Africa Region Working Paper Series

Number 21

Handcling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings:Governance Underpinnings of School Performancein Tikur Inchini, West 5hewa Zone, Oromia Region

Navin GirishankarAbebaw AlemayehuYusuf Ahmad

5eptember 2001

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Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings: Governance Underpinnings ofSchool Performance in Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia RegionSeptember 2001Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 21

Abstract

This paper provides a survey-based analysis of the governance of school perfonnance inTikur Inchini, a woreda (a sub-national unit of government) in Ethiopia's Oromia Region.The reality in Tikur's educational system was one of almost exclusive reliance on top-down or hierarchical controls during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, theuse of hierarchy produced mixed results. Systematic interventions by higher levels ofgovernment prevented woreda and school officials from making legitimate allocativechoices. This overly centralized approach also generated budgetary uncertainty andvarious operational inefficiencies. In meeting these constraints, school and woredaofficials responded in ways that could be instructive in future attempts to deependemocratic decentralization. In particular, schools and communities demanded anddemonstrated greater openness and accountability in key areas. The paper concludes thatTikur's schools and woreda institutions are well-positioned to exercise greater autonomyin allocating and managing resources because of their demonstrated capacity to monitorbudgets, manage personnel, and undertake monitoring and evaluation.

Authors' Affiliation and Sponsorship

Navin GirishankarSenior Public Sector Specialist, AFTI2, Africa Region, The World BankEmail: Ngirishankar@worldbank.org

Abebaw AlemayehuConsultant, AFC06, Africa Region, The World BankEmail: Aalemayehu@worldbank.org

Yusuf AhmadConsultant, OEDCR, The World BankEmail: Yahmad@worldbank.org

THE WORKING PAPER SERIES

The Africa Region Working Paper Series expedites dissemination of applied research and policystudies with potential for improving economic performance and social conditions in Sub-SaharanAfrica. The Series publishes papers at preliminary stages to stimulate timely discussion within theRegion and among client countries, donors, and the policy research community. The editorial boardfor the Series consists of representatives from professional Families appointed by the Region's SectorDirectors.

Editor in charge of the series: Antoine Waldburger, AFTM3, Email: awaldburger@worldbank.org,who may be contacted for hard copies.

For additional information visit the Web site http://www.worldbank.ora/afr/wps/index.htm, wherecopies are available in pdf format.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of theauthor(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its ExecutiveDirectors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them.

HANDLING HIERARCHY IN DECENTRALIZED SETTINGS:

Governance Underpinnings of School Performancein Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region

Navin GirishankarSenior Public Sector Specialist, AFTI2, Africa Region, The World BankEmail: Ngirishankar~worldbank.org

Abebaw AlemayehuConsultant, AFC06, Africa Region, The World BankEmail: AalemayehuWworldbank.org

Yusuf AhmadConsultant, OEDCR, The World BankEmail: Yahmad(worldbank.org

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of theauthor(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its ExecutiveDirectors, or the countries that they represent and should not be attributed to them.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary ............................................................. i

1. Introduction .............................................................. 1

Tikur's educational system .............................................................. 1Methodology and approach .............................................................. 3Organization of the paper .............................................................. 3

2. Hierarchy in Tikur's educational system ......................... ..................................... 4

Hierarchy in resource allocation: control without efficiency, capability .............. .................4

Planning and prioritization .............................................................. 5Recruitment of qualified personnel ........................... ................................... 8Procurement of educational inputs ......................... ..................................... 8

Hierarchy in implementation: probity without predictability ................................................. 9

Financial accountability ............................................................. 9Monitoring of schools and personnel-in-post ............................................................. 10Management of resource flows ...................... ....................................... 11

3. Guideposts along the critical path ............................................................. 12

Unsustainable responses to weak enabling environment ............................................. ........ 13Ability to exercise autonomy .............................................................. 5Options along the critical path ............................................................. 16

4. Next steps ............................................................. 19

Charts

1.1 Primary education in Tikur, 1997-99 ............................................................. 22.1 Openness to community preferences versus influence over the budget ................................. 6

(a) Who listens to communities? .............................................................. 6(b) Who influences the budget? .............................................................. 6

2.2 The impact of hierarchy on intra- and inter-sectoral spending ..............................................7(a) Composition of total expenditures, West Shewa Zone (1997-99) ................................... 7(b) Woreda official's view of inter-sectoral spending ........................................................... 7(c) Woreda official's view of intra-sectoral spending ........................................................... 7(d) Recurrent expenditures on primary education, Tikur Inchini Woreda (1997-99) ........... 7

2.3 Disciplinary problems in the woreda education office and in schools . . 112.4 Causes of uncertainty in resource flows from above ........................................................... 113.1 Deficiencies in raising and collecting community contributions for primary schooling ... 143.2 Which would improve school performance-more money or greater autonomy? . . . 153.3 Prospects for fiduciary transparency in Tikur's woreda, kebeles, and schools .. 163.4 Criteria for getting promoted in Tikur's woreda education office and schools .... ............... 16

Figures

1.1 Tikur's educational system ....................................................... 2

Boxes

3.1 Participation as accountability mechanism: an under-exploited resource? .......................... 18

Annexes

1. Activity list for piloting of tool in Tikur Inchini, April 13-19, 2000 .20

2. Regression results .21

3. Data on West Shewa Zone-expenditures, personnel, and performance .233.1 Planned and actual capital budget by sector, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .233.2 Recurrent expenditures by sector, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .233.3 Staffing by sector, West Shewa, EC 1991 .243.4 Basic data on primary education, West Shewa, EC1989-91 .24

4. Data on Tikur Woreda-expenditures, revenues, personnel, and performance .254.1 Revenue collected by select woredas, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .254.2 Financial inflows into Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .254.3 Overall expenditures by Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .254.4 Expenditures on primary education by Tikur, EC 1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .264.5 Monthly wage bill by level in Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) .264.6 Data on primary education, Tikur, EC 1989-91 .264.7 Primary school enrollment in Tikur, EC 1989-91 .264.8 Number of teachers by salary grade in Tikur, EC1989-91 .27

5. Data on schools-enrollments, financial flows, and personnel .285.1 Kochere School, Buyumawini Kebele .28(a) Pupils enrolled in Kochere School by grade, EC1990-92 .28(b) Financial flows into Kochere School, EC 1989-91 .28(c) Staffing in Kochere School .28

5.2 Tikur Inchini School, Inchini 01 Kebele .29(a) Pupils enrolled in Tikur Inchini School by grade, EC1990-92 .29(b) Financial flows into Tikur Inchini School, EC 1989-91 .29(c) Staffing in Tikur Inchini School .29

5.3 Nannoo Gidu Primary School, Nannoo Gidu Kebele .30(a) Pupils enrolled in Nannoo Gidu Primary School by grade, EC 1990-92 .30(b) Financial flows into Nannoo Gidu Primary School, EC 1989-91 .30(c) Staffing in Nannoo Gidu Primary School .30

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. According to Ethiopia's policy of decentralization, sub-national units ofgovernment-most notably, the woreda-are expected to assume responsibility fordelivering essential services such as health, education, and rural roads. As part of thislarger effort to better understanding the evolving decentralization process, a World Bankteam piloted the "assessing constraints" survey tool in Tikur Inchini Woreda, WestShewa Zone, Oromia Region to collect quantitative and perception data on thegovernance underpinnings of primary schooling, specifically, the design of institutionalarrangements governing resource allocation and implementation. Based on surveyfindings, the pilot also identified options for institutional reform that would be feasibleand credible in the eyes of woreda administrators, community representatives, and schoolofficials.

Tikur's educational system

2. In Ethiopia, primary schooling takes place within a constitutionally-mandatedstructure for decentralized delivery that consists of four tiers of sub-nationalgovernment-the region, the zone, the woreda, and the kebele. The school sits below thekebele and is administered by a School Management Committee (SMC), which iscomposed of community leaders, school officials, kebele representatives, and at times,parents. Operating within this governance framework, Tikur made notable progress inexpanding the reach of primary education as enrollment rates rose nearly 40% over thelast three fiscal years. Prospects for sustaining enrollment rates and enhancing studentachievement, however, remained uncertain as Tikur struggled with modest success tomarshal the budgetary, human, and infrastructural inputs required to meet the needs of itsburgeoning student population. The governance of resource allocation and programimplementation not only determined whether Tikur increased spending on primaryschooling, but also how efficiently and effectively it managed existing resources against abackdrop of pervasive aggregate scarcity.

Hierarchy as dominant institutional arrangement

3. Notwithstanding formal decentralization of service delivery responsibility, thereality in Tikur's educational system is one of almost exclusive reliance on top-down orhierarchical controls during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, this use ofhierarchy produced mixed results. On the one hand, hierarchy ensured that a substantialshare of public expenditures were allocated to primary education. It also provided thecontrol regime required to develop the rudiments of a fiduciary framework (with somechecks on corruption and resource leakage), promote staff discipline, and foster esprit decorps among teachers.

4. On the other hand, hierarchical interventions, primarily by the zone, preventedworeda and school officials from making legitimate allocative choices between intra-sectoral priorities such as capital and recurrent expenditures, or wage and non-wagerecurrent ones. Even though they were far removed from the front-lines, zonal (and to alesser extent, woreda) officials sought to identify and meet the specific budgetary,

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procurement, and staffing needs (based on the production function) of individual schoolsin Tikur. Centralized management also meant that negative externalities associated withpoor financial and payroll management at higher levels-most commonly manifest asbudgetary uncertainty-were passed on to the woreda and schools.

Responses to hierarchy and implications for reform

5. Tikur's schools actually responded to two sets of constraints imposed byhierarchy-namely, systemic constraints as well as those endogenous to Tikur's publicinstitutions and processes. As far as systemic constraints such as poor wages andunpredictable resource flows were concerned, Tikur's formal and informal attempts tocope proved unsustainable. For instance, schools used the informal practice ofaccelerated promotions to enhance pay-levels. The practice not only attenuated linksbetween performance and promotions, but also imposed a hidden burden on the wagebill, thereby siphoning off resources needed to hire new teachers. Also, kebeles sought tocollect community contributions to compensate for budgetary uncertainty and theresulting funding shortfalls that adversely affected O&M and procurement. These own-source revenues themselves did not provide a more stable or robust source of educationresources than fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. Ultimately, the onlyviable strategy for grappling with systemic constraints would be a Government-wideeffort, probably supported under the auspices of the Civil Service Reform Programme(CSRP), to strengthen budget management and develop an affordable medium-term paypolicy at the federal and regional-levels.

6. The zone's punctual use of hierarchy to limit discretion by the woreda and schoolsconstituted the major constraint, endogenous to Tikur, on allocative and operationalefficiency. Schools attempted to gain a measure of allocative choice and reverse the biasagainst capital spending by financing small works such as an additional classroom onthrough community contributions albeit on an ad hoc basis. On the personnelmanagement front, schools tried to meet staff shortages (caused in part by zonal delays infilling vacancies) by double-shifting and hiring 'community' teachers with own-sourcerevenues. Both instances suggest public officials in Tikur were conscious of-and tosome extent, capable of-making better allocative decisions using the finite resourceavailable to them. More significant perhaps is the observation that Tikur's 'responses' tohierarchy (its attempts to allocate resources more efficiently) emanated from schools.The implication is that the school-not the woreda office or zone-was the appropriatelocus for introducing greater flexibility or autonomy within Tikur's ostensibly'decentralized' education system.

7. Prospects for school-based management, however, depend on whether schooldirectors can guarantee a reasonable degree of fiduciary comfort including crediblesafeguards against the leakage of resources intended for classrooms. Schools also need todemonstrate their willingness to hire and promote teachers on the basis of merit ratherthan patronage. On both these counts, the pilot's findings indicated that Tikur's schoolsappeared well-position to exercise greater discretion precisely because they could availthemselves of existing and locally-based mechanisms of accountability and restraint.

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Options along the critical path

8. Assuming that increased school autonomy were in fact the most effective measurefor driving educational performance in Tikur, the ancillary question-that ofsequencing-looms large. How can zonal and woreda officials devolve a greater array ofinput decisions to schools without exposing public institutions to increased risks ofresource leakage and patronage-based hiring? One approach, supported by the Bank inother countries undergoing decentralization, is to allow lower levels of government to'earn their autonomy by demonstrating their capability' (specifically, their capability toexercise restraint). Over time, this type of instrument can also enable local authorities,even communities, to graduate to higher levels of responsibility and discretion withinacceptable levels of risk.

9. It is conceivable that this approach could be designed to meet the needs of Tikur'sschool system on a pilot basis. Schools can be given formal budgets with some level ofdiscretion in resource allocation or personnel management, provided that they meeteligibility criteria. These eligibility criteria in turn can be defined around goodstewardship of inputs, thereby reducing the fiduciary and patronage risks associated withschool-based management.

Next steps

10. This pilot has sought to demonstrate how an inductive (yet systematic, survey-based) approach to institutional analysis can help identify a critical path for institutionalreform in decentralized settings. The challenge is whether the approach can beaggregrated across woredas or even regions in order to highlight trade-offs, alternativepathways for institutional development, and specific reform options at a systemic ormacro-level. Pursuant to developing this broader perspective on Ethiopia's governanceprospects, the Country Team should consider applying survey-based institutional analysisupstream of other sectoral or cross-cutting initiatives in the Ethiopia country program.

11. In addition, the pilot indicated a need to further investigate the degree to whichhierarchy is the dominant institutional arrangement governing allocative decisions andimplementation in relationships between federal and regional authorities, and thosebetween regions and zones. Finally, options for developing "earned autonomy"instruments in Ethiopia should be explored as a means of further embedding devolutionnot only at the regional level, but also at the woreda and sub-woreda levels.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 According to Ethiopia's policy of decentralization, sub-national units ofgovernment-most notably, the woreda-are expected to assume responsibility fordelivering basic services such as healthcare and primary education. In spite of theseambitious goals, knowledge of the actual decentralization process and its impact on front-line delivery remains poor. Several questions about woreda government including thosewith potentially far-reaching implications for the design and implementation ofdevelopment programs remain unanswered. For instance, do local-level institutions havesufficient autonomy to make allocative and operational decisions related to the provisionof services? Are there adequate provisions at higher levels of government to establishand enforce minimum standards over the use of key financial and human resource inputs,as well as the delivery of outputs? Are local institutions capable of undertake thecomplex forms of collective action required under a decentralized system of delivery?

1.2 Addressing these and other questions-including studying trends in thegovernance of decentralized delivery across Ethiopia's diverse regions-is the purpose ofthe ongoing Woreda Studies (WS). This includes assessing the ways in which varioustiers of woreda government and communities actually shape planning, financial andpersonnel management, and accountability processes. The WS also aim to assesswhether 'institutional ground realities' favorably impact front-line performance in keysectors such as health, education, and rural roads.

1.3 As part of this larger effort, a World Bank team piloted the "assessing constraints"survey tool in Tikur Inchini Woreda (West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region) to collectquantitative and perception data on the governance underpinnings of primary schooling.Specifically, the pilot sought to assess 'what works, what doesn't, and why' in the designof institutional arrangements governing resource allocation and implementation. Withthese findings, it then attempted to chart a critical reform path that would be feasible anddesirable in the eyes of Tikur's communities and public officials. A short description ofTikur's educational system follows along with a discussion of the methodology andapproach taken during the piloting of the survey tool.

TIKUR'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

1.4 In Ethiopia, primary education is a regional responsibility. Schooling thereforetakes place within a constitutionally-mandated governance structure for decentralizeddelivery. In the Oromia Region, like others, this consists for four tiers: first, the regionwith its political representatives and administrative cadres; second, the zone, whichserves an administrative layer designed to facilitate collection actions by lower levels ofgovernnent; third, the woreda or the basic unit of local government (akin to a district)with technical units formally accountable to an executive of elected officials; and finally,the kebele with an assembly of community representatives managed by an executive(figure 1.1). Below the kebele sits the school, administered by a School ManagementCommittee (SMC). The SMC is typically composed of community leaders, schoolofficials, kebele representatives, and at times, parents.

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Figure 1.1: Tikur's educational system

region exnan~~J i 'I ~~~~~~Commite

zone-eLicLioI Li i ctmmitte

schoolA School management committee

communities

Chart 1.1: Primary education in Tikur, 1997-99

Indicator 1997 1998 1999

Enrollment 7130 8490 10159

Total teachers 132 142 144Teacher-pupil ratio 1:54 1:60 1:71Average class size 60 67 76Percentage of female pupils 18% 23% 33%Percentage repeaters 9% 13% 11%Percentage dropouts 12% 12% 14%Wage bill for teachers (OOOs ETB) 119.712 120.372 122.400Wage bill for woreda staff ('OOOs ETB) 656.148 749.508 726.120Capital expenditures C(OOs ETB) - 216.759 217.510Operating costs ('OOOs ETB) 21.348 70.099 69.937Total expenditures COOOs ETB) 806.022 950.978 918.457

1.5 Operating within this formal governance structure, Tikur has madenotable progress in expanding the reach of educational services. Student enrollment inthis woreda grew over 40% between 1997 and 1999, with improvements in the genderbalance as well as modest reductions in the percentage of repeaters. The sustainabilityof enrollment, however, was questionable as Tikur's burgeoning student populationoutstripped the woreda's ability to staff the front-lines. Average class size grew to 76students in 1999 and contributed to a deteriorating teacher-pupil ratio and drop-out rate.

1.6 In spite of its growing clientele, Tikur's educational system received fewerresources in 1999 than it did in 1998. That primary education was the single mostimportant spending priority for both zone and woreda belied a reality of aggregatescarcity. The shrinking resource envelope only compounded difficulties in the allocationof resources between capital, wage and non-wage items; funding of established teaching

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posts; and procurement of basic educational inputs. Also, the woreda had a very limitedpool of personnel to manage and implement its primary education program. Overall,pervasive aggregate scarcity provided the backdrop against which actors in Tikur soughtto undertake collective actions in support of primary education.

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

1.7 Given this context, the team piloted the "assessing constraints" survey tool toidentify institutional constraints that affected the ability of public officials andcommunities to negotiate pervasive scarcity-that is, their ability to efficiently allocatescarce resources and carry out primary schooling. The tool comprised threequestionnaires-one each for the woreda-, kebele-, and school-levels respectively.Survey questions were derived from basic propositions about the institutionalunderpinnings of 'good public management' in decentralized settings. Thesepropositions, listed below, also reflected the ways in which Ethiopian policymakersthemselves view (and represent) the ongoing decentralization process:

* First, active community participation in planning helps local institutions setpriorities that are more demand-responsive.

- Second, hierarchical processes in financial and personnel management promoteadequacy and predictability in the flow of resources, both of which are necessaryfor services to be delivered in line with program objectives.

* Third, top-down enforcement of rules in combination with bottom-up pressuresfrom communities enhance the probity and accountability of local institutions.

1.8 Accordingly, respondents were asked to describe the extent to which institutionalarrangements governing resource allocation (for example, planning, budget formulation)and implementation (for example, budget execution, monitoring and accountability) werehierarchical or participatory. Then, they were asked to assess whether thesearrangements helped promote various aspects of performnance such as responsiveness,predictability, and probity.

1.9 Given time constraints, the pilot covered a modest sample of twenty-two publicofficials in Tikur. This included interviews of nine officials from the woreda educationand finance offices as well as the executive council using a woreda-level questionnaire,as well as five representatives from three kebeles and eight from three schools using thekebele-level and facility-level surveys respectively. Quantitative data on expenditures,revenues, staffing, and educational performance were also collected at the zonal-,woreda-, and school-levels.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

1.10 What follows is a discussion ofthe pilot's findings and their implications forinstitutional reform. Section 2 explains the central role that hierarchy played in decision-making processes governing resource allocation as well as arrangements shapingimplementation in Tikur's educational system. It also evaluates the impact of these uses

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of hierarchy on efficiency, capability, resource predictability, and probity. Section 3 thenexplores the 'responses' of public officials in Tikur to hierarchy and considers what thesecoping mechanisms imply for reform options in the near future. Finally, section 4 offersa way forward for using survey-based analytics on a broader scale to address governanceissues in the context of the Bank's evolving program of support to Ethiopia.

2. HIERARCHY IN TIKUR'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

2.1 Top-down management structures-or hierarchy-served as the dominant fromof institutional arrangement within Tikur's ostensibly decentralized educational system.As in the case of other African countries that have decentralized responsibilities forservice delivery, hierarchy was maintained and even reproduced in decision-makingprocesses over resource allocation such as planning and prioritization, the recruitmentand deployment of personnel, and procurement of inputs, all of which impacted schoolperformance.' Hierarchy also shaped implementation arrangements such as thosegoverning budget execution, the management of front-line workers-in-post, and themonitoring of financial and physical performance.

2.2 This section describes the specific uses of top-down mechanisms in resourceallocation and implementation, as well as their proximate impact on efficiency, resourcepredictability, and probity.

HIERARCHY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION: CONTROL WITHOUT EFFICIENCY, CAPACITY

2.3 There is growing recognition that open or participatory approaches to resourceallocation (for example, in planning and prioritization, personnel management, andprocurement) are more likely to result in allocative decisions that are responsive tocommunity demands. At the same time, countries undergoing decentralization havesought to maintain some degree of central control (for example, through conditional grantmechanisms) to ensure that sub-national authorities devote adequate resources to sectorsthat are deemed to be national priorities (for example, healthcare and primary education).The ability of governments to balance this type of bottom-up flexibility with top-downrestraint significantly shapes how efficiently they deploy scarce financial and humanresources and physical assets.

t In Uganda, hierarchy has been re-introduced in a 'decentralized" system through a variety of fiscal and administrativeinstruments including strict conditionality in intergovernmental transfers, centralized management of the teacher'spayroll, etc.

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Planning and prioritization

2.4 Survey responses indicated that Tikur was unable to strike an appropriate balancebetween hierarchy and participation, between control and flexibility in educationplanning. The top-down involvement of zonal authorities in education planning didensure relatively high levels of spending on primary education. But it also short-circuitedotherwise robust consultative processes in two ways, both of which contributed tomisallocation between intra-sectoral priorities. First, zonal authorities and to a lesserextent, party officials, regularly intervened to vet education plans prepared by woreda andsub-woreda units before the woreda executive reviewed them. Second, schools had littleor no discretion in allocating education resources despite their demonstrable ability toencourage community participation in education planning.

2.5 The pilot charted the contours of the planning process in Tikur's educationalsystem. Annual plans, usually developed without an indicative resource envelope, weredeveloped by the School Management Committee (SMC) as well as kebeles inconsultation with communities, specifically parents. These plans were then submitted tothe woreda education office, where they were vetted and compiled by education officialsinto a draft education plan for Tikur. Rather than costing planned activities incollaboration with the woreda finance office and submitting them to the woreda'sexecutive, the education office first submitted draft plans to the Zonal Education Sectionin Ambo. Interviews conducted during the pilot indicated that zonal education andfinance authorities exercised significant veto power over woreda proposals, some ofwhich were usually deemed unaffordable or out of line with zonal and regional priorities.Once reviewed by the zone, the plans were returned to the education office for revisionand submission to Tikur's executive.

2.6 In addition to interventions by zonal authorities, the role of the party in shapingplans prepared by Tikur's education office, and facilitating bargaining between woredaand zonal interests over spending priorities (particularly on the capital side) requiresfiurther investigation. Interviews of elected officials revealed that the party did regularlyemploy various mechanisms such as reporting publicly on peers to enforce disciplineamong party cadres, including members of the woreda's executive. These practices alsoserved to filter local priorities (particularly those that ran counter to party diktats) andprovided a parallel process by which hierarchy and undermined the ability of electedofficials to translate local preferences, with the help of woreda-level bureaucrats, intodevelopment programs.

2.7 Public officials in woredas, kebeles and schools were also asked to rate thedemand-responsiveness of their units as well as their influence over the woreda budget.Notably, schools and to a lesser extent kebeles proved more effective in consultingcommunities and incorporating their preferences into official development plans.2 Yetkebeles and schools had little influence over setting spending priorities within theworeda's budget (chart 2.1 (a)-(b)). Since Tikur's schools were not assigned a budget inany formal sense, planning by individual facilities and kebeles was undertaken without anindicative resource envelope. Also, without budgets, schools could not receive resource

2 These were the same development plans that are vetted by woreda and zonal authorities.

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transfers from above, much less enjoy discretionary authority over resource allocation.Put simply, hierarchical control of prioritization processes by the zone prevented Tikurfrom leveraging the superior ability of schools to 'listen to communities.'

Chart 2.1: Openness to community preferences versus influence over the budget

(a): Who listens to cornmunities? (b): Who influences the budget?

VWoreda Woreda225 2.10

2.24 1 90

223

222 E.

2.21

School Kebele School Kebele

2.8 The primary benefit of the zone's punctual use of hierarchy during budgetformulation-that is, in vetting woreda plans before they were reviewed by electedofficials-did ensure that inter-sectoral spending priorities consistently favored primaryeducation sector. More than half of total annual expenditures for West Shewa in each ofthe last three years have gone to primary education (chart 2.2 (a)). The data suggests thatzonal influence in planning and budgeting processes did not significantly distort inter-sectoral allocations out of line with those otherwise preferred by communities. Only athird of woreda officials felt the communities wanted to allocate marginal resources toprimary education. Most felt that commnunities would spend untied resources, on themargin, on other priorities such as healthcare (34%) and electricity (22%) (chart 2.2 (b)).

2.9 That said, hierarchy in budget formulation also served to distort intra-sectoralspending priorities. The pilot identified two sources of allocative inefficiency within theworeda's education budget hampered prospects for medium-term improvements ineducational access and quality. First, capital expenditures, controlled by zonal officials,were dwarfed by the wage bill for woreda staff and teachers (chart 2.2(d)), in spite ofworeda officials' preferences that marginal education resources be used for investmentsin school expansion (chart 2.2(c)). Data collected from the Zonal Planning Sectionindicated that planned investment spending in the education sector rose only 2% innominal terms between 1997-99, while actual capital expenditures fell 27% over thesame period. Barring immediate efforts to re-align intra-sectoral priorities towardsinvestment (and specifically, classroom or school expansion), Tikur will likely facesevere difficulties accommodating its burgeoning student population in the near future.Since capital spending was largely West Shewa's responsibility, zonal budget processesand outcomes deserve further investigation.

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2.10 The second source of allocative inefficiency was the crowding out of non-wagerecurrent spending. The wage bill for teachers and woreda education officers amountedto an average of 94% of current expenditures during the 1997-1999 period (chart 2.2(d)).Non-wage recurrent items such as training and other forms of operations andmaintenance (O&M) were largely unfunded. Since the authority to recruit new teachersand woreda education officials rested with the zone, part of this bias towards wageexpenditures can be attributed to Ambo's failure to consider the recurrent implications ofhiring new staff.

2.11 Inadequate provisions for O&M meant that even basic amenities in the woredaeducation office such as electricity and water-proof roofing were lacking as werestationery and vehicles. Education officers often could not carry out even routinefunctions, much less more sophisticated activities such as school inspection and programevaluation. Such concerns were exacerbated in schools, which had no budgetarydiscretion (with the exception of allocating community contributions), and therefore,could not provide for the upkeep of existing school facilities or regular access to drinkingwater and medical treatment for students. Finally, staff at all levels had few opportunitiesto upgrade their skills. Most education officers had not received in-service training in thelast year. Only a quarter of school-level respondents received some form of short-termtraining in the past twelve months.

Chart 2.2 (a)-(d): The impact of hierarchy on intra- and inter-sectoral spending

(a) Composition of total expenditures in (c) Woreda Officiars View ofWest Shewa Zone (1997-99) Intra-sectoral Spending Prioriies:

_ _0__ W__ _ commursties v4uzd spener an addtional ETS I mn7ifn|00% __- Iearmsn*ed farpnmary education

new high

801% school cho

20%

expansion1997 (EC89 198 EC90) 1999 (EC9I) 89%

n Edus~n rrAgnctxltre 5 Health aWstet. mneKs. ur.fgy * Other ----- - --- _____

- -_-__________________ - (d) Recurrent expenditures on prirary education,___________________ ~flkur Inchini Woreda (1997-99)

(b) Woreda OffcMias View of 1000 - - -Inter-sectoral Spending Priorities:

ql,ers commuities wCd spend an addjWoaE1 mitfitr 800 --- - -IBO - --- .in unfied furn -

clinical 40Caducatiorn , bes Ire

52 % ~~~~~~~~~~~~200 -

1997 (ECS9) 1998 (EC90' 1999 (ES91)

water ~ wage billof teacherselectrcity t1% cwage txil lWoreda educaton ofce

* Nonwage recurrent expendftires

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Recruitment of qualified personnel

2.12 Recruitment of woreda staff and teachers was also governed by a highlycentralized regime. When faced with staff shortages, the woreda education office had toformally request the zone to either increase the number of posts or fill vacancies.Similarly, schools sought the permission of the education office to fill vacancies withinschools, or expand the number of teaching posts within the establishment. For bothworeda staff or teachers, the zone had final authority on hiring decisions. Thisarrangement was ostensibly designed to prevent local institutions from hiring unqualifiedpersonnel, or expanding staff size beyond affordable levels.

2.13 Even if centralized recruitment prevented patronage hiring at the woreda- or sub-woreda- level, it came at a price: significant delays in filling staff vacancies in the woredaeducation office, and in establishing new teaching posts in schools. Nearly a third ofprofessional posts in the education office remained vacant at the time of the pilot. Staffshortages were even more pronounced in schools; survey data indicated that each schoolrequired an average of 4 additional teachers. In fact, the number of teachers-in-postactually fell 9% between 1998 and 1999 even as enrollment rates expanded.3 Half ofworeda respondents indicated that delays in filling posts were due in part to inadequatefumding. This was indicative of how-despite an allocative bias towards wageexpenditures-personnel management in Tikur was subject to problems of aggregatescarcity (para 2.9).

2.14 Scarcity alone, however, does not fully explain vacancies and staff shortages.Survey respondents also acknowledged that low wages made it difficult to attractqualified candidates even when funding was available for established posts. Yet, Tikurhad no formal instruments such as discretion to provide selective wage increases withingrades, allowances, or other benefits to improve conditions of work. Rather, pay levelswere formulated and managed centrally by region in line with national standards.Centralized recruitment of new staff and control of pay-levels-and the lack of flexibilityafforded to woredas-imposed costs on Tikur's education system in terns of capacityforegone on the front-lines of delivery.

Procurement of educational inputs

2.15 The authority to procure various educational inputs was stratified across differentlevels of government. For instance, textbooks were purchased by the region, furniture bythe zone, and stationery by the woreda. Notably, schools themselves not authorized toprocure inputs under any circumstances. This particular procurement regime generatedvarious coordination problems as authorities at different levels sought to satisfy the inputrequirements for the 'production function' of each of Tikur's schools. The resultinginefficiencies compounded the already chronic under-supply of textbooks and furniture(which, again, were caused primarily by pervasive aggregate scarcity). Woreda-levelrespondents estimated that on average only 39% of students received textbooks.Instances of over- or under-supply were most apparent at the school-level. On average,school-level respondents identified the need for 5 additional classrooms, 35 benches, and

3 The overall wage bill for teachers fell in nominal terms between 1998 and 1999 along with staff size.

8

3 blackboards. At the same time, schools reported excess inventories of stationery itemssuch as chalk. Even in cases where certain items such as stationery were over-supplied,schools were not allowed to sell excess stock in order to use proceeds to procure goods,works, or services.

2.16 A related challenge for this centralized system was to distribute goods efficientlywith minimal risk of error or leakage. Yet, a third of school-level respondents attributedshortages in textbooks to weaknesses in distribution, for example, theft or delivery to thewrong school. Feedback mechanisms to correct erroneous deliveries were not robust.The extent to which such inefficiencies would be reduced by decentralizing certainprocurement functions to the school-level will require further investigation and piloting.

HIERARCHY IN IMPLEMENTATION: PROBITY WITHOUT PREDICTABILITY

2.17 As noted above, open planning processes, flexible recruitment procedures, andstreamlined procurement systems can facilitate the allocative efficiency of expenditureand personnel decisions, as well as demand-responsiveness. These alone, however, donot ensure effective implementation. Rather, execution of policies and programs requiresinter alia enforcement of standards for financial accountability as well as for staff andorganizational performance. Typical enforcement mechanisms include various forms ofhierarchy (vertical reporting relationships, or inspection and auditing by higher levels ofgovernments), which-when viewed as credible by public officials- can promotepredictability in resource flows, probity, as well as improved unit performance.

Financial accountability

2.18 Public officials at all three levels of Tikur's educational system-the woreda,kebele, and school-regularly undertook some form of accounting or book-keeping totrack financial transactions. While the pilot was unable to assess the accountingstandards used in this woreda, field interviews indicated that the quality of financialinformation was rudimentary; it also varied between woreda and sub-woreda institutions.Most units prepared annual reports on their financial performance and submitted them tosupervisory bodies within the same tier of government as well as authorities at higherlevels. For example, financial reports from the woreda education office were submittedto the finance office, the executive, as well as the zone. Schools reported to their SMCson internally-generated income, and, to a lesser extent, kebeles reported to woredas oncommunity contributions. The pilot concluded that reporting relationships-particularly,vertical ones-between tiers of woreda government on matters of fiduciary interest werereasonably routinized.

2.19 Financial audits by higher-level authorities constituted a second mechanism-anda hierarchical one-by which Tikur sought to ensure prudential financial management.Virtually the woreda officials interviewed acknowledged that the education office hadbeen audited by zonal authorities at least once during the past three years. Similarly,eighty-eight percent of school officials and forty percent of kebele representativesreported that some form of auditing had been undertaken by woreda officials in the lastthree years. Audit reports were more likely to be sent to higher levels of government

9

such as the zone (as indicated by 78% of respondents) as opposed to elected officialswithin woreda government (30%).

2.20 Survey data indicated that this particular use of hierarchy during budget executiondid engender probity. Only a quarter of woreda-level respondents acknowledged thataudits revealed financial irregularities. A subset of these cases resulted from malfeasanceor other willful attempts to misappropriate public funds; most irregularities were theresult of officials misunderstanding procedures governing financial management. It isalso worth noting that some school officials complained of kebeles 'diverting'community contributions earmarked for education. Such problems resulted in partbecause contributions were held as cash by the kebele-an arrangement which allowedofficials the discretion to (mis)handle revenues before having reported receipts to thepublic. This suggests that hierarchical reporting and audit procedures, while necessary,were probably not sufficient to ensure probity at lower levels of woreda government. Asdiscussed in para 3.14, publicizing information on financial performance in order to elicitan accountability response from citizens should serve as an effective complement.

Monitoring of schools and personnel-in-post

2.21 Three hierarchical mechanisms-the establishment of performance standards,school inspection, and periodic evaluation of staff performance-were used to promotediscipline and performance. Nearly 80% of woreda-level respondents were aware ofperformance standards for educational performance in Tikur. At the facility-level, 75%of those interviewed said they were aware of standards which their schools weresupposed to meet. These included standards set by national and regional authorities, aswell as those set by school authorities. At the staff-level, a majority of woreda officialsindicated that they were aware of codes of conduct and understood them. However,awareness of standards alone does not ensure their enforcement.

2.22 Equally important were the monitoring of schools and the evaluation ofpersonnel-in-post. Over the past three years, supervision by donors [of their projects] andinspection by woreda education officers constituted the mechanism for monitoring unit orfacility-level performance. Woreda officials typically inspected schools on a quarterlybasis. Sixty-three percent of school officials verified that, over the past three years,school inspection served as a key enforcement mechanism. Regression analysisundertaken with the data also indicates that regular inspections bore a significant andnegative relationship to drop-out rates (annex 2). It is worth noting that the coverage andfrequency of schools visits was jeopardized by aggregate scarcity or lack of fundingrequired for per diem allowances to education officers.

2.23 The practice of superiors evaluating staff in writing was relatively well-established for a capacity-poor woreda. Fifty-five percent of woreda-level respondentsreported that staff performance had been evaluated in writing on a semi-annual basis bythe head of the education office. Teachers were evaluated twice a year by their directorand the SMC, according to the majority of school officials interviewed.

10

2.24 The pilot found Tikur's monitoring and evaluation regime was viewed as crediblein eyes of its public servants, and in some cases, contributed to their discipline and espritde corps. Notably, three quarters of woreda-level and nearly forty percent of school-levelrespondents acknowledged that the failure to meet the above-mentioned standards wouldresult in some form of reprimand from above. If teachers were caught engaged in corruptpractices, nearly two-thirds of school respondents expected disciplinary action by higherofficials and even criminal prosecution. This belief that malfeasance would result inreprimand from above made a tangible difference. Regression results indicated that staffworking in units that faced 'consequences' for poor performance were also more likely toview themselves and their peers as ._______

competent (annex 2). It can be inferred Chart 2.3: Disciplinarv problems in Tikur's

that expectation of swift and strict education office and schools

sanctions also discouraged some of themore egregious forms of indiscipline such 86 y

as bribery, misappropriation of funds, and P _oor_work

insubordination (chart 2.3). That said, * e _ _:_i

hierarchical controls and sanctions alonecould not compensate for the public - SChooi

sector-wide problem of inadequate pay, n , Woreda

which explains the high incidence of poor pwork performance and moonlighting, Of f ___s____

particularly at the woreda-level. ovxO I10% 20% 30% 40% SOS 60%

Management of resource flows

2.25 As noted earlier, various forms of zonal hierarchy limited the little formaldiscretion that Tikur's woreda office, much less its schools, enjoyed in the allocation andmanagement of budgetary resources. Under such as system, the efficiency andpredictability of resource flows depends heavily on robust mechanisms at higher levels ofgovernment for the release of funds, management of the payroll, etc. In Tikur, publicofficials at all levels of woreda government indicated that unpredictable resource flowsfrom above hindered implementation of planned education-related activities such asundertaking school inspections, construction, etc. A majority of woreda officials alsoreported delayed payment (56%) and even non-payment (33%) of salaries in the lasttwelve months. Salaries of nearly two-thirds of school officials were also delayed in thepast twelve months.

Chart 2.4: Causes of uncertainty in resource flows2.26 According to survey responses, from aboveuncertainties in resource flows wereprimarily caused by weaknesses in cash mgt in

cash management at the regional and 3fld Dne

zonal levels, and bottlenecks in zonal dek! ingrants

and regional transfer mechanisms, zo

rather than inefficient financialmanagement practices within the icstn nr

woreda (chart 2.4). The pilot did notinclude a detailed assessment of fiscal 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

11

transfer mechanisms and payroll management systems in West Shewa due to timne andresource constraints. However, it was apparent that centralized budget and payrollmanagement allowed zonal and regional government to 'pass' the costs of inefficientmanagement down the chain of public action. These costs-in tenns of foregoneinvestments (for example, school expansion) and recurrent activities (for example,inspections and monitoring), and likely salary arTears-potentially constituted aconsiderable liability for woreda government.

3. GUIDEPOSTS ALONG THE CRITICAL PATH

3.1 Notwithstanding formal decentralization of service delivery responsibility, thereality in Tikur's educational system is one of almost exclusive reliance on top-downcontrols during allocation and implementation. As a strategy, this use of hierarchyproduced mixed results. On the one hand, hierarchy ensured that a substantial share ofpublic expenditures were allocated to primary education. It also provided the controlregime required to develop the rudiments of a fiduciary framework (with some checks oncorruption and resource leakage), promote staff discipline, and foster esprit de corpsamong teachers.

3.2 On the other hand, hierarchical interventions, primarily by the zone, preventedworeda and school officials from making legitimate allocative choices between intra-sectoral priorities such as capital and recurrent expenditures, or wage and non-wagerecurrent ones. Even though they were far removed from the front-lines, zonal (and to alesser extent, woreda) officials sought to identify and meet the specific budgetary,procurement, and staffing needs (based on the production function) of individual schoolsin Tikur. As noted above, centralized management also meant that negative externalitiesassociated with poor financial and payroll management at higher levels-most commonlymanifest as budgetary uncertainty-were passed on to the woreda and schools.

3.3 Emblematic of other countries' experiences with decentralized delivery, regionalauthorities in Ethiopia face a trade-off between grantingflexibility and ensuringaccountability in the management of critical inputs.4 Successfully resolving this trade-offimplies a more nuanced approach to designing hierarchical control systems-that is, onethat seeks to internalize some of the benefits described above while alleviating the costs.'Best practice' however is not immediately obvious when it comes to eliminating harmfulforms of hierarchy and capitalizing on beneficial ones.5

3.4 As a way of identifying win-win opportunities for Tikur, the pilot investigatedhow public officials actually responded-whether formally or informally-to theparticular control regime they faced. The assumption was that some of these 'responses

4 Burki et al., Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State. World Bank, 1999.s Burki et al., 1999.

12

to hierarchy'-whether or not they were successful-could be instructive in fashioning orre-fashioning governance arrangements to support improved school performance. Whatfollows is a discussion about Tikur's attempts to cope with (i) systemic weaknesseshigher up in public management systems, and (ii) excessive controls on allocativedecisions at the local level, as well as their implications for reform.

UNSUSTAINABLE RESPONSES TO A WEAK ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

3.5 As noted in section 2, centralized decision-making on matters of budgetallocation, procurement, and personnel management served to increase Tikur'svulnerability to systemic weaknesses. The pilot identified two system-wide deficienciesthat adversely impacted the woreda's ability to undertake primary schooling efficiently-(i) poor incentives due to inadequate pay, and (ii) unpredictable resource flows resulting,in part, from weak transfer mechanisms at higher levels. Tikur sought to cope with eachof these constraints in different ways-in one case, informally, and in other, formally.

3.6 The first system-wide constraint, low civil service wages, was widelyacknowledged as a problem both in Tikur and the public sector at large.6 Inadequate paymade it difficult to attract and retain qualified personnel such as accountants,procurement specialists, program officers, as well as teachers. Even though they had noformal authority to improve wages, Tikur used informal practices to make publicemployment more attractive. For example, in the past two years, the woreda did notrecruit any staff in its three lowest teaching grades, which paid between ETB 197 andETB 285 per month (annex 4.8). Virtually all new entrants were absorbed into theteaching cadres only at the fourth lowest salary grade, with monthly salaries starting atETB326 per month. This defacto 'embargo' on hiring at the three lowest gradescoincided with substantial increases the numbers of staff entering (or being promoted to)higher grades including a ten-fold increase in staff within the ETB565-600 salary grade.Indicative of grade-creep, such informal attempts to enhance pay-levels constituted anunsustainable and hidden burden on the wage bill, potentially siphoning off resourcesneeded to hire new teachers. They also attenuated links between performance andpromotions. It was apparent that such forms of informality would likely proliferate,barring system-wide improvements in civil service pay scales (including those ofteachers) or increased discretion to woredas to raise wage-levels within the a given gradeunder a hard budget constraint.

3.7 The second system-wide constraint involved resource uncertainties causedprimarily by inefficient cash management and financial transfer mechanisms at higherlevels of regional government. While the pilot was unable to assess financialmanagement practices at higher levels of government, it did find that resulting budgetaryuncertainties adversely impacted a range of activities including O&M and procurement atthe woreda-level, as well as payment of teachers' salaries. One way in which Tikur'skebeles sought to gain a measure of control was to collect community contributions forschooling, as permitted by Ethiopian law. SMCs also earned income through some

6 Inadequate remuneration is acknowledged by the Government of Ethiopia as a constraint both in central as well asregional governments. Improving civil service wages has been an important objective of the Human ResourceManagement Sub-program of the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP).

13

commercial activities such as selling grass. Community contributions and other localrevenues were utilized for hiring of 'community teachers' to fill staff shortages and alsofor funding of small works.

3.8 Ultimately, own-source revenues failed to provide a more predictable or robustsource of education resources than fiscal transfers did. This was due in large part toTikur's low tax base and poorly coordinated system of administering multiple levies,both of which diminished revenue prospects at least in the short run. These revenues,once collected, were frequently reallocated and diverted by kebele officials prior toreporting on tax receipts (chart 3.1).As with the pay issue, Tikur was not Chart 3.1: Deficiencies in raising and collecting community

likely to successfully navigate contributions for primary schooling

through this uncertain resource _

environment without deliberate bw _efforts by higher levels ofgovernment strengthen budget kelebe

execution including mechanisms for reallocates i

intergovernmental fiscal transfers. mutiple lcontribuions

3.9 Such 'responses' to kebele under- ,

exogenous constraints (that is, those reports, diverts

originating outside Tikur) do offersome lessons for prospective reforms. 0% 20% 4i% 60/0 800oFirst, woreda government is likely toresort to informal means to cope or insulate itself from systemic constraints in theabsence of any formal discretion to do so. Coping through informal means not onlyjeopardizes formal rule-based governance, but also constitutes a hidden expenditure risk(for example, grade creep). Second, even when it is authorized to insulate itself fromwider constraints (for example, local revenue mobilization in the face of unpredictableresource flows), woreda government in poor, rural settings may still not possess therequisite capacity. One short-term approach to limiting informality is to offer greaterscope (along with capacity building support) for woredas to legitimately exercisediscretion within restraint in order to address problems of inadequate and unpredictableresource flows on an incremental basis. Ultimately, the only viable strategy for grapplingwith systemic constraints would be a Government-wide effort, probably supported underthe auspices of the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP), to strengthen budgetmanagement and develop an affordable medium-term pay policy at the federal andregional-levels.

14

ABILITY TO EXERCISE AUTONOMY

3.10 Aside from systemic weaknesses in the public sector, the pilot concluded that thezone's use of hierarchy to limit discretion by the woreda and schools constituted themajor constraint on allocative and operational efficiency in Tikur. Public officials triedwith modest success to increase their autonomy to allocate resources according to thespecific input requirements of their organizational unit rather than the prescriptions(intentionally or otherwise) of zonal authorities.

3.11 In matters of financial management, for example, schools sought to reverse theworeda's overall bias towards wage expenditures at the expense of O&M and capitalitems. SMCs would finance small works such as an additional classroom on an ad hocbasis with community funds. Such measures were also noted-albeit less frequent-forrecurrent items such as basic supplies. On the personnel front, schools tried to meet staffshortages (caused in part by zonal delays in filling vacancies) by double-shifting andhiring 'community' teachers with own-source revenues. Given the need to meet thedemands of a growing student population, most woreda officials acknowledged advisingschools to informally hire teachers even though such staff were deemed 'unqualified.'7

3.12 Both instances suggest public officials in Tikur were conscious of-and to someextent, capable of-making better allocative decisions using the fliite resource availableto them. More significant perhaps is the observation that Tikur's 'responses' to hierarchy(its attempts to allocate resources moreefficiently) emanated from schools. The Chart 3.2: Which would improve school performance-

implication is that the school-not the more money or greater autonomy?

woreda office or zone-was theappropriate locus for introducing greaterflexibility or autonomy within Tikur's 60%

ostensibly 'decentralized' education --system. In fact, school-level respondentswere more likely than their woredacounterparts to recommend autonomy- ; r -rather than more money-as the mosteffective means for improving school money

performance (chart 3.2).

3.13 Granting schools greater autonomy comes with its fair share of risks, whether realor perceived. Prudential management of inputs at any level requires credible restraints onarbitrariness and abuse. Prospects for school-based management in particular depend onwhether school directors can guarantee a reasonable degree of fiduciary comfortincluding credible safeguards against the leakage of resources intended for classrooms.Schools also need to demonstrate their willingness to hire and promote teachers on thebasis of merit rather than patronage. On both these counts, Tikur's schools appearedwell-position to exercise greater discretion precisely because they could avail themselvesof existing and locally-based mechanisms of accountability and restraint.

' As far as the pilot team could discern, the wages of community teachers were set on a case-by-case basis, notnecessarily in line with official pay-scales for teachers.

15

3.14 Schools and kebeles were subject tothe similar vertical reporting arrangements, Chart 3.3: Prospects for fiduciary transparency in Tikur's

audits by higher levels of government, and woreda, kebeles and schoolsthreats of sanction, all of which helpedcontain malfeasance at the woreda-level. sc Not surprisingly, the reach of thesehierarchical restraints waned in kebeles andto a lesser extent, schools (para 2.20). 2 KebeF _ rces a:st

Instead, these community-level institutionswere more capable and willing to rely ontransparency as a complement tohierarchy. According to chart 3.3, in the -

past three years, schools and kebeles more 0% 20% _ 40%h 60% 80% 100%/

often publicized the findings of financial -- r 34 Caudits than did the woreda education office. Chart 34 Criteria for geting promoted in Tikur's

education office and stboolsThis suggests inter alia that kebeles andschools felt a greater need to reportfinancial performance to their immediateclients. The findings in box 3.1 alsoindicate that they were more likely to elicit 400/o

a demand-side response from communities.20%.

3.15 Openness of schools to ZJ° Stw

participatory pressures was also evident in School stathe responses of public officials on matters p Sechoo steof personnel management, specifically * Woreda stcriteria for promotion. School-levelrespondents felt their promotions were much more likely to depend their "service to thepublic" than "political connections" (chart 3.4). Contrary to the belief that school-basedmanagement would jeopardize the integrity of personnel systems, the data indicates thatthe woreda was in fact the more attractive watering hole for patrons and clients. Theseand other findings clearly indicate that Tikur's schools and kebeles had a broader menuof restraint options than woredas; these local institutions had in effect started to evolvedthe rudiments of downward accountability while the woreda remained focused onresponding to the zone.

OPTIONS ALONG THE CRITICAL PATH

3.16 Given the purported benefits of granting greater autonomy to schools and Tikur'sprospects for doing the same, the central dilemma is one of sequencing. How can zonaland woreda officials devolve a greater array of input decisions to schools withoutexposing public institutions to increased risks of resource leakage and patronage-basedhiring? Alternatively, what constitutes an appropriate instrument for leveraging thestrengths of schools-that is, their proxirnity to clients and participatory pressures-while phasing the introduction of flexibility in primary education?

3.17 One approach, piloted in several other decentralized settings around the world,allow lower levels of government to 'eam their autonomy by demonstrating their

16

capability' (specifically, their capability to exercise restraint). As early as the 1980s, theBank supported a Provincial Development Program in Argentina that gave sub-nationalauthorities access funding for various "sub-projects" if they could demonstrate a track-record of good fiscal performance, robust participatory processes, and a basic level ofcapacity in financial management. This marked the beginning a period of innovation asthe Bank and other donors developed instruments that embedded the incentives forchange-in this case, incentives for more radical devolution of decision-making authorityto lower levels of government-within operational design itself.

3.18 In recent years, the Bank along with UNCDF-supported a Government of Ugandapilot that offered districts greater discretion over both capital and recurrent expendituresin exchange for meeting minimum capacity requirements in accounting, budgeting, andother aspects of financial management. At the same time, the instrument supported.districts that did not qualify with the necessary capacity building support to meeteligibility requirements in following years. Social funds, in some cases, have applied asimilar logic when requiring that beneficiary communities demonstrate a modicum ofcapacity as well as a track-record in participatory planning before approving sub-projects.

3.19 The key is that governments can design instruments that allow local authorities,even communities, to graduate to higher levels of responsibility and discretion withinacceptable levels of risk. It is conceivable that this approach could be designed to meetthe needs of Tikur's school system on a pilot basis. Schools can be given formal budgetswith some level of discretion in resource allocation or personnel management, providedthat they meet eligibility criteria. These eligibility criteria in turn can be defined aroundgood stewardship of inputs, thereby reducing the fiduciary and patronage risks associatedwith school-based management. This paper has already identified some criteria that canbe used for schools. For instance, in budgeting and financial management, schools couldbe required to meet basic standards for bookkeeping, prepare quarterly financial reports,and publicize (or disseminate) audit information. In personnel matters, requirementscould include regular written evaluations of staff performance, parental participation inthese appraisals, and regular reports to the woreda education office on staffing levels.

17

Box 3.1: Participation as accountability mechanism: an under-exploited resource?

Countries with robust decentralization programs typically offer communities various instruments withwhich communities can provide feedback, voice dissatisfaction, and generally hold public officialsaccountable. These typically comprise administrative processes (for example, consultations withtechnical staff, report cards), formal political processes (for example, voting in elections, consultationswith elected officials), and civic media (for example, writing editorials in the local press, radio,participation in public fora organized by NGOs).

Based on data collected by the pilot surveys, the table below illustrates whether communities in Tikurwould likely use administrative, political, or civic processes to apply participatory pressures on schoolsand public officials. In the eyes of most officials, political participation at the woreda- and kebele-levels,as well as regular involvement in SMCs were the most likely levers by which communities would holdpublic institutions accountable.

Woreda Kebele School

Administrative processes m [

Political processes ?

Civic and other media

Administrative arrangements for garnering client feedback The pilot found that communities wereaccustomed to voicing their concerns through open meetings between school officials and parents. Thesemeetings, organized by the School Management Committee (SMC), constituted the most basicadministrative arrangement by which clients could interact directly with providers. Most woreda officials(78%) also considered the SMC to be the primary filter for the educational system to glean clientfeedback. It is worth noting that the pilot surveys did not gauge whether parents actually shaped theagenda of these meetings or whether school officials were responsive to criticism and feedback receivedduring these sessions.

The field visits did, however, reveal that the membership of SMCs typically included several kebeleexecutives, who ostensibly wielded considerable authority in critical areas such as revenue mobilizationand to a lesser extent, resource allocation. By implication, parents may have hesitated to expressdissatisfaction with school management for fear of reprisal by an officials wearing both SMC and kebelehats. This finding suggests that the selection process for SMC officials requires further investigationsince, in some communities, it was apparently a captured institution.

Communities also expressed dissatisfaction by contacting the education office directly. Forty-fourpercent of woreda-level respondents indicated clients had complained directly. On occasion, the woredaeducation office also held workshops with client groups, although this did not appear to be a very robustmechanism for clients to express concems and provide feedback. In fact, given the choice, about a thirdof respondents felt that parents would agitate for better school performnance through the political processby exercising their vote during woreda elections.

Accountability through politicalparticipation-voting and agitating. Nearly 40% of public officialsindicated that client satisfaction with educational performance affected the way citizens voted in kebeleand woreda elections. In addition to exercising their vote to register dissatisfaction with educationalperformance, kebele-level respondents indicated that parents typically agitated with sitting members ofthe kebele's executive (40%) and even more typically went straight to the woreda (60%).

Civic and other media. Communities in Tikur, which were largely rural and poor, were not likely toapply pressure on education officials by writing in newspapers or agitating NGOs. Nor were they likelyto 'vote with their feet' or move to a private or NGO-run school. Such options were not as yet viable formost of the woreda's residents.

18

4. NEXT STEPS

4.1 This "assessing constraints" pilot charted the broad contours of governance withinTikur Inchini's educational system using a triangulated survey tool as well as qualitativeanalysis based on field visits. In addition to evaluating the impact of these largelyhierarchical arrangements on school performance, the pilot attempted to highlight those'responses to hierarchy' by Tikur's officials that were particularly instructive about afeasible and desirable way forward. Prospective reforms (discussed in section 3) werenot fashioned from any pre-defined notion of best practice, but rather emerged ananalysis of what actually works in this particular woreda. In so doing, the note has triedto demonstrate how an inductive (yet systematic, survey-based) approach to institutionalanalysis can help identify a critical path for institutional reform in decentralized settings.

4.2 The challenge is whether this approach can be aggregrated across woredas or evenregions in order to highlight trade-offs, alternative pathways for institutionaldevelopment, and specific reform options at a systemic or macro-level. Pursuant todeveloping this broader perspective on Ethiopia's governance prospects, the CountryTeam should consider the following recommended next steps:

* Tailor and apply this survey-based technique to institutional analyses planned forother sectoral or cross-cutting initiatives in the Ethiopia country program, particularlythose that depend heavily on the capability of woreda government.

* Incorporate lessons learned from the Tikur pilot surveys in the design and sampleselection of the World Bank Institute's Govemance Survey.

* Investigate the degree to which hierarchy is the dominant institutional arrangementgoverning allocative decisions and implementation in relationships between federaland regional authorities, and those between regions and zones.

* Options for developing "earned autonomy" instruments in Ethiopia should beexplored as a means of further embedding devolution not only within regions orzones, but also within woredas vis-a-vis communities and facilities.

19

Annex 1. Activity list for piloting of tool

Tikur Inchini, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region, April 13-19, 2000

DATE SITES VISITED ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN No. OFRESPONDENTS

4/12 Oromia regional administration * Discussed the overall purpose of the study and survey strategyPlanning Bureau * Selected woreda for the study

West Shewa zonal administration * Discussed planning and prioritization process* Planning section * Collected data on revenue and expenditure for zone, Tikur, and comparator woredas* Finance section * Collected data on education outlays and school performance for zone, Tikur and* Education section comparator woreda

4/13 Tikur Inchini woreda * Discussions on prioritization, resource mobilization and allocation, and* Education office implementation as it relates to primary education; preliminary test of woreda tool* Administration with education officers

Discussions on overall prioritization, resource mobilization and allocation, andaccountability; preliminary test of woreda tool with administrators (elected officials)

Nannoo Gidu kebele and school * Discussions on resource mobilization and allocation, and accountability processes at

4/14 * Kebele officials community-level; preliminary test of kebele tool with kebele representativesa School director and teachers * Discussions on resource mobilization and allocation, and accountability processes at

facility-level; preliminary test of school-level tool with school officials

4/15-16 RM, Addis * Adapted the toolkit to Ethiopian context.

Tikur Inchini woreda * Conducted triangulated woreda-level survey 4 education officials4/17 Education ofaioce * Collected quantitative woreda-level data on revenue and expenditure, manpower, 2 finance officials

Administration wage-levels, and school performance 3 administration officialsFinance officeNannoo Gidu kebele and school 2 kebele representativesNannoo Gidu kebele and school ___ 4 school_officials

- * Conducted kebele-level survey

4/18-19 Inchini 01 kebele and school a Conducted triangulated school-level surveys 2 kebele representativesa Collected relevant school-level data on own-source revenue mobilization, 2 school officials

manpower, capacity, and performance I kebele representativeBuyumawini kebele, Kochere school 2 school officials

20

Annex 2. Regression results"

Regression 1 (Dependent Variable D1 - Drop Out)Independent Constant D2 - D3 - D5 - D6 - McFadden LRVariables Poor Health Regular Likely to Teacher R2 (Ratio)

of Student Inspection Express AbsenteeismDissatisfaction

Coefficients (0.72) 1.93 (1.94) (0.50) (0.97) 0.43 12.32T- Statistics (0.75) 2.89** (2.87)**T (1.68)* (0.81)

* associated with the T-statistic represent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively

Reg ession 2 (Iependent Variable DI - Competence of Public Officials)Independent Constant D2- D3 - D4- D5 - McFadden LR

Variables Merit Based In Service EPCS Consequences for Not R2 (Ratio)Promotion Training Meeting Standard

Coefficients (2.38) 0.24 0.13 (0.13) 0.24 0.46 13.84T- Statistics (1.65) 2.02** 1.17 (0.44) 1.86*

, associated with the T-statistic represent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively

Regression 3 (Dependent Variable DI - Incidence of Embezzlement.)Independent Constant D3 - D4 - D6 - McFadden LRVariables Merit Based Likely to Express Public Audit R2 (Ratio)

Promotion DissatisfactionCoefficients (1.56) (0.90) (0.93) (0.33) 0.27 5.0T- Statistics (1.79)* (2.50)** (1.65)* (1.90)*

3 associated with the T-statistic represent statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively

Methodology

The variables used in this study were dichotomous or qualitative in nature. A simplelinear regression was not appropriate because inter alia the implied model of theconditional mean places inappropriate restrictions on the residual of the model. Inaddition, the fitted value of dependent variable from a simple linear regression was notrestricted to lie between zero and one. The Logit model was used to ensure that theestimated probabilities lie in the 0 - 1 range and that these are non-linearly related to theexplanatory variables.

The model took the form of,

Li =In 1-P; > A +, 2 Xi +ui

Where Pi = 1 is the value of dependent variable which take value of Pi 1 if thelikelihood the event occur and P, = 0, otherwise and Xi is the explanatory variable. Sincea range of the data in this study was not long enough, estimating the above regressionwould encounter problem of heteroscedasticity.

"'Prepared by Yusuf Ahmad (OEDCR).

21

To resolve the problem of heterocesdasticity, we transformed the equation above asfollows,

.[F7Li =I XW +P2 +W7 X, + rW U,

Given such a classification, we could then estimate the parameters of this model using themethod of maximum likelihood.

22

Annex 3. Data on West Shewa Zone expenditures, personnel, and performance

3.1: Planned and actual capital budget by sector, EC1989-91 (in ETB 000s)Sector 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual

1. Agriculture 4389.400 3350.576 3453.400 1883.827 2786.400 1984.198

2. Water, mines, and energy 4132.500 1396.580 3092.600 1287.720 3670.400 1114.840

3. Work and urban dev't 1075.300 - 667.600 423.466 400.800 331.877

4. Rural road construction 3030.000 - 4886.600 - 5644.700 -

5. Transport and communication 529.100 608.980 666.100 618.445 64.600 64.554

6. Health 5564.600 3362.220 4279.100 - 37201.100 2895.320

7. Education 7294.700 6813.678 5064.600 3523.533 7461.000 3898.990

Total 18720.900 8718.356 17045.400 4213.458 49768.000 6390.789

3.2: Recurrent expenditures by sector, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs)Sector 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

Wage Nonwage Total Wage Nonwage Total Wage Nonwage Total

1. Agriculture 6380.300 2724.000 9104.300 7128.000 4099.000 11227.000 8304.000 3968.000 12272.000

2. Education 31682.000 2240.000 33922.000 34346.000 3513.000 37859.000 37067.000 3140.000 40207.000

3. Health 3132.701 1209.220 4341.921 3519.418 1264.994 4784.412 3568.270 1925.865 5494.135

4. Water, mines, and energy 796.703 411.664 1208.367 886.610 475.969 1362.579 853.760 712.348 1566.108

5. Work and urban development 182.719 35.816 218.534 235.343 52.248 287.591 254.283 72.267 326.550

6. Disaster prevention and preparedni 199.250 46.589 245.839 109.300 74.000 183.300 211.000 71.200 282.200

7. Trade, industry and tourism 332.937 95.831 428.768 336.420 111.800 448.220 334.878 93.328 428.206

8. Culture and information 86.744 37.385 124.129 94.360 35.160 129.520 113.683 36.400 150.083

9. Finance dept 1573.000 848.000 2421.000 1786.000 811.000 2597.000 1997.000 35.000 2032.000

10. Sodal and labor affairs 215.740 14.830 230.570 238.800 35.200 274.000 268.400 35.300 303.700

11. Cooperative promotion dept - - 0.000 380.630 226.910 607.540 524.040 249.330 773.370

12. Sports commission - - 0.000 - - - - - -

13. Transport and communication 147.551 65.870 213.420 133.019 84.611 217.630 164.879 98.466 263.345

14. Planning and economic dev't offic 189.620 61.768 251.388 154.175 79.512 233.686 160.551 81.600 242.151

Total 337.171 127.638 464.809 287.194 164.122 451.316 325.430 180.066 505.496

23

Annex 3 (continued)

3.3: Staffing by sector, West Shewa, EC1991 3.4: Basic data on primary education, West Shewa, EC1989-9

Sector 1999 (EC91) West Shewa Zone__Technical Support Item

1. Agriculture 865 430 1997 (EC89)] 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)2. Education - - No. of teachers 4933 5037 52053. Health - - No. of adminstrative staff 717 702 7134. Water, mines, and energy 47 89 Average class size 48 58 645. Work and urban dev't 6 6 Percentage of femnal pupils 28% 29% 30%6. Disaster prev. and prep. 6 37 Percentage of repeaters 10% 11% 10%7. Trade and industry - - Percentage of drop-out 14% 13% 12%8. Culture and Information - - Enrollments 162896 193575 2316279. Finance department - - Participation rates 30% 35% 41%10. Social and labour affairs - - Wage bill ('000s ETB) 31,685.73 33,931.75 36,662.2811. Cooperative promotion dept 52 30 Operating costs ('000s ETB) 2,240.68 5,256.37 3,125.8512. Sports commission - -

13. Transport and comm.14. Planning and economic dev't -

Total 976 592

24

Annex 4. Data on Tikur Inchini Woreda-expenditures, revenues, personnel, and performance

4.1: Revenue collected b f select woredas In West Shewa, EC1 89-91 (in ETB OOOs)Tikur Elere Kokir

Type of revenue1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

DIRECT TAXES 718.371 508.165

Payroll Income - 88.913 87.915 - 171.158 9.594 - 21.800 23.929

Business income - 18.071 27.800 - 56.211 68.828 - 8.404 9.430

Agricultural - 254.956 214.370 - 369.942 367.521 - 173.610 209.422

Land use - 192.405 230.656 - 256.876 266.294 - 274.134 267.264

Property _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _

INDIRECT TAXES 321.021 5.390

Domestic production - 0.200 0.359 - - - -

Stamp duties - 1.697 1.031 - 10.356 3.389 - 0.972 0.691Service sales - - - 59.949 62.084 -

Other incomes - 8.635 28.919 - - - - 4.051 8.584

NON-TAX INCOME 5.899 51.683

Pension contribution - 45.494 - - 76.218 - - - -

Goods and services sales - 37.647 27.264 - - - 22.029 25.477

License and other payment - 20.977 23.056 - - - 15.914 24.681

Sales of non-fixed assets - - - - -

Interest from loans given 0.954 0.853 - - 0.468 0.259

Other Incomes - 21.738 19.781 - 80.481 113.191 - 3.061 9.922

Total - 691.686 662.004 1045.291 1081.192 890.901 565.238 524.443 579.659

4.2: Financial flows into Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB 0009) 4.3: Educational expenditures by Tikur, EC1989-91 (inYear ETB 000s)

Item 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) ItemYear

Transfers from zone for salaries - 1174.208 1308.08796 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

Transfers from region/zone for other - 193.650 221.040 Capital - 216.759 217.510

Local taxes (incl. lcenses, permits) - 26.907 57.07886 Wage - 1198.854 1308.088Other - 1.741 1.980 Non-wage recurrent - 1191.482 199.703

Total - 1396.506 1588.186 Total - 2607.095 1725.300

25

Annex 4 (continued)

4.4: Expenditures on primary education by Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs) 4.5: Monthly wage bill by level in Tikur, EC1989-91 (in ETB OOOs)Year Year

Item 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91) Item 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

Capital expenditures 8.814 10.999 - Teachers 47.741 55.419 59.409Wage bill for Yreda education office 119.712 120.372 122.400 School directors 6.938 7.040 7.203Wage bill for teachers 656.148 749.508 726.120 Woreda ed/office tech staff 6.082 6.410 6.443Nonwage recurrent expenditures 21.348 70.099 69.937 Head of wreda education office 0.835 0.880 0.880

Total 806.022 950.978 918.457 Total 61.596 69.749 73.935

4.6: Data on primary education, Tikur, EC1989-91 4.7: Primary school enrollment In Tikur, EC1989-91Year Year

Indicator 1997 1998 1999 Grade 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)

Total teachers 132 142 144 Grade 1 2765 2833 3336Teacher-pupil ratio 1:54 1:60 1:71 Grade 2 1683 1860 1850Average class size 60 67 76 Grade 3 973 1532 1693Percentage female 18% 23% 33% Grade 4 668 876 1389Percentage repeaters 9% 13% 11% Grade 5 425 624 811Percentage dropouts 12% 12% 14% Grade 6 240 377 541

Grade 7 240 221 321Grade 8 136 167 218Total 7130 8490 10159

26

Annex 4 (continued)

4.8: Number of teachers by salary grade In Tikur, EC1989-91YEAR

Salary grade for teachers 1997 (EC89) 1998 (EC90) 1999 (EC91)(ETB/month)

Teachers Wage bill Teachers Wage bill Teachers Wage bill

790 0 2 1580 0

750 2 1500 0 1 750

710 0 1 710 0

672 1 672 0 0

636 0 0 2 1272

600 2 1200 4 2400 1 600

565 1 565 16 9040 26 14690

532 15 7980 0 15 7980

500 18 9000 32 16000 2 1000

472 12 5664 0 13 6136

445 0 0 14 6230

420 16 6720 25 10500 0

395 9 3555 0 19 7505

370 25 9250 27 9990 30 11100

326 0 7 2282 0

305 16 4880 32 9760 10 3050

285 1 285 0 0

247 13 3211 0 0

197 1 197 1 197 1 197

X ~Total 132 54679 147 62459 134 60510

27

Annex 5. Data on schools-nrollments, financial flows, and personnel

5.1: Kochere school, Buyumawini Kebele

5.1 (a): Pupils enrolled in Kochere School by grade, EC1990-92Year

Grade 1998 (EC 90) 1999 (EC 91) 2000 (EC92)

Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls

1 157 42 164 98 111 88

2 100 55 89 39 92 54

3 120 43 88 44 81 35

4 61 13 105 40 86 44

5 31 6 62 10 87 356 21 4 26 5 47 97 27 7 25 58 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _23 4

Total 490 163 561 243 552 274653 804 826

5.1 (b): Financial flows into Kochere School, EC1989-91Years

1996-97 (EC89) 1997-98 (EC90) 1998-99 (EC91)Outlays from zoneOutlays from woredaOther grants from donors -

Community contributions 800 1000Internal Income - 400 400

5.1 (c): Staffing In Kochere SchoolType Number Females Who pays salary Qualiflcation University

Headmaster 2 WoredaFull-time teacher 10 3 Woreda TTI

Part-time teacher TTISecretaryGuard 1 Community

Other

28

Annex 5 (continued)

5.2: Tikur Inchini school, Inchini 01 Kebele

5.2 (a): Pupils enrolled in Tikur Inchini School by grade, EC1990-92Year

Grade 1998 (EC 90) 1999 (EC 91) 2000 (EC92)

Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls

1 261 174 343 263 221 209

2 212 132 173 101 264 174

3 227 107 196 122 162 105

4 92 43 206 103 183 113

5 116 33 141 59 201 101

6 86 44 108 39 137 50

7 116 29 145 45 145 43

8 45 27 121 31 97 52

Total 1155 589 1433 763 1410 8471744 2196 2257

5.2 (b): Financial flows Into Tikur Inchini School, EC1989-91Years

1996-97 (EC89) 1997-98 (EC90) 1998-99 (EC91)Outlays from zone - - -

Outlays from vvredaOther grants from donors -

Community contributionsInternal Income 6000 7069

5.2 (c): Staffing In Tlkur Inchinl SchoolType Number Females Who pays salary Quallflcation University

Headmaster I Woreda TTI

Full-timeteacher .29 Woreda TTI

Part-time teacher 4 Woreda Diploma

Secretary1 paid by woreda, 1

Guard 2 paid by school

Other

29

Annex 5 (continued)

5.3: Nannoo Gidu primary school, Nannoo Gidu Kebele

5.3 (a): Pupils enrolled in Nannoo Gidu Primary School by grade, EC1990-92Year

Grade 1998 (EC 90) 1999 (EC 91) 2000 (EC92)

________Bys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls

1 86 68 73 50 66 722 88 52 61 48 75 493 96 60 79 53 61 464 55 19 95 52 78 525 89 45

67

Total 325 199 308 203 369 264524 511 633

5.3 (b): Financial flows Into Nannoo Gidu Primary School, EC1989-91Years

Items1996-97 (EC89) 1997-98 (EC90) 1998-99 (EC91)

Outlays from zone - - -

Outlays from woreda -

Other grants from donors -

Community contributions -

Internal Income

5.3 (c): Staffing In Nannoo Gidu Primary SchoolType Number Females Who pays salary Qualification UniversityHeadmaster I Woreda TTIFull-timeteacher 7 Woreda TTIPart-time teacherSecretaryGuard 1 1 paid by schoolOther

30

Africa Region Working Paper Series

ARWPS 1 Progress in Public Expenditure Management in Africa: Evidence from World BankSurveys, January 1999, by Christos Kostopoulos

ARWPS 2 Toward Inclusive and Sustainable Development in the Democratic Republic of theCongo, March 1999, by Markus Kostner (out of stock)

ARWPS 3 Business Taxation in a Low-Revenue Economy:A Study on Uganda in Comparison with Neighboring Countries, June 1999, by RitvaReinikka and Duanjie Chen

ARWPS 4 Pensions and Social Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Options, October1999, by Luca Barbone and Luis-Alvaro Sanchez B.(out of stock)

ARWPS 5 Forest Taxes, Government Revenues and the Sustainable Exploitation of TropicalForests, January 2000, by Luca Barbone and Juan Zalduendo

ARWPS 6 The Cost of Doing Business: Firms' Experience with Corruption in Uganda, June2000, by Jacob Svensson

ARWPS 7 On the Recent Trade Performance of Sub-Saharan African Countries:Cause for Hope or More of the Same, August 2000, by Francis Ng and Alexander J.Yeats

ARWPS 8 Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, November 2000,by Miria Pigato

ARWPS 9 The Macro Implications of HIV/AIDS in South Africa: A Preliminary Assessment,November 2000, by Channing Arndt and Jeffrey D. Lewis

ARWPS 10 Revisiting Growth and Convergence: is Africa Catching Up?, December 2000, byCharalambos G. Tsangarides

ARWPS 11 Spending on Safety Nets for the Poor: How Much, for How Many? The Case ofMalawi, January 2001, by William James Smith

ARWPS 12 Tourism in Africa, February 2001, by lain T. Christie, Doreen E. Crompton

ARWPS 13 Conflict Diamonds, February 2001, by Louis Goreux

ARWPS 14 Reform and Opportunity: The Changing Role and Patterns of Trade in South Africaand SADC, March 2001, by Jeffrey D. Lewis

ARWPS 15 The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa, March 2001, by Miria Pigato

ARWPS 16 Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes for Developing Countries, April 2001, by FahrettinYagci

ARWPS 17 Export Processing Zones: Has Africa Missed the Boat? Not yet!, May 2001, by PeterL. Watson

ARWPS 18 Rural Infrastructure in Africa: Policy Directions, June 2001, by Robert Fishbein.

ARWPS 19 Changes in Poverty in Madagascar: 1993-1999, July 2001, by Stefano Paternostro,Jean Razafmdravonona, and David Stifel.

ARWPS 20 Information and Communication Technology, Poverty, and Development in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, August 2001, by Miria Pigato.

All Papers can be accessed via the internet at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/wpslindex.htm

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