hanging the kaiser: anglo‐dutch relations and the fate of wilhelm ii, 1918–20

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Hanging the Kaiser:Anglo‐Dutch relations andthe fate of Wilhelm II,1918–20Nigel J. Ashton a & Duco Hellema ba London School of Economics ,b University of Utrecht ,Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Nigel J. Ashton & Duco Hellema (2000) Hanging theKaiser: Anglo‐Dutch relations and the fate of Wilhelm II, 1918–20, Diplomacy &Statecraft, 11:2, 53-78, DOI: 10.1080/09592290008406157

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Hanging the Kaiser: Anglo-DutchRelations and the Fate of Wilhelm II,

1918-20

NIGEL J. ASHTON AND DUCO HELLEMA

The flight of the German Kaiser to the Netherlands at the end of the First World War ledto a crisis in Anglo-Dutch relations. Prime Minister David Lloyd George made the trial ofthe Kaiser a key issue in the British general election campaign of December 1918. Article227 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the Kaiser's surrender by the Netherlandsgovernment for trial before an international tribunal, a request the Dutch repeatedlyrefused during the period January to March 1920. Using both British and Dutch sources,this article highlights the internal Dutch debate over the fate of the Kaiser, and theconfusion and hypocrisy with which the problem was handled by the British government.

The debate surrounding the fate of the German Kaiser in the monthsfollowing the armistice of November 1918 is an interesting episode,not only in the pre-history of twentieth-century war crimes trials, butalso in Anglo-Dutch relations. Due to the lead given by PrimeMinister David Lloyd George over the question of the Kaiser's trial,the asylum offered by the Dutch government to the ex-Emperormade this a period of particular tension in relations between the twocountries. British diplomacy over the issue, particularly during theperiod January to March 1920, was baffling. The Dutch government,without much experience in international politics, reacted at firstwith confusion, later with obstinacy to the demands for theextradition of the Kaiser. Dutch obstinacy and British muddle duringthis period can perhaps best be understood by setting the Kaiserquestion in the context of longer term Anglo-Dutch relations, andBritish and Dutch politics at the end of the war.

The Background in Anglo-Dutch Relations

From around the turn of the twentieth century, the Netherlands hadseemed increasingly to be located on the fault-line between twospheres of influence in northern Europe, coming under pressure from

Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.11, No.2 (July 2000), pp.53-78PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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54 DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT

Germany on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other. Thisconflict manifested itself in political divisions at The Hague overissues such as the North Sea Convention of 1908 and the plans tobuild a fort near Flushing in 1910. Nevertheless, the Netherlandsgovernment tried to maintain a neutral and independent position. AWhite Paper, written by Queen Wilhelmina in 1905, argued that theNetherlands could not afford to bind itself to one of the rival greatpowers. A sea power such as Great Britain could not defend Dutchsovereignty in Europe, while a continental power, such as Germany,could not protect Dutch colonial possessions.1

After the outbreak of the First World War, the Netherlandsgovernment was fortunate in that it was in the interests of both sidesto accept its neutrality. The entente powers wanted to avoidallowing Germany any opportunity to gain control over DutchNorth Sea ports, while, for Germany, the continuation of the Dutchrole as a supplier of raw materials and food was of great importance.Although both sides had a fundamental interest in the maintenanceof Dutch neutrality, each wanted to limit the influence of the otherover Dutch commercial activities. The Dutch response was to set upthe Netherlands Overseas Trust Company (NOT) in November1914 as a device to reassure the entente powers that contrabanditems would not make their way via Holland to Germany. Theestablishment of the NOT still did not prevent the export ofagricultural produce and industrial goods produced within theNetherlands to Germany.2

The export of these goods was one way in which militant, mostlymilitary, opinion in Germany could be dissuaded from launching anywartime invasion of the Netherlands. Despite tensions in relationswith Britain caused by the operation of the maritime blockade, itremained the case throughout the war that the most pressing threatto Dutch independence came from Germany. After all, the Belgianexample had shown that if Germany felt its military strategy couldbest be advanced by invading the territory of a neutral power, itwould have few qualms about pursuing this course.

The tensions brought about by the British blockade and the threatof German invasion reached their zenith in the period from the endof March 1918 onwards. The earlier imposition of a completeblockade on Dutch shipping was followed in March 1918 by theseizure of all Dutch ships lying in American harbours. At the sametime, the German government pressed the Dutch to allow freer

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ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS AND THE FATE OF WILHELM II 55

transit facilities over their territory for sand and gravel shipmentsfrom Germany to the Front in Belgium and northern France. Only alarge measure of compliance with German demands seems to havesaved the Netherlands from invasion at this stage.3 Dutch neutralitywas preserved, although the new Cabinet created on 6 Septemberadopted a more pro-German policy. This tendency was particularlyevident in the attitudes of the new Foreign Minister, Herman vanKarnebeek, who was later to play a crucial role in the Kaiser affair.This, together with a lingering aftertaste of bitterness in Allied publicopinion over the Netherlands' neutrality, made for relations withboth Britain and France after the conclusion of hostilities which weredelicate at best.4

Gatecrasher or Invited Guest: The Vexed Question of the Kaiser'sArrival in the Netherlands

The circumstances surrounding the Kaiser's flight to the Netherlandsat the end of the war remain something of an historical mystery.5 TheGerman Emperor spent the final days before the Armistice at theheadquarters of the German High Command at Spa. In what theDutch authorities were later consistently to maintain was no morethan a coincidence, the Dutch General J.B. van Heutsz had travelledto Spa, at German invitation, on 5 November. Van Heutsz, a formerGovernor-General of the Dutch Indies, well known for his pro-German sympathies, was Adjutant General to Queen Wilhelmina. On8 November, Van Heutsz lunched with the Kaiser and that eveningdined with Von Hindenburg. During his trip to Belgium he alsovisited Brussels, which is of interest in view of the role that the DutchMinister there would soon play during the Kaiser's flight to theNetherlands.6 On 9 November Van Heutsz returned to theNetherlands, reaching Maastricht in the evening, a mere 12 hoursbefore the Kaiser 'unexpectedly' arrived at the Dutch border seekingasylum. Van Heutsz took the same route that the Kaiser and hiscompany would take the following day.

In addition to the remarkable coincidence of Van Heutsz's visit,there is in fact a good deal of further circumstantial evidence to fuelthe notion of a high political conspiracy surrounding the Kaiser'sarrival at the Dutch border. On the evening of 9 November, the headof the German administration in occupied Belgium, O. von derLancken-Wakenitz, told the Dutch Minister in Brussels, M.WR. van

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Vollenhoven, that the Kaiser would travel from Spa to the Dutchborder village of Eysden the following day. Von der Lancken-Wakenitz passed on a request on the Kaiser's behalf that QueenWilhelmina should be informed of these travel plans. VanVollenhoven's response was to despatch messengers to ForeignMinister van Karnebeek and the Queen immediately. A furthermessenger was sent to the commanding officer of the Dutch borderpatrol at Eysden, Major van Dijl, with orders that all German militaryvehicles should be allowed to cross the, frontier.7 It is unlikely thatVan Vollenhoven would have taken so significant an initiative as theorder despatched to the Eysden border patrol without priorinstructions from his Foreign Minister, or another representative ofthe Cabinet or Queen.8

The following morning, the Imperial Train left Spa at 5am withthe Kaiser on board. After travelling a mere ten kilometres Wilhelmleft the train at La Reide, fearful of rumours that mutinous troopsmight seek to bar his passage further down the line. With a smallentourage he then continued his journey to Eysden by car.9 Initially,the sergeant on duty at Eysden refused the Kaiser's party permissionto enter the Netherlands. Meanwhile, Van Dijl had received VanVollenhoven's instructions and was hurrying to Eysden. Despite hislater insistence that the Kaiser was only given permission to crossonto Dutch soil to await the deliberations of the Dutch governmentin the comfort of the Imperial Train, it in fact appears that Van Dijlled the Kaiser's party over the border shortly before 8am.10 TheImperial Train followed him at 8.15am. With the Kaiser and his trainon Dutch soil it would now be far more difficult for the governmentto reject his plea for asylum and expel him. One month later, on 10December, Prime Minister Ch. J.M. Ruys de Beerenbrouck toldparliament that he was informed on the morning of 10 Novemberthat the Kaiser had already entered the Netherlands, which seems tobe an accurate description of the situation in Eysden.11 Van Dijl'sactions had created a fait accompli.

According to the memoirs of the German envoy in the Hague,Friedrich Rosen, when he visited Foreign Minister van Karnebeek at8am on the morning of 10 November, Van Karnebeek had alreadyspoken to the Queen about the matter of where the Kaiser should behoused in the Netherlands. The Queen had proposed Het Loo, whilstVan Karnebeek had suggested Huis ten Bosch. In the end they hadagreed on Van Karnebeek's suggestion of the Bentinck Castle.12

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Prime Minister Ruys de Beerenbrouck was apparently not privy tothe scheming of his Foreign Minister. He found out about theKaiser's arrival not from Van Karnebeek but through a message sentdirect from Maastricht, which informed him of the fait accompli.Meeting with Minister of Justice Th. Heemskerk, Minister of FinanceS. de Vries and Secretary-General J.B. Kan later that morning, in theabsence of Van Karnebeek, the Prime Minister decided that the Kaiserwould now have to be admitted as a private individual, but could stayonly for the time being on the Bentinck estate at Amerongen.13 Thenext day, this decision was accepted by the Cabinet.

The welcome afforded the Kaiser from the Dutch public as awhole was initially also rather mixed. The Imperial Train wasgreeted with protests, mainly from Belgian refugees, as it passedthrough Limburg on the morning of 11 November. The Dutch presswas soon reporting rumours that the Kaiser had been invited to theNetherlands, allegations which were to be repeated by the pro-British journal De Telegraaf. De Beerenbrouck's doubts about themanner of the Kaiser's arrival were reflected in his decision toappoint W.F. Pop, a senior general, to investigate the accusations ofcomplicity on the part of members of the Dutch government in theKaiser's arrival.

Pop's report, eventually submitted on 8 January 1919, confirmedthat Sergeant Pinckaers, commander of the border patrol which firstencountered the Kaiser's party, had indeed been told by Germanofficers that the Kaiser was expected by the Dutch government. TheKaiser himself had apparently made no comment. Major van Dijl, theofficer who had arrived later to take charge of the situation, repeatedhis story that he had only allowed the Kaiser to cross on to Dutch soilto await the government's deliberations in the comfort of theImperial Train. De Beerenbrouck was evidently unhappy with thisexplanation, for he annotated on one of the appendices of Pop'sreport the words: 'it would have been better not to have done this.'He repeated his suspicions in a memorandum distributed to theCouncil of Ministers alongside Pop's report. Specifically, hequestioned whether the legation in Brussels was implicated inpreparing the ground for the Kaiser's flight.14

The lingering suspicion that the Kaiser might not have been sounwelcome a guest in some quarters in the Netherlands as thegovernment sought to maintain publicly was, therefore, not quelledby Pop's report. Apart from all the circumstantial evidence, the

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motives of the personalities involved seem to strengthen the case.Queen Wilhelmina was a strong-minded person, not always actingwithin the limits of her constitutional authority. Both General vanHeutsz and Foreign Minister van Karnebeek had pro-Germanreputations, and were undoubtedly loyal and conservativemonarchists.15

The War Crimes Question and the Fate of the Kaiser as an Issue inBritish Politics

The question of the fate of the German Emperor in British politics isinextricably bound up with the slogan 'Hang the Kaiser', which iscredited with helping to win the December 1918 General Electionfor Lloyd George. Critics of the Prime Minister charge that hecynically exploited this question along with that of reparations purelyfor short-term electoral purposes. With the election won, it is argued,the extradition of the Kaiser was allowed quietly to slip down theagenda, meriting only limited attention at the peace conference. Hisdefenders contend that, on the contrary, there is ample evidence inhis private papers that his desire to see the Kaiser brought to justicewas genuine, an expression of righteous indignation that someonemust answer for the sacrifices of the war.16

Although the question of the Kaiser had come up on Armisticenight, with Lloyd George evidently in favour of shooting him,17 thefirst serious post-war consideration of the matter came during twomeetings of the Imperial War Cabinet on 20 and 28 November1918.18 To the majority of those present, and indeed to British publicopinion, it was clear that the Kaiser was guilty of something. If that'something' had to be formulated, it would probably have beencomposed of guilt in starting the war, and guilt in instigating acts ofbarbarity, including the use of poison gas, and unrestricted U-boatwarfare, during its conduct. As Lloyd George told the Imperial WarCabinet at its first meeting to consider the Kaiser's fate on 20November, 'the crime for which he is responsible is plunging thisworld into war'.19

The difficulty with this line of argument, as Australian PrimeMinister Hughes pointed out, was that this was the acceptedprerogative of the leaders of nations, dating back to the time ofAlexander and Moses. Hughes argued that 'you cannot say that heshould die because he plunged the world into war, because he had a

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perfect right to plunge the world into war, and now we haveconquered, we have a perfect right to kill him, not because heplunged the world into war, but because we have won'.20 TheImperial War Cabinet was unable to reach immediate agreement onthe nature of the precise charge to be brought against the Kaiser. Thematter was therefore referred to the Legal Officers of the Crown forimmediate consideration.

Reporting to the Imperial War Cabinet on the Legal Officers'deliberations a week later, the Attorney-General, RE. Smith, arguedthat it would not be wise to proceed with a general charge regardingresponsibility for the outbreak of the war, since 'the trial of such acharge would involve infinite disputation'. He did, however, believethat the Kaiser could be tried for two more specific offences. The firstwas responsibility for the breach of Belgian neutrality with which thewar had begun. The second was the instigation of the campaign ofunrestricted U-boat warfare.21

The fundamental handicap in proceeding with these charges wasthe state of international war crimes legislation in 1918. The onlyestablished basis for any sort of trial was provided by the HagueConventions of 1899, 1907 and 1909. The 1907 Convention on theRights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Landgave certain protection to neutrals, including a guarantee of theinviolability of the territory of a neutral state. The 1909 Code ofMaritime Warfare also placed restrictions on the operation ofsubmarines. However, the conventions were not regarded asperfected, and the doctrines of military necessity and reprisal, whichpermitted exceptions to the strict observance of the laws of war, leftroom for interpretation and circumvention.22

Not only this, but no thought had been given at The Hague to theestablishment of an international criminal court. The punishment ofindividual soldiers, whom it was imagined would be brought to trialunder the Conventions, was to be left to national courts. Thus,although the final indictment against the Kaiser in the VersaillesTreaty included an indirect reference to the rights of neutrals throughits use of the words 'the sanctity of treaties', the vagueness of the restof the article was testimony to the fact that, as Hughes had pointedout, the Kaiser was going to be tried on grounds little more securethan the fact that the Allies had won and Germany had lost. This waspresumably what was meant by the ultimate stipulation in Article 227

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that 'in its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motivesof international policy'."

The Fate of the Kaiser as an Issue in Dutch Politics

The Dutch government, too, claimed to be making its stand on thehigh ground of international politics. The question of granting theKaiser asylum was from the outset presented as a test case for theDutch tradition of protecting political refugees. Van Karnebeek tookparticular trouble to try and correct the notion that the granting ofexile to the Kaiser was the result of pro-German sentiments ingovernmental and court circles.24 Nevertheless, the prestige of theDutch monarchy became much bound up with the continuation ofthe protection granted to the German Kaiser.25

The position of the monarchy was not undisputed in theNetherlands in November 1918. At the end of and directly after thewar, the economic situation was difficult, leading to social andpolitical unrest, partly stimulated by political developments inGermany. Around 10 November there was even speculation about apossible socialist revolution, although on 18 November a hugedemonstration in The Hague suggested the loyalty of the majority ofthe population lay with the Queen and government. Thecoincidental timing of the Kaiser's arrival meant that his fate becamelinked with the general political controversy raging in theNetherlands.26

The Kaiser's asylum became a delicate issue in the field of foreignaffairs as well. Here matters were further complicated by thedecision of the Dutch government to permit 70,000 unarmed,German troops to return home by crossing Limburg on 12November 1918. The war was not over, and according to neutralityregulations these troops should have been interned. At first, theentente powers did not react, but Belgium formally protested on 23November and within a few days France, Great Britain and theUnited States followed.27

The decision of the Dutch government seemed to confirm its pro-German or opportunist role. The Belgian government tried to makefurther use of the situation by endeavouring to settle a number ofoutstanding disputes which had resulted from the 1839 agreementover Belgian secession. Belgium demanded sovereignty over thesouthern shore of the Scheldt and parts of Limburg. France initially

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supported the Belgian demands and for several months the positionof the Netherlands seemed vulnerable.

In more general terms, the reputation of the Netherlands was notvery high directly after the war. The Dutch ambassador in London,R. De Marees van Swinderen, reported on 15 November that manyin Great Britain were of the opinion that the Netherlands now had toface the consequences of its economic dependence on Germany,which had led to obstruction of the entente blockade.28 The Dutchambassador in Paris, A.L.E. de Stuers, informed Van Karnebeek thatMarshall Petain had said that the Dutch military and political elitewas 'bochephile'.29 The arrival of the Kaiser only seemed to makematters worse. The Dutch government could now be accused ofprotecting a war criminal and possible revanchist.

Moreover, during the first weeks after his arrival, the statusof Wilhelm remained unclear. One of the problems was that hehad only abdicated as Emperor, and not as King of Prussia, andeven his abdication as Emperor was legally questionable. It wasonly after three weeks that Wilhelm, after long debates with theGovernor of Utrecht, F.A.C. van Lynden van Sandenburg, who actedas a contact between the Cabinet and the Kaiser, was prepared tosign a new and legally binding abdication both as Emperor and Kingof Prussia.30

Nevertheless, other legal aspects of the Kaiser's positionremained unclear to the Dutch government. This led to theappointment by Minister of Justice Heemskerk of a commission ofthree well-known legal experts, who were instructed to write anopinion on the status of the Kaiser's asylum. The resulting reportwas a compromise, in practice rejecting expulsion and extradition,but not in principle excluding the possibility.31 The Cabinet was notpleased with these conclusions, probably because they seemed togive fuel to the demands of the entente powers. It decided not topublish the report.32

In the first half of December, therefore, the position of theNetherlands remained difficult. In addition to the hysteria of theBritish election campaign, Belgium continued to put forward itsclaims on Dutch Flanders and Limburg. On 3 December, the Cabineteven decided to send extra troops to Limburg in view of theaggressive public atmosphere in the entente countries.33 An attemptby Queen Wilhelmina to improve Anglo-Dutch relations by invitingthe British royal couple to visit Holland backfired. Sir Ronald

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Graham, at this point Acting Under-Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs, described this invitation in a telegram to Minister Townley as'a preposterous idea ..., while the ex-Emperor is still an honouredguest in Holland'.34

In this tense climate, the status of the Kaiser became even morecontroversial within the Dutch Cabinet. In spite of all the officialhigh motives, Prime Minister Ruys de Beerenbrouck began to doubtthe wisdom of continuing the hospitality offered to Wilhelm. Beforethe Cabinet's meeting on 6 December, Minister Aalberse had to calmdown the Prime Minister, who was shouting that the Kaiser had togo, and Van Karnebeek as well. Ruys de Beerenbrouck's outburst ledVan Karnebeek to conclude that he would have to step down, but themajority of his colleagues would not accept his decision.35

Nonetheless, the Cabinet did decide at this point that theKaiser must leave.36 The following day Van Lynden vanSandenburg was instructed to explain to Wilhelm the difficulties hispresence was bringing to the Netherlands.37 Van Lynden's visit toAmerongen created confusion in the imperial household. Plans weremade for the Kaiser's escape, perhaps to Denmark or Sweden.38

Nevertheless, on the advice of the German Ambassador FriedrichRosen, the Kaiser was persuaded to remain in the country for thetime being.

These vacillations over the Kaiser issue exposed the traditional'fault lines' in Dutch politics between pro-German and pro-Britishtendencies. Ernst Heldring, a leading Anglophile member of theDutch commercial elite, who had regular contact with severalministers, noted in his diary on 9 December that Van Karnebeek wasbecoming a disaster for the country. Heldring compared VanKarnebeek's pro-German approach unfavourably with the Western-oriented policy of his predecessor J. Loudon. Nevertheless, Heldringadmitted that under the 'volcanic circumstances' then prevailing inthe Netherlands, it would be dangerous to force Van Karnebeek fromoffice.39

In November and the first half of December Dutch public opinionremained critical of the Kaiser's presence in the country. Dutchnewspapers, especially De Telegraaf, accused the government ofhaving conspired to bring him to the Netherlands.40 During thedebate in parliament on 10 December mentioned above, PrimeMinister Ruys de Beerenbrouck denied all rumours of a conspiracyand stated that the Cabinet had been completely surprised by the

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Kaiser's arrival. The Kaiser's present status was only temporary, Ruysargued, and he was prepared to discuss future residentialarrangements with the entente powers.41

Ruys' statement in the Second Chamber showed that inmid-December the Cabinet was still in a state of confusionas to what to do with the Kaiser. Towards the end of the month,however, the situation began to improve, above all in respect ofAnglo-Dutch relations. Ambassador de Marees van Swinderenreported on 18 December that Foreign Secretary Balfour consideredthe question of the German troops who had been allowed to crossthe Netherlands after the Armistice as closed. In addition, LordHardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, statedthat he rejected the Belgian claims over Dutch Flanders andLimburg. Finally, with respect to the Kaiser, Lord Hardinge alsoadopted a more moderate position. He told De Marees vanSwinderen that he preferred to see the Kaiser staying in Hollandrather than anywhere else.42

Nonetheless, it remained the case that in early December theDutch government might have been prepared to discuss a solution tothe Kaiser problem more in line with the public position of theentente powers. Even Foreign Minister van Karnebeek, his positionseemingly vulnerable, was not sure what should been done. However,in December not one of the former enemies of Germany formallydemanded the Kaiser's extradition. They were awaiting the openingof the Versailles Peace Conference on 18 January. It would take morethan a year before a formal request for the Kaiser's extraditionarrived in The Hague. By then, the Dutch government had regainedits self-confidence.

The Kaiser Awaits His Fate, January-December 1919

At the insistence of Lloyd George, the question of war crimeswas placed at the head of the agenda of the Paris Peace Conferencewhen it officially convened on 18 January 1919. Like much ofthe other business of the peace conference, the final decisionon the provisions relating to the Kaiser's trial was ultimately made apart of a process of Great Power barter in the Council of Fourduring the early part of April 1919. US President Woodrow Wilson,who was strongly opposed to trying the Kaiser, was only persuadedto agree to war crimes provisions under intense pressure from Lloyd

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George and French Prime Minister Clemenceau.43 The agreedformula, which was incorporated into Article 227 of the Treaty,called for the Dutch government to surrender the Kaiser to theAllied and Associated Powers for trial before a specially constitutedtribunal.

The Paris Peace Conference was of great importance for theNetherlands, mainly because of the Belgian claims over Limburg andDutch Flanders. The situation necessitated active Dutch diplomacyvis-a-vis the entente powers. Van Karnebeek had already moved inmid-December to ask the former minister and Shell Director HendrikColijn to visit London in order to try to improve Anglo-Dutchrelations. Ernst Heldring also went to London and later to Paris. Inview of the importance of the Peace Conference, the staff of theembassy in Paris was enlarged with the addition of former Ministerof Foreign Affairs J. Loudon, who had a solid pro-ententereputation.44

In general, the peace conditions that the entente powers wantedto enforce on Germany were received with much criticism in theNetherlands, both in more pro-German and pro-British circles.Heldring concluded that the peace treaty was outrageous andunworkable, and that it would lead to political turmoil in Europe.45

However, as far as the direct interests of the Netherlands wereconcerned, the situation soon improved. Little credence was given tothe Belgian claims, and, in the end, the only question directly relatedto the Netherlands about which Van Karnebeek had to worry wasthat of the Kaiser.

At the start of the Peace Conference Van Karnebeek had remainedin doubt as to what should be done with Wilhelm. A voluntarydeparture, for instance a return to Germany, seemed to be the bestsolution, or so Van Karnebeek wrote to Van Lynden van Sandenburgin January.46 In the following months, such a departure seemed tobecome more and more unlikely, partly because of politicaldevelopments in Germany. It quickly became clear that there was nosignificant political constituency advocating Wilhelm's return topower. The confidence of the Kaiser's entourage in the willingness ofthe Dutch government to protect the ex-Emperor increasedmarkedly.47

That did not mean that the Kaiser could be completely at his ease.For instance, the New Year of 1919 had brought with it a further

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brief scare for Wilhelm. Colonel Luke Lea, a former US Senator, hadhatched a scheme to 'bag Kaiser Bill' by abducting him fromAmerongen with the help of six accomplices. Although thedesperadoes managed to bluff their way into the Kaiser's residence,the ex-Emperor refused to enter into the spirit of the proceedings.After a two-hour stand-off, the American soldiers were forced todepart without speaking to Wilhelm. They evidently did not leaveempty-handed, though, for their story was later written up in TheSaturday Evening Post under the heading 'They Tried to Kidnap theKaiser and Brought Back an Ash Tray'.48

Other than the possibility of further such quixotic interventions,from March 1919 onwards it became an accepted fact in TheHague that the Kaiser was going to remain in the Netherlands.In the following months the Dutch standpoint hardened still further.At the end of June, after rumours about an escape attempt on thepart of the Crown Prince, the Dutch government received a letter,signed by Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference, whichstated that the entente powers hoped that the Netherlands wascapable of discharging its responsibilities in respect of its Germanguests. If not, the entente powers were prepared to take oversurveillance of the Kaiser.49 The Dutch Cabinet was surprised by thetone of this letter. Aalberse wrote in his diary that the letter wasincredibly impertinent and unreasonable.50 The Cabinet pointed outthat the Netherlands was a sovereign state, which decided for itselfwhat responsibilities it had to fulfil. Nonetheless, security inAmerongen was tightened.51

Still, Clemenceau's intervention came at another importantjuncture in the Kaiser saga, marked by the signature of thepeace treaty at the end of June. At this point it is still arguablethat if the Dutch government had been confronted by theAllied powers speaking with one voice, and by every representativeof each Allied government pressing the case for the Kaiser'sextradition with equal force, it would have been compelledto reconsider its position. From the very outset, though, the attemptto enforce the provisions of Article 227 of the Versailles Treatywas conducted with ineptitude and duplicity by the Allies. Almostas soon as the treaty had been signed, the Dutch government wasreceiving indications that opinion was divided on the questionof the Kaiser. The Dutch Minister in London, Jonkheer de Mareesvan Swinderen, told Sir Ronald Graham, then Acting Under-

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he had discussed thequestion with a number of highly placed Englishmen. Only LordCurzon had ventured to suggest that the Netherlands shouldconsider handing over the Kaiser.52

Indeed, the respective reports produced by Curzon himself, andVan Swinderen, of their conversation about the Kaiser on 19 Julymark the beginnings of an explicit divergence in the Dutch andBritish records of dealings over the matter. According to VanSwinderen, Curzon had refused to make an unequivocal statement asto whether the Netherlands should extradite the Kaiser or not. Infact, Van Swinderen's conclusion from the conversation was thatCurzon would prefer a Dutch refusal, but was reluctant to say soexplicitly." Curzon, on the other hand, in his report of theconversation, represented himself as having been anxious to draw adistinction between particular reservations about where the trialshould be held, and the broader question of whether it should be heldat all.54

This discrepancy in Dutch and British accounts, which was tobecome a feature of their exchanges over the matter, seems most easilyexplicable as follows. Essentially, what developed was an ambiguoussituation in which British politicians and diplomats were obliged totake a certain position for the official record, while privatelyacknowledging that it was not desirable or likely that the Dutch wouldcomply with their requests. A show of pressure on the Netherlandshad to be maintained to satisfy those within the government, such asLloyd George, who still favoured the Kaiser's trial.

So, Curzon's record of his discussion with Van Swinderen can bestbe deciphered alongside his correspondence with Lloyd George onthe subject of the venue for the Kaiser's trial.55 The Foreign Secretarywas amongst those who been surprised by Lloyd George'sannouncement on 3 July, when presenting the Peace Treaty to theHouse of Commons, that the Kaiser's trial should take place inLondon. He had already made it known to the Prime Minister thathe was opposed to this venue due to the likely impact on thesensibilities of the British Royal Family. By sticking to this issue in hisrecord of the meeting with Van Swinderen, he was reiteratingreservations already familiar, if unwelcome, to the Prime Minister. If,as Van Swinderen suggested in his account, Curzon was now opposedto the whole notion of a trial, he could not yet go so far as to makethis explicit in his record of their conversation.

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Van Swinderen's reports of the apparent ambiguity of Britishattitudes towards the question only served, according to charged'affaires in The Hague, Arnold Robertson, to harden the Dutchstance against giving up the Kaiser. Although he anticipated that theDutch government would probably try to stick to purely legalarguments in defending their position, it was unlikely to be able toresist mounting what he termed the 'high horse of idealism'.56 If theKaiser's extradition was to be secured, it would be of greatimportance that the Allies should speak with one voice whenapproaching the Dutch government.

The Formal Requests, January-March 1920

Allied unity over the Kaiser question proved as elusive as unity withinthe British government. By the time the leaders of the victoriouspowers met on 15 January 1920 to prepare the formal demand forthe delivery of the Kaiser, a Dutch refusal was thoroughly expected.57

A formal request, prepared by Clemenceau, was forwarded toLoudon, the Dutch envoy in Paris, on 16 January. Loudon indicatedthat the Dutch government would probably reject the approach. Thesame Dutch envoy was soon receiving signals from his Americancounterpart that the US government had not been consulted orinformed about the request for the Kaiser.58 On 19 January theopinions of Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti were alsocommunicated to Loudon. Italy would not insist on the extraditionof the Kaiser if he were to be housed sufficiently far from theDutch-German border.59 The acting Dutch representative in Londonalso reported that a substantial body of British high political opinionwas hoping that the Netherlands would refuse to give up the Kaiser.60

There could be little surprise, therefore, that in its formal response tothe Allied request, the Dutch government refused to deliver theKaiser.61

The Netherlands' refusal gave rise to a particularly tortuouspassage of Anglo-Dutch diplomacy over the issue, the ambiguity ofwhich was entirely in the spirit of Curzon's conversation with VanSwinderen the previous July. It began with a request from Sir RonaldGraham, now British Minister in The Hague, that Curzon shouldgive him some private indication as to the intentions of thegovernment with regard to the Kaiser. Graham noted that when hehad left England opinion had been divided over the matter, and that

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68 DIPLOMACY 8c STATECRAFT

some held very strong feelings against trying the ex-Emperor. 'TheKing', Graham reported, 'spoke to me most emphatically in this senseat my farewell interview with him.' Graham expressed sympathy withthe King's view, and argued that, in his own opinion, the Kaiser wasno longer of any political danger or importance. In view of this,Graham posed the question: 'am I to strain every nerve to secure hisextradition - in which case I think it may possibly but not easily bebrought off, or would a Dutch refusal to hand him over for trial beviewed with a certain amount of complacency?' The whole tenor ofGraham's communication was to invite Curzon to give him informalauthorization not to pursue the Kaiser's extradition with vigour.'2

Two private telegrams followed Graham's letter. The first wasfrom Lord Curzon, and was received by Graham on 25 January1920. The second was from Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and was received the followingday. No copy of either telegram survives in British archives.63 Whatdoes survive is Graham's version of what the telegrams conveyed.According to Graham, the first telegram from Curzon informed himthat the Allied demand for the Kaiser was seriously made andintended, and was to be supported by every available argument.64 Thiswas confirmed by Lord Hardinge's telegram the following day. Sincea copy of Graham's original letter had evidently found its way to thePrime Minister's Private Office it is not surprising that he representedthe contents of Curzon and Hardinge's instructions in this way.Graham's version of his immediate response to these telegrams wasthat 'I at once took all possible action that lay within my power toimpress upon the Dutch authorities ... the serious intention thatunderlay the Allied demand'.65

On 29 January, Graham paid a private call on Van Karnebeek.According to him, Van Karnebeek seized the opportunity to conveyhis opinions on the Kaiser question. Graham's record of his advice toVan Karnebeek on the state of Allied opinion about the Kaiser showshim carefully treading the official, public line. He had 'every reasonto believe that Allied feeling on the subject was strong andunanimous'.66 Van Karnebeek, for his part, recorded that Graham wasimpressed by his arguments against giving up the Kaiser, andacknowledged that in the Netherlands' position, Britain would haveacted in the same way.67

In the meantime, back in London, further machinations had beenset in train. It seems that Lloyd George, backed by the Lord

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Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, was weaving one strand of Britishdiplomacy over the issue, while Curzon, Hardinge and Graham, withthe King in the background, were weaving quite another. In order toavoid a further rupture with the Prime Minister over the question,Curzon, Hardinge and Graham had to present their approach asbeing at one with his.

On 27 January, the Lloyd George and Lord Birkenhead strand ofdiplomacy had produced an agreement designed to salvage Britishpolicy based on the precedent of Napoleon's internment on SaintHelena. They decided that the Dutch should be told that leaving theKaiser so close to Germany represented a future danger. He shouldtherefore be held by the Allies in some suitably distant location suchas the Falkland Islands. If the Dutch refused to comply with the Alliedrequest for the Kaiser then sanctions would be taken against them inthe form of denial of entry to the League of Nations, the severing ofdiplomatic relations and possibly severe economic measures. TheAchilles' Heel of the whole approach was that Lloyd Georgeentrusted Hardinge, and through him Graham, with theresponsibility of implementing the new policy.68

Hardinge communicated the new policy to Graham in twodespatches dated 28 and 31 January 1920.69 At the same time, heinstructed the War Department of the Foreign Office to draw up amemorandum of possible sanctions which could be taken against theNetherlands in the event of the continuing refusal of the governmentto surrender the Kaiser. The purpose of the document was made clearby an annotation at its head by a Foreign Office official: 'memodrawn up for the Prime Minister'.70

Graham responded by making it clear that he did not think thenew policy would be successful. The Dutch were likely to dig theirheels in, and great damage would be done to future Anglo-Dutchpolitical, and possibly commercial, relations if the British governmentwere to threaten such action alone. He asked whether an alternative,such as a spontaneous offer by the Netherlands government to internhim themselves, might not also be acceptable.71 Graham thenproceeded to cut the ground from under the new policy proposed bythe Prime Minister by making his own private approach to VanKarnebeek. Meeting the Dutch Foreign Minister on 2 February, hewarned him of the possibility of reprisals if the Dutch did not takeaction to satisfy the Allies. According to Graham's account, hiswarning had a considerable effect upon Van Karnebeek. In contrast,

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Van Karnebeek's record of the meeting shows him mounting a robustdefence of the Dutch position, based on the principle of right overmight. There is no sense in the Dutch record of the Foreign Ministerbeing at all cowed by Graham's warnings.

Graham's record then suggests that 'by easy stages, theconversation, with indications but without concrete suggestions onmy part, passed to the idea of offering the ex-Emperor an asylum insome salubrious, but remote and inaccessible, spot more favourableto the contemplation of the past than to the making of futurehistory'. And then, 'we eventually touched upon the idea ofinternment in the Dutch Indies'. The Dutch record makes it clear incontrast that Graham stated from the outset that he had a suggestionto put to Van Karnebeek which he was raising on his own initiative,and not at official instigation. By making this approach, and implyingthat this solution might be considered by the Allies, Graham hadundercut Lloyd George's Falklands proposal. This despite the factthat he claimed he had 'in no sense committed His Majesty'sGovernment to anything but a determination to enforce their originaldemand, or implied that there was any weakening in theirresolution'.72

In any event, Van Karnebeek now made it clear in private that hethought the British approach was a bluff which would not besupported by the other powers, or even by the whole of the Britishgovernment.73 The Dutch Council of Ministers also decided that VanKarnebeek should inform the British envoy unofficially that theNetherlands government did not intend to change its mind.74 Asexpected, the tough line proposed by Lloyd George was notfollowed through. In addition to lack of unity within the BritishCabinet, the Prime Minister's plans were undercut by the divisionsbetween the victorious powers. The French, Italians and Americansall signalled through various channels to the Dutch government thatthey were not prepared to support acts of coercion directed againstthe Netherlands for the purpose of securing the Kaiser'sextradition.75 The French went further and leaked news of Graham'swarning, which was described in a statement in the Journal desDebats as an 'isolated and a kind of semi-official step'. The Alliedpowers as a whole had not adopted this attitude.76 The Dutchaccordingly dug their heels in still further, with Van Karnebeektelling Graham at successive meetings that no form of pressurewould compel the government to surrender the ex-Emperor. This

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was as much a matter of prestige for the Netherlands as it was forBritain, he argued.77

A second formal demand for the Kaiser's extradition did not comeuntil 14 February. Again, although a superficial front of Allied unitywas presented, the terms of the note revealed the Frenchundercutting the British position. While the British government hadnow fallen back to the notion of the Kaiser's internment in one of theDutch colonies, the note drafted by the French used the phrase 'soitsur place'. As Graham reported, this could only be taken by the Dutchgovernment as a direct invitation to make further arrangements forthe Kaiser's internment in the Netherlands themselves.78 Notsurprisingly, therefore, the Allied demand was again rebuffed by theDutch, with Queen Wilhelmina taking, according to Graham'ssources, a strong personal interest in the framing of the government'sreply.75

In the meantime, Lloyd George had made a further unproductiveattempt to secure Allied unity over the question when he metMillerand and Nitti in London on 24 February. He warned that ifmatters were allowed to drift then the impression might be created inGermany that the whole of the Versailles Treaty was a bluff. Althoughhe managed to extract a promise from the French and Italianrepresentatives that they would support the Kaiser's internmentoverseas, neither was prepared to back the threat of coercive actionagainst the Dutch to underpin the policy.80 The result of the PrimeMinister's efforts was that for the first time, on 26 February, theAllies made a joint approach at The Hague.81 The Dutch position wasby now so entrenched that the effort made no difference.82 Theofficial reply published on 2 March was, according to Graham, a'sarcastic, unsatisfactory and typically Dutch production.'83

Graham and his colleagues were instructed once again to presstheir demands on the Dutch, which they did at a meeting on 8March. By this stage Van Karnebeek had evidently tired of thepretence of being impressed by Allied protestations, for the interviewwas of a very stiff character.84 He categorically ruled out anypossibility of the Kaiser being interned in the Dutch colonies. VanKarnebeek was evidently not alone in feeling that the game of bluffhad been pushed too far, for, in an acerbic annotation to Graham'stelegram, Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary at the ForeignOffice, suggested that before any further lectures were delivered tothe Dutch Foreign Minister, the allied governments should make sure

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72 DIPLOMACY &c STATECRAFT

they were prepared to back up their demands.85 Lord Hardinge, too,later recorded the opinion that 'the whole question from thebeginning was a hollow sham'.86

The Dutch government proceeded with its plans to intern theKaiser in the Province of Utrecht, which was confirmed by royaldecree on 16 March 1920. The ex-Emperor was to live at Doom, avillage ten kilometres further from the German border thanAmerongen, in a house he had been allowed to purchase in August1919. In the meantime, there had been a brief scare that the KappPutsch in Germany might portend some new political dangerconnected to the Kaiser.87 These fears quickly passed. Exasperation incertain quarters of the Foreign Office at the outcome of the Kaiserfiasco was tangible. Curzon himself belatedly, and somewhathypocritically, began to blame Graham for the shambles. Annotatingone of his despatches on 16 March, he noted that 'Sir R. Graham hasnow wobbled back to Doom, but he himself suggested the Coloniesand said deliberately that we could get that solution. Then he fellback on some other part of Holland than Doom. Now he is all forDoom. Next it will be Amerongen - and finally Berlin'.88

Curzon's exasperation with Graham may also have been anexpression of his strained relations with Hardinge which dated backto the pre-war years. Hardinge himself later described Curzon'sappointment as Foreign Secretary as a disastrous blow, and, sinceGraham was a close protege of Hardinge's, he perhaps made aconvenient lower-ranking scapegoat for the Foreign Secretary.89

Although Graham, who had been aware throughout of the politicalperils of the task entrusted to him, now presented his own resume ofthe handling of the Kaiser question to date, Curzon remaineddismissive of his suggestions as to how to respond to the Dutchaction. He minuted that 'Sir R. Graham is too late and I think thaton the whole I prefer my Reply ... to his'.90

Conclusions

Although the Kaiser fiasco caused much needless tension in Anglo-Dutch relations in the short term, its longer term impact was lesspolitically significant than observers such as Graham had warned.Anglo-Dutch relations during the rest of the inter-war era developedalong cordial, if distant, lines." It was not until the end of the 1930sthat tensions resurfaced in the face of the potential threat to Dutch

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neutrality posed by Nazi Germany. In this context, therefore, theKaiser incident is best viewed as a short term, if acute, diplomaticcrisis.

As regards the failure to secure the Kaiser's extradition to standtrial, it seems reasonable to conclude that there were interests onboth the British and Dutch sides, including those of the RoyalFamilies, which worked consistently to block progress on the issue.The Dutch Queen Wilhelmina was not prepared to see the Kaiserplucked from the Netherlands and thrown on the mercy of hisenemies," while King George V too was horrified by the prospect ofthe Kaiser going on trial, especially in London. Once the popularfrenzy of the 'Coupon Election' had died down, there were plenty ofBritish politicians and officials who were happy to let the issue fadeaway.

In fact, in hindsight the period of the British election campaignhad presented possibly the best opportunity to secure the Kaiser'sextradition. The Dutch Cabinet had seemed to be in a temporarystate of confusion, especially during the first two weeks of December,when Foreign Minister van Karnebeek's position was weak. Underthese circumstances, Prime Minister Ruys de Beerenbrouck wouldhave been prepared to discuss a solution with the entente powersinvolving the Kaiser's extradition. By the end of the month theposition of the Netherlands, and that of Van Karnebeek as well,seemed rather less vulnerable. During the course of 1919, the way theentente powers addressed the Netherlands with respect to the Kaisercreated growing irritation. Therefore, during the first three monthsof 1920, when the formal requests for the Kaiser's extradition finallyarrived in The Hague, there was no question of the governmentaccepting them.

After March 1920, the fate of the Kaiser rapidly ceased to be amatter of political importance. The ex-Emperor lived out the finaltwo decades of his life in largely peaceful retirement in theNetherlands. He was never visited by Queen Wilhelmina. His onlyexcursions into international politics were contradictory in tone: onthe one hand sending a letter congratulating Queen Mary on NevilleChamberlain's success at the Munich Conference, and on the othersending a telegram congratulating Hitler on his capture of Paris inJune 1940. Interestingly, one of the last acts of the Britishgovernment during the Kaiser's lifetime was Churchill's private offerof political asylum should he care to seek refuge from the Nazis in

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May 1940. According to the Prime Minister, the ex-Emperor wouldnow be received 'with consideration and dignity' by the Britishgovernment should he choose to flee the Netherlands.93 The offerwas not taken up.

London School of Economics and University of Utrecht

N O T E S

The authors are grateful for the support of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research(NWO) for their research.

1. For Dutch foreign policy during the years preceding the First World War, see thefollowing: C. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899-1919). Eerste Deel: HetVoorspel (1899-1914) (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1971); A. Vandenbosch,Dutch Foreign Policy since ISIS. A Study in Small Power Politics (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1959); and D. Hellema, Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek (Utrecht: HetSpectrum, 1995).

2. Literature on the Netherlands during the First World War includes C. Smit, Nederlandin de Eerste Wereldoorlog, 1899-1919 3 vols. (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff,1971-73); M. Frey, 'Trade, Ships and the Neutrality of the Netherlands in the FirstWorld War', International History Review, Vol.19, No.3 (Aug. 1997), pp.541-62; andon Anglo-Dutch relations during the war, H. Pruntel, 'Bereiken wat mogelijk is.Besluitvorming in de Brits-Nederlandse Betrekkingen, 1914-1916' (unpublisheddissertation, University of Nijmegen, 1994).

3. Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815, pp.125-6.4. De Marees van Swinderen-Van Karnebeek, 15 Nov. 1918, in C. Smit (ed.), Bescheiden

Betreffende de Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland, 1848-1919, Derde Periode1899-1919, Vijfde Deel 1917-1919, Tweede Stuk (hereafter Bescheiden) (The Hague,Nijhoff, 1964), p.744; De Stuers-Van Karnebeek, 25 Nov. 1918, ibid., p.759.

5. There is quite a division of opinion on this issue. Briefly, the following historians tendto dismiss the notion of a conspiracy to invite the Kaiser to the Netherlands: S. Marks,Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p.75, and '"My Name is Ozymandias": TheKaiser in Exile', Central European History, Vol.16, No.2 (June 1983), pp.122-70; J.F.Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminalsof the First World War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), p.66; R. ter Sluis, DeKeizer-Quaestie. Nederland en de vlucht van Wilhelm II, november 1918-maart 1920(Doom: Foundation Simon Westdijk, 1996), pp.51-73; whilst the following give creditto the existence of some sort of conspiracy: H.J. Scheffer, November 1918: Journaalvan een Revolutie die niet Doorging (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984),pp.60-63; Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899-1919). Derde deel:1917-1919, pp.131-3; M. Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times (Boston: HoughtonMifflin & Co., 1964), p.413; W Gutsche, Ein Kaiser im Exil: Der Letzte DeutscheKaiser Wilhelm II in Holland; Ein Kritische Biographie (Marburg: Willibald Hitzeroth,1991), pp.24-6. Vandenbosch, Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815, pp. 135-6 sitssquarely on the fence.

6. The newspaper, Het Handelsblad, published an interview with Van Heutsz about histrip to Belgium on 12 November, in which he admitted to having visited Brussels (TerSluis, De 'Keizer-Quaestie', p.61).

7. Van Vollenhoven-Van Karnebeek, 9 Nov. 1918, Bescheiden, pp.728-9.

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8. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereld-oorlog (1899-1919) Derde Dee!: 1917-1919,p.132; Scheffer, November 1918, p.275.

9. Gutsche, Ein Kaiser im Exil, p.24.10. Scheffer, November 1918, p.274.11. Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 1918-1919, 10 Dec. 1918, p.658.12. Scheffer, November 1918, p.272. Scheffer bases his comments on the memoirs of

Friedrich Rosen, Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben (Wiesbaden: Friedrich Berlin,1959). The Bentinck castle was located at Amerongen in the Province of Utrecht.

13. Scheffer, November 1918, pp.62-3. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog, Derdedeel: 1917-1919, p.129. Both authors make use of the diaries of Secretary-GeneralKan.

14. Scheffer, November 1918, pp.273-5. Statements by van Dijl and other officers, andRuys' comment in: ARA, Archief van de Raad van Ministers 1823-1972, inv. nr. 148,Stukken over den komst van den ex-keizer in Nederland.

15. Marks, 'My Name is Ozymandias', p.127, puts a very different gloss on this. She arguesthat 'any sensible government would have preferred to avoid the complications andhostility caused by Wilhelm's arrival'. However, governments do not always act on arealistic assessment of the national interest, but sometimes on the basis of thepredilections and prejudices of powerful individuals inside and outside their ranks.

16. The debate about Lloyd George's role in shaping the peace is nicely summarised, albeitsympathetically, in A. Lentin, 'Several Types of Ambiguity: Lloyd George at the ParisPeace Conference', Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.6, No.l (March 1995), pp.223-51.

17. A. Lentin, Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: An Essay in thePre-History of Appeasement (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), p.25; A.Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (London: Macmillan,1991), p.125.

18. Imperial War Cabinet, Meetings Nos, 37 and 39, 20 and 28 Nov. 1918, PROCAB23/43. Lloyd George claimed in his memoirs that the topic was raised at Curzon'sinitiative (D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol.1 (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1939), pp.54-66). Although Curzon opened the debate in Cabinet,Lloyd George's own contributions showed him to be the greatest enthusiast present fora trial (D.A. Foltz, 'The War Crimes Issue at the Paris Peace Conference', unpublishedPh.D. dissertation, American University, 1978, p.307).

19. Imperial War cabinet, Meeting No.37, 20 Nov. 1918 PRO CAB23/43.20. Ibid.21. Imperial War Cabinet, Meeting No.39, 28 Nov. 1918, ibid. For F.E. Smith's role over

the Kaiser's trial see J. Campbell, F.E. Smith: First Earl of Birkenhead (London:Jonathan Cape, 1983), pp.449-51.

22. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp.5-6.23. Article 227, Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919:

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern,formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international moralityand the sanctity of treaties.

A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him theguarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, oneappointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America,Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of internationalpolicy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of internationalundertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix thepunishment which it considers should be imposed.

The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government ofthe Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he maybe put on trial.

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(Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, p.177).24. Van Karnebeek diary, 3 Dec. 1918, Bescheiden, pp.772-3. The debate in the

Netherlands over the fate of the Kaiser is summarized in M. Wester, "Hang the Kaiser':Nederland en de uitlevering van Wilhelm II', Skript, Vol.19, No.2 (1997), pp.107-17.

25. Robertson (The Hague)-Curzon, 1 July 1919, E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds.),Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 [DBFP], First Series, Vol.5, 1919(London: HMSO, 1954), p.10.

26. Scheffer, November 1918, passim.27. Smit, Nederland in de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899-1919). Derde deel: 1917-1919,

p.136.28. De Marees van Swinderen-Van Karnebeek, 15 Nov 1918, Bescheiden, p.744.29. De Stuers-Van Karnebeek, 20 Nov. 1918, Bescheiden, p.749.30. Van Lynden van Sandenburg-Van Karnebeek, 28 Nov 1918, Bescheiden, p.764.31. ARA, BZ, Kabinet en protocol, 2.05.18, inv. nr. 174, Report by Struycken, Loder and

Bles, 8 Dec 1918.32. ARA, Archief van de Raad van Ministers, 1823-1972, 2.02.05, inv.no.138, notulen

ministerraad, 16 Dec 1918.33. J.P. Gribling, P.J.M. Aalberse 1871-1948 (Utrecht: De Lanteern, 1961), p.331. Gribling

bases his comments on the diary of Minister Aalberse.34. Graham-Townley, 30 Nov. 1918, in C. Smit (ed.), Bescheiden betreffende de

Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland, 1848-1919, derde periode 1899-1919, achtstedeel, buitenlandse bronnen, 1917-1919, eerste stuk (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973),p.629.

35. Gribling, P.J.M. Aalberse, pp.331-2.36. ARA, Archief van de Raad van Ministers, 1923-1972, inv. nr. 138, notulen

ministerraad, 6 Dec. 1918.37. ARA, Archief van de Raad van Ministers, 1823-1972, inv. nr. 138, notulen

ministerraad, 7 Dec. 1918.38. Gutsche, Em Kaiser im Exil, pp.36-8.39. Heldring diaries, 9 Dec. 1918, Bescheiden, p.782.40. De Telegraaf, 10 Dec. 1918.41. Handelingen derTweede Kamer, 1918-1919, 10 Dec. 1918, p.659.42. De Marees van Swinderen-Van Karnebeek, 17 Dec. 1918 and 18 Dec. 1918,

Bescheiden, pp.806, 808-9.43. A. Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace

Conference, 1919 (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986), pp.213-16; S.P. Tillman,Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1961), pp.311-14.

44. Ter Sluis, De 'Keizer-quaestie', pp.150-51.45. E. Heldring, Herinneringen en dagboek (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1971), p.340.46. Ter Sluis, De 'keizer-quaestie', pp.157-8. Van Karnebeek-Van Sandenburg, Archives of

the Province of Utrecht, Archief van Lynden van Sandenburg, inv. nr. 200, De Duitseex-keizer.

47. Ter Sluis, 'De Keizer-quaestie', p. 160.48. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp.100-101.49. Balfour-Townley, 1 July 1919, DBFP, First Series, Vol.5, pp.8-9.50. Gribling, P.J.M. Aalberse, p.333.51. Van Lynden van Sandenburg-Van Karnebeek, 5 July 1919, in J. Woltring (ed.),

Documenten Betreffende de Buitenlandsche Politiek van Nederland, 1919-1945,Periode A 1919-1930, Deel I Juli 1919-Juli 1920 (hereafter Documenten) (The Hague:Nijhoff, 1976), pp.15-17.

52. Curzon-Balfour, 9 July 1919, DBFP, First Series, Vol.5, p.22. See also Curzon's reportof a conversation with van Swinderen, Curzon-Robertson, 17 July 1919, ibid.,pp.35-9.

53. De Marees van Swinderen-Van Karnebeek, 31 July 1919, Documenten, p.69.

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54. Curzon-Robertson (The Hague), 17 July 1919, DBF?, 1919-1939, First Series, Vol.5,1919, pp.35-9. Graham was careful to stick to Curzon's version of what transpired inhis annual report for 1919. PRO FO371/3848, Graham-Curzon, Netherlands, AnnualReport, 1919, p.5.

55. Curzon-Lloyd George, 7 July 1919, F/12/1/21, Lloyd George-Curzon, 8 July 1919,F/12/1/22, and Curzon-Lloyd George, 9 July 1919, F/12/1/23, Lloyd George Papers,House of Lords Record Office.

56. Robertson-Curzon, 1 Aug. 1919, DBFP, First Series, Vol.5, 1919, p.83.57. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, pp.104-5, goes further and suggests that from August

1919 onwards no Allied Government seriously intended to try the Kaiser.58. Loudon-Van Karnebeek, 16 Jan. 1920, Documenten, p.387.59. Loudon-Van Karnebeek, 19 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.389.60. Michiels van Verduynen-Van Karnebeek, 19 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.389.61. Van Karnebeek-Clemenceau, 21 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.392.62. Graham-Curzon, undated Jan. 1920, F/57/3/8, Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords

Record Office.63. Notes 8 and 9, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, p.720.64. Graham-Curzon, 30 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.622; also, Graham-Curzon, 20 March 1920,

ibid., p.720.65. Graham-Curzon, 20 March 1920, ibid., p.720.66. Graham-Curzon, 30 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.623.67. Van Karnebeek, diary, 29 Jan. 1920, Documenten, p.417.68. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, p.108.69. Hardinge-Graham, 28 Jan. 1920, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, p.620; Hardinge-Graham,

31 Jan. 1920, ibid., p.624.70. 'Refusal of the Netherlands Government to Surrender the Ex-Kaiser: Possible

Reprisals', undated, ibid., pp.628-30.71. Graham-Curzon, 1 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.627-8.72. Graham-Curzon, 4 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.646-9; Van Karnebeek, diary, 2 Feb. 1920,

Documenten, pp.423-5.73. Van Karnebeek-De Beaufort (Washington D.C.), 5 Feb. 1920, Documenten, pp.433-4;

Van Karnebeek-Loudon (Paris), 5 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.436-7.74. Record of the Council of Ministers, 5 Feb. 1920, ibid., p.433.75. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, p.109.76. Graham-Curzon, 6 Feb. 1920, n.1, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, pp.652-3.77. Graham-Curzon, 6 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.662-3; and Graham-Curzon, 7 Feb. 1920,

ibid., p.671; Van Karnebeek, diary, 6 Feb. 1920, Documenten, pp.436-7; 7 Feb. 1920,ibid., p.443.

78. Graham-Curzon, 16 Feb. 1920, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, pp.682-4.79. Graham-Curzon, 23 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.685-6. Also, Graham-Curzon, 9 March

1920, ibid., p.705.80. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg, p.110.81. Curzon-Graham, 25 Feb. 1920, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, p.687.82. Graham-Curzon, 26 Feb. 1920, ibid., First Series, Vol.9, p.689; and Graham-Curzon,

27 Feb. 1920, ibid., pp.690-91.83. Graham-Curzon, 6 March 1920, ibid., p.698.84. Graham-Curzon, 8 March 1920 and 9 March 1920, ibid., pp.700-701.85. Note 3, Graham-Curzon, 9 March 1920, ibid., p.701.86. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of

Penshurst (London: John Murray, 1947), p.248.87. Curzon-Graham, 14 March 1920, and Graham-Curzon, 15 March 1920, DBFP, First

Series, Vol.9, pp.711-12.88. Graham-Curzon, 12 March 1920, annotation by Curzon, 16 March 1920, n.3, ibid.,

p.710.89. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of

Penshurst, pp.242-4; R.M. Warman, 'The Erosion of Foreign Office Influence in the

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Making of Foreign Policy, 1916-1918', The Historical Journal, Vol.15, No.l (1972),p.156.

90. Graham-Curzon, 20 March 1920, DBFP, First Series, Vol.9, pp.718-26; Curzonminute, n.17, p.726.

91. B. Moore, '"The Posture of an Ostrich"? Dutch Foreign Policy on the Eve of theSecond World War', Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.3, No.3 (Nov. 1992), pp.468-93;and M. de Kaiser, 'Dutch Neutrality in the Thirties: Voluntary or Imposed', in L.E.Roulet (ed.), Les Etats Neutres Européens et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Neuchâtel:Editions de la Baconniere, 1985), pp.177-94, elaborate on the influences governingDutch foreign policy during these years.

92. For Wilhelmina's role see for example: Graham-Curzon, 20 March 1920, DBFP, FirstSeries, Vol.9, pp.723-4; Graham-Curzon, 23 Feb. 1920, ibid., p.685;Graham-Curzon, 9 March 1920, ibid., p.705.

93. Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times, p.419.

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