampling, detection, and identification capabilities of NBC22
C-37
agents. It also is equipped with a variety of personal protective and1
rescue equipment.2
3
b. Evidence Response Teams (ERT). Provide crime scene4
documentation and evidence collection in support of criminal5
investigations. Some evidence response teams are HAZMAT trained.6
7
c. Critical Incident Response Group. The teams and units that8
make up this group are specially assembled to conduct tactical and crisis9
management efforts.10
11
d. Intelligence Collection and Analysis. The FBI has experts that12
contribute to and coordinate detailed interagency threat assessment13
activities.14
15
16. Environmental Protection Agency16
17
Under the authority of the NCP, EPA coordinates all Federal18
containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an19
incident. EPA on-scene coordinators work with state, local, and private20
responders to protect human health and the environment. EPA has21
approximately 185 on-scene coordinators at 17 locations nation-wide.22
C-38
For site-specific assistance, EPA on-scene coordinators can provide1
responders with access to any of the resources described below:2
3
a. Environmental Response Team. These teams can provide 24-4
hour access to special decontamination equipment for chemical releases5
and advice to the on-scene coordinator in hazard evaluation; risk6
assessment; multimedia sampling and analysis; on-site safety; clean-up7
techniques, and more. The team has portable chemical agent8
instrumentation capable of detection and identification in the low and9
sub parts per million, as well as entry-level capabilities.10
11
b. Radiological Emergency Response Team. This team can provide12
on-site monitoring and mobile laboratories for field analysis of samples,13
along with expertise in radiation health physics and risk assessment.14
The team is accessible 24 hours per day.15
16
c. Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System17
(ERAMS). EPA operates ERAMS for monitoring radioactivity in samples18
of precipitation, air, surface water, drinking water, and milk. In the19
event of a radiological emergency, sampling at the approximately 26020
monitoring sites can be increased to provide information on the spread of21
contamination.22
23
C-39
d. Radiation Environmental Laboratories. EPA has two state-of-1
the-art radiological laboratories in Montgomery, AL, and Las Vegas, NV.2
By quickly characterizing radiation sources, they can offer advice on how3
best to protect public health in emergency situations.4
5
e. EPA Research Laboratories. EPA's 12 research laboratories offer6
programs in field monitoring, analytical support, and other technical7
support to quality assurance programs related to air, water, wastewater,8
and solid waste. Five of these laboratories are capable of deploying9
mobile units to a contaminated site for CB analysis.10
11
f. National Enforcement Investigations Center. This center offers12
expertise in environmental forensic evidence collection, sampling, and13
analysis; computer forensics and information management; and14
enforcement-related technical analysis.15
16
g. Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team. This17
team is able to mobilize the fastest and can provide immediate18
monitoring, sampling, analysis, and technical support and can perform19
minor containment activities.20
21
22
23
C-40
17. Department of Energy1
2
a. Consequence Management Planning Team (CMPT). The CMPT3
provides technical advise and supports the development of a CM plan4
that addresses radiological hazards, medical impacts, mitigation of5
consequences, and the deployment and use of other DOE assets.6
Additionally, they coordinate and direct the in-field deployment and use7
of other deployed DOE teams. The team consists of a team leader, two8
effects prediction personnel, two health physics/data assessment9
personnel, two communications and logistics specialists, and one10
medical advisor.11
12
b. Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT). The CMHT is13
activated immediately following the deployment of a DOE asset. They are14
the exclusive source for coordinating effects predictions, modeling, and15
data assessment for field operations until the CMPT is operational.16
17
c. Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). The RAP provides the18
initial DOE radiological emergency response. Under the RAP, there are19
several Radiological Assistance Teams to assist in identifying the20
presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment and21
property at the accident or incident scene. These teams also provide22
advice on personnel monitoring, decontamination, and material recovery.23
C-41
d. Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site. This1
assistance center provides 24-hour medical consultation on health2
problems associated with radiation accidents. It also provides training3
programs and emergency response teams comprised of health4
professionals.5
6
e. Nuclear Emergency Search Team. This team provides technical7
response to resolution of incidents involving improvised nuclear and8
radiological dispersal devices. The team is able to search, locate, and9
identify devices or material.10
11
f. Joint Technical Operations Team. This team is a combined DOD12
and DOE team that provides technical advice and assistance to13
Department of Defense.14
15
g. Aerial Measuring System. The system provides helicopters and16
fixed-wing aircraft to respond to radiological emergencies. Its capabilities17
include aerial radiation surveys and search (gamma spectroscopy), real-18
time radiological aerial sampling, aerial photography survey, and aerial19
multi-spectra scanning surveys.20
21
C-42
h. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability. The center provides1
real-time computer predictions of the atmospheric transport of2
radioactivity from a nuclear accident or incident.3
4
i. Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. The5
center coordinates Federal off-site radiological monitoring and6
assessment activities for a nuclear incident.7
8
j. Accident Response Group. This group is the technical response9
group for US nuclear weapons accidents. The team provides equipment10
and technical assistance for weapon damage, risk assessment, safe11
recovery, packaging, transportation, and disposal of damaged weapons.12
13
D-1
APPENDIX D1
ORGANIZATIONAL TELEPHONE AND WORLD WIDE WEB2
LISTING3
4
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL HOTLINE 1-800-424-88025
6
Federal Agencies: Phone Numbers: WWW Addresses78
ARC (703) 248-4222 www.redcross.org910
EPA (202) 260-2090 www.epa.gov1112
FEMA (202) 646-3923 www.fema.gov1314
DOE (202) 586-5000 www.home.doe.gov1516
DHHS (202) 690-7591 www.hhs.gov1718
CDC (404) 639-3311 www.cdc.gov1920
DOJ (202) 514-2000 www.usdoj.gov2122
FBI (202) 324-8186 www.fbi.gov2324
NDPO (202) 3234-XXXX www.fbi.gov/programs/ndpo/news.htm2526
DOT (202) 366-4000 www.dot.gov2728
DOD www.defenselink.mil2930
DOMS (703) 695-3012 www.hqda-aoc.army.pentagon.mil/Doms3132
DTRA (703)325-2102 www.dtra.mil3334
USJFCOM (757) 836- www.jfcom.mil3536
FORSCOM (404) 464-6349 freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca3738
RTF-E (404) 362-34003940
RTF-W (210) 221-2955 www.5tharmy.army.mil4142
D-2
SBCCOM (410) 436-XXXX www.sbccom.army.mil12
OPS Enterprise, (410) 671-2148 www.sbccom.army.mil/about/ops.htm34
52d Ord Gp (404) 363-5971 www.forscom.army.mil/52d_ORD_GP.htm56
AMC Treaty Lab (410) 671-284078
310th Chem Co (205) 848-7152/7483910
CBIRF (910) 451-81181112
TEU (410) 671-3044 www.sbccom.army.mil/teu1314
USAMRICD (410) 436-3628 http:/chemdef.apgea.army.mil1516
DART (360) 968-05961718
NMRI (301) 295-0288 www.nmri.nnmc.navy.mil19
A-D-1
ANNEX A to APPENDIX D1EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STATE and TERRITORTY OFFICES2
3Alabama4
5Emergency Management Agency65898 Country Road 417P.O. Drawer 21608Clanton, AL 35046-21609Telephone: (205) 280-220010Fax: (205) 280-249511Website: www.aema.state.al.us/12
13Alaska14
15Alaska Division of Emergency Services16Military & Veterans Affairs Dept.17P.O. Box 575018Fort Richardson, AK 99505-575019Telephone: (907) 428-700020Fax: (907) 428-700921Website: www.ak-prepared.com/22
23Arizona24
25Arizona Division of Emergency26Management Emergency & Military27Affairs Dept.285636 East McDowell Road29Phoenix, AZ 8500830Telephone: (602) 231-624531Website: www.state.az.us/es/32
333435
Arkansas3637
Arkansas Office of Emergency Services38PO Box 75839Conway, AR 7203240Telephone: (501) 329-560141Fax: (501) 730-975442Website: www.oes.state.ar.us43
4445464748
49California50
51California Office of Emergency Services522800 Meadowview Road53Sacramento, CA 9582354Telephone: (916) 262-181655Website: www.oes.ca.gov56
575859
Colorado6061
Colorado Office of Emergency62Management63EOC, Camp George West64Golden, CO 8040165Telephone: (303) 273-162466Website:www.dlg.oem2.state.co.us/oem67
6869
Connecticut7071
Connecticut Office of Emergency72Management73Dept. of Public Safety74360 Broad Street75Hartford, CT 0610576Telephone: (860) 566-337777Fax: (860) 247-066478Website:www.state.ct.us/dps/ctoem.79
8081
Deleware8283
Delaware Emergency Management84Agency85PO Box 52786Delaware City, DE 1970687Telephone: (302) 326-600088Website:www.state.de.us/govern/agenci89es/pubsafe/dema/indxdema.90
9192939495
A-D-2
Florida12
Florida Division of Emergency3Management42555 Shumand Oak Blvd5Tallahassee, FL 323996Telephone: (850) 418-99007Website: www.dca.state.fl.us/fdem/8
910
Georgia1112
Georgia Emergency Management13Agency14PO Box 1805515Atlanta, GA 30316-005516Telephone: (404) 635-700017Fax: (404) 635-720518Website: www.State.Ga.US/GEMA/19
20Hawaii21
22State Emergency Response Commission23Dept. of Health24P.O. Box 337825Honolulu, HI 9680126Telephone: (808) 586-442427Website: www.iao.pdc.org/28
29Idaho30
31Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services32Military Division33650 West State Street34Boise, ID 8372035Telephone: (208) 334-346036Website: www.state.id.us/bds/bds37
3839
Illinois4041
Illinois Emergency Management Agency42110 East Adams Street43Springfield, IL 62701-996344Telephone: (217) 782-270045Website: www.state.il.us/iema/46
4748495051
Indiana5253
Indiana Emergency Management Agency54Indiana Government Center South55302 W. Washington St., Room E20856Indianapolis, IN 4620457Telephone: (317) 232-398058Fax: (317) 232-389559Website: www.ai.org/sema/introduction60
61Iowa62
63Emergency Management Division64Hoover State Office Building65Des Moines, IA 5031966Telephone: (515) 281-323167Fax (515) 281-753968Website: www.state.ia.us/government/69dpd/70
71Kansas72
73Office of Emergency Preparedness74State Defense Building752800 SW Topeka Blvd.76Topeka, KS 66611-128777Telephone: (785) 274-140978Website: www.ink.org/public/kdem/79
80Kentucky81
82Kentucky Division of Emergency83Management84100 Minuteman Parkway85Frankfort, KY 4060186Telephone: (502) 507-160087Website:KyEM.dma.state.ky.us88
8990
Louisiana9192
Louisiana Office of Emergency93Preparedness94625 North 4th St95Baton Rouge, LA 7080296Telephone: (504) 342-547097Fax: (504) 342-547198Website: www.199.188.3.9199
100101102
A-D-3
Maine12
Maine Emergency Management Agency3State Office Bldg Station #724Augusta, ME 043335Telephone: (207) 287-40806Fax: (207) 287-40797Website:www.state.me.us/mema/memah8ome.htm9
10Maryland11
12Maryland Emergency Management13Agency142 Sudbrook Lane East Road15Pikesville, MD 2120816Telephone: (410) 486-442217Fax: (410) 486-186718Website: www.mema.state.md.us/19
20Massachusetts21
22Massachusetts Emergency23Management Agency24Post Office Box 149625400 Worchester Road26Framingham, MA 01701-031727Telephone: (508) 820-200028Fax: (508) 820-203029Website: www.magnet.state.ma.us/mema30
31Michigan32
33Michigan Emergency Management34Division35Michigan State Police.364000 Collins Rd37Lansing, MI 4890938Telephone: (517) 336-619839Fax: (517) 322-067540Website:www.msp.state.mi.us/division41/emd/emdweb1.42
43Minnesota44
45Minnesota Division of Emergency46Management47State Emergency Response Commission48444 Cedar Street, Suite 22349Saint Paul, MN 55101-622350Telephone: (651) 296-223351Website: www.dps.state.mn.us/emermgt/52
Mississippi5354
Emergency Management District554080 U.S. Highway 1156Hattiesburg, MS 3940257Fax: (601) 545-451658Telephone: (601) 544-591159Website: www.temd.state.ms.us/60
6162
Missouri6364
Missouri State Emergency Management65Agency66PO Box 11667Jefferson City, MO 6510268Telephone: (573) 526-910069Fax: (573) 634-796670Website: www.sema.state.mo.us/71semapage.htm72
73Montana74
75Disaster and Emergency Services76Dept. of Military Affairs771100 North Main78P.O. Box 478979Helena, MT 59604-478980Telephone: (406) 841-391181Fax: (406) 841-396582Website: www.state.mt.us/dma/des/83index.shtml84
85Nebraska86
87Emergency Management Agency881300 Military Road89Lincoln, NE 68508-109090Telephone: (402) 471-7421-business hrs91Telephone: (402) 471-4545-nonbusiness92Website: www.nebem.org.93
9495
Nevada9697
Div. of Emergency Management982525 S. Carson Street99Carson City, NV 89710100Telephone: (702) 687-4240101Fax (702) 687-7688102Website:www.state.nv.us/dmv_ps/emer103mgt.htm104
A-D-4
New Hampshire12
New Hampshire Office of Emergency3Management State Office Park South4107 Pleasant Street5Concord, NH 03301-38096Telephone: (603) 271-22317Fax: (603) 225-73418Website: www.nhoem.state.nh.us9
10New Jersey11
12Div. of State Police13Dept. of Law & Public Safety14PO Box 706815West Trenton, NJ 08628-006816Telephone: (609) 538-200017Fax: (609) 538-0345 (Emergencies)18Website:19www.state.nj.us/lps/njsp/outfit-p.20
21New Mexico22
23Department of Public Safety24Office of Emergency Management2513 Bataan Blvd26PO Box 162827Santa Fe, NM 8750428Telephone: (505) 476-960029Website: www.dps.nm.org/emergency/30em_overview.htm31
32New York33
34Emergency Management Office351220 Washington Avenue36Building 22, Suite 10137Albany, NY 12226-225138Telephone: (518) 457-220039Fax: (518) 457-993040Website: www.nysemo.state.ny.us/41
42North Carolina43
44North Carolina Emergency Management454713 ail Service Center46Raleigh, NC 2769947Telephone: (919) 733-386748Website: www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/49index2.htm50
5152
North Dakota5354
North Dakota Division of Emergency55Management56PO Box 551157Bismarck, ND 58506-551158Telephone: (701) 328-810059Fax: (701) 328-818160Website: www.state.nd.us/dem/61
62Ohio63
64Ohio Emergency Management Agency652855 West Dublin-Granville Road66Columbus, OH 43235-220667Telephone: (614) 889-715068Fax: (614) 889-718369Website: www.state.oh.us/odps/70division/ema/Oema.htm71
7273
Oklahoma7475
Oklahoma Civil Emergency Mangement76PO Box 5336577Oklahoma City, OK 73152-336578Telephone: (405) 521-248179Fax: (405) 521-405380Website: www.onenet.net/~odcem/81
8283
Oregon8485
Oregon Emergency Management86595 Cottage Street NE87Salem, OR 9731088Telephone: (503) 378-291189Fax: (503) 588-137890Website: www.osp.state.or.us/oem/91
929394
Pennsylvania9596
Emergency Management Agency972605 Interstate Dr98Harrisburg, PA 17110-936499Telephone: (717) 651-2009100Fax: (717) 651-2040101Website: www.pema.state.pa.us/102
103104
A-D-5
Rhode Island12
Emergency Management Agency3645 New London Avenue4Cranston, RI 029205Telephone: (401) 946-99966Fax: (401) 941-18917Website: www.state.ri.us/riema8
910
South Carolina1112
South Carolina Emergency13Preparedness Division14Office of the Adjutant General151429 Senate Street16Columbia, SC 2920117Telephone: (803) 734-802018Fax: (803) 734-806219Website: www.state.sc.us/epd/20
21South Dakota22
23Department of Military & Veterans'24Affairs25Emergency & Disaster Services26500 E. Capitol27Pierre, SD 57501-507028Telephone: (605) 773-323129Fax: (605) 773-358030Website:www.state.sd.us/state/executiv31e/military/sddem.32
33Tennessee34
35Tennessee Emergency Management36Agency Dept. of Military373041 Sidco Dr.38Nashville, TN 3720439Telephone: (615) 741-000140Fax: (615) 242-963541Website: www.tnema.org42
43Texas44
45Texas Division of Emergency Mgmt46Dept. of Public Safety47PO Box 408748Austin, TX 7877349Telephone: (512) 424-200050Fax: (512) 424-244451Website: www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/52
Utah5354
Utah Division of Comprehensive55Emergency Management56Dept. of Public Safety571110 State Office Building58Salt Lake City, UT 8411459Telephone: (801) 538-340060Fax: (801) 538-340061Website:www.ps.ex.state.ut.us/cem/cem162
63Vermont64
65Vermont Emergency Management66103 S. Main Street67Waterbury, VT 05671-210168Telephone: (802) 244-872169Fax: (802) 244-865570Website:www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/index.71
72Virginia73
74Virginia Dept. of Emergency Services7510501 Trade Court76Richmond, VA 2323677Telephone: (804) 897-650078Fax: (804) 897-650679Website: www.vdes.state.va.us/80
8182
West Virginia8384
Office of Emergency Services85Room EB-80, Bldg 1861900 Kanawha Blvd East87Charleston, WV 25305-036088Telephone: (304) 558-538089Fax: (304) 344-453890Website: www.state.wv.us/wvoes91
92Wisconsin93
94Wisconsin Emergency Management95Div. of Emergency Government96Dept. of Administration97PO Box 786598Madison, WI 5370799Telephone: (608) 242-3232100Website:www.badger.state.wi.us/agencies101/dma/wem/index102
103
A-D-6
Wyoming12
Emergency Management Agency35500 Bishop Blvd.4Cheyenne, WY 82009-33205Telephone: (307) 777-49006Fax: (307) 242-32327Website: http://wema.state.wy.us/8
9District of Columbia10
11Office of Emergency Preparedness122000 14th Street, NW 8th Floor13Washington, DC 2000914Telephone: (202) 727-616115Website: www.fema.gov/dc-oep/16
17Guam18
19Civil Defense, Guam Emergency Services20Territory of Guam2122439 GMF22Barrigada, Guam 9692123Telephone: (671) 475-166924
25Northern Mariana Islands26
27Civil Defense Coordinator, Office of the28Governor29Saipan, Mariana Islands 9695030Telephone: (670) 322-952931
32Office of Planning & Statistics33Office of the High Commissioner34Trust Territory Headquarters35Saipan, Mariana Islands 9695036Telephone: (670) 011-933337
3839404142434445464748495051
American Samoa5253
Emergency Management Coordination54Office of the Governor55Pago Pago, American Samoa 9679956Telephone: (684) 633-230457
58Office of Territorial Emergency59Management Coordination60Office of the Governor61PO Box 108662Pago Pago, American Samoa 9679963Telephone: (684) 633-111164
65Puerto Rico66
67Emergency Response Commission68Environmental Quality Board69P.O. Box 1148870Santurce,, Puerto Rico 0091071Telephone: (787) 767-805672
73Virgin Islands74
75Civil Defense & Emergency Services76PO Box 120877St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 0080178Telephone: (809) 774-224479
E-1
APPENDIX E1
REFERENCES23
The development of the Handbook for Joint Task Force Domestic Consequence4
Management Operations is based on the following primary references:5
6
1. Executive Order 12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness7
Responsibilities,” 18 November 1988.8
9
2. Presidential Decision Directive 39, US Policy on Counterterrorism,10
24 January 1997.11
12
3. Presidential Decision Directive 62, Combating Terrorism, 22 May 1998.13
14
4. Public Law 104-201, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 97,”15
23 September 1996.16
17
5. Public Law 93-288, “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency18
Assistance Act.”19
20
6. “Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.”21
22
7. “The Federal Response Plan,” with Change 11, “Terrorism Incident,”23
April 1999.24
E-2
8. “The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan,” 1 May 1996.1
2
9. Title 18, USC 1385, “The Posse Comitatus Act.”3
4
10. DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program,5
13 April 1999.6
7
11. DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities,8
15 January 1993.9
10
12. DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances,11
4 February 1994.12
13
13. DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities,14
18 February 1997.15
16
14. DOD Directive 3150.8, Response to Radiological Accidents,17
13 June 1996.18
19
15. “DOD Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component20
Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,” January21
1998.22
23
E-3
16. Domestic Emergencies Handbook, DOD Emergency Preparedness Course,1
15 March 1999.2
3
17. JP 3-07.7, JTTP for Domestic Support Operations. (in development)4
5
18. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,6
12 May 1998.7
8
19. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical9
(NBC) Environments, 11 July 2000.10
11
20. JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations, 14 May 1997.12
13
21. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,14
27 January 1995.15
16
22. JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in17
Joint Operations, 28 August 1996.18
19
23. FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, 1 July 1993.20
21
24. “Department of Defense Response Capabilities for a Weapon of Mass22
Destruction,” November 199823
E-4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Intentionally Blank11
GL-1
GLOSSARY1
PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS23
AFB Air Force Base4
AFRAT Air Force Radiation Assessment Team5
AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute6
AFTAC Air Force Technical Applications Center7
AIT aeromedical isolation team8
ALCON all concerned9
AO area of operations10
AOR area of responsibility11
ARC American Red Cross12
ATSD(CS) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil13
Support14
15
BDRP biological defense research program16
BIDS biological integrated detection system17
BL biocontainment level18
BN battalion19
BSI base support installation20
BW biological warfare21
22
C2 command and control23
C3 command, control, and communications24
GL-2
CB chemical and biological1
CB-RRT Chemical Biological--Rapid Response Team (USA)2
CBIRF Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USMC)3
CBRED chemical, biological, radiological environmental defense4
CBRNE-CM chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high yield5
explosives-consequence management6
CBRT chemical and biological response team7
CCS contamination control station8
CDC Center for Disease Control9
CDRFORSCOM Commander, Forces Command10
CM consequence management11
CMAT consequence management advisory team (DTRA)12
CMHT consequence management home team (DOE)13
CMPT consequence management planning team (DOE)14
CO company15
COCOM combatant command (command authority)16
CONUS continental United States17
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program18
19
DART disaster assistance response team20
DCE Defense Coordinating Element21
DCO Defense Coordinating Officer22
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team23
DET detachment24
GL-3
DFO Disaster Field Office (FEMA)1
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services2
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized3
DOD Department of Defense4
DOE Department of Energy5
DOE/NV department of Energy Nevada Operations Office6
DOJ Department of Justice7
DOMS Director of Military Support8
DTGR Defense Technical Response Group9
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency10
11
EOD explosive ordnance disposal12
EPA Environmental Protection Agency13
EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer14
ERAMS environmental radiation ambient monitoring system15
ERT emergency response team16
ESF emergency support function17
18
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation19
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer (USG)20
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency21
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (USG)22
FRP Federal Response Plan (USG)23
24
GL-4
HAZMAT hazardous material1
HF high frequency2
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle3
HMRU Hazardous Materials Response Unit (FBI)4
HQ headquarters5
6
IED improvised explosive device7
IPE individual protective equipment8
9
JNACC Joint Nuclear Accident Coordination Center10
JOA joint operations area11
JS Joint Staff12
JSOTF joint special operations task force13
JTF joint task force14
JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support15
16
kw kilowatt17
18
lbs pounds19
LFA lead federal agency20
LNO liaison officer21
MCBAT medical chemical biological advisory team22
MMST Metropolitan Medical Strike Team23
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture24
GL-5
MSCA military support to civil authorities1
MTF medical treatment facility2
3
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical4
NCA National Command Authorities5
NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution6
Contingency Plan7
NCO noncommissioned officer8
NDMS National Disaster Medical System9
NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI)10
NEHC Naval Environmental Health Center11
NEPMU Naval Environmental and Preventive Medical Unit12
NG National Guard13
NMRI Naval Medical Research Institute14
NMRT National Medical Response Team15
NSF National Strike Force (USCG)16
17
OPCON operational control18
OSC on-scene commander19
20
PA public affairs21
PAO Public Affairs Officer22
PDD Presidential Decision Directive23
PHS Public Health System24
GL-6
PIAT Public Information Assist Team (USCG)1
PLT platoon2
3
RAP Radiological Assistance Program4
RC Reserve Components5
ROWPU reverse osmosis water purification unit6
RTF Response Task Force7
RTF-E Response Task Force-East8
RTF-W Response Task Force-West9
10
SBCCOM Soldier Biological and Chemical Command11
SCO State Coordinating Officer12
SIED special improvised explosive device13
SMART special medical augmentation response team14
SME subject matter expert15
SMU special mission unit16
SOF special operation forces17
S/T short ton18
STARC State Area Commands19
20
TAG The Adjutant General21
TEU Technical Escort Unit22
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data23
24
GL-7
US United States1
USACE US Army Corps of Engineers2
USAMRICD US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical3
Defense4
USAMRIID US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious5
Disease6
USC United States Code7
USCINCJFCOM Commander in Chief , United State Joint Forces8
Command9
USCINCPAC Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command10
USCINCSO Commander in Chief, United States Southern11
Command12
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command13
USPACOM United States Pacific Command14
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command15
USG United States Government16
USRT urban search and rescue team17
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command18
19
WMD weapons of mass destruction20
21
22
23
24
GL-8
PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS1
2
antiterrorism--Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of3
individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and4
containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)5
6
biological agent--A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or7
animals or causes the deterioration of materiel. (JP 1-02)8
9
biological defense--The methods, plans, and procedures involved in10
establishing and executing defensive measures against attacks using biological11
agents. (JP 1-02)12
13
biological environment--Conditions found in an area resulting from direct or14
persisting effects of biological weapons. (JP 1-02)15
16
biological operation--Employment of biological agents to produce casualties in17
personnel or animals and damage to plants or materiel; or defense against such18
employment. (JP 1-02)19
20
biological threat--A threat that consists of biological material planned to be21
deployed to produce casualties in personnel or animals and damage plants or22
other materiel. (JP 1-02)23
GL-9
biological weapon--An item of materiel which projects, disperses, or1
disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors. (JP 1-02)2
3
blister agent--A chemical agent which injures the eyes and lungs, and burns or4
blisters the skin. (JP 1-02)5
6
blood agent--A chemical compound, including the cyanide group, that affects7
bodily functions by preventing the normal utilization of oxygen by body tissues.8
(JP 1-02)9
10
chemical agent--A chemical substance which is intended for use in military11
operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through its12
physiological effects. The term excludes riot control agents, herbicides, smoke,13
and flame. (JP 1-02)14
15
chemical, biological, and radiological operation--A collective term used only16
when referring to a combined chemical, biological, and radiological operation.17
(JP 1-02)18
19
chemical defense--The methods, plans and procedures involved in establishing20
and executing defensive measures against attack utilizing chemical agents. (JP21
1-02)22
chemical environment--Conditions found in an area resulting from direct or23
persisting effects of chemical weapons. (JP 1-02)24
GL-10
chemical monitoring--The continued or periodic process of determining1
whether or not a chemical agent is present. (JP 1-02)2
3
chemical operations--Employment of chemical agents to kill, injure, or4
incapacitate for a significant period of time, personnel or animals, and deny or5
hinder the use of areas, facilities, or material; or defense against such6
employment. (JP 1-02)7
8
chemical survey--The directed effort to determine the nature and degree of9
chemical hazard in an area and to delineate the perimeter of the hazard area.10
(JP 1-02)11
12
civil damage assessment--An appraisal of damage to a nation’s population,13
industry, utilities, communications, transportation, food, water, and medical14
resources to support planning for national recovery. (JP 1-02)15
16
civil-military operations--Group of planned activities in support of military17
operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian18
authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable19
emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (JP 1-02)20
21
collective nuclear, biological and chemical protection--Protection provided to22
a group of individuals in a nuclear, biological and chemical environment which23
GL-11
permits relaxation of individual nuclear, biological and chemical protection. (JP1
1-02)2
3
combatting terrorism--Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures4
taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive5
measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose6
terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02)7
8
counterterrorism--Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to9
terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)10
11
consequence management--United States Government interagency assistance12
to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and13
provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by14
the results of a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction. (This15
term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication.)16
17
crisis management-- Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and18
prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will19
include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special20
improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the21
lead federal agency. (CJCSM-1244-96)22
23
GL-12
deceased--A casualty status applicable to a person who is either known to have1
died, determined to have died on the basis of conclusive evidence, or declared to2
be dead on the basis of a presumptive finding of death. The recovery of remains3
is not a prerequisite to determining or declaring a person deceased. (JP 1-02)4
5
decontamination--The process of making any person, object, or area safe by6
absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or7
biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it.8
(JP 1-02)9
10
decontamination station--A building or location suitably equipped and11
organized where personnel and materiel are cleansed of chemical, biological or12
radiological contaminants. (JP 1-02)13
14
domestic emergencies--Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring15
within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US16
possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of17
enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other18
public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or19
disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency20
includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense21
emergency--A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation22
created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and23
following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in24
GL-13
anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances--Riots, acts of violence,1
insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders2
prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all3
domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed4
Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code.5
c. major disaster--Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or other6
catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of7
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal8
Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 United States Code 58) to9
supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in10
alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural11
disaster--All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy12
attack or civil disturbance. (JP 1-02)13
14
domestic support operations--Those activities and measures taken by the15
Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the16
Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or17
preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the18
consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security19
emergencies. (JP 1-02)20
21
dosimetry--The measurement of radiation doses. It applies to both the devices22
used (dosimeters) and to the techniques. (JP 1-02)23
24
GL-14
executive agent--A term used in Department of Defense and Service regulations1
to indicate a delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on2
behalf of the superior. An agreement between equals does not create an3
executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of4
Defense Executive Agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of5
the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of6
Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority.7
The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the8
document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to9
providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions,10
or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources11
for specified purposes. Also called EA. (JP 1-02)12
13
explosive ordnance--All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or14
fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and15
warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms16
ammunition; all mines, torpedoes, and depth charges; demolition charges;17
pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated18
devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices;19
and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. (JP 1-02)20
21
explosive ordnance disposal--The detection, identification, on-site evaluation,22
rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It23
GL-15
may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or1
deterioration. (JP 1-02)2
3
explosive ordnance disposal incident--The suspected or detected presence of4
unexploded explosive ordnance, or damaged explosive ordnance, which5
constitutes a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material. Not6
included in this definition are the accidental arming or other conditions that7
develop during the manufacture of high explosive material, technical service8
assembly operations or the laying of mines and demolition charges. (JP 1-02)9
10
explosive ordnance disposal procedures--Those particular courses or modes of11
action taken by explosive ordnance disposal personnel for access to, diagnosis,12
rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any13
hazardous material associated with an explosive ordnance disposal incident. a.14
access procedures--Those actions taken to locate exactly and gain access to15
unexploded explosive ordnance. b. diagnostic procedures--Those actions taken16
to identify and evaluate unexploded explosive ordnance. c. render safe17
procedures--The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving18
the application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to19
provide for the interruption of functions or separation of essential components of20
unexploded explosive ordnance to prevent an unacceptable detonation. d.21
recovery procedures--Those actions taken to recover unexploded explosive22
ordnance. e. final disposal procedures--The final disposal of explosive ordnance23
GL-16
which may include demolition or burning in place, removal to a disposal area, or1
other appropriate means. (JP 1-02)2
3
explosive ordnance disposal unit--Personnel with special training and4
equipment who render explosive ordnance safe (such as bombs, mines,5
projectiles, and booby traps), make intelligence reports on such ordnance, and6
supervise the safe removal thereof. (JP 1-02)7
8
fallout--The precipitation to Earth of radioactive particulate matter from a9
nuclear cloud; also applied to the particulate matter itself. (JP 1-02)10
11
Federal Coordinating Officer--Appointed by the Director of the Federal12
Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate13
federal assistance to a state affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and14
level of the Federal Coordinating Officer will likely depend on the nature of the15
federal response. Also called FCO. (JP 1-02)16
17
hazard--A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness or death of18
personnel; damage to, or loss of, equipment or property; or mission degradation.19
(JP 1-02)20
21
immediate decontamination--Decontamination carried out by individuals22
upon coming contaminated, to save life and minimize casualties. This may23
include decontamination of some personal clothing and/or equipment. (JP 1-02)24
GL-17
incident control point--A designated point close to a terrorist incident where1
crisis management forces will rendezvous and establish control capability before2
initiating a tactical reaction. (JP 1-02)3
4
individual protective equipment--In nuclear, biological and chemical warfare,5
the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from6
biological and chemical hazards and some nuclear effects. (JP 1-02)7
8
joint nuclear accident coordinating center--A combined Defense Nuclear9
Agency and Department of Energy centralized agency for exchanging and10
maintaining information concerned with radiological assistance capabilities and11
coordinating assistance activities, when called upon, in connection with12
accidents involving radioactive materials. (JP 1-02)13
14
lead agency--Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the15
interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The16
lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate17
policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda,18
ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing19
decisions. (JP 1-02)20
21
lead Federal agency--The Federal department or agency assigned primary22
responsibility to manage and coordinate a specific emergency support function23
GL-18
under the Federal Response Plan. (This term and its definition are applicable1
only in the context of this publication.)2
3
national emergency--A condition declared by the President or the Congress by4
virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency5
actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may6
include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. (JP 1-02)7
8
nuclear damage--1. Light Damage--Damage which does not prevent the9
immediate use of equipment or installations for which it was intended. Some10
repair by the user may be required to make full use of the equipment or11
installations. 2. Moderate Damage--Damage which prevents the use of12
equipment or installations until extensive repairs are made. 3. Severe Damage--13
Damage which prevents use of equipment or installations permanently.14
(JP 1-02)15
16
nuclear damage assessment--The determination of the damage effect to the17
population, forces, and resources resulting from actual nuclear attack. It is18
performed during and after an attack. The operational significance of the19
damage is not evaluated in this assessment. (JP 1-02)20
21
nuclear incident--An unexpected event involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or22
component, resulting in any of the following, but not constituting a nuclear23
weapon(s) accident: a. an increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive24
GL-19
contamination; b. errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or1
transportation of equipment, and/or the malfunctioning of equipment and2
materiel which could lead to an unintentional operation of all or part of the3
weapon arming and/or firing sequence, or which could lead to a substantial4
change in yield, or increased dud probability; and c. any act of God,5
unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the weapon,6
facility, or component. (JP 1-02)7
8
nuclear weapon(s) accident--An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or9
radiological nuclear weapon components that results in any of the following; a.10
accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use by United States forces or11
United States supported allied forces, of a nuclear-capable weapon system12
which could create the risk of an outbreak of war; b. nuclear detonation; c.13
nonnuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear14
weapon component; d. radioactive contamination; e. seizure, theft, loss, or15
destruction of a nuclear weapon or radiological nuclear weapon component,16
including jettisoning; f. public hazard, actual or implied. (JP 1-02)17
18
Posse Comitatus Act--Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military19
personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased20
Department of Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement21
activities. (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United22
States Code, Section 1385) (JP 1-02)23
24
GL-20
radiation dose--The total amount of ionizing radiation absorbed by material or1
tissues, expressed in centigrays. (DOD) The term radiation dose is often used in2
the sense of the exposure dose expressed in roentgens, which is a measure of3
the total amount of ionization that the quantity of radiation could produce in air.4
This could be distinguished from the absorbed dose, also given in rads, which5
represents the energy absorbed from the radiation per gram of specified body6
tissue. Further, the biological dose, in rems, is a measure of the biological7
effectiveness of the radiation exposure. (JP 1-02)8
9
radiation exposure state--The condition of a unit, or exceptionally an10
individual, deduced from the cumulative whole body radiation dose(s) received.11
It is expressed as a symbol which indicates the potential for future operations12
and the degree of risk if exposed to additional nuclear radiation. (JP 1-02)13
14
radiation sickness--An illness resulting from excessive exposure to ionizing15
radiation. The earliest symptoms are nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea, which16
may be followed by loss of hair, hemorrhage, inflammation of the mouth and17
throat, and general loss of energy. (JP 1-02)18
19
radiological survey--The directed effort to determine the distribution and dose20
rates of radiation in an area. (JP 1-02)21
22
riot control agent--A substance which produces temporary irritating or23
disabling physical effects that disappear within minutes of removal from24
GL-21
exposure. There is no significant risk of permanent injury, and medical1
treatment is rarely required. (JP 1-02)2
3
terrorism--The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence4
to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in5
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)6
7
terrorist--An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a8
result. (JP 1-02)9
10
support--1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains11
another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit12
which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be13
used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning14
of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects,15
or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)16
17
weapons of mass destruction--In arms control usage, weapons that are18
capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as19
to destroy large numbers of people. Can be nuclear, chemical, biological, and20
radiological weapons, but excludes the means of transporting or propelling the21
weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also22
called WMD. (JP 1-02)23
24
GL-22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Intentionally Blank11